INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

Item

Title
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND DISARMAMENT
extracted text
WH: B MTERNATIOMAL PEACE
tgi_;gZZZZ] AMD DiSAMMEHT
J

L. Ilyin, T. Dmitrichev

Against
Neutron Death

CONTENTS

Introduction.............................................................................................................. 5

.

I.

A Glimpse of the History of Emergence of Neutron Weapons .

II.

Basic Military and Technical Properties of Neutron Weapons
and Medical and Biological Effects of Their Use....................................... 20

.

III.

Neutron Weapons in US War Plans.................................................... 26

IV.

Efforts of Peace Forces to Ban Neutron Weapons............................. 40

Conclusion...............................................................................................................54

Notes and References.............................................................................................. 56

Annex....................................................................................................................... 58

12

INTRODUCTION

Two major international conflicts, involving most of the world popu­
lation, broke out in the 20th century. The two world wars killed, maimed
or visited countless privations upon tens of millions of people and did
immense damage to world civilization. About 140 regional and local
armed conflicts have flared up on our planet during the less than 40 years
since the Second World War. International tensions have pushed the
world to the brink of suicidal nuclear catastrophe on more than one occa­
sion during that period. The threat of nuclear war sometimes receded
thanks to the efforts of all the peace forces and to realism and statesman­
ship displayed by governments, as was the case during the 1970s, but only
to escalate anew.
Today the dark shadow of nuclear war again is looming large over the
world. The threat looks even more formidable than before, and more dif­
ficult to remove.
The main cause of this dangerous turn in world developments is the
growing activity of the aggressive forces, which are trying ever harder to
subvert peaceful coexistence, this only sensible basis for relations between
states with different social and political systems. It is those forces that are
seeking to destroy the fabric of detente, woven so effectively by the joint
efforts of the peoples during the 1970s. It is they that call in question the
peaceful foundations of state-to-state relations and.stymie the develop­
ment of political contacts, mutually beneficial economic, scientific, tech­
nical and cultural relations and other useful ties between nations by resor­
ting to various sanctions or advancing patently unacceptable conditions.
Pursuing their selfish ends, these forces are trying to exploit rapid scien­
tific and technical progress which makes it possible to develop qualitati­
vely new types and systems of weapons, including nuclear ones.
In these circumstances the arms race is acquiring a new, far more
dangerous dimension, and embracing all types of weapons, both nuclear
and conventional, all kinds of military activity, and virtually all regions
of the world. It is becoming even more difficult to control both existing
and emerging conflict situations, and no progress is made in the solution
of outstanding global problems, including those related to socio-economic
development. The arms race is consuming an ever larger share of the
resources badly needed to cope with unemployment and inflation
and to heal many other social ills. The situation is compounded by
5

the fact that today the talks in virtually every field of the restriction of
the arms race and disarmament have been interrupted or deadlocked. In
other words, pursuing their selfish interests, the forces of aggression and
war aggravate the international situation, worsen social problems,
escalate international tension and mount the threat of war, particularly
nuclear war.
The fate of mankind as a whole has been jeopardized as a result of this
policy. Everyone needs peace. That is why the international community
of states should pool all their efforts and resources to accomplish the most
important task ever facing humanity, namely, to safeguard peace and
cemove the threat of nuclear war looming over the peoples.
Aware of the urgency of this problem, the Soviet Union jointly with
other socialist countries is constantly making energetic and consistent
efforts to secure the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons,
to prevent nuclear war and to achieve disarmament. “A durable, depen­
dable and lasting peace is the first and most compelling need of all people,
of all nations, of all humankind." These words, which express the
sincere feelings of the Soviet people, resounded during the celebra­
tions of the 60th anniversary of the USSR in the Kremlin Palace of Con­
gresses as'the Address of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the CPSU
Central Committee “To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties
and Peoples of the World” was read out. Representatives of the Soviet
people solemnly stated that the USSR, following its Leninist policy of
peace and international cooperation, would do everything in its power
to avert war, the threat of which was being aggravated by the perceptible
escalation of international tension through the fault of the imperialist
forces, first and foremost the US leaders with their ideology of aggressive
militarism and their reckless drive toward world domination.
In its approach to the focal problem facing mankind, the Soviet Union
proceeds from the assumption that at present the most effective and reli­
able way toward a lasting peace is to put an end to and reverse the arms
race and to carry out universal and complete disarmament under effec­
tive control. A world without wars and armaments, which can be ensured
through universal and complete disarmament, is the idea! which mankind
has always sought and will continue to seek. “Disarmament is the ideal
of socialism,”1 Lenin wrote in his day. However, the realities of interna­
tional affairs make it impossible to reach that ultimate objective over­
night. Progress toward general and complete disarmament is going
through a number of stages made up of individual steps in various fields
of disarmament. It is in this way that the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries approach the problem of disarmament. They have always belie­
ved that the most important measure in this field is the limitation of nuc­
lear weapons and nuclear disarmament. “The task of curbing the arms
race and going over to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament,
is central to the struggle for averting war,”’’ read the Political Declaration
adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member states in January 1983.
The limitation of the arms race and disarmament, which are consis­
tently advocated by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, are not
6

