




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SECTION 3 = NEW POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Politics occupy a key position in the process of transformation of any society. How is power exercised and in favour of which categories of the population are questions on the response to which depends the nature of a social system. China today, within the broad framework of Socialism is redefining its political institutions. The documents in this section unveil some of the new thrusts of the new leadership in the political field.

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"Although socialist practice over the last few decades has differed in very distinct ways from Marx's theory of socialism the two are not completely different....We need a fairly historical period to develop a socialist and planned commodity economy in order to achieve highly developed, socialised and modernized ~~social~~ productive forces. This is a task which history has thrust upon the proletariat in those economically underdeveloped countries where a socialist system has been established" (Lin Zili, Beijing Review August 24, 1981)

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SOCIALISM : THEORY AND PRACTICE

- Lin Zili

Marked differences exist between socialism as practised in this century and Marx's theory of socialism. The general trend is to develop socialism in line with a particular country's actual conditions, especially the state of its social productive forces.

The problems of motive force and balance in socialist economies can be solved by integrating the exchange of equal amounts of labour with the exchange of equal values and unifying regulation through planning with that through the market.

To give full scope to the development of a socialist commodity economy in order to achieve a highly developed, socialized production and provide the material basis for communism - this is a road feasible for socialist countries with fairly backward economies.

Socialism : A Tortuous Road

Marx and Engels turned socialism into a scientific ideological system and a theory after summing up the experience of the workers' movement and criticizing utopian socialism. In the present era, socialism also consists of social practice, tremendous revolutionary practice on a world scale.

Since the beginning of this century, socialism has been practised in a number of countries in Europe, Asia and other regions of the world, giving rise to different types and models. It is an indisputable fact that socialism is, on the whole, being practised.

Of course, some countries, including China itself, have travelled along a tortuous road in their socialist construction. But socialism is still advancing in these countries, and they are carrying out explorations in the process. In the contemporary capitalist world, Marxists, Communists and other personages who have concerned themselves with social progress have been striving to find a road towards socialism taking into consideration different aspects of the matter and their own national conditions.

Socialism: Difference in Theory and Practise

Developments in socialist countries, including China, have revealed one common major problem: a difference exists between Marx's theory of socialism and socialism as practised during the 20th century. During his visit to China last November, Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, talked of some of his observations about socialism which are shared by others of his generation: "A number of countries have built

socialism for decades. Socialism, however, has turned out to be a great deal more complex than our generation expected. We had thought that once (a workers') Party assumed power and applied the principle 'to each according to his work', we could go on and build communism and all the problems would be solved. This has not been the case in practice."

Marx and Engels : Only made a Theoretical Statement about its Essence

A brief discussion of the characteristics of socialist economic formation prescribed in the Marxist theory of socialism will elucidate why this has happened. Marx and Engels did not and could not provide a concrete model of a future communist society. They only made a theoretical statement about its essence. In the works of Marx and Engels, the terms of socialism and communism were used interchangeably. The socialism (communism) they envisaged was to be based on socialized production. Under socialism, labour would be socialized and the resources commonly owned; society would in fact be one single economic entity, "a federation of free persons." The fruits of social labour would be directly distributed to all. No commodities or money would be necessary. Socialized production would be entirely and directly controlled and regulated according to a plan. It would not have to go through the zig-zags resulting from the exchange of values, and there would be no market economy or competition. Such were the basic characteristics of communist economic formation as conceived by Marx and Engels. In some of his writings, Marx distinguished between the preliminary and advanced stages of communism. He stated that the main economic characteristic of the preliminary stage was the exchange of equal amounts of labour* while in the advanced stage it was the principle "from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs." Later, people held that socialism consisted only of the social economic relationship which was built entirely on the model Marx had envisaged for the first stage of communism. However, practice has proved that things are not so simple. Now that much experience has been gained by those countries which have been practising socialism, we should not allow our understanding to be rigidly confined by Marx's assumptions. The Marxist theory of socialism must be developed in keeping with practice.

It needs to be pointed out that Marx attached great importance to the material basis for the communist social economic formation. It is well known that socialism developed from a utopian philosophy into a science because of the appearance of the theories of historical materialism and surplus value**. According to these theories, communism is the inevitable outcome of social productive forces which cannot be absorbed by capitalism. Marx and Engels argued that communism was a more advanced social formation than capitalism and would replace capitalism after it had fully developed and begun to decline and fall.

* The exchange of equal amounts of labour - the exchange between a certain amount of labour in one form and the same amount of labour in another.

** Surplus value - the value created by wage workers during their surplus labour hours and usurped by capitalists without remuneration.

Lenin : Proletarian Revolution would Succeed first in Countries with Less Developed Economies

World history, however, has not developed the way Marx and Engels had expected. The proletariat-led revolution did not first triumph in developed capitalist countries with advanced productive forces but in those countries with less developed capitalism and relatively backward productive forces. Before the victory of the revolution, China was a very poor and backward semifeudal and semi-colonial country. It was precisely in such countries that socialist practice started.

It was Lenin who put forward the theory that proletarian revolution would succeed first in countries with less developed economies. At the beginning, all the countries (including China) which had successful revolutions tried to build more or less the kind of social economic relations Marx had envisaged for the first stage of communism. China instituted an ownership of the whole people which was actually a socialist state ownership. For the economy of the state ownership, an attempt was made to adopt a highly planned system which limited commodity relations. Not enough importance was attached to the positive role market mechanisms could play. Though, in reality, it was impossible to altogether abolish commodities and money, their role and the role of value were very limited. This is because they were not able to reflect the economic interests between different producers but served as an accounting and calculating tool. Such being the case, the law of value could hardly play the role of regulating social production.

Forced to Focus on the State of its Social Productive Forces

There used to be the tendency to have large scale collective ownership, particularly in the rural economy, as it was commonly believed that the closer collective ownership was to the ownership of the whole people the better. In the cities, the strictly controlled collective economy was, in most cases, managed in the same way as the economy owned by the whole people. With less developed capitalism and relatively backward productive forces. Before the

At the same time we did not pay enough attention to the private sector of the economy (with individual ownership) a necessary supplement to the socialist economy, and it could not play its positive role as fully as it should have done.

It was Lenin who put forward the theory that proletarian revolution would succeed first in countries with less developed economies. Practice in almost all the socialist countries shows that the present material conditions make it impossible to introduce an economic system in which commodity relations are limited, the planning is highly centralized and market mechanisms are excluded, that is, the kind of economic relations Marx envisaged for the first stage of communism. To attempt the impossible would only produce poor results. An attempt was made to adopt a highly planned system which limited commodity relations. Not enough importance was attached to the absence of strong motivation for economic development, a lack of enthusiasm, the difficulty of maintaining a balance, and frequent disproportions in economic development. Their relations of production have been unsuited to the productive forces. With the intensification of this contradiction, the social and political life and other spheres have been affected. People are forced to seek a social form which will better suit the development of the productive forces. It is characteristic of the development of the practice of socialism that, in the last few decades, economic reforms have been instituted in practically every socialist country. Such economic reforms, in whatever

Part III MARX'S THEORY OF SOCIALISM : REMAINS TO BE VERIFIED

Although there are points in common between socialism as practised in our era and the first stage of communism as envisaged by Marx, we should not overlook their differences. What Marx envisaged belongs to the social economic form of communism which is to be established on the basis of fully developed social productive forces resulting from a highly developed commodity economy. No such social economic form exists in the world today. Whether an economic form will in the future fully conform to what Marx envisaged for the first stage of communism remains to be verified by practice.

Socialism as practised in our era is a social economic system which differs essentially from capitalism though the two are built on roughly the same level of productive forces. Mankind will ultimately adopt communism. To materialize communism, an appropriate material prerequisite must be created. In this respect, there are apparently two different roads. The first one requires that the material basis for communism is built by fully developing the capitalist commodity economy and thus highly socializing production. The other road shows that the material foundation for communisms can also be built on highly socialized production deriving from the full development of the socialist commodity economy. Some underdeveloped countries which for historical reasons have first achieved victorious revolutions under the leadership of the proletariat have taken the second road.

Socialism : Task which the Future Needs to Answer

Why must they take this road ? Because in the course of human history, the highly developed commodity economy is an inevitable stage. The productive forces cannot be highly socialized until the commodity economy is fully developed. Just as the commodity economy could grow only out of the natural economy, a high social form without commodities and currencies can develop only from a fully developed commodity economy. But the highly developed commodity economy will not necessarily be a capitalist economy. The period of highly developed commodity economy cannot be averted, but the period of capitalism can. We do not follow the road of developing a planned socialist commodity economy. From an economic point of view, such a road is socialist, and nothing else.

In short, we need a fairly long historical period to develop a socialist and planned commodity economy in order to achieve highly developed, socialised, and modernized social productive forces. This is a task which history has thrust upon the proletariat in those economically underdeveloped countries where a socialist system has been established.

source: *Beijing Review*, no. 34
August 24, 1981

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REFORMING THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

This is an abridged translation of the third part of a long article by Feng Wenbin Vice-president of Party School under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It first appeared in Renmin Ribao under the heading "On Questions of Socialist Democracy."

SOCIALIST democracy in China is deficient, and moreover, has long been trampled underfoot. Of the many different contributing factors involved, the principal one arises from problems in its structure. In order to fully bring out the superiority of socialism, the political structure must be reformed and put on a sounder basis.

This great endeavour, crucial to the future and destiny of our country, demands that the reforms be carried out in a planned, methodical way.

All power belongs to the people. The people are the masters of the country, the masters of our society. All affairs of the state and society are to be run by the people, who have the supreme authority to govern the country and direct the multifarious affairs of the society. This is the basic point of departure for our current reforms in the political structure and for developing and improving our socialist democratic institutions.

To put the institutions of socialist democracy on a sounder basis, we must, at present, work for a correct solution of problems in the following six spheres:

ONE. REVAMP THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS.

In China, the organ of power through which the people govern the country is the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses at various levels; all state affairs of importance are to be decided on by the people's congress. All leading members of the executive organs of the state are either elected or appointed by the people's congress, are subject to its supervision and may be removed from office by it. The people's congresses at various levels are elected by the people and the electoral units have the right to supervise the deputies they elect and replace them at any time as prescribed by law.

The Chinese Constitution explicitly provides for all these functions and powers. In real life, however, we have failed to carry them out to the letter. Some stipulations of the present Constitution are no longer applicable to the new situation, many are imperfect, or unclear, and therefore need revision. In fact, we have not yet seen to it that the entire populace fully enjoy their democratic rights—they have not really been able to exercise their power of governing the state or the various enterprises and undertakings, and we lack specific procedures for applying the principles of socialist democracy. This is demonstrated by the fact that democracy more often than not exists in form only, while in reality a few people only too often have all the say. People's deputies and leading officials of government organizations are only nominally elected, while actually, voters cannot as yet fully have their choice through elections. At present, only deputies below the county level are directly elected. In reality, the people at large are not yet in a position to supervise the deputies and leaders they elect, to say nothing of exercising the right to remove them from office when necessary. Our electoral system still leaves much to be desired. For example, specific provisions are lacking to ensure that people's deputies meet their constituents at regular intervals, solicit and reflect their opinions, and report their work to them.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out in 1956 in On the Ten Major Relationship: "Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and the conditions are so complex that it is far better to have the initiative come from both the central and the local authorities than from one source alone." In September the same year, the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress said: In order to overcome bureaucracy in the central state organs and at the upper levels generally, and in order to give full, wide play to the initiative and flexibility of all state organs of local and lower grades, to the benefit of the general upsurge of socialist construction in our country, we must properly readjust administrative functions and powers between the central and local state organs, and between the higher and lower local state organs. In the political report to the congress, mention was made of the need to ensure for enterprises proper amount of autonomy, to ensure the implementation of regional national autonomy and bring about national equality.

It is a pity that we have failed to act according to these correct principles. For years we have held the muddled view that socialism is possible only when there is high degree of centralism, so the more highly centralized the power, the greater the degree of socialism. As a result, the power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the central government while any effort to expand the power of national autonomy or the power of enterprises had been looked on as dispersionary, springing from local nationalism and "refusing to follow the leadership." In 1978, at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, the tasks of reforming the managerial structure and granting more power of autonomy to the local authorities and enterprises were proposed. Preliminary experiments in carrying them out have yielded definite results. But overall reform of the managerial structure in the political, economic, cultural and educational fields according to the principle of developing socialist democracy remains a herculean task.

FOUR. DEVELOP DIVERSIFIED FORMS OF THE SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT AND EXPAND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DECISION IN ENTERPRISES.

The major and most basic rights due to labourers under socialism are the rights to govern their country, run enterprises and manage cultural and educational affairs. We must not interpret the people's democratic rights as government by some people and under their government the people enjoying the right to work, to education and social security. An enterprise is the base and a cell of socialist economy; only when each cell gives full play to its vitality can the entire socialist economy grow in a healthy way. The old system of factory management should undergo reform because it does not help modernize factory management and the managerial structure.

The workers' congress or the conference of workers' representatives in a factory should have the right to discuss and decide on major issues in the unit; the congress or conference should have the right to replace, or to suggest that the higher authority replace, administrative personnel in the unit who are unfit for their jobs, and gradually introduce the practice of electing factory leaders up to a certain level.

In rural people's communes, we must likewise give full scope to democracy, ensure for the labouring people their democratic rights and set up the system of the conference of representatives of the commune members. The vestiges of feudal autocracy are even stronger in the countryside and it is impossible to arouse the commune members' enthusiasm for production if we fail to give full scope to democracy and, in the absence of their enthusiasm, it will be impossible to carry out successful socialist construction in the countryside.

FIVE, REFORM THE CADRE SYSTEM STEP BY STEP.

Civil services personnel in a socialist country should be the people's public servants. Some cadres and a few leading cadres, however, do not now behave like public servants, but rather like overlords. Reforms of the existing cadre system are necessary if the masses are truly to govern the country, if the leading personnel at all levels are going to be younger in age, if they are to acquire professional skill and knowledge. If we do not try to solve problems through institutional reforms, the idea that the people are masters of the country remains empty talk. There should be a set of rules to guide personnel work in respect to promotion, employment, checkup examination, transfer, awards, selection, dismissal and retirement.

The existing electoral law in our country is mainly applicable to the election of deputies to the people's congress. These days in some enterprises and undertakings, leaders are being elected on a trial basis, but in most cases, they are still appointed by the higher authority. Conditions permitting, the electoral system should be extended to all fields, wherever it is essential, and it should gradually replace the appointment system. In some government offices and units, not all leading cadres are to be elected by the higher authority; still they must be subject to the supervision of the masses, who have a right to demand the replacement of cadres who are not on to their jobs. With a general electoral system, it is possible to place the right person in the right post so that every one can do his best. We must acknowledge and respect the people's democratic rights, and also have confidence that the people have the socialist consciousness and ability to choose their leading cadres well. Every convenience and facility must be provided to ensure that the people enjoy these rights.

Besides an electoral system, there must also be a reliable system for supervision and recall. "No elective institution or representative assembly," said Lenin, "can be regarded as being truly democratic and really representative of the people's will unless the electors' right to recall those elected is accepted and exercised." (Draft Decree on the Right of Recall.) Our present Constitution and laws do have stipulations on supervision and recall, but they are not acted on seriously because we lack concrete ways and measures to carry them out. It is necessary to set up a system of elections, supervision and recall, effect an all round reform of the cadre system, and have them legally institutionalized. This is a very important thing in perfecting the socialist democratic system and a major organizational measure for giving full play to the superiority of socialism.

SIX, PUT THE SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEM ON A SOUND BASIS AND SAFEGUARD THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS.

Political democratization in our country should be made a system. A complete set of laws should be drawn up to have democracy institutionalized and made part of the law, which will see to it that the democratic system is implemented. In the past, our cadres did not have a strong concept of rule by law. This is related to our long-time emphasis on rule by men ignoring rule by law, and also to the absence of traditions of legality. For many years, someone's say was law and power was law, so that even the Constitution and laws in general became mere scraps of paper and there was no safeguard for the people's rights.

Among the masses, there are people who know nothing about democratic order and who are not yet used to democratic procedures. They have not yet thrown off the influence of anarchism taken on during the "cultural revolution," are obsessed by individualism, and often violate the law, impairing the people's interests and obstructing other people's exercise of their democratic rights. This state of affairs must not be allowed to go on any longer. The people's legitimate rights must be safeguarded and no one should be allowed to infringe on them.

SOURCE: Beijing Review, No 4, January 26, 1981, Page no. 17 to 20 & 28.

THE CAUSES OF THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Zhu Yuanshi

The Cultural Revolution is submitted to a critical assessment by the present Chinese Leadership. What could have led to the Cultural Revolution's excesses? Where have been the mistakes? At the level of practice or at the level of theory? These questions are being examined in the article taken from the Beijing Review (September 14, 1981) and reproduced here.

MAO ZEDONG'S MISTAKES

In May 1966, Comrade Mao Zedong launched the "cultural revolution" which swept across the whole country. As a result of his mistaken estimation of China's class situation and the political condition of the Party and the state at that time, many long-tested, loyal revolutionaries of the older generation and numerous excellent leading Party cadres suffered ruthless attacks. Two counter-revolutionary cliques (Lin Biao's and Jiang Qing's) emerged during the "cultural revolution." Taking advantage of Comrade Mao Zedong's errors, they committed many crimes unbeknownst to him, bringing disaster to the country and the people. The "cultural revolution" which he initiated became uncontrollable like an unbridled wild horse. Due to various complex reasons, it was not possible to check this tumult during Comrade Mao Zedong's lifetime. Only after the downfall of the gang of four in October 1976 and the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Party in December 1978, did the Party and the state enter a new historical period of development.

Then, can it be said that the "cultural revolution" was caused only by a mistake of Comrade Mao Zedong? No, the coming into being of each social phenomenon has its own dynamic. The main causes for the emergence of the "cultural revolution" and its protraction for ten years are:

*. 1. COMRADE MAO ZEDONG'S MISTAKE IN LEADERSHIP IS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE.

After the basic completion of socialist transformation and as a result of the implementation of the correct line of the Party's Eighth National Congress (see page 19) in 1956 to concentrate efforts on developing the productive forces, 1957 was one of the best years since the founding of the People's Republic in terms of economic work. Unfortunately, Comrade Mao Zedong had become snug about the successes; he and many other leading comrades, both at the centre and in the localities, overestimated the role of man's subjective will and were impatient for quick results. Thus the big leap forward (see page 19) and the movement to establish rural people's communes (see page 20) were initiated in 1958 without sufficient experience in large-scale socialist construction and in violation of the basic law of economic development. "Left" errors—characterized by excessive targets, the issuing of arbitrary directives, boastfulness and the stirring up of a "communist wind"—spread throughout the country, causing serious setbacks to socialist construction. From the end of 1958 through the early stage of the Lushan Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee in July 1959, Comrade Mao Zedong led the whole Party in energetically rectifying the errors which had already been recognized.

However, in the later part of the meeting, Comrade Peng Dehuai voiced his objections to the "Left" errors of the big leap forward and Comrade Mao Zedong deemed this as an attack on the Party. He erred in initiating criticism of Comrade Peng Dehuai, which developed into a Party-wide struggle against "Right opportunism." As a result, not only were the "Left errors in the principles guiding economic work not eradicated, but they gradually infected the political, ideological and cultural spheres.

Comrade Mao Zedong's view of widening and absolutizing the class struggle developed gradually. In 1959, he said; "The struggle at Lushan is a class struggle, a continuation of the life-and death struggle between the two major antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, a struggle which has been going on in the socialist revolution for the last 10 years." In 1962, he often expounded the view that in socialist society, "there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and there is the danger of capitalist restoration." In 1965, he put forward the concept of Party persons in power taking the capitalist road. Henceforth, the spearhead of struggle was clearly directed against such persons in the Party.

In the May 16 Circular (see page 20), which marked the launching of the "cultural revolution," Comrade Mao Zedong severly criticized the so-called representatives of the bourgeoisie who had sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and the cultural circles. It seemed to him that this was a major matter which affected the future of the Party and state and the destiny of the world revolution, a matter which could not be left unresolved. Unfortunately, his analysis was like that of a devoted doctor who has made an incorrect diagnosis and thus written a wrong prescription.

Our Party concurred with every step in the development of this erroneous "Left" view point, regarded it as Comrade Mao Zedong's new creative theory in furthering Marxism-Leninism and propagated it widely. Thus with this "Leftist" thinking so deep-rooted, the launching of the "cultural revolution" was hard to resist.

2. IN ADDITION TO COMRADE MAO ZEDONG'S MISTAKE IN LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE COMPLE SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CAUSES UNDERLYING THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION."

1) The history of the international communist movement is not long and that of the socialist countries even shorter. Some of the laws governing the development of socialist society are relatively clear, but many others remain to be explored.

Marx and Engels only prophesied the coming of communist society and its initial stage. Apart from the Paris Commune which existed for only 72 days, they had not seen or experienced socialism. Therefore, their great ideal could only be a general concept which pointed out the trend of scientific communism; it could not be very specific.

Lenin had more experience. But those years just after the establishment of the Soviet political power were chaotic; there was resistance from the bourgeoisie, adverse activities against the Soviet by the kulaks and attacks by the domestic counter-revolutionary cliques like Kolchak and Denikin and by 14 capitalist countries. In these years the Soviet Union suffered civil war, famine and economic difficulties. Although Lenin had much understanding of socialist construction, there was little time and it was impossible for him to scientifically summarize their experiences in large-scale socialist construction. In his Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the communist International published in July 1920, Lenin stressed that the class struggle against the bourgeoisie after the proletariat's

conquest of political power was "most widespread, intense and ruthless." He not only thought that the resistance of the overthrown landlords and the bourgeoisie would become 10 times more frenzied and that there was the danger of restoration, but he also deemed the numerous small producers as the basis for restoration. This thesis which Lenin put forward in light of the Soviet situation at that time was not appropriate for China's conditions after 1957 when socialist transformation had basically been completed. But had a great influence on us.

Inheriting Lenin's behest, Stalin led the socialist construction in the Soviet Union. But he, too, did not and could not provide ready made answers to all the problems that would crop up in the socialist cause. Moreover, he vacillated in his assessment of the class struggle became acuter day by day. Furthermore, he forced his opinions onto others in the international communist movement and simplified the question that each socialist country is to develop socialism in the light of its own concrete situation.

2) The Chinese Communist Party had long existed in circumstances of war and fierce class struggle. It was not adequately prepared, either ideologically or in terms of scientific study, for the swift advent of the new-born socialist society and for nationwide socialist construction. We lacked experience in handling extensive socialist economic construction and in dealing with the various political contradictions in socialist society. These historical features of our Party determined, to a large extent, our habitual falling back on the familiar methods and experiences of large-scale, turbulent class struggle used in the years of war. They should no longer have been followed in solving new contradictions and problems that cropped up in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres in the course of the development of socialist society, especially when some serious social, political events had occurred. As a result, we broadened the scope of class struggle.

3) This subjective thinking and practice which was divorced from reality seemed to have a "theoretical basis" in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin because certain ideas and arguments in them were misunderstood or dogmatically interpreted.

For instance, it was thought that equal right, which reflects the exchange of equal amounts of labour and is applicable to the distribution of the means of consumption in socialist society, or "bourgeois right" as it was designated by Marx, should be restricted and criticized, and so the principles of "to each according to his work" and of material interest should be restricted and criticized. Actually, in his Critique of the Gotha Programme, what Marx called equal right was abstracted from the economic relation of "to each according to his work," or from the common characteristics of exchange of commodities of equal value, that is, exchange of equal amounts of labour, which is embodied in the equal rights of the two exchangers. Equal right does not have any capitalist exploitative nature. Marx's idea of the first stage of communist society did not include commodity production, a monetary system or any classes. The "bourgeois right" in his book has nothing to do with the right of the bourgeoisie or any other exploiter. The term "bourgeois" here is not used in its original meaning. In The Tasks of the proletariat in Our Revolution, Lenin extended only to socialism, i.e., to the social ownership of the means of production and the distribution of products according to the amount of work performed by each individual. This clearly confirms that the principle of "to each according to his work" and the public ownership of the means of production are the criteria for socialism.

Other passages that were misunderstood or dogmatically interpreted included: Small production will continue to engender capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily and hourly on a large scale even after the basic completion of socialist transformation; all ideological differences inside the Party are reflections of class struggle in society. All this led us to erroneously regard the broadening of the scope of class struggle as an action taken in defence of the purity of Marxism.

4) The chaotic international environment and the failure to correctly understand the new problems arising in the international communist movement hindered us from correctly understanding the class struggle. In dealing with the relations between China and the Soviet Union and between the two Party's, the Soviet leaders headed by Khrushchov deviated further and further from the Marxist-Leninist principles. They regarded themselves as the paternal party, replaced internationalism with big-nation chauvinism and hegemonism, and flagrantly tried to control China politically, economically and militarily. Having been rebuffed by Comrade Mao Zedong, Khrushchov flew into a rage from shame and went even further. The Soviet leaders started a polemic between China and the Soviet Union and turned the arguments between the two countries. When we were faced with difficulties resulting from our errors in economic work and consecutive years of natural disasters, the Soviet government perfidiously tore up contracts, withdrew Soviet experts and forced us to pay back the debts (debts incurred mainly through purchasing Soviet arms during the movement to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea). This caused enormous economic losses and intensified the severity of our difficulties. All these activities of the Soviet leaders forced us to wage a just struggle against the big-nation chauvinism of the Soviet Union. In these circumstances we were susceptible to Comrade Mao Zedong's erroneous viewpoint. In order to guard against a change of political colour of the Party and the state, a campaign to prevent and combat revisionism inside the country was launched. The error of broadening the scope of class struggle spread step by step in our Party. It was difficult for us to fully discuss many problems. Normal differences among comrades inside the Party and small errors came to be regarded as manifestations of the class struggle inside the Party, as matters of life and death. This led to the thinking that there were those in the leading core of our Party who like Khrushchov flaunted a red flag to oppose the red flag, that there was a revisionist political line inside the Party and an organizational line which served this political line and that there was a bourgeois headquarters in the Central Committee and its agents in the provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Under such circumstances it seemed only logical that to solve this serious nationwide question, it is not enough to just rely on normal criticism and self-criticism inside the Party. So, Comrade Mao Zedong used his prestige earned over long years to ignite a mass movement by openly and fully mobilizing the broad masses from the bottom up. This was in essence a violent struggle in which one class would overthrow another. He even thought that this type of "revolution" would have to be waged time and again.

3. *The principles of collective leadership in the political life of the Party and the state and of democratic centralism were seriously weakened and even undermined; this is another key reason why the "cultural revolution" could be launched by Comrade Mao Zedong single-handedly and last a whole decade. The social and historical causes include.*

17) At the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party's collective leadership and democratic centralism were underscored; and exaggeration of a single person's role, deification of the leaders and the personality cult were opposed. Nevertheless, the relevant rules and regulations adopted at that time failed to be implemented. The leading position of Comrade Mao Zedong in the party Central Committee had been recognized ever since the Zunyi meeting in 1935. The continuous victories of the Chinese

revolution earned him unparalleled prestige, but with this came excessive extolling from the Party and the people of all nationalities. Some even credited him with all the victories of the Chinese revolution; propaganda that placed him well above the Party and the people increased day by day. Comrade Mao Zedong, on his part grew conceited. He no longer treated his comrades as equals, and it became harder to discuss and make decisions with him in a democratic way. Such abnormality in the inner Party life and, first of all, in the political life of the Party central leading organ grew so serious that on the "cultural revolution" the Party Central Committee was unable to restrain Comrade Mao Zedong at all. Shortly after the "cultural revolution" began, many Members of the Political Bureau expressed disagreement with its methods, only to be accused of whipping up the "February adverse current". (See page 21.) Later on, the "cultural revolution group," set up the upon a decision of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee as a working organ under its Standing Compolitical Bureau. With the Party's democratic centralism so crippled it is not surprising that no one could prevent the "cultural revolution" from running its course.

2) Leaders play quite an important role in the communist movement. But, owing to the failure to handle the relationship between the Party and its leader correctly, there occurred certain grievous deviations in the history of the international communist movement. Comrade Stalin, at a time when his reputation was at its pinnacle at home and abroad, exaggerated his own role and placed his own power in a position antagonistic centralism. During his later years, he enjoyed, accepted and encouraged the personality cult; and he made decisions arbitrarily. Further, the Third International under his leadership after Lenin's death instituted a system in which power was over-concentrated. All this has had a negative influence on our Party.

3) That arbitrary individual rule and the personality cult found fertile soil here is because China had been an autocratic, feudal country for thousands of years. Autocracy in China has a historical tradition and a social basis. The new-democratic revolution led by our Party completely freed China from the feudal economic and political systems. However, because we focused our attention on the decisive role of the transformation of the economic system, we overlooked the role tradition plays in the people's thinking and failed to systematically criticize and repudiate the ideological influences of feudal autocracy that were still prevalent in the political and social life. As a result, remnants of such ideology and traditional practices as the personality cult, patriarchy, privilege, and hierarchy found their way into our Party. In addition, we had for a considerable period of time failed to amply understand the importance of the establishment of a sound people's democratic political system, and to enact a sound socialist constitution, laws and legal system. We abandoned some correct political and legal concepts and in this way provided hotbeds for the remnants of feudal autocracy to grow in our political life. All this provided favourable conditions for the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques to whip up the personality cult to serve their own schemes. Even a great Marxist like Comrade Mao Zedong could not avoid being influenced. Any word from Comrade Mao Zedong became a "supreme directive," the criterion for testing the truth, and sometimes even the unchallengeable law. Without such a political environment, the launching and continuation of the "cultural revolution" would have been impossible.

Experience is the best teacher. We must draw lessons from the "cultural revolution," and thus we will be able to make up for lost time.

THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY

(172)

This article attempts to show that neither the purpose and the methods nor the results of the "Cultural Revolution" played positive roles in the struggle against bureaucracy. Furthermore, the Party resolution's negation of the 'Cultural revolution' does not mean that China has given up the struggle against the bureaucratic style of work. On the contrary, we are using all means to fight bureaucracy, including strengthening ideological education, enforcing discipline delegating more democratic right to the people and introducing reforms.

SOME foreign friends do not fully understand why the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China has completely negated the cultural revolution." They have raised the question; Is it true that the cultural revolution" did not play any positive role in fighting against bureaucracy? I would like to express my view on this question.

Bureaucracy is a very complicated social problem, but I don't think "cultural revolution" had any positive impact on the struggle against bureaucracy. I would approach the question by examining three aspects: its purpose, methods and results.

NO POSITIVE MEANING? WHY?

First, the "cultural revolution" was not launched for the purpose of fighting bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a decadent style of thought and work left over from the old society. It does tremendous harm to the cause of socialist revolution and construction. The people are greatly discontented with it.

In our country, leading cadres at every level were tempered during the long period of revolutionary struggle, and most of them worked hard for the people's interests. Generally speaking, those who were contaminated by the bad habits of bureaucracy could mend their ways after criticism and education. Therefore, there was no need to launch a massive political movement just to fight bureaucracy.

The purpose of launching the "cultural revolution" was explicitly worded in the Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued on May 16, 1966, which was considered a programmatic document for the "cultural revolution." It is also clearly defined in the Political Report at the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

According to these two documents, the purpose of the cultural revolution" was to criticize the so-called "revisionism," "capitalism" and "large numbers of representatives of the bourgeoisie who sneaked into the Party, government and army as well as the cultural circles," to "struggle against counter-revolutionary revisionists," and to "seize back power from capitalist-roaders in the Party." In other words, it was to carry out "a political revolution in which one class overthrows another."

The "revisionists," "capitalist-roaders in power within the Party and "representatives of the bourgeoisie" to whom the documents referred were in fact revolutionary leading cadres of the Party and the state at

various levels. They were the backbone force of socialism. To put negative political labels on them was tantamount to framing them. The launching of a "great political revolution" under the dictatorship of the proletariat was aimed at overthrowing vast numbers of veteran revolutionary cadres and not improving or substantially altering any of the bureaucratic methods some cadres had adopted.

In the later stages of the "cultural revolution," the gang of four called for a struggle against "the bureaucratic class." The gang sought to overthrow additional veteran revolutionary cadres while stepping up their efforts to usurp the power of the Party and the state.

As we know, the term "class" has a scientific meaning, and it must not be interpreted at will nor used randomly. Whether a certain group of people form a class in society depends upon their position in the social economic structure. It is based on their position in the production, process, on whether they possess the means of production, and on how they have acquired these productive means.

Under the socialist system, the means of production are owned by the whole people and exploitation of others' labour is eliminated. Thus, the exploiting class no longer exists as a class and the overwhelming majority of exploiters are changed into labourers who earn their own living. Although remnant elements of the exploiting classes still exist and new exploiters might emerge, a new exploiting class can never be formed so long as we uphold the socialist political and economic system.

Like other labouring people, our cadres, including high-ranking cadres, are public employees of the state. They are paid only the wages they are entitled to under the state wage system, which is based on distribution according to work. They can neither possess the means of production, nor lay claim to the products of other people's labour. Therefore, to say that our cadres have been bureaucratized or that a "bureaucratic class" has emerged is incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist theory of class and with the social reality in our country.

In fact, only a tiny number of cadres degenerated into new exploiters. They committed serious bureaucratic mistakes, violated state laws and Party discipline and robbed the people or seized state property by force and trickery. But these people cannot form a class. It is not hard to deal with them—just subject them to Party discipline and state laws through the use of normal procedures.

Second, wrong methods for treating cadres and handling matters were adopted during the "cultural revolution." Some cadres have been contaminated by bad habits of bureaucracy. On the one hand, they have been influenced by the ideology of the exploiting classes. On the other, some irrational and defective procedures for work, administration and organization also promoted the development of bureaucracy.

Therefore, the struggle against bureaucracy requires that we strengthen ideological education to enable cadres who have committed mistakes to foster again the fine style of serving the people and keeping in close touch with the masses, and that we perfect socialist democracy and the socialist political and economic system, and overcome numerous outdated conventions and customs. Thus we can really enable the people to manage the affairs of the state and effectively supervise government employees.

Undeniably, the initiator of the "cultural revolution" subjectively desired to re-educate the cadres and to reform the irrational rules and regulations. However, he had made a completely wrong analysis of the cadre contingent, handling the contradictions among the people as contradictions between ourselves and the enemy. He adopted wrong

methods for dealing with cadres who had committed mistakes, including those who had committed mistakes of bureaucracy. Many were unjustly overthrown or dismissed from office. As a result, the movement failed to perform the function of education.

Moreover, the "cultural revolution" did not reform the irrational practices but, on the contrary, undermined some effective ones. Before the "cultural revolution," the government functioned separately from the Party within the state administration. But during the "cultural revolution," the work of the Party and government was lumped together and performed by the same group of people. In name, a "Party committee" and a "revolutionary committee" attended to the tasks separately. But in fact, the bodies were indistinguishable. This not only weakened the leadership of the Party, but also encouraged a bureaucratic style of work.

Another example is that in the past people's deputies at different levels made inspection tours of the grass-roots units to promote work, maintain close ties with the masses and learn about the people's opinions. This was helpful in overcoming bureaucratism. During the "cultural revolution," however, the practice was abolished.

Before the "cultural revolution," cadres also took part in physical labour, which was another measure against bureaucracy. During the "cultural revolution," the system was misused and turned into a means to punish and persecute cadres.

Third, judging from the results of the "cultural revolution," bureaucracy has not been eliminated but, in some respects, aggravated.

Why? It is because the "cultural revolution" confounded right and wrong and undermined the Party's fine style of work. While good, hard-working cadres who kept close ties with the masses were dismissed from office, opportunists were promoted. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques openly advocated feudal and bureaucratic styles of work among the cadres. For instance, Lin Biao instructed his trusted followers to lure cadres and the masses with promises of promotion and material benefits. Their evil practices caused various manifestations of bureaucratic habits to spread unchecked. This serious consequence could not disappear immediately with the end of the "cultural revolution." As a result, difficulties were added to our struggle against bureaucracy and other malpractices.

THE CURRENT ANTI-BUREAUCRACY STRUGGLE:

After the gang of four was smashed, particularly after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee held in December 1978, the Party began to comprehensively correct the "Left" errors committed during and before the "cultural revolution" and to attach great importance to the struggle against bureaucracy.

For instance, Comrade Ye Jianying clearly stated that bureaucracy must be combated resolutely in his speech at the celebration meeting of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at the end of September 1979. He pointed out that if cadres who were invested with power by the people were not responsible to the people, the people had the right to take back the power.

The Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee held in March 1980 stipulated: "In order to maintain close ties between the Party and the masses of the people, and see to it that the leading Party cadres and Party members who are the people's servants do not turn into lords sitting on their backs, it is necessary to strengthen supervision by the Party organization and the masses over the leading Party cadres and Party members."

The Third Plenary Session of the Fifth National People's Congress held in August and September 1980 reiterated that the eradication of bureaucracy depended first of all on thorough eradication of the irrationalities within the state administration, the cadre system and other administrative networks.

The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, said: "The style of work of a political party in power is a matter that determines its very existence. Party organizations at all levels and all Party cadres must go deep among the masses, plunge themselves into practical struggle remain modest and prudent, share weal and woe with the masses and firmly overcome bureaucratism."

This resolute attitude of the Party and the government has also been manifested in their response to some serious accidents. For example, the oil rig Bohai No. 2 capsized on November 25, 1979, killing 72 people. This accident resulted from issuing orders which violated established regulations. The cause of the accident was closely linked with the bureaucratic style of work on the part of the leading departments. Therefore, the cadres directly responsible for the accident were punished according to law. The Minister of Petroleum Industry was dismissed from office and a demerit "grade one" was recorded for a Vice-Premier of the State Council.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, some important reforms have been instituted throughout society. These reforms are not merely directed against bureaucracy, but they are nevertheless helpful to the struggle against it.

For instance, at the Third Plenary Session, the Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline was established. Its function is to oversee the implementation of the Party's regulations and discipline and thereby improve the Party's style of work. Immediately thereafter Party organizations, at all levels set up their own organs to supervise discipline. Thus the Party has established a system of inspecting and supervising itself from top to bottom.

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee stressed strengthening collective leadership and abolishing de facto life tenure for leading cadres. It called for the division of work between the Party and the government. As a rule, the first secretary of the Party committee will no longer concurrently head the people's government.

The Third Plenary Session of the Fifth National People's Congress supported the suggestion of the Party Central Committee and approved the reshuffle of the State Council leading bodies. It also decided that the Chairman of the Party Central Committee would no longer hold the post of Premier of the State Council and that the Vice-Chairmen of the Party Central Committee would no longer be Vice-Premiers of the State Council. These are important reforms of the systems of Party and state leadership.

Other reforms are: delegating power to the grass roots; enlarging the decision-making powers of each enterprise; establishing workers and staff congresses; and setting up democratic management and supervision organizations.

In the countryside, the people's communes, production brigades and teams also have more decision-making power and democratic elections are held at these basic levels.

All these reforms have one feature in common, that is, they aim at enlarging, institutionalizing and legalizing socialist democracy. All this will help overcome bureaucracy.

The reforms are only a beginning. Many irrationalities still exist within the state administration and other organizational systems. Further reforms are necessary. If these irrationalities are not eradicated, it will be impossible to overcome bureaucracy and the modernization programme will also be delayed.


Of course, there is a connection between the existence of bureaucracy and the developmental level of the socialist productive forces as well as the educational and cultural levels of the cadres and general populace. To thoroughly eliminate all the manifestations of bureaucracy is a long and arduous task.

Finally, I would like to stress one point: Bureaucracy is not an incurable disease inherent in the socialist system. Now, as we are uncovering the sources from which bureaucracy emerged, we are sure to win victories in our struggle against it, so long as we continue to reform our organizational structures, and enlarge, institutionalize and legalize socialist democracy. At the same time, we must strengthen the education of leading cadres at all levels and help improve their style of work, even if it is a long struggle.

SOURCE: Beijing Review, No. 49, December 7, 1981. page No. 17-20.

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
Humour In China



"When does the show start?"



— Wu Qibing

Urbanization




Urbanization.

— Sun Xinglong



Buried in Work.

— Wang Peng



— He shouldn't have fallen in!
— If only we had a lifebuoy.
— He should try to be calm.

— Cheng Jia



"I'm so modest. I never boast."

— Liu Qibing

SECTION 4 = EDUCATION, YOUTH, CULTURE

In a process of "modernization", education plays an important role. For a long period of time, knowledge was looked upon with ideological suspicion. Science and culture remained backward. In today's China, education, mass media, culture are considered as important instruments for social transformation. To this transformation youth and the intellectuals are specially invited to participate actively. In this section, therefore, one will find a documentation dealing with Intellectuals, Youth and Education.

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elements of truth accumulated gradually by human beings in the long procedure of cognizing and transforming the world. Knowledge constitutes the basic element of human civilization. The level of its development marks the degree of progress of a society. Knowledge itself is non-classical, but in class society different classes have different conceptions of the value of knowledge.

In feudal society where knowledge was degraded to serve feudal rulers only, its value was decided by power. Ideologies, theories and doctrines which helped consolidate the domination of the feudal imperial authority and divine authority were appreciated by the ruling figures. Those opposing feudal power were banned. Politically, imperial authority was the foundation of feudal dictatorial rule. Under it, power was everything while knowledge became insignificant. This was because keeping the people in ignorance is the essential condition for maintaining feudal rule. Economically, the self-sufficient small-peasant economy of feudal society was restricted by the narrow experiences passed on from generation to generation. People with specialized knowledge were not needed, to say nothing of any requirement for science and technology. Under this situation superstition and blind faith were encouraged but knowledge and science were rejected. The intellectuals naturally could not escape being humiliated and harassed.

Capitalism : Value of Knowledge Decided by Profit

In the bourgeois revolution and during the development of capitalism, knowledge experienced a great change in status and role. The capitalist class was linked with a newly emerged mode of production, and capitalist production by large machinery replaced the small peasant economy and handicrafts. Social production broke through the framework of narrow experiences, and there was a growing need for science and technology and also a strict demand on the educational level of hired managerial personnel and workers. This advanced education and various kinds of training. In addition, with the development of large-scale industrial production and the deepening of the human rights movement, intelligence was developed on a deeper and wider scale. Many new sciences and technologies appeared. To make high profits, the capitalists strove to convert science and technology into wealth by putting them to use in production as quickly as possible. This was the first time in history that knowledge became so closely and widely linked with social production and wealth. Knowledge became a ready source of money for the capitalist class and intellectuals were the pathbreakers of capitalist society.

However, capitalist society is not in any sense a paradise for intellectuals and their knowledge. It is a society under the control of capital in which profit is everything and the value of knowledge is decided by profit. Once it cannot bring money to the capitalists, any knowledge will be cast away without the slightest regret.

Socialist Society : Knowledge - Wealth of People - Weapon to Win its

Emancipation

Under socialist conditions, knowledge becomes the wealth of the whole people. Its value is decided by the economic development of society and the people's material and cultural demands. Socialist society is founded on the basis of large-scale modern production; therefore, there is a higher demand for specialized knowledge and intellectuals in order to advance the techniques of the

the national economy, increase productivity, improve the work of statistics and management in production, circulation and distribution as well as to explore and transform society and the natural world. This is because, as Lenin once pointed out, "socialism and communism can only be established on the basis of the total knowledge accumulated by human beings over thousands of years."

Basically, knowledge should be more required and intellectuals more respected in socialist society than at any other time in history. They should be given the widest opportunity to play their role. Unfortunately, for many years, because of our incorrect line and policies as well as the drawbacks in institutions such as life tenure for leading cadres, the patriarchal style of work and the over-concentration of power, the superiority of the socialist system could not be given full play. On the contrary, abnormal phenomena characteristic of feudal times reappeared in certain respects of our political and economic lives, such as despising knowledge, worshipping power and letting those without any expertise lead those who are well-trained. And this is related to many of our shortcomings such as low-efficiency management, wasteful-type production and arbitrary, non-scientific way of directing our work.

HISTORICAL CAUSES

Historical Causes of Overlooking the Role of Scientific Knowledge

What are the historical causes for overlooking the role of scientific knowledge for such a long time? There are at least the following factors: First, before liberation, China was a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society with a backward economy. The working people had a low educational and cultural level. Ignorance and superstition, therefore, had deep roots among the masses. Second, for quite a long time the bases of China's revolution were in the countryside. While mainly engaged in revolutionary wars, had no chance to raise their cultural level. Third, though the main emphasis of our democratic revolution was to solve the problem of feudal land ownership, the influence of feudal autocracy in the superstructure was under-estimated and not adequately criticized. As China had never gone through prolonged anti-feudal ideological emancipation movements like the Renaissance and Enlightenment in European countries, there is little democratic tradition to speak of. Science cannot prosper in the absence of democracy. Fourth, under our system of economic management, plans were made and handed down from above and the method of unified purchase and marketing of finished products by the State was practised. Within different branches of the economy, there was no incentive to better scientific and technological knowledge. This resulted in the strange phenomenon in which new scientific and technological achievements were often unwanted and talent and wisdom were ignored. Fifth, because of experiences of the international communist movement were summed up mistakenly, to attach great importance to the role of scientists and experts was labelled "revisionism," "courting danger to the Party and the state." Intellectuals were further restricted and cast aside, knowledge was sometimes equated with bourgeois ideas and blindly discarded. Naturally all these factors are by no means products of the socialist system, but result from going against socialism.

Intellectuals : The New Role

Since the convocation of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978, the Party has made great efforts to correct past mistakes by reforming the political and economic management system and implementing a sound policy towards intellectuals. With their political status greatly raised, our intellectuals now have greater enthusiasm.

This article is an abridged translation of a recent speech to the youth of Beijing by Deng Liqun, Director of the Research Office of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Deng recalled the past sufferings of the Chinese people as well as their achievements and setbacks since the founding of New China and then outlined the course he felt young people should advance along. We hope the publications of this speech will be useful to those interested in China's modern history. Title and sub-heads are ours.

Most of you attending today's meeting are young people. Compared with you I can only be called an old man. But I myself was once a youth. Some people claim that there is a generation gap between the old and the young and no common ground exists between them. But I don't agree with this opinion. I am a member of the Chinese Communist Party. Among you there are Communist Party members and Communist Youth League members. We are fighting together for the communist ideal. We share the same objectives and are travelling the same road. Why can't our hearts be linked together? In fact most of China's people, both old and young, hope to build our motherland into a powerful modern socialist country. I believe the hearts of the two generations beat as one on this fundamental question.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NEW AND OLD CHINA

The founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 marked the beginning of a fundamentally new era in modern Chinese history. For the previous century after 1840, imperialist powers had collaborated with China's feudal rulers, causing the country to degenerate into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society.

Subsequent to the Opium War, there was no imperialist country that did not invade China or fleece our people. The unequal treaties signed by the reactionary governments of old China following the Sino-British Treaty of Nanking numbered over 1,000. Foreign troops were stationed in China, foreign concessions were set up in some cities, and many areas were carved out by foreign powers as spheres of influence. In terms of indemnities, the 1842 Treaty of Nanking alone forced the Qing Government to pay the equivalent of one-third of its annual revenue. As to territorial cessions, the Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigun signed in 1858 yielded over 600,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory to Russia; the 1860 Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking ceded another 400,000 square kilometres of territory; and the 1895 Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki surrendered Taiwan and the surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, all China's inland and coastal provinces, big and medium-sized cities and vital communication lines were occupied by the Japanese aggressors. In the four years after the war, the publicly announced treaties and agreements signed by the Chiang Kai-shek clique with the United States numbered 40. These accords meant China's giving up its sovereign rights, territorial sovereignty, power over military, financial and foreign affairs and even the prerogative over its internal affairs.

Comrade Mao Zedong made mistakes on certain questions in his later years when he was seriously ill. However, he always maintained a sober mind, a staunch determination and high vigilance on any issue of national independence, sovereignty and security. His resistance to Khrushchov's patriarchal behaviour and hegemonic acts is an example.

Comrade Mao Zedong's mistakes in his later years brought great misfortunes to the country and the people. But in terms of his whole life, his merits are primary and his mistakes secondary. He deserves to be recognized as the greatest proletarian revolutionary and the greatest national hero of the Chinese nation. His greatness lies in his loyalty to the Chinese people, his unswerving faith in their might and his staunch class stand, patriotism and revolutionary will as a Communist. We should draw lessons from Comrade Mao Zedong's mistakes. But his spirit of fighting tenaciously and unceasingly for the people's cause must not be forgotten and is something we should all emulate.

Always stand with the people and defend and represent their interests this is what our Party has consistently taught young people. The achievements of great men are always in proportion to their efforts to safeguard and represent the interests of the people. Those who are with the people go forward; those who divorce themselves from or oppose the people go backward or may even become reactionaries. This is a historical truth.

The youth of modern China have played a tremendous role in the revolutionary movement. During the 1976 revolutionary mass movement at Tiananmen Square, many young people, guided by Marxism, heroically came to the fore and made great contributions to the smashing of the gang of four. In recent years, numerous outstanding youths have appeared in various trades through their hard study and work. At present a movement to learn from Lei Feng* and a campaign of five stresses and four points of beauty** are being carried out. These are educating a new generation and are conducive to social stability and modernization. It is necessary to carry out these campaigns more thoroughly and persistently. Communist ideals, morality and values should be encouraged and young people should be commended when they display them. I hope that all the young people will exert themselves in study and work, further raise their ideology and morality and strive to rapidly acquire a correct world outlook, a strong physique and professional ability.

Today belongs to both you young people and us old people but the future only belongs to you. Modernized socialist China will belong to our youth. Young people are not only the builders of a modernized China but also its masters.

* Lei Feng was a P. L. A. hero who died while on duty in 1962 (see our issue No. 10, 1981, p. 6)

** The five stresses are: stress on decorum, manners, hygiene, discipline and morals. The four points of beauty are: beautification of the mind, language, behaviour and the environment (see our issue No. 15, 1981, p. 5)

Are China's 200 million young people a lost generation, victims of the gang of four who will never make a contribution to the development of the country? Or are they full of promise and eager to work for the modernization of China? One of the correspondents decided to answer this question by finding out what a recent survey on China's youth showed, by interviewing Gao Zhanxiang, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League and by talking with a number of young people from different background.

LAST year three teachers of the school under the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League queried about 1,000 young people in Factories, communes, schools and city neighbourhoods in Fujian and Anhui Provinces. Questionnaires were distributed and the findings were later published in a Renmin Ribao article.

In the report, published here in a condensed form, the three teachers identified the following characteristics among the younger generation:

1) Over half of the group polled believe that the socialist system is superior. Among the nearly 25 per cent of the young people who believe that the socialist system is not clearly superior, many remarks on their questionnaires like: "The real socialist system is Superior," "Superior but not perfect", "The socialist system is good in theory, but not in practice" and "The socialist system is advancing amidst hope and hardship". Among the 9.9 per cent who cannot see any superiority or don't know which is better, some wrote comments like, "I don't know what a socialist system is". Such remarks indicate real confusion. One person wrote on this part of the questionnaire: "The Officials are Superior", a clear condemnation of the privileged bureaucracy.

HOW DO YOU VIEW THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM ?

		%
Number polled	987	100
Superior	638	64.6
Not much better	235	23.8
Can't see any superiority	63	6.4
Don't know	35	3.5
Others	16	1.6

2) The responses to "What Is Your Ideal?" and "What is Your Favourite Proverb or Saying?" show that the majority of youth are concerned about the country's future and want China to develop quickly into a powerful nation. However, these young people hold different philosophies towards life, with some seeming to lack firm convictions.

From their answers to "What Is Your Ideal?" we conclude that 78.4 per cent (713 people) have very high aspirations which extend beyond their own personal concerns, 14.3 per cent (130 people) are most concerned about their work and 7.3 per cent (66 people) have no real aspirations.

WHAT IS YOUR FAVOURITE PROVERB OR SAYING ?

		%
Number polled	810	100
Genius comes from hard work and knowledge has to be accumulated	307	37.9
Every one has a share of responsibility for the fate of his country	132	16.3
With a fierce brow, I coolly defy a thousand pointing fingers head-bowed, like a willing OX I save the children	81	10.0
Birds are beautiful because of their feathers; people are beautiful because of their hard work	75	9.3
Lofty aspiration does not necessarily come with age; without any, one may live a hundred empty years	70	8.6
To get to the front in time of hardship, to stay behind in times of cheer	66	8.1
If you Don't enjoy your self while young, you will lose the chance of your life	32	4.0
All things are empty and life is just a dream	15	1.9
Life's purpose is to eat and drink	6	0.7
Everyone for himself and the devil can take the hind most	20	2.5
Others	6.	0.7

3) The characteristic of young people which was revealed in their answers to "What Kind of Social Problems Concern You Most ?" is that they are most concerned about the country's economic development and other practical problems.

WHAT KIND OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS CONCERN YOU MOST

		%
Number Polled	788	100
Development of Science and Technology	255	32.4
Increase production	75	9.5
Better living standards	117	14.9
Prevention of emergence of careerists like the gang of four	83	10.5
Combating bureaucracy	69	8.8
Development of Education	51	6.5
Rich Cultural Life	48	6.1
Better social order	45	5.7
Promotion of democracy and a legal system	44	5.6

In conducting the survey, an attempt was made to select as broad and diverse a group as possible. The three teachers went to 5 factories (Anhui Tractor Plant, the Hefei Cardboard Box Factory, the Fuzhou Silk Printing and Dyeing Mill, the Printing and Dyeing Mill, the Fuzhou Generating equipment Plant and the Xiamen Bearing Plant), one department store in Fuzhou, 2 universities, (Fuzhou University & Xiamen University), 2 middle schools (one in Hefei and one in Fuzhou) one commune in Anhui and 2 production brigades in Fujian and 2 neighbourhoods (one in Fuzhou and one in Xiamen.).

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SOURCE: Beijing Review, NO 30. July 27, 1981. pp.21-22 .

Some people say that the Chinese youths are a lost generation and some say they are the best generation of China. How do you look at this question?

The young people are the most vital force in society and the hope of a nation. Many foreign friends have shown concern for the Chinese youths and have noticed some of their shortcomings. This is not surprising. The Party and Youth League organisations, trade unions and schools as well as government departments attach importance to this question and have in the last few years carried out investigations at the grass-roots units, studied and analysed the conditions and characteristics of the younger generation today so as find ways to guide and help them solve their problems. For nearly a year since spring 1980, discussions of the meaning of life were published in leading national newspapers, attracting the attention of millions upon millions of young people.

The early years of the present generation of youths were years of endless rebellion and struggles, and in the 10 tumultuous years of the "Cultural Revolution", they were deeply influenced by "Leftist" thinking. They lost the opportunity to receive a good education when they should most needed, it. And when they should study Marxism and get to know what it really means, they were swayed by sham revolutionary slogans and many took part in rash "revolutionary action" such as indiscriminately toppling leading cadres, ransacking homes, resorting to coercion or force, and so forth. Unlike the older generation, they do not know what it really means to be freed from the miseries of the old society, nor do they have any experience of the happiness of seeing the speedy advance of China's socialist construction in the 1950s. When they came of age, what they saw was that the national economy was on the brink of collapse brought on by Lin Biao and the gang of four, with innumerable social problems crying for solution and unhealthy tendencies waiting to be corrected. None of these problems, however, can be solved overnight.

Compared with the youths of the 50s or the early 60s, the young people of today have more social experience and their minds are more complicated, more sensitive to the social and political problems. But, owing ~~to~~ to their shortcomings and limitations, they are often confused, unable to look at and analyse the various social contradictions in a comprehensive and dialectical way--.

After the smashing of the gang of four, our country has entered a new historical period. The young people's are compelled by reality to consider many questions, such as: What must be done to prevent a recurrence of their crimes of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their cohorts? What must be done to transform our poor and backward country into a powerful and prosperous one? What exactly is a meaningful life?

It is true that a small number of young people are perplexed of and at a loss. They waver and fail to see the superiority of the socialist system, and a few declare they no longer believe in Marxism. Some people in the west describe this as a loss of faith and say categorically that marxism doesn't work in China now. This pronouncement is of course too arbitrary.

Investigations by the Youth League, trade unions and other organisations show that most of the Young people in the factories, rural communes and schools hold that the socialist system and that they are studying and working hard, brimming with confidence that China's four modernizations will be accomplished.

The main reason why a small number of young people have doubts about the present-day society and no longer have a noble aim in life is that their minds have been poisoned by the fallacies of sham Marxism in those 10 chaotic years. Another reason is that, owing to the state of confusion and our mistakes in work during those years, the superiority of the socialist system could not be brought into play. For those young people who are unable to distinguish right from wrong to desavor Marxism is, thereforen like throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

It cannot be denied that there are a few young people who have degenerated and become criminals. Efforts are being made to save these people and help them turn over a new leaf.

To educate the young and lead them on to the correct path is the task of the whole society. A lot of work needs to be done but, through peristent efforts, this goal can be achieved under the guidance of Marxism.

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SOURCE: Beijing Review No.16 April 20,1981. p. 3

REGULATION ON ACADEMIC DEGREES

During the Cultural Revolution an attempt ~~x~~ had been made to do away with "degree". This had resulted in a certain deterioration in the "academic standards". Today, as part of the modernization process, regulations are enforced which stipulate that B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees will be conferred in accordance with the common practice in most countries of the world.

Regulation on academic degrees came in to effect in January 1 this year. The regulation stipulate that B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees will be conferred in accordance with the common practice in most countries of the world. College graduates with the required qualifications will be given the B.A degree, while postgraduates studying in the Universities or scientific research institutes and other people with the same academic level may qualify for master's or doctor's degrees through examinations, including oral tests. The degrees conferred will be the same as those Universally acknowledged.

The state Council has set up a national academic degrees committee in accordance with the regulations approved in February last year by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The Committee which held its first meeting in Beijing last December discussed the ways of implementing the regulations.

Chairman of the academic degrees committee is Fang Yi, who is concurrently President of the Chinese Academy of Science and Vice-Premier of the State Council. The granting of academic degrees, he noted, will encourage people to obtain solid achievements in their specialized fields, speed up the training of qualified people, improve China's educational and academic levels and promote exchanges between Chinese and foreign scholars. All this will contribute to the realization of the four modernisation.

The 20 -point regulations constitute an important legislation in China's educational and scientific fields as well as a long-awaited event for those concerned.

The academic degrees committee stressed that, in implementing the regulations, it is necessary to show due respect for science and uphold academic standards. In awarding academic titles, quality should be paid to facilitating the selection of qualified people. The regulations have provided opportunities for those who have through self-study and practice made outstanding achievements in their specialization field. In addition, the regulations stipulate that academic degrees obtained in foreign countries will be recognized; academic degrees will be conferred on foreign students and scholars studying or doing research work in China on application if they are up to the required standard. Honorary doctor's degrees will be conferred on outstanding Chinese and foreign scholars and noted public figures in recognition of their contributions.

Apart from the chairman, the academic degrees committee consists of four vice-chairmen and 36 other members. They include vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Minister of Education and other noted scholars and professors.

SOURCE: Beijing Review, No 1. January 5, 1981. pp.9-10.

The Chinese Party and Government always make great efforts to raise the educational level of the workers and peasants. In June 1950, shortly after the birth of New China, the Administration Council issued the Directive on Conducting Spare-Time Education Among Workers and Staff Members which declared: "The Central People's Government regards it as a task of paramount importance to develop education among workers and peasants and train them intellectually."

Before the "Cultural Revolution" began in 1966, over 100 million people had learnt to read and write, 960,000 had graduated from part-time middle schools and 200,000 more from part-time colleges.

By 1965, the total enrolment in various spare-time schools for workers had reached 17.19 million. Among them, 8.24 million were in part-time primary schools, 5.02 million in part-time middle schools, 3.51 million in part-time secondary technical schools and 410,000 in part-time colleges. All this helped greatly in raising the educational level of China's vast contingent of workers. The skills of these trained workers played a significant part in socialist construction.

To recoup lost time, the drive for on going workers education has gone into high gear during the past few years. Part-time workers colleges have been reopened all over the country. Many regular colleges and universities now sponsor correspondence and evening courses. TV colleges have been set-up, and worker primary and middle schools have been resumed.

In 1980, some 1.1 million workers attended 3,600 spare-time schools and colleges, over 200,000 graduated from worker colleges and over 1 million from workers' middle schools, and tens of millions raised their educational and technical levels to varying degree.

In April 1980 a national worker education committee was set up; Since then 25 Provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions have set up their own worker or worker-peasant education committee.

At present, 490,000 workers are enrolled in part-time primary schools, 2.9 million in part-time middle schools, 2.01 million in secondary technical schools, and 1.53 million in various kinds of worker college. So far 68,000 full-time and 250,000 part-time teachers are on the faculties of the various worker schools and colleges. The Ministry of Education has compiled and published a series of text and reference books for workers studying in part-time primary and middle schools.

The national plan drafted in 1980 specified that during the Sixth Five Year Plan period (1981-85), every worker and staff member should participate in at least one educational programme or training course

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SOURCE: Beijing Review No.41. October 12, 1981 pp.22

In socialist countries, education of workers occupy a key position. How does today's China go about it? The following article is a description of the concrete functioning of a "Worker University" in present day China.

THE Dalian Worker University is housed in a former exhibition centre. According to Director Liu of the University's administration office, 1,200 workers and technicians now study here. The University has four college affiliated to it.

Set up in 1979, the university has 11 classes in seven departments; automation, machine building, health and medicine, Chinese, Computer science, industrial chemistry and foreign languages. The students were chosen after exams taken by 3000 workers and staff members from the city's 37 industrial bureaus and enterprises. Some of them study here on a full time basis, some on a part-time work, part-study basis, and some come during their spare time.

Last year, 200 students graduated from the university's two-year training courses in Japanese and English. With the increase in trade and exchanges between China and other countries, the training of people capable of speaking, reading and writing in foreign languages has become an urgent matter. Another 100 students studying traditional Chinese medicine will soon graduate and become registered medics. "Our students study hard and abide by discipline because they know their chances of study do not come easily", said Director Liu.

Besides intensive studies, the students also take part in physical training and other recreational activities. The university pays careful attention to student health. Worker-students in the spare-time classes have been praised as the "most conscientious students in the university". When I got to know them, I could only agree.

Chen Yaoguang, 36, majors in radio in the automation department. He suffers from chronic rheumatism and is hunchbacked and dependent on crutches. His difficulty in getting about inspire profound sympathy in whoever sees him. He works in a school-run factory. His handicap had deprived him of several chances for university, so he was thrilled to be able to enrol in the worker university in 1979.

Every day after eight hours of work, he hurries to class. Getting on board a bus and climbing stairs are both great ordeals for him, especially in rain and snow. Even the bumping of the bus hurts. However, he has managed a perfect attendance record in his two years of schooling. What made him so single-minded? He told me: "I want to study because as a man I can't spend my days fooling around. I should make a full use of my mind, the only healthy part of me, so that I can do my share for my country.

Sun Demin, a thin and petite, 34-years-old sanitarium nurse, studies in the medical department. Everyday she has to travel 30 Km from the sanitorium to the university. More often than not she has to make use of the 40 minutes on the train to review her lessons.

Shortly after she enrolled she gave birth to a child, and was in poor health afterwards. Concerned people tried to persuade her to quit, but she refused: "I believed I could stick it out, I have lots of questions in my job which I don't know why, so I've got to study to get the answer". She told me that she often sits down with a book in one hand and a bell in the other to amuse and quiet her seven month old baby. She has strong support from her illiterate mother, who has taken on all the household chores. Her husband and his two sister-in-law are also spare-time worker-students, and at night the whole family settles down to study. "My family is a small worker university itself," said Sun proudly.

Xu Kaijian, an electrician at the No. 6 Plastic Plant, had only a primary school education, and so failed at several technical innovations he attempted. With a strong desire for knowledge, he became a spare-time radio student at the worker university. He studied very hard, and hardly a year after he enrolled, he succeeded in improving the operating efficiency of an electromagnetic iron which had been giving his plant a lot of trouble. For this he was commended and awarded by the plant. Now he is working on a project to conserve energy and has made much headway.

What has prompted these ordinary workers to study so hard in their spare-time even after long eight-hours work days? The answer is not hard to find. They want to live up to their job and make up for the inadequacies in education and time lost during the 10 years turmoil of the "Cultural Revolution". A watchword chalked in red on a blackboard at the worker university seems to say it all: "A man without learning is like a flower without fragrance."

The worker University has 15 full-time teachers and 77 part-time ones, 80 per cent of whom lecture at formal universities and college. A lecture from the Institute of Railway Engineering, 43-year-old Zeng Zhongning teaches physics to spare-time students at the worker university. He is a strong supporter of the school: "It has provided not only learning opportunities for workers but also an outlet for university teachers who are eager to pass on their knowledge in their spare time. He said that what costs the regular university millions of Yuan can be done by the worker university for at most 30000 Yuan, thus saving a lot of money. Beyond this, spare-time education is conducive to raising the cultural level of the nation as a whole."

The teachers were visibly excited whenever they talked about their students. Sun Muxian, who came from the mathematics department of the Dalian Engineering Institute, told me: "most of the students in my chemistry class are women. Many are mothers, and some are in mid or late thirties. But they know what they have come for. He recalled the time a big snow storm had struck the afternoon before a scheduled class. Sun himself had hesitated to come because the worker university is far from where he works and he was not sure the students would show up. He finally made it to the university and was surprised to find his whole class there, despite the bad weather. Many had started for class two hours ago. Some had asked permission to leave work ahead of time. Some came despite health problems. But they all came. He told me, "Never before have I seen students so eager to learn. I would feel guilty if I didn't try my best to teach them".

The teachers have organised themselves into research groups to improve the quality of their teaching. They mark homework with care and help students outside of class free of charge. Regular institutes of higher learning in Dalian have also helped by lending their laboratories to the worker university. All this has paid off; Though the exams are given at level equivalent to that of the regular colleges, most of the students pass them with good grades.

ALTHOUGH China's television programme service started as early as 1958, it did not become part of a way of life until three or four years ago. Today, about one third of Beijing's families living in the city proper have television sets. Elsewhere in the country—in workshops of industrial plants, in rural production brigades (a production brigade is composed of one or a number of villages), in schools, government offices as well as in every local residents' committee—there is a television set; some even have colour ones replacing the black-and-white.

Beijing residents every evening have three TV programme services to choose from and each channel provides news, recreational items and special programmes. Mornings and afternoons there are educational programmes. On Sundays and national holidays, one channel offers three services a day, beginning with a children's programme in the morning. These programmes are prepared and released by CCTV, short for the China Central Television, (one channel beamed to the whole country and another to Beijing only) and a local TV station.

ON THE SCREEN

IN The ten years of turmoil which began in the middle of the 1960s, the programmes offered were uninteresting and monotonous. With the exist of Jiang Qing and her gang from China's political scene, our TV programmes, like all other cultural undertakings in this country have regained vitality. Our TV workers are working diligently to organize better programmes. They look forward to a TV screen free from unhealthy scenes, a screen that is informative, entertrining and pleasing to the eye. This, of course, cannot be achieved overnight and the present situation is far from what is envisaged.

NEWS SERVICE

In Beijing, Shanghai and other fairly big cities the number of people watching TV new in the evening is on the increase and this has gradually become a way of life.

Throughout the country wherever people have access to television* they can see the news of the day in the evening, such as the meeting of the National People's Congress, or the trial of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques which began last November. However, mainly for technical reasons, news items do not always reach the public quickly.

*China now has 38 programme originating TV stations, plus 238 TV rebroadcasting stations. In addition, there are also 2,000-odd low-power TV frequency translators to serve the county seats and some rural districts.

News stories about economic construction take up the lion's share of news over the TV. Subjects in the latest coverages that have aroused public interest are newborn things connected with structural reforms such as joint enterprises of agriculture, industry and commerce, and the system of factory director taking charge under the leadership of the congress of workers and staff members on an experimental basis in some of the factories.

More and more news of social events of public concern can be seen on the screen, among them are helping juvenile delinquents mend their ways, finding jobs for those waiting to be employed, urban marriage "exchange," old-age pensioners in rural people's communes, home life of a 2.2-metre-tall basketball player and his wife; cracking cases of smuggling.

Every evening beginning last April, there has been ten minutes of satellite news, which has proved very popular. Many TV watchers want to know more about happenings in small countries and in the lives of ordinary people.

There are also exclusive interviews with visitors from foreign lands. One such interview was with President Giscard d'Estaing of France who told a CCTV reporter of the measures he had taken in tackling budgetary deficits when he was in charge of his country's financial affairs and his appraisal of French youth today. Another was an interview with Santiago Carrillo Pizarro, General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party, whose connections with the Chinese Communist Party had been discontinued for some years. He explained his Party's activities to a reporter of the same station. The Chinese audience found these interviews particularly interesting.

There is a programme entitled "Across the Land," which spotlights the scenic beauties and special features of various localities in China.

Chatting with this correspondent, the two news editors in charge emphasized the fact that they had been exploring ways to serve their audience better and the goal of their endeavours had always been: wider coverage, more prompt and vivid news-reporting.

WIDER KNOWLEDGE

A special weekly programme set up three years ago provides viewers with a window through which to look out on the world. It has introduced among other things the agro-industrial complexes in Yugoslavia, a West Berlin hospital of a new type, the music centre in Sydney, offshore oil drilling in Mexico, rubber plantations in Malaysia, scientific and technological achievements in some developed countries, as well as cultural life, local conditions and customs in various parts of the world. On this programme, called "Round the World," more than a hundred documentaries on dozens of countries have been shown so far. One of the most highly enjoyed films was about the adventures of a young British woman in Tanzania unveiling the mysterious kingdom of the chimpanzees.

"Culture of Foreign Countries" has been running since New Year's Day. The first of the series was an American film about the Louvre in Paris, and proved to be a hit among Chinese TV viewers.

Editors in charge of these two programmes said they were aimed at helping viewers broaden their knowledge of the world.

Other programmes with the same purpose include "On the International Scene," "Science & Technology," "Hygiene & Health," "Advice on everyday Living" as well as "Cultural Life." The last one deals

with almost every field of literary and artistic endeavour ranging from theatre, literature, cinema, music and dancing to art, calligraphy and photography. Professionals and amateurs alike find them immensely absorbing.

On the Chinese TV screen viewers are able to get a glimpse of popular sports events overseas, such as surfing, canoeing and frisbee.

PROMOTING SOCIAL PROGRESS

Earlier on, our TV crew shot some scenes of people (who appeared to be related to ranking officials or officers) stepping out of government limousines outside Beijing's biggest department store. These scenes were a sharp charge against some senior cadres abusing privileges granted them because of their position. -- This two-minute news evoked a strong response from the public.

CCTV, probably inspired by this, is now organizing tentatively a special programme entitled "Look & Think It Over." A greater part of the more than a dozen subjects that have been dealt with concern economic or social problems, looking, for instance, into the causes of the housing shortage in Beijing, explaining why the number of traffic accidents in the capital went up at one time, or citing reasons for vegetable scarcities on the market. On this particular programme authorities concerned appeal to the public to make more rational use of Beijing's already overtapped subterranean water resources and to economize on water, or call on people to develop collectively owned service trades for the convenience of the public and provide more job opportunities. The express purpose of this programme is to give a push to the solution of problems and improve things, making use of both criticism and praise.

This calls to mind the fact that for some time reporting on shortcomings and problems in the press was looked on as detrimental to socialism. But today more and more people have come to see that whitewashing reality will not help solve problems but, on the contrary, compromise the credibility of our mass media. The efforts made by the TV station to bring about progress in real life are truly praiseworthy.

ENTERTAINMENT

More than half the TV programmes here are recreational. In the earlier years, they were mostly feature films or live theatrical performances. China's TV stations, state-owned and non-profit, charge their audiences nothing, nor do they have to pay for the release of films or live programmes.

In recent years, however, a problem cropped up with TV sets finding their way into many homes and the governments insistence on enterprises handing in profits. While TV audiences ask for more new films and theatrical performances, cinemas and theatres, out of box-office considerations, have had to put their foot down. Our TV stations have thus been forced to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.

This is how TV shows are being developed at a fast tempo. About a month before and after last year's October 1, National Day, CCTV provided a nationwide programme of 46 TV shows made in various parts of the country. It was on an unprecedented, grand scale. Since New Year's Day, the station has released a fresh batch of TV shows. A Chinese TV show series, the first of its kind, is being shown on Saturdays.

These shows, numerous in number, though artistically immature and nondescript in style, have touched on many facets of life-career, friendship love, marriage and so on. Many are in praise of people and things contributing to the country's modernization drive. Some recall the difficult yester years of war or the trauma wrought by the ten years of turmoil; others deal with bureaucracy, conservatism, special privilege mentality, social abuses, morality and legal system. There are also a dozen or so programmes especially designed for children.

Up-and-coming, TV shows have now become the topic of the day, some people trying to define what their salient features should be, others debating whether artistically they should be presented more like a modern play or like a film.

