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ISI DOCUMENTATION CENTRE:
-x-Post Bos: 4628,
24,B enson Ro ad,

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CHINA

TODAY

. NEW POLITICAL ORIENTATION

VOLUME

I I

. EDUCATION AND CULTURE
. FOREIGN POLICY

. INDIA AND CHINA IN COMPARISON

III. SECTION g

1. SOCIALISM

NEW POLITICAL ORIENTATION

THEORY AND PRACTICE

Page

156

A framework of reference
Source = Beijing Review, August H^/Sl

2. REFORMING THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE ;
An abridged translation of the third part of an article
by Feng Wenbin, Vice-President of Party School under the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Source = Beijing Review, Jan 26/81 p.17 to 20

162

3. THE CAUSES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
Some critical reflections on the Cultural Revolution
and the ’’mistakes” of Mao Zedong.
Source = Beijing Review, Sept,14/81 pp. 15-18
4. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY1
An official view on the cultural revolution or what
the present leadership thinks about it
Source =Beijing Review, Dec 7/81 pp- 17-20

167

IV SECTION 4

172

EDUCATION, YOUTH? CULTURE

1. ON THE QUESTION OF INTELLECTUAL
A new attitude of the present leadership towards the
intellectuals and the role they haV© to play in
the progress of society.

177

Source =Beijing Review, Feb.16/81
2. CHINAS YOUTH I BUILDERS OF SOCIALIST MODERNIZATION

181

An abridged translation of a speecfc.to the Youth of Beijing
by Deng Liqun, Director of the Research Office of the
Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party
Source =Beijing Review., July •27/81 p.18-20
185
CHINA*S YOUTH - AN OPINION POLL
An opinion survey among the present youth of China
Beijing Review, July 27/81 pp.21*-22
Source
4. THIS YOUNG GENERATION
What should one think of Youth ?
Source =Beijing Review, April 20/81 p.3
REGULATION ON ACADEMIC DEGREES
Going back to former regulations
Source = Beijing Review, Jan 5/31 p< 9U’1O

18?

189

6.

WORKER EDUCATION IN CHINA.
General setting
Source = Beijing Review, Oct. 12/81, p.22
7. A WORKER UNIVERSITY
A case study of how a worker university is functionning
in todya's China.
Source _ Beijing Review Oct. 12/81 p.23
8. CHINA'SBURGEONING TV
Its goalP, its programs
Source =Bcijing Review, March 9/ 81 p.21-26
9. TELEVISION UNIVERSITY
Salient features of China's Television University
Source =Beijing Review, March 10/81 pp.28-2.8
10. EDUCAT ION IN CHINA
Technology in command or politics in command
An analytical articlej on education in today's China
By Lalpat Rai
Source = China Report, Sept.-Oct./83

V.

SECTION 5

2.90

191

193

199
201

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

1. LANDMARKS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS (Up to 1970)
An historical survey
Source
King Co Chen, ('Editore) : China And
the Three Wolrds (The MacMillna
Press, 1979) p. 8 to 31 (Edited and
abridged).

211

2. THE CHIP^SE UNDERSTViND OF THE WORLD SITUATION
21?
The^theory of the three worlds as understood by the
present leadership.
Source Poking Review, Nov 4/77*Article reproduced
in "China and the Three Worlds" (King.C.Chen
Editore, MacMillan 1977) pp. 99 to 126.
(Abridged and Edited)
3. CHINA BELONGS FOR EVER TO THE THIRD WORLD
Oppositon to Hegemonism and support to the
Third World,
Source = Peking Review, Sept 28/81
VI. SECTION

6

222

CHINA AND INDIA IN COMPARISON

1. ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN INDIA A-ND CHINA
An appraisal by the World Bank
Source = India Today, Nov.30/83, pp.110-115
2. CHANNELIZATION OF YOUTH ENERGIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN INDIA ANDIN CHINA~

223

229

Comparative study of the mobilisation of Youth for
Development Programmes in both countries. History,
Analysis.
Source = China Report, Jan.-Feb. 83
pp. 21-33.
3. THE DIALECTICS OF INDIAN AND CHINESE DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGIES
’

An analytical and comparative study of the Indian
and Chinese models of development.
Source = Bjorn Hettne i Self-reliance versus
Modernization-The Dialectics of Indian
and Chinese Development Strategies,
in " India-China Comparative Research,
Edited by Erik Baark & Jon Sigurdson
(Curzon Press, 1981) pp. 20-57
(Abridged and Edited).

241

i

Page

CHINA’S MOCERNIZATION AND
THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE

CONCLUDING ARTICLE

265

An historical survey that
concludes our documentary
file.
Source = China Report, MarchApril /83,
NEW PLAN DEVELOPMENT
PROSPECTS

APPENDIX

latest statistics.

Some

Source = The Economic Times
June 1983

Map of China

Volume I

P.- 36C

Map of China

Volume II

p. 282

Humour in China (Cartoons) VolImportant

II

P- 176, 22^

Tables

1. Volume 1

Output of major farm products (1982)

p. 70,71

Output of major industrial products
(1982)

P* 72,73

Shanghai's basic statistics (1980)
Shanghai's output of major industrial
items ( 1980)

P. 97
P* 98

II. Volume 2

India and China, comparative
statistics

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&

p. 228

283

SECTION 3 = NEW POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Politics occupy a key position in the process of
transformation of any society. How is power exercised
and in favour of of which categories of the population
are questions on the response to which depends the
nature of a social system. China today, within the broad
framework of Socialism is redifining its political
institutions. The documents in this section unveil
some of the new thrusts of the new leadership in the
political field.

CONTENTS

Page

1, SOCIALISM Z THEORY AND PRACTICE
A theoretical framework of reference
Task which the future needs to answer -

156

2. REFORMING THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE
An abridged translation of the third part of an
article by Feng Wenbin, Vice-President of Party
School under the Central Committee of the Commu­
nist Party of China.

162

3. THE CHASES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
The cultural revolution is subjected to a
critical assessment by the present Chinese
leadership. What could have led to the Cul­
tural Revolution’s excesses ? Where have been
the mistakes ? What have been the mistakes of
Mao Zedong according to the new leadership ?

167

4. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
BURE AUG RACY"
An official view of the cultural revolution or
what the present leadership thinks about it.

’’Although socialist practice over the last few decades has
differed in very distinc ways from Marx’s theory of socia.
lism the two are not completely different....We need a fairly
historical period to develop a socialist and planned commo­
dity economy in order to achieve highly developed, socia­
lised and modernized eocial productive forces.This is a task
which history has thrust upon the proletariat m those
economically underdeveloped countries where a socialist
system has been established" ( Lin Z1I1, BeiQing Review
August 24, 19&1^

172

Cfor^priv-ate
SOCIALISM

THEORY AM PRACTICE

- Lin Zili
Marked differences exist between socialism as prac­
tised zn this century and Marx's theory of socialism
Th generaj.'trend is to develop socialism in line
P^tlC+U1+ar c°u.ntry's actual conditions, espe-y the state of its social productive forces."
The PT'°blens'°f m°tive force and balance in socialist
economies can be solved by integrating the exchanae d
. equal amounts of labour with the exchange of equal
thaT^hrm^iV129 re9ulation through plannina with
triat through the market*

To give full scope to the develo pment of a socialist
commodity economy in order to achieve a highly deveb fsTs3 f?ClalZSe<i Product1-on arui provide the material
bsoeiaifT+ commu:ni:sm ~ this is a road feasible for
socialist countries with fairly backward economies.

: A Tortuous Road
Marx and Engels turned socialism into a scientific ideological system and
tilling ut™ianUrinVP th®' e^erience of the workers' movement and cri-

socialism h
so ansm

™
w ?
codeia. It is an indisputable fact
on the whole, being practised.

a
giving
that

Of course, .some
-- countries, including China itself, have travelled along a
tortuous road in their
socialist construction. But socialism is still
advancing in these
In''th«C™nh’leS'
thGy are CarryinS out explorations in
the process. ; ?le ^‘temporary capitalist world, Marxists, Communists
and other personages who have
have been striving to find ..3 concerned themselves with social progress
roa^ towards socialism taking :into consideration different aspects
oi the matter and their own national conditions.

goSigjziggi^iff grgnce in Theory and. Practise

ohi“> “•«

»“

lism
*’
^J;erellce exisus between Marx’s theory of sociato China 1^3- w
kS prac b:’-Se^ during the 20th century. During his visit
Communist Party^talked
General Secretary of the Spanish
are shared bv o^pS > w
hlS observations about socialism which
are shared by others of his generation: "A number of countries have buiit

(157)
socialism for decades. Socialism, however, has turned out to be
more complex tnan our generation expected. We had thought that c a great deal
workers ) Party assumed power and applied the principle 'to eachonce ( a

be Xr^sWhaCsTt 30 °n+:nd bUild C0“ffi

o±ea.. inis has not .peen-the case in practice.”

Js.£x__and>_Engels a

a11 the

a according
---J would

Only__made_a_Theoretical_SJcatement__about its Essence

prescribed in3the* Marxist theory "ofS0C^alist ec°nomic formation
happened.-Marx and En,. els did not and covS^ T
el^cidate W ^is has
a future communist society. They only made o°
a conci’ste model of
its essence. In the works of MaJx and EnSls th
statemen1: about
communism were used interchangeobiv mb b
■
't/rms of socialism and
ged was to be based on social?
^G,S0Clallsm (communism) they envisabo socialized and the resources comonw
'
3ocialisjalabour would
one single economic entity, "a federation of’ society would in fact be
social labour would be directly di^r.h? a ? ? Persons." The fruits of
would be necessary. Socialized nmd
9
° al-« No. commodities or money
controlled and regulated noonrd? ■ aCl'lon would be entirely and directly
the zig-zags resulting fom the exch^nX^f1* V
haVe t0 S° throu®h
market economy or competition
b
° it, vadues’ an(^ there would be no
munist economic formXi a° cone
baSiC oaa^^eristics of comwritings, Marx distXiihed
In some of his
communism. He stated thot th S
thG preliminary and advanced stages of
stage was the excXe of p
ch^cteristic of the preliminary the exchange of
according to his needs." Late-r 7 i^b0^111®
liS ab^-Li'ty an<i bo each
the social economic relationship p®op?"e held that Socialism consisted only of
had envisaged for the first sta'o iifC WaS °UiltT ellbirely on the model Marx
that things are not so sSnl! T
However, practice has proved
those countries which have been 7 19 .mUcil e2Perience has been gained by

».aeratmain(. t» £ rtX" «««“
theoxy of

11» »ur

SXXX®
pointed out that Marx attached great
...ct importance to the material '
socialism < 9 Gonnanls't social economic formation,

----- * it is well known that
appearance of the^heories of^stor^11!030^7 int° i-vS science because of the
historical
According to these theories of mm
- rlCal materialism
laa'fcerialism and surplus value**,
,
communism
is the
productive forces which cannot ™ absorbed
tbv inevitable outcome of social
argued that communism was a more aXX
7 C^tallsm- ^rx and Engels
was a more
and would replace capitalism
<f+ advanced
ancod social
social formation than capitalism
decline and fan! Capitallsra
er it had fully developed and begun to
-—i aft
after

The exchange of equal amounts of labour
the exchange between a certain
amount of labour in one form and the
same amount of labour in another.
** Surplus value ■-the value created by wage workers during their surplus
labour hours and
-d usurped by capitalists without remunerftSnt
?

(153)
Lenin t Prolet^an_RevoMon_woul£_Succee£first_in Countries

with
——s Developed. Economies

countries with advanced productive forces^but ij

thos

deVedoped capitalist

vSo:rdor?i:tzx:elc2:ely ha“producti- ^-srieS ti:ss
practice°started?n^ry* “

succeed first in countri’esSitSlosSdJvel^ proletai''dan revolution would
all the countries (including China)
eooilom::-es*
the beginning,
to build more or loss the !ind of i
\ h
successful revolutions tried
for the first stage of communism. China i^U^Td^1^10113
hQd ^visaged
people which was actually a socialist
,
ownership of the whole
the state ownership, an attennf
m st7te ownership. For the economy of
which linitod oomnodirelations8
\dOpt a hisllly Panned system
positive role market OOchLg±
W£S attaChcd to the
impossible to altogether ZSh ™J ?
“ rcali^ it was
role of value were very limited This i'1 b*38 and money» their role and the
the economic interests between‘dSfe-ent nroduc
h
^le to reflect
■mg and calculating tool. Such bein" the on
®^s ^ut served as an accounPlav the role of regulating social production!’
°0Uld hardly
?2£?±d_to_Focus_on_.the_Stato_of_its_Social_Productivo Forces

cularly in the^ural elonomy1" a°- 1^°
col-Lective ownership, parti­
collective ownership was •'-(/th
Wds commonly believed that the closer
----- .j people the better,
10 same way as the economy owned by theeconomy
whole was, in most cases,
------- 1 people.

At die same time
economy (with findmdSl^wnS^r611 attenti011 t0 th3 Private sector of the
t couJd not X iJ^ a ^Oessa^ ^pplement to the socialist
economy, and it i
not play xts positive role as fully as it should have
done.

Practice in almost all the
conditions make it
dity relations
fflechanisms r~:
1 first
n'
- lqj- f that is,,
,‘ thee kind qi economic relations Marx envi
saged for the
produce poor results.svage of comunism. To attempt the impossible would only
--

.

.

.

,

■

'

■

■

-

■

■

■

-

■

-

,

absence of stro^^tivatiojTf^ P^lonced . pe Perplexing problems of an J

the difficulty of maintaini-np- .
development. Their relations of

° ono®lc development, a lack of enthusiasm,
fre1U3nt disproportions in economic

iivo forces. With tg iniensifleSSrorth

t0 the Co­

political life and other sXr^ h
? S 3-ontradiction, the social and
seek a social form wh ch win be ter
^fected. People are forced to
forces. It is characterisSeV
, the dQVol°^i of the productive
that, in the last few dbcSe- economicpracUce
socialism
practically every socialist count
T ;<9f01‘os have-been instituted in
ry socialist country. Such economic reforms, in whatever

('161)
Rant III

MARX 'S THEORY OF SG0IALISM

REMAINS TO BE VERIFIED

Aithough there are points in common between socialism as practised in our era
and the. first stage of communism as envisaged by Marx, we should not overlook
their differences. What Marx envisaged belongs to the social economic form of
communism which is to be- established on the basis of fully developed social -o-<
Pi’o^ctive forces resulting from a highly developed commodity econlmy! No ^0^
social economic form exists in the world today. Whether an edonomefn^
m the future fully conform to what Marx envisaged for the first “stare'of 11
communism remains to ber verified by practice.
Socialism as practised in our era is a social economic system which differs
of nrS r CapTtalls“ thou®h the tw° a*s built on roughly .the same level
of productive forces. Mankind will ultimately adopt com uni. To materZalile
c~ism,an appropriate material prerequisite must be cre^thin this res2
p
, there, are apparently two different roads. The first one requires that
the material oasis for communism is built by fully developing the cnnihiiit
IlisdSteISOmtalld liS
S0Cializing Production. The other road
1 th material foundation for commuaims can also be built on highly
socialized production deriving from the full development of the socialist 7
ha™OfirstiMra?‘dSO'm°+lmdGrdeVG1OPed countries
which f
°r historical
countries which
for
historical reasons
C.V0 first achieved victorious revolutions
under
the
leadership
revolutions under the leadership of
of the
the pro­
letariat have taken the second road.
P
: ?ask which theFuture Needs to Answer

hi-hlvSLve!yntHke this/°ad ? Because in the course of human history, the
firci cnnnnt h
co“?°dity.economy is an inevitable stage. The productive
lotted T,^i *
highly socialized until the commodity economy is fully devenomvd\J^la! the “odlt7 economy could grow only out of the natural ecofrom’a fnlTi, d°C1T'1
w?tllout co»bdities and currencies can develop only
ecoromv will ™t
^odity economy. But the highly developed commodity
economy will not necessarily bc a capitalist economy. The period of highly
developed commodity economy cannot be averted, but the period of capitalism

ea». w io not folio,, tho rood of aor.l„plns k plamsd sciolist o XS J

economy. Prom an economic point of view, such a road is socialist, and
nothing’ else.
r

In short, WQ need a fairly long historical period to develops a socialist and
planned commodity economy in order to achieve highly developed socialise?
thrust upo^theSnro?tPr°drtiV+ f°rCCS’ ThiS is a ^sk whick h^tory lias "
ruse upon the proletariat m tnose economically underdeveloped countries
where a socialist system has been established.

sources Beijing Review, no. 34
August 24, 1981

ISI documentation centre,

(private circulation only)

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(162)
REFORMING THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

This is an abridged translation of the
third part of a long article by Feng Wenbin
Vice-president of Party School under the
Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China. It first appeared in Renmin
flibao" under the heading "On Questions of
Socialist Democracy. "
SOCIALIST democracy in China is deficient, and moreover, has
long been trampled underfoot. Of the many different contributing
factors invoiced, the principal one arises from problems in its structure.
In order to fully bring out the superiority of socialism, the political
structure must be reforned and put on a sounder basis.
This great endeavour, crucial to the future and destiny of our
country, denands that the roforns be carried out in a planned, nentodical way.

411 power belongs to the people, The people are the masters of
the- country, the masters of our society.
11 affairs of the state and
society are to be run by the people, who have the supreme authority to
govern the country and direct the multifarious affairs of the society.
This is the basic point of departure for our curfent reforms in the
political structure and for developing and improving our socialist
denocrhtic institutions.
To put the institutions of socialist democracy on a sounder basis,
vie must, at present, work for a correct solution of problems in the
following six spheres:

ONE, REVAMP fg-IE INSTITUTIONS OF .TEE PEOPLED CONGRESS.
In China, the organ of power through which the people govern the
country is the National People’s Congress and the local people’s con­
gresses at various levels; all state affairs of importance are to be
decided on by the people’s congress.
11 leading members of.the
executive organs of the state are either elected or appointed by the
people’s congress, are subject to its supervision and nay be removed
from office by it. The people’s congresses at various levels are
elected by the people and the electoral units have the right to super­
vise the deputies they elect and replace then at any tine as prescribed
by law.

W

e
S
w

6
€

The Chinese Constitution explicitly provides for all those functions and powers, In real life, however, we have failed to carry them
out to the letter. Some stipulations of the present Constitution are
no longer applicable to the new situation, many are imperfect, or
unclear, and therefore need revision. In fact, we have not yet seen
to it that the entire populace fully enjoy their democratic rightsthey have not really been able to exercise their power of governing
the state or the.various enterprises and undertakings, and wo lack
specific procedures for applying the‘principles of socialist democracy.
This is demonstrated by the fact that democracy more often than not
exists in forn only, while in reality a few people only ton often
have all the say. People’s deputies and leading officials of govern­
ment organizations are only nominally elected, while actually, voters
cannot as yet fully have their choice tlircugh elections At present,
only deputies below the county level are directly elected. In
reality, the people at large are not yet in a position to supervisethe deputies and loaders they elect, to say nothing of exorcising the
right to remove them from office when necessary. Our electoral
system still leaves much to bo desired. For example, specific
provisions are lacking to ensure that people’s deputies moot their
constituents at regular intervals, solicit and reflect their opinions,
and report their work to them.

C 165)

3MP.“0X°

Button

conditiom arc so conplox that it is
18 80 lare° and the
cone: f ron ’-ofe tho c
t
lo^i^’-J haVe the initiative
source alone/1’ t-? so.<+rtr,K.^""r
l°Gal authorities than fron nr>«
Eighth Party Congress”said:" in^orte to^’
resolution of the
central' state
'
and ai the upper
the
to give full, vride play to th« in-'t-generally, and in order
organs, of local ■ andiower gradest t6"the Z
of all state
of socialist construction in our countrv
2f the genera1' upsurge
admnistratiye functions and -Zers^S ’kkk
proi,erly readjust
organs., and. between' tl-o birho” anri i
' ek the CGntral and local state
Political report to the Ing^oss lontiX, 0Cal kate oreans« In the ’
ensure, for cntGrpriS0S proper anoint 5 nJaS
° °f the nOed to
ncntat.ion of regional nation'-1 m+“
“Utonony, to ensure the inplG~
quality.
autonony and bring about national
It is a pity that wo have fm’lnH

u-

in the hands of thp central“gevZranent uhfi00 lncr°asinely concentrated
power of national autonomy or the ml S
f°rt to eXpand the
on as dispersicnary, springing from ik.i 0k°rPr?sos had boon looked
to follow the lo.aclersh*’p ” Tn 1Q79
d- na-^1onalism and "refusing
tho 11 th p„;j.
“t?h: “ira P1=»”? S»S1O» rf
the oftasks of
ial. structure and granting more powe^
°f .reforming the managerautonomy t0
to thu^local
ntios and onterpris-.-s Woro deposed
thu local ^Co­
carrying then out have ?ick a,!
Erdminary experiments in
oi the managerial structure -in -T/T1kkCSUlts' But overall reform
S^SS^oiSn^a^SkSX^as?
economic, cultural and

_

J socialist

Tno major and most basic ri.o-ht^
arc biie rights to govern their countrvJue to labourers under socialisn
'-ultural. and. educational affairs. ’
, run enterprises and nanage
Wo
uust
not interpet the people'
nent^tlV10
as Sovc-mUOnt by
s
Sent the people enjoying the ri^lj oome people and under their govornsecurity.
c-nterpkso £ tbn ®u G t0
to oduc^tion and social
only when each cell .oves
— - -

>

—

The Old systen of factory

otriloti0”

rssuos m the unit; the con^sr k
* dls°^s and decide on major
ho replace, or to suggest J-W°th° . ?o^croncc should have the right
svratnvo personnel in the uidT kn h tih"r.au'!:110riV replace, adnini—
gradually introduce the r-o^iec ofk k
f°r their 5°bs’ and
certain level,
P—c.ice of electing factory loaders
up to a

In rural
'J wo
'
must like—wise give full c
to denocracy,
— •
scope.
labouring
and sot up the sVstc-’-.
o people their democratics :rights
'
comnune nenbei-s.’ k
, , Oi GiJ° ^c-ronce
—of —
representatives of the
in the countryside and ;t'is
to arouse the connune nenbcT’s'
enthusiasn fr-n production, if
Si
IG fU11 SCC^ t0 denoZeJ
nnc, in the absence of their
carry out successful socialist “ Ik J:Wil1 bp impossible to

<

f

uioii ln -the countryside.

r>
<?

(166)
FIVE, REFORM THE CyWi-LE. SYSTEM STEP _BY AW*
Civil services personnel in a socialist country should be the
people’s public servants. Some cadres and a few loading cadres, how­
ever, do not now behave like public servants, but rather like overlords.
Reforms of the listing cadre system are necessary if the masses are
truly to govern the country, if the leading personnel at all levels
are going to bo younger in age, if they are to acquire professional
skill and knowledge. If we do not try to solve problems through
institutional reforms, the idea that the people are masters of the
country remains empty talk. There should be a sot of rules to guide
personnel work in respect to promotion, employment, chcckupl examina­
tion, transfer, awards, selection, dismissal and retirement*
The existing electoral law in our country is mainly applicable
to the election of deputies to the people’s congress. These days in
some enterprises and undertakings, leaders are being elected on a
trial basis, but in most cases, they are still appointed by the higher
authority. Conditions permitting, the electoral system should be
extended to all fields, wherever it is essential, and it should
gradually replace the appointment system. In some government offices
and units, not all leading cadres are to be elected by the higher
authority; still thejr must be subject to the supervision of the masses,
who have a right to demand the replacement of cadres who are not on to
their jobs. With a general electoral system, it is possible to place
the right person in the right post so that every one can do his best
We must acknowledge and respect the people’s democratic rights, and
also have confidence that the people have the socialist consciousness
and ability to choose their leading cadres well. Every convenience
and facility must be provided to ensure that the people enjoy these
rights.

Besides an electoral system, there must also be a reliable system
for supervision and recall. ”No elective institution or representative
assembly,” said Lenin, "can bo regarded as being truly democratic and
really representative of the people’s will unless.the electors’ right to
recall those elected is accepted and exercised*” (Draft Decree on the
Right of Recall.) Our present Constitution and laws do have stipulations
on supervision and recall, but they are not acted on seriously because
wo lack concrete ways and measures to carry them out. It is necessary
to set up a system of elections, supervision and refall, effect an all
round reform of the cadre system, and have them legally institutional!—zed
This is a very important thing inperfecting the socialist democratic
system and a major organizational measure for giving full play to the
superiority of socialism.

SlXr PUT THE SOCIALIST LEG.1L SYSTEM ON A SOUNDER BASIS JJW WJCTARP
THE PEOPLE!S DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS,
Political democratization in our country should bo made a system.
A conpleto set of laws should be drawn up to have denocracy institution­
alized and made part of the law, which will see to it that the democra­
tic system is implemented• In the past, our cadres did not have a
strong concept of rule by law. This is related to our long-time emphasis
on rule by men ignoring rule by law, and also to the absence of traditions
of legality. For many years, someone’s say was law and power was law,
so that even the Constitution and laws in general became mere scraps
of paper and there was no safeguard for the people1srights•

Among the masses, there are people who know nothing about demo­
cratic order and who are not yet used to democratic procedures. They
have not yet thrown off the influence of anarchism taken on during
the ’’cultural revolution,” are obsessed by individualism, and often
violate the law, impairing the people’s interests and obstructing other
people’s exorcise of their democratic rights. This state of affairs
must not bo allowed to go on any longer. The people’s legitimate
rights must be safguafded and no one should be allowed to infringe
on them.
SOURCE? Beijing Review, No
January 26,f 1981, Pago no. 17to 20 &28.

(167)

THE

CAUSES OF THE

"CULTURAL REVOLUTION"
By

Zhu

Yuanshi

The Cultural Revolution is submitted to a critical assessment
by the present Chinese Leadership. What could have led to the
Cultural Revolution’s excesses ? Where have been the mistakes ?
At the level of practice or at the level of theory ? These questions
are being examined in the article taken from the Beijing Review
(September 14, 1981) and reproduced here.

MAO ZEDONG’S MISTAKES
In may 1966, Comrade Mao Zedong launched tho"cultural revolution"
which swept across the whole country. As a result of
his mistaken
estimation of China’s class situation and the political condition of
the Party and the state at that time, many long—tested, loyal revolu­
tionaries of the older generation and numbberous excellent leading
Party cadres suffered ruthless attacks. TTwo counter-revolutionary
’
cliques (Lin Biao’s and Jiang Qing’s) emerged during thej ”cultural
revolution." Taking advantage of Comrade Mao Zedong’s <errors,, they
committed many crimes unbeknownst to him, bringing disaster to the
country and the poeplc. The "cultural revolution" which he initiated,
became uncontrollable like an unbridled wild horse, -^ue to various
complex reasons, it was not possible to check this tumult during
comraoe Mao Zedong’s lifetme. Only after the downfall of the gang of
four in October 1976 and the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central
Committee of the Party,, in December 1978, did the Party and the state
enter a new historical period of development.

Then, can it be said thaj the "cultural revolution” was caused
only oy a mistake of Comrade ao Zedong? No, the coming into being
of each social phenomenon has‘its own dynamic. The main causes for the
emergence of the "cultural revolution" and its protraction for ten
years are:
1,

CAUSE.

.zedong/s mistake in leadership is the immediate
------------- - ----

After the basic completion of socialist transformation and as a
result of the implementation of the correct line, of the Party’s Eighth
National Congress (see page 19) in 1956 to concentrate efforts on
developing the productive forces, 1957 was one of the best years since
e founding of the People’s Republic interms of economic work* Unforunately^ Comrade Mao Zedong had become smug about the successes; ho
anci nanjr ocher leading comrades, both at the centre and in the locali­
ties, overestimated the role of man’s subjective will and wore impatient
or quick results. Thus the big leap forward (see page 19) and the
movement to establish rural people’s communes (sec pate 20) were initial
ted in 1958 without sufficient experience in large-scale socialist
ht nS+nUC^^C’n
of the basic law of economic development
o^rors-charaetcrized by excessive targets, the issuing of
aroiurary directives, boastfulness and the stirring up of a "communist
wine -spread throughout the country, causing serious setbacks to
socialist construction. From the end of 1958 through the early stage of
the LushanMeeting of the Political Bureau o£ the Party’s Central
Conm+.-fcon 111
in July 1959 Comrade Mao Zedong led the whole Party in enor.ca y recrij-^q errors which had already been recognized.

>

(168)

However, in the later part of the noeting, Conrade Pong Dehuai voiced
his objections to the ’’Left” errors of the big leap forward and Conrade
Mao Zedong decried this as an attack on the Party. He erred in initiating
criticisn of Conrade Peng Dehuai, which developed into a Party-wide
struggle against ’’Right opportunisn." As a result, not only were the
’’Left errors in the principles guiding econonic work not eradicated,
but they gradually infected the political, idoological and cultural
spheres.
Conrade Mao Zedong’s view of widening and absolutizing the class
struggle developed gradually. In 1959, ho said; ’’The struggle at
Lushan is a class struggle, a continuation of the lifo-and death
struggle between the two najor antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat, a struggle which has been going on in the socialist
revolution for the last 10 years.” In 19&2, he often expounded the ■giew
that in socialist society, ’’there is the struggle between the socialist
road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist
restoration.” In 1965, he put forward the concept of Partjr persons in
power talcing the capitalist road. Henceforth, the spearhead of struggle
was clearly directed against such persons in the Party.

In the May 16 Circular (see page 20), which narked the launching
of the ’’cultural revolution,” Conrade Mao Zedong serverly criticized
the so-called representatives of the bourgeoisie who had sneaked into
the Party, the government, the army and the cultural circles. It seemed
to hin that this was a najor natter which affected the future of the
Party and state and the destiny of the world revolution, a natter which
could not be left unresolved. Unfortunately, his analysis was like that
of a devoted doctor who has made an incorrect diagnosis and thus written
a wrong prescription.
Our Party concurred with every stop in the devolopnent of this
erroneous ’’Left” view point, regarded it as Conrade Mao Zedong’s now
creative theory in furthering Marxisn-Leninisn and propagated it widely
Thus with this ’’Leftist” thinking so deep-rooted, the launching of the
’’cultural revolution” was hard to resist«
-2^ IN ADDITION TO COMRADE W ZEDONG’S MISTAKE IN LE/J)ERSHIP, THERE
ARE COMPLED SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CAUSES UNDERLYING THE ’’CULTURAL
REVOLUTION. ”

1) The history of the international connunist novenent is not long
and that of the socialist countries even shorter, ^rnc of the laws govern­
ing the developnont of socialist society are relatively cle&r, but
nany others remain to be explored*

Marx and Engels only prophesied the coning of connunist sociotjr
and its initial stage. Apart fron the Paris Connunc which existed
for only 72 days, they had not seen or experienced socialism. There­
fore, their great ideal could only be a general concept which pointed
out the trend of scientific connunisn; it could not be very specific.
Lenin had nore experience. But those years just after the establishnent of the Soviet political power were chaotic; there was resistance
fron the bourgeoisie, adverse activities against the Soviet by the
kulaks and attacks by the donestic counter-revolutionary cliques like
Kolchak and Denikin and by 14 capitalist countries. In those years
the Soviet Union suffered fivil war, fanine and econonic difficulties.
Although Lenin had nuch understanding of socialist construction, there
was little tine and it was inpossible for hin to scientifically
sunnarize their experiences in large-scale socialist construction, In
his Theses on the Fundanental Tasks of the Second Congress of the
connunist International published in July 1920, Lenin stressed that
the class struggle against the bourgeoisie after the proletariat’s

r 169)
power was ’’most i * '

^iess.^
-- j resistance
the bourgeoisie would becone
10 tine! n of the Overthrown landlords and
more ffrenzied
the danger of restoration
he 2 oT!
JTied and that there —
but he also deemed
—
^1
the numerous small
duCers as the basis
-®ll ProThis thesis which Lenin
--- a put

PrtZ
? China's conditions
tho Smlet
at that tine was not appropriate r
for
conditions after 1957
n'F4*<mv»

laa basically been conpletedv

4 Oc r7

-u-u

Inheriting Lenin's behest

as
others in the internatlLl

when^socialist transfornation

But had a great influence
----- j on us.
'

‘ =“f’°s
rOed his °Pinions onto

question that each social
' ■1™lst.QOVei:leat and simplified the
light of its 0Wn concrete sJtua SS/8
deVeloP s°Pialism in .the •

warLd^iSrSaCrX^l^^it^1

of t—

in ci—dances

h—■ ideologically or in to™!’
W£1-S4.not adequately prepared,
either
■ o neC-born sCCiS^t
sdentific study, for the swift
advent of- the
wZ
s°ciall3t society and for nationwide socialist
construction
construction
Cnd^rS
0!06 in.Jandlln® extensive socialist
economic <
-1 sCciCliS sCCietv
XWlth
’h! Vari0US Politioal condealing
with Ji±e
tradiations in
’
to
!
1
soci
ety.
historical
„•
These
features of
c our
Party determined, to
familiar nethod7and CxpCCiLCC^^’i our habitual
hahitual falling back on the
and CXC
experiences
struggle used in Se
CCT of dy®e“SCa1^ turbulent class
the nL
years
of war. ’o
folic wed in solving
ContraSCk
7 T
* n° 10nger have been

solving new
the political, econonic,
econonic cultur!l
problens that cropped up in
the development of socialist so^1
°'fchei’ spheres in the c ourse of
social, polit cal eXaCs Cad Z
esPa°iaHy when some serious
scope of class struggle.
urre . As a result, we broadened the
5)

■

This subjective
^ni_. cmg and practice which was divorced from
reality seemed
-- to
-o have aa ’’theoretical basis
” in the writings of Marx,
Engels, 7Lenin and Stalin
because
--------?
certain
ideas.and
arguments in then
were misunderstood or dogmatically interpreted.

it was
exchange ofSequ!l’? anounts
that,e?ual riSht, which reflects the
amounts
of
lanour
bv-tion of the neons To!
0Ur.and is applicable to the distriright" as it was designated™^ ’1'°n
®0Clalist society, or "bourgeois
ed, and so the principles of ’ "to^nh shcuid be restricted and criticiznaterial interest should i
4. ?acil acc°rding to his work" and of

Mti,® of

is;

abstracted fron the econonit rthSt
/
e<lu'al
was
or forn the connon characteristics of
, t0 eaCh accordinS to his work,"
^alue, that is, exchange of
i
exchange of com aodities of equal
in the equal rights of the^wo
Of labour’ which Is embodied
any capitalist exploitative n , exchanfers- E<iual right does not have
connunist society did nCt intiud1,6’
3 idea °f the first stage of
system or any classes The“b!
Qoa;-‘od^y production, a monetary
to do with the ri.~ht of the bouC1"6601^ ^S^t" in his book has nothing
torn "bourgeois" here is St ZfT3-!
°ther -P^ter. The®
Tasks of the uroletaCinl CC n
/
°r™l meaning. In The
to socialisn, i.e.. to the sCCf Revolution, Lenin exdirectly only
and the disbtribtion of products1 °wne];?hlP of the neans of production
perfomod by Mch nadvdS
P’’ "to oooh dooorddny to hdj’.ori™ ha SI
tl“'t
r«nodple

neon, of pd-odootion are tho ordtsrtr?oXod^°’°erShl1’ °f
for socialisn.

(170)

Other passages that woro misunderstood or dogmatically interpreted
included: Small production will continue to engender capitalism and
the bourgeoisie daily and houly on a large scale oven after the basic
completion of socialist transformation; all ideological differences
inside the Party afe reflections of class struggle in society. All
this led us to erroneously regard the broadening of the scope of
class struggle as an action taken in defence of the purity of Marxism.
4) The chaotic international environment and the failure to
correctly understand tho new problems arising in the international
communist movement hindered us from correctly inderstanding the class
struggle. In dealing with the relations between China and the Soviet
Union and between the two Party’s, tho Soviet leaders headed by
Khrushchov deviated further and further from the Marxist-Leninist
principles. They regarded themselves as the paternal party, replaced
internationalism with big-nation chauvinism and hegemonism, and flag­
rantly tried to control China politically, economically and militarly
Having been rebuffed by Comrade Mao Zedong, Khrushchov flew into a rage
from shame and went even further. Tho Soviet loaders started a polemic
between China and the Soviet Union and turned the arguments between
the two countries. When wo were faced with difficulties resulting
from our errors in economic work and consecutive years of natural
disasters, the Soviet government perfidiously tore up contracts,
withdrew Soviet experts and forced us to pay back tho debts (debts
incurred mainly through purchasing Soviet arms during the movement
to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea). This caused enormous econo­
mic losses and intensified tho severity of our difficulties. All those
activities of the Soviet leaders forced us to wage a just struggle
against the big—nation chauvinism of tho Spvict Union. In those cir­
cumstances wo woro susceptible to Comrade Mao Zedong’s erroneous view­
point. In order to guard against a change of political colour of the
Party and the state, a campaign to prevent and combat revisionism
inside the country was launched. The error of broadening the scope of
class struggle spread stop by stop in our Party. It was difficult for
us to fully discuss many problems. Normal differences among comrades
inside the Party and small errors came to bo regarded as manifes­
tations of the class struggle inside tho Party, as matters of life and
death. This led to the thinking that there were those in the leading
core of our Party who like Khrushchov flaunted a red flag to oppose
the red flag, that there was a revisionist political lino inside the
Party and an organizational line which served this political line
and that there was a bourgeois headquarters in the Central Committee
and its agents in the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions.
Under such circumstances it seemed only logical that to solve this
serious nationwide question, it is not enough to just rely on normal
criticism and self-criticism inside the Party. So, Comrade Mao Zedong
used his prestige earned over long years to ignite a mass movement
by openly and fully mobilizing the broad masses from the bottom up.
This was
was in
in essence a violent struggle in which one class would over­
This
throw another. Ho even thought that this type of ’’revolution” would
have to be waged time and again.

5. The principles of collective leadership in the
political life of the Party and the state and of democratic
centralism were seriously weakened and even underminded? this
is another key reason why the "cultural revolution^ could be
launched by Comrade Mao Zedong single-handedly and last a
whole decade^
The social and historical causes include*
17? At the Eighth Nationa; Congress of tho Chinose Connunist
Party, the Party!s collective leadership and democratic centralism
wore underscored; and exaggeration of a single person’s role, deifi­
cation of the loaders and tho personality cult wore opposed. Mover—
theloss, tho relevant rules and regulations adopted at that time
failed to bo implemented9 Tho loading position of Comrade Mao Zedong
in the party Central Committee had been rocongnizod over since the
Zunyi mooting in 1955 • The continuous victories of the Chinese

(17^
rovolu-tion earned hin unparalled prestige, but with this cane excessive

Conrado
Zodo„e, „ M8 part
eonoaltod. h“»o
S confadcs as equals, and it becano harder to discuss
1 nakc decisions with hin in a democratic way. Such abnornality in
Partv'centr^ ?
G
first °f a11 > in the Political life of the
2° naLloadl2e Orean sr°w so serious that on the "cultural
Mai 7 h
IhC-JGrt? Central Committee was unable to restrain Conrade
Mao Zedong at all. Shortly after the "cultural revolution" began,
nlthods^IIl
t^Q Political Burcau expressed disagreenent with its
ethocs, only to be accused of whipping up the "February adverse current".
T 12t°r on’ the "cultural revolution group," set up the
p
a <decision of the Political Bureau ot the Party Central Committee as
dnnl
°rer+
ltS StandinG Conpolitical Bureau. With the Party's
C^2 LC C°n ralisn so crippled it is not surprising that no one could
prevent the cultural revolution" from running its course.

day by day.

^2,- LeadG^
luite an important role in the communist movement.
an inportant role in the cormunist novenent.
2s d the fuulure to handle
the
‘
_Lj relationship between the Party
in'thl hn1I+der Cj^ectiy, there occurred certain grievous deviations
the history of the international communist movement. Conrade Stalin,
! ^h°n hlS station was at its pinnacle at hone and abroad,
^^ratGd+hl®.own r°le “id placed his own power in a position antagIncIur^Tn*
^inG hiS later ?CarS> he enjoyed> accepted and
Furthlv
l?0];8?nJ lty CUlt’ and he nacle decisions arbitrarily,
dolth
& International under his leadership after Lenin's
Irtuted a system in which power was over-concentrated. All
this nas hacu a negative influence on our Party.
P1,4.

fertile
individual rule and the personality cult fouzd
coln+rv
be°&use China had been an autocratic, feudal
country for thousands of years, ^utocracy in China has a histcric*!
plrt^I011
i S°Clal basis« The new-democratic revolution led by our.
svlty Gonpictely xr&ed China from the feudal economic and political
rll/of*+hn°ZeVer^ bcoause we focused our attention on the decisive
role trn^fOrnatl22 °f the ccononic system, we overlooked the
critioi
Plays in the people's thinking and failed to systematically
tbit Jlr ^d ^pudxabe
ideological influences of feudal Ltocraoy
7
that were still prevalent in the political and social life.
a
Ders^Z1i^nani+
!UCh ideol°Gy and traditional practices as the
?n+n
y cult, patnarchisn, privilege, and hierarchy found their way
way
into our Party. In addition, we had for a considerable period of tine
„aal2d 1 aaply understand tho importance of the establishment of a
\dan°?ratic Political system, and to enact a sound
Doli+iln? ^^ytution, laws and legal system. We abandoned sone correct
po itical and legal concepts and in this way provided hotbeds for
this
yudy uutocracy to grow in our political life. All
ed fuhourable conditions for the Lin Biao and Jiang fj.ng
theirCowneIIbU 10nary cliques to whip up the personality cult to serve
achenes. Even a great Marxist like Conrade Mao Zedong could
„ "
y116' xmluenced. Any word from Comrade Mao Zedong became a
a
uprene directive, the criterion for testing the truth, and
sometimes even the unchallengeable law. Without such a political
would°havl b the.l£luncI.l1iae and continuation of the "cultural revolution"
wouio. navo been impossible.
Experience is the best teacher, We oust draw lessons from the
’’cultural revolution, ” and thus we will be able to make up for lost
tine.

SOURCE:

Beijing Review, No 379 September 14, 1981. Page no 15-18.
00000000000000000

"=£UUIUSAL=;R£VQLyilg^;=»=^Ng=TH£
SIBUSSkE^fi^iysi^BUgE&ucgAQX

IHE

(172)

This article attempts to show that neither the
purpose and the methods nor the results of the
"Cultural Revolution1’ played positive roles in
the struggle a*gainst bureaucracy. Furthermore,
the Party resolution1’s negation of the ’Cultural revolution’ does not mean that China has
given up the struggle against the bureaucratic
stvle of work. On the countrary, we are using
all means to fight bureaucracy, including strenghthening ideological education,. enforcing discipline
delegating more democr tic right to the
people
and introducing reforms.
SOME foreign friends do not fully understand why the Resolution
°5
Questions in the His troy of Our Party Since the Founding of
of the People's Republic of China has conpletely negated the cultural
revolution.” .They have raised the question; Is it true that the
cultural revolution" did not poay any positive role in fighting against
bureaucracy? I would like to express ny view on this question.

Bureaucracy is a very complicated social problem, but I don't think
cultural revolution" had any positive impact on the struggle against
'wstic"

NO . POSITIVE ffi/iNINGy ygy?