an end in itself but the best way to ensure the security of every individual
state and international security as a whole. That is why any step taken
to expand war preparations eventually subverts both national and global
security and worsens the threat of war. And it is such steps that are taken
by the reactionary forces in the United States and other NATO countries
as they carry on their arms buildup, appropriate unprecedentedly large
funds for militarist purposes, develop and deploy new types and systems of
weaponry and establish and enlarge their military presence in different
parts of the world, particularly its flashpoints. These gigantic and intensi­
ve militarist efforts of the more hawkish forces in the United States and
NATO are aimed primarily at tipping military-strategic parity and reach­
ing military superiority over the socialist world.
Countering that policy of the Western powers led by the United States
with the Soviet Union’s principled and constructive approach to the prob­
lems of war, peace and disarmament, the 26th CPSU Congress stressed:
“We have not sought, and do not now seek, military superiority over the
other side. This is not our policy. But neither will we permit the building
up of any such superiority over us.”'1 Pointing to a realistic course of acti­
ons in the situation which was dangerous to the cause of peace, the
supreme forum of the Soviet communists noted: “Not to try to upset the
existing balance and not to impose a new, still more costly and dangerous
round of the arms race — that would be to display truly wise sta­
tesmanship.”1
It is this kind of wisdom that the world public is calling for in its welljustified worry over rampaging militarization, initiated by the imperialist
reactionary forces and manifest to a particularly dangerous degree in the
deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and in the
concepts of a “limited” nuclear war and of the use of tactical nuclear
weapons.
The anti-war movement, which has mounted particularly high in
Western Europe and the USA during the past few years, voices worry
over the survival of European and world civilization and protests on
behalf of the multimillion mass of the population against the inordinate
burden of military spending. Huge appropriations for military purposes
considerably aggravate socio-economic problems, acute as they are,
first and foremost unemployment, inflation and other crisis phenomena.
During the 1970s, unemployment in the developed capitalist world alone
doubled to exceed 20 million in 1983. At the same time spending on
social programs was drastically cut down.
Military spending is skyrocketing as the living standards of the
overwhelming majority of the population continue to decline. The pro­
duction costs of means of warfare and related spending are growing
virtually every month. Over the recent period the world military spending
has been rising in real terms by roughly two percent a year and now
amounts to 25-30 percent of the gross world product. At the end of 1983,
it was estimated at 500 billion dollars (in the 1980 prices) and is likely to
reach 820 billion dollars by the year 2000. In 1984, the United States
alone will spend for military purposes 274.1 billion dollars, whereas the