The general public in their tens of thousands, however, simply ask for more and better TV shows, in addition to more and better TV entertainments in the form of local operas, songs and dances, musical programmes, as well as cross-talks, ballad-singing and acrobatics.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES

Educational programmes on Beijing's TV screen are provided by a number of sponsors.

Courses offered by CCTV include basic courses on science and engineering (mechanical and electrical engineering) as well as basic courses on technology. They were arranged by the Central TV and Radio Broadcasting University under the joint sponsorship of the Ministry of Education and the Central Broadcasting Administration.

The municipal television station offers basic courses. On such specialities as motor drive and heat treatment of metals for the Beijing TV and Radio Broadcasting University. In Shanghai, the courses include those in medical science. All TV universities elsewhere in the country offer their own curriculums according to local needs and capabilities.

Apart from a nationwide network of such universities, Beijing TV station also offers lectures for scientists and technicians sponsored by the municipal science commission. Advanced courses sponsored by Beijing's Institute of Education are being provided for primary and middle school teachers. Courses in basic medical science for junior medical personnel will be opened before long.

A 30-minute English lesson given every evening has a larger audience than any other TV programme here. It began three years ago as a course open to all, with no registration or examination required. Anyone who attends regularly and does the required homework may master basic English grammar and about 1,000 words in 20 months. The lessons, taught by well-known English professors and teachers from foreign language institutes or English departments of universities, are supplemented with conversation drills and minplays. Three months ago, these lessons entered their second cycle of teaching with a plan to help beginners reach the intermediate level in two years. Teaching materials have been compiled and published for this purpose. Although they have been reprinted over 30 times with more than 5 million copies sold, the demand still outstrips the supply.

The popularity of these English lessons has led to the opening up of a new programme known as "Sunday English" showing imported films with English dialogues.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Advertisements are something new in China's mass media. They appeared only after the elimination of ultra-Leftist influence in the course of resuscitating the economy and culture.

Advertising units and clients alike stress the need for TV advertisements which, they say, are helpful in cementing ties between production and marketing and in activating the market. Thanks to these advertisements, many products have found a brisk market. Advertisements, they say, also play useful role in disseminating knowledge about various commodities and arousing the interest of potential consumers.

Quite a few people, however, can never get used to this sort of thing, not because advertising was for many years considered "capitalist", but because they do not take much interest in advertisements.

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IN A VILLAGE

XIAOYUAN is a village located on a hillside 25 kilometres west of Beijing proper. I arrived in Xiaoyuan by jeep, together with two young work men from a district government broadcasting section on their round of inspections and maintenance of TV sets.

Five or six years ago, the production brigade here (an agricultural unit at the grass roots level) bought a TV set with its public welfare fund. Every evening crowds of people spent hours before the TV, their eyes glued to the screen. At that time, a private television set was practically inconceivable to inhabitants in a poor mountain village like this.

In recent years, with the adoption of more flexible state policies in the countryside, peasants' income has gone up; 109 out of the 122 village households have bought their own TV sets. This is really a high percentage, not yet attained even in urban districts of such big cities as Shanghai and Beijing.

That afternoon I spent about two hours visiting seven families with the TV maintenance men. All the TV sets there are 12" black-and-white models of the Peacock brand with an attractive label, made in Suzhou (Soochow), east China. In respect to price and performance, they are much better than the Shanghai-made one I myself bought six years ago.

I became absorbed in finding out how the villagers responded to the various TV programmes, which ones they liked best and so on. Without exception, every one of the scores of people I talked to, from seven or eight-year-old kids to people in their sixties or seventies, confirmed that he or she was an ardent "TV fan." Young people all said they liked to watch feature films while most of the older people preferred traditional operas based on historical themes or on folklore. In the evening the daughter of the family whom I stayed with took me for a walk around the village. We stopped at the windows or the fences outside some 20 peasant households; the families were all watching the new feature film *Agent Provocateur*, about a rich young couple who in the 1940s at their wedding ceremony, announced their intention to join the people's armed forces but were later victimized by a sham revolutionary.

Members of one household was watching a football game, the principal spectator being a middle school student attending classes inside the city. A member of the municipal junior team, he was convalescing from a bone fracture incurred during a game. I was told that some young villagers were also very fond of TV sports programmes.

A granny I met told me how her whole family enjoyed watching TV programmes but were always divided over which programme to watch in the evening. When they failed to come to terms, they would seek the co-operation of their next-door neighbour, arranging to have a different programme at each home, so that people could take their choice and every one would be happy.

Near the village periphery was a workshop making stone slabs. I saw a group of women workers busy packing the products. These stone slabs made of quarried rocks, with attractive natural colouring and beautiful veins running through, are ideal building materials for walls or floors. It is these materials that have earned enough over the years to enable the villagers to buy TV sets. These women workers were discussing a documentary Believe It or Not which they had seen the night before. It was about certain people in Beijing and other places who are able to tell what words are written on a slip of paper sealed in an envelope and placed behind their ears or under armpits. What has given these people a special function that others do not have? Why is it our scientists have thus far failed to provide an answer? . . .

Obviously, television has brought marked changes to the lives of peasants whose forbears for centuries were cut off from the world of big events and changes, seeing and hearing little or nothing outside of their own villages. Television has moved, so to speak, cinema houses, theatres and gymnasiums right into the hitherto isolated farmhouses, to awaken people's minds, broaden their vision and widen their fields of interest.

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Source: Beijing Review, No. 10, March 9, 1981
Page No. 21 to 26.

TELEVISION UNIVERSITY

Apart from the Central Television and Radio Broadcasting University in Beijing, there are 28 local ones in the country with a total official enrolment of 324,000 (the figure does not include those who attend TV classes on their own).

How do such universities function? What goals do they pursue? such questions are answered in the following short article.

WHAT is the salient feature of China's television university?

It is that of collective study with face-to-face tutorial, as formulated by the President of Beijing Television and Radio Broadcasting University. I learnt during my visit to a heavy duty machinery works in the city that a university of this type, with this salient feature is not open to everyone.

The classroom was spacious and well-lighted. There was a television set beside the black-board and another one at the corner in the rear of the room. Over a dozen students seated before each of the television screens were attending class. This was the last session of the term they had before the termend exam. In a few days they would sit for examinations of the TV university and the results would decide whether or not they could continue their studies the following term.

In a brief chat after class, I learnt that they had been admitted to the department of mechanical engineering five months ago after having passed unified entrance examinations drawn up by the university. Their class was made up of 38 new students from the factory and two entries from a nearby small factory. They get instructions from a work station set up in their locality by the university; their classrooms and laboratories are also in the vicinity.

The students came from different workshops in the factory and among them were lathe operators, fitters foregers and mechanics. There was a sprinkling of draughtsmen from the designing section who had been holding down fairly good jobs. All felt they knew too little and wanted to know more. Among them was a pretty girl from the accountant's office. She confided to me quite frankly that she had come to study because she hoped to find a new job after graduation. She came from a technician's family and experienced the outburst of the "cultural revolution" when she was in primary school. What with the continuing chaos, her high school education was over and she had learnt very little. So she had studied hard on her own and tried to teach herself; she had sat for college entrance examinations once before but had failed.

A large number of young workers today have had similar experiences. This is why they are flocking to apply for enrolment in the television university. Those admitted must be the lucky ones. They leave their old jobs and throw themselves into their studies heart and soul. The factory where they worked before pays their tuition and laboratory fees and provides them with other needed facilities. They get their monthly wages as before and are entitled to the same free medical service and whatever fringe benefits they enjoyed before.

They live more or less like regular college students, attending TV classes together regularly in the morning as required; this method, as they have come to see, is much better than attending classes separately at home.

They receive tutoring in the afternoon. Tutors explain the main points and the difficult part of the lectures to help them understand better. They also answer questions and train students to develop the ability to study on their own. One of the tutors told me that that nearly every one of his students worked very hard, many of them staying up till late at night to master their lessons. In his opinion, it was possible that in three years time they would be nearly as good as any graduate of a regular college. Some simply have left home and moved into the factory's dormitory for single workers. To prepare for the term-end examinations, one of them does not even go home for meals. whereas prior to this, he had always enjoyed cooking and eating with his wife after work. Teachers have to remind students from time to time to get some rest.

The enthusiasm of the faculty members and the diligence of the students are heartening; our new generation of educated young people are showing great promise.

Source: Beijing Review, No.10. March 9, 1981.

Page : , 26 to 28 .

EDUCATION IN CHINA

The last Ching dynasty by 1900 was governing around 300 million peasants -- more farmers than one can find in America, Europe, Japan and the USSR put together. In this task two main conflicting concepts came to a clash. On one side Liu's policy was aimed at creating "experts" under the slogan "technique in command" while on the other side Mao's ideas on education were dominated by the slogan "Politics in command". For Mao, only transformation of human consciousness could bring about material progress. For him, Material progress cannot transform human consciousness nor produce the new "Socialist Man" required for the new society. The confrontation between these two concepts are explained in the present article.

PART - I

When the new educational policy of the Cultural Revolution was spelled out and began to be implemented, it was thought that the Chinese were out to overturn the educational pyramid which dominated the superstructure of the world. It was thought that this was the end of elitist education fostered by Liu Shaoqi and buttressed by the ancient mandarin tradition of the country. The Maoists hardly saw any difference between the pre-liberation education and the one imparted after liberation under Liuist dispensation. Just as the aim of preliberation education was to produce comprador intellectuals, cultural puppets of foreigners and politicians of all sorts, the purpose of post-liberation education likewise was to nurture cultural mandarins, bureaucrats and self-seeking intellectuals. Instead of producing 'Worthy successors to the revolutionary cause,' what the Chinese schools and universities were churning out were careerists or lily-white scholars who considered physical or manual work to be meant only for the uneducated worker and farmer.

This was unacceptable to Mao and his followers. For the Maoists the goal of all education was to train workers' and peasants' children 'with both socialist consciousness and culture, and not intellectual aristocrats who were divorced from revolutionary politics, from production and from the life of workers and peasants'. 1 Education, therefore, became one of the central issues of Cultural Revolution. Only a shake-up of the whole system-the basic re-education of teachers, the development of a new curriculum and new methods for integration of study, work, research and production- could transform it all into socialist education.

The first thing the Maoists attacked was the system of admission to the high schools and universities based on an open entrance and examination in which the dice was always heavily loaded against the children of workers and farmers due to their poor educational and cultural background as compared with those of intellectuals, officials and cadres. Moreover, the majority of them were educated in the exclusive 'key-point' schools. And the competition was so hard and the university seats so few that over fifty million school graduates were competing for only three hundred thousand university positions. 2 It was, truly speaking, as difficult for a son or a daughter of a farmer or factory worker to enter a university as for the Biblical camel to pass through the eye of a needle. The universities were thus preparing the sons of officials to become officials. Mao wrote: 'The entrance examination system should be scrapped. The students should return to production after a few years of study. 3 According to the Maoists, one of the worst vices bequeathed to the Chinese society

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in the field of education and study was the separation of theory from practice, and the self-cultivation' preached by Liu Shaoqi was 'idealistic, formalistic, abstract and divorced from reality and social practice. 4 The new education policy, therefore, laid emphasis on combining theory with practice, and the knower and the doer in the same person. It claimed to create a new man willing to take up both mental and physical labour, willing and capable of handling both the computer and the pickaxe. The twin aims of Liuist education-self-cultivation and self-perfection had to be abandoned in favour of constant struggle against self-interest, desire for fame and other human imperfections. The declared aim of Maoist education was to uplift people morally, intellectually and physically and engage the students at all levels in the 'Three Movements'- the movement for production, the movement for scientific experiment and class struggle. The education had to be rooted in practice and shed its abstract and arid character, as only by taking part in practice could one 'grasp theory quickly, understand it profoundly and apply it creatively.' 5 Carrying their onslaught against the old system further, the Maoists pointed out that for two millennia the mandarin class had imprisoned the minds of young people in tradition, submission, and obedience to elders. The young had to liberate themselves (and education must help them do so) by questioning the fundamental precept of filial piety-the notion that the wisdom of age should never be questioned. No more submission and kowtowing before elders. 'When the parents are revolutionary children should succeed them. When parents are reactionary the children should rebel. 6 And proletarian education must cultivate among the students the spirit of 'Three Daring'-daring to think, daring to speak and daring to act.

The Liuist policy of creating 'experts' or 'technique in command' as opposed to Mao's politics in command' ensured the domination of bourgeois intellectuals in the schools and universities, who stressed technical competence above class stand, personal careerism above 'serving the people' (the famous Maoist precept) superiority of things foreign over things Chinese, examinations as surprise attacks over one's ability to learn and reason. They also stressed the cultivation of the children of 'good cultural background' over developing the latent abilities of every worker, peasant and soldier. This according to Mao, was the bourgeois education which had to be replaced by a 'genuine, socialist proletarian education', capable of creating both reds' and experts'. Mao thus emphasized the role of education in moulding the consciousness of the people and serving proletarian politics. Only transformation of human consciousness could bring about material progress and not the other way about, Material progress cannot transform human consciousness, as maintained by the Liuists.

Mao also de-emphasized the value of book learning, long class-room lectures and frequent examinations. He rightly thought that Chinese education was plagued by examinations-entrance examination, mid-term examination, terminal examination, final examination: 'The examinations are set up like defenses against an enemy. They are ambushed full of exotic and bizarre questions. It is nothing but the methods used in the imperial examinations with their eight-legged essays. 7 As regards book reading Mao thought that a little reading was all right but a lot of it was harmful. 'It is revolutionary practice that rears cadres.' Such Liuist phrases as 'storming the citadel of knowledge,' opening the chests of learning', 'warning hands at the fire of knowledge', etc. left Mao cold. This was all bourgeois sentimental hogwash. Instead the Maoists emphasized the following for the students preparing themselves for living and working in a developing socialist society:

(a) Systematically study and learn from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao so that you can really know something about the principles of philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism.

- (b) Form correct judgments and conclusions through consideration, evaluation, and comparison.
- (c) First and foremost to have a correct political orientation fight against reactionary pragmatism and obscurantism.
- (d) Hold high the banner of Marxism and scientific socialism.
- (e) Draw truth from facts, don't be doctrinaire.

Mao had another preoccupation in the field of education and that was how to keep education from producing a new privileged class in the Chinese society. According to Maoists, several decades of socialist practice had not eliminated the traditional tendencies of the intellectuals denigrating workers and peasants and using education as means of personal advancement. Continuing education was, therefore, necessary to overcome the attitude of superiority, elitism and selfishness which characterized Confucian and bourgeois mentalities. Old ideas were deeply ingrained and even the coming of age of a generation reared totally under communist rule did not end the struggle. Mao believed that one way to prevent the emergence of a new class was through manual labour and political study. When an intellectual carries manure to the fields, plants rice saplings, standing ankle-deep in mud, or feeds hogs and cleans their pens, he is likely to sober down a bit, be less arrogant and think differently of the manual worker. Marxist tradition regards manual labour as a necessary evil from which man will be gradually freed by technological progress. But for Mao it had a nobility of its own and was of irreplaceable educational value. The idea of pupils and teachers spending half their time in physical labour is not motivated so much by economic necessity as by its function in character formation. Education through work was a universal value closely connected with the socialist ideal. Marx believed that the difference between mental and physical labour would essentially disappear, and that there ought not to be one set of people working with their brains while the others used their muscles. It was this understanding that led to the famous or notorious 7 May schools for the re-education of intellectuals. The May 1966 directive of the CPC Central Committee said: 'It is essential that the young intellectuals be re-educated in the countryside by the poor and the lower-middle peasants. The urban cadres must be persuaded to send their children who have completed junior and senior middle school or university to the countryside where comrades in the various rural regions must give them a warm welcome. ' 8

The circular laid stress on combining mental and physical labour and developing an all-round personality of workers, peasants, army men and intellectuals. It called upon the Red Army men to combine theoretical study with practice of agricultural and industrial work, the workers to concentrate on industrial work but also to educate themselves in military, political and cultural matters. The peasant in the commune should concentrate on agricultural production, and yet not neglect military training and cultural education. This also applied to students who must primarily devote themselves to study and at the same time acquire other types of knowledge. They must study not only the cultural things but industrial, agricultural and military things also. They must criticize the bourgeoisie and see to it that the bourgeois intellectuals do not dominate the schools and universities. The idea was that education should shape a new human species—an all-round integrated man, cleansed of all individualistic and materialistic tendencies. And this could be made possible by combining mental with physical labour.

Mao was an enemy of elitist education. According to him when education became elitist the country suffered from cultural poverty. Elitist education is the hallmark of a class society not of a socialist one. He was for abolishing the so-called 'key-point' was for

schools and colleges, started by Liu Shaoqi on the plea of scarcity of resources. The key schools were first introduced in the 1960s. At each level a few schools were singled out to receive the brightest students, the best teachers, and the most advanced education materials. The prevailing argument at that time was to concentrate the limited resources on those children with the most academic potential. The same argument is being offered today. The key schools were heavily criticized during the Cultural Revolution as constituting elitist education. They put too much emphasis on academic skills and too little on practical application and politics. Students who attended these schools were more likely to come from the families of professionals and government officials than from worker and peasant families. More privileged families had more resources to get their children admitted in the key schools 'through the backdoor', that is by paying bribes or pulling strings. In addition, their children were more likely to meet the educational requirements of these schools than the children from worker and peasant families. This was important since better education led to better jobs and better jobs meant better life. These schools were abolished during the Cultural Revolution, and it was thought to be the end of elitist education in socialist China. In 1977, however, with the new leadership firmly in the saddle, they staged a come-back and were reinstituted from primary through higher education.

Such were Maoist ideas on education, that is, socialist and non-elitist, and one that Mao thought would help create a new man in China. These ideas in themselves have a utopian and ultra-left streak. Yet in the hands of the far left radical lunatic fringe that provided leadership in the Cultural Revolution, they were misinterpreted, distorted and applied in a bizarre fashion, causing great damage to education in China. When applied 'they showed little merit, creating more problems than solutions, more ills than cures, more harm than good'. 9 The ultra-left claimed that everything from one past and from the West was only reactionary and must be scrapped. The schools and the universities they debunked all technical and professional training; only ideological education was important. Book learning was of little use if not positively harmful. The more you studied the more reactionary you became. Book learning should be replaced by practice and integration with the masses. In their view the existing educational system was producing 'successors to the bourgeoisie', increasing the gap between intellectual and physical labour, between worker and peasant, between city and countryside. Therefore, an all-out effort must be made to unmask 'the antiparty and anti-socialist views of academic authorities the black line of educational system.' 10 The slogans of the ultra-left were: 'suspect everything, overthrow everybody' 2 'no classes, no examinations, no acquiring of useless'. Honest revolutionary conviction was a better measuring stick than intellectual competence proven only through examinations. They were specially angered by the 'excessive regard' for scholars prevalent in China, for the 'arrogant bourgeois educational authorities' and by the tolerance toward 'reactionary bourgeois despots of science.' It was quite obvious that the ultra-left was not interested in education looked like a pyramid standing on its apex, fated to fall. In July 1966 all schools and universities were closed down with a view to 'mobilizing the revolutionary potential of the youth and the students'.

PART II

One cannot understand either the Cultural Revolution or its education policy without understanding the establishment it was attacking—not merely the party apparatus under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping but the Chinese bureaucratic habit that Mao saw reappearing in the party and the state. All nations are prisoners of their history, more so the ancient ones like China with a long unbroken politico-cultural heritage and traditions. This leads us back to the Chinese invention of bureaucratic government two thousands years ago in the Han period and their subsequent invention of paper, printed books and civil service examinations.

The Chinese are a the inventors of the examination system. One thousand years ago under the Sung dynasty the examination system was the major arm of the state. Down to its abolition in 1905 it recruited the indoctrinated elites (indoctrinated with traditional Confucian precepts) needed to govern the masses for the emperor. Governing the peasants has always been the great speciality as well as a necessity in the world's most stable empire. While the Han dynasty had governed around 45 million peasants, the last Ching dynasty by 1900 was governing around 300 million peasants. Mao's successors today have 800 million -more farmers than one can find in America, Europe, Japan and USSR put together. 11

This is what made education so important. One in power in 1949 on the strength of a peasant army Mao needed to establish institutions for the regime through an indoctrinated elite such as the examination system had provided down to 1905. He needed persons trained in his state orthodoxy who could propagate his new social order. Since party rule had supplanted dynastic rule, Mao's new elite had to come from the party and its cadres, or the 'reds' committed to the communist doctrine and the Maoist concept of revolution. How to train such activists through China's educational system was a top priority question.

It was not as easy as one might think, Until 1905 those who wanted to rise in the world had prepared for the old government examinations through private institutions in family and village. The elite had also used some three hundred academies which were the only residential schools and colleges in the country. The examination system of many-tiered, multi-channelled structure had fostered an 'examination system psychology,' among men of worldly ambition. It offered literary skill orthodox thinking, and conservative morality, if not bigotry, while offering little change for technical specialization. Only during 1911-49 the interregnum of central power between the end of Ching dynasty and the take-over by the communist party, the Chinese education had been built in modern style, first by organizing a school system on Japanese lines (Sun Yat-sen was an admirer of the Japanese school system) and then setting up universities largely on the liberal American model. This period saw the proliferation of China's new literati which included journalists, writers, teachers, doctors, engineers and other professionals, not a few of them having been trained in Japan and western countries. They were the first crop of modern intelligentsia. They did not think with one mind, nor were they primarily devoted (though some came to be known as comprador intellectuals serving the foreigner) to the propaganda of the state ideology and its doctrine of 'Virtuous Conduct' (though a section joined the Guomindang and few were attracted towards the communist ideology.) They were specialists, modern people with knowledge whom leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping after 1949 wanted to recruit as experts to help modernize China. But they were not the functional successors of the old examination degree holders. Their successors, paradoxically, were the new 'red party cadres, a selected elite morally committed to the great leader and his vision of an egalitarian revolution.

For many centuries the Chinese dynastic governments had relied upon indoctrinated cadres selected through examinations. They were not a Soviet or a Maoist invention. The fact that in the past their ideas were based on Confucianism and later on Maoism did not change their function in the system. In this sense the new 'red cadres were the prototype of the old mandarin coming through history and tradition. In some ways China's aforementioned intelligentsia (the products of the period 1911-1949) were more novel than the communist party cadres. Thus the stage was set for the 'class struggle' of the 'red' versus the expert'.

P A R T III

Viewed in this historical perspective, the Cultural Revolution was a product of more than an old man's frustration. It represented an inevitable conflict between the new ruler's need for ideological loyalty and the modernizer's need for special skills. It was a revolution indeed, but unlike the proletarian revolution it was a revolution 'from above', conforming to a long tradition with its roots in the structure and culture of China. This was in line with the 'cultural revolutions' initiated by the emperors before. After all, traditional China was a bureaucratic society like the society under the communists, although at different levels of productive forces and social relations of production. Historians still recall in particular the reforms of Chinshi Huang-ti and his minister Li SSu, initiated less spectacularly under the Ming and Ching dynasties.

Mao was highly traditional in conceiving of education as indoctrination. He deplored even the modern specialization that the Chinese Communist Party modeled on the Soviet system in the 1950s because it gave the specialist a basis for being independent minded and politically unorthodox, at least in his speciality. But since Mao wanted to bring the peasant into the very centre of politics, he was faced with the problem that the school examinations would continue to favour children of educated parents and specialists recruited to modernize China and would seldom come from the peasantry.

Mao had adopted the peasant's ancient distrust of the literati as hangers-on of bureaucrats and local magnates. He had also inherited the Chinese attachment on the old examination system from Wang Anshih (1021-86) in the Ching dynasty. 12 Education China has a long and sophisticated history that has left residual attitudes and assumptions such as those who work with their brains rule and those who work with their hands are to be ruled, that learning is to serve society through the state, and that orthodoxy is essential to order.

Mao, therefore, wanted 'politics in command', to achieve the integration of education and society and to create 'proletarian intellectuals' who will serve the society through the communist state and will uphold Maoist orthodoxy so essential for the new state. This led Mao to exalt the peasant over the scholar and ultimately ensnared him in a struggle against modern learning. By 1970, with the Culture Revolution at its peak, the link between education and society through production was being forged in three ways: (i) by workers' participation in the university, (ii) by teachers' participation in production, and (iii) by students' participation in labour. The integration of education and society was to be achieved through the inter-changeability of the roles of teachers, students, workers and peasants. Thus the cult of physical labour and of the peasant was fostered, and it was decided that the only way to fight against Liuist subversion of the party's educational philosophy was by the closure of universities and institutes and by pulling down the educational system.

P A R T IV

The struggle did not begin at once. As stated before, the pre-liberation system had continued in its place during the 1950s and even after. Students competed at four successive levels: to enter primary school (6 years), junior high school (3 years), senior high school (3 Years) and university (4 Years). The old Chinese fixation on degree status as the measure of success was as strong as ever. The government examinations before 1905 had been at the county, prefectural, provincial, capital and palace levels. Now the revolution had once again asserted the primacy of ideology, which formerly had been ensured by the mastery of the Confucian classics, but which the liberal curriculum of the 20th century had abandoned.

During the 1950s the CCP rated school applicants according to three criteria: family class origin, political behaviour and academic performance. Class origin ranged from good (CCP cadres, soliders, workers and peasants) to bad (capitalists rich farmers, landlords and rightists). In each district the school, best staffed and equipped, was made a 'key-point' school into which came the children of CCP cadres (of good class origin) and of the high level intelligentsia. Working class youth filtered into poorer high schools and into separate echelons of vocational schools that fed the graduates directly into factories.

Many expedients were also tried to produce 'worker-peasant-soldier graduates'-setting up part time and people-managed schools, shortening the educational ladder, simplifying textbooks and reducing requirements. Another reform was to reduce the rote memorizing that had been inculcated by the special nature of Chinese writing, belief in literary models and the tradition of promoting ethical behaviour through classical moral mixins. The teacher assumed that there was a single truth that should be sought, the 'correct line' and they set frequent tests. To combat this tendency the 'key-point' schools and universities experimented with open-book examinations, half-farming, half-study schools, as well as by compressing the twelve-year system into ten years, as in the Soviet Union.

By 1965 both had petered out, and the old high school exams and regular academic curriculum came back once again. It was difficult for the Chinese public to give up the examination route-the meritocracy which originated in China and was nurtured in that country for centuries. Any scholar of ancient Chinese history will remind us that meritocracy in China antedates Christianity in the West, and the Chinese examination system is far older than trial by jury in Britain. Its legitimacy as the main channel for getting ahead in the world is deeply imbedded in the Chinese mental make-up. Before Caesar or Christ the Chinese emperors had begun to examine candidates recommended by high officials. Long before Charlemagne the Chinese examination system was firmly in place: candidates secured the recommendation of officials, they were impartially examined and ranked by the Ministry of Rites and were appointed to office by the Ministry of Personnel, so that selection and appointment were separated. The procedures and the safeguards, the various kinds of degrees including those obtainable by purchase or by simple recommendation, the apportionment of degree quotas by administrative areas, the continuing 'examination life' of an official as he climbed higher in the hierarchy, all these complexities make an enormous record. Over the centuries in the major capitals thousands would compete triennially as they do now every year. The elite thus created was hardly more than two per cent of the population, about the same proportion as the Chinese university graduates today. The tragedy of Mao's Cultural Revolution was that in trying to shake off the elitist incubus of China's hoary past he discredited learning in general.

As the competition intensified in the 1960s among an increasing number of students, tension built up between political activists mainly in the Communist League and the academic achievers mainly from the non-proletarian families. A battle royal began between what is called the 'virtuocracy' and 'meritocracy'. Ambitious students had to choose which road to follow-the road of Cultural Revolution ('virtuocracy') or the traditional road associated with Liu Shaoqi ('meritocracy'). Thus was set the stage for the eventual student warfare between the 'red' and the 'experts' which led to the closure of the universities and high schools and the collapse of the entire educational system. By 1967 Maoist reforms took over China's education: student warfare was quelled by forcible rustication of the Red Guards, 'key-point' schools, entrance examinations were abolished in favour of a system of recommendation (the traditional alternative to examinations). Rural branch schools were set up to facilitate the student labour in the fields. The curriculum was watered down, and academic achievement positively discouraged.

After Mao died in 1976 all this had to be reversed. Liu Shaoqi was rehabilitated. His famous work on education and self-cultivation *How to Be a Good Communist* was published and his collected works are currently being printed. Examinations are back with full force, and 'meritocracy' is in full blossom. This process of educational reform was accelerated after the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981, and the Twelfth National Congress of the CCP in September 1982.

The ideological overloading was halted. In its stead, educational quality was to take its rightful place, starting with the primary school. The starting age for children was lowered from seven to six. The time set aside for physical labour was shortened considerably. Examinations were again seen as an important method of controlling learning and instruction achievements. Differences in ability and character structure were again recognized, and accordingly special educational and training establishments for the highly talented were set up. At the beginning of December held 1977 the National Educational Conference held in Beijing passed new regulations on university enrolment. Entrance examinations were made obligatory for all colleges and universities. The previously mandatory two-year work on a factory or a commune as a prerequisite for university studies was dropped. In 1977, 5.7 million young people applied for the entrance examination. Only 278,000 or about 5 per cent of the applicants were admitted in February 1978 to the 400 institutions of higher learning. Final examinations, abandoned during the Cultural Revolution, were again the norm. China's next generation will have to be qualified.

A directive of the Central Committee (18 September 1977) laid the foundations for the reorganization of science, technology and research. A realistic assessment produced the statement that neither the number nor the educational standard of the scientists and technicians was sufficient to proceed with the necessary modernization of agriculture, industry and national defence. The research institutions, closed during the Culture Revolution, were instructed to commence work and the Commission for Science and Technology which had also been dissolved during the Cultural Revolution was re-established.

Clearly defined areas of jurisdiction with personal responsibility, generally for the institutes' director, under the leadership of the party committee, were set up. The directors with their deputies of the research institutes were given free rein in their specialized fields. Also colleges and universities reinstated their academic titles: professor, associate professor and assistant professor, etc. On various occasions it was emphasized that while the principle of independence and self-reliance was good and would be adhered to, this should not hinder one in learning from 'the advanced science and technology of other nations', and taking over 'as fast as possible' the newest results of international research. The Chinese intelligentsia was sent in large numbers to the western countries in order to study in scientific and technological areas especially necessary for China's progress. Tens of thousands were to study in the West.

In March 1978 the National Science Conference took place in Beijing. At this conference the programmes for an accelerated development, and especially the 'perspective for the development of science and technology' (1978-85), were presented. Addressing this conference Deng Xiaoping made it clear that China could not do without pure research. He promised the scientists a fair deal—five-sixth of their weekly work time will be reserved for their specialities; highly qualified scientists will be provided with assistants and their administrative work load will be kept to the minimum. Asking the scientists 'to storm the citadels of science together with one heart', he de-emphasized politics for the intelligentsia. He told the cheering scientists: 'A person who tried to improve his knowledge

and skill cannot be expected to spend a lot of time on political and theoretical books, or to attend many meetings, unconnected with his work.' 15 .

Noteworthy was also the increase in interest in the social sciences. The former faculty of philosophy and social sciences, originally subordinated to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, In 1978 the academy presided over by Hu Qiaomu comprised 18 research institutes: philosophy, economics, industrial economy, agrarian economy, finance and commerce, international economy, jurisprudence, literature, linguistics, history, archaeology, world religion, anthropology, journalism, and information theory. In the meantime most of these institutes have commenced publishing their own journals. One of these journals, Social Science Front, which appeared in 1978, declared that it would adhere to the principle of 'let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend.'




In the field of art and literature a 'new spring' appeared—the liberation from ideological pressure and from the sterile party 'culture assembly line'. Music by Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven, still proscribed in 1974, as being bourgeois twaddle, reappeared in concert programmes. On 26 March 1970 the Beijing Central Orchestra performed Beethoven's Fifth Symphony in the People's Cultural Hall and received a standing ovation. Shakespeare was also rehabilitated. A Shakespearean edition has already appeared in the market. In June 1982 the Indian classical play Shakuntala was staged in Beijing and a number of Indian classical dancers performed to packed Chinese audiences. The dispute with Confucianism lost its former virulence and became more objective and scientific after a seminar of scholars on the subject. Education in China is surely forging ahead. But Mao's Cultural Revolution for a proletarian culture still remains an enigma, a nearly incredible cataclysm, appealing in name but appalling in detail. We are still far from understanding it. Eight hundred million peasants are still there in the villages. How are they to be educated for a modern life?

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NOTES

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2. John Fraser, The Chinese: Portrait of a People, 1980, p. 281.
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4. Ibid, p. 85.
5. Beijing Review, 7 October 1967, p. 3.
6. Mao's 7th May Directive, no.3.87.
7. Roderick MackFarquhar, That Origin of Cultural Revolution, 1974, p. 62.
8. Mao's 7th May Day Directive, no. 3, p. 87.
9. Ibid, p. 88.
10. Cited by Unger Jonathan, Education Under Mao, 1980, p.65.
11. Ibid.' p. 67.
12. Robert Taylor, China's Intellectual Dilemma: policies and University Enrolment, P. 38.
13. No. 10, p. 72.
14. See Beijing Review, 13 April 1978.
15. Ibid.

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Thousand in China

SECTION 5 = CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is an integral part of the overall policy of a nation. It is shaped by ideological as well as economic and security considerations. All these elements are at play. In this section important events which have marked the development of China's Foreign relations have been summarised, in a first document. The theoretical guiding principles of China's foreign policy are contained in the well known theory of the differentiation of the three worlds. This has been explained in the second document. Finally the position of China vis-a-vis the Third world has been brought out in a final document.

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"Chairman Mao put forward the theory of the differentiation of the three worlds at a time when the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, became locked in a cut-throat struggle for world hegemony and were actively preparing for a new war. This theory provides the international proletariat, the socialist countries and the oppressed nations with a powerful ideological weapon for forging unity and building the broadest united front against the two hegemonist powers and their war policies and for pushing the world revolution forward".

(Peking Review, Nov. 4, 1977).

granted them political asylum and made the incident known to the world. China disliked it. In securing the border, the Chinese army clashed with the Indian forces in the disputed area in late October. Twelve Indian border policemen were killed.

The conflict alarmed Asia. To demonstrate that the People Republic of China could and would reach agreements by negotiations with neighbours on border issues, Peking concluded in 1960-62 friendship and border treaties with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Outer Mongolia. No agreement was reached between China and India. While accusing China of illegally building a highway through the disputed area of Askai Chin, India actively prepared for self-defense. By September 1962, India had built forty-three outposts and had proudly accepted Soviet Military aid (jet fighters) in addition to Britain's and the United States'. One month later, a new war broke out. After a month of fighting (October-November) India suffered a greater defeat than in 1959. The Chinese advanced deep into Indian territory, both in Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency. Peking announced a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew its troops to the original disputed region.

Six Afro-Asian countries (Burma, Cambodia, China, Ceylon, Indonesia and the UAR) held a conference for mediation at Colombo in December 1962. Their proposal was rejected by Peking in January 1963, and the Sino-Indian border dispute has remained unsettled ever since.

Laos and Vietnam. Events in Laos and Vietnam also reflected the difficulties in maintaining the principles of peaceful coexistence. In 1958-60, while the United States offered military and economic assistance to the non-Communist government of Laos, Hanoi and Peking aided the revolutionary Pathet Lao. In 1960-61, Soviet arms for both the Laotian government and the Pathet Lao were flown in via China and Vietnam. In early 1961, the Soviet Union became very influential in Laos. The Laotian crisis then came to a head with the North Vietnam-Pathet Lao forces overran the Laotian highlands. As the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated China no longer provided the transit stops for Soviet planes to Laos. The Soviet Union founded it necessary to agree to a conference on peace and neutrality in Laos in order to check Peking and Washington there. A lengthy Geneva conference was held from May 1961 to June 1962 which ended with an agreement on Laotian neutrality and foreign troops withdrawal.

The Sino-Soviet Dispute. After 1959, several major issues aggravated the Sino-Soviet dispute. Apart from the problems mentioned earlier (de-Stalinization, Yugoslavia, and the commune) the major issues in dispute in 1959-65 were:

1. The Secret Atomic Agreement by which, in October 15, 1957, the Soviet would help China develop its nuclear capability. But later, Khrushchev asked for a say in China's future nuclear delivery system because he was concerned that a nuclear China might be too powerful to be kept aligned. Mao refused it. Khrushchev then "scrapped" the agreement on June 20, 1959.

2. Imperialism, War and Peace. Khrushchev resented Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 to promote his peaceful coexistence policy. To patch up things, Khrushchev rushed to Peking on October 1 -- one day after his return from the United States -- for the tenth anniversary of the founding of the People Republic of China. It was of no avail. On April 16, 1960 the Red Flag published a 15,000 word article entitled "Long Live Leninism" in honour of Lenin's ninetieth birthday. It openly challenged Soviet Ideological leadership and stressed Lenin's belief that war "was an inevitable outcome of the imperialist system."