Bureauerao^ts
a decadent style of thought and work left over from the
01,i so2ieJy • It d°es tremendous harm to the cause of
socialist revolution and construction. The people are
greatly discontented with it.
duTin^n+hUr1C0Untry- ^Ga^ing cadrea at every level were tempered
hard fo?the°^onrt
rev2luti°nary smuggle, and most of then worked
contaniLSd hv
x
Genorally speaking, those who were
critisisn And a
01 bureGUCracy
mend their ways after
and education. Therefore, there was no need to lauch a
massive political movement just to fight bureaucracy.
wordedhinP+hP°C9 of.launahinS the "cultural revolution" was explicitly
worxod in the Circulax of the Centl.al Connittee of the Chinese Communist
nent for^h "n
1966’ WhiCh WaS consifl°red a programmatic docuPoliticL w
i f al revolution." It is also clearly defined in the
Party
6
National Congress of the Chinese Communist

.According to these two docunonts, the purpose of the cultural
t0 Cfiticize tho so-called "rcvisionisE," "capitalisn"
into4S
of the bourgeoisie who sneaked
into the Party, govornnent and arny as well as tho cultural circles "
against counter-revolutionary revisionists,” and to "seize
back power fron cupitalist-roaders in the Party."
In othor words, it
was to carry out "a political revolution in which
one
class overthrows
another."

nn? n^116 revisionists111 "capitalist-roaflors in power within tho Party
were
the bourge°isic" to whon tho docunonts refferred
ore m fact revolutionary leading cadres of the Party and the state at

r 173)
various levels. They were the backbone force of socialisn. To nut
neea ive political labels on then was tantonount to franing then. The
aunching ofa great political revolution" under the dictatorship of
rPvoT’u+^etarlat TaS aiQCd at OVGrthrowinS vast nunbors of vetern
of the
Ca+reS
nOt inprovlnS or substantially altering any
of the bureaucratic nethods sone cadres had adopted.
V

Tn the later stages of the "cultural revolution," the gang of
= n^b+al1CC f°La struS'-;1e against "the bureaucratic class." The gang
,
. 0 overthrow ad itional veteran revolutionary cadres izhile
stepping up their efforts to usurp the power of the Party and the state.
As we know, the tern "class" has a scientific noaning, and it nust
not be interpreted at- will
— nor used rand only. IThether a certain group
of people fora a (class
'
in society depends upon their position in the
so ;ical econonic structure,
— 7- It is based on their position in the production, process, on iwhether^they
’
possess the means of production, and’on
how they have acquired these productive means.

Under the socialist systen, the neans of production arc owned by
Thus tie r®0?1?,anL- ^Plcitation of others' labour is eleninatcd.'
,.
1 exploiting class no longer exists as a class and the ovorwhelaing majority of exploiters are changed into labourers who earn
their own living.. Although remnant elements of the exploiting classes
still exist and ]new exploiters might emerge, a new exploiting class
can never system.
be forned so. longJ
economic
WG UPh°ld th° socialist Political and
Like other labouring people, our cadres, including high-ranking
thet08’ are,?’d,11C cnPloy-os of the state. They arc paid only the wages
dis tribn
Ullc;er thc statc waUe system, which is based oh
distribution according to work. They can.neither possess the means of
Th°refSen'to°r la?i
t0 thG I,ro^cts of othor People’s labour,
"bure^ucr’tio
1
Cadr"S haVC becn bureaucratized or that a
LeniniAt
n aS onereed is incompatible with the MarxistLeninist theory of class and with the social reality in our country.

Thev comfiittrd0^17^
nunber of ca^cs .degenerated into new exploiters.
pSvTt !
S byeaucI-atic mistakes, violated state laws and
and Licker^ Butntbr
d
or sez&c- ^tato .property by force
tn a-, i •+?? But.tll0SC people cannot form a class. It is not hard
throuS S u o o?St S?dCCt then t0 Party ciisciPlino
state laws
unrougn tue use of normal procedures.
Second, wrong methods for treating cadres and handlina
ent7rZ\Wei'ehad°Pted during the "cultural revolution." 1 Some

4/

strenShe?^??
against bureaucracy requires that we
f- -r . 0L>:Lcal.ecucation
enable cadres who have conit ted
mistakes to foster again the fine style of serving the people and

SXXXXX ‘-”3

«p°r£5X-X.t
jXan r,.lly

and

Undeniably, the initiator of the "cultural revolution" ■ ’ '
sub jcctivcly
t**?
rules
contradiction^ ootucun ourselves and the enony.

He adopted cron­

(174)
methods for dealing with cadres who had comittod mistakes, including
those who had committed mistakes of bur aucracy. Many-wore unjustly
overthrown or dismissed from office. As a result, the movement failed
to perform the function of education.
Moreover, the "cultural revolution" did not reform the irrational
practices but, on the contrary, undermined some effective ones. Before
tho "cultural revolution, " the government functioned separately from
the Party within the state administration. But during the "cultural
revolution," the work of the Party and’government was lumped together
and performed by the same group of people. In name, a "Party committee
and a "revolutionary committee" attended to tho tasks separately. But
in fact, tho bodic-s were indistinguishable. This not only weakened the
leadership of the Party, but also encouraged a bureaucratic stylo of
work.
Another example is that in the past people*s deputies at different
levels made inspection tours of the grass-roots units to promote work,
maintain close ties with the masses and learn about the people’s opinions.
This was helpful in overcoming bureaucratism. During the "cultural re­
volution," however, the practice was abolished.

Before the ’’cultural revolution,” cadres also took part in physical
labour, which was another measure against bureaucracy. Buring the
"cultural revolution," the system was misttsed and turned into a moans
to punish and persecute cadres.

Third, judging from the results of the "cultural revolu­
tion, bureaucracy has not been eliminated but, in some
respeet®, aggravated. .
Why? It is because the "cultural revolution" confounded right and
wrong and undermined the Party’s fine style of work. While good, hard­
working cadres who kept close ties with tho masses were dismissed from
office, opportunists were promoted. The Lin Biao and Jiang fting counter­
revolutionary cliques openly advocated feudal and bureaucratic styles
of work among the cadf.es.
or instance, Lin Biao instructed his trusted
followers to lure cadres and the masses with promises of promotion and
. material benefits. Their evil practices caused various manifestations
of bureaucratic habits to spread unchecked. This serious consequence
could not disappear immddiately with tho end of the "cultural revolution.”
As a result, uifiiculties wore addes to our struggle against bureaucracy
and other malpractices.
THE CURRENT /jm-BUREAUCRACY STRUGGLE:

After the gang of four was smashed, particularly after the Third
Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee held in December
1978, the Party began to comprehensively correct the "Left " errors
committed during and before the "cultural revolution" and to attach
great importance to the struggle against bureaucracy.

For instance, Comrade Ye Jinnying clearly stated that bureaucracy
must be combated resolutely in his speech at the celebration meeting
of the 50th anniversary of tho founding of tho People’s Republic of
Chinaat the end of September 1979. He pointed out that if cadres who
were invested with power by the people were not responsible to the
people, the people had. the right to take back the power.

>•

Tho Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life adopted at
the Fifth Plenary Session of tho 11th Party Central Committee hold in
March 1980 stipulated: "In order to maintain close tics between tho
Party and tho masses of the people, and see to it that tho loading
Party cadres and Party members who arc tho people’s servants do not
turn into lords sitting on their backs, it is necessary to strenghen
supervision by the Party organization and tho masses over tho leading
Party cadres and Party members."

(175)
The Third Plenary Session of the Fifth National People's Con
held m August and September I960 reiterated that the cra^ication'of

Of a11 011 th—eradication of So irra-

H®sol;y°n On Certain Questions in tho History of Our Partv
Pounaills of fhc People's Republic of China adopted at the/

Sinr
q 21

.S“? s°6:“;01 ,h°i,a p“'ty

aetaS™
nil P r+
vlth

,d f1111-1-}

Vtzry existence.

c™ittoo ifiV

in po«re 13 a mttor tlu-.t

Party organizations at all levels anri

SX
""“t* “a ?'“-»*>
UO.SS0S ana firmly overcome bureaucratism.”

<md woo

boon SXestXn 2ttitudo of the
govornnont has also
XtZX 2
f rcsponse t0 s^o serious accidents. For
example, the oil rig Bohai No. 2 capsized on November 25 197Q Idiii^
J
,“011»»t rc8nlted frra 188uln(, oMe" «Leb vIo£S““
with the bureaucr-tic^tvl^of0^^ °f +h° accicIent was closely linked
nonts. Therefore JL S °fthc pa^ of tho leading departThorefore, ^7° c;uCr^s erectly responsible for the accident
were punished according to law.
^-4 The Minister of Petroleum Industry
was dismissed from off£^ce ana a demerit “grade one” was recorded for
a Vice-Premier of the “tate Council.
INSTITUTIONJiIl REFORjVjS

.OM important reforms have been
1,‘1’ I’"ty C“,ral Oomitteo,
some
reforms are not merely directed ;
against bureaucracy, but they are
nevertheless helpful to the strug lc against it.

For instance, al _
for InsJectinrSsciilS!
'?hird
Inspecting; Discipline

s°SBicn, tho Central Comisfeion

stressed sKengSenSg SX

Party Central ^ittee

the implementation
. Its functi°n is to oversee
oversee *
improve the Party's style of t7 v regulations and discipline and thereby
nations, at all 1CXX XX Immediately
“X"
Pa^ organithereafter Party
own
<
—
Thus the Party has established2™ °feans to supervise discipline,
a system °off lnspcctin
inspecting
itself from top to bottom."
C and
and supervising

life tenure for leading cadr^ ^t^ ^8^ X ab?lishinS
^cto
leading
cadres.
between the Party and thn
+ allu<3> 1 cr ttlG division of work
■ and the government.
a rule, ’' 3ZZ™
of the i^arty
or
itteo will no longer concurrently head the
people’s
governnent.

The Third Plenary Session
of” thn°P t4?e nifxh National People’s Congress
supported the suggestion o
the Party Central Committee and approved
the reshuffle of the State□of 'Council
leading bodies. It also decided
that the Chairman cd ’* “Party Central Committee •
would no longer hold
tho post of Premier of tho
11 J tGt© Council and that: the ^ico-Chairmen
of the Party Central Committee
-------- o would no Tlonger be Vice-Premiers of the
°tate Council. These are important reforms
--.J of the systems of Party
and state loa.dership.
the c1-ocision-mSngapowers1ofaench ^t01"
eraSS roots»* enlarging
and staff congresses- and s-1-i-ino- enbo:rPr:i-SG’ establishing workers
vision organizations’ ''
o p aomocratic management and superand teams'1 alsoXe^ore dJciH?e? • C°“os’ Production brigades

arc hold at these basic levels" " ~uaklnc powcr and democratic elections
levels.

(176)
All those ref orris have one feature in cormon, that is, they ain
at enlarging, institutionalizing and legalizing socialist democracy.
All this will help overcome bureaucracy.
The reforms are only a beginning. Many irrationalities still exist
within the state administration and other organizational systems,
further reforms are necessary. If these irrationalities are not eradi­
cated, it will bo impossible to overcome bureaucracy and the moderni­
zation programme will also be delayed.

Of course, there is a connection between the existence of bureau­
cracy and the developmental level of the socialist productive forces
as well as the educational and cultural levels of the cadres and general
populace. To thoroughly eliminate all the nanifostations of bureaucracy
is a long and ardous task.
Finally, I would like to stress one point: Bureaucracy is not
an incurable disease inherent in the socialist system. Now, as’we
are uncovering the sources from which bureaucracy emerged, wo are sure
to win victories in our struggle against it, so long as we continue to
reform our organizational structures, and enlarge, institutionalize
and legalize socialist democracy., -^t the same tine, we must strengthen
the education of leading cadres at all levels and help improve their
style of work, even if it is a long struggle.

SOURCE:

Beijing Review, No, 49, Deceriber 7, 1981. page No. 17-20.

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SECTION A = EDUCATION, YOUTH, CULTURE

In a process of "modernization", education plays
an important role. For a long period of time, know­
ledge was looked upon with ideological suspicion.
Science and culture remained backward. In today’s
China, education, mass media, culture are considered
as important instruments for social transformation.
To this transformation youth and the intellectuals
are specially invited to participate actively.In
this section, therefore, one will find a docu­
mentation' dealing with Intellectuals, Youth and
Education.
CONTENTS

Page

1. ON THE QUESTION OF INTELLECTUALS
Deep-going social and historical causes as well
as line and policy mistakes by the Communist
Party have led to the suppression and persecu­
tion of Chinese intellectuals many times in the
last several decades. A new approach is demanded.

177

2. CHINA'S YOUTH t BUILDERS OF SOCIALIST MODERNIZATION
This is a semi-official document: an address
to the Youth of Beijing by Deng Liqun, Director
of the Research Office of the Secretariat of
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party.

181

3♦CHINA'YOUTH I AN OPINION POLL
An opinion survey among the present youth of China.

185

4. THIS YOUNG GENERATION
Some of the problems of Chinese Youth today.

187

5* REGULATION ON ACADEMIC DEGREES
The excesses of the Cultural Revolution are
being rejected today and in the case of Universities
regulations, chiefly those related to degrees, are
brought back.

189

6, WORKER EDUCATION IN CHINA
Some statistical data on worker education

190

7»A WORKER UNIVERSITY
A case study of the actual functionning of a
worker university
8. CHINAfS BURGEONING T.V.
Programs and goals of Chinese T.V.

191

9* TELEVISION UNIVERSITY
'
Salient features of China-s television University
10< EDUCATION IN CHINA
An historical and analytical study

193
199
201

(178)
elements of truth-aocumulated gradually by human beings in the long proce­
dure. of cognizing and transforming the world. Knowledge constitutes the
basic element of human civilization. The level of its development marks the
degree of progress of a society. Knwoedge itself is non-classical, but !in
class society different classes have different conceptions of the value of
knowledge•

In ±eudal society where knowledge was degraded to serve
only,
serve feudal
feudal rulers
rulers only,
its value was decided by power. Ideologies,theories and doctrines which
heiuCd-^OnSOlldat° th° dor;lination of the feudal imperial authority and divine
authority were appreciated by the ruling figures. Those opposing feudal power
were banned. Politically, imperial authority was the foundation of feudal
dictatorial rule. Under it, power was everything while knowledge became in­
significant. This was because keeping the people in ignorance is the essenlal condition for maintaining feudal rule. Economically, the self-sufficient
small-peasant economy of feudal society was rostrictod by the narrow experien­
ces passed on from generation to generation. People with specialized knowledge
were not needea, to say nothing of any requirement for science and technology.
Under this situation superstiti... -nd blind faith were encouraged but know­
ledge and science were rejected. The intellectuals naturally could not escape
being humiliated and harassed.
Capitalism : Value of Knowledge Decid e d by Profit

In the bourgeois revolution and during the development of capitalism, know­
ledge^ experienced a great change in status and role. The capitalist class was •
linked with a newly emerged mode of production, and capitalist production by
large nacninery replaced the small peasant economy and handicrafts. Social
through the ^amework of narrow experiences, and there was a
tecbmology and also a strict demand on the edu­
cational level of hired managerial personnel and workers. This advanced edu­
cation and various kinds of training. In addition, with the development of
large-scale industrial production and the deepening of the human rights move­
ment, intelligence was developed on a deeper and wider scale. Many now
sciences and technologies appeared. To make high profits, the capitalists
-inrnVOfitO4.COnVOrt sclenCG 311,1 technology into wealth by putting them to use
knovi’S0 K°n QS qulckly as Possible. This was the first time in history that
owled^e became so closely and widely linked with social production and
IntZl1' ’J?0T10dee bLMBe a rSady SOUrce of money for thG capitalist class and
intellectuals were the pathbreakers of capitalist society.
capitalist society is not in any sense a paradise for intellectuals
lmowlodgc- it is a society under the control of capital in which
.
s every rung and the value of knowledge is decided by profit. Once
+
tO thG caPitalists, any knowledge will be cast away
without the slightest regret.

>

Socialist Society. : Knowledge - Wealth of People - Weapon to Win its

*

.Emanci pa tion
Under socialist conditions,knowlege becomes the wealth of the whole people.
i
decldod
the economic development of society and the people’s
i ® al ?nd c^Ltural demands. Socialist society is founded on the basis of
° “Odem production; therefore, there is a higher demand for
specialized knowledge and intellectuals in order to advance the techniques of f •

•
*
*
®
•
•

(179)
«#»; -

the national economy, increase productivity, improve the work of statistics
and._mangemeirt^n-..produ£r!ij^
distribution^as- wcil„-ast -to
explore and transform society and the natural world.This is because, as Lenin
once pointed out,^socialism and communism can only be established on the basis
oi the total knowledge accumulated by human beings over thousands of years
Basically, knowledge should be more required and intellectuals more respected
in socialist society than at any other time in history. They should be given
the widest opportunity to play their role. Unfortunately, for many years,
because of our incorrect line and policies as well as the drawbacks in insti­
tutions such as life tenure for leading cadres, the patriarchal style of work
^nd the over-concentration of power, the superiority of the socialist system
ou
no
e given iull play. On the contrary, abnormal phenomena characteris­
tic^ oi feudal times reappeared in certain respects of our political and eco“°+hm,+1V°S’ SUCh.aS
sPisir-S knowledge, worshipping power and lotting those
without any expertise lead those who are well-trained. And this is related to
nX2-°Ur ^orte°“ines SUCh as
fficiency management, wasteful-type
production and arbitrary, non-scientific way of directing our work.

HISTORICAL

CAUSES

Historical Causes of Overlooking the Role of .Scientific Knowledge

Ignorance and superstition, therefore, had deep roots among the masses.
&£2£.c'.i for quite a long time the bases of China's revolution woro in the
countryside. While mainly engaged in revolutionary wars, had no chance to rci-,
rovoLtion^aq1^^!16^*^^! though the main emphasis of our democratic
revoiution was to solve the problem of feudal land ownership, the influence
of feudal autocracy in the superstructure was under-estimated and not ade­
quately criticized. As China had never gone through prolonged anti-feudal
ideological, emancipation movements like the Renaissance and Enlightenment in
European countries, there is little democratic tradition to speak of. Science
cannot prosper in the ^absence of democracy. Fourth, under oL- system of

methoFof^if110^’ ?1rnS WerG made Gnd handed d0Wn fron above aad the

was rrnctisod we^PUrC^
markctinS of finished products by the State
tive to SS’
brancl^s of
economy, there was no incen'strange nhenom
ontlfac and technological knowledge. This resulted in the
Phenomenon m which now scientific and technological achievements
experiences of^ho
talentqand wisdon were ignored. Fifth, because .<
to attach
international communist movement wore XZSSd up mistakenly,
’■rcvLioniS"npo^ancJ t0
role of scientists and experts was labelled
,rnT, ^
’
courting danger to the. Party and the state." Intel] ectusls

boXX ido'r^^v
rt a-side’Naturally
iaiowicdsGall
wasthese
sonetiaes
and blindly discarded.
factors are by no
S
soSIlisn

S

hC S0Clalist system but
hut result from

going against

C* J- J. B Hl >

Intelloctuals : The New Role

ao^itlJo °°nZra50n °f th° Third Plenary Sossion of the 11th ^tral

efforts to
Jhlneae Co™ist Party in 1978, the Party has made great
'mann-emont
Pft m^stakes by reforming the political and economic
With’thoir nolf ZT
iaf10Ecrltill3 a'sound policy towards intellectuals.

/

SrOatlr M1“a-

»» have

18 YPISH;__ BUILDERS OF SOCIALIST
. MODERNIZATION
~~

(181)

Of a recSentrtinC
)/^iS+ ai\ abri(iged translation
j a recent speech to the youth of Beilina
0fftce9oLflthr\I)ir'eCtOr °f the Rese^rcti
r<^ZCA.0^ the Secretariat of the Central
the Chinese Communist Party,
rhin reca^^e^ ^tie past sufferings of the
Chznese people as well as their achieveNew China SG^ba^ks since ^e founding of
-FPT+h.\
and them outltned the course he
f It young people should advance alona
hfV1
plications of this sofok
Chlno^s
P- ihose Interested In
hoofs are ofrs
tOrt'Title

With you I 2 only be Sil
3 “eetlnS arc younC people. Couponed
youth. Son^eo°“g eLiu thS S
1 nyS°lf was once a
old and the youn- and S nS * th
a r'Gncra’ti°n Sap between the
don't aX S’tSs opiXT FT*
betWCCn theD- But 1
Party. Anionx*
vou thp-rn
n*
. a neri^Gr
the Chinese Cormunist
Among you
League nenbers^
Vethere
are fXtiXtSno^ers md Connunist Youth
are
We share tho s4’nG WeobSctivS
S'i t0Se*her ?r thc connunist ideal,
can't our hearts be linked +
both old and X" hope S S
socialist country. I boliev- th
as one on

h

trnVelllnS 'tho sane road. Why
°f China,s ^e,
E1®theJ1f“d lnto a powerful modern

DISTINCUISHING BETOBjW NW nW OLD CHINA

beginning of a^undfnontally^-v 3 ^Gp?hllc of China in 1949 narked the
the previous contry afUr WO
• T™ Chin°SC histo^- ^or
with China's feudal rulers
P°^al:lst Powers had collaborated
a semi-colonial and soni-fludal society.C0UMt^' to d®«®»®^te intg

that d^r^oTinvSeX0^ fece^T
signed by the reactionarv -over

British Ul/S?£££

country

+OUr„po°I’le*

The
The unequal
unequal treaties
treaties

,°iooC“r

’00°' POTel£’n troops wore
“* “P 10
In terns of Indowilties, tho 1842 Troate of^8^3 spJlores of influence
Qing Governnent to pay the enn^i +
Nanking alone forced the
revenue. As to terriUrfll c^If
^one-third of its annual
Aigun sianed in ircr , • i?1 CcBsaoas«, the Sino-Kussian Treaty of
territory to Russia- the ggo^. 600’00°. S(luar« kilometres of Chinese
another 400,0« °^0 £dX'“o?
°f Pokl” ' “'»■>«
Japanese Treaty of Shitonn^
of territory; and tho 1895 Sinoislands, the Penghu Islands itk1
Taiwan an(',‘- 'the surrounding
During tho War of° Liaodong Peninsula to Japan,
coastal provinces, bi^ -nd^odi'nn111^ ^apan^ a11 China’s inland and <
lines were occupUd'by the JapX^^r^sors
V^ta\co™ic^ion
the war, the publicly announced
i
In the r°ur yoars after
the Chiang Kai-shek clique with tJo SX^UtT^
accords nent China's rivin- un ifn = nit?c States numbered. 40. These
territorial
i affairs and
stationed in China, forci^ rX
ond
areas “rS

(184)
omrade Mao Zedong made mistakes on certain Question in his later
years when he was seriously ill. Howerver, he always nintained a sobar
mind, a staunch determination and high vigilance an any issue of
x^cPGndence, soverignty and security. His resistance to
Khrushchov s patriarchal behaviour and hegemonic acts is an example.
. ~ Comrade Mao Zedong’s mistakes in his later years brought great
mis., or tunes to the country and the people. But in terms of his whole
e, his merits are primary and his mistakes secondary. He deserves
‘'°
r?COS];I3;zocI
thc Greatest proletarian revolutionary and the
greatest national herg of the Chinese nation. His greatness lies
■Ln^^S'L°3f , ?’y to the hinese people, his unswerving faith in their
_ Jr.?nCl

.

. staunch<'cla5s stand, patriotism and revolutionary will

as a Conuunist. J7e should draw lessons from Comrade Mao Zedong’s
nistakes RBut
' his spirit of fighting tenaciously and unceasingly
for the people
pie s cause must not be forgotten and is something we should
all enulate.

Aiways stand with the people and defend and represent their interests
what our Party has consistently taught young people. The achieeaenuo of great men are always in proportion to their efforts to
and.rePresent W interests of the people. Those who are
w_th the people go forward; those who divorce themselves from or
oppose
e people go baclrvrard or may even become reactionaries, This
is a historical truth.
The youth of modern China have played a tremendous role in the
revoiutionary movement. During the 1976 revolutionary mass movement
pL/Tn
younS people, guided hy Marxism, heroically
fore and nade sreat contributions to the snashinc of the
0 Iolu. In recent years, numberous outsantding youths have
appeared in various trades through their hard study and work, frt
present a nozenent to learn fron Lei Pens* and a canpaisn of five
f0Ur l;olnts of beauty** are beins-carried our. These are
educating a new generation and are conducive to social stability and
thorou^Mv1011’
-1! necessary to carry out these campaigns nore
-houlRbi
Poristently. Connunist ideals, norality and values
di^lnv thon
t’T
pe°Ple sh0Uld bQ CODnended when they
in s4dv
Zi h°re ^at 311 the y0UnG j?e°Ple wil1 exert themselves
to P
W°rk’ further raise their ideology and morality and strive

a “troae physi’"'> “d
Today belongs to both you young people and us <
old people hut the
future only belongs to you. Modernized socialist China
will belong
our youth. Young people arc not only the builders .of a modernized to
China but a,lso its masters.

z
* Lei Feng was a P * L. A. Jhero who died while on duty in 1962
;see our issue No. W, 1981, p. 6)
The five stresses are; stress on decorum,
decorun, manners,
nanners, hygiene
hygiene,
discipline and ''morals. The four points of beauty are; beautification
of the mind, language
?
, behaviour and the environment
------ (.see our issue
No. 15, 1981, p, 5)
SOURCE'

Beijing Review, No, 30. July 27, 1981 p, 18 to 20&29
* * * * -K- * -K- * # * * -5<- **•?(-

(185)
Are China's 200 million young people a lost
generation^ victims of the gang of four who
will never make a contribution to the deve­
lopment of the country ? Or are they full of
promise and eager to work for the moderni­
zation of China? One of the correspondents
decided to answer this question by finding
out what a recent survey on China's youth
showed, by interviewing Gao Zhanxiang,
secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Youth League and by talking with
a number of young people from different
backgrounds

1

LAST<?year three teachers of the school under the Central Committee of
the Communist Youth League queried about 1 ,000 young people in
Factories, comunes, schools and city nighbourhoods in Fujian and
Aimii Provices. Questionnaires were distributed and the finding were
liter published in a Rennin Ribao article.

In the report, published here in a condensed form, the three teasc era mdentified the following characteristics anoung the younger
generation:
6
1) Over half of the group polled belive that the socialist system
is superior. Amoung the nearly 25 per cent of the young people who
belive that the socialist system is- not
__-j clearly superior, many remarks
on their questionnaires like: " The real socialist sytem is Superior,”
” Superior but not perfect”, ” The socialist system is good in theory,
but not in practice" and ’’The socialist system is advancing amidst hope
hardship . Amoung the 9.9 per cent who cannot see any spueriority or
dont know which is better, some wrote comments like, "I don’t know
what a socialist system is”. Such remarks indicate real confusion. One
person wrote on this part of the questionnaire :’’The Officials are
Superior”, a clear condemnation of.the privileged bureaucracy.
HOW DO YOU rILj THH SOCIALIST SYSTEM ?
Number polled

987

%
1 00

Superior

658

64.6

Not much better

255

Con’t see any superiority

65

25-8
6.4

Don’t know

55

3.5

Others

16

1 .6

2) The responses to "it What Is Your Ideal ?” and " What is Your 1
Favourite Proverb or Saying ?” show that‘the majority of youth are con­
cerned about the country’s future and want China to develop quickly into
a powerful nation. However, these young people hold different philosophies
towards life, with sone seeming to lack firn convictions.

From their answers to ’’What Is Your Ideal ?'4 we conclude that 78.4
per cent (713 people) have very high aspirations which extend beyond
their own personal concerns, 14.3 per cent (150 people) are most concerned
aoout their work and 7,3 per cent (66 people) have no real aspirations.

(186)
WHAT IS YOUR FAVOURITE PROVERB OR SAYING ?
%

81 0

1 00

307

37.9

132

16.3

With a fierce brow, I cooly defy a thousand pointing fingers
head-bowed, like a willing OX I seve the children
81

1 0.0

Birds are beautiful because of their feathers; peopife
are beautiful because of their hard work

75

9.3

Lofty aspiration does not necessarily come with are; with out
out any, one nay live a hundred empty years
70

8.6

To get to the front in tim’e of hardship, to stay
behind in tines of cheer

66

8.1

If you Don’t enjoy your self while young, you will lose
the chance of your life

32

4.0

All things are empty and life is just a dream

15

1.9

Life’s purpose is to eat and drink

6

0.7

Everyone for himself and the devil can take the hind
most

20

2.5

Others

6.

0.7

Number polled
Genius comes from hard work and knowledge has to be
accumulated

Every one has a share of responsibility for the fate
of his country

r

3) The characteristic of young people which was revealed in their
answers to ” What Kind of Social Problems Concern You Most ?” is
that they are most concerned about the country’s economic development
and other practical problems.
WHATT KIND OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS CONCERN YOU MOST

Number Polled

788

1 00

Development of Science and TechnoiogyS

255

32.4

Increase production
Better living standards

75
117

9.5
14.9

Prevention of emergence of careerists like the
gang of four

83

1 0.5

Combating bureaucracy

69

8.8

Development of Education
Rich Cultural Life

51
48

6.5
6.1

Better social order

45

5.7

Promotion of democracy and a legal system

44

5.6

In conducting the survey, an attempt was made to select as broad and
diverse a group as possible. The three teachers went to 5 factories (Anhui
Tractor Plant, the Hefei Cardboard Box Factory, the Fuzhou Silk Printing
and Dyeing Mill, the Printing and Dyeing Mill, the Fuuzhou Generating
equipment Plant and the Xiamen Bearing Plant), one department store in
Fuzhou, 2 universities, (Fuzhou University& Xiamenb-nuniversity), 2 middle
schools (one in Hefei and one in Fuzhou) one commune in Anhui and 2 pr©
duction brigades in Fujian and 2 neighbourhoods (one in Fuzhou and one
in Xiamen.).
SOURCE: Beijing Review, NO 30. July 27, 1981. pp.21-22 .

■ f.i

TMI3_Y0Ui\!G GENERATION
=================
===

III

da?)

■■ ■

Some people say that the Chinese/fouths are a
lost generation and some say they are the beat
generation of China^ How do you look at this
question ?

The y°ung people are the nost vital force in society and the hope ;O'of a
nation. Many.foreign friends have shown concern for the Chinese yduths
and have noticed some of their shortcomings. This
" is not surprising. The
Party and Youth League organisations, trade unions and schools ;
government departments attach importance to this question and heave
in the last few years carried
__o.
—L (out’ investigations
at the grass-roots
units, studied and analysed the conditions
---------------j and characteristics of the
younger generation today so1 as find ways to guide and help then solve
their problems. For nearky ;
s^nce spring 1980, discussions of
the meaning of life were published in 1eading’national
attracting
newspapers,
attracting the
the attention
attention of millions upon millions of young
people.

II

ETi7 year! °5 the present generation of youths were years of
"Cun tnrJ p
S^uggles’ and in
10 tunulatuous ye ers of the
Th , i + Revolution , they were deeply influenced by "Leftist" thinking,
nos?
/ h°PFTU^ity t0 r°CeiVe a S0°d educntion when they should’
most needed, it. And when they should study Marxism and get to know what
? neans^ they were swayed by sham revolutionary slogans and many
took.part in rash "revolutionary action" such as indiscriminately topplinv
fSnSTTC»dgs’ ranfackinfi hones, resorting th coercion or force, and so ''
to bp’fr^a
the °lder generation, they do not know what it really neans
exne-ri
T*5 alserles of the old society, nor do they have any
experiEBnce of the happiness of seeing the speedy advance of China's
socialist construction in the 1950s. When they cane of age, what they
saw was.that the national economy was on the brink of collapse brought
n y Lin Biao and the gang of four, with innumerable social problems
crying for solution and unhealthy tehdencies waiteing to be corrected,
fl one of these problems, however, can be solved overnight.

Compared with the youths of the 50s or the early 60s, the young
people of today have more social experience and their minds are moife
complicated, more sensitive to the social and political problems. But,
owing tlx® to their shortcomings and limitations, they are often confused,
unable to look at and anakyse the various social constradictions in a
comprehensive and dialectical way-•
After the smashing of the gang of four, our country has entered a
new historical period. The young people’s are compelled by reality to
consider many questions,. such as: What must be done to prevent a recur
recurcrines^of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and: their cohorts? what
oust be dffine to transform
j;poor
~
O’ ’backward
„ *
d country into a powerful
- -------- ouh
and
and prosperous one? What exactly is a meaningful life?
It is true that ;a small number of young people are pteplexed of
and at a loss. They waver
-- and
--- fail
--1^ to see the superiority of the socia­
list system, and a few declare they no longer belive in Marxism. Some
“
people in the west describe this as a lodd of faith and say categorically that marxism doesn’t work in China now. This pronouncement is of
cource too arbitrary.

Investigations by the Youth League, trade
un‘
trade unions
and other oggani—
sations show that nost of the Young people in thej factories,
factories, irural cpmcranes and schools hold that the socialist system and that they
y are
studing and working hard, brimming with confidence that Chin’s four
modernizations will be accomplished.

y

J

(188)

i
Llain reason why
small number of young people have doubts
aoout the present-day society and no longer have a noble aim in life
is that their minds have been poisoned by the fallacies of sham Marxism
in those 10 chaotic years. Another reason is that, owing to the state
n£n^S10n ar\d.°xr Clistakes in work during those years, the superioriy f the socialist system could not be brought into play. For those ■
young people who are unable to distinguish right from wrong to desavov
Marxism
i arxism is,
is, thereforem like throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

It reaanot be denied that Uihere are a few i young people who have
degenerated and become criminals, Efforts are being made to save these
people and help then turn over a new leaf.

through

peristent efforts, this goal can be achieved under the guidance of
Marxism*

nnnnn
SOUHCE: Beijing xi’eview No.16 April 20,1 981 . p. J

(189)

During the Cultural Revolution an attempt a had been made
to do away with ’’degree”. This had resulted in a certain
deterioration in the ’’academic standards”. Today, as part of
the mocernization process, regulations are enforced which
stxptlate that B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees will be conferred
in-accordance with the common practice in most countries of
the’world.
Regulation on academic degrees came in to effort in January 1 this year.
The rugulation stipulate that B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees will be
conferred in accordance with the common practice in most countries
of the world. College graduates with the required qualifications will
be given the ‘B.A degree, while postgraduates studing in the Universities
or scientific research institutes and other people with the same academic
level may qualify for master’s or doctor’s degrees through examinations,
including oral tests. The degrees conferred will be the same as those
Univerally acknowledged.

The state Council has set up a national academic degrees committee
in accordance with the regulations approved in February last year by the
Standing Committee of the National’ People’s Congress. The Committees
which held its first meeting in Beijing last December discussed the w
ways of implementing the regulations.
Chairman of the academic degrees connittee is Frang Yi, who is
concurrently President of the Chinese Academy of Science and Vicer'
Premier of the State Council. The granting of academic degrees, he noted 9
will encouragepeople to abtain solid achivements in their specialized
fields, sp^ed up the training of qualified people, improve China’s
educational and academic levels and promote exchanges between Chinese
and foreign achilars. All this will contribute to the realization of the
four modernisation.
The 20 -point regulations constitute an important legislation in
China’s educational and scientific fields as well as a long-awaited event
for those concerned.

The academic degrees committee stressed that, in implementing the
regulations, it is necessary to show due respect for science and uphold
academic standards. In awarding academic tittles, quality should be
psid to facilitating the selection of qualified people. The regulations
have provided oppertunities for those who have through self-study and
practice made outstanding achivements in their specializaflisn field.
In addtion, the regul atiohs stipulate that academic degrees obtained in
foreign countries will be recognized; academic degrees will be confrred
on foreign students and scholars studing or doing research work ub China
on application if they are up to the required standard. Honorary doctor’s
degrees will be conferred on outstanding Chinese and foreign scholars and
noted public figures in recognition of their contributions.
Apart from the chairman, the academic degrees committee cinsists of
four vice-chairmen and 56 other members. They include vice-president of
the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, the Minister of Education and other noted scholars and
professors.

SOURCE: Beijing Review, No 1. January 5, 1981. pp.9-1O.

(190)

EDUCA Tiai^ IN CHIN4

The Chinese Party and Government always make great efforts
to raise the educational level of the workers and peasants. In
June 1950, shortly after the birth of New China, the Administra­
tion Council issued the Directive on Conducting Spare-Time
Educa t ipn_ Ampung_ ferrker s_ g nd rs_tgJi embers hi ch declared: "The
Central People's Government regards it as a task of paramount
importance to develop education amoung workers and peasants
and train them, intellectuals. "

Before the "Cultural Revolution" began in 1966, over 100
million neople had learnt to read and write, 960,000 had
graduated from part-time middle schools and 200,000 more from
part-time colleges.

Bg 1965, the total enrolment in various spare-time schools
for workers had reached 17*19 million. Amoung them, 3.24 million
were in part-time primary schools, 5*02 million in part-time
middle schools, 5*51 million in part-time scoundary techinical
schools and 410,000 in part-time colleges. All this helped
greatly in raising the educational level of China's vast
contingent of workers, i'he skills of these trained workers
phayed a significant part in socialist construction.
To recoup lost time, the drive for on going workers educa­
tion has gone into high gear during tie past few years. Part­
timeworkers colleges have been reopened all over the country.
Many regular colleges and U niversities now sponsor correspon­
dence and evening courses. TV colleges have been set-up, and
worker primary and middle schools have been resumed.

■ rs attended 5,600 snareIn 1930, some 1.1 million .
^^0 gradiated from worker
time schools and colleges, over
s'
1 die schools, and
colleges and over 1 million frc
tens of millions raised their educational and Techinical
levels to varing degree.
In April 1930 a national worker education committee was
set up; Bince then 25 Provinces, municipalities and autono­
mous regions have set up their owm worker or worker-peas ant
education committee.

At present, 490,000 workers are enrolled in part-time
primary schools, 2.9 million in part-time middle schools,
2.01 milliom in secoundry techinical schools, and 1.55 million
in various kinds of worker college. So fi$r 63,000 full-time
and 250,000 part-time teachers are on the faculities ofthe
various vjorker schools and co lieges. The Ministry of Educa­
tion has compiled and published a series of text and reference
books fvr workers studing in part-time primary and middle
schools.

The national plan drafted in 1930 specified that during
the Sixth Five Year Plan period (1931-35), ev ry worker
and staff member should participate in at least one educa­
tional pro gramme or training course

@@@(§)@@@@@@

SOURCE: Beijing Review^. No*41* October 12,

1931 pr).22

j

.A WORK^^. UNIVERSITY

(191)

In socialist countries, education of workers occupy
a key position. How does today’s China go about it ?
The following article is a description of the concrete
functionning of a ’’Worker University” in present day
China•

THL Dalian Darker University is housed in a former exhibition
centre. According to Director Liu of the University's adminstration office, 1,200 workers and technicians now study here,
ihe University has four college affiliated to it.

Set up tn 1979, the university has 11 classes in seven
departments; automation, machine building, health and medicine
9
ohm^se, computer science, industrial chemistry and foreign
1anguages. The students were chosen after exams taken by 3000
workers and staff members from the city's 37 industrial
bureaus and enterprises. Some of them study here on a full
time basis, some on a part-time work, part-study basis) and
some come during their spare time.

Last year, 200 students graduated from the university's
two-year training courses in Japanese and English, itith .the
increase m trade and exchanges between China and other count,
the training of people capable of speaking, readina and
writing in foreign languages has becime an urgent matter)
Another 100 students studing traditional Chinese medicine will
soon graduate and becone registered medics. "Our students study
hard, and abide by discipline because they know their chances of
study do not come easily", said Director Liu.
Besides intensive studies, the students also take cart in
nnysical training and other recreational activities. The uni­
versity pays careful attention to student health. Hrorker-stud­
ents in the spare-time classes have been praised as the "most
conscientious students un the university", yhen I got to know
them, I could only agree.

Chen Yaoguang, 36, majors in radio in the automation depart
suffers from chronic rehuatism and is hunchbacked and
ment. He suyfers
dependent on crutches. His difficulty in getting about inspite
profound sympathy in who
ever sees him. He works in a school-run
whoever
factory^ His handicap had deprived him of several chances for
university, so he was thrilled to be able to enrol in the
worker university in 1979.
Every day after dight hours of work. he hurries to class
Getting on board a ibus and' climbing stairs are both great
ordeals for him,especially in rain
.. .1 and snow. Even the bumping
of the bus hurts. However, he has managed a perfect attendance
record in his two years of schooling, What made him so singleminded? He told me: rtI
.T want to study because? as a man I can ,t
spend my days fooling ariun$. I shauld make x^fuiElse
Vflriy
w
I use pf
my
mxnd, the only healthy part of me, so that I can do my share
for my country.
Sun ue^tn, a thin and petile^ 34-years-old sanitatium nu~pc
nurse.
studies 172 the medacai department.Everyday she has to travel
hm from the sanitarium to the university. More ofetn than nat
she has to make use of the 40 minutes on the train to
revzvew her lessons.

(192)

Shortly aftter ^he emrolled she gave birth to a child,
and was in poor health afterwards. Concerned people tried
to nersuade her to quit, but she refused: ,f I belived I could
stick it out, I have lots of questions in my job which I
don't know why, so I’ve got to study to get the answer". She
told me that she often sits down with a book in one hand and
a bell in the other to amuse and quiet her seven month old
baby. She has strong support from her illierate mother, who
has taken on all the household chores. Her hunsband and his
two sister-in-law are also spare-time wo rker-students, and at
night the whole family settles down to study. "My family is
a small worker university itself," said sun vroudly.

Xu Kaijian, an electrician at the No.@ Plastic Plant, had
only -a primary school education, and so failed at several
technical innovations he attempted, tfith a strong desire for
knowledge, he became a sparer time radio student at the worker
university. He studied very hard, and hardly a year after he
enrolled, he sicceeded in improving the operating efficiency
of an electromagnetic iron which had been givin g his plant
a lot of trouble. Por this he was commended and awarded by the
plant. How hets working on a project to conserve energy and
has made much headway.
What has prompted these ordinary workers to study so hard
in their spare-time even after long eight-hours work days? The
answer is not hard to find. They want to live up to their job
and make up for the inadequacis in deducation and time lost
during the 10 years turmoil of the "Cultural Revolution". A
watchword chalked in red on a blackboard at the worker univer­
sity seems to say it all: " A man without learning is like a
flower without fragrance*
The worker University has 15 full-time teachers and77
part-time ones9 30 per cent of whom lecture at formal univer­
sities and college. A lecture from the Institute of Railway
Engineering, 45 Ucar-old Zeng 2hongning teaches physics to
spare-time^students at the workeruniversity. He is a strong
supporter of the school: "It had provided not only learning
opportunities for workers but also an outlet for university
teachers who are eager to pass on their knowledge in their
the regular university
wpare time. He said
------ that
------ what
------ costs
millions of Yuan cab be done by the worker university for a t
most 50QQ00 yuan, thus saving a lot of money. Beyond this,
dparetime education is conducive to raising the cultural level
of the nation as a whole c
The teachers were visibly excited whenever they talked
avout their students. Sun Uuxian, Iho came from the mathematics
department of the Dalian Engneering Institute, told me: most
of the students in my chemistry class arc women. Many are mothers,
and some are in mid or late thirties. But they know what they
have come for. He recalled the time a big snow st&rr had
struck the afternoon before s scheduled class. Sun himself had
hesitated to come because the worker university is far from
where he works and he was not sure the students would show up.
He finally made it to the university and aas surprised to
his whole class there, despite the bad weathcr.^ Many had star' _
for class two hours ago. Some had asked permision to leav
ahead of time. Some came despite health problems. But they all
come. He told me, "Never defore have I seen students so eage
to loam. I would feel guilty if I didn't try my best to
The teachers have org:miscd thense^es^i^t^^search^groups
mark homework
to improve the quality of tneir teaenmg. They
.
n
with care and help students outside of class jre3e of charge.
also aelged
Regular institute. V higher learning in Dalian.l have
h
university.
All this
by leanding their laboratories to the work^ru
rauivalent
to
has paid off; Though the
that of the regular colleges, most of the sTUc.crib
with good grades.
* * *

CHINA TS

BURCEONINC

TV

(193)

ALTHOUGH 'China's television -progra­
mme service started as early as 1953, it
did not become part of a way of life until
three or four years ago.
Todays about one
third of Beijing's families living in the
city proper have television sets. E^lsewhere in the country-in workshops of indus­
trial plants, in rural production brigades
(a production brigade is composed of one
or a number of villages), in schools, govern­
ment offices as well as in every local
residents' committee- there is a television
set; some even have colour ones replacing
the black-and -white.
Beijing residents every evening have
three TV programme services to choose from
and each channel provides news, recreational
items and special programmes. Mornings and
afternoons there are educational programmes.
On Sundays and national holidays, one chnnel
offers three services a day, beginning with
a children's programme in the morning.
These
programmes are prepared and released by CCTV,
short for the China Central Television,
(one channel beamed to the whole country
and another to Beijing only) and a local
TV station.