7

figure in 1981 was 186 billion dollars. The Pentagon is going to spend
1.5 trillion dollars during the current five years.
Meanwhile, 30-40 million people starve to death in the world every
year, 800 million cannot read and write, and 1.5 billion
have no basic health care. The world has as many soldiers as it has teachers, spending on health care is a mere 60 percent of military appropriations, and the funding of medical research is just one-fifth of that
of military research and development projects.’
Although the arch right-wing forces in the West, particularly in the
USA, are trying to justify the runaway arms race by the “Soviet threat”
myth, the military buildup is actually rooted in the economic foundations
and class nature of imperialism, which still counts on armed force as a
tool of its foreign policy.
The constructive initiatives made by the 26th CPSU Congress and,
subsequently, by leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state during
1982-1983 effectively gave the lie to the “Soviet military threat” myth
and supplied fresh proof of the fact that efforts to lessen the threat of war
have always been central to the Soviet Union’s activities on the world seene. These initiatives constitute a broad complex of proposals which is
known as the Soviet Peace Program for the 1980s and which embraces
the more important and urgent problems of strengthening peace, promoting detente and bridling the arms race, such as the very acute problem of
limiting and reducing strategic armaments, refusal of the deployment of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, their reduction and
elimination, the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of armed
force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the NATO and
the Warsaw Treaty states, confidence-building measures in Europe and
the Far East, the just solution of the Mideast problem, and the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, in particular, in the context
of the security problems of the Persian Gulf, as well as a wide range of
other major problems.
These and other Soviet proposals were broadly supported by the
international community, by all the peace forces. Accord on the above
problems would make a major contribution toward arms limitation and
disarmament. The Warsaw Treaty countries characterized in the Political
Declaration adopted by them in Prague in 1983 the prohibition of
neutron weapons along with a ban on nuclear weapon tests and the
prohibition of chemical weapons as the more important specific
questions which should be resolved as soon as possible through talks.
Efforts to secure the prohibition of neutron weapons constitute
one of the most important areas of the large-scale struggle waged by the
peace forces to remove the threat of war, to secure arms limitation and
reduction and to achieve disarmament. The neutron nuclear bomb, a new
type of weapons of mass destruction, is especially inhuman and can
give an impetus to new dangerous rounds of the arms race.
Weapons of mass destruction are those means of warfare which are
vastly superior to conventional weapons from the point of view of their
devastating, deadly effects. Only two types of those means of warfare,

8

t|.
a<
j
r.
J
C(
o|

e|
01
te
rj
01

_j
V(
q

-r

j

c(
s(

m

£j(

u

figure in 1981 was 186 billion dollars. The Pentagon is going to spend
1.5 trillion dollars during the current five years.
Meanwhile, 30-40 million people starve to death in the world every
year, 800 million cannot read and write, and 1.5 billion
have no basic health care. The world has as many soldiers as it has tea­
chers, spending on health care is a mere 60 percent of military appro­
priations, and the funding of medical research is just one-fifth of that
of military research and development projects/’
Although the arch right-wing forces in the West, particularly in the
USA, are trying to justify the runaway arms race by the “Soviet threat"
myth, the military buildup is actually rooted in the economic foundations
and class nature of imperialism, which still counts on armed force as a
tool of its foreign policy.
The constructive initiatives made by the 26th CPSU Congress and,
subsequently, by leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state during
1982-1983 effectively gave the lie to the “Soviet military threat" myth
and supplied fresh proof of the fact that efforts to lessen the threat of war
have always been central to the Soviet Union’s activities on the world sce­
ne. These initiatives constitute a broad complex of proposals which is
known as the Soviet Peace Program for the 1980s and which embraces
the more important and urgent problems of strengthening peace, promo­
ting detente and bridling the arms race, such as the very acute problem of
limiting and reducing strategic armaments, refusal of the deploy­
ment of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, their reduction and
elimination, the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of armed
force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the NATO and
the Warsaw Treaty states, confidence-building measures in Europe and
the Far East, the just solution of the Mideast problem, and the settle­
ment of the situation around Afghanistan, in particular, in the context
of the security problems of the Persian Gulf, as well as a wide range of
other major problems.
These and other Soviet proposals were broadly supported by the
international community, by all the peace forces. Accord on the above
problems would make a major contribution toward arms limitation and
disarmament. The Warsaw Treaty countries characterized in the Political
Declaration adopted by them in Prague in 1983 the prohibition of
neutron weapons along with a ban on nuclear weapon tests and the
prohibition of chemical weapons as the more important specific
questions which should be resolved as soon as possible through talks.
Efforts to secure the prohibition of neutron weapons constitute
one of the most important areas of the large-scale struggle waged by the
peace forces to remove the threat of war, to secure arms limitation and
reduction and to achieve disarmament. The neutron nuclear bomb, a new
type of weapons of mass destruction, is especially inhuman and can
give an impetus to new dangerous rounds of the arms race.
Weapons of mass destruction are those means of warfare which are
vastly superior to conventional weapons from the point of view of their
devastating, deadly effects. Only two types of those means of warfare,
8