3. Withdrawal of Soviet Economic Aid. The Third Congress of the Rumania Communist Party in late June 1960 unexpectedly witnessed an open confrontation between Khrushchev and Peng Chen, China's chief delegate to the Congress. Peking later charged that the confrontation was a "Soviet all-out and converging attack" on the Chinese Communist Party. In anger, Khrushchev ordered the withdrawal in August-September 1960 of the entire Soviet economic and technical mission. This came at a time when China was facing economic difficulties.

August of the same year, a revolt was staged in the Ministry when radicals, led by Yao Teng-shan who had formally served in Indonesia, were reported to have "seized power" in the ministry for a few days.

Moreover, the Red Guards turned violent against the Soviet Union and several Western missions in Peking. In August 1967, for instance they set fire to the British mission in the Capital. The convulsion and rivalry among the Red Guards even interrupted the arms shipment from Russia to Vietnam via China.

The number of exchanges of delegations between China and all foreign countries dropped from 1,322 in 1965 to 66 in 1969. During the same period there were five diplomatic suspensions (Indonesia, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Ghana and Tunisia) as opposed to two recognitions (Mauritius and South Yemen),

Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts. During the same period, the Sino-Soviet dispute escalated and culminated in the border conflicts of the Ussuri River in March 1969. On March 2, 1969, Soviet and Chinese forces clashed on the disputed Chenpao (Damansky) Islands in the Ussuri river. A few hundred men were involved. Whether or not Lin Biao, or even Mao Tse-tung, had provoked such a conflict to promote his authority and leadership, as some specialists have observed, the Chinese gained the upper hand. Unprecedented publicity was made by both the Chinese and Soviets. On March 15, the Soviets struck at the Chinese in the same area. Each side manoeuvred thousands of soldiers. This time, the Chinese suffered heavy casualties. Kosygin visited Peking in September 1969 after attending Ho Chi Minh's funeral in Hanoi. Chou En lai coolly met him at the airport. He reportedly made conciliatory suggestions for improving relations on three fronts: state-to-state relations, territorial negotiations, and ideological discussions. Although the first two fronts had been quietly but grudgingly improved, the third may last for "9,000 years" as Mao put it.

undercurrent of conciliation with Washington. By the end of 1966, the United States seemed to have developed a consensus in favor of continued containment of China without isolation. As the cultural revolution and the Vietnam War ran apace, it became abundantly clear in 1966-67 that neither the turbulent China nor the war-burdened United States had any intention at all of starting a war against each other. Johnson and then Nixon worked out a rapprochement made easier with the withdrawal of the USA from Vietnam war.

Source = King C. Chen (Edit.) : China and the three worlds,
The MacMillan Press, 1979, pp. 8 to 31
(summarised and edited by our Centre).

CHINA AND THE THREE WORLDS

Mao's theory of the differentiation of the three worlds has been acclaimed by the Chinese as a major contribution to Marxims-Leninism. Its importance in guideing the external policy of China has been considerable. We therefore reproduce here an editorial comment on this theory by the "People's Daily " which has also appeared in the Peking Review (November 4, 1977) It has been condensed and edited by our Centre.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE THREE WORLDS

Mao put forward the theory of the differentiation of the three worlds at a time when the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States became locked in a cut-throat struggle for world hegemony. ...This theory provides the international proletariat, the socialist countries and the oppressed nations with a powerful ideological weapon for foreign unity and building the broadest united front against the two hegemonist powers and their war policies and for pushing the revolution forward.

In his talk with the leader of a third world country in February 1974 Mao said "In my view, the United States and the Soviet Union form the first world. Japan, Europe and Canada, the middle section, belong to the second world. With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to the third world. The whole of Africa belongs to the third world and Latin America too."

CLASS STRUGGLE ON WORLD SCALE

In the final analysis, national struggle is a matter of class struggle. The sameholds true between countries. Relations between countries or nations are based on relations between classes, and they are interconnected and extremely complicated. The international bourgeoisie has never been a monolithic whole, nor can it ever be. The international working class movement has also experienced one split after another, subject as it is to the influence of alien classes. In waging the struggle on the international arena, the proletariat must unite with all those who can be united in the light of what is imperative and feasible in different historical periods, so as to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the diehards. Therefore, we can never lay down any hard and fast formula for differentiating the world's political forces (ie. differentiating ourselves, our friends and our enemies in the international class struggle).

NEW CLASSIFICATION OF THE WORLD'S POLITICAL FORCES

Tremendous changes in the present day international situation and the daily growth of the people's strength in different countries and of the factors for revolution demand a new classification of the world's political forces, so that a new global strategy can be formulated for the international proletariat and the oppressed people according to the new relationship between ourselves, our friends and our enemies.

....Mao's theory of the three worlds meets precisely this demand. This theory makes it clear: The two imperialist superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States constitute the first world. They have become the biggest international exploiters, oppressive and agressors and the

common enemies of the people of the world, and the rivalry between them is bound to lead to a new world war. The contention for world supremacy between the two hegemonist powers, the menace they pose to the people of all lands and the latter's resistance to them -- this has become the central problem in present-day world politics. The socialist countries, the mainstay of the international proletariat, and the oppressed nations, who are the worst exploited and oppressed and who account for the great majority of the population of the world together form the third world. They stand in the forefront of the struggle against the two hegemonists: are the main force in the world-wide struggle against imperialism and hegemonism. The developed countries in between the two worlds constitute the second world. They oppress and exploit the oppressed nations and are at the same time controlled and bullied by the super-powers. They have a dual character, and stand in contradiction with both the first and the third worlds. But they are still a force the third world can win over or unite with in the struggle against hegemonism.

THE US MONOPOLY CAPITAL - ROLE IN THE WORLD

In the post-war period, the concentration of U.S. monopoly capital and its expansion abroad assumed startling proportions. As recent statistics show, in 1976, the twelve giant industrial corporations with sales over 10 billion dollars each together accounted for 27 per cent and 29 per cent respectively of the total assets and sales of the 500 largest industrial corporations in the United States; the ten giant commercial banks held 61 per cent of the assets and deposits of the country's 50 biggest commercial banks. The export of U.S. capital which was highly concentrated after the war has risen by leap and bounds in the last twenty years. While direct private investments abroad stood at 11.8 billion dollars in 1950, they jumped to 137.2 billion dollars in 1976.

The high and rapid concentration of monopoly capital formed the economic foundation of the United States as an imperialist superpower. Exploiting the economic and military superiority it acquired in the war, the monopoly it enjoyed over atomic weapons and a wide range of sophisticated military science and technology, the world-wide dollar-centred currency system it set up and the various military blocs it controlled in North America, Latin America, Europe, Asia and Oceania, U.S. imperialism occupied an unprecedented overlord position in the capitalist world, and it had all the other capitalist countries under its thumb.

For many years it acted as the world's gendarme and perpetuated numerous bloody crimes against revolutionary people (the people of the United States included) and oppressed nations of the world. It had to take crushing blows from the people of Asia in wars of aggression which it thought it could win hands down. The heroic Korean people were the first to explode the myth of U.S. invincibility. In their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, the people of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos plunged U.S. imperialism into military, political and economic crisis and hastened its decline. In the meantime Western Europe and Japan steadily recovered, grew in economic strength and hardened their positions in competing with the United States. The U.S. imperialism was obliged to concede that it could no longer have its own way in the world. However, it remains the most powerful country in the capitalist world and is trying its utmost to retain its supremacy.

EXPLOITATION BY THE U.S. THROUGH OVERSEAS INVESTMENT

The United States exploits other countries mainly through exporting capital in the form of overseas investment. According to U.S. official statistics, in 1976, it recouped profits, earnings from patents included, amounting to 22.4 billion U.S. dollars from its direct private investment overseas, the rate of profit exceeding 16 per cent. (The U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1977) Such is the sordid record of how U.S. monopoly capital sucks the blood of the people of the world.

The United States has gone in for selling arms on a world scale in order to extract huge profits from other countries and dominate them. Between 1960 and 1976 it exported arms to the value of 34.9 dollars.

SOVIET SOCIAL IMPERIALISM

As the United States got bogged down in wars and its strength began to decline, Soviet social-imperialism came up from behind. In the ten years during which the United States was mired in its war of aggression in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos, the Soviet Union strove to develop its own strength, narrowed the gap in economic development between itself and the United States and immensely expanded its military power. It has caught up with the United States in nuclear armament and surpassed it in conventional weaponry. As its military and economic power increases, Soviet social imperialism becomes more and more flagrant in its attempts to expand and penetrate all parts of the world. It makes great play with its ground, naval and air forces everywhere and engages the United States in a fierce struggle for supremacy on a global scale, thus betraying its aggressive ambitions which are unparalleled in world history.

ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION BY THE SOVIET UNION

Although the Soviet Union falls short of the United States in the total volume of profits grabbed from other countries, it is not in the least inferior to the latter in its methods of plunder. It is chiefly through 'economic aid' and 'military aid' to third world countries that the Soviet Union buys cheap and sells . . . and squeezes enormous profits in the process. For example, the Soviet Union has been selling commodities to India in the name of 'aid' at prices sometimes 20 to 30 per cent, and even 200 per cent higher than on the world market. On the other hand it purchases commodities from India at prices sometimes 20 to 30 per cent lower. (Cfr. 'Jad-O-Jehad' weekly, Jammu, December 1973 and 'India Today' published in April 1974 by the Indian Workers' Association in Britain).

According to the 'Statistics of Soviet Foreign Trade', the price paid by the Soviet Union for importing natural gas from Asian countries was something like a half of what it charged for exporting to the West. The same source revealed that the prices of anthracite, pig iron and other commodities exported by the Soviet Union to Egypt were 80 to 150 per cent higher than what it charges West Germany for similar exports (see 'Statistics of Soviet Union Foreign Trade, 1970-76'). It was reported in the Western Press that in the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, "Russia not only demanded payment in cash for the arms it sold but jacked up their prices when the war reached its height" (Le Monde, April 18, 1974). After the principle oil-exporting Arab countries paid this sum in U.S. dollars, the Soviet Union used it to extend a Euro-dollar loan at an interest of 10 per cent or more. (The U.S. Journal 'Money Manager', April 14, 1974)

Between 1966 and 1977 the Soviet Union sold arms amounting to 20.2 billion dollars. According to data issued by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, already in 1974 arms sales by the Soviet Union amounted to 5.5 billion dollars, accounting for 37.5 per cent of the world total in that year and making it the second biggest merchant of death after the United States. Furthermore the Soviet Union endeavours to control its clients by such means as terminating supplies of needed parts and accessories and dunning them for payment.

The Soviet Union has about 700,000 troops in other countries and has put Czechoslovakia which is a universally recognized sovereign country completely under prolonger (actually indefinite) military occupation.

At present, the Soviet Union's armed forces are double those of the United States, and it has over 400 strategic nuclear weapon carriers more than the United States (from 'The Military Balance 1977-78', published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London). It has vastly

more tanks, armoured cars, field guns and other items of conventional weaponry. It now boasts an "offensive navy" with a total tonnage close to the U.S. navy's. According to a Western estimate, Soviet military expenditures have been rising in recent years and they absorb approximately 12 to 15 per cent of its GNP (U.S. military expenditures account for roughly 6 per cent of its GNP) Soviet military spending for fiscal year 1976 has been estimated at 127 billion dollars which is about 24 per cent more than the projected outlay of the U.S. of about 102.7 billion. (From the "The Military Balance 1977-78 published by the International Institute for strategic studies, London). All this shows that the Soviet Union will inevitably adopt an offensive strategy and resort chiefly to force and threats of force in its contention with the United States.

SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET SOCIAL IMPERIALISM

Because comparatively speaking Soviet Social Imperialism is inferior in economic strength, it must rely chiefly on its military power and recourse to threats of war in order to expand. Although economically the Soviet Union has far surpassed the second-rate imperialist countries, it still compares unfavourably with its powerful rival and its economic strength falls short of its needs for world hegemony. Therefore it feverishly goes in for arms expansion and war preparation in a bid to gain military superiority so that it can grab the resources, wealth and labour power of other countries to compensate for its economic inferiority.

The Soviet bureaucratic monopoly capitalist group has transformed a highly centralized socialist state-owned economy into a state-monopoly capitalist economy without its equal in any other imperialist country and has transformed a state under the dictatorship of the proletariat into a state under fascist dictatorship. It is therefore easier for Soviet social imperialism to put the entire economy on a military footing and militarize the whole state apparatus.

Soviet social-imperialism has come into being as a result of the degeneration of the first socialist country in the world. Therefore, it can exploit Lenin's prestige and flaunt the banner of 'socialism' to bluff and deceive people everywhere. U.S. imperialism has been pursuing policies of aggression and hegemonism for a long period and has time and again met with resistance and been subjected to and denunciation on the part of the proletariat and oppressed people and nations throughout the world and of all fair-minded people including those in the United States. Progressive world opinion is already familiar with its true nature and will go on fighting against it. Soviet social imperialism is a new and rising power and wears the mask of 'socialism'. The struggle to resist, expose and denounce it is consequently far more exacting. Arduous efforts are called for to help the people of the world to recognize its true features.

OF THE TWO HEGEMONIST POWERS, U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIET UNION IS THE MOST DANGEROUS

U.S. Imperialism has not changed as far as its policies of aggression and hegemonism are concerned, nor has it lessened its exploitation and oppression of the people at home and abroad. Therefore, the two hegemonist powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are both common enemies of the people of the world. There is no doubt about this. But, if, despite what has been said above, we should still indiscriminately put the two superpower on a par and fail to single out the Soviet Union as the more dangerous instigator of world war, we would only be blunting the revolutionary vigilance of the people of the world and blurring the primary target in the struggle against hegemonism. Therefore, in no circumstances must we play into the hands of the Soviet Union in its deception and conspiracy and give the green light to its war preparation and acts of aggression.

WHO CONSTITUTE THE SECOND WORLD ? THEY ARE THREATENED BY RUSSIA

The value of industrial output in both the United States and the Soviet Union outstrips that of the three major European capitalist countries, West Germany, France and Britain combined. In military strength no other imperialist country is on a par with either of the two superpowers. Both have thousands of strategic nuclear weapons, several hundred military satellites, some ten thousand military aircraft, several hundred major naval vessels and enormous stockpiles of other conventional arms. The war machine of each of the two superpowers in peace-time assumes a magnitude unprecedented in human history.

THE SECOND WORLD IS A FORCE THAT CAN BE UNITED WITH IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST HEGEMONISM

In dealing with the world political situation in recent years, Chairman Mao always regarded the second world countries as a force that could be united with in the struggle against the two hegemonist powers. He said: "We should win over these countries such as Britain, France and West Germany".

Through twenty to thirty years of struggle against U.S. control and simultaneously through taking advantage of the severe world-wide setbacks suffered by the United States in its policy of aggression, the West European countries have succeeded in altering the situation prevailing in the early post-war years when they had to submit to U.S. domination. Japan is in a similar position. The establishment of the common market, in Western European countries, the independent policies pursued by France and under De Gaulle, the passive and critical attitude taken by the Western European countries towards the U.S. war of aggression in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos, the collapse of the dollar-centered monetary system in the capitalist world and the sharpening trade currency wars between Western Europe and Japan on the one hand and the United States on the other -- all these facts mark the disintegration of the former imperialist camp headed by the United States. True, the monopoly capitalists of the West European countries, Japan, etc., have a thousand and one ties with the United States and in fact of the menace posed by the Soviet Social Imperialism, these countries still have to rely on the U.S. "protective umbrella". But so long as the United States continues its policy of control, they will not cease in their struggle against such control and for equal partnership.

BUILD THE BROADEST INTERNATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND SMASH SUPERPOWER HEGEMONISM AND WAR POLICIES

The current fight of the people of the world against the hegemonism of the two superpowers and the fight against their war policies are two aspects of one and the same struggle. Hegemonism is their aim in war as well as their means of preparing for it. The danger of war resulting from Soviet-U.S. contention for hegemony is growing menace to the people of the whole world. What attitude should we take toward this problem?

The people of China and the people of the rest of the world firmly demand peace and oppose a new world war....As Chairman Mao consistently stated, our attitude toward world war is: first, we are against it; second, we are not afraid of it...

What are our tasks then ?

First of all, we must warn the people of the danger of war. The two superpowers are making frenzied efforts to muster all their strength for war.

Since the rivalry between the two hegemonist power is intensifying and especially since Soviet social-imperialism is on the offensive, the conflict between them cannot possibly be settled by peaceful means, when the chips are down. In the course of their fierce rivalry, these two superpowers may sometimes come to some agreement or other for a specific purpose.

Chairman Mao said: "They may reach some agreement, but I wouldn't take it as something solid. It's transitory, and deceptive too. In essence, rivalry is primary." Such rivalry inevitably leads to war. At present, the factors for war are visibly growing. The two hegemonist powers are stepping up their war preparations while harping on the shopworn theme of "detente" and "disarmament." Why don't they simply stop it and destroy their huge arsenals lock, stock and barr 1? Instead, they are spending huge sums of money on further research into new nuclear weapons and missiles and their manufacture and on the development of still more efficient and still more lethal chemical, biological and other weapons. Their armed forces are so deployed that they can swiftly go into action, and they are constantly holding various kinds of military exercises. Each has massed hundreds of thousands of troops in Central Europe. Their fleets keep each other under surveillance as they prowl the oceans. Spies are sent out on new assignments submarines embark on new missions, and new military satellites orbit in outer space. They are gathering military intelligence and readying themselves to wipe out each other's war potential. All this makes it abundantly clear that the two superpowers are actively preparing for a total war....

Second, we should make every effort to step up the struggle against hegemonism, that is, we should fight to put off the outbreak of war and in the process strengthen the defense capabilities of the people of all countries.

Chairman Mao said: "The United States is a paper tiger. Don't believe in it. One thrust and it's punctured. Revisionist Soviet Union is a paper tiger too." ...Going all out as it does for arms expansion and war preparations, the Soviet Union finds that "its strength falls short of its wild ambitions," and it is "unable to cope with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China and the Pacific Region."

History has repeatedly shown that unity in struggle forged by the people of all countries is the main force in defeating the war instigators. The people of every country must work hard and step up their preparations materially and organisationally against wars of aggression, closely watch the aggressive and expansionist activities of the two hegemonist powers and resolutely defeat them. The people must see to it that these two superpowers do not violate their country's or any other country's sovereign rights, do not encroach on their country's or any other country's territory and territorial seas or violate their strategic areas and strategic lines of communication, do not use force or the threat of force other maneuvers to interfere in their country's or any other country's internal affairs; moreover, both power must be closely watched lest they resort to schemes of subversion and use "aid" as a pretext to push through their military political and economic plots. The people must also see to it that they do not establish, enlarge, carve up and wrest spheres of influence in any part of the world. So long as all this is done, it will be possible to hold up the timetable of the two hegemonists for launching a world war, and the people of the world will be better prepared and find themselves in a more favourable position should war break out...

Third, we must redouble our efforts to oppose the policy of appeasement because it can only bring war nearer. There are people in the West today who in fact adopt a policy of appeasement toward the Soviet Union. In striving to work out an "ideal" formula for compromise and concessions in the face of Soviet expansion and threats, some people have dished up such proposals as the "Sonnenfeldt doctrine" in the fond hope of assuaging the aggressor's appetite or at least gaining some respite for themselves. Others intend to build a so-called "material basis" for peaceful cooperation and the prevention of war by means of big loans, extensive trade, joint exploitation of resources and exchanges of technology. Still others hope they can divert the Soviet Union to the East so as to free themselves from this Soviet peril at the expense of the security of other countries. But aren't all these nostrums just a revamping of what was previously tried and found totally bankrupt in the history of war? Did the Munich agreement to sacrifice Czechoslovakia, cooked up by Chamberlain,

Daladier and company, stop or slow down the march of the voracious Hitler? True, Hitler did go east and overrun Poland, but didn't he follow this up by turning west to occupy France? The United States, Britain and France gave Germany and Japan a shot in the arm by extending aid and loans to them and selling them war materials. And did they succeed in saving themselves? Today's activities are indeed far more hectic than those before World War II, what with the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the talks on the reduction of forces in Central Europe and the conference on European security and cooperation. But hasn't the war crisis in Europe worsened rather than abated despite the intensified efforts to keep these conferences going and make deals? Haven't the weapons of all kinds installed on both sides of the European front grown in number rather than diminished? The more highfalutin the talk of detente and the more intense the efforts at appeasement, the greater the danger of war. This is not alarmist talk. It is a truth repeatedly borne out by history. It is high time that these appeasers woke up.

SOURCE: China & the Three Worlds
ed. by C. CHEN king

CHINA BELONG FOR EVER TO THE
THIRD WORLD

((222))

Shen Yi

The process of modernization implies that China has to "buy" technology from Western Capitalist Countries. It has to enter into agreements with them. Does this mean that China is giving up its policy of opposition to hegemonism and of support to the third World people in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism? The following article by a supporter of the present leadership gives an answer.

An African state leader visiting China recently told his hosts that he had heard China was "repudiating" Chairman Mao and changing its foreign policy and this had him worried. However, he had been misinformed. If China were to totally repudiate Chairman Mao, which China is not, it would also include repudiating his correct foreign policy. Chairman Mao firmly opposed hegemonism and resolutely supported the third world people in their struggle against imperialism and colonialism. This was very much appreciated by the people of the third world. But will post-Mao China continue to side with the peoples of the third world? The answer is a definitive yes.

Chairman Mao's strategic conception of the three worlds is correct. China will always be a member of the third world and never seek hegemonism. We will carry on the foreign policy Chairman Mao formulated during his last years.

POLICY UNCHANGED.

Will China only Soviet hegemonism but not imperialism and colonialism as it develops its relations with United States and other developed countries? This is a question some third world countries are asking.

Waging a joint struggle together with some of the "eastern" countries against hegemonism does not mean China has stopped supporting the struggle of the ~~poor~~ people of the third world and no longer care about the interests of the oppressed nations. The situation varies among third world countries. Some are victims of Soviet Union hegemonist expansion; some regard the United States and certain other countries as the main danger, and some are locked in struggle against racist rule, against Israeli expansionism, or for national independence and liberation. As in the past, China will firmly stand by the side of the oppressed nations and the oppressed peoples, oppose all acts of aggression and interference from outside against third world countries and resolutely back their struggle to defend national independence, develop their national economic and firmly support their fight against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism.

Developing relations with the United States does not mean that China supports its erroneous policy towards some third world countries. The United States leans heavily on the side of Israel and the South Africa racist regime, supports South Korea in sabotaging the national reunification of Korea and meddles with the internal affairs of some countries, China included. China is against all these. China follows its own independent foreign policy.

China carries on economic exchanges with some developed countries and absorbs advanced technology and capital from abroad, which helps in our socialist modernization, but China remains an underdeveloped country, in the same situation as other developing countries importing advanced technologies and capital and faces

many similar problems they encounter in developing their national economies. China wants to work with the other third world countries to establish a new international economic order.

UNITY WITH THIRD WORLD.

There are certain people who are afraid of China's solidarity with other third world countries and who are fabricating rumour after rumour to foment discord and create trouble between China and other third world countries.

The Soviet Union and Viet Nam invented the "China threat" to make out that China poses a threat to its neighbours and southeast Asia. But in reality, China has not a single soldier in any other country, whereas it has a million Soviet troops menacing it in the north and is constantly harassed by Vietnamese shellings and attacks in its south. It is China that is threatened. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and Vietnamese control of Laos are a threat to the southeast Asian countries. Rumours and threats from the Soviet and Vietnamese hegemonists are aimed at driving a wedge between China and the Southeast Asian countries to weaken the forces standing against the hegemonists big and small. This naturally will not be allowed to happen. Their morbid fear of the unity between China and other third world countries should show us how much we must cherish such a unity.

Some people have tried to scare people by pointing out, like Dulles, a former US state secretary, that China is a communist country. What the Chinese people believe in is China's own internal affair. China did not import its revolution, nor will it export revolution. Whatever road a country may choose is its own business and has nothing to do with China. As for China, it was because of communist Party leadership that the country won its independence and liberation and made it possible for China to oppose power politics and uphold justice in the international struggle. China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is an implacable adversary of hegemonism, which encroaches upon other's sovereignty and territory and endangers world peace.

The five principles of Peaceful Coexistence has always guided New China's handling of international relationship and China will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. China advocates equality among all countries, big or small, and is against the strong bullying the weak. The People's Republic of China has never tried to force anyone to accept its view.

Another African head of state said while in Beijing: We trust China implicitly, because China gives aid to others at their request and never meddles in their internal affairs. We cannot say this for the Soviet Union. It has only one aim: the realization of its ambitions, hegemonism and global domination. China was the first to see this and it was China which made many aware of it and put them on their guard. We once were recipients of Soviet "aid". But with "aid" came interference.

Such subterfuges as creating a "China threat" are quite useless. Will China move against others when it becomes strong and prosperous? Never. China has already long declared that it will never seek hegemonism. Those who uphold Marxism do not do anything that damages the interests of others.

China is still very poor. It would like to help other third world countries more, but is at present handicapped by its limited strength. Later, when China has built up its economy and is in a better position, it will do much more to help third world countries in difficulties and will also contribute more in defence of world peace. We have always maintained that our modernization is not only for the cause of our country but also for the cause of internationalism.

DIRECT VICTIMS OF HEGEMONISM:

The third world countries are increasingly threatened by Soviet hegemonism. The contention for world domination between Soviet Union and the United States is focused on Europe. But at the moment, the Soviet Union is concentrating mainly on expanding its presence in several key areas of the third world. The Soviet Union wants to take over "eastern Europe, which it finds it cannot do at present. So it is circumventing the more solid to move into the softer areas, striking out south to outflank Europe. It has launched sustained offensives against the Middle East-Persian Gulf region, Southwest and Southeast Asia, southern Africa and the Caribbean.

If the Soviet Union can establish itself firmly in Afghanistan, it will push further, into Pakistan and Iran to seize control of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to enable it to exploit the Middle East oilfields and cut the oil route to western Europe.

The Soviet Union is using the Vietnamese regional hegemonists to take over Kampuchea. If the invading Vietnamese secure a firm foothold there, they will push into Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries, enabling the Soviet hegemonists to control the strait of Malacca and link up its forces in the west cannot do anything about it even though it might want to put up a fight.

It is quite clear that the Soviet Union will not stop with Kampuchea and Afghanistan in order to complete its global strategic deployment. If the Soviet expansionist drive is not checked, more and more countries will fall victim to Soviet hegemony. As a member of the third world, China will join the other countries to oppose the aggression and expansion of Soviet hegemonism and defend peace in Asia and the world as a whole.

INSEPARABLY WITH THE THIRD WORLD

Experience in the international struggle has shown that the third world countries suffer the most from imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, and the contradictions between the third world countries and the imperialist, hegemonist, and colonial powers are very acute. In the struggle against imperialism and colonialism and in the struggle against hegemonism, the third world plays a tremendous role. The third world has a lot of people, plenty of resources, covers an immense area and occupies an important strategic position. The countries of the third world are full of vitality and full of promise.


China and the other third world countries have been through similar experiences and have the same goals. They understand each other the best, are most ready to give sympathy and support to each other. China cannot for a moment become separate from the rest of third world countries.

As the third world pins its hopes on China, so we place our hopes on the third world, of which we are a member.


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Source: Beijing Review, No. 39. September 28, 1981. pp. 23-25

Humour In China



— Hua Junren



Yes-men by habit.


— Zhao Shilin



— Ying Tao

Wang Fuzi

— Li Shimen



SECTION 6 = INDIA AND CHINA IN COMPARISON

China and India are continental countries with vast, still largely untapped, natural and human resources. Historically the cultures of these countries have played an important role in human development; There can be no doubt that, as their resources are fully mobilized for industrialisation and modernization, the two countries will play an increasingly important role in world affairs. However, both countries have followed different models of development. The one that will emerge more successful is likely to exert a powerful attraction over all other developing countries, in Asia more specially. Finally, behind each of the two models there is a different concept of man and history. There are two different ideologies. Can we evaluate what these different ideologies have meant for the concrete man? This is the purpose of this section.

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There is greater equality of incomes in rural China than rural India. Right ? Wrong.

India has made the mistake of emphasising heavy industry, unlike China which has concentrated its efforts on light industry. Right ? Wrong again.

For those labouring under conventional notions about the development patterns of India and China, the World Bank's recently released three-volume compendium 'CHINA: SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT' is an eye-opener. In more than 1,200 pages of often unknown facts and always fascinating information, the Bank's multi-disciplinary team of experts has, after more than a month of touring China, laid bare the achievements and failures of a complex and repeatedly misunderstood country.

What comes through and probably unsurpassed record of economic growth and social progress. Whether one sees the performance in terms of pure growth rates, or in terms of improving literacy, nutrition and population control, or yet again in terms of sweeping structural changes in the economy, the success is as impressive as the canvas is vast. The report is frequently dotted with comparative references to India, and almost without exception the comparisons are humbling.

China's per capita income has been growing twice the rate in India (between 2 and 2.5 per cent, against 1 per cent in India), and industrial growth has averaged 13 per cent annually, one of the highest in the world and far above India's 5 per cent. With only 8 per cent of the world's arable land, it has fed 22 per cent of the world's population, without any signs of extreme deprivation. The agricultural growth rate has in fact been no more than India's, at 2.3 per cent, but an equal distribution of food has ensured an absence of the kind of malnutrition evident in the Indian countryside.

REMARKABLE SUCCESS:

The record of achievements in other sectors is equally, if not more, impressive. Back in the 1960s, China had an annual population growth rate of 3 per cent—more than India's 2.2 per cent. But by 1979 this had been brought down with unprecedented rapidity to 1.2 per cent, while Indian population continued to grow at the old rate. While India's birth rate inched down marginally from 38 per 1,000 population to 35, China's dropped from around the same level to 18. The World Bank report notes quietly that this is a world record.

In this and other sectors, the records are consistently above the average for developing countries with comparable income levels or in similar stages of development. Take education, where China has a primary school enrollment of 93 per cent against India's 64 per cent. Moving up to secondary school, China's enrolment is 51 per cent, compared to India's 28 per cent. The drop-out rate in the first four years of schooling is no more than 28 per cent—less than half India's 59 per cent. And most impressive of all, primary enrolment for girls is 84 per cent, against just 50 per cent for India. Adult literacy, not surprisingly, is as high as 66 per cent, almost double the 36 per cent in India.

Social indicators like these place China right out of the general category of Third world countries. Major Third World killers like diarrhoea and child mortality have been virtually eliminated, while an equitable food distribution had ensured that though per capita food availability has shown virtually no increase since the 1950s, there is no acute malnutrition. The result: an unusually high life expectancy of 64 years, against 51 in India.

LIVING STANDARDS:

These figures are surprising for the quality of achievement they indicate. Chinese statistics are often unreliable, and have in the past been subject to major revisions. In fact, some of the figures in the World Bank report appear mutually contradictory. But there is little doubt that the Chinese authorities getting ready to borrow from the World Bank, have laid bare their country to outside experts for the first time. Otherwise a report with such depth and range of information would have been impossible.

The real surprise is in the figures that tell of income quality, especially in rural China. For a variety of reasons, there appears to be as much inequality there as in rural India. The poorest 40 per cent of China's rural people get only 20.1 per cent of total income, almost exactly the same as India's 20.2 per cent. And the top 10 per cent get 22.8 per cent, not significantly lower than the 27.6 per cent in India.

In the Urban areas, however, the picture is quite different. The poorest 40 per cent in China get a phenomenal 30 per cent of total income, almost twice the 16.9 per cent in India. And the top 10 per cent get only 15.8 per cent, against 34.1 per cent in India.

COMFORTABLE EXISTENCE

But the figures do not tell the full story, and are therefore somewhat misleading. To start with, the poor in China are ensured their minimum needs at reasonable prices, and a fairly effective social Security system appears to take care of those who can't earn their own livelihood. Equally important, there is no evidence of wide income disparities existing side by side in the same community: the income disparities are regional, and caused by poor land availability or other natural factors in the poorer parts of the country.

The World Bank report sums it up by saying: "A large minority of the population is very poor. These people, however, have a much higher standard of living than those at similar income level elsewhere. They all have work; their food supply is guaranteed; most of their children are at school; and the great majority have access to basic health care.... Life expectancy, ... is on average in China outstandingly high". In fact, China's sweeping structural changes in the countryside—starting with land redistribution, the rapid building up of a new often illiterate but nevertheless effective peasants leadership, and then progressing towards cooperative and later collective farming -- stand out in sharp contrast to India's farcical efforts at land reforms.

THE SOCIAL transformation is matched by the structural change in the economy. For, in a truly outstanding achievement,

China has managed to reach a phenomenal level of industrialisation where manufacturing now accounts for fully half of gross national product. This is almost twice the level in India (27 per cent), which itself is no mean achievement by third world standards. Once again, this tends to place China in the same league as many middle income countries. Also, despite its low per capita income (estimated at 25 to 50 per cent more than India's), that country has been able to invest 31 per cent of its gross domestic product for further growth, higher than the 25 per cent average for middle income countries.

More than half the total investment has been made in industry, and 80 per cent of that in heavy industry—thus accounting for among the four consistently highest industrial growth rates in the world in the last three decades. China is now the world's largest producer of cotton yarn and fabric the second largest manufacturer of radios, the third largest producer of cement, the fifth largest manufacturer of steel and the seventh largest generator of electricity.

What makes this records even more amazing is that it has been achieved with one of the lowest rates of urbanisation in the world: 13 per cent of Chinese live in cities and towns against 22 per cent in India. In fact, the percentage of urban population to the total has not changed since 1953, achieving one of the country's goals — achieved largely through restriction on migration.

In short, it had achieved handsomely what the World Bank report starts out with saying were China's two main goals: eliminating the worst aspects of Poverty and building a heavy industrial base.

INDUSTRIAL INEFFICIENCY:

The environment in which this was done has, however, left its mark on the current situation. Isolated internationally after the break with the Soviet Union in 1960, China now has an industrial sector that often uses outdated and inefficient machinery and technology that is wasteful in its use of energy as well as other inputs. There has been little improvement in either labour or other yardsticks of productivity, so that increase in output have been achieved essentially by a greater supply of inputs. The Capital-outputs ratio is therefore much higher than what it should be., and much small industry is in existence not because of its efficiency but because of the stress on local self-sufficiency.

Clearly, changing this and other negative aspects of the system will involve major challenges to policy-makers. Many have already been attempted, including greater linkages between individuals efforts and rewards, ending some of the price distortions in the system, decentralising some of the decision making process in order to make it less rigid, and in giving greater priority to improving consumption levels so as to improve living standards. These could well prove hazardous; greater freedom to producers in taking pricing decisions could easily lead to inflation., for instance. And the World Bank recommends hastening slowly.

HUMAN PRICE:

The Namk Report could also be criticised for underplaying the heavy human price that has often been paid for getting to the commanding heights of national performance. It mentions casually that two million technically educated and one million university-educated people went out during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution; and recent reports have spoken of female infanticide being a rampant phenomenon because of the pressure on families to have only one child (which . . . most parents prefer to be male).

Also, in anything other than a totalitarian state it would be impossible to implement the kind of rationing that prevails in China, where couples are allocated their turn in a commune to have children.

The period of Political turmoil-like the decade-long Cultural Revolution-of-ten cost millions of lives, while other experiments like the Great Leap Forward caused economic chaos. Yet others, such as the effort to break up the family, had to be quickly given up. Human suffering in all of these must have been enormous, and must be laid directly at the door of China's political system.

Nevertheless, it is the same political system that has made possible the close integration of the "well-organised multi-level" economic and social system with the political structure of the country, so that basic social services are delivered, directives quickly transmitted to the field level, and mass campaigns launched to reach social and economic goals.