ON THE. SCRBCT

IN '^he ten years of turnoil which began in the middle of the 1960s
the programmes offered were uninteresting and monotonous. With the
exist of Jiang Qing and her gang from China’s political scene, our TV
programmes, like all other cultural undertakings int this country
have regained vitality. Our TV workers are working diligently to
organize better programmes. They look forward to a TV screen free
from unhealthy scenes, a screen that is informative, entertrining
and pleasing to the eye. This , of course, cannot be achieved over­
night and the present situation is far from what is envisaged.
NEWS SERVICE

In Beijing, Shanghai and other fairly big cities the nunber of
people watching TV new in the evening is on the increase and this
has gradually become a way of life.

Throughout the country wherever people have access to television*
they can see the news of the day in the evening, such as the nesting
of the National People’s Congress, or the trial of the Lin Biao and
Jiang Qing cliques which began last November. However, nainly for
technical reasons, news itens do not always reach the public quickly.
*China now has 58 progranne originating TV stations, plus 258
TV rebroadcasting stations. In addition, there are also 2,000-odd
low-power TV frequency translators to serve the county scats and
sone rural districts.

(194)
News stories about economic construction take up the loin’s share
of news over the TV. Subjects in the latest coverages that have aroused
public interest are newborn things connected the with structural reforms
such as joint enterprises of agriculture, industry and connerce, and the
system of factory director taking charge under the leadership of the
congress of workers and staff members on an experimental basis in sone
of the factories.

More and nore news of social events of public concern can be seen
on the screen, anong then are helping juvenile delinquents nend their
ways, finding jobs for those waiting to be employed, urban marriage
"exchange," old-age pensioners in rural people’s communes, hone life
of a 2.2-hetre-tall basketball player and his wife; cracking cases of
snuggling.

Every evening beginning last April, there has been ten ninutes of
satellite news, which has proved very popular. Many TV watchers want
to know more about happeinngs in snail countries and in the lives of
ordinary people.
There are also exclusive interviews with visitors from foreign
lands. One such interview was with President Giscard d’Estaing of
France who told a CCTV reporter of the measures he had taken in tack­
ing budgetary deficits when he was in chage of his country’s financial
affairs and his appraisal of French youth today. Another was an
interview with Santiago Carrillo olares, General Secretary of the
Spanish Comaunist Party, whose ceflnections with the Chinese Connunist
Party had been discontinued for sone years, Hg explained his Party’s
activies to a reporter of the sane station, The Chinese audience
found these interviews particularly interesting.

There is a programme entitled "Across the Land ," which spotlights
the scenic beauties and special features of various localities in
China.
Chatting with this correspondent, the two news editors in charge
emphasized the fact that they had been exploring ways to servo their
audience better and'the goal of their endeavours had always been:
wider covera.ge, nore prompt and vivid news-reporting.

WIDER KNOWLEDGE
A special weekly programme set up three years ago provides
viewers with a window through which to look out on the world. It has
introduced among other things the agro-industrial complexes in Yuogoslavia, a West Berlin hosptial of a new typo, the music centre in
Sydney, offshore oil drilling in Mexico, rubber planatations in Malaysia,
scientific and technological achievements in sone developed countries,
as well as cultural life, local conditions and customs in various parts
of the world. On this programme, called "Round the World,” nore than .
a hundred documentaries on dozens of countries have been shown so far.
One of the most highly enjoyed films was about the adventures of a young
British woman in Tanzania unveiling the mysterious kingdom of the
chimpanzees.
"Culture of Foreign Countries" has been running since New Year’s
Day. The first of the series was and American film about the Louvre
in Paries, and proved to be a hit among Chinese TV viewers.

Editors in charge of these two progrannes said they were aimed
at helping viewers broaden their knowledge of the world.

Other progrannes with the sane purpose include "On the Interna­
tional Scene," "Science & Technology," "Hygiene & Health," "Advice
on everyday Living" as well as "Cultural Life." The last one deals

(195)
with almost every field of literary and artistic endeavour ranging
from theatre, literature, cinema, music and dancing to art, calligra­
phy and photography. Professionals and amateurs alike find them
immedsely absorbing.
On the Chinese TV screen viewers are able to get a glinpse of
popular sports events overseas, such as surfing, canoeing and frisbee.

PROMOTING SOCIAL, PRO CRESS

Earlier on,
on, our TV crew shot some scones of people (who appeared
to be related to ranking officals or officers) stepping out of govern­
ment limousines outside Beijing’s biggest department store. These
scenes were a sharp chage against some senior cadres abusing privileges
granted them bevause of their position. — This two-minute news
evoked a strong response from the public.
CCTV, probably inspired by this, is now organizing tentatively a
special programme entitled ’’Look & Think It Over.” A greater part
of the more than a dozen subjects that have been dealt with concern
economic or social problems, looking, for instance, into the causes
of the housing shortage in Beijing, explaining why the rvnber of traffic
accidents in the capital went up at one time, or citing reasons for
vegetable scarcities on the market. On this particular programme
authorities concerned appeal to the public to make more rational use
of Beijing’s already overtapped subterranean water resources and to
economize on water, or call on people to develop collectively owned
service trades for the convenience of the public and provide more job
opportunities. The express purpose of this programme is to give a
push to the solution of problems and improve things, making use of
both criticism and praise.

This calls to nind the fact that for sone tine reporting on short­
conings and problens in the press was looked on as detrinental to
Bu-t today more and more people have cone to see that white
socialisn
washing reality will not help solvo pronlens but^ on the contrary,
conpronise the credi bility of our mass media. The efforts made by
the TV station to bring about progress in real life are truly praise­
worthy.

ENTERTAINMENT

More than half the TV progrannes here are recreational, In the
earlier years, they were mostly feature filns or live theatrical per­
fornances. China’s TV stations, state-owned and non-profit, charge
their audiences nothing, nor do they have to pay for the release of
films or live progrannes.
In recent years, however, a problem cropped up with TV sets
finding their way into many hones and the governments insistence
on enterprises handing in profits. While TV audiences ask for more
new films and theat rical performances, ninenas and theatres, out
of box-office considerations, have had to put their foot down. Our
TV stations have thus been forced to pull themselves up by their own
bootstraps.

This is how TV shows are being developed at a fast tempo. About
a month before and after last year’s October 1, National Day, CCTV
provided a nationwide programme of 46 TV shows made in various parts
of the country. It was on an unprecedented, grand scale, Since New
Year’s Day, the stationhas released a fresh batch of TV shows. A
Chinese TV show series, the first of its kind, is being shown on
Saturdays.

(196)

9

«•»-St n.
children.

011 °r S° iJrosrallLies especially designed for

Up-and-coming, TV shows have noe become the tonic of
some people trvin.'-"
7;oP1c oi che day.
trying to dnfino
define what
-- • artistically they should be
or like a film.
The general public in ■their
”
tens of thousands, however, siriply
ask for more and better TV shows,, in addition to
more and better TV
entertainkents in the form of local operas,
songs
dances, musical
programmes, as well as cross-talks, balled-singing and
and acrobatics?

EDUCATIOfl/J, FRQgRAMMES
Educational progranues on Beijing's TV
screen are provided by a
number of sponsors.

Cou?ses, ofl"ered by CC?V include basic c-—
: courses
on science and engi—
neermg (uechamcal and electrical engineerin'
’*)
/
ns
well
as basic courses
on technology. They were arranged by’the “
c
ntral
TV
and
Radio Broadcasting University under “
the
joint
sponsorship
of
the
Ministry
of
Education and the Centr&i Broadcasting Adninistration.
Tho nunicipal television station
s' '’
offers basic courses. On such
specialities as notor drive and- heat
■'
—treatment
of metals for the

e thoao xn nodical science.
cspnllSSas’
””

In Shanghai, the courses
All TV univorsitloa
------elsewhere
in
occondinc
to local
need, and

Apart from aa nationwide
1‘
network cP
of such universities, Beijing TV
station also offers
--J lectures for scientists
by the municipal science 'Commission, ------ and technicians sponsored
Advanced courses sponsored by
Beijing’s Institute of E’ ucation
are
being
provided for primary and
middle
niddle school teachers. 'Courses in basic*'/'
--;
medical
science for junior
medical
nodical personnel will be opened before long.

A 30-ninute English lossion < '
ence than any other TV progranne given
here. every evening has a larger audi> It began three years ago as a
a^’ witb no resistration
Anyone who attends'regilr^
exanination required,
--- > regularly
the required
nastcr basic En"li^h
i-r-,r y and does8 the
honework nay
lessons, taogM bv tl'< ?
1 ’00° words in 20 nonths. The
foreign lanuage institutes0^ K18? i'rofossors and teachers fron
ago, these lessons entered thni-r
'
a?d nlnP1ays* Three nonths
to help beginners reach tL
CyCle °f tea chine with a
materials have been coupUec, ”
?Vel in two ^rs • Teaching
they have been reprinted over
Published for this purpose. Although
sold, the denand still outstrip tJe^u^w
5 nilli°n COpies
The popularity of those English lessons
has led to the opening
up. of a new programme known as
Sunuay
English
” showing
showing imported
imported
films with English dialogues.

(197)
ADVERTISEMENTS:

Advertisments are something now in China’s mass media. They
appeared only after the olemination of ultra-Leftist influence in the
course of resuscitating the economy and culture.

Advertising units and clients alike stress the need for TV adverti­
sements which, they say, are helpful in cementing ties between production
and marketing and in activating the market. Thanks to these advertise­
ments, many products have found a brisk market. Advertisements, they
say, also play useful role in disseminating knowledge about various
commodities and arousing the interest of potential consumers.

Quite a few people, however, can never get used to this sort of
thing, not because advertising was for many years considered ’’capitalist”,
but because they do not take much interest in advertisements.
0000000000000

IN

VILLAGE

XIAOYUAN is a village located on a hillside 25 kilometres west of
Beijing proper. I arrived in Xiaoyuan by jeep, together with two
young work men from a district governont broadcasting section on their
round of inspedtions and maintenance of TV sets.
Five or six years ago, the production brigade here (an agricultural
unit at the grass roots level) bought a TV set with its public welfare
fund. EVery evening crowds of peple spent hours before thd TV, their
eyes.glued to the screen. At that tine, a private television sot was
practically inconceivable to inhabitants in a poor mountain village
like this.
In recent years, with the adoption of more flexible state policies
in the countryside, peasants’ income has gone up; 109 out of the 122
village households have bought their own TV sets. This is really a high
percentage, not yet attained even in urban districts of such big cities
as Shanghai and Beijing.

That afternoon I spent about two hours visiting seven fanilies with
the TV maintenance men. All the TV sets there are 12” black-and-white
models of the Peacock brand with an attractive lable, made in Suzhou
(Soochow), east China. In respect to price and performance, they are
much better than the Shanghai-made one I myself bought six years ago.
I became absorbed in finding out how the villagers responded to
the various TV programmes, which ones they liked best and so on. With­
out exception, every one of the scores of people I talked to, form seven
or eight-year-old kids to people in their sixties or seventies, con­
firmed that he or she was an ardenf’Tv fan.” Young people all said they
liked to watch feature films while most of the older people preferred
traditional operas based on historical themes or on folklore,, In the
evening the daughter of the family whom I stayed with took mo for a
wa Ik around the village. We stopped at the windows or the fences
outside some 20 peasant households; the families wore all watching
the new feature film Agent Provocateur, about a rich young couple who
in the 1940s at their wedding ceremony, announced their intention to
join the people’s armed forces but were later victimized by a sham
revolutionary.

Members of one household was watching a football game, the principal
spectator being a middle school student attending classes inside the
city. A member of the municipal junior team, he was convalescing
from a bone fracture incurred during a game. I was told that sone
young villagers were also very fond of TV sports programmes.

(198)

her whole family enjoyed watching
1 over which programme to watch in

the evening. T”
co-operation of their next-door neighbour, arranging to have a different
programme at each home, so that people could take their choice
--- j and every
one would be happy.
Near the village periphery was a workshop making stone slabs. I
saw a. igroup of women workers busy packing
the
p
auP make or
slabs
of quarric-d
quarried rocks,
rocks, with attractive S£a^blSSn?and
o^flSs
through, are ideal building materials for walls
, *
s these materials that have earned enough over the
years to enable the villagers to buy TV sots. These wonon workers
night WorelnGI?
“ °r Not Which they had seen th*
who Le Xe'to tn Th t
pertain people in Beijing and other places
«io arc aole to toll what words are written on a slip of paper sealed
Piven thot°toijle ®lacsd .b®h^nd their ears or under arnpits. What has
iven these people a special function that others do not have’ Whv is
it our scientists have thus far failed to provide an answer?'. . !

haS brouSht narked changed to the lives of
ti^ “ent
forDears for centuries were cut off from the world of
ie T.vento and changes, seeing and hearing little or nothing outside
of their own villages. Television has moved, so to speak cinema
houses’ x eatr1eS and Symasiuns right into the hitherto isolated farm-

‘,“ir vlsl“ ■“ -la“

rioiaZ’o^°iXc"tr°P10'8
0000000000000

Source:

Beijing Review, No, 10, March 9, 1981
Page No. 21 to 26.

(199)
TELEVISION

UNIVERSITY

Apart from the Central Television and Radio Broadcasting
University in Beijing, there arc
28 local ones in the country
with a total official enrolment of 32^,000 (the figure does
not include those who attend TV classes on their own)•
How do such universities function ? What goals do they pursue?
such questions are answered in the following short article.

WHAT is the salient feature of China1s television unifersity?

It is that of collective study with face-to-facre tutorial,as
formulated by the President of Beijing Televison and Radio Broadcasting
University. I learnt during my visit to a heavy duty machinery works
in the city that a university of this type, with this salient feature
is not opeji to everyone.
The classroom was spacious and well-lighted. There was a television
set baside the black-board and another one at the corner in the rear of
the room. Over a dozen students seated before each of the ' e'1 elision
screens were attending class. This was the last session of the term
they had before the termend exam. In a few days they would sit for
examinations of the TV university and the results would devide whether
or not they could continue their studies the following term.
In a brief chat after class, I loarnt that they had been admitted
to the department of mechanical engineering five months ago after
having passed unified entrance examinations drawn up by the university.
Their class was made up of 58 new students from the factory and two
entries from a nearby small factory. They get instructions from a work
station set up in their locality by the university; their classrooms
and laboratories arc also in the vicinity.

The students came from different workshops in the factory and among
them were lathe operators, fitters foregers and mechanics. There was
a sprinkling of draughtsmen from the designing section who had been
holding down fairly good jobs. All felt they knew too little and
wanted to know more. Among them was a pretty girl from the accountant’s
office. She confided to me quite frankly that she had come to study
because she hoped to find a new job after graduation. She^came from
a technician’s family and experienced the outburst of the cultural
revolution” when she was in jjrimary school. What with the
contin­
uing °haos, her high school education was ov er and she had loarnt
very little. So she had studied hard on her own and tried to teach
herself; she had sat for college entrance examinations once before
but had failed.
A large nuriber of young workers today have had similar experi­
ences. This is why thej^ are flocking to apply for enrolment in the
television university. Those admitted must be the lucky ones. They
leave their old jobs and throw themselves into their studies heart
and soul. The factory where they worked before pays their tuition
and laboratory foes and provides them with other needed facilities.
They get their monthly wages as before and are entitled to the sane
free medical service and whatever fringe benefits they enjoyed before.

(200)

They live more or ?less like regular college students, attending
TV classes together regularly in the morning as required; this method,
as they have cone to sec, is much better than attending classes
_J separately at hone.
■*

•

■'

*

a

•

■

■

They receive tutoring in the afternoon, Tutors explain the main
points and the difficult part of the lectures to help them understand
better. They also <answer
—
‘‘
. ■ . students to develop the
questions
and- train
ability to study on their own. One
C
’‘ tutors told me that that
of" the
nearly every one of his students worked
v Lhard, many of them staying
---- 1 ■very
up till late at night to ---master- their
lessons,
--In his opinion, it was
possible that in three years
;
time they would be nearly as good as any
graduate
of
.
regular college. Sone simply have left hone and moved
into the fac-uory’s dormitory for single workers. To prepare for the
term-end examinations, ine of them does not even go home for meals,
whereas proor to this, he had always enjoyed cooking and eating with ‘
his wife after work. Teachers have to remind students from tine to
tine to get sone rest.
The enthusiasm of the faculty members and the diligence of the
students are heartening; our new generation of educated young people
are showing great promise.
*********-X-*

Source:

*

Beijing Review, No.10. March 9, 1981.
J?age : , 26 to 28 .

(201)

EDUCATION_IN

china

The last Ching dynasty by 1900 was governing around 300 million
peasants — more farmers than one can find in /unerica, Europe,
♦ apan and the USSR put together. In this task two main conflictin
concepts came to a clash . On one side Liu's policy was aimed
at creating "experts'’ under the slogan "technique in command" while
on the other side Mao ideas on education were dominated by the
slogan "Politics in command".For Mao, only transformation
of human consciousness could bring about material progress.
For him, Material progress cannot transform -human consciousness
nor produce the new "Socialist Man" required for the new society.
The confrontation between these two concepts are explained in
the present article.

PART - I

When the new educational policy of the Cultural Revolution was
spelled out and began to be implemented, it was thought that the Chinese
were out to overturn the educational pyramid which dominated the
superstruc ture of the world. It was thought that this was the end of
elitist education fostered by Liu Shaoqi and butteressed by the ancient
mandarin tradition of the country. The Maoists hardly saw any difference
between the pre-liberation education and the one imparted after libera­
tion under Liuist dispensation. Just as the aim of prelibcration
education was to produce comprador intellectuals, cultural puppets of
foreigners and politicians of all sorts, the purpose of post-liberation
education likewise was to urture cultureal mandarins, bureaucrats and
self-seeking intellectuals o Instead of producing ’Worthy successors
to the revolutionary cause;! what the Chinese schools and universities
wero~ churining our were ca??rcerists or lily-white scholars who considered physical or marual work to be meant only for the uneducated work er
and farrier.

This waw unacceptable to Mao and his followers. For the Maoists
the goal of all education was to train workers’ and peasants’ children
’with botn socialist consciousness and culture, and not intellectual
aristorcrats who wore divorced from revolutionary politics, from
production and from the life of workers and peasants’. 1 Education,
therefore, became one of the central issues of Cultureal Revolution.
Only a shake-up of the whole system-the basic re-education of teachers,
the development of a new curriculum and new methods for integration of
study, work, research and production- could transform it all into
so cialist education.
The first thing the Maoists attacked was the system of admission
to the high s chools and univerisites based on an open entrance and
examination in which the dice was always heavily loaded against the
children of workers and farmers due to their poor educational and
cultural backgraound as compared whith those of intellectuals, officials
and cadres. Moreover, the majority of them were educated in the
exclusive ’key-point’ schools . ;\nd the competition was so hard and
the university scats so few that ox ar fifty million school graduates
were competiong for only three undreed thousand university positions. 2
It was, truly speaking, as difficult for a son or a daughter of a
farmer or factory worker to enter'a university as for the Biblical
camel to pass through the eye of a needle, The universities were thus
preparing the sons of officals fto become officials. Mao wrote:
’The entrance examination system should bo scrapped, The students should '
return to production after a few years of s tudy. 3 According to
the Maoists, one of the worst vices bequeathed to the Chinasesociety

community health cell
47/1. (first Floor) St. M.rksSead
B

I

(202)

Wi+T1 CW e^uca't:LOn Policy, therefore., laid enphasis on conbing theory
with practice, and the knower and the doer in the sane person. It
clained to Crete a now nan willing to take up both mental and physcial
irr
and capablQ of handling both the conputer and the pickof Liuis 1 education-self-cultivation and selfhid t° b® abandoned in fabour of constant strug le against
f-interest, desire for fane and other hunan inperfections. The
-eclared ain of Maoist education was to uplift people morally, intelle•Thr yMand phfstcally and onagago the students at all levels in the
V th° novorient for production, the novenent for scientic
Ind shed if
i CfaSS *trU^le- The educ utio* had to be rooted in practice
nractill I
fDstra °t and arid character, as only by taking part in
Ind * ? °+ld °nf eraSp theory quickly, understand it profoundly
lid slS/f 0^®atlvuly*'
5 Carrying their onslaught against the
old system further, the Maoists poited to out that for two millennia
sXiSi™ln™I had inpriS2ned thS nindS °f y°Une pcople in tradition,
selv^J (Ind d obedlence to elders. The voung had to liberate thennlS
If f°I-nISt-hfP then d° S°)by ^tioning the funda^hlrnd r eCep* of flllal Piety-the notion that the wisdon of age
2S neZ be+FSti0I1:d- N° nore subai3si0* uud kowtowing beofore
then
Whp^
I Parents arc revolutionary children should succeed
/nd
/hI parents are reactionary the children should rebel. 6
of ’Thlil him education must culivate among the students the spirit
arm^s -daring to think, daring to speak and daring to act.
as opLosod^o3!^10^0^^0^1^ ,ex£erts’ or ’technique in command’
as opposed to Mao’s politics m command’ ensured the domination of
burgeois mtellectuais in the schools and universities^ Z slressed

ZZn thlZ T? Sr/1"38 atand’ p—1 dareerisnZove
flXEn ovel thlZ n
US Ha°iSt preccPt) superiority of things
abilitv tl LZ
sClmieSe’ e2ar2inations as surprise attacks over one's
ability
and reason. They also stressed the cultivation of the

abmSt

S°M C'J1Vr‘1

«’«• aovblopine

s f GVery work?r, peasant and solider. This according to Mao
as the oourgeoiseducation which had to be replaced by a ’p-enuinn
’
CpertZ
elation’, capable of creating both reds' Ind
’ Ifeo^tbus emphasized the role of education in mouldin,- the
transflrlltr
PeOple and serving proletarian politics. Only
transformation of hunan consciousness could bring about materialOnly
7
progress and not the other way about, Material propels ZZ transform
hunan consciousness, as maintained by the Liuists.
human

W

Mao also de-enphasized the value of book learning, long class-room
uros anc. frequent exaninations. He rightly thought that Chinese
iZinition33!^3^6?
3Xaninations-entrance examination,' mid-term
ar™ ip 1Z dZtsTZ3 fn’ final exaninati°n:
'The examinations

I-asalnsb an Gneny-

SotiraS M Z

are ambushed full of

the iZrLt
questions. It is nothing but the methods used in
the imperial examinations with their eight-leg,-ed essays
7 As
bit a ?otOIf ^adlnG Mao/hought that a little reading was 111 right
eXos I Sci iZs£aZU1^^h^ionary practice that rlars
opening the choZZ phrasesas( 'storming the citadel of knowledge,'
? t chests ox lermng’, ’warming hands at the firs of 1

SXS36 Instead
prlparil- SenleLIJ f
ZiotZ

t

°01d- This was all bourgeois sentimental
" enJ)llaslzed tho following for the s tudents
VlnG and WirkinG a in developing socialist

(a). Systematically study and Icarnfrom the works of Marx

sool«Sm
o

t-XciXl oLl •

’fv0

yo"

En"ls

i“™ ■°«^e S™t

Philosophy, political sooaoay a»a solsntlrio

(20.5?
(b) Form correct judgments and conclusions through consideration,
evaluationl, and conparision.
and foremost to have a correct political orientation
(c) •^irst
:
fight against reachtiorary pragmatism and obscurantism.

(d.)

Hold high the .banner of Marxisn and scientific socialisn.

(e)

Draw truth frori fadts. don!t be doctrinairee

Mao had another preoccupation in the field of education and that
was how to keep educationfron producing a new privileged class in the
Chinese society. According to Maoists, several decades of socialist
practice had not eliminated the traditional tendencies of the intellectuals denigrating workers and peasants and using education as neans of
personal advancement. Continuing education was, therefore, necessary
to overcone the attitude of superiority, elitism and selfishness which
characterized Confucian and bourgeois mentalities. Old ideas were
deeply ingrained and even the coning of ago of a generation reared
totally under communist rule did not end the struggle. Mao believed
that one way to prevent the emergence of a new class was through
manual labour and political study. When an intellectual carries manure
to the fields, plants rice saplings, standing ankle-deep in mud, or
feeds hogs and cleans their pens, he is likely to sober down a.bit, be
less arrogant and think differently of the manual worker. Marxist
tradition regards manual labour as a necessary ovil from which man
will be gradually freedy by technological progress. But for Mao it
had a nobility of its own and was of irrespJLacable educ. ational value.
The idea of pupils and teachers a spending- half their time in physical
labour is not motivated so much by economic necessity as by its function
in characger fornationo Education through work was a universal value
closely connected with the socialist ideal. Marx believed that the
difference between mental and physical labour would essentially
disappear, and that there ought net to be one ■ set of people working
with their brains while the others used their muscles. It was this
understanding that led to the famous or notorious 7 May schools for
the re—education of intellectuals. The May 1966 directive of the
CPC Central Committee said:
!It is essential that the young intelle­
ctuals be re.educated in the countryside by the poor and the lowermiddle peasants. The urban cadres must be persuaded to send their
children who have completed junior and senior middle school or univer­
sity to the countryside where comrades in the various rural regions
must give then a warn welcome. ' 8

The circular laid stress on combining mental and physical labour
and developing an all-round personality of workers, peasants, army
men and intellectuals. It called upon the 'oRed Army men to combine
theoretical study with practice of agricultural and industrial work,
the workers to concentrate on industrial work but also to educate
themselves in military, political and cultural mattersb The peasant
in the commune should concentrate on agricultural production, and yetnot neglect military training and cultural oducation. This also
applied to students who must prinarly devote themselves to study and
at the same tine acquire other types of knowledge. They must study not
only the cultural things but industrial, agricultural and military
things also9 They must criticize the bourgeoisise and see to it that
the bourgeois intellectuals do not dominate the schools and universi­
ties. The idea was that education should shape a new human specie-an
all-round integrated nab, cleansed of all individualistic and
materialistic tendencies. And thiscould be nade possible by conbining
mental with physical labour.

Mao was an oneny of elitis t education • According to him when
education became elitist the country suffered from cultural poverty.
Elitist education is the hallmark of a class society not of a socialist
one. He was for abolishing the so-called 1key-point1 was for

(204)
schools and colleges, started by Liu Shaoqi on the plea of scaricit Qf
The key schools wore first introduced in the I960 s. At
were singled out to receive the brightest
students, the best teachers, and the
The prevailing argunent at that time nost advanced education naterials.
was to concentrate the United
resources on those children with the
argunent
is
being
off
cred
’
today
’
.
'
.adG?;LCwere
Potential.
The sa“ne
argument is being offered today. The key ac
schools
heafily iriti
““
^ev
S’
, Culty“1 Revalution as
t
iSS™
.
as <
application and^olitics 13 Stud^t
0111^ skills
sk^llc and to
on acadenic
too° little on practical
application and politics.
likely to cone froPtiPPWh° attended thosG schools wore
"
i i „ ■t':6s.°f Pro^essionals and government officials
-- —
families,
acre te.ourcca"o
“et'peasant
’ttcStcgM
i«ri;a
f<>"llia» hS--children
in the^key
the backdoor', that is bv AvS- f y admitted “
h® key schools 'through
their childrel were Are llZlvAA A A pUllinC
pulling' StrinCS
strings,’ In ^^ion,
these schools that th IhSreJ froX J 6 educational
0dAatiOnal requirements
requirements of
was important since better ™-A
On YOrker aand
fellies. Txixo
This
,
nd peasant families.
education
led
to
better
jobs
and
better
jobs
meant better life. These schools .
c-oo_s
during the Cultural
Revolution, and it was thought
to were^
be theabolished
c '
j end of elitist education is
tA1 Al ChAa- In 1977’ how®ver, with the
the saddle, they staged a come-back and —j new leadership firmly in
were reinstituted from primary
through higher education.
elitiS°handron??hat ^^^0^
that iS’ socialist and nonThese Ideas S themselves Lva .
Cr°atc " ncw uan ln Chi^«
in the hands of the far left A bdi °p-an4_alld ultra-left stroak. Yet
ship in the Cultural Revolution At lunatic fringe that provided leader
applied in a biSare KXon clu.werePdsint^preted, distroted and
China. When applied ■thov
nggcat danaSe to education in
than solutions, more iljs thlTcur
creatinS “o re problems
ultra-left
clainndidthn+
cures, more
good
only roaoLSSy
S’ harm
’’S* than fr
™ ’. 9 The «■
they debunked all technical a
sc^ools
the universities
Idoolocioal oduoll. ’ “A1 “
“* l-«ossloml trains, 0„ly
if not positively harmful
?ho nnA ,
11(;™nC was of little use
you became. Book learning should t. y°UJ tudied the more reactionary
with the masses. In their view th ° repdaCed
Practico and integration
producing -successor to the bo A
extstT^ educational system was
intellectual and physical labour At! \A^aSinC?he gap between
city and countryside. Therefore’ A 1T
Peasant, between
unmask ’the antipartv and
?
effort must be made to
the black line o?educational system
W^Th^
authoritics
left were: -suspect everythin" ovo-nth
°
slocans of the ultra­
examinations, no acquiring- ofAATthrow everybody’ i -no classes, no
was a better measuring stick than Ltll locAA* rGyogtionary conviction
through examinations. They were sAoAiA * 1 conpetence Proven only
regard' for scholars prevalent A A ally ane®red by the -excessive
educational authorities' and bv thAtA’
'arr0Gant bourgeois
bourgeois despots of Aience ' S w ‘
’reactionary
was not interested in education lookA vA! OOV10US.that the ultra-left
aped, forredoomed to fall. In July
S pyranld standing on its
wore closed down with a view to*"'rXi • ?• •&11 schools and universities
fof the youth and the students'.
llllzlnS the revolutionary potential
P A R T II

education policyAithoJAundeStondin Zh^A l®YO?-UtiOn °r its
ing-not merely the party ST1nrn+,T A th? establlshnent it was attackbut the Chinese bureaXS. AAt A
ShaOqi and Len^ Xiaoping
habit A
that Mao Saw reappearing in the
Party and the state! S natSnas
All cSna
nationas
so the ancient■ ones
like
wAh 41 prlSonars of their history, more
ones
like
China
heritage and traditions
This with
1 A
1 A unbrokcn politico-cultural
-- This
loads
or tarocucratic XX
’ntX
“J *“*
tto.“l»oso Invention
c ^ovennnent two "thousands
and the’ir subsequent invention o-f - anCS ^ef-rs aS‘o in the Han period
i of paper,
paper, printed
printed books
books and
and civil
civil service
examinations.

(205)
The Chinese are a the inventors of the examination system. One
thousand years ago under the Sang dynasty the examination system was the
major arm of the state. Down to its abolition in 1905 it recruited
the indoctrinated elites (indoctrinted with traditional Confusican
precepts) needed to govern the masses for the emperor. Governing the
peasants has always been the great speciality as well as a necessity
in the world’s most stable empire. While the Han dysasty had governed
around 45 million peasants, the last Ching dysnasty by 1900 wasjgovern■
' , Mao1s succgssors today have 800 million
ing around 300 million
peasants.
—more farmers than one can find in ^mercia, uropu, Japan and USSR
put together. 11
This is what made education so important. One in power in 1949
on the strength of a peasant army Mao needed, to establish institutions
for the regime through an indoctrinate elite such as the examination
system had provided down to 1905. He needed persons trained in his
state orthodoxy who could propogate his new social order. Since party
rule had supplanted'dysanstic rule, Mao’s new elite had to come from
the
reds* connitted to the connunist
the party and its cadres, or \
— ’--doctrine and the Maoist concept of revolution, How to train such activists through China’s educational system was a top priority question.

It was not as easy as one night think, Until 1905 those who wanted
to rise in the world had prepared for the old government examinations
through private institutions in family and village. The elite had also
used sone three hundred acadenies which were^the only residential
schools and colleges in the country. The examination system of many­
tiered, multi—channelled structure had fostered an ’examination system
psychology,’ among men of worldly ambition. It offered literary skill
orthodox thinking, and conservative morality, if not bigotry, while
offering little change for technical specialization. Only during 1911 *“49
the interregnum of central power between the end of Ching dynasty and
the take-over by the connunist party, the Chinse education had been
byilt in modern style, first by organizing a school system on Japanese
lines (SunYat-sen was an admirer of the Japanese school system) and
then setting up iniversities largely on the liberal America?* model.
This period was saw the proliferation of China’s new literati which
included jounalists, writers, teachers, doctors, engineers and other
professionals, not a few of them having been trained in Japan and
western countries. They wore the first frop of modern intelligenstia.
They did not think with one mind, nor were they primarly devoted
(though some came to be lenown as comprador intellectuals serving the
foreigner) to the propoganda of the state ideology and its doctrine of
’Virtuous Conduct’ (though a section joined the Guomindandg and few
were attracted towards the com unist ideology.) They were specialists,
modern people with knowledge whom leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng
Xiaoping after 1949 wanted to recruit as experts to help modernize
China. But they were not the functional successors of the old exami­
nation degree holders. Their successors, paradoxically, were the new
’red party cadres, a selected elite morally committed to the great
leader and his vision of an egalitarian revolution.
For many centuries the Chinese dynastic governments had relied
upon indoctrinated cadres selected through examinations. They were (
not a Soviet or a Maoist invention. The fact that in the past their
ideas were leased on Confucianism and later on Maoism did not change
their function in the system. In this sense the new Tred cadres were
the prototype of the old mandaring coming through history and tradit^
In some ways China’s aforementioned intelligentisia (the products of ulie
period 1911-1949) were more novel than the communist party cadres.
Thus the stage was set for the ’class struggle* of the ’red’ verwus
the expert’.

(206)
r A R T III
Viewed in this hostorical perspective, the Cultural Revolution
was a product of more than an old man’s frustration. It represented
an inevitable conflict between the new ruler’s need for ideological
loyalty and.the moderzier’s need for special skills. It was a"
revolution indeed, but unlike the proleteian revolution it was a
revolution from above’, conforming to a long tradition with its roots
in the structure and culture of China. This was in line with the
’cultural revolutions’ initiated by the emperors before. After all,
traditional China was a bureaucratic society like the society under
the communists, although at different levels of productive forces:
and social relations of production. Historians still recall in parti­
cular the reforms of Chinshi Huang—ti and his minister Li SSu, initated
less spectacularily under the Ming and Ching dynasties.

Mao was highly traditional in conceiving of education as indoct—
rination. ]He deplored oven the modern specialization that the Chinese
Connunist Party nodeled1 on the Soviet system in the 1950s because it
gave the specialist a basis
1
for being independent minded and politically
unorthodox, r•
'
. -But• since Mao wanted to bring
atu least in 1 his
speciality.
the peasant
into
the very centre VJof puxx
politics
A------- --*
uxud f li
he­ was faced with the
the problen that the schoold exaninations wouldJ. <continue to favour
children of educated parents and specialists recruited' to modernise
China and would seldom cone Iron the peasantry!
Mao had adopted the peasant's ancient distrust of the literati as
hangers—on of bureaucrats and local magnates. He had also inherited
the Chinese att^xk on the old examination system from Wang Anshih
(1021-86) in the Ching dynasty. 12 Education China has a long and
sophisticated histroy that has left residual attitudes and assumptions
such as those who week with their braisn rule and those who work with
their hands are to be ruled, that learning is to serve society through
the state, and that orthodoxy is essential to order.

Mao, therefore, wanted ’politics in command’, to achieve the
integration of education and society and to greate ’peroletrian
intellectuals’ who will serve the society through the communist state
and will uphold Maoist orthodoxy so essential for the new state. This
led Mao to exalt the peasant over the scholar and ultimately ensnared
him in a struggle against modern learning. By 1970, with the Culture
Rev olution at its peak, the link between education and society through
production was being forged in three ways: (i) by workers’ participa­
tion in the university, (ii) by teachers’ participation in production,
and (iii; by students’ participation in labour. The integration of
education and society was to be achieved through the inter-changeability
of the roles.of teafhers, students, workers and peasants. Thur the
cult of physical labour and of the peasant was fostered, and it was
decided that the only way to fight agganist Liuist subversion of the
party’s educational philosophy was by the closure or unicersities and
institues and by pttiling down the educational system.
PART

IV

The strug. le did not begin at once. As stated before, the pre­
liberation system had continued in its place duxing the 1950s and even
after. Students competed at four successive levels: to enter prinany
school (6 years), junior high school (5 years), senior high school (
(,3 Years) and university (4 Years). The old Chinese fixation on degree
status as the measure of success was as strong as ever. The government
examinations before 1905 had been at the county, prefectural, provincial,
capital and palace levels. Now the revolution had once again asserted
the primacy of ideology, which formerly had been ensured by the mastery
of the Confucian classics, but which the liberal curriculum of the
20th century had abandoned.

(207)
•j. ■Durinf'
1950s the COP rated school applicats according to three
criteria: family class origin, political behaviour and academic pcriornance. Class origin ranged from good (CCP cadres, soliders, workers
and peasants) to oad (capitalists rich farmers, landlords and rightists).
In each_district the school, best staffed and equipped, was made a
Key-pointschool into which came the children of CCp cadres (of good
class origin) and of the high level intelligentsia. Working class'
youth filtered into poorer high schools and into separate echelons:
o vocational schools that fed the graduates directly into factories.
r.T,nrlllMFlyleZP!ddents Were also triod t0 Produce ‘worker-peasant-soldieer
graduates -setting up part tine and people-managed schools, shortening
Anothrv^f0'1'11 ladder’ sinplifyYng textbooks and reducing requirements.
Another reform was to reduce the rate memorizing that had been inculnndot 7 t ° Sp?cial nature of Chinese writing, belief in literary
models and the tradition of promoting ethical behaviour through classica moral raixins. The teacher assumed that there was a singletruth'
that should bo trufht, the 'correct line' and they set frequent test
To combat this.tendency the 'key-point' schools and universities
experimented with open-book examinations, half-farming, half-study
scnools, as well as by compressing the twclve-year system into ten
years, as m the Soviet Union.

By
had petered
petered out,
out and the old high school exams and
y 1965 both
ootn had
regular academic curriculum came back once again. It was difficult
tor the Chinese public to give up the examination route-the meritocracy'
I^C11 0^1Sinated m China and was nurthured in that country for centuries.
A_y scholar of ancient Chinese history 13 win remind us that meritoc­
racy m China antedates Christinanity in the West, and the Chinese
examination system is far older thantrial by jury in Britain. Its
legitimacy as the main channel for getting ahead in the world is deeply
impeded m the Chinese mental make-up. Before Casesar or Christ the
Chinese emperrors had begun to examine candidates recommended by high
officials. LOng before Charlemagne the Chinese examination system was
1 irmly m place: candidates secured the recommendation of officials,
they were impartially examined and ranked by the Ministry of Rites
and were appointed to office by the Ministry of Personnel, so that
selection and appointment were separated. The procedures and the
safeguards, the various kinds of degrees including those obtainable
°r-b? sin»le reconnendation, the apportionment of degree
q
A. y administrative areas, the continuing 'examination life' of
an official as he clinebod higher in the hierarchy, all these complexi­
ties make an enormous record. Over the centuries in the major capitals
thousands would compete triennially as they do now every year. The
about tSS °reatod waa.hardly more than two per cent of the population.
Tb« t „
? pwrT 1011 as the Chinese diversity, graduates today.
th®
°f M?° S °ultural Revolution was that in trying to shake off
—bus of China's hoary past he discredited learning in
As the competition intensified in the 1960s among an increasing
number of students, tension built up between political activists
mainly in the Communist League and the academic achievers mainly from
the nin-proletarian families, 4 battle royal began between what is called
the 1virtuocracy* and ,' meritocracy* Ambitious students had to choose
which road to follow-the
-j :road of Cultural Revolution (’virtuocracy)1 or
the traditional road associated with Liu Shaoqi (' meritocracy''(F/
^hus was set the stage for the eventual student warfare betweenthe
d. .a*d
'experts' which led to the closure of the universities
and
high
schools
nvdi0R7
hMSC
^°i1S and the
th® collapse
C011aPse (°f the entire educational system,
■oy 1967 Maoist reforms
took
- -7— -- over China’s education: student warfare
was quelled
(
by forcible rustication of the Red Qu ards, ’key-point*
schools ?9 ^ntrance exa minations were abolished in favour of a system
of rcconne'aation (the: traditional alternative to examinations).
Rural branch schools •we re set up to facilitatte the student labour
in the fields. The curriculum was watered down, and academic achieveQent positively discouraged.

(208)
After Mao died in 1976 all this had to be reversed. Liu Shaoqi
was rehabilitated. His famous work on education and self-cultivation
How to Be a Good Communist wa s published and his collected works
are cur.rently being printed.. Examinations are back with full force,
and ’meritocracy’ is in full bolossom. This process of educational
reform was accelerated after the Sixth Bienoxy Session of the Eleventh
Central Committee in June 1981, and the4" Twelfth National Congress of
the CCP in September 1982.
The idological overloading was halted. • In its stead, educational
quality was to take its rightful place, starting with the primary school.
The starting age for children was lowered from seven to six. The time
set aside for physical labour was shortened considerably. Examinations
were again seen as an important method of controlling learning and
instruction achievements. Differences in ability and character structure
were again recognized, and accordingly special educational and training
establishments for the highly talented were set up.
the beginning
of December held 1977 the National ^ducational Conference held in
Beijing passed new regulations on university enrolment. Entrance
examinations were made obligatory for all colleges and universities.
The Previously mandatory two-year work on a factory or a commune as a
prerequesite for university studies was dropped. In 1977, 5.7 million
young people applied for the entrance examination. Only 278,000 or about
5 per cent of the applicats wore admitted in February 1978 to the 400
institutions of high or learning, ^inal examinations, abandoned :
during the Cultural Revolution, were again the i.erm. China’s next
generation will have to be qualified.
A direftive of the Central Committee 18 September 1977) laid the
foundations for the reorganization of science, technology and research.
A realistic assessment produced the statement that neither the number
nor the educational standard of the scientists and technicians was
sufficient to proceed with the necessary moddrnization of agriculture,
industry and national defence. The reseafch institutions, closed
during the Culture Revolution, were instructed to commence work and
the Commission for Science and Technology which had also been dissolved
during the Cultural Revolution was re-established.
Clearly defined areas of jurisdiction with personal responsibility,
Generally for the institutes1 director, under the leadership of the
party comnittee, were set up. The directors with their deputies of the
rcasearch institutes were civen free rein in their specialized fields.
Also colleges and universities reinstated their academic titles:
professor, associate professor and assistant professor, ete. On various
occasions it was enphasixed that while the principle of independence
and self-reliance was good and would be adhered to, this should not
hinder one in learning from ’the advanced science and technology of
other nations’, and taking over ’as fast as possible’ the newest results
of international research. The Chinese intelligentsia was sent in
large numbers to the western countries in order to study in scientific
and technological areas especially necessary for China’s progress.
Tens of thousands were to study in the West.