chemical and biological weapons, were known until the end of the Second
World War. In 1945, when the United States dropped atomic bombs on
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were
added to that class of weaponry. According to a definition made by the
United Nations in 1948, weapons of mass destruction include nuclear,
radiological, chemical and biological weapons, and also any other weapon
which may be developed in future and may have the devastating effects
comparable to those of the above types of weapons of mass destruction,
or exceed them.
The first step toward prohibiting the use of individual types of wea­
pons of mass destruction was the Geneva protocol of June 17, 1925, pro­
hibiting the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons in warfare.
Although extremely important politically this document was not suffici­
ently effective because it did not prohibit the production and stockpiling
of weapons of this type and their delivery means. Moreover, many sta­
tes, includig the USA, did not ratify it for a long time.
Throughout the post-war period the USSR and other socialist counts
ries have worked hard both at the United Nations and in the Committee
on Disarmament to ensure contractual prohibition of weapons of mass
destruction, among them nuclear, radiological, chemical and bacteriolo-^
gical. A major step along this line was the enforcement in 1975 of a Con­
vention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpi­
ling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, which became virtually the first real disarmament measure
in the history of international relations that removed the possibility of
unleashing a war with the use of those weapons. In 1972, the USSR and
other socialist countries submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a
draft convention banning all chemical agents. Certain progress toward
this goal was made at the Soviet-American talks, which begun in 1976
and were unilaterally broken off by the United States out of political
considerations in 1980.
The USSR has consistently opposed to the arms arsenals of states
being supplemented with new types and systems of weapons of mass de­
struction.
Although there is no official definition of new types of weapons of
mass destruction yet, it is common practice to mean by them those wea­
pons which use qualitatively new principles of action, and whose devasta­
ting effects are comparable to those of the known weapons of mass
destruction or exceed them.
The Soviet Union for its part suggested the following definition of
new types of weapons of mass destruction: “New types and new systems
of the mass destruction include weapons which may be developed in the
future, either on the basis of scientific and techni logical principles, that
are known now but that have not yet been applied severally or jointly to
the development of weapons of mass destruction or on the basis of scien­
tific and technological principles that may be discovered in the future,
and which will have properties similar to or more powerful than those of
known types of weapons of mass destruction in destructive and/or
injuring effect.”"
9

The possibility of appearing of such weapons in the arsenals of some
states would open up new channels in the race for awesome types of wea­
ponry and increase manifold the threat to international peace and securi­
ty and all human race.
That is why the world public has been worried by the development
of new types of weapons of mass destruction for over ten years now. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s Western scientists publicly voiced their
concern about the fact that military departments in certain countries
were showing particular interest in some scientific and technological re­
search projects which could be used for qualitatively new types of wea­
pons, among them neutron and radiological weapons, whose destructive
effects were produced by radioactive materials; radiation weapons, which
used strong flows of charged or neutral particles; and subsonic weapons,
using acoustic oscillations in a certain frequency band.
The rapid progress of science and technology, particularly over the
past few years, breeds new engineering decisions based on scientific dis­
coveries which may make the development and production of the above
weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction quite feasible.
These achievements include elementary particle accelerators, which are
constantly growing in capacity and diminishing in size. Bearing in mind
the fact that the effect of high-energy particles on biological organisms
is similar in many ways to the effect of radiation produced by a nuclear
blast, it is easy to see that those who seek a new weapon of mass destruc­
tion can use, in the near future, research into radiation weapons as a tech­
nical basis for the development of a new type of weapons of mass des­
truction.
According to foreign publications, if used purposely, electromag­
netic waves in radio frequency bands can affect the cardiovascular
and central nervous systems.
Acoustic oscillations of a low (subsonic) frequency, which spread
virtually without attenuation over vast distances and which penetrate all
obstacles, cause in people dizziness and pain and make them generally
unwell and disoriented.
Certain types of weapons of mass destruction may have quite appal­
ling selective effects. In view of the existing biological and chemical dif­
ferences between certain ethnic groups (blood types, skin pigmentation,
etc.), a number of new weapons of mass destruction can be used as "eth­
nic weapons", causing genetic change, degeneration and extinction.
Even a superfluous glance at the consequences of the use of some new
types of weapons of mass destruction causes a feeling of horror. It is the
duty of every person with sober thinking to work toward the prohibition
of these weapons before they are developed. The thought that the arms
race may involve new, awesome weapons of mass destruction in the near
future is horrifying. It seems that talks should be initiated as soon as pos­
sible to achieve a general ban on new types of weapons of mass destruc­
tion or to prohibit them individually, all the more so since the Soviet Union already tabled a draft agreement to this effect in 1975 and supplemen­
ted it in 1977.
10