Clearly, numerous challenges now lie ahead of China: a basic need to improve living standards, to modernise laggard sectors of the economy, to tackle the severe housing shortage, to combat a coming energy crunch when oil surplus run out, to graduate towards a more open economy that can improve on export performance, and much more. But if the figures are to be believed and the human cost ignored, the World Bank report leaves little room for doubt that China's performance through three decades of social and economic progress-given the scale of effort and the magnitude of achievement - is without parallel anywhere.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX			
	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>CHINA</u>	
BIRTH RATE (per 1000)	35	18	
Death Rate (per 1000)	14	6	
Population Growth Rate (%)	2.1 %	1.2%	
<u>PRODUCTION STRUCTURE</u> (% of GDP)			
Agriculture	38%	31%	
Industry	27%	47%	
Services	35%	22%	
Annual growth per capita income			
	1.4%	2.7%	
Share of Investment in GDP (%)			
	24%	31%	
<u>INCOME SHARES</u>			
Poorest 40% of population	18.5%	18.5%	
Richest 10% of Population	31.4%	22.5%	
<u>GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION</u>			
COAL (million tons)	32.8	66.0	620.0
CRUDE OIL (million tonnes)	0.25	0.44	105.9
Electricity Generated (billion KWH)	5.3	7.3	300.6
Steel (million tonnes)	1.47	1.35	37.12
CEMENT (million tonnes)	2.73	2.86	79.86
Chemical Fertilisers (000 tonnes)	18.0	39.0	12,320.0
Cotton Cloth (billion meters)	4.2	3.83	13.47
Radio Receivers (000 number)	54.0	17.0	1,900.0
			30,040.0

SOURCE: INDIA TODAY, November 30, 1933, pp. 110-115

In the process of social transformation as envisaged by most Developing Countries, Youth is called to play a vital role. In the case of China and India how have these two countries mobilised youth for their development programmes ? Have both of them been equally successful ?

While the developing countries have been faced with the problem of mobilizing the unutilized and underutilized labour force for the development of their backward economies, the 70s witnessed even the advanced countries finding it difficult to make full utilization of the existing manpower. 1 The nature of the problem in the two worlds is, however, different. In the developing world, rapid growth of population, meagre resources of land and capital and the scarcity of marketing facilities have resulted in non-utilization or underutilization of the existing manpower. Secondly, in most of the developing countries there is a wide gulf between the rich and poor. While the vast majority of the poor are unable to fulfil their minimum basic needs, a small section of rich, by virtue of their economic power, control the means of production and influence the development strategies pursued by their respective countries.

In India many welfare measures taken by the state to protect the interests of the weaker sections have been manipulated in such a way that they mostly benefit the rich. Consequently, over the years the number of people below the poverty line and the number of unemployed have increased.

China, both during the liberation struggle and thereafter, evolved an egalitarian model of development. After collectivizing the ownership of the means of production, attempts were made to have all-round balanced development, with its benefits reaching the common man. The employment requirements of the various sections of the population were by and large co-ordinated with the manpower needs of different sectors of the economy in different regions. However, even in the Chinese political set-up this was an uphill task, and in the process many complicated issues arose. During the Maoist era, China claimed to have solved the problem of unemployment. But the problem of underemployment and of suitable employment seems to have persisted. That is why a large number of the liberal environment and the policy of four modernizations in the post-Mao period, have returned to the cities and are demanding employment suited to their qualifications. The post-Mao leadership acknowledges the difficulties which these rusticated youth have faced with the task of providing jobs to its millions of educated youth.

In this paper, an attempt is made to examine to what extent Indian and Chinese models of development have been successful in channellizing their youth energies for economic development.

THE PROBLEM

According to Chen Muha, in 1949 the Chinese population was more than 500 million. By 1979 it was estimated to have crossed 900 million. 2 The Indian population in 1951 was 361 million. Now it

is 683 million. 3.

(230)

In China, as Chen Muhua has observed in her article, over 600 million people were born after 1959, which means that they are below 30 years of age. Thus the bulk of the population either falls in the working age group or are about to enter the employment market (15-59 age group). According to the CIA Handbook of Economic Indicators, in 1975 around 13 million children were less than 4 years of age, 25 per cent of the total population came within the age group of 5-14 years 20 per cent in the 15-24 and 36 per cent in the 25-29 age group. Only 6 per cent in 25-29 age group. Only 6 per cent were about 60 years of age. This means that in 1976 about 57 per cent were in the working age group. Every year 12-20 million enter the employment market. Accordingly, since 1949 at least 200 million fresh jobs were needed to absorb this increasing work force. 4

In India, the labour force was estimated to be 268.05 million in 1980. With an annual growth rate of 2.43 per cent, it is expected to reach 302.29 million in 1985. Out of this 268.05 million labour force, 215.93 million are supposed to reside in the countryside. This is supposed to reach 240.57 in 1985. As against this, in 1980 the strength of urban labour force was 52.12 million. By 1985 the urban labour force is expected to be above 61.72 million. 5 Age-wise, in March 1980, there were 268.05 million in the 5+ age group. In the 15+ age group the number came down to 251.41 million, which means 16.64 million people were in the 5-14 age group. There were 236.95 million people in the 15-59 age group. This means only 14.46 million labour force was about 60 age group. Similarly in March 1985, 302.29 million labour force would be in the 5+ age group. In the 15+ age group it would be 85.07 million, which means that as against 16.64 million in 1980, in 1985 17.22 million labour force would be in the 5-14 age group. The strength of the labour force in 15-59 age group is 268.22 million. As against 14.46 million labour force in the above 60 age group is expected to reach 16.85 million. Besides, By March 1980 there were about 24.09 million subsidiary workers, nearly 87 per cent of whom were women. 6 A large number of this labour of this force belonging to different strata of society and different age groups are unemployed.

In line with the recommendations of the Dantwala Committee, the nature and extent of unemployment is assessed in terms of the usual status concept, weekly status concept, and daily status concept. 7 Accordingly in March 1980 the number unemployed in usual status was 12.02 million in the 5+ age group, 11.42 million in the 15+ age group 11.31 million in the 15-59 age group. This means in the usual status the majority of unemployed belonged to 15-59 age group (11.31 Million). Only 0.60 million belonged to the 5-14 age group and 0.11 million to above 60 age group. Weekly status-wise, out of 12.18 million unemployed in the 15-59 age group (11.36 million). Only 0.54 million belonged to the 5-14 age group and 0.28 million above 60 age group. Daily status-wise 0.60 million belonged to above 60 age group. Out of 20.74 million million a majority of 19.17 million belonged to the 15-59 age group and 19.77 to to 15+ age group, thus 0.97 million belonged to the 5-14 age group. An analysis by age groups further showed that three-fourth of usual status unemployment was concentrated within the fresh entrants (15-29 age group). Secondly, the National Sample survey's 32nd Round (1977-78) findings show that the rural agricultural-labour households, covering about 21.2 per cent of the total population. accounted for 46.7 per cent of total daily status unemployment. The proportion of casual labor in agriculture has increased along with a reduction in self-employment in agriculture. The proportion of regular salaried employment for urban males and the proportion of urban self-employed women in the non-agricultural sector has been reduced. But both sexes in urban areas have increased share as casual labour in the non-agricultural sector. 8

Education-wise, while 48.9 per cent of the labour force is illiterate 25 per cent of this is unemployed. About 39.6 per cent is educated up to primary and middle standards of which about 41.8 per cent are unemployed, and 8.8 per cent of total labour force is educated up to secondary level of which 23.8 per cent are unemployed. Only 2.7 per cent of the total work force is graduate, out of which 9.4 per cent are unemployed. 9

THE STRATEGIES ADOPTED:

The aforementioned data show that India is really facing gigantic task of providing jobs to millions of children, youth and old people. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85), first the backlog of 12.02 million jobs have to be cleared; then provision has to be made for another 34.24 million on (usual status basis). Thus a total of 46.26 million (usual status) jobs will have to be created within a period of five years. Out of this 42.58 million belong to the 15-59 age-group. Besides there would be seasonal unemployment and part-time underemployment prevalent largely in labour households.

In view of the gigantic problem, the employment policy before the Sixth Five-Year Plan has two major goals: to reduce under-employment for the majority of the labour force and to cut down on long-term employment. It is recognised in the plan that a lasting solution to these problems could be found only within the framework of a rapid employment-oriented economic growth. Suitable measures have also to be evolved on a short-term basis in a co-ordinate way particularly for the benefit of the weaker sections. Self-employment ventures in agriculture, village and small industries and in non-farm occupations are to be encouraged. 834 items have already been reserved for production exclusively in the small-scale sector and 379 items have been reserved for production exclusively purchase from small-scale units.

Besides, it has been assumed that the Integrated Rural Development Programme would benefit about 3,000 poor families. Fifteen million families would be brought above poverty line by means of distribution of land. The Operation Flood II Dairy Development project and other similar projects would benefit about 13 million milk producing families during 1980-85. The Fish Farmer Development Agencies and Village and Small Industries Sector would benefit about 9 million. About 300 to 400 million mandays of employment per year during the plan period would be generated under the National Rural Employment Programme (NERP). Every year 2 lakh rural youth are to be trained for self-employment under the National Scheme for Training Rural Youth for Self-Employment (TRYSEM).

Apart from rural poor, the employment of educated manpower has been given special attention in the plan. It has been estimated that expansion of the various programmes in the primary sector-agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries and agro-forestry-to all states would require about 25,000 additional village-level workers. Over and above this, another 32,000 will be employed in agricultural research. The central schemes of agricultural census would provide additional employment to about 34,000 persons. The Operation Flood II has an employment potential of 1,67,000 persons during 1984-85, to be engaged in infrastructural support, technical input, supply and milk processing operations. The inland fishery project would provide opportunities for 2,40,000 persons, many of whom are likely to be educated. Moreover, block-level planning would also generate employment opportunities for the educated in work relating to survey, planning, monitoring etc.

In spite of these impressive figures given in the plan, the planners acknowledge that 'unemployment would not be eliminated in the Sixth Plan unless efforts are immediately made to make the

current unemployment more employable through short-term training, vocational programmes and special employment programmes directed towards their absorption.¹⁰ To promote self-employment, public institutions can provide assistance for training, credit, marketing and general guidance about the various facilities available to the people for starting their own ventures for organizing relevant services.

11.

This approach to the unemployment problem touches only one aspect of the problem—how many hours a day/a week a person gets work to earn his livelihood. However, the problem of invisible unemployment does not seem to have bothered the planners. According to some sources, disguised unemployment in 1941 was about 28 per cent of the total agricultural labour force. In 1954, C.D. Deshmukh, the then Finance Minister, told the Lok Sabha that it was to the tune of 15 million out of a total of 150 million. 12

In reality this problem has acquired gigantic form. Villagers leave their villages in search of jobs or the agents of contractors recruit them promising lucrative wages. In actual practice, these people are made to work long hours in inhuman and unsafe working conditions without adequate food and shelter. Labourers are recruited from distant places like Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and transported to Kashmir, Laddakh, NEFA, Sikkim, etc. site to do construction work. At the construction site the labourers are treated like slaves. The Minimum Wage Act is observed by violating it and they are not paid any compensation for injury or loss of life. A few such cases are reported which prove the ineffectiveness of the state machinery in providing social justice to the poor.

According to 1971 census, about 70 per cent (125.60 million) labour work force was engaged in agriculture. Out of these 78.17 million were cultivators and 47.49 million agricultural labourers. In 1961 about 131 million were engaged in agriculture, out of which 99.50 million were cultivators and 31.50 million agricultural labourers, 13 However, the percentage of agricultural labourers to cultivators has increased from 32 per cent in 1961 to 61 per cent in 1971. 14 In terms of numbers it jumped from 31.50 million in 1961 to 47.59 million in 1971, which reflects the pauperization trend in the countryside. In the industrial sector, too, the percentage of workers came down from 14.45 per cent of the total workers in 1961 to 13.58 per cent in 1971. This is due to a sharp declining trend in the household industries (6.39 per cent in 1961, 3.52 per cent in 1971).

THE INDIAN MODEL:

Soon after India's independence and China's liberation it was realized that without land reforms and eradication of poverty all-round development was not possible. In China land reform acquired the form of a mass movement and was completed by 1952. In India, it is yet to be achieved. Even the Sixth Five Year Plan stipulates that taking possession and distribution of surplus land should be completed within two years after the launching of the plan. However, as against 38.05 lakh acres identified as surplus, only 17.48 lakh acres have so far been distributed among the landless, though the states have taken possession of 25.02 lakh acres. 15 How much of this distributed land is in the actual possession of the landless in anybody's guess.

With land reform failing to make a dent on rural power structure, the rich have been the main beneficiaries of the development programmes. The poor have been reduced to the status of mere wage earners. With the increasing pauperization, the number of these wage earners is swelling, thus increasing the competition and decreasing the wages.

Like China India, too, initially concentrated on heavy industries, big dams, and large-scale mechanization which became a panacea for poverty, unemployment and backwardness. Unlike the light small-scale and cottage industries, the heavy industry's employment generating capacity is limited. It is estimated that in a heavy industry in the public sector Rs. 1 crore of gross investment gives employment to 98 persons, in chemicals and pharmaceuticals the corresponding figure is 67, and in heavy electricals it is 168. On the other hand, Rs. 1 crore gross investment in different industries in the light sector has much larger employment potential. For example, in cotton textiles (registered factories) Rs. 1 crore investment would generate about 1,458 jobs, the leather and fur products 1,492, electrical appliances 763, radios and TVs 857, and 496 in dry and wet batteries. In rural capital formation, assuming that Rs. 2,000 worth implements are needed for one worker with Rs. 1 crore investment, employment could be given to 5,000 persons. 16

Thus while the land reform programme could not give a new lease of life to the rural poor, the capital goods industries failed to generate enough jobs to absorb the surplus rural labour force. On the other hand, the construction of dams, establishment of big industries and mining and other operations have displaced a large number of people. According to an estimate between 1951-78, 146 major and 756 medium irrigation projects were started. Of these 40 major and 447 medium schemes were completed and others were partially commissioned.

While these hydroelectric projects have by and large been successful in meeting the increasing demand for electricity and the dams have increased the cultivated area under irrigation, the local people who were displaced by the construction of these projects have not benefited by them. The cash compensation paid by the government is much less than the market value of the land. Secondly, in the payment of this cash compensation the simple local people are cheated. 17 Thirdly the construction of these projects changes the local environment giving rise to various diseases of which the poor locals become victim. No provision is made to protect them from these diseases. Finally, the local people become victims of floods and landslides which have now become a common feature due to deforestation on the river catchment areas.

The establishment of heavy industries in backward areas is one aspect of the Indian model of development. Since the backward regions are rich in mineral wealth, establishment of these industries saves the cost of transportation, etc. Secondly, these establishments are supposed to develop the regions by facilitating the spread of a network of transport and communication and by generating employment in the industries and exposing the local people to the outside world. However, as the aforementioned Reports of Study Teams found, most of the skilled jobs are taken up by outsiders. The local people had excess to only unskilled jobs which were limited. 18

The locals have resisted the attempts to take away their individual or collective property. One such instance is the struggle waged by Naini (Allahabad) villagers. Their land was taken over to set up highly capital intensive and mechanized industries like Triveni Structures (TSL), Bharat pumps and Compressors (BPS), Indian Telephones Industries (ITI), displacing large number of villagers, who are working in distant villages as agricultural labourers. These villagers have been demanding jobs in these factories. 19 Similar is the case of Dhanbad's dispossessed peasants 20 and Bailadilla workers. 21 In Grahwal region, the local people under the Chipko campaign have resisted many such displacements.

The central and states governments have initiated various schemes small Farmers Development Agency (SFDA), Agency for Marginal Farmers

and Agricultural Labourers (MFAL), Rural Work Programme (RWP), Draught Prone Area Programme (DPAP), Crash Scheme for Rural Development (CSRDP), Pilot Intensive Rural Employment project (PIREP), Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS), etc.- to ensure continuity of employment and income to small and marginal farmers, landless agricultural labourers, artisans, person engaged in household occupations, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As most of these schemes are executed through the Contractual system, the money allocated is misappropriated by the contractors in connivance with local bureaucracy and vested interests. As far as the rural poor are concerned, these schemes are, in the words of Tarlok Singh, only 'relief' measures, not permanent solutions, to either employment or to poverty'.

The wages fixed under these schemes are very low. For example, under CSRE, wages were fixed at Rs.3.00 per day. In Maharashtra under EGS the wages were raised in 1974 from Rs.1.84 for an agricultural labourer and Rs. 1.79 for small cultivators to Rs.3 or 4.50 per day respectively. According to Raj Krishna's estimates the average actual per day wages varied from Rs. 1.38 to Rs.2.30. The various studies of these schemes have shown that these schemes have actually benefited the better off who own the largest portion of rural assets (the poorest 10 per cent in the countryside own only 0.1 per cent and the richest 10 per cent own more than half the total assets).²²

In a nutshell, while the development programmes displaced and pauperized the weaker sections, different schemes meant for their upliftment provided them only temporary relief at the subsistence level and put them at the mercy of the rich, who have made full use of these development schemes and have at various levels strengthened their control over the means of production. While these displace unemployed people work long hours, their wages have not risen above subsistence level.²³

The policy of production of and reservation for small-scale cottage industries have benefited the bidi makers, lace makers, matchstick makers and numerous other industries. As the work is done in homes, factory law and labour welfare measures do not apply to these workers, a majority of whom are women and children. Trade unions are yet to enter this unorganised sector which employs the largest section of the people. Numerous studies of the workers of unorganised sector have shown that, while they live at subsistence level, the women have put up with sexual harassment too. The margin of profit of the manufacturers goes on increasing, thus increasing their political influence too.²⁴

Due to this pauperization, illiteracy rates have also increased and a large number of children (over 15.25 million in March 1978) form the work force.²⁵ Most of them are engaged in tea gardens, cashew processing units, bidi and match industries and hotels. Thus, even the hope of improving the conditions of the next generation seems baseless. The aforementioned analysis shows that the western model of development adopted by India has neither ensured a balanced development nor helped in eradicating poverty and unemployment. In the following section an attempt would be made to see to what extent the Chinese model of development has succeeded in eradicating poverty and unemployment from China and ensuring a balanced development of the country.

THE CHINESE MODEL:

Like India, China also was poor and backward in 1950 with four-fifth of its population depending on agriculture, but only 10 per cent people occupied 70 per cent of total agricultural land. As described by Tawney, remaining rural population 'suffers horribly through the insecurity of life and property. It is taxed by one ruffian who calls himself a general, by another, by a third, and, when it has bought them off, still owes taxes to the Government It is squeezed by dishonest officials.

It must cut its crop at the point of bayonet, and hand them over without payment to the local garrison, through it will starve without them. It is forced to grow opium in defiance of law! 26

The industrial sector was very small, confined to coastal areas only. The Communist Party of China adopted the Soviet model of development, giving top priority to heavy industry. Accordingly, over 50 per cent of state funds were allocated to capital goods industries and only 6.2 per cent were allocated to agriculture. This increased the demand both for skilled and unskilled manpower in industrial sector. 27

The expansion of educational facilities and job opportunities in the industrial sector in the early 50s resulted in cityward mobilization of the vast mass of rural population. It is estimated that in 1949 the total agricultural population was 470 million. By 1956 it got reduced to 417 million. In 1957 the total urban population had jumped from 52.65 million in 1949 to 92.00 million. The steep rise in the strength of workers also explains this point. 28 In 1949 the total strength of industrial labour was 8,004 thousand, in 1955 it rose to 19,076 thousand and in 1957 it touched 24,506 thousand mark. 29

Thus during the First Five Year Plan, immense job opportunities were created in the industrial sector to provide employment to all able-bodied persons within the age group of 15-59 years. In 1949 four million jobless were reported in China (presumably in the cities). 30 By 1953, 207 million unemployed were reported to have found employment through government's assistance. By 1957 only 70,000 out of the four million remained unemployed. 31 However, Li Fuchun vice-Premier of the State state council in his 'Report on the First Five-Year Plan for Development of National Economy of the People's Republic of China', said that full elimination of unemployment and making full use of surplus labour power would require continued effort in the period of the Second and Third Plan. 32 According to Hou, in 1956 the total percentage of unemployment was about 9 per cent of the male population aged between 15-59. 33

On the agricultural front between 1950-52, land reform was carried out throughout China eliminating the landlord class and reducing the influence of the rich peasants. During the land reform movement, 700 mou (1 mou equal 1/6 acre or 1/15 hectares) of land was distributed among 300 million people. This constituted about 45 per cent of the total total arable land. Of all the land redistributed, two-thirds was taken from landlords and one-third from rich peasants. Two-thirds of this land was given to poor peasants and one-third to middle peasants. In the following Table, Peter Schran gives details about rural population, employment and labour days for 1950, 55, 57 and 59. In early fifties, the percentage of the rural population comprising the labour force tended to decline sharply owing to rapid absorption of children of school age in educational institutions. But in the latter half of the decade due to mobilization of women this trend was upset. 34

The land reform movement was followed by the formation of mutual-aid-teams. By 1954 over 10 million mutual-aid-teams of permanent or seasonal nature, comprising 58 per cent households, were in operation. 35 By 1956 almost all peasant families were organized into agricultural producers' co-operatives (APC). Thus, attempts were made to engage the peasants in the development of agriculture.

However, during this period, the expanding industrial sector absorbed the majority of jobseekers. This sector registered 19 per cent growth rate every year, absorbing about 14 million new job seekers. 36 By the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the employment situation in the industrial sector reached saturation point. This adversely affected the higher education of the vast majority of Chinese students. To undo the imbalances generated by giving top priority to heavy industry, the policy of walking-on-two-legs was enunciated in 1958. This meant that both industry and agriculture would be treated as on the same footing. However, heavy industry still got priority over light industry and agriculture.

TABLE 1
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(236)

1	2	3	4	5	6	
Year	Peasant Population	Total Employed peasant	Average annual labour days	Total annual labour days	Index of col.(4)	1952=100
1950	479.7m	222.6m	119.0	26.5a	97.5	
1955	523.8	243.3	121.0	29.4	108.4	
1957	541.5	260.3	159.5	41.5	152.8	
1959	539.6	309.1	189.0	58.4	215.0	
Collectivization						
1955-57	+17.5	+17.0	+38.5	+12.1	+44.4	
Communication						
1957-59	-1.7	+48.8a	+29.5	+16.9	+62.2	

NOTE: (a) Increase owing largely to increased mobilization of women and part-time employment of school children.

On the agricultural front this was compensated by initiating labour-intensive schemes like improving soil, increasing fertilizer, development of irrigation facilities, encouraging the practice of close planting, protection of plants, improving farm management and agricultural implements. In the industrial sector too, small, indigenous, labour-intensive plants were initiated. It was reported that in 1958, 3,00,000 small plants employing about 4.4 million workers were started. During 1959-60, the number of workers was 70 million. More than 67 million women were reported engaged in afforestation projects in 1958. In 1959 this number got reduced to 30 million, and 15 million were engaged in public sector (welfare) services. By the fall of 1959 more than 7 million were mobilized for road building. 37 As is widely recognized, these figures might be inflated. Nevertheless, during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) maximum utilization of available manpower was made and the city ward mobilization of the population continued. 35

In the following Table Peter Schran gives indices of the structure of rural employment by labour days:

TABLE -2
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INDICES OF THE STRUCTURE OF RURAL EMPLOYMENT BY LABOUR DAYS - 1950, 1955, 1957, and 1959 (39)

(Total Number of days in 1952= 100)

Year	Total Labour Days	Farm work	Subsidiary work (a)	Convey Basic Constru- ction	Others(b)
1950	97.5	75.2	19.2	3.1	0.0
1955	108.4	83.0	21.0	3.9	0.4
1957	152.8	113.4	25.0	9.7	3.8
1959	215.0	151.7	29.5	12.3	21.4

NOTE: (a) Includes gathering activities, domestic handicrafts, administration, professional services care of private plot and livestock;
(b) Includes collective affairs, communal services and communal industry.

The derailment of the national economy due to naturak and man-made factors compelled the CPC to redefine its economic priorities. Agriculture was now the foundation and industry the leading factor. 40 Thus 'top priority would go to those industrial pursuits that directly served agriculture, either by producing modern inputs for the sector or by processing outputs coming from it.' during the 1960s not only small industries directly serving agriculture were set up in the countryside, but whenever possible small basic industries like iron and steel making, Cement making, coal mining were also established. This was in a way an attempt to substitute traditional inputs in agriculture-labour, natural fertilizers, draft animals and traditional tools- by modern inputs- Chemical fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides, small hydroelectric plants, electric motors, rice transplanters, tractors, trucks, other machinery and seed improvement stations. "The agricultural task in 1960s was, in short, to industrialize and modernize rural areas. " 41

Thus while during 1960-75 employment opportunities in the urban industrial sector were drastically reduced, there was a surfeit of job seekers in the cities. It was reported that about 11 million persons would enter the labour market in cities during 1960-70. 42

To facilitate countryside mobilisation of this increasing labour force the party intensified the Going-up-to-the-Mountain-Down-to-the-countryside Campaign. Besides school and college graduates, people belonging to different cross-sections of the society were sent to the countryside for different durations. It was reported that between 1962-65, 40 million youth were transferred to the countryside. 43 The number of permanent settlers, however, is not known.

The policy of rustication of educated youth got a filip after 1968 and continued till 1976. It was reported that the total number of rusticated youth increased from 1.2 million in 1966 to 12 million in 1976. The recent initiation of the policy of four modernization--modernization of agriculture, industry, science-technology and national defence--aroused new hopes of comfortable city life among the Chinese youth. However, while educational opportunities, even going abroad for higher education, have increased, the modernization programme neither revoked the policy of rustication nor opened enough new vistas of employment for the already rusticated youth. The CPC and the Communist Youth League (CYL) only took note of the prevalent discontent among the rusticated youth. 44 And many conferences were called to discuss the ways and means of making the life of the educated youth comfortable. 45 These conferences made it clear to the youth that sending the surplus manpower to the countryside was essential to provide them jobs and for balanced development of the country. It was estimated that in 1979, after college enrollment, about 800,000 educated youth would have to go to the countryside. 46.

Disappointed by the party's attitude, the rusticated youth protested by organizing demonstrations, resorting to train hold-ups 47 and demanded suitable jobs in the cities. 48 The party leaders adopted a diplomatic attitude and put forward some remedial measures to make the living conditions better for the educated youth in the countryside. 49

In the meantime, attempts are being made to create more jobs in the cities for educated youth. According to the report of the State Bureau of Labour, more than 19.3 million young city youth and others were given jobs over the past three years (1977-78), out of which 9 million were given jobs in 1979 itself. However, the downward mobilization of the youth has continued. 50

Thus in 1950, the problem of channellization of youth energies for the balanced development of the country was a complicated problem for both China and India. During the last 30 years, China has to a large extent mitigated the income disparities of different classes of people and has by and large been able to give employment to its vast population at the minimum wage level. 51

24. See 'Bedi Workers of Nipani', EPW. vol. xiv, no 29, 22 July 1978, pp. 1176-78 and Times of India, 22 Jan & 12 April 1981.
25. See Indian Express, 7 May 1981.
26. Tawney, Land and Labour in China, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966 pp. 70-72.
27. See Ta Kung Pao, 29 Oct '1950 & The Ten Great Years, Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1960, pp. 192, 193, Current Background No 140, p. 6.
28. See Liu and Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Development 1933-59, Princeton, 1965. Also Eckstein et al. (ed), Economic Trends in Communist China, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1968, pp. 340-47.
29. See Ten Great Years, op. cit., p. 180.
30. See Ibid., p. 157.
31. See Ekstein (ed) Economic Trends in Communist China, op. cit p. 372.
32. 'Li Fuchun's Report' in Bowei (ed), Communist China 1955-59: Policy Document with Analysis Harvard University Press, Cambridge Harvard, 1962, p. 57.
33. See Hou Chi-ming, 'Manpower Employment and Unemployment' in Ekstein (ed) op. cit p. 373.
34. See Gurley, 'Rural Development in China 1949-72 & the Lessons to be Learned from It' in Edwards (ed), Employment in Developing Nations. Columbia University Press, NY, 1974, pp. 387-91.
35. See Ibid., p. 390.
36. See Ishikawa quoted by Wheelwright and MacFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism: Economics of the Cultural Revolution, Penguin, 1973, p. 41.
37. See Ekstein (ed) Economic Trends in Communist China, op. cit pp. 380-81.
38. See Editorial in People's Daily, 25 Aug '1960. also the Joint Publication "Research Service, no, 24464.
39. Quoted by Gurley, op. cit., p. 392.
40. See 'Communique of the Tenth Plenary Sessions of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China', Beijing vol. 5, no. 39, p. 9.
41. Gurley, op. cit., p. 393.
42. See Bernstein, up to the Mountain Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth From Urban to rural China, Yale University Press, Yale, 1967, p. 37.
43. See Wen Hui-pao, 12 Oct, 1963, Hong Kong; People's Daily, 12 September 1965, Beijing.
44. See Daily Report: People's Republic of China, vol. i, no 238 11 December 1978, pp. E16-E19.
45. See Ibid., no. 242, 15 December 1978, pp. E1-E4.
46. See Daily Report, no 163, 21 August 1978, pp. L4-L5.
47. See Ibid, No 030, 1 Feb '79, pp. G1-G3 & Xinhua News Bulletin, 73.
48. See Xinhua News Bulletin, 12 March, 29-30 Aug '79; Daily Report, op cit, no 172, 4 Sept '70, pp. L10-L11; Beijing Review, Vol 22, nos 18 & 37, 4 May and 14 Sept '79; pp. 20-28 & 5;
49. See Xinhua News Bulletin, no 11489, 29 June 1980.
50. See Xinhua News Bulletin, Hong Kong, 2 December 1980.
51. However, even during Maoist era, the problem of Unemployment and disguised unemployment remained. Now with large number of rusticated youth returning to cities, this has acquired the form of unemployment.
52. J.N. Sinha, 'Rural Employment Planning: Dimensions and Constraints', EPW, vol. xii, nos 6-7 (Annual Number), 1978, pp. 295-313.

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DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

This paper, written by Bjorn Hettne, department of peace and conflict research, University of Gothenburg, Swede, is a major contribution of the comparative study of Indian and Chinese models of development. The author bases his arguments on both the history and the concepts of development in both countries.

THREE STAGES IN THE APPROACH TO THE CHINESE MODEL

Why comparative studies of India and China? Let us first consider the changing concerns of this early established field. In the fifties and early sixties India and China were often regarded as two great Asian experiments, one democratic, the other totalitarian, which could serve as models for other developing countries. Their growth record was the undisputed yardstick showing the viability and effectiveness of the two systems.

From the mid-sixties and until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 for different reasons the two experiments became increasingly incomparable. One reason was that the Chinese government had stopped releasing statistical figures in 1959. Another was that China, due to a combination of lack of information and an over-enthusiastic response from the 'new left' in the west, was thought to be moving toward some kind of utopia. At the same time India entered a period of economic stagnation and recurrent political crises ending up with the Emergency of 1975-6, which demolished the last argument in India's favour: the democratic facade.

We have now, as it seems, reached a third phase of comparative studies of India and China. After the 1977 election friends of India again raise their voices stating that, after all, the strength of the democratic system has been amply demonstrated. Simultaneously the present rulers of China are denouncing the Maoist experiment as a 'lost decade', while facing a spontaneous movement calling for a fifth modernization: democracy. This new situation will most probably modify the assumptions involved in comparative studies of the two countries but it is too early to say exactly in what way. Optimistically, the 'competitive' approach will never be revived, it is also doubtful if an overall comparison of economic performance is of much value. The differences in historical background, in resource endowment, in climate and ecology are so great that such an exercise would hardly be very rewarding. More fruitful comparisons could for example deal with specific economic sectors or organisational structures, where the major biases can be eliminated. We would also suggest that general thematic comparisons, where historical and other differences enter the analysis as explanatory factors, should be made to a larger extent. This has been attempted in the present essay, where we are exploring the ideas of 'self-reliance' versus 'modernization' in the context of Indian and Chinese history.

In the contemporary discussion on development strategies, particularly in the context of the New International Economic Order, one often comes across these two fundamentally different competing perspectives. We do not see them as incompatible, although those who are

ideologically committed to one or the other may feel so. Rather they are conceived as dialectically interrelated, which implies that they have a corrective effect on each other.

According to the modernization-perspective, development in the Third world is necessarily a repetition of the historical experience of contemporary industrialized countries. This Western world view is shared by Liberalism and Marxism alike. 1 The most naive expressions of this development paradigm have, it is true, been demolished; but the basic notions, particularly as regards technology in relation to modern industry, remain, for obvious reasons, very relevant. It may be argued that technology is somehow more 'universal' than for example a political institution, but we feel nevertheless that the form and content of technology is so deeply influenced by a specific culture that a certain technology also implies a certain social structure. Thus, 'modernization' will here be used more or less as a synonym of 'Westernization', and it is important that this specific meaning of the term is kept in mind.

The other perspective is less imitative and more indigenous, it conceives the real meaning of development as a progressive change and improvement of given structures rather than development through 'creative destruction'. Self-reliance, as opposed to both dependence and imitation, is a crucial concept within this tradition. The ideology of local self-reliance in particular, emphasizing rural development, is commonly but not universally referred to as 'populism'. One reason to be careful with this word is that it has different connotations in Asia and Africa on the one hand and Latin America 2 on the other. However, the concept is hard to avoid, as it in our view constitutes a 'third dimension' in development thinking, it questions the primacy of technology and industrialism, so characteristic of both Marxist and Liberal development thinking, and stresses instead the human potential. In stressing the need for a maximum of local self-reliance and in attempts to solve the rural-urban contradiction, populism, furthermore, rejects the notion centralized solutions. It is our contention that 'Maoism' and 'Gandhism' to a large extent embody these populist ideas in China and India, and that they therefore constitute two similar albeit far from identical, models of development. In both countries they serve as alternatives to the more conventional modernization paradigm.

In both India and China the self-reliance strategy and the modernization strategy have been dialectically related to each other largely in way in which they affect the social power structure. This relationship is shown in Figure 1.




FIGURE 1

Thus, in order to explain why a particular development strategy is adopted, one must account for the power structure and the way various established institutions and groups attempt to promote their own interests. Certain economic policies will, on the other hand, affect the power structure in such a way that the economic structure is changed as a result. This also implies a change in the relationship between social groups. Thus there will always be a continuous progress of adaptation between the development strategy and the power structure, resulting in more or less dramatic 'swings' in development policies. This further implies that there may be a difference between the formulation of a strategy and its actual implementation. The more heterogeneous the power structure, the greater this difference will be as is amply illustrated by the cases of India and China.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF DEVELOPMENT THINKING: A) THE QUEST FOR MODERNIZATION

As emphasized above, 'modernization' implies a comparison between two units, and the development perspective associated with this concept is that the unit which is found to be 'old-fashioned' should try to catch up with the unit which is more 'advanced'. Because of the international power-structure created by imperialism, this comparison, along with the obvious conclusion to 'modernize', was more or less forced upon the non-European world. 3 The choice was between modernization and destruction by imperialist powers. The latter was the inescapable fate for small-scale isolated and technologically 'primitive' societies. On the other hand, the great agrarian civilizations, with more developed political superstructures, where the challenge could be assessed and some remedy be thought of, had a possibility of escaping destruction. Japan is of course the great and so far only example of a society which accepted the challenge, modernized, and was able to beat the imperialist countries on their own terms.

Both India and China were deeply affected by Western imperialism and the response to the Western challenge has a long and complex history. Since India was colonized at a very early stage (before industrialism and modern imperialism), she never the opportunity to follow the Japanese example.

The case of China lies somewhere between those of India and Japan as far as the imperialist challenge is concerned. Unlike India, China was never colonized in the strict sense of the word, although a number of imperialist powers carried out their policies with very little regard to the Chinese government. Unlike Japan, China was therefore unable to avoid imperialist control. The Self-strengthening Movement in the nineteenth century was too weak to follow the Japanese example. One of the reasons for its weakness is that it was opposed by the reasons for its weakness is that it was opposed by the Imperial court, another is that the early modernizers were themselves very ambivalent in their approach to modernization. In the introduction we mentioned that technology was inseparable from culture and society. This fact was not quite realized by the early 'self-strengtheners' of China. They were traditional Confucian scholars advocating 'Chinese learning for the substance, Western learning for practical application.' 4 They entertained the hope that Western military technology might be mastered by skilled artisans and craftsmen, so that the Chinese literati could devote themselves to more important things. It is significant that the emergence of 'Western studies' was conceived mainly as an alternative for those whose path to an official career had been blocked. 5

A less ambivalent attitude toward modernization and Westernization was held by the leaders of the May Fourth Movement (1917-21) the purpose of which was to maintain the existence and independence of China as a nation. To the young intellectuals who were in the lead it had become clear that conservatism and traditionalism (Confucianism) now had to be scrapped altogether. The worship of the old was replaced by enthusiasm of the new, i.e., Western knowledge and ideas. 6 As we shall see this instrumental approach to Westernization and modernization dies hard in China.