In March 1978 the National Science Conference took place in
Beijing. At this conference the programmes for an accelerated devo—
lopicent, and especially the ’perspective for the development of
science and technology1! (1978-85), were presented. Addressing this
conference Deng Xiaoping 14 made it clear that China could not do
without pure research. He promised thescientists a fair deal—fivesixth of their weekly work time will be reserved for their special­
ities,' highly qualified scientists will be provided with assistants
and their administrative work load will be kept to the minimum.
Asking the scientists ’to storm the citadels of science together with
one heart’, he de-enphasized politics for the intelligentisa. He told
the cheering scientists: ’A person who tried to improve his knowledge

(209)

and skill cannot bo expected to spend a lot of tine on political and
theoretical books, or to attend nany nestings, unconnected with his
work.’ 15.
Noteworthy was also.the increasee interest in the social sciences,
he forner faculty of philosophy and social sciences, originally
subordinated to the Chinese Academy of Sc iences, In 1978 the academy
presic.ed overly Hu Qiaonu comprised 18 research institutes: philosophy,
economics, industrial economy, agrarian econony, finance and connerce",
international economy, jurisprudence, literature, linguistics, history,
archaeology, world religion, anthropology, journalism, and information
, ®Ory’. I\7the neantine most of these institutes have commenced
publishing their own jounals. One of these jounals. Social Science
ront, which appeared in 1978, declared that it would adhere to the
prmcipie of let a hundred flowers bolln and a hundred schools of
thought contend.’

In the field of art and literature a ‘new spring1 appeared-the
liberation from ideological ]pressure
—
and iron the sterile party ’culture
assonbly line*.
Music
by
Bach,
Mozart,
, .
.
•
» anc^ Beethoven, still proscribed
oeing bourgeois
twaddle, reappeared in concert p
-----programmes.
1970 I1® BeuJine Central Or chestra performed Beethoven's
ifth ynphony m the People's Cultural Hall and received a standing
ovation. Shakespeare was also rehabilitated. A Shakespearean edition
nlLaqhe£dyAPeare!i
th® narkot- In Juno 1982 the Indian classical
p ay Shakuntala was staged in Beijing and a number of Indian classical
dancers performed to packed Chinese audiances. The dispute with
seientif^^^J031 ltS foraQr virulenco and became more objective and
e entific after a seminar of scholars on the subject. Education in
China is surely forging ahead. But Mao’s Cultural ^evolution for a
proletarian culture
-- - - stull
---- -- regains an enigma, a nearly incredible cataclysri, iappeaiing
mnano but appalling in detail . We arc still far
from understanding. it. Eight hundred million peasants are still there
in the villages. How are they to be educated for a modern life9
MOTES
1.

2.
3.

Cited by Donald S. Zagoria, China By ^aylight, 1975, p. 155.
aylisht, 1975, p. 155.

Nao-s 4^VXeeU:rb96S

and

ntnietta, Daily Life m Revolutionary China, 1972, p.82-87.
Maria ^ntnietta,
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

c

XDICl, p. p5 .

Beijing Review, 7 October 1967, p. 3.
Mao’s 7th May Directive, no.3.87.
4°n^1Ck ^ckFarquhar, That Origin of Cultural Revolution,
1974, p. 62.
?
.
9
Mao’s 7th May Day directive, no. 3, p. 87
Ibid, p. 88.
1

Un&er Jonathan, Eduction Under Mao, 1980, p.65.
Ibid.’ p. 67.
•

Robert Taylor, China’s Intellectual Dilemia: policies
anu University Envrolnent, P. 38.
15. No. 10, p. 72.
14. _See Beijing Review, 13 April 1978.
15. Ibid.
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SECTION 5

CHINArS FOREIGN POLICY /

oreign policy is an integral part of the overall policy
oi a nation. It is shaped by ideological as well as
economic and security considerations.All these elements
are at play. In this section important events which
have marked the development of China’s Foreign rela­
tions have been summarised, in a first document.
The theoretical guiding princples of China's foreign
Policy are contained in the well known theory of the
di±irentiation of the three worlds. This has been
e3JPiuined in the second document.Finally the position
o± China vis-a-vis the Third world has been brought
out m a final document.

CON TENT

1_. LANPivWKS 11. CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS

An historical survey.
—CHINES^E UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD SITUATION
theory behind the foreign policy of ChinaC
The differentiation of the three worlds
CHINA BELONGS FOR EVER TO THE THIRD WORLD

Page

211

21?

222

Support to the thrid world and opposition
to hegemonism.

ofhtheD1thrS°^U1\fOII0rd the
th° theory
theory of
of the
the differentiation
differentiation
Soviet TTn-ir,
at a time when
-- the
-- two
...j superpowers, the
, °n and the United States, became locked in a cut-throat
new
r
hegGmony and woro actively preparing for a
theory provides the international proletariat,
the socialist countries and the oppressed nations with a powerful
uniwT /eaPO11 f°r fOrgin®
and building the broadest
cd front against the two hegemonist powers and their war
policies ana for pushing the world revolution forward".
( Peking Review, Nov. 4, 1977)•

(213)
grantedthem political asylum amd made the incident known to the world.
China disliked it. In securing the border, the Chinese army clashed
with tbe Indian forces in the disputed area in late October.Twelve Indian
border policemen were killed.
The conflict alarmed Asia. To demonstrate that the People Republic of
China could ana would reach agreements by negotiations with neighbours
on border issues, Peking concluded in 1960-62 friendship and border
treaties with Burma, .Nepal, Pakistan,Afghanistan and Outer Mongolia.
No agreement was reached between China and India.While accusing China of
illegally building a highway through the disputed area of Askai Chin, Indda
actively prepared for self-defense.By September 1962, India had built
forty-three outposts and had proudly accepted Soviet Military aid (jet
fighters) in addition to Britain's and the United States'. One month
later, a now war broke out. After a month of fighting (Octobor-November)
India suffered a greater defeat than in 1959.The Chinese advanced deep
into Indian territory, both in Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency.
Peking announced a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew its troops to
the original disputed region.
Six Afro-Asian countries (Burma, Cambodia, China, Ceylon, Indonesia
and the UAR) held a conference for mediation at Colombo in December 1962.
Their proposal was rejected by Peking in January 1963, and the Sino-Indian
border dispute has remained unsettled ever since.
Laos amd Vietnam. Events in Laos.and Vietnam also reflected the difficulties
in maintaining the principles of peaceful coexistence. In 1958-60, while
the United States offered military and economic assistance to the non­
Communist government of Laos, Hanoi and Peking aided the revolu­
tionary Pather Lao.In 1960-61, Soviet arms for both the Laotian
government and the Pather Lao were flown in via China and Vietnam. In
early 1961, The Soviet Union became very influential in Laos.The alotian
crisis then came to a head with the North Vietnam-Pather Lao forces
overran the Laotian highlands. As the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated
China lo .onger provided the transit stops for Soviet planes to Laos.
The Soviet Union founded it necessary to agree to a conference on peace
and neutrality in Laos in order to check Peking and Washington there.
A lengthy Geneva conference was held from May 1961 to June 1962 which ended
with an agreement on laotian neutrality and foreign troops withdrawal.
The Sino-Sovict Dispute. After 1959? several major issues aggravated the
Sino-Sovict dispute. Apart from the problems mentionned
earlier ( de-Stalinization, Yugoslavia, and t!'o commune) the major issues
in dispute in 1959-65 were •

l.Tho Secret Atomic Agreement by which, in October 15, 1957, the
Soviet would help China develop its nuclear capability.But later , Krushchev
asked for a say in China’s future nuclear
..
delivery system
because he was concerned that a nuclear China might be too powerful
to be kept aligned. Mao refused it.Krushchev then "Eor^ped” the agreemnt
on June 20, 1959 .

2>Imperialism, War and Peace. Kkk Peking resented Krushchev’s visit
to the United States in September 1959 to promote his peaceful coexistence
policy. To patch up thing, Krushchev rushed to Peking on October 1 —
one day after his return from the United States --for the tenth anniversary
of the founding of the People Republic of China. It was of no avail. On
April 16, I960 the Red Flag published a 15?000 word article entitled ”
Long Live Leninism” in honour of Lenin’s ninetieth birthday. It openly
challenged Soviet Ideological leadership and stressed Lenin’s belief that
wjr ’’was an inevitable outcome 2 of the imperialist system.
J.. Withdrawal of Soviet

Economic Aid.
The Third Congress of the
Rumania Communist Party in late Juno I960 unexpectedly witnessed an
open conf.-ontatiom between Krushchev and P-eng Chen, China’s chief
delegate to the Congress,Poking later charged that the confrontation
was a ’’soviet all-out and a on-verging attack” on the Chinese Communist
Party. In anger, Krushchev ordered the withdrawal in August-September
I960 of the entire Soviet economi', and technical mission .This came at a
ti^o
“
'■
'-I'f /*■? ffa culties e

(216)
August of the same year, a revolt was staged in the Ministry when
radicals, led by Yao Tehg-shan who had formally served in Indonesia
reported to have "seized power" in the ministry for a few days?
’ wore
moreover, the Red Guards turned violent against the Soviet Union
thovSeV?r?1
f fu mlesions in Poking.In August 196?, for instance
y set fire to the British mission in the Capital. The convulsion

vK Chl»«“rae eV“ ™
C^t^l^Xi

Giauritius
Glauritius an
anddrouth Yemen^11*

suspensions (Indonesia, Dahomey, the

Tunisal) as °PP°sed to two ^cognitions

had provoked such a conflict to promote his authority al^le^Lr^h

°MtoaPTOMicitB h"° Obs"',''d-’ th0 “>ines« salnod th. upp.r hmMn^".by b°“ ‘be
“d S~lot=. 0„ S„oh

.“XL™„i r

k.

fu.

AUhoS0w’"?I ‘:U“”ia\”Sc'‘1?‘l»». “S Ideologienl al..
improve d,

th. t£axfs: s

undercurrent of c
'll
th° end of 1966 ’ th0 United
States seemed to have
whh???
h
.
COnsensus
in
f«vor of continued containment of China
ran
apace
^
sola
i^As
the
cultural
revolution and the
Vietnam War .-apace, it became abundantly clear in 1966-6? that neither the turbulent
---- China nor the war-burdend United States had any intention at all of s tai ting a war against each other .Johnson and then^ixon
worked out a ■approachment made easier with the withdrawal of tS
USA
from Vietnam ur •

Source

King C.Chen (Edit.) ' China and the three worlds,
The MacMillan Press, 1979, PP« 8 to JI
(summarised and edited by our Centre). 1

)

(217)

CHINA AND THE THREE WORLDS
Mao’s theory of the differentiation of the
three worlds has been acclaimed by the Chinese
as a major contribution to Marxims-Leninism.
Its importance in guideing the external policy
of China has bven considerable. We therefore
reproduce here an editorial comment on this theory
by the "Peorle’s Daily ” which has also appeared in
the , Peking Review ( November 4, 1977) It has been
condensed and edited by our Centre.

L
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE THJ^EE WORLDS
Mao put forward the theory of the differentiation of the three worlds
at a time when the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States
became Rocked in a cut-throat struggle for world hegemony. ...This theory
provides the international proletariat, the socialist countries and the
oppressed nations with a powerful i.doQl_ogAc-aA weapon, for foreign unity and
b ui 1 di ng t h e b r o ad e s t unit e d _f r onjt against the two hegemonist powers and
their war policies and for pushing the revolution forward.
in his talk with .the leader of a third world country in February 1974
Mao said ”In my view, the United States and the Soviet Union foimthe first
world, Japan,. Europe and Canada, theL..Api.d_dke-? belong to the .second
world. With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to the t^hixd.JIP-Dld< -T1!0
whole of .Africa belongs to the third world and L a,t i n..Adi er i c a too.”

CLASS. STRUGGLE ON WORLD SLADE
In the final analysis, national struggle is a matter of class struggle.
The sameholds true between countries. Relations between countries or
nations are based on relations between classes, and they are interconnected
and extremely complicated. The international bourgeoisie has never been a
monolithic whole, nor can it ever be. The international working class move­
ment has also experienced one split after another, subject as it is to the
influence of alien classes. In waging the struggle on the international
arena, the proletariat must unite with all those who can be united in the
light of what is imperative and feasible in different historical periods,
so as to deyeIpn_the progressive, force_sg._ wiJL-Qy.gjL.jand
isolate the . diehards. Therefore, we can never lay down any hard and fast
formula for differentiating the world’s political forces (ie. differen­
tiating ourselves, our friends and our.enemies in the international class
struggle).

IJSXJSiASSIFK^^^
Tremendous changes in the present day international situation and
the daily growth of the people’s strength in different countries and of
the factors for revolution demand a new classification of the world’s
political forces, so that a npw global strategy can be formulated for
the international proletariatXand the oppressed people according to the
new relationship between ourselves, our friends and our enemies.
....Mao’s theory of the three worlds meets precisely this demand. This
theory makes it clear: The two imperialist superpowers, the Soviet Union
and the United States constitute the first world. They have become the
biggest'international exploiters, oppressive and agressors and the

(218)
common enemies of the people of the world, and the rivalry between them
is bound to lead to a new world war. The contention for world supremacy
between the two hegemonist- powers, the menaeje they pose to the people
of all lands and the latter!s resistance to them — this has become the
central problem m present-day world politics. The socialist countries,the
mainstay of tne international proletariat, and the oppressed nations, who
are the worst exploited .and oppressed and who account for the great majo­
rity of the population of tne world. togoLner form the third world. They
stand in the forefront of the struggle against the two hegemonists
ore
the main force m the world-wid.- ..oiu^gle against imperialism and hegemo­
nism. The developed countries in between the two worlds constitute the
second worlda They oppress and exploit the oppressed nations and are at
the same time controlled and bullied by the super-powers. They have a dual
character, and stand in contradiction with both the first and the third
worlds. But they are still a force the third world can win over or unite
with m the struggle against hegemonism. . .

THE

-

ROLE ICT THE WORLD

In the post-war period, the
monopoly • capital
the concentration
concentration of
of U.S.
U.S
and its expansion abroad assumed startling proportions. As recent statis­
tics show, in 1976, the twelve giant industrial corporations with sales
over 10 billion dollars each together accounted for 27 per cent and 29 per
cent respectively of the total assets and sales of the 500 largest indus­
trial corporations in the United States; the ten giant
’ com. ercial hanks held
61 per cent of the assets and deposits of the country’s 50 biggest commercial banks. The export of U.S. capital which was highly concentrated after
the war has risen by leap and bounds in the last twenty years. While direct
private investments abroad stood at 11.8 billion dollars in 1950, they
jumped to 137.2 billion dollars in 1976.
The high and rapid concentration of monopoly capital formed the econo­
mic foundation of the United States as an imperialist superpower. Exploi­
ting the economic and military superiority it acquired in the war, the
monopoiy it enjoyed over atomic weapons and a wide range of sophisticated
military science and technology, the world-wide dollar-centred currency
system it set up and the various military blocs it controlled in North
America, Latin America, Europe, Asia and Oceania, U.S. imperialism
occupied an unprecedent d overlord position in ’the capitalist world, and it
had all che other capitalist countries under its thumbc

or rnany years it acted as the world’s gendarme and perpetuated
numerous^bloody crimes against revolutionary pec. le (the people of the
United Scates included) and oppressed nations of the world. It had to
t?k!-uCrU?12:Lnf blows froa ‘toe people o:l Asia in wars of aggression which
i thought it c©und win hands down. The heroic Korean people were thefirst
to explode the myth of U.S. invincibility. In their war against U.S.
aggression and for national salvation, the people of Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos plunged U.S. imperialism into military, political and economic crisis
and Hastened its decline. In the meantime Western Europe and Japan steadily
recovered, grew in economic strength and hardened their positions in com­
peting with the United States. The U.S. imperialism was obliged to concede
that it could no longer have its own way in the world. However, it remains
the most powerful country in the capitalist world and is trying its utmost
to retain its supremacy,
'
•

ffi?LTLQ.H ^0VERS£!AS _JWEST^EjJT
The United States exploits other countries mainly through exporting
capital in the form of overseas investment. According to U.S. official
Statistics, in 1976, it • recouped profits, earnings from patents included,
amounting to 22.4 billion U.S. dollars from its direct private investment
overseas, the rate of profit exceeding 16 per cent. (The U.S. Department of
Commerce, Surrey of Current busines , August 1977) Such is the sordid
record of how U.S. monopoly capioal sucks the blood of the people of the
world.

(219)

.SOVIET

SOCIM^ IMPERIALISM

As the United States got bogged down in wars and its strength began
o c.ecline, soviet social-imperialism came up from behind. In the ten
years during which the United States w^s mired in its war of aggression
m Vice Nam, Cambodia and Laos, the Soviet- Union strove to develop its
own strength, narrowed the gap in economic development between itself and
the United States and immensely expanded its military power. It has caught
up with the United States in nuclear armament and surpassed it in con­
ventional weaponery. As its military and economic power increases, Soviet
social imperialism becomes more and more flagrant in its attempts to1 ex­
pand ano. penetrate all parts of the world. It makes great play with —its
ground, naval and air forces everywhere and engages the United States inl a
fierce struggle for supremacy on a global scale, thus betraying its
aggressive ambitions which arc unparalleled in world history.

££QWgjL JXPLCISAT IPX BY
Although the Soviet Union falls short of the United States in the
total volume of profits grabbed from other countries, it is not in the
least inferior to the latter in its methods of plunder. It is chiefly
through ’economic aid' and 'military
’ ’" ’ ’ w a-id*‘ to third world countries that the
Soviet Union buys cheap and.sells ■ . and squeezes enormous profits in the
process. For example, the Soviet Union has been selling oommodi t-i es to
India in the name of 'aid' at prices sometimes 20 to 30 per cent, and wen
2 00 pe. cent -..tigher than on the world market. On the other hand it pur­
chases commodities from India at prices sometimes 20 to 30 per cent lower.
(Cfr. 'Jad—O—Jehad1 weekly, Jammu? December 1973 and 'India Today1 pub­
lished,in April 1974 by the Indian Workers’ Association in Britain).

According to the Statistics of Soviet Foreign Trade’, the price
paid by the Sovet Union for importing natural gas from Asian countries was
something like a half of what it sharged for exporting to the West. The
same source revealed that the prices of anthracite, pig iron and other
commodities exported by the Soviet Union to Egypt were 80 to 150 per cent
higher than what it charges West Germany for similar exports (see ’Statis­
tics of Sovet Union Foreign Trade, 1970-76). It was reported in the Wes­
tern Press that in the ^rab.Israeli war in October 1975,
"Russia not only
demanded payment in cash for the arms it sold but jacked up their prices
when the war reached its height" (he Monde, April 18, 1974). After the
principle oil-exporting Arab countries paid this sum in U.S. dollars, the
Soviet Union used it to extend a Euro—dollar loan at an interest of 10
per cent or more. (The U.S. Journal 'Money Manager', April 14, 1974)
Between 1966 and 1977 the Sovet Union sold arms amounting to 20.2 ’■
billion dollars. According to date issued by the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, already in 1974 arms sales by the Soviet Union amounted
to 5.5 billion dollars, accounting for 37.5 per cent of the world total in
that year and making it the second biggest merchant of death after the
United States* Furthermore the Soviet Union endeavours to control its
clients by such moans as terminating supplies of needed parts and access­
ories and dunning them for payment.

The Soviet Union has about 700,000 troops in other countries and has
put Czehoslovakia which is a universally recognized sovereign country
completely under prolonger (actually indefinite) military occupation.
At present, the Sovet Union's armed forces are double those of the
United States, and ic has over 400 strategic nuclear weapon carriers more
than the United States (from 'The Miliatary Balance 1977-78’, published by
the International Institue for Strategic Studios, London). It has vastly

.

(220)

wore tanks, armoured cars, field guns and other items of conventional
weaponeryc It now boasts an ’’offensive navy” with a total tonnage close
to the U.S. navy’s. According to a Western estimate, Soviet military ex­
penditures have been.rising in recent years and they absorb approximately
to 15 pe^ cent of its OTP (U .S. military expenditures account for
roughly 6 per cent of its OTk) Soviet military spending for fiscal year
1976 has been estimated at 127 billion dollars which is about 24 per cent
more than the projected outlay of the U.S. of about 102.7 billion. (From
the ’’The Military Balance 1977-78 published by the International Institute
for strategic studies, London): All nils shows that the Soviet Union will
inevitably adopt an offensive strategy and resort chiefly to force and
threats of force in its contention with the United States.

is _oil sovi^OQCi£L xWkizlisk
Because comparatively spea. rng Soviet Social Imperialism is inferior
in economic strength, it must rely chiefly on its military rower and re­
course to threats of war in order to expand. Although economically the
Soviet Union has far surpassed the second-rate imperialist countries, it
still compares unfavourably with its powerful rival and its economic
strength xalls short of its needs for world hegemony. Therefore it
fever?rrly goes in for arms expansion and war preparation in a bid to gain
military superiority so that it can grab the resources, wealth and. labour
power of other countries to compensate for its economic inferiority.

The- Soviet bureaucratic monopoly capitalist group has transformed a
highly centralized socialist state-owned economy into a state-monopoly
capitalist eccncmy without its equal in any other imperialist country
and has transformed a state under the dictatorship of the proletariat into
a state under fascist dictatorship. It is therefore easier for Soviet
social imperialism to put the entire economy on a military footing and
militarize the whole state apparatus.
Soviet social-imperialism has come into being as a result of the
degeneration 't ^ho first, ^oicialis’
country in the world. Therefore, it
can exploit Lenin•s prestige and flaunt the banner of ’socialism* to bluff
and deceive people everywhere. LT.s. imperialism has been pursuing policies
O14.vgg"°SS L°n an(i hGgGlnonisn for
long period and has time and again met
with resista?-..ce and been subjected to and denunciation on the part of the
proletariat and oppressed people and nations throughout the world and of all
fair-minded people including those in the United States. Progressive world
opinion is already familiar with its true nature and will go on fighting
against iu. Soviet social imperialism is a new and rising power and wears
the mask of ’socialism’- The struggle to resist, expose- and denounce it
is consequently far more exacting. Arduous efforts are called for to help
the people of the world to recognize its true features.

JLffitJ.3I.Q..._,u..^v /jtl

ovist uuiou, the sotiiet otion is

U.S. Imperialism has not changed as far as its policies of aggression
and hegemonism are concerned, nor has it lessed its exploitation and
oppression of the people at home and abroad. Therefore, the Uro hegemonist
powers, L-he^u.o/ieb Union a,nd the United States, are both common enemies
ox the people ox the world. There is no doubt about this. But, if, despite
what has been said above, we s hculd still undiscriminatingly put the two
superpower on a par and fail to single out the Soviet Union as the more
dangerous instigator of world war, we would only bo blunting the revolu­
tionary vigilance of the people of the world and blurring the primary target
in the scruggle against hegemonism. Therefore, in no circumstances must we
play into she hands of the Soviet Union in its deception and conspiracy and
give the green light to its war preparation and acts of aggression.

(221)

OL CONSTITUTE THE SECOH.p WORLD J , THEY ARE. _TB-tEATOTED BY

RUSSIA

The value of industrial output in Loth the United States and the
Soviet Union outstrips that of the three major European capitalist
countries, West Germany, France and Britain combined. In military strength
no other imperialist country is on a par with either of the two super­
powers. Both have thousands of strategic nuclear weapons, several hundred
military satellites, some ten thousand military aircraft, several hundred
major naval vessels and enormous stockpiles of other conventional arms.
The war machine of each of the two superpowers in peace-time assumes a
magnitude unprecedented in human history.

. THE.At£&iroj£ORi<p. is_ A.force;

wtjA.

against hegemonism

In dealing with the world political situation in recent years, Chair­
man Mao always regarded the second world countries as a force that could
bo united with in the struggle against the two hegemonist powers. He said:
”We should, win over those countries such as Britain, France and West
Germany”.

Through twenty to thirty years of strug le against U.S. control and
simultaneously through taking advantage of the severe world-wide setbacks
suffered by the United States in its policy of aggreasion, the West Euro­
pean countries have succeeded in altering the situation prevailing in the
early post-War years when they had to submit to U.S. domination. Japan is
in a similar position. The establishment of the common market, in Western
European countries, the independent policies pursued by France and under
Do Gaulle, the passive and. critical attitude taken by the Western European
countries towards the U.S. war of aggression in Viet Nam, Cambodia and
Laos, the collapse of the dollar-centered monetary system in the capita­
list world and the sharpening trade currency wars between Western Europe
and Japan on the one hand and the United States on the other — all these
facts mark the disintegration of the former imperialist camp headed by the
United. States. True, the monopoly capitalists of the West European
countries, Japan, etc., have a thousand and one ties with the United States
and in fact of the menace posed by the Soviet Social Imperialism, these
countries still have to roly on the U.S. ’’protective umbrella”. But so long
as the United States continues its policy of control, they will not cease
in their struggle against such control and for equal partnership.
BUILD THE BROADEST INTERNATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND

SMASH

SUPERPOWER HEGEMONISM AND W.’lR POLICIES

The current fight of the people of the world against the hegemonism of
the two superpowers and the fight against their war policies are two
aspects of one and the same struggle. Hegemonism is their aim in war as
well as their means of preparing for it. The danger of war resulting from
Soviet-U.S. contention for hegemony is growing meance to the people of the
whole world. What attitude should we take toward this problem?
The people of China and the people of the rest of the world firmly
demand peace and oppose a new world war....As Chairman Mao consistently
stated, our attitude toward world war is: first, we are against it5second,
we are not afraid of it...
What are our tasks then ?
First of all, we must warn the people of the danger of war.The two
superpowers are making frenzied efforts to muster all their strength for
war.

Since the rivalry between the two hegemonist power is intensifying and
especially since Soviet social-imperialism is on the offensive, the con­
flict between them cannot possibly be settled by peaceful means, when the
chips are down. In the course of their fierce rivalry, these two superpowers may sometimes come to some agreement or other for a specific
purpose.

(221A)
Chairman Mao said: "They may reach some agreement, but I wouldn’t take
it as something solid. It’s transitory, and deceptive too. In essence,
rivalry is primary." Such rivalry inevitably leads to war. At present, the
a*ters for war are visibly growing. The two hegemonist powers are stepping
up their war preparations while harping on the shopworn theme of "detente"
and disarmament." Why don’t they simply step it and destroy their huge
arsenals lock, stock and barr 1? Instead, they are spending huge sums of
money on further research into now nuclear weapons and missiles and their
manufacture and on the development of still more efficient and still more
lethal chemical, biological and other weapons. Their armed forces are so
deployed that they can swiftly go into action, and they arc constantly
holding various kinds of military exercises. Each has massed hundreds of
thousands of troops in Central Europe. Their fleets keep each other under’
surveillance as they prowl tho oceans. Spies are sent out on now assignments
submarines embark on now missions, and new military satellites orbit in
outer space. They are gathering ii?itary intelligence and readying them­
selves to wipe out each other’s war potential. All this irikkes it abundantly
clear that the two superpowers are actively preparing for a total war....
Second, wo should make every effort to step up the struggle against
hegemonism, that is, we should fight to put off the outbreak of war and in
the process strengthen the defense capabilities of the people of all
countries.
Chairman Mao said: "The United States is a paper tiger. Don’t believe
in it. One thrust and it’s punctured. Revisionist Soviet Union is a paper
tiger too.'’ .. .Going all out as it doos for arms expansion and war prepara­
tions, the .Soviet Union finds that ”it’s strength falls short of its wild
ambitions,I! and it is "unable to cope with Europe, the Middle East, South
Asia, China and the Pacific Region."

History has repeatedly shown that unity in struggle forged by the
people of all countries is the main force in defeating the war instigators.
The people of every country must work hard and stop up their preparations
materially and organisationally against wars of aggression, closely watch
the aggressive and expansionist activities of the two hegemonist powers and
resolutely defeat then. Tho people must sue to it that these two super­
powers do not violate their country’s or any other country’s sovereign rights,
do not encroach cn their country’s or any other country’s territory and
territorial seas or violate their strategic areas and strategic linos of
communication, do not use force or the threat of force other maneuvers
to interfere in their country’s or any other country’s internal affairs;
moreover, both power must be closely watched lest they resort to schemes
of subversion and use "aid" as a pretext to' push through their military
political and economic plots. The people must also sec to it that they do
not establish, enlarge, carve up and wrest spheres of influence in any
part of the world. So long as all this is done, it will be possible to
hold up the timetable of the two hegenonists for launching a world war,
and the people of uhe world will be better prepared and find themselves
in a more favourable position should war break out...

Third, we must redouble our efforts to oppose the policy of appease­
ment because^it can only bring war nearer. There are people in the West
today who in fact adopt a policy of appeasement toward the Soviet Union,
In striving to work out an "ideal" formula for compromise and concessions
in the face of Soviet expansion and threatsJ, some people have dished up
such proposals as the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine " in the fond hope of assuaging
the aggressor’s appetite or at
< ' least
'
’ gaining some respite for themselves,
Others intend, go build a so-called "material basis" ffor peaceful cooperation and the prevention of war by means of big loans, elleu
extensive trade,
joint exploitation of resources and exchanges of technology. Still others
hope they can divert the Soviet Union to the East so as to free themselves
from this Soviet peril at the expense of the security of other countries.
But aren’t all these nostrums just a revamping of what was previously
tried and found totally bankrupt in the history of war? Did the Munich
agreement to sacrifice Czochoslovakaia, cooked up by Chambei’lain,

voracious Hitler?

True, StSr

by turning west to occupy France-? The
i
jUdn't he follow this up
gave Gernany and Japan a'shot in the s ™ hI® ^ates, Britain and France
thea and selling thea war materials' And f G^GndinS aid and loans to*
selves? Todays activities are St
Syccoed in
thenVorld War II, what with bhe SALWst^t
1C than those bofore
what with the
between the United
and ' the sf
Linitation Talks) talks
—States
States and
of forces in Central
Europe
and
the
conf
niC11
’
'’-be talks on the reduction
- —
Europe
cooperation. But
hasn't
the “r Xis S
security and
But hasr1t the i
abated despite the
the in
inte&ifi«d
WorsQned rather than
t en s if 1 $ d efforts 4
ahke_deals? Haven't the veap®p of al!
LtaH conf^ences £oing and
weapons^
of ‘all
installed <on 'both
"
•
--j- kinds insGaJ-ied
^-p
the European front
crown in ntober rather
than
diminished?
The
--- ? than diminished? The more high*falubin the talk of detente and
greater
dan^rlf war More s intense
“?ense+the
th° efforts
appeasoment ? theo gre
at t-r the
1'
not
t! is
13 f
5* alarmist
alarcist ■'talk. It is
a truth )repeatedly borne out bv hIX This
-e oul by history.
„r. It is high tine
time that these
•
appeasers woke up.
<3

T.T

Iz-.-,

n ■»■ -v V

SOURCE: China & the Three Worlds

ed. by 0. CHEN king

£^X^^=S£k3^S=ESg=:^£R=IQ=ia;E
third_world

((222)

ShQn Yi
The process of modernization implies that China has to
’’buy” technology from Western Capitalist Countries.lt has
to enter into agreements with them.Does this mean that
China is giving up its policy of opposition to hegemonism
and of support to the third World people in their struggle
against imperialism and colonialism ? The following article
by a supporter of the present leadership gives an answer.

An African state leader visiting China recently told his
hosts that he had heard China was "repudiating" Chairman Mao
and changing its foreign policy and this had him worried. However,
he had been misinformed. If China were to totally repudiate
c azran Mao, which Ch'Lna is not, it would also include repudiat
mg nzs correct foreign policy. Chairman Mao firmly opposed
hegemonism and resolutely supported the third world people tn
their struggle against imperialism and colonialism. This was
very much apprectatedby the people of the third world. But will
post-Mao China continue to side with the peoples of the third
world? lhe answer is a definitive yes.
Chairman Mao’s strategic conception of the three worlds
is correct. China will always be a member of the third wold and
never seek hegemonism. We will carry on the foreign policy
Chairman Mao fo rmulated during his last years.

POLICY UNCHANGED

9

^ill China only Soviet hegemonism but not imperialism and
colonialism, as it develops its relations with United States and
other developed countries ? This is a question some third world
countires are asking.

Waging a joint struggle together with some of the "estern
countries agaist hegemonism docs not mean China has stopped sunpor
ting the struggle of the pais people of the .third worlf and no
longer care about the intrests of the oppressed nations. The
situation varies amoung third world countries. Some are victims
of Soviet Union hegemonist expansion; some regard the United
States and certain other countries as the main danger, and some
are locked in struggle against racist rule, agaist Israeli expan^
sionism, or for national independence and liberation. As in the
past, China will firmly stand by t'ie side of the oppressed
nations and the oppressed peoples, opnose all acts of ajffressio'n
and interference from outside agaist third world countries and
resolutely back their struggle to defend national independence,
develop their national economic and firmly support their fight
agaist imperialism,.colonialism and hegemonism.
Developing relations with the United States does not mean
that China supports its erroneous policy towards some third
world countries. Tije United States leans fteavily on the side of
Israel and the South Africa racist regime, supports South Korea in
sabotaging the national reunificationof Korea and meddles with the
internal affairs of some countries, China included.China is
agaist all these. China follows its own independence foreign policy.

China carries on economic exchanges with some developedc
countries and absorbs advanced technology and capital from abroad,
which helps in our socialist modernisation, but China remains an
underdeveloped country, in the same situation as other developing
countries importing advanced technologies and capital and faces

(223)
many similar problems they encounter in developing their
national economics. China wants to work with the other third
world ^countries to establish a new international economic
order.

There are certain neonle who are afraid of China's soli­
darity with other third world countries and who are fabricating
rumour after rumour to foment discord and creat trouble between
China and other third world countries.

The ^ociet Union and Viet Nam x> invented the "China threat"
to make out that china poses a threat to its neighbours and
southeast Asia. But in reality, China has not a single soldier
in any odher country, whereas it has a million Soviet troops
menacing it in the north and is constantly harassed by Vietnamese
shellings and attacks in its south. Itis China that is threatned. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and Vietnamese
control of laos are a threat to the southeast Asian countries.
Rumours and threats from the Soviet and Vietnamese hegemonists
are aimed at driving a wedge between uhina and the 'Southeast
Asian countries to weaken the forces standing agaiSt the
hegomonis ts big and small, ^'his naturally will not be allowed
to happen. Their morbid fear of the unity between China and other
third world countries should show us how much we must cherish
such a unity.

Some people have tried to scare people by pointing out,
like Dulles, a former US state secretary9 that China is a
communist Country. What the Chinese people belive in is China's
own internal affair. China did not import its revolution,nor
will it export revolution. Whatever road s country may choose
is its own business and has nothing to do with China, /is for
china, it was because of communist Party leadership that the
country won its independence and liberation and made it possible
for China to oppose power politics and uphold justice in hhe
international: struggle. China under the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party is an implacable dave.rsary of hegemon­
ism, which encroaches upon other's sovereignty and terriory and
endangers world peace.
The five principles of Peaceful Coexistence has always
guided New Chin's handling of international relationship and
China will never interfere in the internal affairs of other
countries. China advicates quality amoung all countries, big
or small, and is agaist the strong bullying the weak. The
People's Republic of China has never tried to force anyone to
acceptits view.
Another Africa he ad of state said while in Beijing:
We trust ^hina implicity. because China gives aid to others at
“" *
. We
their request and never meddles in their internal affairs,
" ■
, It
has only one aim: the
cannot say this for the Soviet Union.
.
and global domination.
realisation of its ambitions, 1hegemonism
v
China was the first to see this and it was China which made many
aware of it and put them on their guard, -^e once were recipients
of Soviet "aid". But with "aid" came interference.
Such subterfuges as creating a "China threat" are quite
useless. Will China move agaist others when it becomes strong
and prosperous? Never. China, has already long declared that it
eill never seek hegemonusm. Those who uphold Marxism do notdo
anything that damages the interests of others.

(224)

unina is still very poor. It would like to hetjb other
third world countries more, but is at present handicapped by
its limited ‘strength. Later, when China has built up its
economy and is in a better position, it will do much more to
help third world countries in diffeculties and will also
contribute more an defence of worl peace. We have always
maintained that our modernization is not only for the cause
of our country but also for the cause of internationalism.
DIRECT _VICTIM SJIF^ GHMONISK :

The third world countries are increasingly threatened by
Bovzet hegemonism. The contention for world domination between
Soviet Union and tlge United States x is focused on Europe. But '
at the monent, the oviet Union is concentrating maiply on
expanding ico or-csehoe in several key areas of the third
worla. Th-e Soviet Uw-on wants to take over "estern Europe,
'which it finds it cannot do at present. So tt i^ circumventing
the more solid to move into the softer arteas, striking out
south to outflank Europe. It has launched sustained offensives
against the Middle Kost-Persian Gulf region, Southwest and
°outhe ast Aisa, southern Africa and the Caribbean.
1 f '^he Soviet Union can establishxd itself firmly in
Afghanistan, it will push further, into Pakistan and Irak to
seize control of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to
enable it to exploit the Middle East oil fields and cut the
oil route to western Europe.
The Soviet Union is using the Vietnamese regional hegemonists to take over Kampuchea. If the invading Vietamese secure
a firm foothold there, they will push - into Thailand and other
Southeast Asian countries, enabling the Soviev hegemonists to
control the strait of Malacca and link up Its forces in the
west cannot do anything about it even though it might want to
put up a fight *
It is quite clear that the Soviet Union will not stop
with Kampuchea and Afghanistan in order to complete its global
strategic deployments If the Soviet expansionist drive is
not checked, more and more countries will fall victim to Soviet
hegemony. As a member of the third world, China will join the
other countries to oppose the aggression and expansion of
Soviet hegemonism and defend peace in Asia and. the world as
a whole.

INSEPARABLY ^ITN THE THIRD YORLD
Experience in the international struggle has shown that
the third world countries suffer the most from imperialism,
hegemonism and colonialism, and the contradictions between the
third world countries and the imperelist, hegemonist, and
colonial powers are very acute. In the struggle against impereiralism and colonialism and in the struggle against hegemonism,
the third world plays a tremendous role. The third world has
a lot of people, plenty of resources, covers an immense area
and occupies an important strategic position. The countries
of the third world are full of viality and full of promise.
China and the other third world countries have been Ithrough
similar experiences and have the same goals. They underst-an t each
other the best, are most ready to give sympathy and support to
each other. China cannot for a moment become separate from the
rest of third world countries.

As the third world pins its hopes on China, so we place our
hopes on the third world, of which we are a 'member.
-x- -x- -x- -x- ■«■
Source: Beijing Review,No.59. So-t^er 28, 198i. pp^2M -25

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SECTION 6

INDIA AND CHINA IN COMPARISON

z_ “:zz _ _z rzzzzzzzz_ z_____

China ar. i India are continental countries with vast,
still largo a.,
uncapped s natural and human resources.
Historically the cultures of those countries have
played a? important role in human development J There
can be no doubt that, as their resources are fully
mobilized for industrialisation and modernization,
the two countries will play an increasingly important
role in world affairsHowever, both countries have followed different models
of development.The one that will emerge more successful
is likely to exert a powerful attraction over all other
developing countries, in Asia more specially.
Finally, behind each of the two models there is a
different concept of man and history.There are
two different ideologies.Can we evaluate what these
different ideologies have meant for the concrete man ?
This is the purpose of this section.
CONTENT

1. ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN INDIA AND IN CHINA
This is an appraisal of the two economies
by the world banko

2. CHANNELIZATION OF YOUTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN INDIA AND IN CHINA
A comparative study of the mobilisation of Youth
in development programs in both countries.
THE DIALECTICS OF INDIAN AND CHINESE DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGIES
An analytical study of the Indian and
Chinese models of development

Page

2257

229

241

A CONCLUDING ARTICLE TO THE FILE:
CHINA MODERNIZATION AND THE POT,ICY
OF SELF-RELIANCE
An historical survey which concludes
our file.

265

APPENDIX
NEW PLAN DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS
Some latest statistics

28j

Map of China

282

Humour in Chinn (Czu '.■xjriF,')

176,224

(225)

There is greater equality of incomes in rural
China than rural India. Right ? arong.

India has made the mistake of emphasising
heavy industry> unlike China which has concentrated
its efforts on light industry. Right ? Irong again.

For those labouring under concentional notions about the deve­
lopment patterns of India and China, t e World Banka’s recently
released three-volume compendium ’CHINA; SOCIALIST ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT in an eye-opener. In more than 1 ,200 pages ofoften
unknown facts and always fascinating information, the Bank’s
multi-disciplinary team of experts has, after more than a month
of touring China, laid bare the achievements and failures of a
complex and repeatendly misunderstood country.
What comes through and orobably unsurpassed record of
economic growth and social
rogrss. Whether one sees the
performance in terms of pure growth rates, or in terms of im­
proving literacy, nutrition and population control
or yet
again in terms of sweeping structural changes in tfie economy,
the success is as impressive as the canvas is vast, The report is
is frequently dotted with comparative references to India, and al
almost without exception the comparisons are humbling.
China*s per capita income has been growing twice the rate
in Endia (between 2 and 2.5 per,cagaist 1 per cent in India),
and
industrial growth has averaged 13 per cent annually, one
of the highest in the world and far above India’s 5 per cent.
With only 8 per cent of the world’s arable land,.it has fed
22 per cent of the world’s population, without any signs of
extreme deprivation. The agricultural growth rate has in fact
been no more than India’s, at 2.3 ier cent, but an equal dis­
tribution of food has ensured an absence of the kind of malnurition evinnt in the Indian countryside.
REMARKABLE SUCESSs

The record of achivements in other sector is qually, if
not more, impressive. Back in the 1960s, China had an annual
population growth rate of 3 per cent- more than Indias 2.2 per
cent. But by 1979 this been brought down with unprecedented
ranidity to 1.2. per cent, While Indian opulation continued to
grow at the oid rate. While India’s birth rate inched down
marginally from 38 per 1,000 population to 35, China’s dropped
from around the dame level to 18. The World Bank report notes
quietly that this is a world record.
In this and other sectors, th e reco rds is consistently
above the average for developing countries with comparable
income levels or in similarstages of develo jment. Take education,
where China
has a primary school enrollment of 93 per cent
agaist India’s 64 per cent. Moving up to secoundary school
China’s enrolment is 51 per cent, compared to India’s 28 per
cent. The drop-out rate in the first four years of schooling
is no more than 28 per cent-less than half India’s 59 per cent.
And most impressive of all, primary emrolment for girls is 84
per cent, agaist just 50 per cent for India. Adult literacy, not
surprisingly, is as high as 66 per cent, almost double the 36
per cent in India.

(226)

Social indicators like these jba place China right out_
of the general category of Third world countries. Major Third
World killers like diarrhoea and child mortality have been
virtually eliminated, while an equitable food distribution
had ensured that though per capita food availablity has shown
virtually no increase s ince the 1950s, there is no acute mal­
nutrition. The result; an unusually high life expectancy of
64 years, agaist 51 in India.
LIVING STANDARDS:

These figures are surprisin’] for the quality of achicvewent they indicate. Chinese statiscs are oftecr unreliable, and
have in the past been subject to majior revisions. In tact, some of
of the figures in the World Bank report appear mutually contra­
dictory. But there is little doubt that the Chinese authorities
getting ready to borrow from the Wbrld Bank, have laid bare,
their country to outside experts for the first time. Otherwise
a re >ort with such depth and range of imformation would have
been impossible.
The real surprise is in the figures that tell of income
quality, especially in rural China. For a variety of reasons,
ttereappears to be as much inequality there as in rural India.
The poorest 40 per cent of China’s rural people get only 20.1
per cent of total income, almost exactly the same as I ndia’s
20.2 per cent. And the top 10 per c mt get 22.8 per cent, not
significantly lower than the 27.6 per c mt in India.

In the Urban areas, however, the picture is quite differenctb. The poorest 40 per ent in China fet a phenomenal 30
per cent of total income, almost twice the 16.9 per cent in
I ndia. And the top 10 per cent get only 15.8 per cent, against
34.1 per cent in India.