Regrettably, only one type of weapons of mass destruction — radiolo­
gical — has so far been the subject of active negotiations. The Committee
on Disarmament holds mere discussions, not talks, on the prohibition
of nuclea- weapons and on nuclear disarmament. As for new types of we­
apons of mass destruction, there are no even such discussions in the Com­
mittee. Moreover, only a limited number of delegations, mostly from soci­
alist and non-aligned countries, insist on the prohibitions of weapons of
mass destruction in the Committee having 40 member states. This state of
affairs is explained by unwillingness of some Western powers to discuss
in a businesslike manner the prohibition of new types of weapons
of mass destruction. They argue that certain types of such weapons
have not yet emerged and are not likely to do so. Western delegates sug­
gest discussing such weapons upon their appearance only. However, it is
perfectly clear that it is easier to prohibit some type of weaponry in ad­
vance than to seek ways to eliminate it after its emergence. That Western
powers’ positions are untenable is revealed by their attitude to nuclear
weapons. Their delegates behave as if there are no problems of new types
of weapons of mass destruction, although some time ago they participated
in the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to
Disarmament and in a number of regular UN General Assembly sessions
which passed resolutions stressing the need to reach agreements in this
area. Today these countries are even opposed to the establishment of a
special group of experts, who could follow scientific and technical
developments so as to keep the Committee on Disarmament
abreast of these complex matters and help it to act concretely and cons­
tructively to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass
destruction.
Neutron weapons — the so-called “clean” nuclear explosive device
intended primarily to kill people by ionizing radiation — are a particu­
larly inhuman type of mass destruction weapons. Way back in March
1978, the USSR jointly with other socialist countries put forward a
draft convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment
and use of neutron weapons, but that proposal failed to win support
from the Western powers. Moreover, in 1981 the USA decided to
initiate the large-scale production of neutron weapons and some of its
allies make no secret of their intention to deploy these weapons. It was
stated at the 26th CPSU Congress that the Soviet Union was not going to
manufacture neutron weapon if it did not appear in other countries and
that it was prepared to reach an agreement banning this weapon once
and for all.'
International developments and practice in general imperatively
demand that, following the bacteriological means of warfare, all the
other types and systems of weapons of mass destruction be outlawed. This
booklet discusses neutron weapons, their military and technical aspects,
the medical and biological consequences of their application and the ef­
forts to ban them.

COMWJMiTY He V TH C~1 L
‘•M. 'Tits, Floor; St.Marks Rt'ad,
"p ale t

rr.;, (

According to press reports, the United States began to develop neutron
weapons in the late 1950s. At about the same time there came speculati­
ons on the possibility to create a nuclear explosive device whose main
destructive effect is to be produced by neutron, or penetrating radiation.
R&D in this field was shrouded in secrecy from the outset during almost
20 years. Occasionally, however, the press, particularly in the USA, hint­
ed that one of the US atomic laboratories was developing “the most sec­
ret of all secret weapons," a “superweapon” which would be able to
kill all life and leave property intact.
Even at that time the sparse news of the Pentagon’s plans to create
a new weapon of mass destruction provoked outrage all over the world.
The Soviet Union was one of the first to draw public attention to the dan­
gerous consequences of the development of this particularly inhuman
type of nuclear weapons. A Statement issued by the Soviet Government
on August 31, 1961, pointed out that there was “talk in the United States
about projects for creating the neutron bomb that would kill all living
beings but would not destroy material values. Only aggressors dead set
on rapine, on the seizure of foreign territory and foreign property, could
concentrate scientific effort on the production of such a weapon.”"
Indeed, the very idea of the development of another type of weapons
of mass destruction, particularly such an inhuman one, intended speci­
fically to kill people in the most efficient way, seems crazy. Who decided
to appropriate huge funds and to mobilize large-scale scientific efforts
to develop a new awesome type of weaponry in utmost secrecy? Why did
the United States go ahead with the implementation of that mad idea at
a time when its arsenals in different parts of the world were overflowing
with both nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, let alone the
colossal stockpiles of conventional weaponry? One can hardly avoid
drawing the conclusion that these plans reflected first and foremost the
aggressive ambitions of the US ruling elite and its attempts to acquire
military superiority over the Soviet Union at all costs, mostly by upgra­
ding the weapons of mass destruction.
Faced with worldwide public outrage over the Pentagon’s plans to
develop neutron weapons, the US Presidents from Eisenhower to Carter
were keeping them top secret for a long time. Meanwhile, the work on this
“superweapon” proceeded at full tilt.