In India the cultural conflict between Western-type modernization and various forms of traditionalism has perhaps a longer and more violent history than in China. As a fully colonized country India has felt the British cultural impact since the middle of the nineteenth century, when a radical modernization policy was started (particularly under Dalhousie 1848-50). The Mutiny of 1857 can be seen as traditionalist and revivalist response to that policy. This uprising was subdued, however, and the later struggle against colonialism operated from a very different intellectual content. As an instrument of this struggle the Indian National Congress was formed in 1885. Most leaders of this organisation were influenced by Western constitutional ideas, and as the emphasis of the agitation gradually turned from political to economic issues, the British were held responsible for the poverty of India. This was the thrust of Dadabhai Naoroji's celebrated 'drain theory'. 7 Significantly it was not, however, British rule but the 'un-British' rule that had created the poverty in India. There was nothing wrong with the liberal principles of Britain. The problem was rather that the British in India did not adhere to them.

The ideals of modernization thus became part of the freedom struggle where they competed with Gandhi's ideals of self-reliance and Hindu revival. The former conquered the Indian modern elite, while the latter were more instrumental in mobilizing the masses. This dualism has characterized the Congress Party ever since. In the thirties there was furthermore, a split among the modernizers between those who preferred capitalist methods and those who believed in socialism and, more specifically, in the Soviet model of development. Much of the political controversy in India has occurred between these two ways of modernization, whereas the 'Gandhists' have been rather passive since the death of Gandhi in 1948 and until recently. We shall return to this matter below.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF DEVELOPMENT THINKING : B) THE ROOTS OF SELF RELIANCE THINKING

Whereas the quest for modernization by definition implies an effort at catching up with 'advanced' nations, self-reliance is, although normally inspired by an external challenge, a more indigenous kind of development thinking, and therefore more difficult to account for. The most simple approach is, of course, to look at the two great personalities which personify self-reliance thinking in India and China, Mahatma Gandhi and Mao Zedong, but it should then be remembered that each belongs to a specific ideological tradition.

India and China are old, proud, and self-conscious civilizations and it is only to be expected that self-reliance thinking should be particularly strong and elaborated here. Possibly the strongest tradition in this respect is that of China, which regarded the rest of the world as 'barbarian' and only through force could be made to trade with the West. The traditional Chinese attitude to foreigners is clearly expressed in the famous edict of Qian Long to the King of England in 1793, from which the following passage is quoted.

As to the request made in your memorial, O king, to send one of your nationals to stay at the Celestial Court to take care of your country's trade with China, this is not in harmony with the state system of our dynasty and will definitely not be permitted. Traditionally people of the European nations who wished to render some service under the Celestial Court have been permitted to come to the capital. But after their arrival they are obliged to wear Chinese court costumes, are placed in a certain residence, and are never allowed to return to their own countries. This is the established rule of the Celestial dynasty with which presumably you, O king, are familiar. Now you, O king, wish to send one of your nationals to live in the capital, but he is not like the Europeans, who come to Peking as Chinese employees, live there and never return home again, nor can he be allowed to go and come and maintain any correspondence. This is indeed a useless undertaking. . . . As a matter of fact, the virtue and prestige of the Celestial Dynasty having spread far and wide, the kings of the myriad nations come by land and sea with all sorts of precious things. Consequently there is nothing we lack, as your principal envoy and others have themselves observed. We have never set much store on strange or ingenious objects, nor do we need any more of your country's manufactures. . . 8

This attitude goes a long way to explain why the Chinese 'modernizers', as discussed above, had a hard time. It is obvious that Western ideas became weapons in the struggle for power within China, and that there were some good political reasons for suppressing those who held it necessary for China to Westernize in order to survive. It is significant that the 'modernizers' who took power after the death of Mao used similar arguments, the only difference being that it is now the Soviet Union that figures as the main threat against Chinese survival. It has been pointed out that Mao comes from that Chinese tradition which is continental and agricultural—a tradition which sees China as a series of self-sufficient rural units, united by a central bureaucracy. This tradition is essentially anti-urban, anti-foreign, and anti-commercial. The Yuan-syndrome was basically a reemergence of this tradition, in a revolutionary mould. But new elements were added.

Gandhi's ideas on economic development were not derived exclusively (or perhaps in this case not even primarily) from the Hindu tradition, he was in fact heavily influenced by the Western, especially Russian populist tradition. Like the economics of populism, Gandhian economic thought can only be understood as a counter-theory to Western economics. From Tolstoy, Gandhi borrowed the concepts of egalitarianism, simplicity, and asceticism (the last two of course having their Hindu parallels), from Ruskin the emphasis on ethics in economic development, and from Kropotkin a hatred of economic centralization and bureaucracy. 9 Thus, the ideal for Gandhi was the rural economy. He visualized the society as being built up of circles of self-supporting and self-contained units, exchanging only necessary commodities with other villages, where they were not locally producible. Agriculture and handicraft based strictly on subsistence, in place of an economy of surplus, would be the foundations. Land should be communal property, and the implements and tools of a cottage industry should belong to the family traditionally engaged in it. Since, in this society, owners of the means of production would also be labourers, exploitation based on individual property would be impossible. 10

Mao, like Gandhi, was deeply rooted in the soil of his country, but in his case too the Western impact seems to have had a catalyzing effect on his ideas. Mao is often pictured as a Marxist-Leninist, but it is of importance to point out that the influence of Marxism came rather late in his life. Like Gandhi he was early influenced by the anarchist and populist thinking of Kropotkin, Bakunin and Tolstoy. 11

In fact the first great Chinese Marxist, Li Dazhao, who had a great impact on young Mao, seems to have been equally influenced by Russian Narodism and Marxism. 12 Even if he never directly studied the Narodnik writings he took a strikingly similar stand in emphasizing the village community and the need for the intellectuals to 'go to the people'. His Marxism, like later that of Mao, was therefore of a very unorthodox kind.

There is no denying that Mao was a Marxist. He himself said he was, so this is not the issue. However, he has been convincingly argued by Maurice Meisner, the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and Maoism is a rather ambiguous one. 13 According to Meisner the influence of Marxism-Leninism never completely overwhelmed the populist strain in China and, furthermore, a powerful populist impulse was to become an integral component of the Maoist version of Marxism. One of the fundamental characteristics of Maoism is the still unresolved tension between Leninist-type elitism and the populist belief that the peasantry possess an innate socialist consciousness. 14 In the case of Gandhi we find the populist ideology in its more pure form. 15 It could be argued that what differentiates Maoism from Gandhism is Marxism and that what Mao and Gandhi have in common is populism. 16 The common elements in Gandhism and Maoism have lately become more widely acknowledged and comparisons between them are no longer rare. 17 At least the Soviet Marxist characterizations of Gandhi and Mao are more or less the same, both being described as protagonists of petty bourgeois nationalism and voluntarism.

Comparisons are always highly suspect, since two phenomena may seem different or similar depending upon what aspects are considered. Here we are more concerned with similarities than differences, and it is particularly the problem of self-reliance which is in focus.

Galtung has observed that self-reliance primarily belongs to the realm of psycho-politics. 18 Gandhi and Mao gave the ordinary Indian and Chinese self-respect, dignity, and the capacity to defend themselves. 19 One of the first concerns of both men was with the image of weakness projected by imperialism on India and China. 20 Both Gandhi and Mao realized the 'modernity of tradition', i.e. they were innovative traditionalists. Gandhi often referred to Ram Raj, and Mao spoke of Da tong; these were the two utopias in the classical Indian and Chinese traditions. Neither Mao nor Gandhi believed that material incentive could be a prime mover for individual effort and efficiency. Both were anti-elitist in the classical populist sense and both wanted to narrow the distinctions between physical and manual labour, between cities and countryside, and between workers and peasants. 21 Gandhism and Maoism are also alike in the emphasis on simple living and identity with the poorest. The loincloth and the 'Yanan way of life' are symbols that have different historical settings but are similar in substance. 22 Finally, the communes of Mao and the village communities of Gandhi (stripped of the differences in ideological approaches) practically amount to the same thing. According to Sethi, this is one of the most remarkable points of similarity between the two. 23

THE POWER STRUCTURES OF INDIA AND CHINA

The main reasons for the different emphases in the Indian and Chinese development strategies should of course be looked for in the different power structures of the two countries. By this term we refer to the relative importance of various classes and institutions in the decision-making process (and their changes over time), rather than the more formal distribution of power as expressed in the constitutions. We shall confine ourselves to those components of the power structures which are identified in the simplified model 24 in Figure 2.

This model (Figure 2) is no substitute for class analysis but it identifies more or less institutionalized spheres of interests which acquire meaning only insofar as they are related to the class structure of society. This can, however, be only crudely attempted here.




FIGURE 2

The dominant parties in India and China have been the Congress Party and the Communist party. The Congress Party had suffered a great setback in 1967, split in 1969 and was almost demolished in 1977. It has, in terms of voters, a middle-class, worker, and peasant base, but its leadership has all along been dominated by a Westernized elite, of which one segment has had capitalist and another, much smaller one, socialist leanings. This heterogeneous and somewhat paradoxical structure should be seen against imperialism: penetration never developed toward social revolution as it happened in China, but relied instead on Gandhi's charisma as well as local patronage structures, which of course were not very revolutionary. The orthodox facilitated this reformist strategy.

The recent breakdown of the Congress Party should not be over-dramatized. It is very likely that the party may be restored. The Janata party, which took over as the 'dominant party', has functioned much in the same way, represented essentially the same interests, and was in fact partially based on segments of the disintegrating Congress Party. The difference between Janata and Congress is thus one of emphasis within a ruling coalition of classes and elite groups. During the Emergency (1975-6) segments of the industrial bourgeoisie, had the upper hand, whereas the rural rich, particularly the 'kulak' elements, occupied a corresponding position in the Janata government. However, Janata was never a homogeneous political force. It was rather a delicately balanced and continuously changing alliance system.

After a less successful phase of organizational work in the urban areas the Communist Party of China became primarily a peasant movement, mobilized by the issue of land reform and by the rather unorthodox (populist-inspired) policy of the party under Mao's leadership. Immediately after the revolution the recruitment policy again shifted toward the bourgeoisie and the intellectuals, and the characteristic dualism (red versus expert) took shape. The cultural Revolution (1966-9), which almost destroyed the party, was intended to reduce the 'expert' element. Since the army was instrumental in maintaining law and order a conflict between the army (Lin Biao) and the party (Zhu Enlai) became unavoidable. The party was obviously the more successful actor and has now been re-established as the dominant political force in China—together with the bureaucracy.

The administration is of course formally in charge of executing political decisions but it also has a certain autonomy. Both India and China have long and complex bureaucratic traditions. In India the colonial administration was taken over almost intact, and only the local administration (Panchayati Raj) is a later innovation. There has always been a tension between politicians and administrators, though this does not exclude a certain symbiotic relationship. During

the Emergency (1975-6 an 'administrative society', similar to the political system of the colonial era, was reestablished, but this was not of long duration. The administrative structure in India is and has always been extremely centralized and the bureaucrats of course have a stake in this system. The same is the case in China, where a clear tension exists between the mandarin tradition on the one hand and the antielitism manifested in Mao's thought on the other. After Mao there has been a most forceful revival of bureaucratic power.

CHARISMA: is perhaps a controversial concept, but somehow one has to account for the remarkable power to influence the flow of events that has been exercised by exceptional leaders like Mao and Gandhi. Of course their 'charismatic power' was not equally influential on all groups and categories but should be explained by reference to cultural traditions and class interests. 26 Charisma reflects a social relationship rather than a psychological quality, and the strength of charisma is therefore explained by the expectations raised by certain leader in his 'followers'. The character of charisma is determined by cultural factors, such as the stress upon moral purity and self-denial in Hindu tradition or heroism and struggle in Chinese tradition. It is difficult to see how the cultural Revolution would have been possible without Mao, or the demolishing of the Congress Party without Jayaprakash Narayan, applying basically Gandhian technique of political change.

The military has so far been of direct political importance only in China, but it has been intimated that Indira Gandhi after the catastrophic 1977 election actually asked the military to take over. 27 The Indian military is extremely professionalized, however, and does not seem to harbour political ambitions. One student of the Indian army notes that 'possibly no other group in south Asian society is so critical of politicians on particular issues, and yet is so strong in its support of the political system.' 28 The contrast with Chinese army is striking. The people's Liberation Army (PLA) has been both a political and military organization, besides being a production force all in line with the T'ang way, and enforced by Mao against the 'professionals'. The Korean War boosted the latter view, as did Soviet aid to the specialized branches, dependent as they are on modern technology. The Great Leap and Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, reinforced 'guerrillaism'. This, however, has again changed after the demise of Lin Biao, and in the future the army will also be 'modernized.'

Foreign interests, finally, is admittedly a somewhat cryptic term but here we refer primarily to other nations which by diplomatic and other means attempt to influence the internal policies of a certain country. In the case of India these interests have, as well shall see, been quite formidable in spite of India's rather independent foreign policy. Typically they have operated through the mechanisms of financial dependence in periods of foreign exchange constraints. In the case of China, the policy of self-reliance implied a break with the Soviet Union, and it is an open question whether the modernization strategy recently adopted will lead to a new dependence. If so, the dependence will not be upon the Soviet Union.

Now, to summarize the implications for 'self-reliance' versus 'modernization' of the Indian and Chinese power structures, there is, particularly in the Indian case, a heavy bias in favour of modernization. Initially there was a cleavage between the Congress party and the bureaucracy, and between the bureaucracy and the business class (the former mainly Brahmins, the latter merchant castes and minorities), but gradually there have emerged close ties between party and business, while the cleavages have been bridged, thus creating a solid establishment bent on industrialization and modernization. Already in 1956 (at the height of 'socialism') it was clear that the

publicsector versus the private sector was a minor issue, and that most important business concerns willingly accepted government participation in management without any fear of vigorous extension of governmental activity for example in the field of heavy industry. The struggle between 'capitalism' and 'socialism' has therefore been a matter of emphasis rather than principle and both ideologies share the same modernization paradigm. To the 'modernization forces' must be added the military, whose modernization was emphatically stressed after the 1962 debacle against the Chinese, and whose increased strength became clearly visible in the war against Pakistan in 1971. The Gandhian elements, on the other hand, rapidly declined in political importance after the death of Gandhi. His selected heir, Vinoba Bhave, emphasized the metaphysical aspects of Gandhism rather than the practical-political aspects, and in doing so he led the Gandhian movement into the desert.

Jayaprakash Narayan (in India known as J P) much later rediscovered the political struggle component and, now also supported by the bulk of the Sarvodayaists, achieved a remarkable revitalization of Gandhism which put an end to the rule of the Congress.

In China too the strength of self-reliance has been primarily connected with the charismatic factor, but in contrast with Gandhi, Mao lived long enough to create a very distinctive political tradition. In this he evidently had the support of the old core of the army, who continued to believe in the Yanan way, as well as those many students who came from non-academic backgrounds and therefore rejected the elitism of the universities. In the peasants, Mao of course also had a rather secure base. On the other hand he was often opposed by the urban interests, proletarian and nonproletarian, as well as the more orthodox communists within the party, the bureaucracy at large, and parts of the military, eagerly waiting for modernization. This makes the balance between modernization and self-reliance a little more even in China than in India. However, in both cases the odds against a radical policy of indigenous development and self-reliance must ultimately be considered as rather heavy.

THE DIALECTICS OF DEVELOPMENT:

After the above presentation of the two contending views on development, and having discussed, in a sketchy way, the power-structures in India and China, it should now be possible to put things together and see how the opposites interact. This will give concrete form to the development process in the two countries. It has been fairly common to give a dialectically inspired exposition of the changes in development strategy in China, whereas this approach is less common in the case of India. 30 The reason for this may be that those who analyse the development in China may be influenced by Mao's own dialectic view of things, but it is also very clear that the oscillations are more pronounced in the case of China, where the alternative lines have been 'capitalist' versus 'socialist' modernization, whereas the emergence of the JP-movement in the early seventies was never fully articulated as an alternative development path. Gandhian policies, as for example the Community Development programme, have been emphasized now and then, but never as part of a consistent development strategy. Thus the pendulum movement in the Indian case is somewhat distorted by the fact that there is a triangle of policies, 'capitalism', 'socialism', 'Gandhism', which operates within the framework of a 'modernization system'. 31 These terms are here used in a contextual way, which means that they have limited meaning outside a concrete Indian or Chinese situation. 'Modernization' and 'self-reliance', as defined above, are on the other hand here used as universal concepts which may serve our comparative purposes. Thus in India 'capitalism' and 'socialism' represent two varieties of modernization, while 'Gandhism' is the Indian form of self-reliance thinking. In China 'revisionism' represents modernisation and 'Maoism' self-reliance.

Let us now define the dialectics of development, first for India and then for China. 32

INDIA: CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND GANDHISM:

Even before independence the three development paths of Capitalism, Socialism and Gandhism were widely discussed in India. Three plans containing these diverse approaches were presented in the forties: the Bombay Plan, expressing the visions of the industrialists, the People's Plan, emanating from the socialist camp, and the Gandhi Plan, written by disciples of Gandhi.

In this way the heterogeneity of the Congress was clearly reflected in the development debate. When the First Plan was announced it became clear that the capitalist forces led by Sardar Patel had been the strongest. This plan was extremely pragmatic and may be described as a combination of Capitalist and Gandhian elements, the most conspicuous example of the latter being the Community Development Programme. However, there was very little Gandhian about the implementation of this programme, which was a completely bureaucratic exercise.

Only during the Second Five Year Plan (1956-61) was it possible to speak of a consistent development strategy. The plan had been formulated by P.C. Mahalanobis, inspired by the Soviet Model. This implied emphasis on large industries and public ownership, i.e. modernization in the socialist way. Even in agriculture a 'socialist pattern' of economic development was stated as a goal in the Nagpur resolution passed by the Congress in 1959.

This shift to the left had been facilitated by the death of Sardar Patel, by the successful elections in 1951-2, and by the encouraging economic development during the First Plan. It is also very likely that Nehru's visit to China in 1954 had played its part. All this contributed to a strengthening of the hands of Nehru, who in turn left much of the responsibility of the planning process with Mahalanobis. The approach in the plan was, however, extremely theoretical, and reflected current ideas on the basic importance of capital accumulation as the sine qua non of development. In international finance circles the radicalism of the Second Plan was never much appreciated, and when India in the late fifties lived through an acute payment crisis, the world Bank and other agencies of international capitalism were able to exercise a certain influence over the economic policies of the Indian government.

The Second Plan failed miserably in mobilizing resources for the ambitious investment and growth targets. On the whole the planning exercise in India has been quite unrealistic, and after the Second Plan, which may be considered the only 'real' plan, the tendency has been a ritualization of the planning exercise.

THE THIRD PLAN: (1961-6) was basically a repetition of the general objectives of the Second Plan, but turned out to be even less successful. In the midsixties there was a decisive shift to the right in economic policy, this can be seen most clearly in the sphere of agriculture. The Green Revolution meant that Gandhian agrarian policies given up altogether. The emphasis was now on productivity rather than the creation of self-reliant village communities, and the organizational model of this modernization policy was clearly the capitalist firm. The Nagpur resolution was quickly forgotten. The reasons for this the shift to the right were: the death of Nehru and the rise of the Syndicate, the political organization of Indian conservatism in the Swamtra party, the reduction of federal power, monopolism in the private sector, and, again, an increasing influence of foreign (US) interests, as shown for example in the devaluation of the rupee in 1966.

The shift in development policies had important social and political consequences. In the late sixties the social tensions both in the countryside and in the cities increased dramatically (Naxalism, strikes, riots etc.). A crisis within the Congress led to a split Congress -O and Congress-R and the rise of Indira Gandhi in the elections of 1971 and 1972 to a position of power comparable to that of her father. At that time many expected a straightening-up of the political system under the banner of 'socialism'. India approached the Soviet Union, and Congress (R) received full support from the Communist Party of India (CPI), but in practice very little changed. Indira Gandhi's great alliance was based on political 'outsiders' who were given an opportunity to replace the old State bosses, who formed the Syndicate, with the result that corruption reached new heights. The Fifth Plan was launched under great controversy regarding its degree of realism. Whatever realism there was, it disappeared during the oil-crisis of 1973-4. After 1971 the Green Revolution also lost momentum and agricultural production began to fall, this contributed to the price rise. All this led to a political crisis in 1973-5, which saw the growth of the JP-movement (a Gandhian movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan) and ended with the Emergency of 1975 and 1976.

The JP-movement, which started in early 1974 in Bihar, was the first serious challenge that the Congress regime had faced since independence. It represented a resurgence of Gandhian political activism after more than 25 years of passivity. As mentioned above this passivity was caused by the particular interpretation of Gandhism made by Vinoba Bhave, but in the early 1970s many Sarvodayites, led by JP, challenged Bhave's view. The 'constructive approach' was, they felt, not sufficient. Political struggle was also necessary. 33

The Sarvodaya organization was, however, too weak (except perhaps in Bihar) to carry out JP's 'total revolution', and therefore JP made use of the organized political opposition to attain the necessary infrastructure. The Gandhian element in the JP-movement became more and more diluted as the movement was elevated from its original Bihar context and transformed into an all-India movement. In spite of this the political establishment was alarmed, and on 26 June 1975 the President of India declared a state of national emergency due to 'Internal disturbances'. Though the Emergency was the result of an acute political crisis there were of course underlying economic causes, which in a summary way may be described as a contradiction between the transactional form of political system ('politics of distribution') and the stagnating economy. A more authoritative approach was therefore felt to be necessary, since there was now less to distribute. As the Emergency was not a very sudden change however. It had been preceded by nearly a decade of increasing authoritarianism and police violence.

During the Emergency Indira Gandhi made desperate efforts to get the general political and economic crisis under control. Thousands of political opponents were imprisoned and a 20-point programme was launched to solve the economic problems. This was adhocism (which may be said to have started with Indira Gandhi's 'Stray Notes on the Economy' at the 1969 Bangalore meeting of the Congress Party) in its most pronounced form. There was no consistency whatsoever in the programme, but it implied a straightening-up in the administration, which led to a tension between certain officials and the rural elite. 34 On balance the Emergency was more beneficial to the industrial than to agricultural interests. The enforcement of the family planning programme (not included in the 20 points), and the rough way in which it was implemented, backfired on the Government, which was already in a process of disintegration caused by the activities of the Indian 'Gang of Four' (Sanjay Gandhi and his associates),)

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The reasons for Indira Gandhi's decision to hold elections in 1977 are still rather obscure. She may have been unaware of the real state of public opinion, or she may have found it healthy to dissociate herself from the 'Gang of Four'. In any case the election destroyed the Indian dominant party, which in itself was a most remarkable outcome. A 'new' party emerged after the election to take over government responsibility. This organization, the Janata Party, was a most unusual and peculiar political configuration, and the most unbelievable thing about it was perhaps that a GANDHIAN economic programme was announced by the new government. This needs some clarification.

As discussed above, the Indian political scene in 1974 and 1975 was dominated by the JP-movement. A distinction should be made between on the one hand, the movement as such, which was more or less Gandhian, was mainly student-based, and relied on the Sarvodaya organization for its core leadership and, on the other hand, the greater political alliance surrounding it. This alliance was composed of most of the opposition parties, from the Communist Party of India (Marxist), whose attitude was rather ambivalent, to Congress (O), with the Socialists and the Jan Sangh constituting the more enthusiastic core. (The Indian Socialists maintain certain Gandhian traditions, and the Jan Sangh had recently gone through a face-lift which made its outlook rather Gandhian too). Another party, Bharatiya Lok Dal, was mainly a North Indian 'kulak' party. Most of Janata's and in the South, even in the great debacle of 1977, Congress fared rather well.

What kind of economic programme was the new government pushing? Janata's election manifesto had spoken out against 'elitism, consumerism, and urbanism'. Light industry was preferred to heavy industry and rural to urban. It was, furthermore, necessary to steer away from both capitalism and socialism. A typical passage read:

Cities have their place, but, if rural India cannot provide economic opportunity and creative outlets for the growing masses in the countryside, we will be forced along the capital intensive, urban-oriented, and centralized path of development followed in the West. The experience of the last three decades has only underlined the relevance and validity of the values that Gandhiji placed before us. 35

After the election the Janata government's economic declaration turned out to be much more vague:

In the economic sphere the government is pledged to the removal of destitution within a definite timeframe of 10 years. Relative neglect of the rural sector has created a dangerous imbalance in the economy leading to migration of people from rural areas to urban centres. The farmer has been denied reasonable and fair prices for his products. Allocations for agriculture and related developments have been grossly inadequate and the need to improve conditions in the villages has received scarce attention. More than a lakh of villages do not even have the most elementary facilities for drinking water. My government will follow an employment-oriented strategy in which primacy will be given to the development of agriculture, agro-industries, small and cottage industries especially in rural areas. High priority will also be given to the provisions of minimum needs in rural areas and to integrated rural development. To the extent possible at this point of time, the fifth five year plan will be reviewed. The planning process will be revitalized and work on the sixth five year plan will be taken up without delay. My government will announce at the time of the presentation of the final budget later this year the details of the economic programme that is proposed to be followed. 36

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In early 1978 the Government released the draft 'sixth plan' (1978-83), a new kind of rolling plan, which differed from previous plans in that it should be continuously revised. In presenting the plan in Lik Sabha the Prime Minister said that it was 'necessary to go on assessing the implementation of the plan from year to year in order that shortfalls in implementation can be corrected and effective attention given to priorities', 37 The emphasis on agriculture (43 per cent of total outlay) and rural industries was maintained in this document, it was described by the opposition as 'most retrograde and reactionary', as it 'threatened to reverse the process of industrialization and take the nation back to the colonial era'. The Prime Minister explained that the government's aim was to reduce dependence on outside help and achieve self-sufficiency. We also stressed that in the past the plans remained unimplemented to a large extent because of lack of involvement of the people. Now the government would organize panchayates and municipal ties on a 'partyless basis' to ensure involvement of 'all people' in the implementation of schemes for agriculture, cottage industries, and other rural developments.

The bold programme of self-reliance incontrovertibly implies a fundamental change in the development strategy. The heavy odds against its implementation stem not only from the lack of unity within the government but also from various structural constraints. The most obvious constraint is that the existing income distribution is not compatible with a re-orientation towards a decentralized domestic production. Second, it is not possible to allocate production quotas to large-scale, small-scale, and cottage industries without substantial state interference. Third, the discussion of 'appropriate technology' has overlooked the time-lags involved in infusing adequate organizational, managerial and entrepreneurial inputs into cratic structure of Indian society will possibly make the fate of the new panchayat policy similar to that of the Community Development in the 1950s.

Let us now turn to the political constraints. In order to assess the realism of that kind of economic programme it is necessary to consider the political power structure at the time. This is summarized in Figure 3.

It should be emphasized that the figure only summarizes the institutional conflict pattern at the national level. Below the elusive surface of formal organizations there is an immensely complex social infrastructure of caste conflicts, class-struggle, religious tensions, and clashing economic interests, which differs in its concrete manifestations from one State to another. The power game that goes on in the superstructure is ultimately determined by this changing infrastructure, but the scope of the present essay does not allow an elaboration of these connections.

Even with regard to superstructures the model is much too simplified but a few comments will add the necessary nuances. To start with the Janata corner of the conflict triangle, the lifetime of the Janata government was a little more than two years. During these two years its energy was spent on a power struggle in which the leading parts were played by the prime minister Moraji Desai (former leader of Congress) and Charan Singh (leader of the Jat-Kulak party BLD).




FIGURE 3

The major factor keeping Janata together was the threat coming from Indira Gandhi. The Congress party had been split into Congress (I) and Congress (S), led by Swaran Singh, on the issue of her leadership. Indira Gandhi had used the comfortable position of Congress in the southern State of Karnataka as a base, but in July 1979 the Karnataka prime minister Devaraj Urs challenged her leadership, which resulted in still another 'congressparty', Congress (U). 39

As the third corner of the triangle we see the 'Gandhian' establishment dominated by Jayaprakash Narayan. The Gandhian activists in India are a nebulous category which included Sarvodaya workers engaged in the various activities which have their origin in Gandhi's Constructive programme. They number about 50,000 persons, attached to over 8,000 Gandhian institutions. 40 We have earlier referred to the split in the Sarvodaya movement between followers of JP and followers of Vinoba Bhave. It is necessary to make a distinction between the JP-movement and the Janata party in spite of the charismatic role of JP in forging the alliance that crushed the dominant party of India JP and his followers became more and more disillusioned with Janata government and from time to time JP spoke of starting a new movement, but his state of health did not permit this. In an interview with Geoffrey Obstergaard in January 1979 JP said: 41

It was another historical opportunity lost . . .
I don't know what new initiatives are called for
or are necessary. But some new initiatives have
to be taken by somebody . . . I'm out of the picture
now because of my illness.

It is obvious that the Gandhian image of the Janata Government to a very large extent was a concession to the role played by JP in the struggle against Indira Gandhi.

Even if the government had wanted to implement a Gandhian economic programme it was too paralysed by internal conflicts to accomplish much. Already in the summer of 1978 it was very close to breaking down, as Charan Singh was forced by Desai to leave the Cabinet, only to return as Deputy Prime Minister in early 1979. By summer the tensions burst out again, and this time it was Desai who had to resign after a wave of defections from the Janata Party. Charan Singh then took over the prime minister post but had to resign in August after Indira Gandhi had withdrawn her support. 42 Once again the 'old lady' turned out to be 'the crucial element around whom the whole political process is revolving'. 43

Indira Gandhi got what she wanted. A mid-term poll, expected to take place sometime in early 1979, was announced by president. A desperate power game in order to reorganise the large number of factions into viable political alternatives started. In the midst of this unprecedented political disintegration JP died, physically broken by his term in prison during the Emergency and psychologically broken by disillusionment from watching the performance of what mainly had been his creation, the Janata party. Was that the end of a self-reliant and indigenous approach to India's economic and social ills?

CHINA: MAOISM AND REVISIONISM

Initially the Chinese development strategy was little more than a copy of the Soviet model of development. It did not work in China, however. The reason was that the process of socialist accumulation had much earlier reached the limit of mass starvation in China than in the Soviet Union, and that many Chinese Communists, notably Mao' were not prepared to pay the political price that Stalin had paid.

Thus emerged the uniquely Chinese (and Maoist) Great Leap Forward in 1958. This development strategy, which included the organization of people's Communes, clearly expressed Mao's visions about the future Chinese society and the means to achieve it. There is a close correspondence between this strategy and the 'Yanan way of life', the society created by the Communists in the Liberated Areas during the forties. It immediately shook the relations with the Russians, who in 1960 discontinued their aid, thereby contributing to great leap-backward.

From 1959 when Mao found it necessary to leave the presidency to Liu Shaoqi, his position was weakened, and in the early 1960s a completely new development strategy emerged. It was not a return to the Soviet model since, for example, agriculture rather than heavy industry was emphasized. However, Mao's critics were anxious to minimize the conflict with the Soviet Union. The populist emphasis on the supreme knowledge of the people was rejected, and the party began to stress the crucial role of the intellectuals and the professionals in the development process. It was no longer considered essential for scholars to work in fields and factories. Rather they were encouraged to concentrate on studies. The hierarchical system of education was reintroduced at Peking University. Encouraged by the President, Liu Shaoqi, and the party Secretary, Deng Xiaoping, intellectuals severely criticized Mao's economic policies. These critics were mainly authors and artists, and the critique against Mao was consequently given an allegorical form. This is no doubt one reason why Mao's counter attack was a Cultural Revolution. Later this concept was incorporated into the Marxist doctrine as one of the more significant theoretical innovations of modern times.

Since Liu Shaoqi was Mao's foremost opponent during the Cultural Revolution, a comparison between the two is called for. 44 In spite of the outright repudiation of everything that Liu allegedly stood for, which accompanied his purge in the Cultural Revolution, there are reasons to believe that their differences were perhaps more in political style and method than in revolutionary goals. This is at least suggested by the fact that there is nothing which indicates that Liu did not believe in the Great Leap, though he in retrospect admitted that it had been a failure, which Mao never did. However, the methods used by the radicals in the Cultural Revolution were more than he could accept, since they implied the destruction of the party and the administrative machinery. In short Liu could never accept, nor could he understand the populism of the cultural Revolution. He had not experienced the mass campaigns in the ('red') areas and having been responsible for the political work in the 'white areas' during the war, he had had to 'empty "revolutionary" shouts, which have no practical meaning, must never be made'. The two varieties of communist experience in China—in the White and the Red areas—explain much of the two subsequent 'fronts' of the party: the bureaucratized, urban-oriented, technocratic, and Western-influenced group versus the more egalitarian, populist and more local-oriented group. Liu decidedly belonged to the former. Liu, intrusted on mobilizing workers. When he spoke of 'the masses' he meant workers, while Mao meant peasants. In a 1941 essay (The Class Character of Man) he spoke of the peasants' 'lax ways, conservatism, narrowmindedness, backwardness' in contrast with the 'solidarity, mutual co-operation sense of organization, and discipline' of the urban proletariat. 45

The personality types of Mao and Liu could not have been more different, but of course this in itself is no reason why they should have become political enemies. However, in an era of 'destructive creation', these differences were bound to develop into contradictory positions, a struggle between 'two lines'.

The Cultural Revolution was a rebitalization of Maoism. Assisted by the army, Mao cut the bureaucracy to pieces and all but crushed the communist Party. In terms of the Chinese power structure it was a strengthening of the military element. In terms of regional balance of power it was a strengthening of the Shanghai group. In terms of regional balance of power it was a strengthening of the Shanghai group. In terms of Marxist philosophy it pointed to the need for a continuous revolution in the superstructure of society, where there was a permanent danger of capitalist revivalism which could affect the socialist infrastructure as well. In terms of development strategy it was a re-emergence of populism and the indigenous Maoist model of development.

This model contains six important components. As its core we see the elimination of 'three unequal relationships': between city and countryside, between industry and agriculture, and between intellectuals and manual labourers.

Mao conceived these relationships as contradictions to be resolved in a dialectic process, resulting in completely new economic, social and political structures.

The model is furthermore based on the principles of self-reliance, participation (mobilization), and decentralization. Self-reliance, the antithesis of 'dependence', is one of the key concepts in the recent discussion on development and underdevelopment. It is not wrong to say that Mao was one of the great popularizers of the concept. It should not be interpreted as 'autarchy', but implies a high degree of reliance on one's own resources and, very important, autonomous goal-setting and decision-making. As we discussed above, self-reliance thinking has a long tradition in China.

Participation and mobilization have been characteristic features of Chinese economic policies under Maoist inspiration. It is not correct to evaluate these features primarily as means to development. They should also be regarded as ends in themselves, reflecting the Maoist emphasis on equality and popular involvement. The principle of decentralization is an application of the same values to regions and levels of administration.

This model was thus basically similar to that of the Great Leap Forward. How did it work out this time? In retrospect it looks as if the Cultural Revolution, like its predecessor the Great Leap Forward, had adverse effects on production. This was recognized already in 1968 in a frank speech by Zhou Enlai. Whereas the Great Leap Forward suffered its worst setbacks in the agricultural sector, it was now industrial production which was most severely affected. The Shanghai workers in particular had been extremely active during the Cultural Revolution, though their activism was more due to their own grievances than to any commitment to the revolutionary goals. The disruptive effects on industrial production reached a peak in 1967, and the level of production both in 1967 and 1968 was lower than in 1966. Only in 1970 was the situation normalized.

In contrast to the case of the Great Leap Forward the economic policies of the Cultural Revolution did not imply any great structural changes. The People's Communes were largely intact, and in spite of recurrent campaigns against material incentives the private plot was left undisturbed. The most radical changes seen to have taken place in the field of education, the stronghold of Chinese elitist tradition. Theoretical studies were now downgraded in favour of practical training. Each university was required to establish workshops and agricultural plots. Whereas the failure of the Great Leap Forward brought the expansion of small-scale industry to a halt, the Cultural Revolution was characterized by an increased emphasis on the development of a

local self-reliant industry. The functions of this industry included the utilization of agricultural raw materials, the training of a large rural industrial work force and the production of iron, cement, coal, and machinery required by the agricultural sector. 46 The trend toward decentralization could also be seen in the decreasing role played by the central ministries. 47

This emphasis on self-reliance suggested that such economic concepts as economies of scale, specialization, and comparative costs were largely ignored. However, in 1972-3 the economic policies of Maoism were again increasingly criticized. 1974-5 saw a counter-attack led by the infamous 'Gang of Four'. One of its manifestations was the campaign against Confucius, the real target of which seems to have been Zhou Enlai. In January 1975, at the Fourth National People's Congress, Zhou had given a speech on the Four Modernizations which can be seen as the programme of the moderate group. In 1976 both Zhou and Mao died, and the power balance thereby changed significantly. Without the support of Mao the radicals were isolated and their defeat a question of time.