COMFORTABLE EXISTENCE
But the figures do not tell the full story, and are there­
fore somewhat misleading. To start with, the poor in China
are ensured their minimum needs at reasonable prices, and a
fairly effective social Security system appears to take care
of those who can’t earn their own livelihood. Equally important,
there is no evidence of wide income disparities existing
side by side in the same community; the income desparities
arc regional, and caused by poor land availability or other
natural factors in the poorer parts of the country.

The World Bank report sums it up b '■> saying; •’ A large
minority of the popula ion is very poor. These people, however,
have a much higher standard of living than those at similar
income level elsewhere, ^hey all have work; their food supply
is giaranted; most of their children are at school; and the
grat majority have access to basic health care.... Life
expectancy^ ... is on average in China outstandingly high’’.
In fact, China’s sweeping structural changes in the country­
side-starting with land redistribution, the rapid building
up of a new often illiterate but nevertheless effective peasants
leadership, and then progressing towards cooperative and later
collective farming — stand out in sh ;rp contrast to India s
farcical efforts at land reforms.
THE SOCIAL transformation is matched by the structural change
in’*tEe"economy . For, in a truly out standing achivement,

(227)
Chi na has managed to reach a phenomenal level of’ in du stria 11sation where manufacturing now accounts for fully half of
gross national product. This is almost twice the level in
^7 Per cent), which itself is no mean achivement by
third world standards. Once again, this tends to place China
in the same league as many middle income countries. Also,
despite its low per capita income (estimated at 25 to 50 per
more than India’s), t at country has been able to incest
31 per cent ofhits gross domestic product for futher growth,
higher than the 25 per cent average for middle income countries.
Flore than half the total investment has been made in
industry, and BO per cent of that in heavy industry- thus
accounting for
amoung the four consistently highest industrial
growth rates in the world in the last three decades. Chiba
is now the wold’s lagest producer of cotton yarn and fabric the
second largest manufactor.jr of radios, the third largest
producer of cement, the fifth largest manufacturer of steel
and the seventh largest generator of electricity.
^hat makes this records
even more amazing is that it has
been achieved with dine of the lowest rates of urbanisation
in the world: 13 per cent of Chinese live in cities and towns
agaist 22 per cent in India. In fact,
fact. ■'the percentage of urban
population to the total has not changed1 since 1953, achieving
one
7 — of the
w,.,J (country’s goals - achived largely through restriction on migration.

In short, it had achieved handsomely what the World Bank
report starts out with saying were China’s two main goals: elemi
nating the worst aspects of Poverty and building a heavy
Indusrial base.
INDUSTRIAL INEFFICIENCY:

•C.------------------------------

The enviroment in which this was done has, however, left
its mark on the current situation. Isolated internationally
after the break with the Societ Union in I960, China now has
an industrial sector that often uses outdated and inefficient
machinaery and techonology that is wasteful in its use of
energy as well as other inouts. There has been little improve
ment in either labour or other yardsticks of pro ductivity,so

that increase in output have been achieved essentiallv bv a
grater supply of inouts. The Capital—outputs ratio is there­
fore much higher than what it should be., and much small
industry is in existence not because of its efficiency but
because of the stress on local self-sufficiency.
Clearly, ejanging this and other negative aspects of t-he
sutem will involve major challenges to policv-rnak ers. Many
have already been attemtpted, includdmg greater linkages bet­
ween individuals efforts and rewards,ending some of the price
distrotions in the system, decentralising some of the decision
making process in order to make it less rigid, and in giving
greater priority to improving consumption levels so as to
improve living standards. These could well prove hazardous;
greater fre dom to producers in taking prisig decisions sould
easility lead to inflation., for instance. And the World Bank
recommends hastening slowly.
H^jaTJ=PRI£E :

The Namk Report could also be criticised for underplaying
the heavy human price that has often been paid for getting
to the commanding heights of national performance, It men tion s
casually that two million technically educated and one million
university-educated people went out during the turmoil of the
Cultural Revolution; and recent reports have spoken of female
infanticide being a rampant ‘henomenon because of the pressure
on families to have only one child (which .
. most parents
prefer to be male).
•’ ’ ■

(228)
Also, in anyrning
than a totalitari
anything other
other than
an state it would
be impossible
kind of
-e to implement the
th

rationing that precails

where
i» hC^r;h"J^:
n""P1"

-.1 a commune
--- in
‘^-^n

The period of Political turmoil-like the decade-long

Cultural Revolution-of-ten

cost millions of lives, while
other expcr.i^enfc like the Cpea-t Leap Forward
caused economic
choas, '*Yet others, such
as the .effort to break upthe family,
had to be
’
-J (quickly
given up. Human buffering in all c?
- of these
must have been eno rmo us
. , and must be laid directly at the
door fo China’ s political system.

- ’
ls.tJe samB Political system that has
made possible the close integration of t h e" well-o r g ani s ed
multi-level” economic and social system with the political
structure of4* the country, so that basic social services are
dpiiK/P-rnri

to combat s comingHenergy^runch^hgn oilVe ho^Slng shortage,
graduate towards a more^.Sn economy that
°Ut’ tO
export performance, and much more But ft fhe fOn
three

decades of social^nd

tHat Cf?lna,s Performance through

/

3cal”

INDIA
HgTH RATE
lr
1000)

35

Death Rate
(per 1000)

appendix
china^'
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Agriculture 5

38%

31%

Industry

2 7%

4 7%

3 5%

22%

Services

Annual growth
per capita
I ineo me

1 . 4%

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Investment
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Richest 10% of
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INCnfiE SHARES
Poorest 40/o of
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Population
Growth rtate
(%)

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GO

CHJOTEiLIZATION OF YOUTH ENERGIES FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA AND
CHINA
1950-80

I

(229)

In the process of social transformation as envisaged by ..most
Developing Countries, Youth is called to play a vital role.
In the case of China and India how have those two countries
countries
mobilised youth for their development programmes ? -Have both
of thorn been equally successful ?

While the developing countries have been faced with the problem of
mobilizing the unutilized and underutilized labour force for the deve­
lopment of their backward economies, the 70s withnessed even the advan­
ced countries finding it difficult to make‘full utilization of the ’
existing manpower. 1
The nature of the problem in the two worlds is,
however, different. In the developing world, rapid growth of population,
meagre resources of land and capital and the scarcity of marketing faci­
lities have resulted in non-utilization or underutilization of the
existing manpower• Secondly, in most of the developing counties there
is a wide gulf between the rich and poor. While the vast majority of
the poor are unable to fulfil their minikun basic needs, a snail section
of rich, by virtue of their economic power, control the means of
production and influence 'the development stategies pursued by their
respective countries.
In India many welfare measures •taken
’
by the state to protect the
interests of the weaker sections have been manipulated in such
_-i a way
that they mostly benefit the rich. CConsequently,
x
over the years the
number of people below the poverty line and the number of unemployed
have increased.

China, both during the liberation struggle and thereafter, evolved
an egalitarian model of developkent. •^fter collectivizing the ownership
of the means of production, attemps were made to have all-round balanced
development, with its benefits reaching the common man. The employment
requirements of the various sections of the pupulation were by and large
co-ordinated with the manpower needs of different sectors of the economy
in different regions. However, even in the Chinese.politica 1 set-up
this was^an uphill task, and in the process many complicated issues
arose.
uring the Maoist era, China claimed to have solved the problem
of unemployment. But the problem of underemployment and of suitable
employment seems to have persisted. That is why a large number of the
liberal environment and .the policy of four modernizations*in the post­
Mao period, have returned to the cities and are demanding employment
suited to their qualifications. The post—Mao leadership acknowledges
the difficulties which these rusticated youth have faced with the task
of providing jobs to its millions of educated youth.

In this paper, an attenpt is made to edariine to what extent
Indian and Chinese riodels of development have been successful in
channellizing their youth energies for economic development.
THE PROBLEM

According to Chen Muhu, in 1949 the Chinese population was more
than 500 million. By 1979 it was estimated to have crossed 900
million. 2 The Indian population in 1951 was 561 million. Now it

is 685 uillion.

3.

(230)

In China, as Chen Muhua has observed in her article, over 600
nillion people wore born after 1959, which neans that they are below
30 years of age. Thus the bulk of the population cither falls in the
working age group or are about to enter the' engloyBent Barket
(,1;>—59 age group). According to the CIA Handbook of conotiic Indicators,
in 1975 around 13 Billion children were less than 4 years of age, 25
per cent of the total population caBe within the age group of 5-14 years
20 per cent in the 15-24 and 36 per cent in the 25-29 age group. Only
6 per cent in 25-29 age group. Only 6 per cent were about 60 years
of a{je.
This Beans that in 1976 about 57 per cent wc.re in the working
age group. Every year 12-20 Billion enter the OBplcyBent Barket.
accordingly, since 1949 at least 200 Billion fresh jobs were needed to
aosoro this increasing work force. 4
In India, the labour force was estinated to be 268.05 Billion
in 1980. With an annual growth rate of 2.43 per cent, it is expected
to reach 302.29.Billion in 1985. Out of this 268.05 Billion labour
force, 215.93 Billion arc supposed to reside in the countryside. This
is supposed to roach 240,57 in 1985. As against this, in 1980 the strength
of urban labour force was 52.12 Billion. By 1985 the urban labour
i? Wetted to be above 61.72 Billion. 5 fee-wise, in March
I960, there were 268.05 Billion in the 5+ age group. In the 15+age
group the number cane down to 251.41 Billion, which means 16.64 million
people were m the 5-14 age group. There were 236.95 million people
m the 15-59 age group. This means only 14.46 million labour force
was about 60 age group, Similarly in March 1985, 302.29 million labour
i CLWAnld.be.ln
5 + age group, m the 15 + age group it would
• i nQc\QllliOn, Yhich neans that as against 16.64 nillion in 1980,
m 1J85 17.22 nillion labour force would be in the 5-14 age group.
The strength of the labdur force in 15-59 age group is 268.22 million.
As against 14.46 million labour force in the above 60 age group is
expected to reach 16.85 nillion. Besides, By March 1980 there were
about 24-.O9 Billion subsidiary workers,, nearly 87 per cent of whom
were wonen. 6 jx’ large number of this labour of this force belonging
to different strata of society and different
------- j age a groups are unemployed.

In line with the reconnendations of
the Dantwala
Dantwala Connittee,
of the
Connittee, the
the
nature and extent of unenploynent is assessed in terns of the usual
status concept, weekly status concept, and daily status concept. 7
111 March 1980 the nunber unenplyed in usual status was
g
U1h10n ln ble 5 + aee Sr°up, 11.42 nillion in the 15+ age group
11.31 nillion m the 15-59 age group. This neans in the
,,
.
usual status
nn!
un.enI)lo5'cd belonged to 15-59 age group (11.31 Million).
Only 0.60 pillion belonged to the 5-14 age group and 0.11 nillion to
above 60 age group. Weekly status-wise, out of 12.18 nillion unemployed
t
d5-59 aSe Gr°Up
million). Only 0.54 nillion belonged to
S/n Anae-1?r0UP1a?d °-28 111111011 Qb0V0 60 a-e -rouP* Daily statusw sc 0.6° Billion belonged to above 60 ago group .Cut of 20.74 million
°f 19,17 nillion belonged to the 15-59 age group
and 19.77 to to 15 + ago group, thus 0.97 million belonged to the
b 14 age group. An analysis by age groups further showed that throe­
tour th of usual status unenploynent was concentrated within the fresh

show that the rural agricultural-labour
households,
Governing about 21.2
■ er cent. of- the total population,
.
.
-2 P
accounted for 46.7 per cent of total daily status unenploynent
unemployment.. The
proportion of casual labur in agriculture has increased
increased along
along with
with a
reduction in self-employment in agriculture, The proportion of rugular
salaried employment for urban males and the
propootion of urban sclfemployed women in the non—agricultural sector has been reduced. But
both sexes in urban rareas have increased share as casual labour in the
non-agricultural sector. 8

(231)
Education-wise, while 48.9 per cent of the labour force is
illiterate 25 per cent of this is unemployed. About 39.6 per cent
is'educated up to primary and middle stadards of which about 41.8
per cent are unemployed, and 8.8 per cent of total labour force is
educated up to scondary level of which 23*8 per cent are unemployed
Only which 2.7 per cent of the total work force is graduate, out of
which 9.4 per cent are unemployed. 9
THE STRATEGIES ADOrTED:

The aforememtioned dat.a show that India is really facing gigantic
task of providing jobs to millions of childro, youth and old people.
During the Sixth -^ive-Year Plan (1980-85), first the backlog of 12.02
million jobs have to be cleared; then provision has to be made for
another 34<24 million on (usual status basis). Thus a total of 46.26
million (usual status )jobs will have to be created within a period
of five years. Out of this, 42.58 million belong to the 15-59 age-group
Besides there would be seasonal unemployment and part-time underemploy ­
ment prevalent largely in labour households.
In view of the gigantic problem, the employment poicy before the
Sixth Five-Year Plan has two major goals: to reduce under-employment
for the majority of the labour force and to cut down on long-term
employment. It is recognised in the plan that a lasting solution to
these problems could be found only witjpLn the framework of a rapid
exployment-oriented economic growth. uitable measures have also to
be evolved on a short-term basis in a So-ordinate way particularly for
the benifit of the weaker sections. Self-employment ventures in agri­
culture, village and small industries and in non-farm occupations are
to be encouraged. 834 items have already been reserved for production
exclusively in the small-scale sector and 379 items have been reserved
for production exclusively pruchase form small-scale units.
Besides, it has been ss: umed that the Integrated Rural Development
Programme would benefit about 5,000 poor families, fifteen million
families would be brought above poverty line by means of distribution
of land. The Operation nFolld II Dairy Development project and other
similar projects would benefit about 13 million milk producing families
during 1980-85. The Fish Farmer Development Agencies and Village and
Small Industries Sector would benefit about 9 million. About 300 to
400 million mandays of employment per year during the pl§:n period would
be generated under the National "^ural mployment Progranme(NERP) •
Every year 2 lakh rural youth are to be trained for self-employment under
the National Scheme for Training Rural Youth for Self-Employment (

(trysem).
Apart from rural poor, the employment of educated manpower has
been given speical attention in the plan. It has been estimated that
expansion of the various programmes in the primary sector-agriculture,
animal in husbandry, fisheries and agro-forostry-to all states would
require about 25,000 additional village-level workers. Over and above
this, another 32,000 will be employed in agricultural research. The
central schemes of agricultural census would providg additional
employne nt to about 34,000 persons. The Operation lood II has an
employment potential of 1,67,000 persons during 1984-85, to be engaged
in infrastructural support, technical input, supply and milk processing
operations. The inland fishery project would provide opportunities
for 2,40,000 persons, many of whom are likely to be educatied. Moreover,
black-level planning would also generate employment opportunities for
the educated in work relating to survey, planning, monitoring etc.
In spite of these impressive figures given in the plan, the
planners acknowledge that 1 unemployment would not be eliminated in
the Sixth Plan unless efforts are immediately made to make the

)

(232)
current unemployment more employabke thtough short-term training,
vocational programmes and special employment programmes directed
towards their absorption.!10 To promote self—employment, public
institutions can privide assistance for training, credit, marketing
and general guidance about ’he variousfacilities available to the
people for starting their own ventures for organizing relevant services.
11.
This approach to the unemployment problem touches only one aspect
of the problem-how many hours a day/a week a person gets work to earn
his livelihood. However, the problem of invisible unemployment does
not seem to have bothered the planners. Recordings to some sources,
disguisted unemployment in 1941 was about 28 per cent of the total
agricultural labour force. In 1954, C.D, Deshmukh, the then Finance
Minister, told the Lik babha that it was to the tune of 15 million
out of a total of 150 million. 12
In reality this problem has acquired gigantic form. Villagers
Villagers
leave their villages in search of jobs or the agents of contractors
recruit them promising lucratice wages. In actual practice, these
people are made to work long hours in inhuman and unsafe working
conditions without adequate food and shelter. Labourers are recruited
from distant places like Orissar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar and transported to Kashmir, Laddakh, NEFA, Sikkim, etc. site
to do construction work. At the construction site the labourers are
treated like slaves. The Minimum Wage Act is observed by violating
it and they are not paid any compensation for injury or loss of life.
A few such cases are reported which prove the ineffectiveness of the
state machinaery in providing social justice to the poor.

According to 1971 census, about 70 per cent (125.60 million)
labour work force was engaged in agriculture. Out of thois 78.17
million were cultivators and 47.49 million agricultural labourers.
In 1961 about 131 million were engaged in agriculture, out of which
99’50 million wore cultivators and 31.50 million agricultural labourers,
13 Howvever, the percentage of agricultural labourers to cultivators
has mcresed from 32 per cent in 1961 to 61 per cent in 1971. 14 In
terms of members it jumped from 31,50 million in 1961 to 47.59 million
in 1971, which refl cts the pauperization trend in the countryside.
In the industrial sector, too, the percentage of workers came down
iron 14.45 per cent of the total workers in 1961 to 13.58 per cent
in J 971. This is due to a sharp declining trend in the household indus­
tries (6.39 per cent in 1961, 3.52 per cent in 1971).
THE INDIAN MODEL:

Soon after India’s independence and China’s liberation it was
realized that without land reforms and eradication of poverty all­
round development was not possible. In China land reform acquired
the form of a mass movement and was completed by 1952, In India it
is yet to be achieved. Even the Sixth Five Year Elan stipulates that
taking possession and distribution of surplus land should be completed
within two years after the launching of the plan. However, as
against 58.05 laksh acres identified as surplus, only 17.48 lakh acres
have so far been distri buted among the landless, th: ugh the states
have taken possession of 25.02 lakh acres. 15 How much of this dis­
tributed land is in the actual possession of the landless in anybody’s
guess.
'
0
J

-With land reform failing to make a dent <on rural povrr structure,
the rich nave been the main benificiaries of the development programmes.
The poor have been reduced to the status of mere wage earners. With
the increasing pauperization..
number of these wage earners is
swelling, thus increasing the competiotion and decreasing the wages.

(253)

I

Liko China India, too., initially concentrated on heavy industries,
big dams, and large-scale mechanization which beeano a panacea for
poverty, unemploynnet and backwardness. Unlike the light small-scale
and cottabe industries, the heavy industry’s employment generating
capacity is limited. It is estimated that in a heavy industry in the
public sector Rs. 1 crore of gross investment gives employment to
98 persons, in chemicals and pharmaceuticals the corresponding figure
is 67, and in heavy electricals it is 168. On the other hand, Rs. 1
crore gross investment in different industries in the light sector has
much larger employment potential, ^or example, in cotton textiles
(registered factories) Rs. 1 crore investment would generate about
1 ,458 jobs, the leather and fur products
electrical appliances
765, radios and TVs 857, and 496 in dry and wet batteries. In rural
capital formation, assuing that Rs. 2,000 worth implements are needed
for one worker with Rs. 1 crore investment, employment could be given
to 5,000 persons. 16

Thus while, the land reforn progranne could not -give a new lease
of life to the rural poor, the capital £oods industries failed to
generate enough jobs to absorb the surplus rural labour force. On the
other hand, the construction of dans, estab.lishnent of big industries
and nining and other operations have displaced a large nunber of people.
According to an estinatc bet ween 1951-7.8, 146 najor and 756 nodiun
irrigation projects wore started. Of these 40 najor and 447 nediun
schenes were conpletcd and others were partially connissioned.

While these hydroelectric projects have by and large been successful
in meeting the increasing demand for electricity and the dans have
increased the cultivated area under irrigation, the local people who
were displaced by the construction of these projects have not benifited
by them. The cash compensation paid by the government; is much less
than the market value of the land. Secondly, in the .payment cf this
Cash compensation the si: ole .local people a.re cheated. 17 Thirdly
the construction of these projects changes the local environment
giving rise .to various deaseas of which the poor locals become victim.
No provision is made to protect then from these doseases. Finally,
the local people become victims of floods and landslides which have
now become a cornu on feature due to deforestation on the river catch­
ment areas.
The establishnent of heavy industries in backward areas is one
aspect of the Indian nodel of dcvelopnent. Since the backward
regions are rich in nineral wealth, establishment of those industries
saves the cost of transportation, etc. Secondly, these establishments
are supposed to develop the regions by facilitating the spread of a
network of transport and connunication and by generating oxploynent
in the industries and exposing"the local people to the outside world
However, as the aforekentioned Reports of Study Teams found, nost of
the skilled jobs are taken up by outsiders, The local people had excess
to only unskilled jobs which were United:. 18
The locals have resisted the attempts to take awqy their individual
or collective property. One
C
such instance is the stru./ .le waged by
Naini (^llahabad) villagets., Their land was taken over to set up
highly capital intensive and mechanized industries like Triveni
Structures(TSL), Bharat pumps and Conpressors $PS), Indian Telephones
Indust ries (iTl), displacing large nunber of villagers, who are
working in distant villages as agricultural labourers. These villagers
have been demanding jobs in these factories. 19 Similar is the case
of Dhanbad’s dispossessed peasants 20 and Bailadilla workers. 21
In Grahwal region, the local people under the Chipko campaign have
resisted many such displacements.
The central and states governments have initiated various schemes
small Farmers Development .Agency (SFDA), Agency for Marginal Farmers

(2^4)
and /igrxcultural Labourers (MFAL), Rural Work Prosrarme (RWP), Draught
Pilot InT r.OeraE1Lle jD1'AP^’ Crash Scheue for Rural Development(CSRD)
fppot InJenslp Rui'al Employment pro ject(PIREP), Employment Guaretee Scheme
kEGoJ, etc.- to ensure continuity of employentn and income to small
and marginal farmers, landless agricultural labourers, artisans, person
As^^ost o? +hUSeh01K occuI)ations» Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
nonev^l1op+ J80 SC^eS ar® exeoutef’ throug-h the Contractual system, the
all°cted 13 nisapproprited by the contractors in connivance
with local bureaucracy and vested interests. As far as the rural poor
^relief <reneCt’ theSG !cheDes are’ in 'the
of Tarlok Singh, only
poverty'
reS’ not Pcraanent solutions, to either employment or to
unde/cVr663 fiX8d UnC;er theSe scheE10S al-e

low. For example,

per day wages varied from Rs. 1 .38 to Rs.2.50. The various stuCes ofthese
off6who oJnetheOlnrthai
Schenes haVG ac^ally bonigited the bettor
in thr> n
+ 1 largest portion of rural assets (the poorest 10 per cent

°“t *«»rich“t
periled theb^Si’
the idevel0Pnent programmes displaced and paumcntprovSed ?h
sections, different achenes meant for their upligtZ Z
t “
7 1temporary relief at the subsistence level and
P
e i at the norcy of the rich, who have nade full use of
controFover^h01108
St various lcvels strengtherned their
noon! 1
> n
°f Proc1-Uction. While these displace unemployed
level 23
10ne h0Urs’ their waL'es have not risen above subsistence ’’

?

1

^IC ^olicy 01 production of and reservation for suall-scalo cotta.^p

and numerous^Ithe^iSusLieL'^A^the^ork lace ,nakorsmatchstick makers

whom^e^onln'S ch?Sren

T

^^^^^a’allorSy o7

:XsT!Hsr^“

b- 1 ! of the workers of unorganised sector have shown that, while they
too. The na?^nCofeprofii’
PUt Up With SexUal harassment

ino^Xr^^

— -

th-

and aXge nt-Sera^eriLZ^iOn\illitSraCy rateS haVe als° ^oreasod .
the Jo^flr" 2l Most of tSn ar"^
1978> fo^
processing units bbh of them are engaged m tea gardens, cashew
processing units, bidi and natch industries and hotels. Thus even
bafeiesl
a^afoi^
C°^itions of ^e next feneration bens
dcve£Znt^dopLdebvnT H1- ,analySiS Sh°WS that the westGra nodol of
not helped in eradibb ndla
nelthcr ensured a balanced development
-ctioS aneg: would bPP°VdeI,t?
^enPloy^nt. In the following
of development
V
t0
to what extent the Chinese model
from China and pn<m ■ Gc eCl Tn eradicating poverty and unenployennt
non onma and ensuring a balanced development of the country.

‘

-s

THE CHINESE MODEL:

Like India, China also was poor and backward in 1950 with four-

and backward in 1950 with fourfifth of its population dependingpoor
on agriculture, but only 10 per cent
r~\ -i-i 4*
J_
n
— .
P—Ple occupied 70 per cent
of-P total
agricultural
laud”
-- ,* s discribed
by Tawney, renaming rural population '
’suffers horribly through the
h?npCKlty
life and proP3rty- It is, taxed by
h^self a fieneral, by another, by a third, and, one ruffan who calls
when it has bought then off,
s ?'11 owes to the Governnent
it is
2.3 squeezed by dishonest
officials.

(235)
It must cut its crop at the point of bayonet, arid hand them over without
payment to the local garrison, through it will starve without them. It
is forced to grow opium in defiance of law! 26

The industrial sector was very snail, confined to coastal areas
only. The Cemaunist Party of China adopted the Soviet model of develop­
ment, giving top priority to heavy industry. Accoedingly, over 50 per
cent of state funds were allocted to capital goods industries and only
6.2 per cent were allocted .to agriculture. This increased the demand
both for skilled and unskilled manpower in industrial sector., 27

The Expansion of educatonal facilities and job opportunities in the
industrial sector in the early 50s resulted in cityward mobilization of
the vast mass 'of rural population. It is estimated that in 1949 the
total agricultural population was 470 million * By 1956 it got reduced
to 417 million9 In 1957 the tota.1 urban population had, jumped from 52.65
million in 1949 to 92.00 million. The steep rise in the strength of
workers also explains this point* 28 In 1949 th total strength of
industrial labour was 8,004 thousand, in 1955 it rose to 19,-076 thousand
and in 1957 it touched 24,506 thousand mark.29

Thus during the First Five Year Olan, immense job opportunities
were created in the industrial sector to provide employment to all
able-bodied persons within the a-.e group of 15-59 years. In 1949 four
million jobless were reported in China (presumably' in the cities). 50
By 1953, 207 million uncnployodnt
were reported to have found cnployomnt
through government’s assistance. By 1957 only 70,000 out of the four
c!
million remained unemployed. 31 However, Li Fuchun vice-Premier of the ^tate
state council in his ’Report on the First Five-Year Plan for Development
of National Economy of the Pepplea’s Republic of China’, sajbd that full
elimination of unemployment and making ful use of surplus labour power
would’ require continued effort in the period of the Secound and Third
Plan. 52 According to Hou> in 1956 the total percentage of unemploy­
ment was about 9 per cent of the male population aged between 15-59. 35
' On the agricultural front between 1950-52, land fofora was carried
out throurht China elininatidg the landlord class and reducing the
influence of the rich peasants» ^During the land refera aovement, 700
nou ( i mou equal l/6 acre or 1/15 hectares) of land was distributed
aaoung 500 aillion peoplee This constituted about 45 per cent of the total
total arable Hand. Of all the land redistributed,
redistributed two-thirds was taken
from landlords and one-third from rich peasants. Two-thirds of this
land was given to poor peasants and one-third to middle peasants. In the
following Table, Peter Schran gives details afrput rural population, e
employment and labour days for 1950,55, 57 and 59. In early fifties, the
percentage of the rural population comprising the labour force tended
to decline sharply -.-wning to rapid absorption of children of school
age in educational institutions. But in the 1 ter half of the decade due
to mobilization of women theis trend was unpset. 54

The land reform movement was fol..owed by the formation of nutural-r
aid-teams * By 1954 over 10 million mutural-aid-teams if permanent or
seasonal mature, comprising 58 per cent households, were in operation.55
By 1956 almost all peasant families were organized into agricultural
producers1 co-operatives (APC). Thus, attempts ?rere made to engage the
peasants in the development of agriculture*
However, .during this period, the expanding industrial sector
absorbed the majority of jobseekers1,. This sector registered 19 per cent
growth rate every year, absorbing about 14 million new job seekers. 36
By the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the employment siruation ih the
industrial sector reached saturation point. This adversely affected
the higher education of the vast majority of ^hinese students. To undo
the imbalanc -s generated by giving top priority tpjieavy industry, the
policy of walking-on—two-legs was enuncited in
‘ ° This meant that both
industry and agriculture would bp treated as on the same footing. However,
heavy industry still got priority over light industry and agriculture.

TABLE 1
-

(236)

-

-"I------

- 2’

Year

Peasant
Total
Population

1950
1955
1957

479.7a

1959
CollcctiviB
zation
1955-57

“"T'-".. . ~5
)q

6---

Av er ace
annual
labour
days

Total
annual
labour
days
26.5a
29.4

index
of
col.(4)

523.8
541 .3
539.6

222.6n
243.3
260.3
309.1

119.0
121 .0
159.5
189.0

41.5
58.4

97.5
108.4
152.8
215.0

+ 17.5

+ 17.0

+ 5S.5

+ 12.1

+ 44 • 4

-1.7

+ 48.8a

+ 29.5

+ 16.9

+ 62.2

1952=100

gognunica1957-59

NOTa;(a) Increase owing
nart fin' ” °Yins ^-ycoly to increased mobilization of wonen and
part-tine enployiaent
enploynent of school children.
'

O.n the agricultural front this was oonpensated by initiating labourintensive schenes like i
---- ^ProvlWi: soil, increasing fertilizer, developnont of irrigation facilities,
protection
of
nlanf.,
oncouragang the practice of close planting, —J- • -J ■
LB! Bon a ?lants» inproving,farn nanagenent and agricultural
inplinents. In the indusrial i’
intensive
plants
were
t00’
indiSenous. labour­
intensive
plants
wore initihrTTf
initiated.
snail plants
onploying
abS 4 4 It
“ 1958’ 3’00>0°0
iQt;o.vn
j
.u
.
i
.
**
r
million
workers
were
started.
Burins
1959-60, the nunbor of workers' I
was~70 pillion. More than67 million
wonen were reported engaged in e afforestation
---- 1 projects in 1958. In 1959
this nurwer ^’or reduced t4 3C
3
nillion,^
and
15 nillion were encaged in
public sector (welfarejservices). B
. By the fall of 1959 wore than 7 nillion
were iiobilized for road building.37
-is widely regognizod, these
gi^ures night be inflated. JNeverthless
^
during
(1958-60) naxinun utilizatio: of avilable i-- the Great Leap Fprward
"”7 — continued.
manpower whs made and the ‘ ' city ward nobilization of the population
---- 35
In the following Table Peter Schran fives indices
of the structure
of rural enploynent by labour days:
TABLE -2

nuuuuamMO®
days - 1950
A95.7^_ and _1959 Cit)
”
~~
-------------- -hhlh-B-—days in 1952= 100)
Year

£afeh
Bays

Farn
work

Subsidiary fionvee
:onveo
asic"
work (a)
Constru­
ction

1950
1955
1957
1959

97.5
108.4
152.8
215.0

75.2
83.0
113.4
151 .7

19.2
21 .0
25.0
29.5

3.1
3.9
9.7

12.3

Others(b)

0.0

0.4
3.8
21 .4

doristic handicrafts, adninis-

llectivc affairs, connunak
connunak services
and connunal industry.
survives and

(257)
The derailment of the national econemy due to naturak and man-made
factors compelled the CPC to redefine its economic priorities..Agri­
culture was now the foundation and industry the leading factor. 40
Thus ’top priority would go to those industrial pursuits that directly
served agriculture, either by producing modern inputs for the sector
or by .
. ‘ : processing outputs coming from it.’ during the 1960s
not only small industries directly serving agriculture wore set'up in
the countryside, but whenever possible‘small basic industries like iron
and steel making, Cement making, coal mining were also established.
This was in a way an attempt to subsitmte traditional inputs in agricikuture-labour, natural fertilizers,draft animals and traditional toolsby modern inputs- Chemicals: fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides,
small hydroelectric plants, electric motors, rice transplanters,
tractors, trucks, other machinery and seed improvement stations. ’’The
agricultural task in 1960s vias, in short, to industrialize and
modernize rural areas. ” 41
Thus while during 1960-75 employment opportunities in t he urban
industrial sector were drastically^ reduced, there was a surt fo job
seekers in the cities. It was reported that about 11 million persons
would enter the labour market in cities during 1960-70. 42
To facilitate countryside mobilisation of this increasing labour
forcem the party intensufied the Going-up-to-the- Mountain-Down-to*-the
countryside Campaign. Besides school and college graduates, people bee
longing to different cross-sections of the society were set to the
countryside for differebt durations., It was reported that between 1962
65, 40 million youth were transferred to the count ryside. 43 The number
of permanent settlers, however, is not known.

The policy of rustication if educated youth got a filip after
1968 and continued till 1976. Itwas reported that the total nuhber
of rusticated youth increased from 1.2 million in 1966 to 12 million
in 1976, The recent initiation 'of the policy of four modernization—modernization of agriculture, industry, science-technology and national
defence - - aroused new hopes of comfortable city life amoung the
■Chinese youth. However, while educational opportunities, even going
abroad for higher education, have increased, the modernization programme
neither revoked the policy of rustication nor opened enough new vistas
of employment for the already rusticated youth. The CPC and the Communist
Youth League (CYL) only took note of the prevalent descontent amoung
the rusticated youth. 44 And many conferences wore called to discuss
the ways and means of making the life of the educated youth confortable.45
These conferences made it clear to the youth that sending the surplus
manpower to the country-side was essential to provide them jobs and for
balanced development of the country. It was estimated that in ^979,
after college enrollment, about 800,000 educated youth would have to go to
to the countryside. 46.
Disppointed by tho party’s attitude, the dusticated youth protested
by organizing deraonstrations, resorting to train hold-ups 47 and. demanded
suitable jobs in the cities. 48 The party leaders adopted a diplomatic
attitude and out forward sone remedial measures to make the living
conditions better for the educated youth in the vountryside. 49

In the meantime, attempts arc being made to creat more jobs in ±he
cities for educated youth. According to the report of the State Bureau
of Labour, more than 19*3 million young city youth and others were
given jobs over the past three years (1977-78), out of which 9 million
were given jobs in 1979 itself. However,the downward mobilization of
the youth has continued. 50
Thus in 1950, the problem of channellization of youth energies
for the balanced development of the country was a complicated problem
for both China and India. During the last 30 years, China has to an largeextent mitifated the income desparities of different classes of
people and has by a' c large been able to give employment to its vast
population at the minimum wage level. 51

/■

(240)
24. See'Bedi Workers cof 11 ip ant', EPJli. vo 1. xiv, no
29,22 July
97B9 pp» 1176—78 and
.-J Times of India,22 Jan & 12,-April 1981.
25. See Indian Express, 7 May 1981.
26' ^70-72^^ and Lab0^r in China,BeaCon Press,Boston, 1966

27. See Ta Kung Pao s
.Oct''
& The Ten Great Years, Foreign
Language Press, Beijmg, I960, pp192, 198, Current Banckground
Mo 140,p.6.

2al SIn^oLmIInTfII’ ^ Economy af the Chinese Mainland: NationEckVtlin
di f °T}m^c Devel°went 1933-59,Princeton, 1965. Also
Publishlna99’
^C°TTOC Trends in Communist China,Aldine
Jr'UDlzshing Co., Chicago, 1968, pa. 340-47.
29. See Ten Great Years, ov. cit., p.180.
30. See.Ibid., p. 157.

31- See Ek stein (ed) Economic Trends in Communist China,on. cit
p. 372.
32. 'Li Fuchun's Report' in Bowei (ed), Communist China 1955-59:
Policy Locument with Analysis Harvard University Press, Cambridge
iiarvard,19o2,p.57.
33. See Hou Chi-ming, 'Manpower Employment and Unemployment’ in ~
Ekestezn (ed) op. cit p.373.
34. See Gurley, 'Rural Development i^ China1949-72 & the Lessons
to be Learned from Itf in Edwards (ed),Employment in Developing
nations.Columbis University Press,NY, 1974, op.387-91.
35^ See Ibid9*p. 390.

36.See Ishikawa quoted by itheelwight and MacFarlane, The Chinese
Road to Scoialism: Economics of the Cultural Revolution.
Penguine, 1973, p^41.
37^See Ekstein(cd) Economic Irends in Communist China.on.cit
pp. 380-81.

38. See Editorial in People's Daily,25 Aug'1960. also the Joint
Publication Research Service,no,24464.
39. Jioted by Gurley,op. cit., p.392.
40. See' Comminique of the Tenth Plenary Sessions of the Eighth
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China', Beilina
vol. 5, no. 39,p. 9.
41. Gurley, op. cit. , P-393.
42. See Bernstein, up to the Mountain Down to the Villages: The
Transfer of Youth From Urban to rural ChinalYale^UnlversiTu
Press, Yale, 19679p.37.
43^See ^en Hui-nao,12 oct, 1963,Hong Kong ^People ' s Daily,
12 September 1965,Beijing.
44* See Daily Report: Perole's Republic of China, vol, i, no 238
11 December 1978, pp. E16-E19.
45* See Ibid., no.242, 15 yecenber 1978, np.E1-E4*
46. See Daily ^eporti^nol63,21 August 1978,pp.L4-L5.
47. See Ibid,No030, 1 L'eb ' 79, pn. G1-G3 & Xinhua News Bulletin,73.
48*See Xihha News Bulletin, 12March,29-30 Aug ' 79:Daily Report,op
cit, no 1 72, 4Sept' 70, pp. L10-L11 ;Beijing Review, Vol22, nos 13 & 37,
4 May and 14 Sept' 791 pp. 20-28 & 51
49.See Xinha News Bulletin, no 11489,29 June 1930.
50.See Xinhua New Bulletin,Hong Kong,2DUeember 1930.
51 * However, even during Maoist era, the problem of Unemployment
abd disguised unemployment remained.Now with large number of
rusticated youth returning to cities,this has acquired the
form of unemployment.
52.J.N. Sinha, 'Rural Employment Planning:Dimensions and Contraintsj
EPW, vol. xii,nos6-7 (Annual Number), 1978, pp. 295-313.
SOURCE: CHINA REPORT,Vol.XIX STSip.ry.February 1985,pp.21-33.

THE^JjlALECTICS of INDIAN AND CHINESE

(241 )

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

This tpaper,
-------• * •
written
by Bjorn Hettne, department n
of peace and7 conflict re$earCh, Universtty of Go thenburg, Swede, is a major contributton of the comparative study of Indian and
Chinese mod 31s of developments•
The author
bases his carguments on both the history and
the concepts of development• tn both counties.

THRSS, STAGES IN THE APPROACH TO THE CHINESE6M0 DEL

Fron tho nid-sixtics and until •*'
the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 for
0n”?o2o»rw«»°th.
hexpor““te "o'™
’inronwablo*.
was
that
the
Chinese
governcnt
had
stopped
releasing^
XSaSK £‘>,90^‘‘SiE?TO'”«"t “ topped rolo.,3^
Another was that China, due to a conbination of lack of infornation and an over-onthusiastic
----------- j response frou
the 'new left' in the west, twas thought to be noving toward sone kind
of utopia. M tho sane tine India entered
•
.----- 1 at period
of- econonic stag—
^tion and recurrent political crises ' ending- up- with tho
/ j finergen cy of
1975-6, which denolishod the last argunent in Indian favour: the
denocratic facade.
studies

“ seens» reached a third
third phase
phase of
of comparative
conparative

lost decade , while facing a spontaneous novenent calling for a fifth
°a: donocracy- This new Situation will nost probably
SountriS\»+SU?P
invo^ved in comparative studies of the two
1 txt,ls t0° early t0 say exactly in what way. Optinistioally,
if nr> rn Pet^XVC ap?roac11 w111 never be revived, it is also doubtful
11 an overall comparison of econonic performance is ofnuch value. The
and ornlnX8
hls'fcorlcal background, in resource endowment, in clinate
\ . ey are so Breat that such an exorcise would harldy bo very
rewarding. More fruitful comparisons could for example deal with
specific econonic sectors or organisational structures, where the naior
biases can be eliminated. We would also suggest that general thenatic
comparisons, where historical and other differences enter the aSysL
*s olf-r-linnnhT present Gssay, Where we are exploring the ideas of

oLX

‘K» “«‘oxt of

cularlv Jn th
c^cussion on devtfelopnent strategies, partioftS co^?
Of th0 NeW Int<^*ional Econonic Order one
tives
Wn fl
T
f^danontally different conpeting perspec­
tives. Wo do not soe then as incompatible, although those who are ?

(242)

idoalogically connittod to one or the other nay feel so* Rather they
are conceived as dialcctica ly interrelated, which inplies that they
have a corrective effect on each other*

According to the modernization-perspective, development in tho
Third world is necessarily a repetition of the historical experience
of contempor ry industrialized countries, This Western world view is
shared by Liberalism and Marxism alike. 1 The nest naive expressions
of this development paradigm have, it is true, been donolishod; but the
basic notions, particularly as regards teclmology in relation to modem
industry, remain, for obvious roasong, very relevant* It may bo argued
that technology is somehow more ’universal’ than for example a political
institution, but wo feel nevertheless that the form and content of
technology is so deeply influenced by a specific culture that a certain
teclmology also implies a certain social structure.
Thus, ’moderni­
zation’ will here be used more or less as a synonym of ’Westernization’,
and it,is important that this specific meaning of the term is kept in ..
mind *
The other perspective is loss imitative and nore indigenous, it '
conceives tho real meaning of dcveloOnent as a' progressive change and
improvement of given structures rather than development through
’creative destruction1• Self-reliance, as opposed to both dependence
and imitation, is a crucial concept within this tradition. The ideology
of local self-reliance in particular, emphasizing rural development, is
commonly but not universally referred to as ’populism1. Ono reason to
be careful with this word is that it has different connotations in Asia
and Africa on the one hand and Latin Anerica 2 on tho other. However,
tho concept is hard to avoid, as it in our view constitutes a ’third
dimension1 in development thinking, it questions the primacy of technology
and industrialism, so characteristic of both Marxist and Liberal develop­
ment thinking, and stresses instead tho human potential* In stressing
tho need for a maximum of local self-reliance and in attempts to solve
the rural-urban contradiction, populism, furthermore, rejects the notion
centralized solutions. It is our contention that ’Maoism1 and ’Gandhism1
to a largo extent embody these populist ideas in China and India, and
that they therefore constitute two similar albeit far from identical,
models of development. In both countries they serve as alternatives to
the more conventional modernization paradigm.

In both India and China the self-reliance starto-cy and the moder­
nization str-tocy have been dialectically related to each other largely
in way in which they affect thesocial power structure. This relation­
ship is shown in Figure e

•______

.>

POWER STRUCTURE .

Socigl
effects

DEVELOPMENT
_STRATEGY
'

ECOMi'MIC bTRUCTUKE

■

Economic
Poli cies

■

■■

■■

(245)
FIGURB 1
Thus, in order to explain why a particular development strategy is
adopted, one must account for the power structure- and the way various
cstabliched institutions and groups attempt to promote their own
interests. Certain economic policies will, on the other hand, affect
tho power structure in such a way that the economic structure is changed
as a result. This also implies a change in the relationship between
social groups. Thus there will always be a continuous progress of
adaptation between tho development strategy and the power structure,
resulting in more or loss dramatic ’swings’ in development policies.
This further implies that there may bo a difference between the
formulation of a strategy and its actual implementation • The more
heterogeneious the power structure,the greater this difference will be
as is amply illustrated by the cases of India and China.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF DEVELOPMENT THINKING; /i) THE, QUEST
FOR MODERl'IIZATION ~

As emphasized above, ’modernization’ implies a comparison between
two units, and the development perspective associated with this concept
is that the unit which is found to be ’old-fashioned’ should try to catch .
up with the unit which is noro ’adbanccd1. Because of tho international
power-structure created by imperialism, this comparision, along with tho
obvious conclusion to ’modernize’, was more or less forced upon the'non­
European world. 5 The, choice was between modernization and destruction
by imperialist powers. Tho latter was tho inescapable fate for small-scale
isolated and technologically ’primitive* societies. On the other hand,
tho groat agrarian civilizations, with more developed political superstruc­
tures, where tho challege could bo assessed and some remedy bo thought
of, had a possibility of escaping destruction. Japan is of course the
g reat and so far only example of a society which accepted the challege,
modernized, and was able to boat the imperialist countries on their
own terns.
Both India and China were deeply affected by Western iriporialisn
and the response to the Western challenge has a long and complex
history. Since India was colonized at a very early stage (before
industrialism and modern imperialism), she never the opportunity to
follow the Japanese example.

The case of China lies somewhere betvTeon those of India and Japan
as far as the imperialist challenge is concerned. Unlike India, China
was never coloniz d in the strict sense of the word, although a number
of imperialist.powers carried out their policies with very littlo regard
to the Chinese government, Unlike Japan, China was therefore unable to
avoid imperialist control, The Self-strengthening Movement in the nineteenth century was too weak to follow the Japanese example, Onc of tho
reasons for its wealmess is that it was opposed by the reasons for its
weakness is that it was opposed by the Imperial court, another is that
the early modernizers were themselves very ambivalent in their approach
to modernization. In tho introduction wo mentioned that technology was
inseparable from culture and society. This fact was not quite realized
by the early ’sclf-strengthoners’ of China. They wcretraditional Con­
fucian scholars advocating’Chinese learning for tho substance. Western
learning for practical application.1 4 They entertained the hope
that Western military technology might bo mastered by skilled artisans
and craftsmen, so that tho Chinese literati could devote themselves
to more important things. It is significant that tho emergence of
’Western studios’ was conceived mainly as an alternative for those
Whoso path to an^official career had been blocked. 5

(244)

i,. less anbivalent attitude toward modernization and Westernization
was held by the loaders of th^ May Forth Movement (1917-21 ) the purpose
of which was to riainta.“.n th/ existence and independence of China as a
nation. To the your.f; into IP.actuals xho were in the lead it had become
clear that consorvatirri '//. traditionalism (Confucianism) now had to
be scrapped alter s-;] or■r-.rship of the old was replaced by enthusiasn of the nouf i, , ' o'”?-':r:. Iciiowledye and ideas. 6 4s we shall see
this instrunentaJ. ry pr- -oh. itemization and modernization dies hard
in China.
In India tlio cu
. c inflict between Western-type modernization
and various f orris c •? ? r- "itionalisn has porhps a longer and more
violent history toao
'Jlu.na- Is a fully colonized country India has

felt the Bristisr. -mV. r. ?uf
.pact since the middle of the rinotoe nth
century, vhor. a r.- f t'j -. / ::ni.nation policy was started/particularly
under Dalhousic 1O4C-L;C)
Tbo Mutiny of 1857 can bo seen as tradition­
alist and rcvivalis': : espouse to that policy. This uprising was subdued,
however, and the latpr w'/.’u : lo against colonialism operated from a
very different in.tolloctu:.?. content. As an instrument of this struggle
the Indian National Congress wasvformed in 1885. Most leaders of this
organisation were influenced by Western constitutional ideas, and as
the emphasis of th-' agitation gradually turned from political to
economic issues? the British wore held responsible for the poverty of
India. This was the thrust of Dadabhai Naoroji’s celebrated ’drain
theory’. 7 Significantly it was not, however, British rule but the
’un—British’ rule that bad created the poverty in India. There was
nothing wrong with the liberal principles of Britain. The problem was
rather that the British in India did not adhere to them.

The ideals of modernization thus became part became part of the
freedom struggle where they competed with Gandhi’s ideals of selfreliance and Hindu revival. The former conquered the Indian modern
elite, while the latter wore more instrucnental in mobilizing the
masses. This dualism has characterized the Congress Party ever since.
In the thirties there was furthermore, a split among the modernizers
between those who preferred capitalist methods and those who believed
in socialism and, more specifically, in the Soviet model of development.
Much of the political controversy in India has occurred between these
two ways of modernization., whereas the ’Gandhists* have been rather
passive since the death of Gandhi in 1948 and until recently. Vo shall
return to this natter below.

historic;.!, foundation of development thirking : B) THE ROOTS OF
_.l'!ELF_ RELIANCE THINKING

Vheroas the quest for modernization by definition implies an effort
at catching up with ’advanced’ nations, self-reliance is, although
normally inspired by...an external c hallonge, a more indigenous kind of
development thinking, and therefore more diffoicult to account for. The
most simple approach is, of course, to iook at the two groat personali­
ties which personify self-reliance thinking in India and China, Mahatma
Gandhi and Mao Zedong, but it should then be remembered that each
belongs to a specific ideological tradition.
India and China are old, proud, and self-conscious civilizations
and it is only to bo expected that self-reliance thinking should be
particularly strong and elaborated here. Possibly the strongest
tradition in this respect is that of China, which regarded the rest
of the world as 1barbarian? and only through force could be made to
trade with the West. The traditional Chinese attitude to foreigners
is clearly expressed in the famous edict of Qian Long to the King of
Englund in 1793> from which the following passage is quoted.

(245)

ti1C pSUGst nado in your memorial, 0 king, to send one of
your nationals to. stay at the Celestial Court to take care of your
of^ur^3 r‘+de W^th hina» 1:1113 13 n®1 ln harmony with the state system
People ofnth
definitely not bo permitted. Traditionally
tLPCol^+?hi' pUro?e®n natlons who wished to render sone service under
he Celestial Courc have oeon permitted to cone to the capital.
ut
X nl^Gdr-arrXVc ?hey ar° Oblieed t0 wcar Cllinose court costunbs,
are placed m a certain residence, and are never all wed to return to
^heir own countries. This is the established rule of the Celcstical
ynasty.with which presumbly you, 0 king , are familiar, New you, 0
ho is not lik a?bG fi G °f y0Ur naWonals t0 llve ln «1G capital, but
1? X +h
1 k° thG IlllroP0ans, wllo cone to poking as Chinese employees.
o there ana never return hone again, nor can ho be allowed to go and
^ome and maintain any corrospondance. This is indeed a useless undertan
i*
a na c cor
fact, the virtue and prestige of the Celestial
bj^land anFs2 ■SP^^d if
WidC’ the 1£inGS °f thc ^riad nations come
is nothin- w 1 W>
S°rtS °f prGci0US things. Consequently there
is nothing we lack, as your principal envoy and others have themselves
observed, We have never set much store on strange or ingenious objects,
nor do we need any more of your country's manufactures. . .8

nizers^^i^-^H0
W&y t0 exPlain why
Chinese 'moderw !
•/,
dycllss0d above, had a hard tine. It is obvious that

nnrthnt1?^3 bCCanG Weapons in the struggle for power within China,
^d that there were some' good political reasons for suppressing those who
hold it necessary for China to Westernize in order
to survive
It J
isodXsinilt r tho 'modernizers' who took power after the death of Hao
Soviet UniX SU?nt5’
°^y diffcrcnco bGlnC that it is now the
It
h
th
^Curos as the main threat against Chinese survival,
ihich incontinent d out that.^o cones from that -'hineso tradition
a scrips of sSf Stf1 aGricultural"a tradition which sees China as
Thil tradition i~ o
i°n1/Ur^.UnltS’ Unit°d by a ccntral bureaucracy.
yZ r
\£mtl"Urba’ anti~foroign, and anti-conmer/
cial,'Xn? y?an“’syndro^e was basically a rccncr^enco of this tradition
in a :revolutionary nould. But now clcnents were added.
f
(or
°n ocon°nic ^velopHont wore not derived exclusively
k
p rhaps m thio case not even prinarlity)fron the Hindu tradi-Hnn
thouiht cS onS bo nna
ocononics of populism, Gandhian economic
Prnnti.T
understood as a counter-theory to Western economies

S a n:6 lclsn kthe last two of course
C°“OPhaving
‘O Of their Hindu

-p

Thus the
A
ineTXX

f

SuSS *

rSr “economic
IS centralization
la
£ 2'
and bureaucracy. 9

was UP.Ofrural
cconony.
He visualizedand
theSlLc^taCir°105
Of ^-Sporting

f czc lanGxng only necessary commodities with other villaroq
not locally PPOdPeiblp.
producible. toloulta-p
’aS
’
J----xstence,
in of
place of an cconony of surplus, would
, 4-u-.
-y.
in place
do the foundations• Land should be cormunal property, and the inplc~
uonts
and tools jof -a
■it-innaiiir
industry should belong to the fanilv trad-

orzXs^id\is:
bSir:'
in this societ^
property
:

LX

>»“•>“ » ^irldu.l

in h-i**0* late Gandhi» Was deeply rooted in the soil of his country, but
Cas°.to?1the Western impact scons to have had a catalyzing
ararelust

p[>puli.,t

Like Gandhi ho T“
J of kropotkin

(246)

In fact the firsu groat Chinese Marxist, Li Dazhao, who had a great
impact on young Mao, seems to have been equally influenced by Russian
Narodism and Marxism. 12
Evon if ho never directly studied the
Narodnix writings he took a strikingly similar stand in emphasizing the
village community and the need for the intellectuals to ’go to the
people’. His Marxism, like later that of Mao, was therefore of a very
unorthodox king.
There is no denying that mao was a Marxist. He himself said ho
was, so this is not the issue. However, he has been convincingly
argued by Maurice Meisner, the relationship between Marxism-Leninism
and Maoism is a rather ambiguous one. 15 According to Meisner the
influence of Marxism-Leninism never completely overwhelmed the populist
strain in China and, furthermore, a powerful pululist impulse was to
become an integral component of the Maoist version of Marxism. One of
the fundamental characteristics of Maoism is the still unresolved
tension between Leninist-type elitism and the populist belief that the
peasantry possess an innate socialist consciousness. 14 In the case
of Gandhi wo find the populist ideology in its .more pure form. 15
It could be argued that what differentiates Maoism from Gandhism is
Marxism and that what Mao and Gandhi have in common is populism. • 16
The common elements in Gandhism and Maoism have lately become more
widely acknowledged and comparisons between them are no longer rare.
17 At least the Soviet Marxist characterizations of Gandhi and Mao
arc more or loss the same, both being described as protagonists of
potty bourgeois nationalism and voluntarism.

Comparisons are always highly suspect, since two phenomena may
seem different or similar depading upon what; aspects are considered,
. ..
Here we are rmore concerned with similarities
than differences, and it
is particularly the-problem of self-reliance which is in focus.

Ge.ltung has obsorvocl that solf —rolianco prinarly belongs to the
realm of psycho-politics. 18 Gandhi and Mao gave the ordinary Indian
and Chinese self-respect, dignity, and the capacity to defend themselves*
19 One of the firs-; concerns of both mon was with the image of weakness
projected by imperialism on India and China. 20 Both Gandhi and Mao
realized the 1 modernity of tradition1, i.e. they were innovative tradi­
tionalists. Gandhi often refferred to Ram Raj, and Mao spoke of Da
tong; these were the two utopias in the classical Indian and Chinese
traditions. Feithe?’ Mao nor Gandhi believed that material incentive
could be a prime mover for individual effort and efficiency. Both wore
anti—elitist ir the? classical populist sense and both wanted to narrow
the dr.strinctiors between physical and manual labour, between cities
and countrysidef and bwtwoen workers and peasants. 21 Gandhism and
Maoism are also alike in the emphasis on simple living and identity with
the poorest. The loincloth and the ’Yanan was way of life1 are symbols
that have different historical settings but are similar in substance.
22 Finally, the communes of Mao and the village communities of Gandhi
(stripped of the differences in ideological approaches) practically
amount to the same thing. According to Sethi, this is one of the most
remarkable points of similarity between the two. 25
THE POWER STRUCTURES OF INDIA .ZJD CHINA
The main reasons for the different enphases in the Indian and
Chinese development strategies should of course be looked for in the
different power structures of the two countries• By this term we
refer to the relative importance of various clashes and institutions j.
in the dovision-making process (and their changes over time), rather
than the more formal distrienution of power as expressed in the constitu­
tions. We shall confine ourselves to those components of the power
structures which are identified in the simplified model 24 in Figure 2*

1247}
This model (Figure 2) is no substitute for class analysis but it
identifies more or less institutionalized spheres f of interests which
acquire meaning only insofar as they are related to the class structure
of society. This can, however, bo only crudely attempted here.

THE ADMIN IS THATION |

fi. THE MILITARY |

Foreign

interns is

*

i

Charisma
FIGURE 2

~

dominant narty \
other parties and^
'winterests

The dominant parties in India and China have been the Congress
Party and the Communist party. The CcncrossParty had suffered a great
setback in 1967, split in 1969 and was almost demolished in 1977. It
has, in terns of voters, a middle-class, worker, and peasant base, but
its leadership has all along been dominated by a Westernized elite, of
which one segment has had capitalist and another, nuch smaller one,
socialist leansings. This heterogeneous and sinewhat paradoxical
.structure should be seen against inperilaist penetration never developed
toward social revolution as it happened in China, but relied instead
on Gandhi’s charisma as woll as local patronage structures, which of
course wore not very revolutionary. Tho orthodox facilitated this
reformist strategy.
The recent breakdown of the Congress Party should not beoverdranatized. It is very likely that the party nay be restored. The Janata
party, which took over as the ’doninant party*, has functioned nuch in
the sane way, represented essentially the sane interests, and was in
fact partially based on segnonts of the disintegrating Congress Party.
25 The difference between Janata and Congress is thus one of enphasis
within a ruling coalition of classes and elite groups. During the
Energency (1975.6) segments of the industrial bourgeoisie, had the
upper hand, whereas tho rural rich, particularly the ‘^ulak1, elements,
occupied a corresponding position in the Janats governuant. However,
Janata was never a honogeneious political force. It was rather a deli­
cately balanced and continuously changing alliance system.

After a less successful phase of organizational work in the urban
areas the Communist Party of China became primarily a peasant movement,
mobilized by the issue of land reform and by the rather unorthodox
(populistinspired) policy of the party under Mao’s leadership. Immed­
iately after the revolution the recruitme t policy again shifted toward
the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, and rhe characteristic dualism
(red versus expert ) took shape. The cultural Revolution(
1966-9),
Kcvolution(l
966-9)>
which almost destroyed the party, was intended to reduce the ’export’
element. Since the army was instrumental in maintaining law and order
a conflict between the army (Lin Biao) and the party Zhiu Enlai)
became unavoidable. Tho party was obviously the more successful actor
and has now been ro—established as the dominant political force in
China-together with the bureaucracy.
The ad min i s tr a t i o n is of course ‘fornally
- - in
- charge of executing
political decisions but it also has a certain autonomy,. Both India
and China have long and complex bureaucratic traditions, In India
the colonial administration was taken over almost intact, and only
the local administration (Panchayati Raj) is a later invovation.
There has always been a tension between politicians and administrator’s,
though this does not exclude a certain symbiotic relationship. During

(248)

the Emergency (1975-6 an ’administrative society’, similar to the poli­
tical system of the colonial era, was restnblished, but this was not of
long duration. The administrative structure i-. India is and has always
been oxtremcljr cetralized and the bureaucrats of course have a stake
in this system. The sane is the case in Chinn, where a clear tension
exists between the mandarin tradition on tho one hnnl and the antielitis^*
manifested1 in* Liooi .. t
.e \ ’v,
<tc-r
there has been a most
foreceful revival of bureaucratic powers
io perhaps a controversial concept, but somehow one has
to account for the remarkable power to influcenco the flow of events
that has been exercised by exceptional loaders like Mao and Gandhi. Of
course their ’charismatic power’ was rot equally influential a on all
groups and categories but should bo explained by reference to cultural
traditions and class interests. 26 Charisma reflects a social relation
ship rather than a psychological quality, and the strength of charisma
is therefore explained by the expectations raised bj7- certain leader in
his ’followers’ . The character of charisma is dotevninod by cultural
factors, such as the stress upon moral purity and self-denial in Hindu
tradition or heroism and struggle in Chinese tradition. It is difficult
to see how the cultural Revolution would have been possible without
Mao, or the demolishing of the Congress Barty without Jnyaprakash
Narayan, applying basically Gandhian tcclmiquc of political change.
The nilitary has so far been of direct political inportance only
in China, but it has been intinated that I diva G-ondhi after the catas­
trophic 1977 election actually asked the nilitaary to take over. 27
The Indial military is extremely professionalized, however, and does
not seem to harbour political amibitions. One student of the Indian
army notes that possibly n? other group in south Asian society is so
critical of politicians on particular issues, and yet is sc strong in
its support of the political system. ’ 28 The contrast with Chinese
army is striking. The people’s Liberation Army (ILA) has boon both
a political and military organization, besides being a production force
all in lino with the danan way, and enforced by Mao against the
’professionals’’. The Korean War boosted the lattor view, as did Soviet
aid to the specialized branches, dependent as they are on modern
technology. The Great Leap and Cultural Revolution, on the other
hand, reinforced fg uerillaism1. This, however, has again changed
after the demise of Lin Biao, and in the future the army will also be
’modernized.’
foreign interosts, finally, is admittedly a somewhat cryptic term
but here we refer primarily to other nations which by diplomatic and
other means attempt to influence the internal policies of a certain
country. In the case of India these interests have, as well shall sec,
been quite formidable in spite of India’s rather independent foreign
policy. Typically they have operated through tho mechanisms of financial
dependence in periods of foreign ecchango constratints. In tho case
China, tho policy of self—reliance implied a break with the Soviet
Union, and it is an open question whether tho modernization strategy
recently adopted will lead to a now dependence. If so, the dependence
will not bo upon tho Soviet Union.

Now, to summarize tho implications for ’self-reliance’ versus
’modernization’ of tho Indian and Chinese power structures^.there is,
particularly in the Indian case, a heavy bais in favour of moderni­
zation. Initially there was a cleavage between the Congress party
and tho bureaucracy, and between tho bureaucracy and the business
class (the former mainly Brahmins, the latter merchant casts and mino­
rities), but gradually there have emerged close ties between party and
business, while tho cleavages have been bridged, thus creating a
solid establishment bent on industrialization and modernization. Al­
ready in 1956 (at tho hight of ’socialism’) it was clear that tho

(249)

publicsector versus the private sector was a ninor issue, and that nost
inportant business concerns willingly accepted governnent participation
in nanagenont without any fear of vigorious extension of governmental
activity for example in the field of heavy industry. The struggle bot~
woen 1 capitalism1 and Socialism1 has therefore been a natter of emphasis
rather than principle and both ideologies share the sane nodernazation
paradigm. To the ’modernization forces1 must be addes the military, whose
modernization was emphatically stressed after the 1962 debacle aganist
the Chinese, and whoso increased strength became clearly visible in the
war against Pakistan in 1971. The Gandhian elements, on the other hand,
rapidly declined in political importance after the death of Gandhi.
His selected heir, Vinoba Bhave, emphasized the metaphysical aspects
of Gandhism rather than the practical-political aspects, and in doing
so he led the Gandhian movement into the desert.

J-OYAPr cikash Uar ayan (in India known as J p) much later rediscovered
the political stru, z le conponent and, now also supported by the bulk of
the Sarvodayaists, achieved a renarkable revitalization on Oandhisn which
put an end to the rule of the Congress.
In China too the strength of self-reliance has been primarily
connected with the charismatic factor, but in contrast with Gandhi,
Mao lived long enhough to create a very distrinctivc political tradition.
In this he evidently had the- support of the old core of the army, who
continued to believe in the Yanan way, as well as those many students
who came from non-academic backgrounds and therefore 'rejected the elitism
of the universities. In the peasants, Mao of course also had a rather
secure base. On the other hand he was often opposed by the urban
interests, proletarian and nonproletarian, as well as the more orthodox
cominunists within the party, the bureaucracy at large, and parts of the
military, eagerly waiting for modernization. This makes the balance
be ween modernization and self-reliance a little more even in China than
in India However, in both cases the odds against a radical policy of
indigenous development and self-reliance mustultimately bo considered
as rather heavy.

THE DIZLECT.ICS OF DEVELOPMENT s
After the above presentation of the two contending views on
on
development, and having discussed, in a sketchy way, the power-struct­
ures in India and China, it should now bo possible to put thihgs to—
gobher and see how the opposites interact. This will give concrete
form to the development process in the two countries. It has been fairly
common to give a dialectically inspired expostion of thechanges in
development strategy in China, whereas this approach is less connon in
the case of India. 30 The reason for his may be that those who
analyse the development in China may be influenced by Mao’s own dialectic
view of things, but it is also very clear that the oscillations are
more pronounced in thecase of China, where the alternative lines have
been^ ’capitalist1 versus ’socialist1 modernization, whereas the emergence
of the JP-movement in the early seventies was never fully articulated
as an alternative development path. Gandhian policies, as for exam le
the Community Development programme, have been emphasized now and them,
but never as part of a consistent development strategy. Thus the
pendulum movement in the Indian case is somewhat distorted by the fact
that there is a traiangle of policies, 1 capitalism’, ’socialism1,
Gandhism’ ,^which operates within the framework of a ’nobukuzaticn system1.
3^ those terms’ arc hero used in a contextual way, which means that they
have limited meaning outside a concrete Indian or Chinese situation.
Modernization’ and ’self-reliance1, as defined above, are on the other
hand here used as universal soncepts which may serve our comparative
purposes. Thus in India ’capitalism’ and ’socialism’ represent two
varieties of modernization, while ’Ganhism’ is the Indian form of selfreliance thinking. In China ’revisionism1.represents modernisation
and ’Maoism1 self-reliance.

(250)

Lot us now define the dialectics of development, first for India
and then for China. 32

iroiA: CAPITALISM, SOCIATISM AMD GA1TOHISM:

Even before independence the three development paths of Capitalism,
Socialism and Gandhism were widely discussed in India. Three nlans
d-icorse approaches were presented in the forties:
the Bombay Plan, expressing the visions of the industrialist^'th^
People’s Plan, emanating from the socialist canpt, and the Gandhi Plan,
written by disciples of Gandhi.
In this way the heterogeneity of the Congress was clearly reflected
in the development debateWhen the First Plan was announced i_t became
clear that the capitalist forfes led by Sardar Patel had been the strongest.
This plan was exfremely pragmatic and may be described as a combination
of Capioalist and Gandhian elements, the most conspicuous example of the
latter being the ommunity Development Programme. However, there was
very little Gandhian about the implementation of this programme, which
was a completely bureaucratic exercise.

Only during jthe_Socond Five Year Ptan (1956-61) was it possible
to speak of a consistent development strategy. The plan had been formulated
by F.C. Mahalanobis, inspired by the Soviet Model. This implied emphasis
on large industries and public ownership, i.e. modernization in the
socialist way. Even in agriculture a ‘socialist pattern* of economic
development was stated as a goal in the Nagpur resolution passed by the
Congress in 1959.
This shift to the left had been facilitated by the death of Sardar
patel, by the successful elections in 1951-2^ and by the encouraging
economic development during the First Plan. It is also very likely that
Nehru*s visit to China in 1954 had played its part. All this contribu­
ted to a strengthening of the hands of Nehru, who in turn left much of
the responsibility of the planning process with Mahalanobis. The approach
in the plan was, however, extremely theoretical, and reflected current
ideas on the basic importance of capital accumulation as the sine qua
non of development In international finance circles the radicalism of
the Second Plan was never much appreciated, a
and' when India in the late
fifties lived through an acute payment crisis,
the world
wurru. ^ariK
J- the
Bank a:
and able
other agencies of internationalcapitalism wore able to exercise a certain
influence over the economic policies of the Indian government.

The Second Plan failed miserably in mobilizing resources for the
ambitious investment and growth targets. On the whole the planning
exercise in India has been quite unrealistic, and after the Second Plan,
which may be considered the only 'real* plan, the tendency has been a
ritualization of the planning exercise•
THE THIRD PLAN; (1961-6) was basically a repetition of the general
objectives^of the Second Plan, but turned out to be even less success­
ful. In the midsixtios there was a devisive shift to the right in
economic policy, this can be seen most clearly in the sphere of
agriculture. The Green Revolution meant that Gandhian agriarian policies
given up altogether. The emphasis was now on productivity rather than
the creation of self-reliant village communities, and the organizational
noderl of this modernization policy was clearly thecapitalist firm. The
Nagpur resolution was quickly forgotten. The roasongs for this the shift
to the right were: the death of Nehru and the rise of the Syndicate, the
political organization of Indian conservatism in the Swantra party, the
reduction of federal power.- monopolism in -the private sector, and,
again, an increasing influence of foreign (US) interests, as shown for
example in the devaluation of the rupee in 1966.

/

(251)

The shift in developnent policies had.inportant social and political
consequences. In_the_la.to sixties the social tensions both in the
,the^n^s_j^e&Eod. dranaticallfTifaxaiisn,' strikes^
riots etc.;. A crisis within the Congress,led to a split Congress -0
and Congress-B. and the rise of Indira Gandhi in the olections of 1971
and 1972 to a position of power conparablo to that of her father.
At that tine nany expected a straightening-up of the political systen
under the banner of ’socialisn'. India approached the Soviet Union,
and Congress (r) received full support fron the Connunist Party of
India (CPI/, but in practice very little cha god. Indira Gandhi's
great alliance was based on political 'outsiders'who were a-iven an
to repiane. the old State bosses, who forned the Syndicate,
with the result that corruption reached new heights. The Fifth Plan
was launched under great controversy regarding its deg^e* of realist!.
■u^eIer
t1101,0 wa9» it disappeared during the oil-crisis of
Green Revolution also lost nonentun and agri­
cultural a production began to fall, this contributed to the price rise.
All this led to a political cirsis in 1973-5, which saw the growth of
the JP-novenent (a Gandhian novonent led by Jayaprakash Narayan) and
endect with the Energency • of 1975 and 1976,

^e^?r£ojrencni , which started in early 1974 in Bihar, was the first
serious challenge that the Congress regime had faced since independence.
It represented a resurgence of Gandhian political activism after more
than 25 years of passivity. As mentioned above this passivity was
caused by the particular interpretation of Gandhism nade by Vinoba
ave, but m the early 1970s nany Sarvodayites, led by JP, challenged
Shave s yew. The constructive approach' was, they felt, not sufficient. Political struggle was also necessary. 33
■Sfee. Sarvodaya organization was, however, too>weak (except perhaps in
Bihar/ to carry out IP's 'total revolution', and therefore JP made use
oi the organized political opposition to attain the necessary infrastrucyure- The Gandhian element in the JP-movement became more and more
diluted as the movement was elovatedfrom its original Bihar context and
transformed into an all-India movement. In spite of this the political
establishment was alarmed, and on 26 June 1975 the Present of India
declared a state of national emergency duo to 'Internal disturbances'.
Though the Emergency was the result of an acute political crises
there were of course underlying econonic causes, which in a summary
way nay be described as a contradiction between the transactional form
of political systen ('politics of distribution') and the stagnating
econoky. A more authorita tion approach was therefore felt to be
necessary, since there was now less to distribute. Es The,. Emergency
wa s not a very sudden change however. It had been preceded by nearly
a decade of increasing authoritarianism and police violence.
During .th^_EDerge^cy_ Indira Gandhi nade desperate efforts to
?®.?en ®rG1 P°litical and econonic crisis under control. Thousands
o± political opponents were inprisoned and a 20-point programs was
launched to solve the econonic problens. This was adhocisn (which
nay be said to have started with Indira Gandhi's 'Stray Notes on the
Econony at the 1969 Bangalore neeting of the Congress Party) in its
most pronounced^orn. There was no consistency whatsoever in the
program©, but it inplied a straightening-up in the adninistration, which
led to a tension between certain offcials and the rural elite. 34
J, ^CS nthG 7ierSency was no re beneficial to the industrial than to
cultural, interests. The enforcement of the family planning programme
( ot included m the 20 points), and the rough way in which it was
inplenentec., oackfired on the Government, which was already in a process
fqS^c^ation caused by the activities of the Indian 'Gang of Four'
<Sanjay Gandhi and his associates}f )

\J

COMMUNITY HEALTH CT!.L
47/1. (First FImf) St. Marks Evwl,
BanffaTore - 560 C01.

(252)

The reasons for Indira Gandhi’s decision to hold elections in
1977 arc still rather obscure. She may have been unaware of the real
state.of public opinion, or she nay have found it healthy to dissociats
herself from the ’Gang of Four1. In any case the election destroyed
the Indian deninant party, which in itself was a most remarkable
outcome. A ’new^’ party emerged after the election to take over gov er­
ment responsibility. This■organization, the Janata Party, was a most
unusual and peculiar political confiquration, and the most uunbelicvable
thing about it was perhaps that a GANDHIAN economic prog ranne was
announced by the now government. This needs some clarification.
As discussed above, the Indian political scene in 1974 and 1975
was dominated by the JP—movement• A distinction should be made between
on the one hand, the movement as such, which was more or less Gandhian,
was mainly student—based, and relied on the Sarvodya organization for
its ebre lead ersjip and, on the other hand, the greater political alliance
surrounding it. This alliance was c mposed of most of the opposition
parties, from the Communist Party of India (Marxist), whoso attitude
was rather ambivalent, to Congress (o), with the Socialists and the Jan
Sangh constituting the more enthusiastic core. (The Indian Socialists
maintain certain Gandhian traditions, and the Jan Sangh had recently
gone through a face—lift which made its outlook rather Gandhian too).
Another party, Bharatiya Lok Bal, was maily a North Indian ’kulak’ party.
Most of Janata’s and in the South, even in the great debacle of 1977,
Congress fared rather well.

What kind of economic programme was the new government pushing?
JanataTs election manifesto had spoken out against ’elitism, consumerism,
and urbanism1 Light industry was preferredto heavy industry and rural to
urban. It was, furthermore, necessary to steer away from both capitalism
and socialism. A typical passage read:
Cities have their place, but, if rural India cannot provide
economic opportunity and creative outlets for the growing
masses in the countryside, we will be forced along the capital
intensive, urbanoriented, and centralized path of develop­
ment followed in the West. The experience of the last
three decades has only underlined the relevance and vallidity of the values that Gandhiji placed before us. 55
After the election the Janata
out to be much more vague:

government1s econinic declaration turned

In the economic sphere the government is pledged to the removal
of destitution within a definite timeframe of 10 years. Relative
neblect of the rural sector has created a dangerious imbalance in the
economy leading to migration of people from rural areas to urban
centres. The farmer has been denied reasonable and fair prices for
his products. Allocations for agriculture and realated developments
have been grossly inadequate and the need to improve conditions in
tthe villages has received scarce attention. More than a lakh of
v illagos do not even have the most elementary facilities for drinking
water. My government will follow an employment-oriented strategy in
which primacy will be given to the development of agriculture, agro­
industries, small and cottage industries especially in rural areas.
High priority will also be given to the provisions of minimum needs
in rural areas and to integrated rural development. To the extent
possible at this point of time, the fifth five year plan will be
reviewed. The planning process will be revitalized and work on the
sixth five year plan will be taken up without delay. My government
will announce at the time of the presentation of the final budget
later this year the details
of the economic programme that is
proposed to be followed. 56

(255)

C^53)
(l07aIR^a:rly 197l8.tbe Government released the draft ’sixth plan’
(1978-83),
plans~in thnti’T “
Jollin® Plan» which differed fron previous
han in T?? ?
be continously revised. In presenting the
plan m Lik Sabha the Brine Minister said that it was ’necessarv to
ordor

°f tl“ pl“ rron

*»

1»

cent of tot-,1
Priorities , j. The emphasis on agriculture (43 per
docunont
y)
rUral industries was maintained in this
uocunont, it was described by the onnosi ti on no
4.
reactionary’ as it ’thr^-t, + opposition as ’nost retrograde and
nation and take t?
? ,d ? rGV° Se the Process of industrial!m* • j
fhe nation back to the colonial era *
Thn p-r-in^

in the past the planes
regained uninplenented to a large extent becase
of lack of involvement
oi the people. Now the governnent would organize
panchayates and municipal ties
2 ?n.a in the 'Partyless basis ’ to
ensure involvement of 1’ all^people
~
in the inplenentation of schenos for
agriculture, cattage industries,
j and other rural developmentsa
incontrovertibly implies a fundananinplonentation sten not oniS?strab®ey‘
haeyy odds against its
but also fron various structura^con3!1^?0*' UJ£ty within the governnent

B££»J«?^sh,ssr“
-40 1 1

b

allocate production quotas to larve-scolo

5SSS:: :ith+

qnnii

Vt-tia? SX^^Senoe.

tine-lags involved in 2nf a?prop^atG technology’ has overlooked the
enterprenourial inputs Sto^r ?deqUate organizational, managerial and
possibly nnko thM
2 2,
10 structuro of Indian society will

JXSXS S’th,”

th.
the

polioy sinll“

»f

Let us ]nowturn
\
to the political constraints.
In ordar to assess
the realism
of
that
.
kind of economic programme it is necessary to

“”iSXa? “ th»” This is sumerized .

instiWiom^confWS^1^'1
?G fi?Ure Only s™rizeS the
surface of formal organizations^h he natlonal loVol« Below the elusive
infrastructure of cafte conflicts 7?
™n3ely conpled social
and clashing economic interests’ whichScul5rsCle’ *el±Sious tensions,
tations from one State to nno+h’ ’ ™ dif-ers m its concreta raanifossuperstructuro is ultimtolv
?°Wer SaH0 that s°os on in the
but the scope of the orSoS detem“Gd by this changing infrastructure,
these connections^ ?
* C'SSaly d°0S not allow an elaboration of
’

but a few cor^entf^il^ae^the?^*^60 thG n°del ±S nUCh to° simplified
Janata corner S thZ conf
necessary nuances. To start with the
government Was a little nor^t^n^10’
lifotine of the Janata
energy was spent on a power str^.^^rSich thoT d^36
played by the urine
m
which the leading parts wore

«»a Ctera. S1„sh (leate of the

7\V

C°aerGss0<

^"objets ■

- 55OJ

°i j p

Vl’no'bct

Co^sess

+'CUctdc.<5

Z^.^
j2

Cxncrrlcx

°

c?. \ c

(254)

FIGURE 5
The hajor factor keeping Janata together was the
the threat
threat coning
coning
fron Indira Gandhi. The Congress party had been split into Congress
(I? and Congress (s), led by Swaran Singh, on the issue of her leader­
ship. Indira Gahdi had used the comfortable position of Congress in
the southern, tate of Karnataka as a base, but in July 1979 the
karnataka pru.no ninister Devaraj Urs challenged her leadership, which
reasulted in still another ’congressparty’, Congress (u). 59

As the third corner of the triangle wo see- the ’Gandhian’ establishnent doninatod by Jayaprakash Narayan. The Gandhian activists in
Incia are a nebulous category which included Sarvodaya workers engaged
m the various activities which have their origin in Gandhi’s Constructive
progpannor Unoy nunber about 50,000 persons, attached to over 8,000
Gandhian institutions. 40 We have earlier referred to the split in
the Sarvodaya novenent between followers of JP and followers of Vinoba
B
It 13 necessary to nake a distinction between the JP-novonent
anc. one Janata party in spite of the charisnatic role of JP in forging
tne alliance ’
jhat crushed the doninant party of India JP and his
followers becane nore and nore disillusioned with Janata governnent
and fron tine to tine JP spoke of starting a new novenent, but his state
o health c.id not pernit this. In an interview with Geofifrcy Obsterr’aard
m January 1979 JP said; 41
It was another historical opportunity lost . . .
I don’t know what now initiatives are called for
or are necessary. But sone now initiatives have
to be taken by somebody . . . I’n out of the picture
now because of my illness.

Io 2- obvious that the Gandhian inage of the Janate Govcrnent to
a very large extent was a concession to the role played by JP in the
struggle against Indira Gandhi.
Even if the governnent had wanted to inplenont a Gandhian econonic
progranne i , w?.s boo paralysed by internal conflicts to acconplish
nuch. Already m the sunner of 1978 it was very close to breaking down,
Charan Singh was forced by Desai to leave the Cabinet, obly to
return as Deputy Prine Minister in early 1979. By sunner the tensions
burst out again, and this tine it was Desai who had to resign after a
°- c-GG®c^i2nS fror-1 ‘tiic Janata Pary. Charan Singh then took over
hn!
mni;3ter P031’ but had to resign in -August after Indira Gandhi
-d wibxiarawn her support. 42 Once again the ’old lady’ turned out
be the crucial elenent around whon the whole political process is
x U V O -L V Illg

0

Indira Gandhi got what she wanted, A nid-tern poll, expected to
take place sonotine
in early
uuacune m
early 1979,
1979, was announced hy president,. A
desperate power ^'ano m order to reorganise the large nunber o:
of
factions inio viable political alternatives lstarted.
v
In the Didst
of this unprecedented political disintegration JP died, physically
broken by his tern in prison during the ^nergency
'
and psychologically
broken by disillusionnent fron watching the perfornance of what nainly
had been his creation, the Janata party, Vlas that the end of a selfreliant and indigenous approach to India’s economic and social ills?
CHINA;

MAOISM AND REVISIONISM

ImtiaHy the Chinese developnent strategy was little nore than
a copy ox the Soviet node! of developnent. It did not work in China,
however. The reason was that the process of socialist accunulation
had nuch earlier reached the linit of nass stravation in China than
m the Soviet Union, and that nany Chinese Connunists, notably Mao’
were not prepared to pay the political price that Stalin had paid.

(255)

b^Wenn thlS strate^ and the !Yanan way of life’, the society
?• 4A he CoriDUnists in the
the Liberated
Liberated Areas
Areas during
during the
the forties
forties, It
»”d
,he
•»■>
ons with the
,.l„ “ «*O dlBooatlthereby contributing to groat leap-backward!

to LiFshalai9
Ma? {ound 11 necessary to leave the presidentship
eonnio-f- i
Position was weakened, and in the early 1960s a
thFsIvFt
dev?lopnent strategy emerged. It was not a return to
iridustrFwn! ! bSlnCe; fOu Gxa^e» agriculture rather than heavy
minimS th eapkaslfed- However, Mao's eristics were anxious to
mninize the conflict with the Soviet Union. The populist emphasis
CaFtoSUsten0n S°Wledge Of the P0°P10 was rejected, and the
als In the d!v!FF CyClal r°le °f the intellectuals and the profossionfor Fho
I
PT ^0CGSS- “ WaS no lonsor considered essential
for scholars to work m fields and factories. Rather they were encouraged
SluSuS L°?
Mbrarohloal syst„ of option »a.
“■
Sh“S aS th P,ki”esVn !rol‘r; Bwourseoa hy the President, Liu
SitloLrf » ? P
7 *C"‘K’’ e"® ““Pi-S, intolleotuals oovorely
aS ortKL
Polloloo. Ihese orltioo »ore uuiuly mti,orJ
and artists, and the critique against Mao was consequently given an

.^TcX^voSKoi: “??““■

’“■» ”hy

this conceP't was incorporated into

the Marxist doctrine as one of the
—nore significant theoretical inno—
vations of modern times.

Bnvninv00
Sha0^i was Mao's forenost opponent during the Cultural
Revolution, a conparison between the two is called for. L In enito
of the outright repudiation of everything that Liu aS^eUy s?o2 for
rSSnJTT?104 “J"
“>e
aorol«tS7tSc ™
’

stvle Tnd°

+1

by^heXrSS

tlleir differences were perhaps acre in political

ln reVO"ution^

This L at least^esSd

■in th! r! \
1 th®fe 18 n°ihing which indicates that Liu did not believe
eat Leap, though he in retrospect adnitted that it had been a
in S’SulXXS’? ald- H0"VOr'

inoliZd tJ
In"short

aiioals

+
2 tlOn Were nore than he could accept, since they
desRuction of the party and the administrative machinery.
couid never accept, nor could he understand the popSKm of

SeOreS<aL eV?1Utre* .He had not ^P^ienced the mass c!paigns In

in K t u-+reaS £,'nd having been responsible for the political work
shout!
durine the war, he had had to 'empty "revolutionary"
two
’-.which have no practical meaning, must never be made'. The
rI! ZrT! eSn°f co™ist experience in China-in the wS ^nd the
the hur3 “ezpTa1n much of the two subsequent 'fronts' of the party
PrL v!XC!aK1Ze ’ urban-°ri0nted, technocratic, and WestcrJ-influenced
groun
Liu d
®e?litiarian» Populist and-more local-oriented
Sg workers
Wherh bel?^ed?,tha fo^er. Liu, intrated on mobilimS ™t !
? Splke °f the ?ass®s' he meant workers, while
S spoke oF^8’
! f F41 °SSay (Th° ClaSS Character of Man)
backwardness'hinP!attS + la* ways’ conservatism, narrowninedncss,
oacKwardness m c ontrast with the 'solidarity, nututal co-operatLn

.«>.e of organisation,

aisolpll„, of ihe

aiffore»tP'ta?’^1S tTO‘ »f

"d L1"

pJXtaS' 45

■»« kav., boon oore

-illerent, but of course this m itself is no reason why thev should
StS"etLosi1:vSenenies- However’±n of 'desteucS::ld
positions' Fl^fFb^Fn^Fo^esF deVel°P
^-^ory

C2'56)

was a rebitalization of Maoism. Assisted
by the army, Mao cut the bureaucracy to pieces and all but crushed the
communist Party. In terms of the Chinese power structure it was a
strengthening of the military element. In terms of regional balance
of power it was a strengthening of the Shanghai group. In terms of
regional balance of power it was a strengtheing of the Shanghai group.
In terms of Marxist.philosophy it pointed to the need for a continuous
revolution m the superstructure of society, where there was a permanent
danger of capitalist revivalism which could affect the socialist
infrastructure as well. In terms of development strategy it was a reemergence of populism and the- indigenous Maoist model of development .
J-10C^Qj^9,Q.ntaj.n_s _six_ import ant components, /is its core we see
the ^^iminatiogi^^^^thrpp^ unequal relationships ’ ; between city and
countryside, betwe.oil industry and agriculture, and between intelleeurals
and manual labourers.
’ “
“
~
- ---- Mao conceived these relationships as contradictions to be resolved; in
a. dialectic process, resulting in completely new economic, social and
political structures.
.The n,0-Ael is furthermore based on the principles of self-reliance,
^rtici^j-iion Cnobilipation) t, and decentralization. Self-reliance, the
antithesis of ’dependence1, is one of the key concepts in the recent
discussion on development and underdevelopment. It is,not wrong to
say that Mao was 1 one of the great populatizers of the concept. It
should not be interpreted as ’autarchy’, but implies a high degree of
reliance on one’s.own resources and, very important, autonomous goal­
setting and decision-making. As we discussed above, self-reliance thinking
has a long tradition in China.