SELF RELIANCE AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE GANG OF FOUR

Soon after 'the decisive victory over the Gang of Four' new economic signals appeared. In late 1976 a front page article in the People's Daily declared that China's new leadership intended to step up the nation's purchases of plant technology and capital equipment from abroad:

Stressing self-reliance does not mean that we advocate a closed-door policy, but we learn from the good experience and advanced science and technology of other countries and absorb them for our own use. . . 48

The People's Daily ridiculed the self-reliance of the Gang of Four' by referring to their alleged importation of pornographic films, and emphasized that 'economic and technical exchanges between countries with different social systems are completely normal activities'.

Obviously, the new leadership in Peking did not want to create an impression that a different development strategy was emerging. Therefore a famous speech originally made by Chairman Mao in 1956, entitled 'On the Ten Major Relationships' was used as the major policy document. 49 In this way the emerging policy was legitimized in the name of Mao, although it should be remembered that the situation in 1977 (when the document was first officially published in China) was very different from that in 1956. At that time Mao's mildly critical remarks about the Soviet development strategy secret), but in the light of later events the same observations sounded rather like praise for the modernization approach.

The wide publication of this document was one of the first important signs of a new trend in economic policies, but for several reasons it took time to state out the new path. One reason was that the 'gang' had had some sensible points in their criticism against the 'modernizers' although their views had tended to become rather extreme in the course of the power struggle. Further, they had widespread support from those officials who had been recruited during and after the Cultural Revolution. 50 Therefore the preparations for the Eleventh Party Congress, finally held in September 1977, were rather long-drawn out and accompanied by purges at different administrative levels. To the extent that there was a plan for a dramatic change in economic policy (which is now fairly obvious), there was of course a need for a corresponding change in the power structure. 51 Hua Guofeng was evidently Zhou Enlai's man, but he also owes his present position to Mao's alleged judgment that Hua was the one in the best position to

preserve Maoism. He pays lip-service to modernization, but appears to prefer a slower process than Deng Xiaoping.

Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, has been a major figure in Chinese politics, twice purged (1967 and 1976) but always on his way back again. Deng's economic programme, as for example spelt out in a talk (reported in China Trade Report) on the country's economy on 18 August 1975, may be summarized in five points:

1. We must stress the idea of taking agriculture as the foundation. A major task of industry is to promote the modernization of agriculture.
2. We must adopt new technology. To import, we must export a few more things. The first thing to my mind is oil.
3. Step up scientific research work in enterprises. Now some intellectuals have not put to use the skills they have learned.
4. Attaching first priority to quality is a major policy, and this includes variety, specifications, and quality.
5. The key to rules and regulations is the system of responsibility. The present problem is no one takes responsibility.

In the Eleventh Party Congress (September 1977) the modernization drive was firmly set. A 23-man Politburo, discipline, was elected, and the policy of the Four Modernization (agriculture, industry, science and defence) spelt out. The new leadership was particularly concerned about the 'technological gap' created by the voluntarism of the previous decade, and this paved the way for a dramatic change in educational and research policy. The new policy was finally confirmed by the Fifth National people's Congress (January 1978). This was followed by a National science Conference in March 1978, which saw the wholesale rehabilitation of China's intellectual and scientific community, declared by Deng to be 'a component of the proletariat'. 52 The aim was to have by 1985 an army of 800,000 trained scientific workers in China. Thus, in the new 'Long March' toward modernization, the meritocracy is to play the role of an agent garde.

The goal of modernization is no longer disputed but there may of course be many shifts in approach and emphasis as the imbalances and contradictions of the new strategy appear. During 1979 the signs point to a slowing down in speed, suggesting a victory for the gradual rather than the crash approach.

WHAT IS NEW IN THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF TODAY'S CHINA

One way to summarize the recent changes in economic policy is to relate them to the six above-mentioned components of the Maoist model. To start with self-reliance, there is of course no explicit refutation of this goal. The difference is rather one of interpretation. Today self-reliance is stressed as a reason for importing foreign technology (rather than importing commodities), thus strengthening the productive base of the country. The cultural aspect of dependency is completely ignored. The training of thousands of young intellectuals abroad, thus exposing them to an alternative ideology and way of life, is a case in point. Mao's self-reliance and Deng's do not belong to the same world.

Today mobilization is not supposed to be based on moral but on material but incentives. Furthermore the trend is toward a hierarchical organization in the factories, putting an end to the chaos of popular participation in decision-making. The revolutionary committees are being abolished at lower levels of administration.

...the new relationship between industry and agriculture is still unclear. The initial emphasis on industry (particularly steel) in the modernization programme was modified during the 1979 'slowdown' and the importance of the agricultural sector was stressed. Within this sector a significant shift from grain production to the production of cash-crops took place. Regional specialization according to the principle of comparative advantage and productivity-raising measures were also stressed. All this points to a more conventional pattern of economic development. Like India, China will also have its Green Revolution.

Finally, the intellectual-manual contradiction illustrates most dramatically and explicitly the shift in development strategy. It is necessary to see the educational system as an integral part of the total development strategy. Whereas the Maoist model necessitated a very specific kind of training, stressing political consciousness and a command of very diverse skills, such an education will only turn out to be a handicap if the process of economic development is based on imported technology. The latter pattern of development implies specialization and professionalism. Since it takes time to develop new skills it is in this field that the measures to make up for past 'mistakes' are bound to be most dramatic, not to say desperate.

These changes are not only incompatible with Maoism but they may, at least in some of their consequences, be difficult to reconcile with any variety of socialism. A reported trend toward the spontaneous disbanding of the production teams is a case in point. Such a process would undermine the most cherished innovation of the Maoist strategy, the people's communes. The policy of agricultural specialization, and the downgrading of grain production in order to boost production of cash-crops for exports, will have similar consequences. Occasionally the communes are even said to be obstacles to the modernization of agriculture. 54

It is at present not possible to assess the importance and significance of these and similar signs. Perhaps we are too alarmist? Or could it be that socialism is at stake in China? Scholars who have made important contributions to our understanding of China disagree intensely on this issue today.

In a statement which has attracted much attention, Charles Bettelheim, a great admirer of the Maoist model, made the allegation that the apparent fidelity to Mao Zedong's policies has been a 'smoke-screen designed to conceal a quite different line'. In his view 'a revisionist line is presently triumphing.' 55 Many China watchers found this judgment a little rash and instead suggested that the new measures were designed to cope with new problems or correct former mistakes. A distinction was made between 'strict' discipline and 'exploitable' discipline, the former associated with industrial socialism the latter with industrial capitalism. 56 The critics also emphasized the atmosphere of relief and freedom prevailing in China after the fall of the Gang of Four. 57 Another important point raised by the critics was the error of inferring social practice from the political line: 'Today the line has shifted, but the experience of the earlier period gives us every reason to believe--contrary to Bettelheim--that practice has not changed nearly so much.' 58 Thus there are two lines of 'defence': recent changes are necessary, or they will have only a limited impact. If they are 'necessary', they are so only to the extent that a modernization on the lines of Western industrialism is the ultimate goal for all societies. As to the impact, it may be true that a policy that goes against the forces of modernization will face great difficulties and much sabotage. But present policies are with the current. They are bound to have an impact.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

As the preceding overview has shown, the development strategies of India and China have followed winding roads. In India the dialectics of development seem to be at work primarily at the policy level with limited impact on economic structure. Certainly the emphasis impact on economic structure. Certainly the emphasis on public investment in the heavy industry sector in Nehru's days and the new agricultural strategy from the mid-sixties and onwards deeply influenced the pattern of economic and social development, but on balance development planning has more and more turned out to be a somewhat ritual exercise in India.

In China the shifts in emphasis, as far as economic policies are concerned, have had more important structural implications, simply because of the nature of the political system. It must, however, be emphasized that our general lack of knowledge about what really goes on at the local level in different parts of China makes it too easy to exaggerate the real effects of different signals from Peking.

Another observation is that the movements of the pendulum have gone in opposite directions in India and China. Thus when one country stressed agriculture the other stressed heavy industry, when one followed outward oriented policies, the strategy of the other was inward oriented, and so on. On the whole the dialectics have worked in a more constructive way in China. The issue of self-reliance is a case in point.

There are few countries in the Third World having a real option with regard to 'self-reliance' versus 'modernization', as here defined. India and China are among those few, and it is also in these two countries that the option has been a major political issue for an extended period. Both of them have large natural resources, huge domestic markets, and great cultural traditions to draw upon. Nevertheless the traditions of Westernization are also long and important, since modernizers in both countries have made use of Western ideologies such as Liberalism and Marxism to combat indigenous conservative traditions (Brahminism, Confucianism). The temptations of the Western-inspired policy of modernization have therefore been substantial, in spite of the well-known dangers of dependence. In discussing the power structures

we could conclude that the forces of modernization and self-reliance were not equally strong. Whereas the 'modernization paradigm' receives authorization the Western experience or unrivalled technological change and economic growth, the untrodden path of populism, self-reliance and 'alternative' patterns of development can rely on little else than the charismatic power of inspired leadership. History indicates that this is insufficient. Furthermore, both India and China have recently been deprived of the active incarnations of such traditions: Jayaprakash Narayan, who operated within a revitalized Gandhian tradition, and Mao Zedong, whose message is becoming more and more distorted as the new leaders consolidate their position. Significantly the utopian visions of both leaders were compromised and frustrated through the opportunism of political 'followers'.

For the present the economic policy of China is outward-looking whereas the economic policy of India's Janata government until its fall in July August 1979 was oriented toward self-reliance, decentralization, employment creation, small-scale industries, rural development etc. It should be noted that these were also the components of the Maoist development strategy. In India little was achieved in this direction, however, since the government spent its energy in a desperate internal power struggle. Our analysis of the underlying power structure of the Janata 'Party' showed why this had to be so. As late as November 1979, it was impossible to foresee what political combinations might emerge from the unprecedented political disintegration in India.

However, the era of dominant party rule seems to be over and a new era of short-lived coalition governments is in sight. If this scenario comes true, the relevance of what goes on in the political superstructure for the actual process of economic and social change may be even less than it is today. Thus the spontaneous process of 'development' will continue unabated, a process that will benefit the forces of 'modernization' in 'growth areas' rather than those of self-reliance' - or, for that matter, an optimal mixture between the two.

In contrast with the situation in China in the nineteenth century (the Self-strengthening Movement and India today, China can carry out its present modernization programme from a position of relative strength. There is no question of accepting external inputs to make up for a general lack of internal inputs. Rather the point seems to be a selective use of external inputs in order to eliminate important bottlenecks in development, in exchange for a resource which China more than most other developing countries can spare: namely oil. If the output of oil turns out to be less than so far has been expected, which seems likely, there will be an increased export of cash crops and products from light industry. At present this strategy seems to be preferred over the more dangerous policy of budget deficits and borrowing abroad.

Instead of being a net exporter of ideology, China will be an exporter of oil. The change is significant. Today China is in the process of re-evaluating and demythologizing the accomplishments of Mao Zedong in an attempt to change the Chinese collective consciousness. It would be undialectic to say that this attempt will succeed to in the long run but at present it is rather obvious that anti-Maoist policies have substantial popular backing. It should also be obvious that these policies are bound to create new imbalances and contradictions. Those (including the present author), who persist in admiring the Maoist strategy as a solution to China's problems and as a possible model for developing countries, set their hope on a new turn of the pendulum. A few pessimistic reflections are, however, called for. A movement from 'chaos' to 'order', from amateurism to professionalism and from mass participation to bureaucracy is obviously easier to bring about than the reverse. The Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution were extraordinary incidents made possible by extraordinary circumstances, among

which we possibly by extraordinary hold the charismatic power of Mao Zedong to be the most important. What we now are witnessing is the 'routinization' of charisma, a change from revolutionary Charisma 'in the process of originating' to the system-maintaining 'charisma of office'. However, the Chinese revolution belongs to the Chinese.

N O T E S

1. For a discussion of the Western Model of Development in the context of intellectual dependency and liberation, see B. Hettne, *Current Issues in Development Theory*, SAREC Report R5: 1978.
2. In Latin America 'populismo' signifies a nationalist development strategy, based on a class alliance of the national bourgeoisie and the labour class (or rather the trade unions), and aiming at industrialisation. In Asia (and Africa) populism (much like the Russian Narodniks) is oriented towards rural development, the local community and the indigenous culture.
3. Very much the same challenge was created within Europe through the British industrial lead, some countries were able to take up the challenge and some were not. The various responses to this challenge, which gave a specific pattern to European industrialization, are dealt with in A. Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical perspective*, Cambridge, Mass. 1962.
4. On this, see Mary C. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung-chih Restoration*, Stanford 1957.
5. Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and power*. Yen Fu and the West, Cambridge, Mass. 1964.
6. Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement. Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Stanford 1967, p 359.
7. Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and un-British Rule in India*, London 1901.
8. Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West. A Documentary Survey 1939-1923*, New York 1975, p. 19.
9. B. Hettne, 'The vitality of Gandhian Tradition', *Journal of peace Research*, No. 3, vol. xiii, 2 1976, p. 20
10. B. Hettne and G. Tamm, 'The Development Strategy of Gandhian Economics', *Journal of the Indian Anthropological Society*, vol. 6 No. 1, 1971, p. 54.
11. Jerone Chen points out that Mao's impatience with bureaucracy stems more from Chinese than Western sources. J. Chen, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* Oxford, 1965. See also Stuart Schran, *The political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* New York 1969.
12. Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* New York, 1970.
13. Maurice Meisner, 'Leninism and Maoism. Some populist perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China' *The China Quarterly*, January March 1971.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
15. For a comparison between Gandhism and Russian populism see Hettne, 1976, op. cit.
16. Hettne and Tamm, 1971, op. cit.
17. J. Bandyopadhyaya, *Mao Tse-tung and Gandhi* New K Delhi, 1973, R. Vaitheswaran, 'Gandhi and Mao: A Comparison in Terms of Relevance for the politics of National Liberation and Reconstruction' *China Report*, Vol XII, Nos. 5-6, 1976, J. D. Sethi, 'Mao and Gandhi: Convergence and Divergence- A preliminary Note' *China Report*, Vol. xiii, No. 1, 1977.
18. J. Galtung, *The Politics of Self-reliance*, Chair in conflict and peace Research, University of Oslo.
19. Sethi, op. cit., p. 26.
20. Vaitheswaran, op. cit., p. 35.
21. Sethi, op. cit., p. 27.

22. Vaitheswaran, op. cit., p. 35.
23. Sethi, op. cit., p. 28.
24. For a more historical approach see B. Hettne, Utvecklingsstrategier i Kina och Indien (Development Strategies in China and India) Lund 1971, 1979.
25. After the split in January 1978 there were four 'congress parties' two inside and two outside Janata. Many leading figures in the Janata government were former congressmen.
26. See the discussion in p. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound New York 1968.
27. See an article by Dev Murarka in the Danish newspaper Information, 29 April 1977.
28. S.P. Cohen, The Indian Army, Berkeley, California, 1971, p. 187.
29. G.H. Corr, The Chinese Red Army, Osprey 1974. For a review of books dealing with the relations between the People's Liberation Army and Chinese Society at large, see Lynn T. White III, 'The Liberation Army and the Chinese People', Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 1, No 3, May 1975.
30. This oscillation approach has been critically discussed by A.J. Nathan ('Policy Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Critique', China Quarterly, 68, 1976), who notes that there are authors who use the policy oscillations model as 'a kind of shorthand, convenient for summarizing the content of for policy and its changes' but that there 'also are authors who want to explain policy oscillations'. Among these he distinguished three categories: (1) those who see the oscillations as cyclical movements between Communist utopia and the realities of backwardness, (2) those who see them as conscious applications of Mao's conception of dialectics and (3) those who see them primarily in terms of changing power structures would probably qualify the present author for membership in the third category. Nathan's criticism may be summarized thus: (1) It is not possible to place all policy options under two headings, (2) it is not possible to establish a necessary link between different sets of 'right' and 'left' policies, (3) the 'two line' struggle is so forcefully projected by the Chinese media that outside analysts are led astray. To this our reply would be that it is quite enough if certain fundamental perspectives (for example what we here have called 'self-reliance' versus 'modernization') could be contrasted. It is not necessary to explain every programme in terms of policy oscillations. Secondly, We would agree that it is very difficult to establish a close connection between internal oscillations and Chinese foreign policy. Possibly they must be analysed within different frameworks. As for internal linkages there are certainly causative relations between some if not all areas. Thirdly, there has obviously been a sometimes very bitter and bloody political struggle in China which simply does not fit with a less dramatic 'trial and error' model of development.
31. For the concept of 'reconciliation system' and 'mobilization system', see D.E. Apter, The politics of Modernization, system, Chicago 1965.
32. We are here mainly relying on Hettne (1979).
33. JP said: 'I'm afraid my Sarvodaya friends may not like this but I have come to feel that our approach was wrong . . . The struggle approach is the right one. Gandhiji had seen this this when he developed struggle along with constructive work'. INDIAN EXPRESS, 13 July 1974.
34. Personal observations from Karnataka.
35. 'Janata Party Manifesto', published in Commerce, 19 February 1977.
36. Times of India, 29 March 1977. p. 7.
37. Times of India, 4 May 1978.

38. Economic and Political Weekly, 28 January and 4 February 1978.
39. Economic and Political Weekly, 14 July 1979.
40. G. Ostergaard, JP's Total Revolution: in Retrospect and Prospect, (mimeo 1979).
41. Ibid., p. 16.
42. Far Eastern Economic Review 31 August 1979.
43. Economic and Political Weekly 18 August 1979.
44. Lowell Dittmer Liy 'Shao-cgi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, Berkeley, California, 1974, especially chapter 6.
45. Ibid., p. 180.
46. J. Sigurdson, 'Rural Industry - A traveller's View' China Quarterly, No. 1972.
47. A. Donnithorne, 'China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution' China Quarterly, No. 52, 1972.
48. Quoted from China Trade Report, January 1977, p. 8.
49. Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 February 1977, pp. 10-12.
50. Leo Goodstadt, 'Poverty and power in peking politics' Economic and Political Weekly, 3 December 1977.
51. In January 1977 a wall poster which appeared in Guangzhou spelt out a modernization strategy in nine points, recommending among other things increased levels of consumption, material incentives, workers' control, and rapid introduction of foreign technology. Significantly, the poster was anonymous.
(China Trade Report, March 1977, p. 9.)
52. Asiaweek, 14 April 1978.
53. C.P. Cell, 'Deurbanization in China. The Urban Rural Contradiction Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 11, No. 1.
54. China Trade Report, May 1979.
55. Letter of resignation to the Franco-Chinese Friendship Association. The letter was published in Monthly Review, July-August 1978, and followed by an interesting debate between Bettelheim and Neil Burton. Later a special issue of Monthly Review (May 1979) was devoted to the same debate with contributions from, among others, Jerome Chen and Joan Robinson.
56. R.S. Leiken in Monthly Review, May 1979, p. 37.
57. According to Joan Robinson the present Chinese leadership 'has embarked upon a hitherto unprecedented course of combining an ambitious plan for accumulation and growth with open discussion and freedom of thought.' Ibid., p. 56.
58. A. MacEwan, ibid., p. 45.

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CHINA'S MODERNIZATION
AND
THE POLICY OF 'SELF-RELIANCE'

One of the most debated aspects of today's China is its "modernization" and its policy of self-reliance. China, according to certain observers, is turning away from its original policy of self-reliance and moves towards the West for updating its technology. But has there been a real departure from the concept of self-reliance² as understood by Mao? This article traces the history of self-reliance back to the Chinese Revolution and examines the application of the concept to the various phases of China's revolution. The author, Ronald C. Keith teaches in the Department of political sciences, University of Calgary, Canada. The article is taken from "China Report, March-April 1983.

SELF RELIANCE AND THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS

Since the death Mao Zedong in 1976 western political analysis has anticipated a reduction in the radical politics of Maoist socialist justice in favour of what is seen to be a more rational advocacy of the 'four modernizations'. This reduction has often been interpreted to include 'the shift away from self-reliance'.¹ The persistent advocacy of 'self-reliance' since Mao's death in 1976 may, however, challenge western historiographical assumptions as to the continuity of meaning and the practical policy implications of the term 'self-reliance.' A precise understanding of the dimensions of 'self-reliance' as formal policy would seem to be crucial to any larger analytical treatment of the role which foreign investment and technology might play in the context of China's modernization.

Particularly with respect to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, 'self-reliance' has in western historiography been described in terms of an autarchy irrationally opposed to an international division of labour based on the classical theory of the law of comparative advantage in trade. In so far as the Chinese are concerned such an interpretation is controversial. This concept originated from within a revolutionary matrix of thought which integrated a burning rationalist concern for China's survival with an aspiration to socialism in a world of competitive 'imperialism'. However, according to the Chinese argument on the level of formal policy, this concept has never agreed with xenophobic autarchy. On the contrary, past and present expositions of 'self-reliance' are said to be quite consistent with a commitment to the expansion of China's international trading relations. Under the historiography of the current Chinese leadership, China's Cold War condition of semi-isolation in the 1950s was a matter of external imposition rather than an expression of domestic policy preference.

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Cold War conditions in and of themselves, of course, cannot be taken as PRIMA FACIE confirmation of a policy of national autarcy.

Contemporary Chinese argument has assigned a great deal of ideological significance to 'self-reliance' as one of the 'three foundations' of Mao Zedong Thought. 2 The important Central Committee resolution of 27 June 1981 on party history repudiated the 'closed door policy' of the Gang of Four to agree with Mao's oftenstated argument to the effect that China's modernization cannot take place in isolation from external technological development. The resolution agrees that Mao historically understood 'self-reliance' as consistent with commercial and technological exchange on the basis of the principle of 'mutual assistance and benefit' (pingdenghuli).

Sine Mao's death Chinese leadership has continued to endorse Mao's 1958 directive, namely, 'self-reliance is primary, while striving for foreign assistance is supplementary' (zili gengsheng wei zhu, zhengqu waiyuan wei bu). 3 Premier Zhao Ziyang, like Premier Hua Guofeng before him, has argued that China is no longer 'obstructed' by 'imperialism' and 'social-imperialism' from utilizing advanced technology and that under a regime of 'self-reliance' China can expand foreign trade using 'our strong points to make up for our weak points through international exchange on the basis of equality and mutual benefit'. 4

According to current Chinese argument, 'self-reliance' has never formally precluded the bypassing of the sometimes lengthy and costly domestic process of research and technological development necessary to successful industrialization through the purchase of superior foreign technology. While the party leadership has accepted the 'four modernizations' as its primary political task, it continues to emphasize the great differences between China's economy and that of the western countries. Apart from the very fundamental differences which originate within a planned as opposed to a market economy, the party has continuously emphasized China's vast countryside, the scarcity of domestic capital resources and China's exceptionally large labour force. In the continued advocacy of 'self-reliance' - a concept, which originated with Chinese nationalism and the socialist perspective on 'imperialism' - there is a clear interrelation of factors of economic and political independence.

Historically consistent with this emphasis on independence is a tradition of fiscal conservatism, which is today relevant in its resistance to the wholesale as opposed to the selective purchase of technology. This tradition is itself currently manifest at the policy level in its deliberate relation of the rate of importation and foreign borrowing to the generation of new exports. 'Self-reliance' thus precludes a strategy of rapid modernization, emphasizing a unidimensional strategy of massive foreign capital investment and the unqualified assimilation of foreign technological inputs within the domestic economy.

CONTINUITY OF POLICY WITH THE PAST

However, at the level of official historiography, Chinese leaders have insisted that there has been no significant break with regard to the policy of 'self-reliance' as it was originally set forth in the mid to late 1950s. Zhao Ziyang has recently said that he too is in favour of an 'open door' policy, but that the door is opened only in accordance with 'self-reliance', which in practical terms implies the following scheme of priorities: 'We should use our domestic resources in the first

place and international resources in the second; we should develop our domestic market in the first place and our role in the world market in the second., 5

Foreign technology and capital are, thus, valued as positive contributing factors in China's modernization. In terms of the current 'four modernizations', foreign capital and technology are seen as playing a greater role within a multidimensional economic strategy, 6 which still places a high priority on the maximum exploitation of indigenous resources in order to meet China's particular conditions of labour abundance and capital scarcity. The present emphasis on 'self-reliance' has not precluded either foreign investment or China's greater participation in international exchange, and China's abundance of labour has even used to attract foreign investment. However, within the context of the eight-character economic strategy, namely, 'readjusting, restructuring, consolidating and improving the national economy' (tiaozheng, gaige, zhengdun, tigao), 'self-reliance' as a cardinal point of policy has been invoked by the leadership in an attempt to define more closely the limits of China's participation in international exchange and the level of foreign investment in China. 7

SELF-RELIANCE : HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND IDEOLOGICAL CONNOTATIONS

An appreciation of the current policy significance of 'self-reliance' to some extent rests upon an analysis of the continuity or discontinuity of the ideological connotations of the term itself. 'Self-reliance' is a conceptual thread running through the entire tapestry of the Chinese revolutionary experience. Its complex connotations are perhaps not adequately conveyed in English translation. Zili gengsheng is a four character phrase consisting of two compounds, the former meaning 'self-standing', while the latter conveys the idea of 'changing one's life' or 'regeneration'. Together the two compounds mean 'standing on one's own to change to a new life'. The meaning becomes quite clear in the historical context of revolutionary movement, which has progressively entwined themes of both nationalism and socialism.

THE EARLY CHINESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND NATIONALISM/CONSEQUENCE SELF-RELIANCE OF LATER PERIOD

The early Chinese communist movement of the 1920s was informed by a chiliastic sense of nationalism, and Marxism was initially only understood in terms of Lenin's explanation of imperialism. For Mao and his mentor, Li Dazhao, class struggle was not as important as the unity of the Chinese people as a historically progressive force. Mao and Li were active in an intellectual environment, which was apprehensive over the imminent 'loss of state' (wang guo), meaning in a broad nationalistic sense, the loss of ethnic and cultural identity. 8 Apprehension was met with conviction. Mao and Li thought of revolution as a self-conscious act in which the vital energies of the Chinese people would be unleashed.

This early populism had some impact on the later development both the revolution and 'Mao Zedong Thought'. Nationalism required the unity of the Chinese people, and in the early mass movements of the first united front of the mid-1920s the communists engendered a populism in the countryside. The emphasis on the unity of the people in early 1930s, however, stood in tension with socialist aspirations which saw national salvation in terms of radical restructuring of the society. The tension was formally resolved in the formation of a second united front of the late 1930s, as Mao progressively integrated the struggle for national liberation with the worldwide socialist movement. Domestic united front on a theoretical level became a progressive feature of the international struggle against capitalism.

The revolution in the countryside did not turn in on itself. The party's history of imperialism relegated hoary notions of China as the 'Middle Kingdom' to the innermost recesses of Chinese Marxism and consciousness. Moreover, both Chinese Marxism and Chinese nationalism insisted on placing China in the mainstream of modern industrial development. The basic revolutionary tactic of the party, namely, 'to surround the cities with the countryside' did have significant implications for China's later pattern of development, particularly with respect to a dialectical emphasis on agriculture as of prime importance to the development of industry. Nevertheless, it did not result in xenophobia and autarchy.

The history of imperialism, in fact, linked China to the outside world. Mao noted how the 'fond dreams' of learning from the West had been shattered with the 'teacher's' (i.e. western imperialism) aggression on the 'pupil' (i.e. China).⁹ However, while China was apparently wronged there was no rejection of the outside world. There was no rejection of the outside world. There was instead a vociferous assertion of equality and reciprocity, which originated in the Marxist-Leninist understanding of imperialism and the concept of national self-determination. Given the 'teacher's aggression' it was necessary to 'stand on one's own to change to a new life.'

In terms of the immediate domestic realities of the revolution, the notion of 'self-reliance' took on a very real meaning for the communist cadre struggling to survive in the bitter warfare of the early 1940s. Immediate material crisis dictated the practice of doing it yourself to achieve self-supply in production' (ziji dongshou shengchan ziji).¹⁰ Public functionaries in the army, party and school systems were called upon to make personal sacrifices in the supply of necessities to their respective units.

EARLY ECONOMIC POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE

At a higher level of organization, communist economic policy called for a move towards self-sufficiency within the border regions under their control, and an attempt was made to stop the export of necessities from the communist areas to the enemy areas. Under the slogan 'Develop the Economy and Ensure Supplies' (fazhan jingji, baozhang gongji)-a slogan which is still very important today-the communist leaders radically cut back administrative expenditure, rationalized the tax structure on the basis of 'from economics to finance' (cong jingji dao caizheng) stressing a reduction on taxes and the greater provision of material incentives in production, and organizationally focused on mass movements to increase production at the local levels.¹¹

Even under such a programme of 'self-sufficiency', 'self-reliance' did not mean the complete severing of links with areas outside the border regions. The Chinese leadership even called for incentives to encourage outside capitalists to set up shop in the border regions, arguing that private enterprise would prosper more in the communist-controlled areas than in the areas under Guomindang control where private enterprise was subject to the vicissitudes of an 'expanding and corrupt 'bureaucratic capitalism'.

Two important points must be kept in mind with respect to this early 1940s notion of self-reliance. firstly, Mao discussed the organization of local production and the need for 'self-supply' with respect to the scientific division of labour in production and concluded that the development of 'self-supporting economies' by the different organizational systems of government, army and party would be 'unreasonable and incomprehensible in other historical conditions'.¹² Such 'self-sufficiency' was thus seen as specific to the wartime conditions of the base areas.

Secondly, 'self-reliance' was not placed in opposition to foreign economic aid. In 1936, Mao had appealed for foreign aid and 'legitimate' foreign loans. 13 Mao in 1937 highlighted the inequities of imperialism noting the unfavourable balance of trade, the lack of reciprocity, the disruption of China's traditional handicrafts, the inequitable warlord tax structures, which favoured foreign-owned as opposed to Chinese-owned enterprises. 14 Yet in 1944 he renewed his appeal for foreign assistance. 'Self-reliance' was not placed in opposition to foreign economic aid. In 1945, Mao simply stated: 'We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid, but cannot depend upon it; we depend on our own efforts. . . . 15 The policy of border-region self-sufficiency was a response to the economic warfare of the Guomindang which did not preclude the acceptance of foreign aid from 'capitalist' countries.

The negative view of imperialism did not lead to an intransigent autarchy. In 1949 Mao declared to the world that China had 'stood up', but he also looked forward to the development of China's international relations. In his famous speech of 30 June 1949, 16 Mao announced that to China would 'lean to one side' (i.e. lean to the Soviet Union), but then he indicated a willingness to do business with any country on the basis of 'equality and mutual benefit' (pingdeng huli), a principle which was written into the Common Programme the following September, and which has since been repeatedly emphasized in China's official agreements with foreign states.

DOMESTIC SOLUTION TO POST WAR RECOVERY

In the context of difficult negotiations for Soviet aid and the blockade of China's important East coast ports, the CCP focused its attention on a domestic solution to the problem of post-war recovery. For two months between mid-December 1949 and mid-February 1950, Mao and Stalin argued over the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the joint stock companies and border issues. The acrimonious and protracted negotiations finally resulted in a thirty-year treaty of friendship as well as a Soviet undertaking to extend US \$ 300 million to the People's Republic of China. Stalin, who feared Mao might yet turn into another Tito, loosened the purse strings only to offer fraternal comrades US \$ 50 million more than he had offered Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) in 1938.

The prospects for diversifying the sources of foreign aid were sharply reduced by the American refusal in January of 1950 to recognize the People's Republic of China. The latter was effectively barred from admission to the UN, and American attempts to isolate the Chinese diplomatically met with a measure of success. Only a handful of western states, specifically the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland followed the British lead in recognizing the new republic. China's relations were for the most part circumscribed by relations with the USSR and eastern Europe.

While the Chinese were pleased to receive whatever Soviet credits were advanced, and one can see the influence of Soviet economic thinking in the Chinese First Five-Year Plan, this should not detract from a balanced assessment of China's own efforts in achieving economic recovery in the early 1950s. The early 1940s thematic emphasis on production increase and austerity was then clearly explicit in the 'Production Increase and Economy Campaign'. The party unfurled the banner 'better, faster, and more economical results' to foster 'production on all fronts'. In fact 'achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results' later became a fundamental part of the general line of the party in the late 1950s.

The party persisted with a multidimensional strategy which emphasized the exploitation of all positive indigenous factors of production. Soviet aid certainly did not accomplish the job of recovery. The chief

source of investment in the early 1950s capital construction was funds accumulated through the profits of existing Chinese enterprise. 18

In 1950 the Chinese were able to provide domestic supplies of grain to the large maritime cities such as Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou, which formerly depended upon foreign sources of supply. Under the prevailing conditions of 'old War', the CCP warned against 'over emphasizing foreign and paying little attention to native' (chongyang, jingtu). Government policy stressed the expansion of domestic markets for Chinese industry under the slogan, 'taking domestic sales as primary and foreign sales for support' (yi neixiao wei zhong, waixiao wei fu). 19

In the early and mid-1950s the Chinese respected Soviet industrial and technological achievements, but clearly distinguished wholesale 'copying' from selective and balanced importation of Soviet technology and expertise. Zhou enlai, in January 1956, warned the cadres to 'discard servile thinking' and admonished those who espoused the view: 'Since we cannot immediately change the backwardness of the scientific situation in China we shall at any rate have to rely on Soviet assistance. 20 The premier insisted that China must adopt an overall plan which distinguishes 'what is essential and urgent' on the basis of China's own particular economic priorities.

MAO'S APPROACH DEFINED

In the summer of 1956, Mao elaborated on what China could borrow from the outside world, and in the context of what seemed to be an innocuous debate over the relative merits of Chinese and western music, he vigorously attacked 'national nihilism' and 'left-wing closed-doorism'. 21 Mao talked at length about a creative synthesis, whereby foreign things could be made to serve China. As an intrepid Daoist dialectician, 22 he could speculate upon eternal flux with equanimity, but as a nationalist, he was not ready for the submergence of Chinese culture in a sea of 'national nihilism'. Mao, in fact, argued that the Chinese people would reject 'complete westernization.'

He advised those who feared the contaminating influence of western music: 'It is all-right to be neither donkey nor horse, the mule is neither donkey nor horse.' The mule in this instance is presumably to be taken as a biological metaphor of cross-fertilization which connotes greater productivity as opposed to lack of posterity. The metaphor is consistent with Mao's approbation of dialectical change. As a dialectician, he was willing to explore aspects of cross-cultural synthesis, but he also persisted with Marxist-Leninist assumptions which would not allow for a willy-nilly convergence of socialist and capitalist culture. As a nationalist, Mao refused to accept 'blind westernization', and as Marxist-Leninist, he was wary of decadent bourgeois ideology' Thus while he firmly indicated his support for 'learning the strong points of all nations' he qualified such learning in the following way: 'We must firmly reject and criticize all the decadent bourgeois systems, ideologies and ways of life of foreign countries.' 23

On the more concrete level and in the context of party debate, Zhou Enlai supported Mao and adopted a characteristically middle course. He rejected the 'parasitic view' to the effect that China could depend on international assistance, and did not, therefore, need to build a comprehensive industrial system. This, he argued, would be irrational in the light of China's great population and rich natural resources. But then he took to task those who supported an 'isolationist view', arguing that it is necessary for China to 'develop and expand economic technical and cultural exchanges with other countries.'

Even as early as 1956, Mao argued that the Soviets in their scheme of economic development had made 'mistakes of principle' (Yuanzhexing cuowu). On 28 June 1958, Mao admonished dogmatists within his own

party for 'slavishly copying' the Soviet Union. The chairman instructed: It is very-necessary to win Soviet aid, but the most important thing is self-reliance. ' 24 In fact with respect to the behind-the-scenes ideological debate with the Soviets, Mao distinguished between 'public' and 'internal' attitudes in the following instruction: 'As regards learning from the Soviet Union, for internal use we say "study critically". In speaking publicly, in order to avoid a misunderstanding it would be better to put it: "Study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union analytically and selectively", 25

After the dramatic confrontation between Peng Zhan, a senior member of the CCP Politbureau, and Khrushchev at the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party in Bucharest in June of 1960, there was no further need to maintain the pretence of ideological unity. In response to Chinese criticism the Soviets in July 1960 ordered the withdrawal of 1,390 of their experts from China. The Soviets scrapped 257 projects for scientific and technical co-operation at a time of serious economic disaster in China. Such action left a legacy of ill-will. It also resulted in a renewed and very firm emphasis on self-reliance within China.