Participation and mobilization have been characteristic features.
of Chinese economic policies under Maoist inspiration, It is not correct
to evaluate these features primarily as means to development, They
should also be regarded as ends in themselves, reflecting the Maoist
emphasis on equality and popular involvement, The principle of clccentralization is an application of the same values to regions and levels
of administration.
This nodel.was thus basically similar to that of: the Great Leap
orward. How did it work out this time? In retrospect it looks as if
the' Cultural Revolution, like its predecessorthe ^reat Leap Forward,
a. adverse effects on production. This was recognized already'in 1968
in a rank speech by Zhou nlai. Whereas the Groat Leap ^orward suffered
its^worst setbacks in'the agricultural sector, it was now industrial
production which was most severly affected. Tho Shanghai workers in
particular had been extremely active during the Cultural Revolution,
though their activism was more
nore due to their own.grievances than to any
connitnent
to
the
revolutionary
commitment
revolutionarv goals
/reals.# The u.disruptive effects on
industrial production reached a peak in 1967, and the level of production
both in 1967 and 1968 was. lower than in 1966* Only in 1970 was the
situation nornalized.
In contrast to the case of the Great Leap P orvrard the ecdnonic
policies of the Cultural Revolution did i__*.
not inply any great structural
changes. The People’s C-onnunes were’largely intact
j-iibGiuu, and in spite of
recur :r2nt
~ .conpaigns
*
against naterial incentives the private plot was
left undistrurbed. T'
The nos-t radicalchanges seen to have taken place
in the field of education, the stronghold of Chinese elitist tradition.
Theoretical studies were now downgraded in favour of practical•training.
Each university was equirod to ostablich workshops and agricultural
plots.Whereas the failure of tho Groat Leap Forward brought the
expansion of snail-scale industry to a halt, the Cultural Revolution
was characterized by an increased onphasis on the development of a

(257)

local self-reliant industry. IThe functions of this industry included
the utilization of agricultural
-- raw materials, the training of a largo
rural industrial work force and the production of iron, cencnt, coal,
and machinery roquirced by the atriculturald sector. 46 The trent
toward decentralization could also be seen :in the decreasing role,
played by the central ministries. 47

This■emphasis on self-reliance suggested that such economic concept
as economics of scale, specialization, and comparaticc costs were largely
ignored. However, m 1972-3 the economic policies of Maoism wore again

L““iCi“$!--d974-5

''.“""‘•’-Hack lea by tta iXous

.
• 0ilG
1^s manifestations was the canpaing against
onfucious, txie real target of which seems to have been Zhou Enlai. In
January 1975, at the Fourth National People’s Congress, Zhou had given
a speech on the ™our Modernizations which <can be seen as the programme
of the moderate group. In 1976 both Zhou and Mao dies,j and the power
balance thereby changed significantly. Without the support of Mao
the radicals were isolated and their defeat a question of time*

p

SELF RELIANCE AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE GANG OF FOUR

Soon after ’the decisive voctory over the Gang of pour ’ new
economic signals appeared. In late 1976 a front page article in the
People s Daily declared that China’s now leadership intended to stop
up the^nation’s purchases of plant, toclinology andcapital equipment
from abroad: ...
'
Stressing self-reliance doos not mean that wo advocate
a closed-door policy, but we learn from the good oxperience and advanced science and technology of other
countries and absorb them for our own use. . . 48
The people’s Daily ridiculed the self-reliance of the Gang of Four1
by refieerring“ to their alleged
importation of pornographic Xfiles,
W------ J/WA XX\J(3X
XlUiJ |
ano omphasixed
an^
onphasixed that ’!economic and technical exchanges betweencotaies
betweencotrios
with different social systems are completwly normal activities’.

Obviously, the now leadership in Peking did not want to create
an ikpression that a different development strategy was emerging.
Therefore a famous speech originally made by Chairman Mao in 1956,
entitiled ’On the Ten Major Relationships’ was used as the major policy
document. 49 In this way the emerging policy was legitimized in the
nano of Mao, although it should be remembered that the situation in
1977 (when the document was first officially published in China ) was
very different from that in 1956. At that time Mao’s mildly critical
remarks about the Soviet development strategy secret), but in the light
of later events the sane observations sounded rather like praise for
the modernization approach.
The wide publication of this document was one of the first important
signs of a new trend in econimic policies, but for several r easons it
took tine to state out the new path. One reason was that the ’gang had
had some sensible points in 'their criticism against the ’modernizers’
although their views had tended to become rather extreme in the course
of the power struggle. Further, they had widesperas support form
those officials who had been recruited during and after the Cultural
Revolution. 50 Therefore the preparations for the Eleventh Party
Congress, finally helf in September 1977, were rather long-drawn out
and accompanied by purges at different administrative levels. To the
extent that there was a plan for a dramatic change in economic policy
(which ny now is fairly obvious), there was of course a need for a
corresponding change in the power structure. 51 Hua Guofeng was
evidently Zhou %lai’s man, but he also owes his present position to
Mao’s alleged judgment that Hua was the one in the best position to

7 (253)

preserve Maoisn. He pays lip-service to nodernization, but appears to
prefer a slower proedss than Dong Xiao pin/; ■»
Dong Xiaoping, on the other hand? has been a najor figure in Chinese
polios, twice purged (1967 and 1976) but’ always on his way back again.
Dong’s econonic pro^ramc, as for oxar.nlo spelt out in a talk (reported
in China ^rade Report) on the country* s oconoriy on 18 August 1975, nay
be sunnerizod in five points:

1 . Ho nust stress the idea of talcLnc af: iculturc as the foundation.
A najcr task of industry is to pronoto the nodernization of agriulturo.
2. Ho nust adopt now technology. To inport, wo nust export a few
nore things. The first thins to ny nind is oil.
3. Stop up scientific research work in enterprises. Now sone
intellectuals have not put to use the skills they have learned.
4. Actacxiin/; first priority to quadity is a najor policy, and this
includes variety, specifications, and quality.
5 . The key to rules and regulations is the systen of rospobsibility.
The present problem is no one takes responsibility.

In the Eleventh Party C ngross (Septnebor 1977) the nodernization
drive was firnly set. a
A 23-nan Politburodiscipline, was
elected, and the policy of the Four Modernization (accriculture, industry, science and defence) spelt out. The new leadership was •particularly
concerned aboutthe ’technological gap’ created by the voluntarisiTof
the previous decade, and this paved the way for a dranatic change in
educational and research policy. The now policy was finally confirnod
by tao^Fifth National people’s Congress (January 1978). This was
follwed by a National science Conference in March 1978, which saw the
wholesale rehabilitation of China’s intellectual and scientific commu­
nity, . declared by Dong.: to be ’a component of the proletariat’. 52
The am was to have by 1985 an affay of 800,000 trained scientific
workers in China. Thus, in the now 'Long March' towar d nodernization,
uho noritocracy is to play the role of an agant. garde.
no goal of nodernization----is no longer
longer disputed
disputed but
but there
there nay
nay of
of
course be nany shifts in approach and enphasis as the inbalances and
conTradic Lions oi tho now simtegy appear•o During 1979 the signs point
to a slowing down in spoed^ puggpsting a ‘victory for the gradual rather
than the crash approach.

WHAT_IS NW IN THE ECONOMIC.POLICY OF TODAY'S CHINA
i, r.
WTf t0 su™larizo ‘the recent changes in econo
econonic
nic policy is
node! a T
t11 +°
six above -mentioned conponents of the Maoist
nodol. To start with self-reliance, there is of course no explicit
refutation of this goal. The difference is rather one of interuToc}ay self-reliance is stressed as a reason for inportinv
oign technology (rather than inporting connodities) thus strength­
ening the productive base.of the country. The cultural aspect of
voun™C in^l^3 completely igncred. The training of thousands of
id^o4
wavUofSlSr°a-’ thUE exposinG then t0 an altrernativc

organization in the factories, putting t-n end’to t’- S Q hxel’achical
participation in-decision-naking. The fevSut^cn^ comit?
being abolished at lower levels of adninistraHon^ COQnittecS

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compatible with continued '^urbanizationKural .industries are still
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of their
’all functions in the induePmphasizod but ipthpr
’rather in tcrms
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sufficiency at the commune, level.
■

'

'

The new’ relationship between industry and-,, agriculture is still
unclear. The Initial emphasis,on industry (particularly steel);in
the modernization.programme was modified .during the 1979 ^lowsown4
and.the importance of the agricultural•sector was stressed^ Within
this sector a significant shift from grain’production to the production
of cp,sh—crops tdd,k place., , .Regional specialization according to the
priciple of edmpar tive advantage and productivity-raising measures were
also stossed. All this points to a more conventional pattern of
economic development. Like India,.China will also have its Green
Revolution.
-

.

’

•

••

Finally, the intelleftual-manual cohtraditction illustrates most
dramatically and .explicitly the shift in development strategy. It is
necessary Jig see the educational system as an integral part of the
total development strategy. Whereas the Maoist model necessitated
a very, specific kind of training, stressing political s consciousness
and a command of verjr diverse skills-, si£h an education will only
turn out to bo a handicap if the process of economic development is
based on imported technology. The latter pattern of development implies
specialization and professionalism. Since it-’t jkcs time to develop
now skilly it is -in this, field that the? measures to -make up for-past
’mistakes * are bound to be most dramatic, not to say desperate.
Those changes are not only incompatible with Maoism but they
may, at least in some of their consequences, be difficult to
reconcile with any variety of socialism. A reported trend toward
the spontaneous disbanding of the production teams is a case in point.
Such a process would undermine the most cherished innovation of the
Maoist strqtogy, the, people’s oomnunos. The policy of s agricultural
specialization, and the downgrading of grain production in order to
boost production of cash-crops for exports, will have similar conse­
quences. Occasionally the communes are even said to bo obstacles to
the modernization of agriculture. 54

It is at present not possible to assess the importance and signi­
ficance of these and similar signs. Perhaps we arc too alarmist? Or
could it be that socialism is at stake in China? Scholars who have made
important contributions to our underst nding of China disgrec intensely
on this issue today.

(260)

In a statement which has attracted much attention, Charles
Bcttlehoin, a groat admirer of the Maoist model, made the allegation
that the apparent fidelity to Mao Zedong’s policies has been a ’smoke­
screen designed to conceal a quite different line1. In his view ’ a
revisionist lino is presently triumphing. ’ 55 Many China watchers
found this judgment a little rash and instead suggested that the new
measures were designed to copc with new problems or correct former
mistakes. A distrinction was made between ’strict1 discipline and
’exploitable1 discipline, the former associated with industrial socialism
the latter with induetrisl capitalism. 56 The critics also emphasized
the atmosphere- of relief andfrecdom prevaling in China after the fall
of the Gang of Four. 57 Another important point Raised by the critics
was the error of inferring social practice from the political line:
’Today the line has shifted, but the experience of the earlier period
gives us evdry reason to believo-cltrary to Battolheim-that practice
has not changed nearly so much. * 58 Thus there are two lines of
’defence’: recent changes are necessary, or they will have only a limited
impact. If they are ’necessary*, they arc so obly to the extent that
a modernization on the lines of Western industrialism is the ultimate
goal for all societies. Ais to the impact, it nay bo true that a policy
that goes against the forfes of modernization will face great difficul­
7
ties and much sabotage. But present policies
are with the current. They
are bound to have an impact. !
.
.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As the preceding overview has shown, the development strategies of
India and China have followed winding rccts . In India the dialectics of
development seem to be at work primarily at the policy level with
limited impact on economic structure. Certainly the emphasis impact
on economic structure. Certaibly the emphasis on public investment
in the heavy industry sector in Nehru’s days and the new agricultural
strategy from the mid—sixties and onwards deeply influenced the pattern
of economic and social development, but on balance development planning
has more and nor turned out to be a sonehwhat ritual exercise in India.

In China the shifts in emphasis, as far as economic policies are
concerned, have had more important structural implications, simply
because of the nature of the policial system. It must, however, be
emphasized that our general lack of knowledge about what really goes on
at the local level in different parts of China makes it too easy to
exaggerate the real pf ..cts ’of different signals from poking.
Another observation is that the novononts of the pendulum have
gone in opposite directions in India and China.
Thus when one country
stressed agriculture the other sttessed hevy industty, when one followed
outward oriented policies, the strategy of the other was inward oriented,
and so on. On the whole the dialectics have worked in a more construtive
way in China. The issue of self-reliance is a case in point.

There are few countries in the Third World having a real option
with regard to ’self-reliance’ versus ’modernization’, as here defined.
India and China re among those few, and it is also in these two countries
that the option has been a major political issue for an extended
period. Both of them have large natural feesources, huge domestic
markets, and great cultural traditions to draw upon. Nevertheless the
traditions of Westernization are also long and important, since moder­
nizers in both countries have made us*e of Western ideologies such as
Liberalism and Marxism to cohbat indigenous conserbative traditions
(Brahininism, Confu cianism),) The tempatations of the Westerninspired
policy of modernization have therefore been substantial, in spite of
the well-known dangers of dependence. In discussing the power structures

(261)

we could concluded that the forces of modernization and self-reliance
were not equally strong. Whereas the ’modernization paradign’ receives
authorization the Western experience or unrivalled tochnologicaal change
and economic growth, the untrodden path of populism, self-reliance
and ‘alternative’ patterns of development can rely on little else than
the charismatic power of inspired leadershipe History indicates that
this is insuificionto furthermore, both India and dh.'.na have recently
been deprived of the active incarnations of such traditionss Jayaprakash
Narayan, who operated within a revitalized Gandhian tradition, and Mao
Zedong, whoso message is becoiming more and more distorted as the new
leaders consolidate their position, ^ignificantly the utopian visions
of both leaders were compromised and frustrated through the opportunism
of political ’followers’
For the present the economic policy of China is outward-looking
whereas the economic policy of India’s Janata government until its fall
in July August 1979 was oriented toward 'self-reliance, decentralization,
employment creation, small-scale industries, rural development etc.
It should be noted thea t those were a?so thoconponents of the Maoist
development strategy. In India, little was achieved in this direction,
however, since the government spent its energy in a desperate interr.al
power struggle. Our analysis of the underlysing power structure of the
Janata. •Party’ showed why this had to bo so. As Late as November 1979,
it was impossible to foresee what-political combinations'might emerge
iron the unprecedented political disintegration in India..

Howevery the era of dominant party rule seems to be over and a
new era of short-lived coalition governments is in sightc If this
scenario comes true, the relevance of what goeu on in the political
superstructure for the actual process of economic and social change
nay'be even less than it is today, Thus the spontancicus prevess of
’development•' will continue unbated , a process that will benefit the
forces of ’modernizationin 1growth areas’ rather bran those of solf­
reliance’ -or? for that matter. an optimal, mixture between the two.

In contrast with the situation in China in the nv^tconth century
(the Self-sirenghtoains Kovcnent and India today., China can cany out its
present nodernization programme fron a position of ro?.ative strength.
There is no question of accepting entornal inputs to nakp up for a
general lack of internal inputs. Rathe the point soons to be a sele­
ctive use of external inputs in order to eliminate important bottlenecks
in development, in exchange for a resource which China none than most
othe? developing countries can spare: namely oil, Il the output of •
oil turns out to be loss than so far has been expectuck . wh?.ch seons
likely, there will be an increased export of cash crops and products
from light industry. At present this strategy seems co be preferred
over the more dangerous policy of budget deficits and borrowing abroad.
Instead of being a n exporter of ideology* China will bo an exporter
of oil. The change is significant. Today China is in the pj.-ocess of
re-evaluating and demythologizing the accomplishemcn us of Mao Zedong
in an attempt to change the Chinese collective consciousness. It would
be undialectic to say that this attempt will succeed to i?? the long run
but at present it is rather obvious that at anti-Maoist policies have
substantial popular backing. It should also bo obvious that those
policies are bound to create now imbalances and contradictions. Those
(including the present author);, who persist in admiring the Maoist
strategy as a solution to China's problems and as a possible model for
developing countries? set their hope on a now turn of the pendulum.
A few pessimistic reflections are., however, called for, A movement from
’chaos? to -rrder** from amateurism to professionalsn f and from mass
participation to bureaucracy is obviously easier to bring about than
the reverse. Two Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution were extraor­
dinary incidents made possible by Extraordinary circumstances, among

(262)

which we possible by extraordinary hold the charismatic power of Mao
Zedong to bo the mostinportant• What we now are witnessing is the
’routinization: of charisma, a change from revolutionary Charisma ’in
the process of.originating’ to the systemmintaining ’charisma of office’
However, the Chinese revolution belongs to the Chinese.

NOTES

1
2.

5.

4.
5<
6.

7.
8.

9.

10.
11 .
12.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21 .

For a discussion of the Western Model of Development in the context
of intellectual dependency and liberation, see B. Hettne, Current
Issues in Development Theory, SAREC Report R5: 1978.
In Latin Americal ’populismo’ signifies a nationalist devclpOment
strategy, based on a class alliance of the national bourgeoisie
and the labour class (or rather the trade unions), and aiming at
industrialisation. In Asia (and Africa) populism (much like the
Russian Narodniks) is oriented towards rural development, the
local community and the indigenous culture.
Very much the same challenge was created within Europe through
the British industrial load, some counties were able to take up
the challenge and sone were not. The various responses to this
challenge, which gave a specific pattern to European industriali­
zation, are dealt with in A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness
in Historical perspective, Cambridge, Mass. 1962.
On this, see Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism;
The Tung-chih Restoration, Standfor 1957.
Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and power, Yen
and
the West, Cambridge, Mass. 1964.
Chow Tse-tsuing, The May Fourth Movement. Intellectual Revolution
in .Modern China, Stanford 1967, p 359.
Dadabhe j. Naoroji, Poverty and un-British ' ulo in India, London
1901 o
Ssu—yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West.
A Documentary Survey 1939-1925, New York. 1975, p. 19.
Bc Hettne, ‘The vitality of Gandhian Tradition’, Journal of
peace Research, No. 5,
3? vol. xiii, 2 1976, p. 20
B. Hettne and Go TTanrij ’The Pevolopnent Strategy of Gandhian
Economics1? Journal of tho Indian Znthropilogical Society,
vol. 6 No. 1, 1971, p. 54.
Jerome Chen points out that Mao’s impatience with bureaucracy
stems more from Chinese than Western sources. J. Chen, Mao
and the Chinese Revolution Oxford, 1965. See also Stuart
schran. The political Thought of Mao Tse-tung New York 1969.
Maurice Meisner, Li Ta—chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism
New York. 1970.
MauriceMeisner, ’Leninism and Maoism. Some populist perspectives
on Marxism—Leninism in China The China Quarterly, January
March 1971.
Ibid., p. 16.
For a comparison between Gandhiasm and ^-ussioan populism see
Hettne, 1976, op. cit.
Hettne and Tamm, 1971, op. cit.
J. Bandyopadhyaya, Mao Tse-tung and Gandhi New K Delhi, 1975,
R. Vaitheswara n, ’Gandhi and Mao: A Comparison in Terms of
Relevance for the politics of National Liberation and Reconstru­
ction’ China Report, Vol XII, Nos. 5-6, 1976, J. D. Sethi,
’Mao and Gandhi: Convergence and Divergence- A preliminary
Note’ China Report, Vol. xIII , NoA 1, 1977.
J. ^-altung, The Politics of Self— eliance, Chair in conflict
and peace easearch, University of "’Oslo.
Sethi, op. cit., p. 26.
Vaitheswaran, op. cit., p. 55.
Sethi, op. cit., p. 27.

(265)

22.
23.
24.

Vaitheswaran, op. cit., p. 35.
Sethi, op. cit., p. 28.
For a mere historical approach soe B. Hettno,
I y Utvecklingsstrategier i Kina och Indian ( Development Strategiesj in China
and India) Lund 1971, 1979.
25. lifter the split in Janaury 1978 there were four 'congress parties1
two inside and two outside Janata. Many leading figures in the
Janata govornnent wore former congressmen.'
26.
See the. discussion in p. Worsley, The Truript Shall Sound
New York 1968.
27.
Seo an article by Dev Murarka in the Danish, newspaper Information,
29 April 1977.
■
28.
S.F. Cohen, The Indian Army, Berkeley, California, 1971, p. 187.
29.
G.H Corr,^ The Chinese Red Army, Osprey 1974. For a review
of books dealing with the relations between the Peopl’s Liber­
ation Army and Chinese Society at large, see Lynn T. White III,
r The Liberation ^my and the Chinese People1,
Armed Forces and'Society, Vol. 1, No 3, May 1975.
30.
This oscillation approach has been critically discussed by
A.J. Nathan ('Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic
of China: A Critique1, China Quarterly, 68, 1976), who notes
thatthere are authors who use the policy oscillations model as
'a kind of shorthand, convenient for summarizing the content
of for policy and its- changes' but that there also are authors
who want to explain .policy oscillations. Among these he
distinguished three categories:
(l) those who see the oscilla­
tions as cyclical movements between Communist utopia and. the
realities of backwardness, (2) those who see them as conscious
applncab.rons 01 Mao's conception of dialectics and (3) those
who see them primarlily in terms of changing power structures
would probably qualify the present author for membership in the
Nathan's criticism may be summarized thus:
7/
F°^siblo to place all policy options under two
headings<4.) it is not possible to establish a nccessary link
between different sets of 'right' and 'left' policies, (3)
the 'two line' struglle is so forecefully projected by the
Chinese mediant at outside analysis are led astray. To this
our reply would be that it is quite enough if certain fundamental
persped wives (for example what we here have called 'selfreliance' versus 'modernization') could be contrasted. It is
not necessary to explainl every programme in terms of policy
oscillations. Secondly, WG WOuld agree that it is very difficult
to establish a <close connection between internal oscillations
and
....Chinese
_ foreign policy.
‘
> Possibly they must be analysed
within dificront frameworks. As for internal linkages there are
cortaihly causative relations between sone if not all areas.
Thirdly, there has obviously been a sometimes very bitter and
bloody political struggle in China which simply does not fit
with a less dramatic 't: ial and error’ model of development.
31 .
For the concept of 'reconciliation system' and 'mobilization
system , see D.E, Apter, The politics of Modernization,
system, Chicago 1965.
32.
We are hero mainly relying on Hottno (1979).
33.
JP said:
'I'm afraid my Sarvodaya friends nay not
■ like this
but I have cone to feel that our approach was wrong . . . The
struggle approach is the right one. Gandhiji had seen this
this when ho developed struggle along with constructive work1,
ENDIAN EXPRESS, 13 July 1974.
34.
Personal observations fron Karnataka.
35.
'Janata Party Manifesto’, published in Connerce, 19 February
19 77 •
36.
Times of India, 22 March 1977. P. 7.
37.
Tines of India, 4 nay 1978.

(264)

58.
59.
40.

41.
42.
45.
44.
45..
46.

Econonic and Political Weekly, 28 January and 4 February 1978.
Econonic and Polical Weekly, 14 July 1979.
G. Ostergaard, JP’s Total Revolution: in Retrospect and
Prospect, (nineo 1979).
Ibid., p. 16. '
Far Eastern Econonic Review 51 -August 1979.
Econonic and Political Weekly 18 August 1979.
Lowell Bittner Liy ^hao-cgi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution,
Berkeley, California, 1974
1974, espoctially chapter 6.
Ibid.,? p. 180.

J.

sIgurdson,
?
. ’Rural Industry - A traveller’s Vievz’ China- Quarterly,

No, 1972.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51 .

52.
55.

54.
55.

56.
57.

58.

A. Bonnithorne, ’ China’s Cellular Econony: Sono Econonic Tradcncls
Since the Cultural Revolution’ China Quarterly, No. 52, 1972.
Quoted fron China trade’Report, January 1977, p. 8.
Par Eastern Econonic Review, 4 February 1977, pp. 10—12.
Leo Goodstadt, ’Poverty and power in poking politics* Econonic
and Political Weekly, 5 Bocenber 1977.
In January 1977 a wasll poster which appeared in Guangzhou spelt
out a no.dernization strategy in nine points, reconnending anong
other things increased levels of consunption, natcrial incentives,
workers’control, and rapid introd ction of foreign technology.
Significantly, tho poster was anonynous.
(China Trade Report, March 1977, p. 9.)
Asiaweek, 14 April 1978.
C.P. Cell, ’Beurbanization in C&ina. The Urban Rural Contradiction
Bulletin of Concerned Asian cholars, Vol. 11, No. 1.
China Trade Report, May 1979.Letter of resignation to the „ranco-Chinese Friendship Association.
The letter was published in Monthly Review, July-August 1978,
and followed by an interesting debate between Bottlehein and Neil
Burton. Later a special issue of Monthly Heview (May 1979) was
devoted to the sane debate with contributions fron, anong others,
Jerone Ch’on and Joan obinson.
R.S. Leiken in Monthly-Review, May 1979, p. 57.
According to Joan Robinson the present Chinese leadership ’has
enbarked upon a hitherto unprecedented course of cokbining an
anbitious plan for accunulation and growth with open discussion
and freedon of thought.’
Ibid., p. 56.
A. MacEwan, ibid., p. 45.
00000000000000

(265)
c

ERNIZATI ON
“'“AND

THE POLICY OF ’

'

•

SELF-RELIANCE’

One of the most debated aspects of today’s
China is its” modernization” and its policy
of self-reliance.
China, according to cer­
tain observers, is turning away from its
original policy of self-reliance and moves
towards the West for updating its technology.
But has there been a real departure from
the concept of self-reliance^’ as under­
stood by Mao? This article tracer the
history of self-reliance back to the Chinses
Revolution and examines the application
of the concept to the various phases of
China’s revolution.
The author, Ronald
C. Keith teaches in the Department of
political sciences, University of Calgary,
Canada.
The article is taken from ’’China
Report, March-April 1983.

SELF RELIANCE AND THE FO UP MODERNIZA TIP NS

Since the death Hao Zed.cng in 1976 western political analysis has
anticipated a reduction in the radical politics of Maoist socialist
justice in favour of what is seen to be a more rational advocacy of the
1 « This reduction has often been interpreted to
’four modernisations
modernizations’
include ’the shift arvy from o If •••reliance ’ • 1 The persistent advocacy
of ’self-reliance1 since '.c.j's death in 1976 may, however, challenge
western historxographncal assumptions as to the continuity of meaning
and the practical.policy implications of the term ’self-reliance. ’1 A
precise undersGand'jjg of the dimensions of ’self—reliance’as formal
policy would seem to he crucial tc■any larger analytical treatment of
the role which fore.upn Anyostment and technology might play in the
context of China!s medernisatipho

Particularly wxt.'.i r.oapc .t to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
Revolution, ’self-reliance * has in western historiography been described
in terms of an autai ehy irrationally opposed to an international division
of labour based on the classical theory of the law of comparative advantage in trade 0 m so far as the Chinese are concerned such an interpretation is controversial.
________ This concept orginated from within a revolution­
ary matrix of thought which integrated a burning rationalist concern
for China’s survival with an aspiration to socialism in a world of
competitive ’imperialism’. However, according to the Chinese argument
on the level.of formal .policy, this concept has nev er agreed with
xenophobic autarchy. On the contrary, past and present expositions of
’self-reliance1 are said to be quite consistent with a commitment to
the expanision,of China’s international trading relations. Under the
historiography of the current Chinese leadership, China’s Cold War
condition of semi-isolation in the 1950s was a matter of external
imposition rather than an expression of domestic policy preference.
_______ _--------_______________________ ___________ _

* I would like to thank the Canadian SocialSciences and Humanities
Research Council and the Chinese ^.cademy of Social Sciences for their
joint sponsoiship of a research trip to the People’s Republic of China
in December 1982,

(266)
which.allowed me the opportunity of interviewing scholars and government
officials on ’self-reliance’ and economic policy• I would also thank my
colleague^ Professor Neil Nevitte for his helpful editoral advice.

Cold War conditions in and of themselves, of course, cannot be taken as
PRIMA FACIE confirmation of a policy of national autarcy.
Contemporary Chinese argument has assigned a great deal of idological significance to ’self-reliance’ as one of the ’three foundations’
of Mao Zedong Thought. 2 The important Central Committee resolution
of 2? June 1981 on party history repudiated the ’closed door policy’
of the Gang of Pour to agree with Mao’s oftenstated argument to the
effect that China’s modernization cannot take place in isolation from
external technological development. The resolution agues that Mao
historically understood ’self-reliance’ as consistent with commercial
and technological exchange on the basis of the principle of ’mutual
assistance and benefit’ (pingdenghuli).

Sine
•
Mao’s death Chinese leadership has continued to endorse Mao’s
1958 directive, namely, ’self-reliance is primary, while striving for
foreign assistance is supplementary’ (zili gengsheng wei zhu, zhengqu
waiyuan wei bu)
< .» 3 Premier Zhao Ziyang, like Premier Hua Guofeng
before him, has argued that China is no longer ’obstructed* by ’imperialism’ and ’social—imperialism’ from utilizing advanced technology and
that under a regime of ’self-reliance
--- ---- _~*1 China can expand foreign trade
using ’our fstrong points to make up for our weak points through inter—
national exchange on the basis of equality and mutual benefit*. 4

argument ’self-reliance’ has never
According to current Chinese argument,
form illy precluded the bypassing of the sometimes lengthy and costly
domestic process of research and technological development necessary to
successful industrialization through the purchase of superior foreign
technology. While^the party leadership has accepted the ’four moderni­
zations* as its primary political task, it continues to emphasize the
great differences between China’s economy and that of the western coun—
tries <.
part from the very fundamental differences which originate
within a-planned. a,s opposed to a market economy, the party has contin­
uously emphasized China’s vast countryside, the scarcity of domestic
capital resources and China’s exceptionally large labour force. In,the
continued advocacy of ’self-reliance’ - a concept, which originated with
Chinese nationalism and the socialist perspective on ’imperialism*—
there is a clear interrelation of factors of economic and political
independence.

Historically consistent with this emphasis on independence is a
a
tradition of fiscal conservatism, which is today relevant in its resis­
tance to the wholesale as opposed to the selective purchase of teclm’ology.
This tradition is itself currently manifest at the policy level in its
deliberate relation of the rate of importation and foreign borrowing to
uhe.generation of new exports. ’Self-reliance’ thus precludes a strategy
of rapid modernization, emphasizing a unidimensional strategy of massive
foreign capital investment and the unqualified assimilation of foreign
technological inputs within the domestic economy.
CONTINUITY OF POLICY WITH THE PAST,

However, at the level of official historiography, Chinese leaders
have insisted that there has been no significant break with regard to
the^policy^of ’self-reliance1 as it was orginally set forth in the mid
to late_ 1950s
Zhao Ziyang has recently said that he too is in favour
of an
cjan door’ policy, but that the- door is opened only in accordance
with ’Self-ielianOe! , which in practical terms implies the following
scheme of priorities
’We should use our domestic nespufoes in the first

(267)
placed and international resources in the second; we should develop our
domestic market in the first place and our role in the world market in
the second. . . .
5

oreign technology and capital are, thus, valued as positive con­
tributing factors in China’s modernization. In terms of the current
four modernizations’, foreign capital and technology are seen as
playing a greater role within a multidimensional economic strategy, 6
which still places a high priority on the maximum exploitation of indi­
genous resources in order to meet China’s particular conditions of
labour abundance and capital scaricity. The present emphasis on ’selfreliance’ has not precluded either foreign investment or China’s greater
participation in international exchange, and China’s abundance.of labour
has even used to attract foreign investment. However, within the context
of the eight-character economic strategy, namely, ’readjusting, restructujconsolidating and improving the national economy’ (tiaozheng, gaige,
zhengdun, tigaoj, ’self-reliance’ as a cardinal point of policy has been
invoked by the leadership in an attempt to define more closely the
limits of China’s participation in international exchange and the level
of foreign investment in China. 7
SELF-RELIANCE r.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AiW IDEOLOGICAL. COmOTATIONS
An appreciation of the current policy significance of ’self-reliance
to some extent rests upon an analysis of the continuity or discontinuity
of the ideological connotations of the term itself. ’Self-reliance1
is a (conceptual thread running through the entire tapestry of the Chinese
revolutionary
’
- experience,
- *
* Its complex connotations are perhaps not
adequately
conveyed
in
English
- .
' translation,
---- . Zili gengsheng is a four
character phrase
consisting
of
— ~~vj. two
uwv compounds , the former meaning ’self­
standing’, while the latter conveys the idea of ’changing one’s life’
or regeneration’. Together the two compounds mean ’standing on one’s
own to change to a new life’. The meaning becomes quite clear in the
historical context of revolutionary movement, which has progressively
entwined themes of both nationalism and socialism.
.THE EARLY CHINESE COMMUNIST ?K).VE.MENT_^AUD N ATI ON ALIS M/c ONSBQUENCE
_SELF-RELIAI^CE OF. LATER' PERIOD

The early Chinese communist movement of the 1920s was informed by
a ch^1^as^ic sense of.nationalism, and Marxism was initially only under­
stood in terms of Lenin’s explanation of imperialism. *or Mao and his
mentor, Li azhao, class struggle was not as important as the unity of
the Chinese people as a historically progressive force. Mao and Li were
ac ive in an intellectual environment, which was apprehensive over the
imminent ’loss of state’ (wang guo), meaning in a broad nationalistic
sense, ■the loss of ethnic and cultural identity. 8 Apprehension was
met with conviction.
’
* Mao and Li thought of revolution as a self-conscious act in which the vital energies of the Chinese people would be
unleashed.
This early populism had some impact on the later development both
the revolution and ’Mao Zedong Thought’
1. Nationalism required the unity
of.the Chinese people, and in the early mass movements of the first
united front of the mid-1920s the communists engendered a populism in
the countryside. The emphasis on the unity of the people in early 1930s,
however, stood in tension with socialist aspirations which saw national
salvation in terms of radical.restructuring of the society. The tension
was formally resolved in the formation of a second united front of the
late 1930s, as Mao progressively integrated the struggle for national
liberation with the worldwide socialist movement. Domestic united front
on a theoretical level became a progressive feature of the international
struggle against capitalism.

(268)
’Side?Stns o?. cSna^s S

lnnermo?t reCGSSes of Chinese Marxism and
Moreover, both Chinese Marxism and Chinese nationalism
insisted on placing China in the mainstream
#
-------- 1 of modern industrial devclopment. Tho ' ao-,. n
ntionary tactic of the partynamely, ’to
surround the cities with the
’-onntrysido’ did have significant implications for China's j-ator
'
pattern of development, particularly with
respect to a dialectical emphasis, on agriculture as of prime importance
to tho development of industry. Nevertheless, it did not result in
xenophobia and autarchy•
consciousnefs°M

sx*rr"
of
s:
“
^3^
’
s
r
"S
“
tiy
o^a^ut;’“dJ’XXk,
LXf£s.“"_
stc.nd. on one s own to,-.change to a.new life*1
+ho „^n-tern1^
HJ0 im“edia‘fce domestic realities of the revolution.
commum'q+ °d °C+ rGliancc'' took on a very real meaning for the
ommun1st cadre struggUng to survive in the bitter warfare of the early
1940s. Immediate material crisis dictated the parctice of doino- it
Sji)
10° ajSlic f°lf7SUppl? in production' tziji dongshou shengchan
werJ called upon to
“ th<3 army’ party
sch°o1

tc^their^espective Ssr30**1 SaCrifiC0S “ the

EARLY ECONO?I^mi_CXO^SEL F-RELIAKCE

of nece^ities

'

celledhxgher 10Vel of organization, communist economic policy

Sir.
ss

th’

baozkang gongji)-a slogan which is stilS very important total
~nist leaders radically cut back administrative SponStoe
rationalized tho tax. structure on tho basi^ n-P ifrnr
•
1
finance’ fennrr -in-nrrn-; zi
• ,
\ G Dasis °r from economics to

'

Even under such a programme of 'self-cufficiencv'
v i•
i
did not moan the complete sever-ine- np
x°loncy ’ self-reliance'
border regions. The Ch-ino^o i
0^.llnks wlth areas outside the
egions. The Chinese leadership even called for incentives to
encourage outside capitalists to sot up shop in the border regions,

eXo?leda^reasVSLein^hriSe would ProW wre in the communist­
enterprise was subject to the^icissitudo^oflndanS c™tro1 where private
'bureaucratic capitalism'.
missitudcs °f an expanding and corrupt

:xS"°K
“
A’

diffele^t
th? ‘•Jevelopment of 'self-supporting economies' by the
dnierent organizational systcems of government, army and party would
12 Sych^self s,— lnco“Pnehensible in other historical conditions'.
condSSns of ?h h
n°y
aS Specific to the ^time
Gonaibions ol the base areas.

*

(269)
Secondly, ’self-reliance’ was not placed in opposition to foreign
ecoi omic aid. In 1936, Mao had appealed for foreign aid and ’legitimate’
foreign loansP 13 Mao in 1937 highlighted the inequities of impe ialism
noting the uniacourablc balance of trade, the lack of reciprocity, the
disruption of China’s traditional handicrafts, the inequitable warlord
tax structures, which favoured foreign-owned as opposed to Chinese—
owned enterprises. 14 Yet in 1944 he renewed his appeal for foreign
assistance. ’Self-reliance’ was not placed in opposition to foreign
economic^aid.. In 1945, Mao...simply stated:
’We stand for self-relinco.
We hope for foreign aid, but cannot depend upon it; we depend on our
own efforts. ... 15 The policy of border-region self-sufficiency
was a response to the economic warfare of the Cuomindang which did not
preclude the acceptance of foreign aid from’capitalist’ countries.
The negative view of imperialism did not lead to an intransigent
autarchy. In 1949 Mao declared to the world that China had ’stood up’,
but he also looked forward to the development of China’s international
relationso In his famous speech of 30 June 1949, 16 Mao announced
that to China would ’lean to one side’ (i.e. lean to the Soviet Union),
but then he indicated a willingness to do business with any country
on the basis of ’equality and mutual benefit’ (pingdeng huli), a
principle which was written into the Common Programme the following
September, and which has since been repeatedly emphasized in China’s
official agreements with foreign states.

DOMESTIC SOLUTION TO.POST__WAT?_ RECOVERY
In the context of difficult negotiations for Soviet aid and the
blockade of China’s important East coast ports, the CCP focused its
attention on a domestic solution to the problem of post-war recocory
For two months between mid—December 1949 and mid—February 1 950, Mao
and Stalin argued over the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance,
the Chinese Eastern ailway, the joint stock companies and border
issues. The acrimonious and protracted negotiations finally resulted
in a thirty-year treaty of friendship as well as a ^oviot undertaking
to extend US $ 300 million to the People’s Republic of China. Stalin,
who feared. Mao might yet turn into another litp, loosened the purse
strings only to offer fraternal comrades US
50 million more than he
had offered Jiang Jicshi (ChiangKai-shck) in 1938.

The prospects for divorsifying the sources of foreign aid were
sharpD.y reduced by the Anorican refusal in January of 1950 to recognize
the People’s Republic of China. The latter was effectively barred from
admission to the UN, and American attempts to isolate the Chinese dipplonatically met with a measure of success. Only a handful of western
states, specificall y the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and
Switzerland followed the British lead in recognizing the new republic.
China’s relations were for the most part circumscribed by relations
with the USSR and eastern Europe.

"While the Chinese were pleased to reveive whatever Soviet credits
were advanced, and one can see the influence of ^oviet economic thinking
in the Chinese First Five-Year Plan, this should not detract from a
balanced assessment of China’s own efforts in achieving economic
recovery in the early 1950s. The early 1940s thematic emphasis on
production increase and austerity was then clearly explicit in the
’Production Increase and ^conomy Campaign’. The party unfurled the
banner ’better, faster, and more economical results’ to foster ’pro­
duction on all fronts’. In fact ’achieving greater, faster, better
.and more economical results* later became a fundamental part of the
general line of the party in the late 1950s.

The party persisted with a multidimensional strategy which empha­
sized thp exploitation of all positive indigenous factors of production.
Soviet aid certainly did not accomplish the job of recovery. The chief

(270)

source of investment in the early 1950s capital construction was funds
accumulated through the profits of existing Chinese'enterprise• 18

In 1950 the Chinse wore able to provide domestic supplies of grain
to the large maritime cities such as Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou,
which formerly depended ugon foreign sources of supplyu Under the
prevailing conditions of old War, the COP warned against 'over emphas­
izing foreign and paying little attention to native’ (chongyang, jingtu).
Government polios^ stressed the expansion cf domestic markets for
Chinese industry under the slogan, 'taking domestic sales as primary and
foreign sales for support' (yi neixiao woi zhong, waixiao wei fu). 19
In the early and mid-1950s the Chinese respected Soviet industrial
and technological achievements, but clearly distinguished wholesale
’copying’ from selective and balanced importation of Soviet technology
and expertise. Zhou enlai, in January 1956, warned the cadres to
’discard servile thinking! and admonished those who espoused the view:
’Since we cannot inmdiately change the baclcwardness of the scientific
situation in China wo shall at any rate have to rely on Soviet assis­
tance. 20 The premier insisted that China must adopt an overall plan
which distinguishes 'what is essential and urgent' on the basis of
China’s own particular economic■priorities.
MAO'S AFMOACH DEFINED

In the summer of 1956. Mao elaborated on what China could borrow
from the outside world, and in the context of what seemed to be an
innocuous debate over the relative merits of Chinese and western
music, he vigorously attacked !natlonal nihilism1 and !loft^w-ing
clos}d-doorism :, 21 Mao talked ah length about.a creative synthesis,
whereby foreign things could be made to servo China., Jis on intrepid
Daoist dialectician; 22 L.o could speculate upon eternal flux with
equanimity, but as a nationalist, ho was not ready for the submergence
of Chinese culture in a sea of umtional nihilism* e Mao., in fact,
argued that the Chinese people wcilc. re.jcet 'complete westernization.1
He advised those who feared the contaminating influence of western
music: 'It is all-right'to bo nolcher donkey nor horse, the mule is
neither donkey nor horseo ‘ Themulo in this instance is presumably to
be taken .as a biological metaphor of cross-fertilization which connotes
greater productivity as opposed 5o lack of posterity. The metaphor is
consistent with Mao's approbation of dialectical change. As a dialecti­
cian, he was willing to explore aspects of cross-cultural, synthesis,
but he also persisted with 1^..Is u-Lcninist assumptions which would not’
allow for a willy-nilly convergence of spcialisr and capitalist culture.
As a nationalist, Mao refused to accept ’blind westernization1, and
asMarxist-Leninist, he was wary of decadent bourgeois ideology1 Thus
whilw he firmly indicated his support for ’learning the strong points
of all nations' he qualified such learning in the following way: 'We
must firmly reject and criticize all the decadent bourgeois systems,
ideologies and ways of life of foreign countries.’ 23
gn the more concrete level and in the context of party debate,
Zhou nlai supported Mao and adopted a characteristically middle course
He rejected the 1 parasiticvion 1 to the effect that China could depend
on international.assistance, and did not, therefore, need to build a
comprehensive industrial system. This, he argued, would bo irrational
in the light of China's great population and righ natural resources.
But then he took to task those orho supported an 'isolationist view’,
arguing that it is necessary for China to 'develop and expand economic
technical and cultural exchanges with other countries.1

Even as early as 1956? Kao argued that the Soviets in their scheme
of economic development hod mar's ’jiis cokes of principle ’ (Yuanzoxing
cuowu)» On 28 June 195^j
admonished dogmatists within his own

(271)

party for ’slavishly copying’ the Soviet Union. The chairman instructed:
It is very-necessary to win Soviet aid, but the most important thing is
self-reliance. ‘ 24 In fact with respect to the behing-the-scenes
ideological debate with the Sovietsj Mao distinguished between ’public’
and -internal’ attitudes in the following instruction:
’As regards
learningfrom .the Soviet Union, for internal use we say "study critically
In speaking publicly, in order to avoid a misunderstanding it would be
better ro pur it:
’’Study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union
analytically and solectictively”, 25
After the dramatic confrontation between Peng Zhan, a seior member
of the CCP Politbureau, and Khrushchev at the Third Congress of the
Rumanian Workers’ P
\ in ~Bucharest
‘
Party
in June of I960, there
was no
further
need
to
maintain
the
pretence
of
ideological
unity
,
.
. . \-----uuxuy. In response
go^ hitnese criticism the Soviets in July I960 ordered the wihdrawal of
1-390
.?j9c of their experts from China. The Soviets scrapped 257 projects
for scientific and technical
gchnical co-operation at a time of serious economic
disaster in China,
uch action left a legacy of ill-will. It also
resulted in a renewed and very firm emphasis on self-reliance within
China0
Mao,as the ’Great Teacher’, outlined the lesson of ’self-suffici­
ency m oil. ’Self-reliance’ became the story of Daqing (Great Cele­
bration;, .the monolithic oil...field which was almost built from scaratch
in tne early 1960s. Mao Zedong invoked the self-sacrificing sprit of
the battlefields of the 1940s, when in 1964 he first raised the slogan:
In Industry, learn from Daqing.’ Apparently, from the streets of Beijing,
where buses continued in service, substituting huge bags of methane for
petrel, to the tents and dugouts of the snow-bound grasslands of Heilon­
gjiang. where the self-reliant soldiers of Daqing huddled reading Mao’s
On Contradictions, there was a great national resolve to cut China’s
dependence on Soviet oil and to make China ’§clf- standing’.