Mao, as the 'Great Teacher', outlined the lesson of 'self-sufficiency in oil. 'Self-reliance' became the story of Daqing (Great Celebration), the monolithic oil field which was almost built from scratch in the early 1960s. Mao Zedong invoked the self-sacrificing spirit of the battlefields of the 1940s, when in 1964 he first raised the slogan: 'In Industry, learn from Daqing.' Apparently, from the streets of Beijing, where buses continued in service, substituting huge bags of methane for petrol, to the tents and dugouts of the snow-bound grasslands of Heilongjiang, where the self-reliant soldiers of Daqing huddled reading Mao's On Contradictions, there was a great national resolve to cut China's dependence on Soviet oil and to make China 'Self-standing'.

Mao invoked the spirit of the 1940s and laid heavy stress on the importance of political organization in achieving self-reliance, but he did not advocate autarchy and unqualified rejection of foreign technology. The late 1950s represented a different set of historical circumstances than those which had prevailed in the border regions of the early 1940s. In the Great Leap forward of the late 1950s, Mao fully articulated a multidimensional strategy of economic development, which specifically called for the simultaneous development of 'large and foreign', as well as 'small and native technologies'. He clearly disagreed with Stalin, who apparently believed that 'technology solves everything' to emphasize the importance of politics to organization in production. This latter emphasis, however, cannot simply be interpreted as the negation of technology.

Despite the economic disaster of the Great Leap Forward, the party leadership essentially persisted with a strategy which would see the generalization of intermediate, or upgraded traditional technology as a positive feature of the of the national economy. Such labour-intensive technology is to play a constructive role in the economy operating alongside large-scale, capital-intensive industry in the cities. Within such a strategy 'self-reliance' neither implies the creation of a 'cellular economy' 26 in rejection of comparative regional economic advantage, nor can it be taken to suggest the denial of large-scale production as the basis for socialist economic development. It is basically a part of a rational strategy designed to cope with labour abundance and capital scarcity.

INTEGRATING POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Western historiography has at times tended to describe Mao's strategy in terms of the 'total primacy of revolutionary politics over economics'-a description which denies the significance of Mao's

own dialectical frame of reference. 27 Mao's own so-called 'Yanan generation' of the 1940s, which incidentally includes several of the architects of China's latest economic reforms such as Chen Yun, Bo Yibo and Li Xiannian, is said to have substituted human will and politics for technology in the attempt to achieve a 'self-reliant' economy. This interpretation describes 'self-reliance' as part of the fanaticism of Mao Zedong, who not only sought to impose a radical egalitarianism on Chinese society, but also substituted an irrational revolutionary asceticism for technology in the struggle for China's industrialization.

Daqing, however, was built upon the Great Leap Forward strategy which at least on the formal level of policy statement attempted to integrate politics and technology. Daqing self-professedly adhered to Mao's March 1960 instruction to implement the Charter of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, which not only emphasizes the importance of the mass movement and the slogan 'politics takes command' but also calls for technical revolution, and greater application of scientific technique to production. Daqing was a great lesson in 'self-reliance', yet explicit in the Anshan Charter is an injunction to learn critically from the Soviet experience of economic construction and to dialectically integrate the positive factors of that experience with the specific conditions of China's economy.

Under Mao's 'unity of opposites' there is to be a dialectical integration as opposed to a 'metaphysical' opposition of politics and technology. While Daqing is today perhaps the most significant symbol of 'self-reliance', as a model it is acclaimed for having combined revolutionary spirit with scientific learning. The Chinese leadership has consistently identified with Marx on the significance of technology to the development of socialism. Mao's model of development does deal with China's specific features of capital scarcity and labour abundance through greater emphasis on political organization, but not to the formal extent of substituting voluntarism of the masses for technology. It is, however, important to note that an exclusive emphasis on technology as a benign strategy of development has often been criticised on the left as indicative of a 'theory of productive forces' which would altogether ignore the political and social dimensions of Mao's strategy for development.

SELF-RELIANCE, DENG XIAOPING AND THE GANG OF FOUR: ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE

The interpretation of 'self-reliance' in concrete policy terms became a critical issue in the years just prior to Mao's death in September 1976. 'Self-reliance' emerged as an important aspect of a larger debate over the significance of the Cultural Revolution and the terms for reintegration of a political system which had been shattered by several years of uncontrolled factional politics. Once he was rehabilitated in 1973, Deng Xiaoping became a primary target of criticism on the part of those who wished to perpetuate the Cultural Revolution. Deng was caricatured as 'a clever Bukharinist', who not only denied class struggle but peddled a 'slavish comprador philosophy' (Yangnu zhexue). He allegedly collaborated with imperialism to revive the old days of the treaty ports, and he was accused of ignoring Mao's 'self-reliance' to turn China into 'raw material base, a repair and assembly workshop, and an investment center'. 28 The issue of 'national betrayal' was thrown as kerosene on the fires of debate concerning the nature of class struggle under socialism and the need for continuing the dictatorship of the proletariat against a class enemy within the party itself.

However, when in 1947 Deng Xiaoping explained the concept of 'self-reliance' to the UN General Assembly, he was quite consistent with Mao's own instructions. Deng warned Third World countries against the unscrupulous trading practices of the superpowers and multinationals, and he defined 'self-reliance' as follows: 'By self-reliance we mean that a country should mainly rely on the strength and wisdom of its own

people, control its own economic lifelines, make full use of its own resources, strive hard to increase food production and develop its national economy step by step in a planned way. ' 29

Deng, in what was essentially a theoretical commentary on the integration of theory and practice, opined that the content of 'self-reliance' would vary from country to country in relation to specific national economic and political conditions, but he pointedly observed that 'self-reliance' is not autarchy and noted: 'Self-reliance in no way means "self-seclusion" and rejection of foreign aid. 30 While Deng regretted any false opposition between 'self-reliance' and international economic exchange, he insisted that such exchange takes place 'on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit and the exchange of needed goods to make up for each other's deficiencies. ' 31

In reaction to accusations of 'national betrayal', Deng counter-attacked against unnamed leftists, whom he taunted as the 'daring-to-to-against-the tide elements'. These were allegedly metaphysicians who chose to ignore economic reality. They were apparently ignorant of the fact that socialism rests upon, and indeed could not have come into being without the technological base provided under capitalism.

THE "MISTAKES" OF THE GANG OF FOUR

After the arrest of the Gang of Four (ie. 'the daring-to-go-against the-tide elements') in October 1976, Deng's counterattack of 1975 was fleshed out in much greater detail in the course of campaigns to 'seek the truth from the facts' and to 'emancipate the mind' against metaphysical extremism. 32 Deng personally identified himself with Mao's Yanan discourses of 1941 on 'seeking the truth from the facts.' 33 The gang had failed to integrate theory and practice, and they had failed to appreciate the 'unity of opposites' in Mao's dialectics. Instead they allegedly practised Stalinist metaphysics and talked only of the clash between opposites.

In related concrete terms, they had failed to understand Mao's concept of 'self-reliance.' They ignored Mao's instructions to make foreign things serve China', and they were charged with having sponsored a state policy of 'blind rejectionism' which was historically associated with the reactionary xenophobia of the empress Dowager Cixi in 1900.

The party then proceeded to establish an 'open-door policy' within a strategy for the 'four modernizations' (i.e. of agriculture, industry, the military and science and technology). The gang's alleged attempt to discredit foreign studies with an association with 'slavish comprador philosophy' was repudiated as inconsistent with Mao's directives to study and to achieve a better understanding of Chinese things in comparison with foreign things. The then Chairman of the Party Hua Guofeng re-emphasized Mao's 1956 strategy of 'learning the strong points of other countries'. The gang was accused of having attempted to negate the findings of western natural science, which they erroneously declared to have bourgeois class nature. 34 And in 1978 Deng declared that intellectuals and scientific workers were henceforth to be considered part of the working class.

DENG'S "MERGING OF THE SUPERIORITY OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM WITH THE ADVANCED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF DEVELOPED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES.

Deng's 1974 definition of 'self-reliance' was endorsed by the party leadership in the 1978 decision, 'Thirty Points for Industry', 35 and the President of the Academy of Social Sciences enthusiastically pointed out that 'learning advanced things from foreign countries' is actually a condition of 'self-reliance', which requires the merging of the

'superiority of the socialist system with the advanced science and technology of the developed capitalist countries. . . . ' 36

Is such merging consistent with socialism? The author attended discussions in Beijing with researchers of the National Council for the Promotion of International Trade in May 1979. Council staff then stressed the importance of 'self-reliance', but frankly conceded that foreign companies would profit from cheap Chinese labour and raw materials. However, the acquisition of new technology and the resultant increases in production was regarded as sufficient compensation for this kind of 'temporary exploitation'. 37 There was no question of China becoming a 'raw materials base' or 'assembly workshop', for it would distort grossly the significance of foreign investment in relation to the development of the economy as a whole. Indeed, imports and exports together account for approximately 4-5 per cent of China's GNP. Furthermore the council staff stressed Zhou Enlai's 'four points' concerning the importation of foreign technology: 'first, use; second, criticize; third, improve; and fourth, make it our own' (yi yong, er pi, san gai, si chuang). In other words, technology, which is imported, must easily lend itself to a process of improvement and adaptation whereby it becomes Chinese technology.

SELF-RELIANCE AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT

'Self-reliance' in its international implications must be explained as part of an all-encompassing economic policy, which is inherently conservative in its assessment of China's economic conditions. 'Self-reliance' precludes the uninhibited importation of technology. The Chinese leadership has historically demonstrated an awareness that squander in a shopping spree for all types of technology, and in 'self-reliance' a solution was found to this scarcity of capital. 'Self-reliance' expects a balanced budget, and there is tremendous continuity with respect to the current emphasis on the Yanan Principle of 'develop the economy and ensure supplies'. Under this principle production is placed before capital construction, and the radical impulse towards forced primitive accumulation in agriculture is rejected as a 'mistake in principle'. Financial policy requires emphasis on the accumulation of revenue based on the increases in production.

Foreign technology cannot solve the problems of China's domestic economy. However, it can contribute new technological inputs towards the expansion of domestic production. Investment in the 'new economic zones' of South China can make a contribution towards the improvement of China's 'productive forces', but 'self-reliance', as it is expressed in the initiative of local enterprise which serves local markets, is ultimately more important. The production of joint ventures is geared towards the demands of the international market, and in many cases the joint ventures are excluded from the domestic market. Mao's strategy, which is still in place, presumes an 'all positive' approach in an economy which encourages contemporaneous increases in production at different levels of organization in both the modern and traditional sectors of the economy. This does mean, however, the denial of either regional economic interdependence within China or the expansion of international exchange on the basis of 'mutual benefit and equality'.

'Develop the economy and ensure supplies' would seem to set some limits to the expansion of foreign trade and investment, and the conservatism, explicit in China's economic policy, became quite clear in the elaboration of the strategy for national economic readjustment. This strategy was rationalized in terms of a frank admission that capital construction had been placed before production and too much stress had been laid on foreign technology in the period subsequent to the arrest of the Gang of Four. At the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress in March 1978, the then chairman of the party re-emphasized Mao's 'On the Ten Great Relationships' which had underlined the importance

of the dialectical balance between production and consumption, production and capital construction and industry and agriculture. While he emphasized 'self-reliance', he also spoke of a 'big increase in China's foreign trade and the 'breaking free from conventions and the use of advanced technological techniques as much as possible'. 38 Hua also adopted the traditional emphasis on the need to tap the potential of existing enterprises through the maximum usage of existing equipment, and the simultaneous development of large, medium and small enterprises.

However, the second session of the Fifth Congress in June 1979 called for a 'read-justment' because the above principles had in fact been more 'honoured in the breach'. Instead of concentrating China's meagre resources to fight the classic guerrilla action of a battle of annihilation' at one or two weak spots in the economy, the Chinese leadership apparently had unfurled the banner of the 'four modernizations' to do battle along an excessively 'long front' of capital construction, and despite vociferous protestations of 'self-reliance' the Chinese government had overspent in the purchase of complete sets of technology from abroad. The Chinese leadership admitted that insufficient attention had been given in the importation of technologies to the limitations of China's infrastructure of communications and energy supply. 39 The second session focused on major imbalances in the economy, and in Mao's tradition of 'seeking the truth from the facts' came up with the strategy of 'national economic readjustment'. Formally the strategy called for 'one step back, and two steps forward'. 40 Along with retrenchment, there was to be an advance. The situation was not regarded as extreme as in the early 1960s, which was a period of severe economic upheaval and international hostility. 41

Even though Chinese leaders insisted that there was no change in the long-term policy of 'open-door,' it seemed as though a bucket of cold water had been poured over foreign business concerns. Chairman Hua was reassuring: 'The view that the policy of readjustment is a negative retreat and the view that its implementation will lead to a termination of the importation of advanced technology are both wrong through and through. 42

There was nevertheless on the part of the Chinese government a temporary disinclination to draw upon existing foreign credits. There was also a greater insistence upon the maximum use of existing resources, and there was an insistence upon the selective purchase of key technology, as opposed to the purchase of complete technologies.

The second session did pass into law the Statute of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation and the Law on Joint Ventures. Gu Ming, a Deputy Minister of the State Planning Commission reiterated at the same session that the scale of imports would have to be tailored to China's ability to acquire foreign exchange through the expansion of exports. 43 The Chinese policy of 'exports first, integrating imports with exports and striving to achieve a balance between imports and exports' requires three types of balancing: a rough balance between imported technologies and China's capacity to assimilate such technology in terms of existing economic infrastructure; and the balance between imported projects and the domestic capacity to produce ancillary equipment for such projects. 44 The conservatism, which animates China's economic policy insists not only on the maximization of existing resources within China, but also a studies correlation between the amount of foreign funds to be drawn upon with China's capability of absorption and repayment.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC READJUSTMENT EXPLICITLY INCORPORATES MAO'S SELF-RELIANCE.

'National economic readjustment' explicitly incorporates Mao's notion of 'self-reliance'. For example, Vice-Premier Yao Yilin in a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's

Congress sought out the dialectical balance in Mao's 'self-reliance' when he related the concept to 'readjustment': 'In a populous large country like ours, modern construction must rely on our own efforts, that is mainly rely on our own industrial foundations, on our own technical strength. This basic principle is unalterable. But this does not mean we will close our country to international exchanges. It is also our unalterable principle to develop economic and technical co-operation and exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of the principle of equality and mutual benefit.' 45 Yao confirmed the reduction in the scale of technological imports, but he emphasized that this reduction did not 'signal a change of policy.'

CONFUSION REGARDING THE "READJUSTMENT POLICY" AMONG OUTSIDERS IS THE RESULT OF A "TOO SIMPLISTIC APPROACH"

In the western literature concerning China, a great deal of confusion still surrounds the concept of 'self-reliance', and as a result the status of China's relationship with the more advanced economies of the West is open to some misinterpretation. In part such confusion originates with conflicting western and Chinese historiographical perspectives, especially as the former has not always recognized the continuity of self-declared principle manifest in the historical definitions of 'self-reliance'.

Self-Professed Marxist-Leninist perspective on imperialism as a negative phenomenon has reinforced an emphasis on 'self-reliance' in terms of maintaining national economic independence. But, while Marxism-Leninism provided a critique of imperialism, it also provided a methodological framework within which China could on the basis of 'equality and mutual benefit' rationalize new relationships with countries of different social systems on the basis of 'learning the strong points of all countries.' Mao's own Marxist-Leninist dialectics effectively precluded 'blind rejectionism' or xenophobia as irrational and inconsistent with the development of the Chinese revolution.

Thus, despite the 'teacher' having aggressed upon the 'pupil' there is still the desire on the part of the 'pupil' to learn foreign things in order to study and develop Chinese things. And, as former Party Chairman Hua Guofeng pointed out in his defence of the use in China of western technology and natural science, radical xenophobia would negate Marxism itself. Hua posed two telling rhetorical questions: 'Can we refuse to study Marxism because its birthplace was in the West? Can we refuse to learn from the Great October Socialist Revolution because it took place in Russia?' 46

On one level confusion over 'self-reliance' can be traced to conflicting interpretations of the Cold War in the Far East. The interpretation. Which is seen in this article as largely correct, insists that Cold War conditions prevented the development of international exchange that 'self-reliance' has never in policy terms meant self-imposed autarchy.

On another level, Chinese historiography of Chinese leadership dispute, based upon a simplistic 'two-line struggle' which pits socialism against 'capitalist restoration' has itself contributed to some of the confusion. Such analysis in fact tends to depart from the complexities of Mao's own dialectical emphasis on the concurrent unity and clash of opposites. Mao's place in the political system was on fact inconsistent with his own dialectical conception of 'seeking the truth from the facts'. Exaggerated emphasis on the two line struggle has at times reduced the entire political system to clearly stated opposites, which dialectically only clash. 47

It is not surprising therefore that western analysis on the basis of an opposition of modernization to revolution has at times tended to treat 'self-reliance' as part of the 'Maoist' package for radical social justice, which is to be achieved on the basis of autarchy and local politicization internally and externally in terms of an extreme isolationist orientation designed to ward off contaminating capitalist influences from abroad.

Within these exaggerated parameters, 'self-reliance' encompasses the rejection of western technology in favour of a retreat to natural economy and the exclusive exploitation of local resources and technologies. Deng Xiaoping could then be indicted for having in 1975 practised a 'slavish comprador philosophy', and we might forget Mao's insistence on 'learning the strong points of all countries'. Such a scheme does not explain a basic underlying consistency in the reasoning which has sustained China's economic policy over time, nor does it explain the significance of 'self-reliance' under the current regime of national economic readjustment. However, it might help to explain how xenophobia could be used politically against the advocates of the 'four modernizations'.

PRESENT POLICIES TO BE UNDERSTOOD THROUGH MAO'S DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVES"

In the formulation of Chinese policy, 'self-reliance' in its entwined domestic and international connotations is treated dialectically.

In domestic terms it is part of an overall multidimensional strategy which responds to labour abundance and capital scarcity through the attempt to create a constructive inter-relationship between large, medium and small enterprise in both the traditional and modern sectors of the economy. Dialectically, the 'unity of opposites' precluded a one-sided emphasis on any one aspect of a contradiction, for the latter could well lead to economic disaster. Too much emphasis for example, on regional self-sufficiency encourages the neglect of comparative regional economic advantage. 'Self-reliance' as a category of balanced dialectical thought cannot mean a retreat to natural economy, and the emphasis on the maximization of local resources does not entail the negation of regional interdependence. It is, however, very important to note that the rationalization of policy within a dialectical framework does not of itself guarantee the effective execution of rational policy.

As for 'self-reliance' in its related international implications, it does not negate the role of foreign capital and technology in China's modernization, but rather on the basis of a 'unity of opposites' it seeks to accommodate these foreign inputs within the economic policy of 'develop the economy and ensure supplies'. With respect to this policy, 'self-reliance' sets out the conditions under which foreign capital and technology can play a positive role in China's economic development. It insists for example, upon freedom from international debt and a balanced budget. It also insists upon a pattern of importation which is roughly consistent with the distinctive economic conditions of China. 'Equality and mutual benefit' from the Chinese point of view can be interpreted to mean that technology coming from abroad must at some point become Chinese technology.

Dialectical analysis by its very nature does not provide the observer with an exceptionally precise empirical instrument by which a fine line can be drawn distinguishing what is too much, as opposed to too little, technological importation and capital investment. One cannot say that at the point of reaching a particular figure, foreign investment becomes a problem of turning China into a 'repair and assembly shop'. Nor has one a specific guideline as to what point 'temporary exploitation' becomes intolerable to socialist goals of equity.

There are obvious problems with respect to experimental law and organization relating to foreign trade and investment, as the Chinese attempt to balance out a contradiction between the need to create an attractive environment for foreign investment and the need to ensure 'self-reliance' within a multidimensional strategy for economic development. However, the determination of the Chinese government with respect to the insuring of 'self-reliance' within the current policy of national economic readjustment has been demonstrated in real terms with the determined attempt in 1980-81 to restore budgetary balance, the substantive cutback in capital construction and the establishment of relatively conservative terms of trade by which foreign technological exports will be allowed to grow on the basis an expansion of exports.

China's 'open-door policy' and her new relationships within the UN and the IMF have been rationalized on the basis of a long-standing conception of 'self-reliance'. Furthermore, expectations on the part of some American observers that the Chinese in their thirst for western technology and in terms of their persisting struggle against Soviet 'hegemonism', could be rendered pliable and responsive to American strategic priorities vis-a-vis the USSR have proven to be quite premature. 'Playing the China card' on the basis of what Prof. Ying-mao Kau has derisively referred to as the 'dependency-leverage assumption' 48 would seem to be out of question in the light of persisting advocacy of 'self-reliance' by the Chinese.

The Deputy Secretary General of the Party Central Committee's Military Commission has recently reaffirmed that China 'will rely mainly on its own strength in developing advanced military technology, while introducing foreign technology in limited instances' 49 Under the continuing emphasis on 'people's war' or 'positive defence', military modernization is subordinated to the modernization of industry.

Most importantly, 'self-reliance' on the basis of 'equality and mutual benefit' assumes international reciprocity, and within the text of international debate regarding the New International Economic Order, Premier Zhao Ziyang has rejected any suggestion that domestic economic reform in developing countries be made a precondition for trade and aid concessions on the part of the developed countries.

In conclusion, an analytical assessment of the self-professed continuity in the formal adherence at the state policy level to Mao's instruction on 'self-reliance', namely, 'to make foreign things serve China' (yang wei Zhong guo) is quite important for a more precise understanding of China's modernization process as it relates to Chinese participation in international exchange and the role of foreign capital and technology within China's multidimensional economic strategy, which consciously seeks socialist development on the basis of national independence. 50

NOTES

1. John Starr has, for example, pointed to this 'shift' as one of the most obvious points of ideological departure in post-Mao China, and indeed, Starr's position may well be consistent with the majority of scholarly opinion. See Starr, 'Discontinuing the Revolution: Recent Political Thought in China', *International Journal*, XXXIV, no. 4, Autumn, 1979, p. 556. Marshall Goldman makes the same point in 'China Rethinks the Soviet Model', *International Security*, Fall 1980, vol. 5, no 2, p. 54. Ross Berill has described three gradations of 'self-reliance', beginning with 'complete univolvment or isolation'. As far as the present author is aware, 'complete univolvment' has never been accepted as official policy. See Berill, 'China and the World: Self-Reliance or Interdependency', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1977, p. 299.

2. Communist Party of China, Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1981, pp. 70-71.

3. See Mao's '7,000 cadres' speech of 1962 in which he noted: 'From 1958 we decided to make self-reliance our major policy and striving for foreign aid a secondary aim.' Stuart R. Scharam (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, Penguin, Harmondsworth, England, 1974, p. 178.

4. Zhao Ziyang, 'The Present Economic Situation and the Principles for Future Economic Construction', Beijing Review, no. 51, 21 December 1981, p. 23. Also see Hua Guofeng in Beijing Review, no. 13, 31 March 1978, p. 13. (Note Beijing Review, formerly Peking Review, is herein-after cited as BR.)

5. Zhao Ziyang, BR, no. 51, p. 23.

6. By multidimensional strategy, the author wishes to suggest the contemporaneous exploitation of both indigenous and external factors conducive to modernization. This strategy incorporates the Great Leap Forward notion of 'walking on two legs'. It is perhaps best described in the research of Professor Carl Riskin, who describes a rational 'choice of techniques' in the context of capital scarcity. Riskin emphasizes the 'sectoral allocation function' by which small-scale enterprise in the rural sectors of the economy are encouraged to increase the level of production of rural and consumer goods through the use of up-graded traditional technology, which is labour intensive. Under a 'multidimensional' strategy this effort in the rural localities is to be closely co-ordinated with the production of large-scale enterprise. It is very important to note that 'self-reliance' does not preclude such a strategy which accepts the need for inter-regional trade within China as well as Chinese participation in the international market. See Carl Riskin, 'Small Industry and the Chinese Model of Development', China Quarterly (hereinafter cited as CQ), no. 46, April/June, 1971, pp. 245-73 and Carl Riskin, 'China's Rural Industrialization: Self-Reliant Systems on Independent Kingdoms' CQ, no. 73, March 1978, pp. 78-98.

7. For an official explanation of this strategy refer to Hua Guofeng, 'Report on the Work of Government', 18 June 1979, BR, no. 27, 6 July 1979, pp. 12-13. The Chinese text is available in Hongai (Red Flag), no. 7, 1979, pp. 8-10.

8. For an interesting discussion of this context and the early Chinese communist movement see Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970, p. 19.

9. Mao Zedong, 'On People's Democratic Dictatorship', Selected Readings of Mao Tse-tung, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1976, p. 304.

10. The Jiefang Ribao (Yanan) is replete with many examples of such practices; for example, see 'A Summary one Year's Work in Border Region Government', Jiefang Ribao, 8 February 1944, pp. 1-2.

11. For a further discussion on these policies see Ronald C. Keith, 'The Relevance of Border-Region Experience to Nation-Building in China 1949-52', CQ no. 78, June 1979, pp. 279-80. Also refer to Andrew Watson's introduction to Mao Zedong and the political Economy of the Border Region, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1980.

12. Mao Zedong, 'Economic and Financial Problems in the Anti-Japanese War', Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (hereinafter cited as SW), Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1967, vol. iii, p. 112.

13.

13. For a discussion of Mao's 1936 and 1944 appeals refer to John Gittings, *The World and China 1922-72* Eyre Methuen, London, 1974, pp. 58-59.
14. Mao Zedong lists the 'means of imperialist oppression' in 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party', SW, vol. ii, pp. 311-12.
15. Mao Zedong, 'We Must Learn to Do Economic Work', SW vol.iii, p.191.
16. Mao Zedong, 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship', SW vol. iv., p. 416.
17. Ronald C. Keith, op. cit., pp. 281-82.
18. In 1950 the Soviets extended a five-year credit of US \$300 millions; however, investment between 1949 and 1953 in Chinese industry amounted to an estimated US \$2, 184 millions, See Cheng Tsu-yuan, *Anshan Steel Factory in Communist China*, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1955, p.69.
19. Ronald C. Keith, op. cit.. p. 281.
20. 'On the Question of the Intellectuals', 14 January 1956 in Robert Bowie and John K. Fairbank, *Communist China 1955-59*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971, p. 140. Zhou urged that China could not indefinitely rely on Soviet experts and that the primary task was, therefore, not copying but developing existing intellectual forces within China itself.
21. Mao Zedong, 'Chairman Mao's Talk to the Music Workers', Stuart R. Schran (ed), *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, pp. 84-90. A relevant gloss of this item can be found in He Luting, 'In Memory of Chairman Mao's Talk to the Music Workers', *Hongqi (Red Flag)*, 10 October 1979, pp. 68-70 in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), 74680, 30 November 1979, pp. 118-21.
22. For an elaboration of Mao's penchant for Daoism refer to Stuart Schran's article in Dick Wilson (ed), *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1977, pp.61-64.
23. 'On the Ten Major Relationships', SW vol, v, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1977 p.61-64 305.
24. Schran (ed.), *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 126.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
26. Prof. William Smead has challenged Audrey Donnathorne's description of China's economy as 'cellular' in his argument that 'self-reliance' is consistent with the furtherance of inter-regional trade as it fosters the creation of exportable surpluses of goods. 'Self-Reliance, Internal Trade and China's Economic Structure', *CQ*, no. 62, June 1975, pp. 305-06.
27. For example, see William Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations 1964-65* the MIT. Press, Cambridge, 1967, p.6.
28. The quoted phrasing is from Fang Hai, 'Criticize the Slavish Comprador Philosophy', *Hongqi (Red Flag)* no. 4, 1 April-1976; US-Hong Kong Consulate General, *Survey of the People's of China Magazines (SPRCM)*, no. 867-68, 20-26 April, 1976, pp.22-23.
29. Speech by the Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly', *Foreign Languages Press, Beijing*, 1974, p. 15.

30. Ibid., p. 16.
31. Ibid., p. 16.
32. For example, see the counter-criticism of the Gang of Four's suggestion that Deng and Zhou were part of a 'foreign affairs (yang wu pai) in study group of the Ministry of Light Industry, Zili gengsheng yong wei chongyong (Self-reliance and make foreign things serve China) in vol. 2 of Jianjue yonghu longxiu Huazhuxi-fennu shengtao siren bang (Firmly support our leader, Chairman Hua in angrily condemning the Gang of Four), Sanlian Shudian, Hong Kong, 1977, p. 119.
33. See the report on Deng's talks on party rectification in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), 2 November 1981, p. 1.
34. For example, refer to 'On Yao Wenxuan's Outlook on Natural Science' in Hongqi (Red Flag), no. 4, 4 April 1978, in JPRS, 71314, 19 June 1978, p. 118.
35. 'Draft Decision Concerning Some Problems in Speeding up the Development of Industry', Issues and Studies, vol. xiv, no. 11, November 1978, p. 91.
36. 'Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up Four Modernizations', BR, no. 45, 10 November 1978, p. 11.
37. May 1979 discussion with Zheng Jianwei and others from the National Council for the Promotion of International trade in Beijing.
38. Hua Guofeng's Report, 'Unite and Strive to Build....', BR, no. 10, 10 March 1978, p. 24.
39. For a discussion of the 'long front' see Liu Xin, 'Inside Story of Economic Readjustment in Communist China', Zhongning (Contending), Hong Kong, May 1979, no. 19, pp. 9-13.
40. Tian Yun, 'One Step Back, Two Steps Forward', BR, no. 29, 21 July 1980, pp. 15-19.
41. Shi Zhi ngwen, 'Readjusting the National Economy: Why and How?', BR, no. 26, 29 June 1979, p. 22.
42. Hua Guofeng, 'Report on the Work of Government', BR, no. 27, 6 July 1979, p. 13.
43. Gu Ming, 'Plans Readjusted, Policy Unchanged', BR, no. 30, 27 July 1979, pp. 9-11.
44. Liu Chaoujin, The New Trend in China's Foreign Trade, pp. 10-11. In interview (1 December 1981) with the author, Prof. Liu, Director of Foreign Trade at the Beijing Institute of Foreign Trade at the confirmed this point, and he noted that joint ventures under present circumstances would only account for a very small proportion of production in China. Professor Liu stressed the potential for the expansion of co-operative production at the organization level below that of the joint economic venture, as at this lower level contracts are quite specific, and there is a faster generation of profitable returns within a shorter time frame.
45. Yao Yilin, 'Report on the Readjustment of the 1981 Economic Plan and State Revenue and Expenditure', BR, no. 11, 16 March 1981, p. 19.

46. Hua Guofeng, BR, no. 13, 31 March 1978, p.12.
47. For a general discussion of 'two-line struggle' historiography refer to Andrew Nathan, 'Oscillations in the People's Republic of China: A Critique', CQ, no. 69, December 1976, pp. 720-33.
48. Ying-Mao Kau's testimony, p.128 of the US Committee on Foreign Relations, Taiwan: One Year After United States-China Normalization, US Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 1980.
49. Zhao Ziyang, BR, no. 44, 22 November 1981, p.14.
50. 'Modernizing Defence', BR, 10 January 1983, p. 6.



APPENDIX

NEW PLAN DEVELOPMENT
PROSPECTS

By Zhai Wen

The article which is being reproduced below is taken from the Economic Times (June 1983) and gives us some of the latest information and statistics available about China.

This is the reason why it is given at the end of our documentary file as an appendix.

ON December 10, the 3,000 members of the National People's Congress gave their formal endorsement to China's Sixth Five-Year Plan, which, Premier Zhao Ziyang promised the deputies, will accelerate modernisation and spur "continuous improvement in the people's living standards" in this nation of more than 1 billion.

The Premier, who is currently on a 10 nation tour of Africa, told the deputies that the plan would encourage the Chinese people "to advance toward the splendid goal set for the end of this century".

Government views the Five Year Plan as the first major step toward achieving a fully modern socialist society by the year 2000.

Although it was put together as a whole only in recent months, the Plan is designed to cover the entire period from 1981 to 1985, both absorbing elements of the last two years' transitional economic policies and setting forth an array of new development targets.

Among the major goals which the Plan envisages are an average annual increase of four per cent in industrial and agricultural output value, a total investment of 360 billion yuan in fixed assets, completion of 400 major construction projects, an annual 4.9 per cent increase in workers' wages and a 6 per cent increase in peasants' income, and an increase of 68 per cent in public expenditures on education, science culture and public health service between 1981 and 1985.

By building on the base of prosperity envisioned in the Plan, Zhao said, China "can realise the magnificent objective of quadrupling the gross value of industrial and agricultural production by the end of this century".

Under the Plan, China will continue the economic readjustment which, since 1979, has sought to correct the emphasis on capital-intensive heavy industry at the expense of light industry and agriculture which was encouraged during the ten years of social turmoil from 1966 to 1976 and even before. A simultaneous shift away from over-centralisation and extreme egalitarianism will also be accelerated.

Under the Plan, the total value of China's industrial and agricultural output in 1985 should come to 871 billion yuan, or 155.1 billion yuan more than the 715.9 billion yuan spent in 1980. Both industrial and agricultural production are expected to rise by an annual average of 4 per cent during the five years; efforts will be made to increase the rate further to 5 per cent.

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By 1985, the country's grain output is scheduled to reach 360 million tons, 12.3 per cent more than in 1980. The gross value of light industrial output should, meanwhile, grow by an annual average of 5 per cent, and that of heavy industry by an average of 3 per cent

The combined annual growth rate of industrial and agricultural output for 1981 and 1982 was 5.2 per cent. The Plan envisages a lower growth rate for the five years as a whole.

In the past, the government has conceded, China set unrealistic production targets with which disregarded the serious constraints of a large population and a weak and backward economy. Production costs were high, and efficiency was low. People's welfare was overlooked.

The current Plan insists on improvement in the quality of products, more efficient use of raw materials, and a sounder basis for production targets.

Energy and transport are particular priorities, and will receive 38.5 per cent of the 230 billion yuan in capital construction funds to be invested over the five years, under the plan.

Twenty-eight large coal mines each with an annual capacity of over one million tons are slated for construction. Coupled with the building of other smaller mines, this is expected to add a total of 220 million tons to China's annual production capacity. The goal in the oil industry is to verify reserves in a number of new oilfields and to seek and exploit new offshore deposits; China's oil extraction capacity should increase by 35 million tons, and that of natural gas by 2.5 billion cubic metres.

Fifteen large hydroelectric stations along the Yellow, the Yangtze and Hongshui rivers are planned. Forty-five major pithead thermal power stations are to be constructed in coal-rich Shanxi and other provinces. A nuclear power station with a generating capacity of 300,000 kw will also be built.

29.8 billion yuan is to be invested in transport and communications, mainly for railway and harbour construction, and inland navigation projects along the Yangtze and other rivers.

In agriculture, emphasis will be laid on strengthening anti-flood facilities along the Yellow, Yangtze, Huaihe and Hahe rivers; on the construction of reservoirs; on building commodity grain bases; and on shelterbelt networks, manmade pastures breeding farms, live-stock farms and feed-processing factories.

The Plan earmarks 130 billion yuan for updating equipment and accelerating the technical transformation of existing enterprises—a sum equivalent to 35 per cent of the total fixed asset investment. In the 28 years from 1953 and 1980, funds for such purposes made up joint about 20 per cent.

Under the Six Five-Year Plan 96.7 billion yuan, or 15.9 per cent of the total expenditure has been allocated for education, science, culture and public health services. Similar appropriations made up only 11 per cent under the Fifth Five Year Plan (1976-80). More colleges and universities, secondary schools and vocational schools will be set up. Undergraduate education is to be strengthened. Primary education will become universal in most counties, and junior middle school education universal in the cities.

With regard to science and technology, the Plan stipulates, among other things, that 40 major achievements in agriculture, light industry, energy, electronics, machine-building and transport should be popularised.

"For the vigorous development of the economy, it is a fundamental question of principle to relay on achievements in science and technology and to gear them to the needs of economic construction," the premier said.

The Plan also forsees the continuing expansion of foreign trade and economic and technological exchange. About 3,000 items of advanced technology are to be imported to reinforce the technical transformation of existing enterprises, particularly small and medium-sized ones.

"Expansion of economic and technical exchange with foreign countries", Zhao said, "is aimed at enhancing China's capability of self-reliance, and it can in no way harm or even weaken the country's national economy."

Meanwhile, about 29 million more city and town dwellers are expected to be employed by 1985. Per capita income among the peasantry is planned to grow from 191 yuan in 1980 to 225 yuan in 1985, at an average annual rate of 6 per cent; between 1955 and 1980 peasant income grew at about 4.3 per cent per year. The payroll for all workers and staff throughout China should increase from 77.3 billion yuan in 1980 to 98.3 billion yuan in 1985—an average annual increase of 4.9 per cent. The salaries of middle-aged intellectuals will be increased by an even bigger margin.

SOURCE

The Economic Times
Sunday, June 1983.