Jiao invoked the spirit of the 1940s and laid heavy stress on the
importance of political organization in achieving self-reliance, but
he did not advocate autarchy and unqualified rejection of foreign
technology. The late 1950s represented a different set of historical
circumstances than those which had prevailed in the border regions of
the early 1940so In the Groat Leap forward of the late 1950s, Mao
lully articulated a multidimensional strategy of economic development,
wia.cn specifically called for the simultaneious development of ’large
and foreign’, as well as ’small and native technologies’. He clearly
disagreed with Stalin, who apparently believed that ’technology solves
everything’ to emphasize the importance of politics to organization in
production. This latter emphasis, however, cannot simply be interpreted
as the- negation of technology.

Despite the economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward, the party
leadership^essentially persisted with a strategy which would see the
generalization of intermediate, or upgraded traditional technology as a
positive fca.tare of the of the national economy. Such labour-intensive
cechnology is to play a constructive role in the economy operating
alongside large-scale, capital-intensive industry in the cities. Within
such a strategy ’self-reliance’ neither implies the creation of a ’celluar
economy 26 m rejection of comparative regional economic advantage,
x]01
cakon to suggest the denial of large-scale production as
the basis for socialist economic development. It is basically a part
of a -rational
'•
strategy designed to cope with labour abundance and
capital scarcity.

Western historiography has at times tended to describe Mao’s
strategjr in terms of the ’total primacy of revolutionary politics
over economicsJ^a description which denies the significance of Mao’s

X >

(272)
own dialectical frame of reference. 27 Mao:s own ^ocalled ’Yanan
generation! of the 1940s, which incidentalljrincludes several of the
architects,of China’s latest economic reforms such as Chen Yun, Bo
Yibo and Li Xiannian, is said to have substituted human will and poli­
tics for technology in the attempt to achieve a ’self-reliant’ econcmy
ln^GrPrGtation describes ’self-reliance’■ as, part of the fanaticism
of Mao Zedong, who not only sought to impose a radical egalitarianism
on hmeso society, but also substituted an irrational revolutionary
asceticism for technology in the struggle for China’s industrialization.
^aqing, however, was built upon the Great Leap Forward strategy
which at least on the formal level of policy statement attempted to
integrate politics and technology. Daqing self-professedly adhered to
Mao s March 1960 instruction to implement the Charter of the Anshan
ron ar.d Steel Company, which not only emphasizes the importance of the
mass movement and the slogan ’politics takes command’ but also calls
tor technical revolution, and.greater application of scientific techni­
que toproduction. Daqing was a groat lesson in ’self-reliance’, yet
explicit in the Anshan Charter is an injunction to learn critically
from the Soviet experience of economic construction and to dialectically
integrate the positive factors of that experience with the specific
condidtions of China’s economy.

Under Mao's ’unity of opposites' there is to be a dialectical
integration as opposed to a 'metaphysical' opposition of politics and
technology. While Daqing is today perhaps the most significant symbol
o
self-reliance', as a model it is acclaimed for having combined
revolutionary spirit with scientific learning. The Chinese leadership
has consistentiy identified with Marx on the significance of technology
dGV(;loPnont
socialism. Mao's model of development does deal
with China s specific features of capital scarcity and labour abundance
tirough greater emphasis on political organization, but not to the for­
mal exten-c of.substituting voluntarism of the masses for technology. It
is, lowoyor, important to note that an exclusive emphasis on technology
as a benign strategy of development has often been criticised on the
loft as indicative of a 'theory of productive forces' which would
altogether ignore the political and social dimensions of Mao's strategy
for development.
,SELF-RELIAIj;CE, DENG XIAOPING Affl) THE GANG OF FOUR; ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE
The interpretation of 'self-reliance' in concrete policy terms
ecamo a critical issue in the years just.prior to Mao’s death in Sepem or 1976.
Self-reliance ' emerged as an important aspect of a larger
debate over the significance of the Cultural Revolution and the terms
for remtebration of a political system which had been shattered by
several years of uncontrolled factional politics. Once he was rehabi­
litated ml97j, l>eng Xiaoping became a primary target of criticism on
the part of those who wished to perpetuate the Cultural Revolution.
eng was caricatured as 'a clover Bukharinist', who not only denied class
struggle but peddled a 'slavish comprador philosophy’ (Yangnu zhexue).
He allegedly collaborated with imperialism to revive.the old days of the
treaty ports, and he was accused of ignoring Mao's 'self-reliance' to
urn.China into 'raw material base, a repair and. assembly workship, and
and investment center'. 28 The issue of 'national betrayal' was
thrown as kerosene on the fires of debate concerning the nature of class
truggle under socialism and the need for continuing the dictatorship
of the proletariat against a class enemy within the party itself.

How°yer, when in 1947 Deng Xiaoping explained the concept of
s^f-reUanCe ■to
Gonoral Assembly, he was quite consistent
with Mao s own instructions. Deng warned Third World countries against
e unscrupulous trading practices of the superpowers and multinationals,
and he defined self-reliance' as follows:
'By self-reliance we mean
that a country should mainly roly on the strength and wisdom of its own

,

(273)
people, control its own economic lifelines, make full use of its own
resources, ;strive hard to increase food production and develop its
national economy step by step in a planned way.. ’ 29

Deng, in what was essentially a theoretical commentary on the
integration of theory and practice, opined that the content of ’selfreliance * would vary from country to country in relation to specific
national economic and political conditions, but he pointedly observed
that ’* self-reliance’ is not autarchy and noted:
'Self-reliance in no
way means "self-seclusion” and rejection of foreign aid. 30 While
Deng regretted any false opposition between ’self-reliance’* and intcrnational economic exchange, he insisted that such exchange.takes place
’’ on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, equality and mutual
benefit and the exchange of need d goods to make up for each other’s
■’
’T
31
deficiencies,
In reaction to accusations of ’national betrayal
‘betrayal’, Deng counter­
—
attacked against unnamed leftists, whom he taunted as.tho ’daring-to
to-against-the
to—against-the tide elements’. Those were allegedly metaphysicians
who chose to ignore cconomic„reality. They were apparently ignorant
of the fac t that socialism rests upon, and indeed could not have come
into being without the technological base provided under capitalism.
THE "MISTAMS’’

OF THE GANG OF FOUR

After the arrest of the Gang of Four (ie. ’the daring—to—go—aganist
the—tide elements’) in October 1976, Dong’s counterattack of 1975 was
fleshed out in much greater detail in the,.course of campaigns to ’seek
the truth from the facts’ and to ’emancipate the mind’ against metaphy­
sical extremism. 32 Deng personally identified himself with Mao’s
Yanan discourses of 1941 on ’seeking the trugh from the facts.’ 33
The gang had failed to integrate theory and practice, and they..had
failed to appreciate the ’unity of opposites’ in Mao’s dialectics.
Instead they allegedly practised Stalinist metaphysics and talked only
of the clash between opposities.

In related concreate terms,! they had failed to understand Mao’s
concept of ’self-reliance.’ They ignored Mao’s instructions to make
foreign things serve China1, and they were charged with having spon­
sored a state policy of ’blind rejcctionsm’ which was historically
associated with the reactionary xenophobia of the empress Dowager
Cixiin 1900.
The party then proceeded to establish an ’open-door policy* within
a strategy for the ’four modernizations’ (i.e. of agriculture, industry,
the military and science and technology). The gang’s alleged attempt
to discredit foreign studies with an association with ’slavish comprador
philosophy* was repudiated ‘as inconsistent with Mao’s directives to
study and to achieve a better understanding of Chinese things in com­
parison with foreign things. The then Chairman of the Party Hua Guofeng
re—emphasized Mao’s 1956 strategy of ’learning the strong points of
other countries’... The gang was accused of having attempted to negate
the findings of,..westorn natural science, which they erroneously declared
to have bourgeois class nature. 34 And in 1978 Deng declared that
intellectuals and scientific workers were henceforth to be considered
part of thd working class.

DENG’S ’’MERGING OF THE, SUPERIORITY OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM WITH THE
-iWANCED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF DEVELOPED CAPIT/illST COUNTRIES .
Deng’s 1974 definition of ’self-reliance’ was endorsed by the party
leadership in the 1978 decision,o’Thirty Points for Industry’, 35 and
the President of the Academy of pcial Soicnces enthusiastically pointed
out that ’learning advanced things from-foreign countries’ is acually
a condition of ’slof-reliance’, which requires the merging of the

)

(274)
’superiority of the socialist system with the advanced science and tech­
nology of the developed capitalist countries., . . .
56

Is such merging consistent with socialism? The author attended
discussions in Beijing with researchers of the National Council for
thePromotion of International Trade in May 1979. Council staff then
stressed the importance of ’self—reliance’, but frankly conceded that
foreign companies would profit from cheap.Chinese labour and raw mat­
erials. However, the acquisition of new technology and the resultant
increases in production was regarded as sufficient compensation for
this kind of ’temporary exploitation’. 57 There was no question of
China becoming a ’raw materials base! or ’assembly workshop’, for it
would distort grossly the significance of..foreign investment in relation
to the development of the economy as a whole. Indeed, imports and
exports together account for approximately 4-5 per cent of China’s
CNF. Furthermore the council staff stressed Zhou ^nlai’s ’four points’
concerning the importation of foreign technology: ’ irst, ust; second,
criticize; third, improve; and fourth, make it our own’ (yi yong, er
pi, san gai, si chuang). In other words, technology, which is import­
ed, must easily lend itself to a process of improvement and adaptation
whereby it becomes Chinese technology.
SELF-RELIANCE .AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT
’ Self-reliance’ in its international implications must be explained
as part of an all-encompassing economic policy, which is inherently
conservative in its assessment of China’s economic conditions. ’Selfreliance’ precludes the uninhibited importation of technology. The
Chinese leadership has historically demonstrated an awareness that
squander in a shopping spree for a..11 types of technology, and in
’self-reliance’ a solution was found to this scarcity of capital.
’ Self -reliance ’ ...expects a balanced budget, and there is tremendous
continuity with respect to the current emphasis on the Yanan Principle
of ’develop the economy and ensure supplies’. Under this principle
production is placed before capital construction, and the radical
impulse towards forced primitive accumulation in agriculture is rejected
as a ’mistake in principle’,. Financial policy requires emphasis on
the a
c cum 1 at ion of revenue based on the increases in production.
accumulation

Foreign technology cannot solve the problens of China’s donestic
economy« However, it can contribute new technological inputs towards
the expansion of donestic production,> Investnent in the ’new economic
zones’ (of South China can make a contribution towards the. improvement
of China’s ’productive forces’, but ’self-reliance1, as it is expressed
in the initiative of local enterprise which serves. local nakots, is
ultimately more important. The production 'of joint ventures is geared
towards the demands of the international market, and in many cases the
joint ventures are excluded from the domestic market. Mao’s strategy^
which is still in place, presumes an ’all positive’ approach in an
economy which encourages contemporaneous increases.in production at
different levels of organization in both the modern and traditional
sectors of the economy. This doe's moan, however, the denial of either
regibnal economic interdependence within China or the expansion of
international exchange on the basis of ’mutual benefit and equality’.
’Develop the economy and ensure supplies’ would seem to set some
limits to the expansion of foreign trade and investment, and the conser­
vatism, explicit in China’s economic policy, became quite clear in the
elaboration of the strategy for national economic readjustment. This
strategy was rationalized in terms of a frank admission that capital
construction had been placed before production and too much stress had
been laid on foreign technology in the period subsequent to the arrest
of the Gang of Four. At the first session of the Fifth National People’s
Congress in March 1978, the then chairman of the party re-emphasized
Mao’s ’On the Ten Great Relationships’ which had underlined the importance

t

(275)

of the dialectical balance between production and consumption, product­
ion and capital construction and industry and agriculture. While he
emphasized ’self-reliance’, he also spoke of a ’big increase in China’s
foreign trade and the ’breaking free from conventions and the use of .
advanced techological techniques as much as possible1. 38 Hua also
adopted the traditional emphasis on the need to tap the potential of
existing enterprises through the maximum usage of existing equipment,
and the sinulataneous development of large, medium and small enterprises.
However, the second session of the -^ifth Congress in June 1979
called for a ’ read-jus tmont1 because the ■'above principles had in fact
been more ’honoured in the breach’. Instead of concentrating China’s
meagre resources to fight the classic guerrilla action of a battle of
annihilation’ at one or two weak spots in the economy., the Chinese
leadership apparently had unfuled the banner of the ’four modernizations’
to do battle along an excessively ’long front’ of capital construction,
and despite vociferous protestations of ’self-reliance’ the Chinese
government had overspent in the purchase..of complete sots of technology
from abroad. The Chinese leadership admitted that insufficient atten­
tion had been given in the importation of technologies to the limitations
of China’s infrastructure of communications and energy supply. 39
The second session focused on major imbalances in the economy, and in
Mao’s tradition of ’seeking the truth from tho facts came up with the
strategy of ’national economic readjustment’• Formally the strategy
called for ’one step back , and two steps forward’. 40 Along with
retrenchment, there was to be an advance. The situation was not
regarded as extreme as in the early 1960s, which was a period of servore
economic upheaval and international hostility. 41
Even though Chinese loaders insisted that there was no change in
the long-term policy of 1 open-door«1 it seemed as though a bucket of
cold water had been poured over foreign business concerns. Chairman
Hua was reassuring: ‘The view that tho policy of readjustment is a
negative retreat and the view that its implementation will lead to a
termination of the importation of advanced technology are both wrong
through and througho t- 42

There was nevertheless on th: part of the Chinese government a
temporary disinclination to draw upon existing foreign credits. There
was also a greater insistence upon the maximum use of existing resour­
ces, and there was an insistence upon the selective purchase of key
technologyas opposed to the purchase of complete technologies.
Tho second session dsi pass into law the Statute of the China
International Trust and Investment Corporation and tho Law on Joint
Ventures. Gu Ming, a Deputy Minister of the State Planning Commission
reiterated at the same sdssion that tho scale of imports would have to
bo tailored to China*s ability to acquire foreign exchange through the
expansion of exports.. 43 The Chinese policy of ’exports first, integ rating imports with exports and striving to achieve a balance between
imports and. exports1 requires three types of balancing: a rough balance
between imported technologies and China’s capacity to assimilate such
technology in terms of existing economic infrastructure; and the
balance between imported projects and tho domestic capacity to produce
ancillary equipment ofr such projects. 44 The conservatism, which
animates China’s economic policy insists not only on the maximization
of existing resources within China, but also a studies correlation
between the amount of foreign funds to bo drawn upon with China’s capa­
bility of absorption and repayment.

NATIONAL ECOITOMIC RE-ADJUSTMENT EXPIICI_mLY INCORPORATES MAOtS
SELF-RELI!NOE.
’National economic readjustmont: explicitly incorporates Mao’s
notion of ’self-reliance1. For example.-. Vico-Premier Yao Yilin in a
meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People’s

(276)
Congress sought out the dialectical balance in Mao’ s 1 self-reliance’
when he related the concept to ’readjustment’ :
’In a xpopulous large
country like ours, modern construction must rely on our own efforts,
that is mainly rely on our own industrial foundations, on our own
technical strength. This basic principle is unalterable. But this
docs not moan wo will close our country to international exchanges. It
is also our unalterable principle to develop economic and technocal co­
operation and exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of the
principle of equality and mutual be efit.’ 45 Yao confirmed the
reduction in the scale of technological imports, but he emphasized that
this reduction did not ’signal a change of policy.*
CONFUSION REGARDING THE "READJUSTMENT POLICY" AMOW OUTSIDERS IS
-THE, RESULT OF A " TOO SIMPLISTIC APPROACH" ~
In the western literature concerning China, a great deal of
confusion still surrounds the concept of ’self-reliance ’, and as a
result the status of China’s relationship vzith the more advanced
economies of the West if open to some misinterpretation. In part such
consfusion orgiinatos with conflicting western and Chinese historiog­
raphical perspectives, especially as thoformer has not always recog­
nized the continuity of self-declared principle manifest in the histori­
cal definitions of ’self-reliance’.
Self —xJrofessed Marxist—Leninist perspective on imperalism as a
negative phenomenon has reinforced an emphasis on ’self-reliance’
in terms of maintaining national economic independence. But, while
Marxism-Leninism provided a critique of imperalism, it also provided
the critique of imperalism, it also providedmethodological framework
within which China could on the basis of ’equality and mutual benefit’
rationalize new relationships with countries of different social systems
on the basis of ’learning the strong points of all countries.’ Mao’s
own Marxist-Leninist dialectic s effectively precluded ’bling, rejectionmsm’ or xenophobia as irrational and inconsistent with the development
of the Chinese revolution.

Thus, despite the ’teacher’ having agressed upon the ’pupil’
there is still the desire on the part of the 'pupil' to learn foregin
things in order to study and develop Chinese things. And, as former
Party Chairman Hua Guofeng pointed out in his defence of the use in
China of western technology and natural science, radical xenophobia
would negate Marxism itself. Hua posed two tolling rhetorical questions:
Can we refuse to study Marxism because its birthplace was in the West?
Can we refuse to learn from the Great October ncialist Revolution because
it took place in Russia?' 46
On one level confusion over 'self-reliance' can be traced to
conflicting interpretations of the Cold War in the Far East. The inter­
pretation. Which is.seen in this article as largely correct, insists
that Cold War conditions prevented the development of international
exchabge that ’self-reliance’ has never in policy terms meant selfimposed autarchy.
On another level, Chinese historiography of Chinese leadership
dispute, based upon a simplistic ’two-line struggle’ which pits socialism
aganist capitalist restoration’ has itself contributed to some of the
confusion. Such analysis in fact tends to depart from the complexities
o Mao s own dialectical emphasis on the concuirent unity and clash of
Ma°ls Place in the political system was on fact inconsistent
with his own dialectical conception of ’seeking the truth from the
facts’. Exaggerated emphasis on the two line struggle has at times
reduced the entire political system to clearly stated opposites, which
dialectically only clash. 47

1

(277)

It is not surprising therefore that western analysis on the basis
of an opposition of modernization to revolution has at times tended to
treat ’self-reliance* as part of the ’Maoist* package for radical social
justice, which is to.be achieved on the basis of autarchy and local poli­
ticization internally and externally in terms of an extreme isoloationist
orientation designed to ward off contaminating capitalist influences
from abroad.

Within these-exaggerated parameters, ’self-reliance’ encompasses
the rejection of western technology in favour of a retreat to natural
economy and the exclusive oxplotiation of local resources and technolo­
gies. Deng Xiaoping could then be indicted for having in 1975 practised
a ’slavish comprador philosophy’, and wo night forget Mao’s insistence
on,.’learning the strong points of all counties’,. Such a scheme does
not.explain a basic underlying consistency in the recoining which has
sustained China’s economic policy over tine, nor does it explain the
significance of ’self-reliance* under the current regine of national
economic readjustment. However, it might help to explain how xenophob ia could be used politically against the advocates of the ’four
modernizations *,
PRESENT POLICIES TO BE UNDERSTOOD THROUG-H MO!S MALECTICAL
PERSPECTIVESn

In the formulation of Chinese policy, * self-reliance 1 in its
entiwinecl domestic and international connotations is treated dialectically.
In demestic terms it is part of an overall multidimensional strategy
which responds to labour abundance and capital scarcity through the
attempt to create a constructive inter-relationship between large,
medium and small enterprise in both the traditional and modern sectors
of the economy.
ialectically, the ’unity of opposites’ precluded a
one-sided emphasi^ on any one aspect of a contradiction, for the latter
could well lead to economic disaster. Too much emphasis for example,
on regional self-sufficiency encourages the neglect of comparative
regional economic advantage.
’Self—reliance1 as a category of balanced
dialectical thought cannot mean a retreat to.natural economy, and the
emphasis on the maximization of local resources does not entail the
negation of regional interdependence. It is, however, very important to
note that the rationalization of policy within a dialectical framework
does not of itself guarantee the effective execution of rational policy.
As for ’self-reliance* in its related international implications
it does not negate the role of foreign capital and techonology in
China’s modernization, but rather on the basis of a ’unity ofopositos’
it seeks to accommodate these foreign inputs within the economic policy
of ’develop the economy and ensure supplies’. With respect to this policy,
’self-reliance* sots out the conditions under which foreign capital
and technology, can play a positive role in China’s economic development.
ZIt insists- for example, upon freedom from international debt and a
balanced budget. It also insists upon a pattern of importation which
is roughly consistent with the distinctive economic conditions of China.
’Eqpalitjr and mutual benefit’ from the Chinese point of view can be
interpreted to mean that technology coming from abroad must a t sone
point became Chinese technology.
Dialectical analysis by its very nature does not provide the
observer with an exceptionally precise empirical instrument by which a
fine line can be drawn distinguishing what is too much, as opposed to
too little, technological importation and capital investment. One cannot
say that at the point of reaching a particular figure, foreign invest­
ment becomes a problem of turning China into a ’repair and assembly shop’
Nor has one a specific guideline as to what point ’temporary exploita­
tion’ becomes intolerable to socialist goals of equity.

r

V I

(278)

attempt co balance out a contradiction between the need to cheats an
a tiac.tj.ve < nvironrien'c for foreign investnent and the need to ensure

lonnent
Her
t
strategy for economic deveJesnoct’tn TV-r’ ‘ 3 JeGa-''E;r-:-“ion
the Chinese government with
M3 ■ V e 3-nSvr;i-E3 01 self-1-eliauce' within the current policy
wfth^h^ j330^^0 jrd;tStTarat?
’Pcc’a de^otrated in real terns
+b 1
+
'-■■ ULuenpu 2n 1 gsO-S’: to restore budgetary balance,
of^elativol^
y.pi-ial construction and the establishment
expc -ts .iri V, n P'PP
o£
oy v-hich foreign technological
c e.......... u0 gr0 01 .L;lle basis an oxpanision of exports.
UN and^hf ™OhCn“^OT p01-:/? alld he- "ov relationships within the
™
1 • -?
racic^Z3d on the basis of a long-standing
op n.on o. •.'3o.i.x-re..ir.nc.o'e furthermore, expe ctations on the p-rt
ttS /ine:'--iGa-7 observers that the Chinese in their thirst for western
*horononisn?naeol
Of,“hoir Persisting struggle against Soviet
slSZTlC.
b°.retoi P^e
responsive to toerican
nntur!
T’'™S “he TO3fl haVe Proven to be quite prev ? h
zi ■Lla‘71ig 1:113 Ch-’-'ia ccn-d' on tho basis of what Prof .Ying-mao
48
t0
th° ’dopondcr.cy -leverage assumption'

MilitSv hT?' £3Crfa“1'y G«erol of the Party Central. Committee's
Go°aission nas recently reaffirmed that China 'will rely
‘ t3 Ov''1 sx- c'-^slopiny advanced military technology.
So onf
ns Sreisa
United instances 49 Snder
the continuing onphas.i- On 'n-or-io n TC,-» 0?.
modernization is subordinated
tiJS ncde^lnation If industry/ Elill*apy

Mos t i e?nor t antly s :self.-relia- ces bn the basis of 'equality and
uu tual benefit1 assunes “:-n‘-yst-enai reciprocity, and within the text
of international lobate rogansh.ng t ne- .Tew Intel national Economic Order,
Premier Zhao Ziyang has rejects
-.-j..c^F 1 a .j segues j.cr -;nat domestic economic
reform in clove Lop?n.o' cour.t"’''c
i”)0
Pi'cccndition for trade and
aid concessions on the part c - t no (. c ve .1 c ped c cun 1 ri es »
In conclusion
,
, .'.n ai-a^pr-ea'. cssesc.nent of the self-professed
continuity in
’C:1"-^ly,
C 't th?'toBtatG
t0 serve
instruction).
China' (VEX cr;
>e?
nnko policy
foreignlevcl
things

understanding of China's c '
anfijctoSog/wi

'

P

f

a nore PrGC10e
o^Jorei^ Sal

£-£_£JLS„
most obvioxiTpoi^ts o^ideo^r^r
t^S
01ie of the
indeed, Starr's no/////
p03^^° C^a, and
scholarly opin’i on
Sc->
■ 0 c;x?',lstont
majority of
Political ?« •;.. mL -1; /'^continuing the devolution: Recent
Auturii 1070 ? /r
v/\-r ^^rnational Journal. XZXIV, no. 4,
Rethinks th-^ovini
J ■lnan nakes 't:-0 sane point in 'China
nno T cM nS
' d
’ i’ltcrnationnl Security, Fall 1980 vol 5
no2, p. 54. Ws n.-ri’J has dehcribod tJiree gradations of Sf’
f/1///,' cea-r'T-’-'3-g with 'complete Uxiivolvenent or isolation'. As
Self-’Reliance or Intoi cor a u. ency', Porei^ Aff airsTj^ua^l 9??^''
P. 299,

(279)

2.
Communist Party of China, Resolution on Certain Questions in the
History of Our Party Since the Pounding of the People’s Republic of China,
Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1981, pp. 70-71.

3•
See Mao’s ’7,000 cadres’ speech of 1962 in which he noted: ’From
1958 we devidod_to made self-reliance our major policy and striving for
foreign aid a secondary aim.’ Stuart R,Scharam (ed.), Mao Tse-tung
Unrehearsed, Penguin, Harmondsworth, England, 1974, p. 178.

4.
Zhao Ziyang, ’Tho Present Economic Situation and the Priciplos
for Future Economic Construction1, Beijing Review, no. 51, 21 December
1981, p. 23. Also see Hua Guofeng in Beijing Review, no. 13, 31 March
1978, p. 13- (Note Beijing Review, formerly Peking Review, is hereinafter cited as BR.)

5.

Zhao Ziyang, BR, no. 51, p. 23.

6.
By multidimensional strategy, the author wishes to suggest the
contemporaneous exploitation of both indigenous and external factors
conducive to modernization. This strategy incorporates the Great Leap
Forward notion of ’walking on two logs’. It is perhaps best described
in the research of Professor Carl &iskin,who describes a rational ’
'choice of techniques’ in the context of capital scarcity. Riskin
emphasizes the ’sectoral allocation function’ by which small-scale
enterprise in the rural sectors of the economy are encouraged to
increase the level of production of rural and consummer goods through
the use of up-graded traditional technology, which.is labour intensive.
Under a ’multidimensional ’ strategy this effort in the rural localities
is to be..closely co-ordinated with the production of large-scale enter­
prise. It is very important to note that I self-relian-co’doos not
preclude such a strategy which accepts the.nced for inter-regional
trade within China as well as Chinese participation in the international
market. See Carl Riskin, ’Small Industry and the Chinese Model of
Development ’, China Quarterly (hereinafter cited as CQ ), no.46,
April/juno,..1971 , pp. 245-75 and Carl Riskin, ’China’s Rural Industria­
lization: Self-Reliant Systems on Independent ..Kingdoms ’ CQ, no. 75,
March 1978, pp. 78-98.

7• For an official explanation of this strategy refer to Hua Guofeng,
’Report on the Work of Government’, 18 June 1979, BR, no. 27, 6 July
1979, pp. 12-13. The Chinese text is available in Hongai (Rod FlagJ,
no • 7, 1979, PP.8-10.

8.
For an interesting discussion of this context and the.early phinese
connunist noveuent see Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of
Chinese Marxism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 19.
9. Mao Zedong, ’On People’s Democratic dictatorship*, Selected Readings
of Mao Tse-tung,.Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1976, p. 304.

10. The Jiefang Ribao (Yanan) is replete with many examples of such
practices; for example, see ’A gummary one Year’s work in Border
Region Government’, Jiefang Ribao, 8 February 1944, pp. 1-2.
11 .

For a further discussion on these policies sec Ronald C. Keith,
’The Relevance of Border-Region Experience to Nation-Building
in China 1949-52’, CQ no.78, June 1979, pp. 279-80. Also refer to
Andrew Watson’s introduction to Mao Zedong and the political
Economy of the Border Region, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, England, 1980.

12.

Mao Zedong, ’Economic and inancial Problems in the ajnti-Japanese
War’, Selected Works of Ma6 Tse-tung (hereinafter cited as SW),
Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1967, vol. iii, p. 112.

13>

i1’

/

(280)

13.

~?^,a discH,ssiprn of Maois 1936 and 1944 appeals refer to John
?hUnS3’ 1116 W°rld and China 1922-72 Eyre Methuen, London,
1974, pp. 58-59.

14.

Mao Zedong lists the 'rneans of imperialist oppression1 in !The
Chinese Revolution and the
— Chinese
---- e Cormunist Party1, SW, vol,
ii, PP. 311-12.

15.

Mao Zedong, ’We Mist Learn to Dq £!conor?ic
Work',SV vol.iii, p.191.

16.

Mao Zedong,'On the People's ■T)“enocratio jJ ictatorship1, SW
vol. iv., p. 416.

17.

Ronald C. Keith, op. cit., pp. 281-82.

18.

•

In 1950 the Soviets extended a five-year credit of US $300 nillionshowever, investnent between 1949 and 1953 in Chinese industry
anounted to an estinated US $2, 184 nillions. See Cheng Tsu-yuan,
£^o2“955:Cp?69.“
C“m- ',”i“
-

19.

Ronald C. Keith, dip. cit.. p. 281.

20.

R°?
!^u?s'fcion of bbe Intellectuals1, 14 January 1956 in
obert Bowie and John K,Fairbank, Communist China 1955-59,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Canbridge 1971, p. 14 0 . Zhou urged
^lna C0U:Ld not definitely rely on Soviet experts and
at the primary task was, therefore, not.copying but developing
existing intellectual forces within China itself.

21 .

I
►

O

Mao Zedong, ’Chairman Mao’s Talk to the Music Workers’, Stuart
K. bchram (edj, Mao Tse-tung Undrehearosed, pp. 84-90. A rele»

<1
22.

‘on an elaboration of Mao's penchant for Daoisn refer to Stuart
Schran s article in Dick Wilson (cd), Mao Tse-tung in the Scales
pp grS1"7’ Canbridee University Press, Canbridge, England, 1977,

23.

*0n the Ten Major Relationships’, f
SW vol, v, Foreign Languages
.Press, Reining, 1977 p.61-64 303.
Schram (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p. 126.
Ibid., p. 129.

24.
25.

Prof. Willian noad has challenged Audrey Donnathorno's descrirenho r
a
eCOnOny aS ,collular' in his argunent that 'selfreliance .is consistent with.the urtheranco of inter-regional
Sods aVa SSpC?S thc creaticn of oxporStable surpluses df
goods.
. Self-Reliance, Internal Trade and China's Economo
Structure', CQ, no. 62, June 1975, pp. 305-06.

27.
.

FtLC^P1^ 306 ^ildlau Griffith, Sino_SoviGt Reiatlons ! 964.65
the MIT. Press, Cambridge, 1967, p.6.

SdoymsSSs HoSi
(S
•no“^rA^lM^hr£n“
Hongqi (Red ^lag)
dll-j

llcl-L,

Hong Kong Conslate General,
’
-------- 1 g^-vey of’ the People’s of China
Magazines (SPRCM), no.. 867-68, 2O~26‘April, 1976, pp.22-23.

29.

o

Q

26.

28.

o

5CChtby ihe CJalrnan of the Delegation of the People's Republic
a
Ch^a?
Xla'°I)lnU at the Special Session of the UN General
Assenbly', ^Or0ign Languages Press, Beijing, 1974, p. 15.

<»

o

VW

5*

(281)

30.
31 .
32.

Ibid., pc 16.
Ibid., p. 16.
For example, see the counter-criticism of the G-ong of Four’s
sugger tioh that Peng an,d Zhour were part of a ’foreign affairs
(yang-wu pai) in gzudy Vcup of the 'Ministry of Light Industry,
Zil.i gengsheng. yong. wei 'chongyong (Self-reliance and nake foreign
things serve China} in vol«2 of Jianjno yonghu longxiu Huazhuxi—
fennu shengtao siren bang (Firgly support our leader, Chairnan
Hua in angrily condenning the Gang of Pour), banlian Shudian,
Hong Kong, 1977. p. 119.

33.

See tho report on Peng
Js talks on party rectification in Rennin
Rihao (PeopleTsBaily),
.2
Novonbcr 1981I, p.1 .
\

34.

For example, refer to r0n Yao Wenyuan’s Outlook on Natural
Science’ in Hongqi (Red plag), no. 4,-4 April 1978 , in JPRS
71314, 19 June 1973, p. 1-18.

35.

’Draft Decision Con corning (one —
-- Speeding up the
Problems
in
Development of Industry1, Issues and Studies, vol xiv,/ no. 11,
November 1978, p.91.

36.

’Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up Four Modernizations’, BR, no,
^45, 10 November 1978, p-.11.
a

37.

May 1979 discussion with Zheng Jianwoi and others from tho
Na tional Council for tho Promotion of Interna tional trade
in Beijing.

38.

Hua Ouofeng1s Report, 'Unite and Strive to Build....', BR,no.10
10 March 1978, p024o

39.

For a discussion of the ’long front’ see Liu Xin, ’Inside Story
- of Economic Readjustment in C>n?jmnist ChinaZhongming (Contending),
Hong Kong, May 1979?
1979: no.
no. 19?
1 9 pp. 9-13.

40.

Tian Yun.. ’One Stop Back- : ^-wo Stops Forward’, BR. no. 29, 21 July
1980, ppo 15-19<

41 .

Shi Zhi ngwen, !Rea djusting the National Economy:
BR? no. 26? 29 Juno 1979., Po22.

42.

Hua ^uofong, ’Report or. tho Work of Government’ , BR, no. 27,
6 July 1979, p.13.

43.

Ou Ming, ’Plans Readjustc’ ,Policy Unchanged', BR, no. 30,2?
July 1979 > PP. 9-11.

44.

Liu Chaoujin, The Now Trend in China’s foreign Trade,, pp. 10-11.
In interview ^1 December1981) with the author, Prof, Liu, director
of Foreign Trade at tho Beijing Institute of Foreign Trade
at the confirmed this point, and he noted that joint v enturos
under present circumstances would only account for a very small
proportion of production in China. Professor Liu stressed tho
potential for the expansion of co-operative production at the
organization jevol below that of tho joint econonic venture,
as at this lower level contracts arc quite specific, and there
is a faster generation of profitable returns within a shorter
time frame.

45.

Yao Milin, 'Report on the Rcadjustnont of the 1981 Econonic
Plan and State Revenue and hrpenditure'. BR, no. 11, 16 March
1983 p. 19,.
’

Why and How?1,

)

[2.^)
46.
47.

Hua' Cruofeng, BR, no. 13, 31 March 1978, p.12.
For a general dis-cussion of 1 two-line struggle* historiography
refer to Andrew Nathon, ’Oscillations in the People*s Republic of
China: A Critique’, CQ, no. 69, Becenber 1976, pp. 720-3.3•
Ying-Mao Kau*s testinony, p.128 of the US Connittee on Foreign
48.
Relations, Taiwan:. One Yea r After United Statos-China^Nornalizaticn, US Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 1980.
Zhao Ziyang, BR, no. 44, 22 November 198}, p.14.
49.
’Modernizing Defence*, BR, 10 January 1983, p. 6.
50.
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*

NEW PLAN DEVELOPMENT
*

prospects'

‘•i-x

By Zhai Wen

The article which is being reproduced below is taken from
the Economic Times ( June 1983) aand gives us some of the
latest information and statisticss available about Chine,
This is the r*
reason why it is given at the end of our
documentary file‘ as an appendix.

December 10, the 3,000 members of the National People’s
Congress gave their formal endorsement to China’s Sixth Five-Year
Plan, which, Premier Zhao Ziyang promised the deputies, will accelerate
modernisation and spur ” continuous improvement in the people’s living
standards” in this nation of more than 1 billion.
The Premier, who is curfently on a 10 nsticn tour of Africa.told
the deputies that the plan would encourage the Chinese people "to
advance toward the splendid goal set for the end of this century”.
Government views the Five Year Plan as the first major step toward
achieving a fully modern socialist society by the year 2000.

Although it was put together as a whole only in recent months,
the Plan is designed to cover the entire period from 1981 to 1985, both
absorbing elements of the last two years’ transitional economic policies
and setting forth an array of new development targets.

Among tne major goals which the Plan envisages are an average
annual increase of four per cent in industrial and agricultural output
value, a total investment of 360 billion yuan in fixed assets, completion
of 400 major construction projects, an annual 4.9 per cent increase in
workers 5 wages and a 6 per cent increase in peasants’ income, and an
increase_of 68 per cent in public expenditures on education, science
culture and public health service between 1981 and 1985.
By building on the base of prosperity envisioned in the Plan,
Zhao said, Chxna ’’can realise the magnificent objective of quadrupling
tne gross value of j.ndustrial and agri cultural production by the end
of this century”.

Under the Plan. China will continue the oconchic readjustment
which, since 197% has sought to correct the emphasis on capitalintensive heavy industry at the expense of light industry and agriculture
which was encouraged during the ten years of social turnoil from
1966 to 1976 and even before. A simultaneous shift away from over­
centralisation and extreme egalitarianism will also be accelerated.
Under the Plan, the total value of China’s industrial and agri­
cultural output in 1985 should cone to 871 billion yuan, or 155.1
billion yuan more than the 715.9 billion yuan spent in 1980. Both in­
dustrial and agricultural production are expected to rise by an annual
average of 4 per cent during the five years; efforts will be made to
increase the rate further to 5 per cent.

NEU PLAN DEVELOPMENT
PROSPECTS
"
By Zhai Wen
The article which is being reproduced below is taken from
the ibconomic Times ( June 1985) and gives us some of the
latest information and statistics available about Chine.
This is the reason why it is given at the end of our
documentary filo as an appendix.

ON

December 10, the 5,000 members of the National People’s
Congress gave their formal endorsement to China’s Sixth Five-Year
Plan, which, Premier Zhao Ziyang promised the deputies, will accelerate
modernisation and spur ” continuous improvement in the people’s living
standards” in this nation of more than 1 billion.

The Premier, who is curfently on a 10 natRn tour of Africa.told
the deputies that the plan would encourage the Chinese people ’’to
advance toward the splendid goal set for the ond of this century”.

Government views the Five Year Plan as the first major step toward
achieving a fully modern socialist society by the year 2000.
Although it was put together as a whole only in recent months,
the Plan is designed to cover the entire period from 1981 to 1985, both
absorbing elements of the last two years’ transitional economic policies
and setting forth an array of new development targets.

Among the major goals which the Plan envisages are an average
annual increase of four per cent in industrial and agricultural output
value, a total investment of 560 billion yuan in fixed assets, completion
of 400 major construction projects, an annual 4.9 per cent increase in
workers ’ wages and a 6 per cent increase in peasants* income, and an
increaso^of 68 per cent in public expenditures on education, science
culture and public health service between 1981 and 1985.
By building on the base of prosperity envisioned in the Plan,
Zhao said, China ’’can realise the magnificent objective of quadrupling
the gross value of i.ndustrial and agri cultural production by the end
of this century”»

Under the Plan. China will continue the economic readjustment
which, since 1979, has sought to correct the emphasis on capitalintensive heavy industry at the expense of light industry and agriculture
which was encouraged during the ten years of social turmoil from
1966 to 1976 and even before. A simultaneous shift away from over­
centralisation and extreme egalitarianism will also be accelerated.

Under the Plan, the total value of China’s industrial and agri­
cultural output in 1985 should cone to 871 billion yuan, or 155.1
billion yuan nore than the 715.9 billion yuan spent in 1980. Both in­
dustrial and agricultural production are expected to rise by an annual
average of 4 per cent during the five years; efforts will be nade to
increase the rate further to 5 per cent.

By 1985, the country’s grain output is scheduled to reach 360
million tons, 12.3 per cent more than in 1980. The gross value of
light industrial output should, meanwhile, grow by an annual average
of 5 per cent, and that of heavy industry by an average of 3 per cent
The combined annual growth rate of industrial and agricultural
output for 18 1981 and 1982 was 5»2 per cent. The Plan envisages a
lower growth rate for the
—five
------ ) years as a whole •
In the past, the government has conceded, China set unrealistic
production targets with which distrregarded the serious constraints of
a large population and a weak and backward economy. Production costs
were high, and efficiency was low People’s welfare was overlooked.

The current Plan insists on inprovenent in the quality of products,
more efficient use of raw materials,j and a sounder basis for production
targets,
Energy and transport are particular priorities, and will receive
38.5 per cent of the 230 billion yuan in capital construction funds to
be invested over the five years, under the plan.
Twenty—eight large coal mines each with an annual ca.pacity of over
one million tons are stlated for construction, Couplexd with the bulling
of other smaller nines, this is
‘ expected
__„ to add a total of 220 million
tons to China*s annual production capacity,
w , The goal in the oil industry
is to verify res erves in a number of :new oilfields and to seek and
exploit new offshore deposits; China’soil extraction capacity should
increase by 35 million tons, and that of natural, gas byX2.5 billion
cubic metres.
. Fifteen largo hydroelectric stations along the Yellow, the Yangtze
and Hongshui rivers are planned. T
\
Forty-five
najor pithead thermal
power stations are to be constructed in coal
-rich-----Shanxi and other
-- ---provinces. A nuclear power station with a generatingcapacity of
300,000 kw will also be built.
.
billion yuan is to be invested in transport and communications,
mainly for railway and harbour construction, and inland navagation
projects along the Yangtze and other rivers.

. -J-11, ^rcilture, emphasis will be laid on strengthening anii-flood
facilities along the Yellow, Yangtze, Huaihe and Hahe rivers; on the
construction
of
reservoirs;5 on building commodity grain bases; and on
C
^n?xrU?tn?n °
f reSGrvoirs
shelterbelt networks, manmade pastures breeding fams, live-stock farms
and feed-processing factories.
The Plan earmarks 130 billion 3man for updating equipment and accderating the technical transformation of
‘
of existing
eftterprises-a sun
equuivalent to 35 percent of the total fixed. asset investment. In
the 28 years from 1953 and 1980, funds for
such1 purposes made up joint
-----about 20 per cent.
Under
Five-Year rian
Plan 96.7 billion yuan, or 15.9 per cent
uxxuux’ the
bue Six nve-iear
oi tae total expenditure- -has been
--- 1 allocated for education, science,
culture and public health services.
inilar appropriations
appropriations made
made up
------ - binilar
only 11 per cent under the Fifth Five Year Plan (1976-80).■ More
More
colleges and universities, secondary schools and covational schools
will be set up. Undergraduate education is to be strengthened.
Primary education will became universal in most counttics, and junior
middle school education universal in the cities.

J

With regard to science and technology, the Plan stipulates? among
other things, that 40 major achievements in agriculture, light industry,
energy, electronics, machine-building and transport should be popularised.

’’For the vigorous development of the economy, it is a fundamental
question of principle to relay on achievements in science and technology
and to gear them to the needs of economic construction,” the premier said.
The Plan also forsees the continuing expansion of foreign tiade
and economic and technological exchange. -About 5^000 items of advanced
technology are to be imported to reinforce the technical transformation
of existing enterprises, partifularly small and medium-sized ones.

"Expansion of economic and technical exchange with foreign countries”,
Zhao said, ”is aimed at enhancing China’s capability of self-reliance,
and it can in no way harm or even weaken the country’s national economy.”

Meanshile, about 29 million more city and town dwellers are expected
to the be employed by 1985. Per capita income among the peasantry is
planned to grow from 191 yuan in 1980 to 225 yuan in 1985, at an average
annual rate of 6 per cent; between 1955 and 1980 peasant income grew at
about 4.5 per cent per year. The payroll for all workers and staff
throughout China should increase from 77.5 billion yuan in 1980 to
98.5 billion yuan in 1985-an average annual increase of 4.9 per cent.
The salaries of middle-aged intellectuals will be increased by an even
bigger margin.
SOURCE

The Economic Times

Sunday, "'June

1.

1933-

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