Most of the research to develop a neutron device was entrusted to the
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, California, which had long been noto­
rious as the US major “hatchery" of ideas and experiments aimed at
developing new types of weapons of mass destruction.
The first nuclear neutron device was tested at the Nevada proving
range in the spring of 1963. However, there was no official statement on
the experiment: Washington apparently feared that the news could provo­
ke another tide of public protests and affect further work on the neutron
weapons program.
The results of the blast in Nevada were subsequently used by the self­
same Livermore Laboratory to create the first neutron bomb, the W-63.
The “father” of the Pentagon’s new toy was Dr. S. Cohen, and major
contributors to the project included H. Brown, the future Defense Secre­
tary in the Carter Administration, and physicist H. York, an advisor to the
Pentagon. The world public was still unaware of the nature of the deve­
lopment work and experiments that were being carried on, although the
Army magazine in 1972 and the New York Times in January 1974
published articles of general nature on that subject. The newspaper
article indicated that the US government was exploring the possibility of
deploying nuclear weapons capable of destroying manpower on the bat­
tlefield by enhanced radiation. To all appearances, in 1974 the Penta­
gon was on the brink of actually fielding neutron munitions.
It came to light later on that as early as 1975 the United States had
fitted neutron warheads with a yield of several kilotons each onto about
30 Sprint-type anti-missile defence missiles deployed at the Grand-Forx
airforce base in North Dacota. However, since any anti-missile defence
system in that area was prohibited by the SALT-1 Accord, the plan to use
neutron warheads for those missiles came to naught. The improvement
of the new nuclear munitions continued at the test sites in Nevada while
the Pentagon kept looking for a missile system to carry neutron warheads.
It soon transpired that even at that stage the USA had had consultati­
ons with its NATO allies on the possible deployment of neutron weapons
in Western Europe. According to the November-December 1977 issue
of the Survival magazine, the neutron bomb, under different desi­
gnations, had been a constant subject of discussion in the NATO Nuclear
Planning Group ever since 1973. ' The United States hoped to keep the
development of new warheads secret until they were deployed in Western
Europe. Washington and its NATO allies hoped to face the world, first
and foremost the Europeans and the Soviet Union, with a fait
accompli by deploying neutron weapons on the borders of the so­
cialist countries. This was pointed out by the Western press in the summer
of 1977, when new details of the plans for development, testing, pro­
duction and deployment of neutron weapons had come to light.1"
Those details became public knowledge in June 1977, when the US
Congress began hearings into the draft bill on budgetary appropriations
for the Department of Energy Research and Development for fiscal
1977/78. In particular, the US press reported that money for the develop­
ment of neutron weapons featured in the Department budget as resources

12

13

I.

-X GLIMPSE OF THE HISTORY OF EMERGENCE
OF NEUTRON WEAPONS

for the construction of dams and sewage facilities. According to the
sources, those concealed appropriations had been sanctioned by Pre­
sident Ford as early as April 1976. The program, hidden in the budget
under the heading “Public Works", was titled “W-70, model 3
(enhanced-radiation nuclear warhead for the Lance missile)."
As the US Congress discussed appropriations for the new program,
which had proven to be quite militaristic, the law-makers requested a
special paper from the US National Security Council on additional
characteristics of the "enhanced-radiation" weapon and its effect on
arms control. The report submitted by the National Security Council to
the Congress in July 1977 described in brief the program in question and
outlined with obvious omissions its goals.
According to the report, the W-70 warhead was being developed
to meet the needs of the US Army in a small-yield “enhancedradiation" warhead for the Lance Missile System.
The Lance is a mobile earth-to-earth missile system capable of
rendering tactical nuclear support on the battlefield by hitting both
immobile and mobile targets (such as tank battalions in troop
concentration areas).
The Lance nuclear missile, according to the report, has a maximum
range of 130 km with a probable error to target of 400—450 meters.
The Lance had replaced the Honest John and Sergeant missiles in the
US forces in Europe and was now replacing those missiles in the armies
of most NATO countries (such as Britain, West Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Italy). In addition, two battalions of Lance missiles
would be based in the United States, one of these to be deployed in the
Pacific if need be. The Lance is more dependable and sensitive than the
outgoing missile systems and has a variable yield. Thanks to its larger
range, it can be installed farther from the frontline of defences and
thus be better protected. In addition, its larger range makes for better
targeting over friendly forces.
The report also said that the “enhanced-radiation" warhead had
a better capacity for destroying targets, first and foremost manpower.
The side effects, including blast wave and heat radiation, were reduced.
The “enhanced-radiation" warhead was said to destroy standard war
technology to a lesser degree than the nuclear fission weapons of the
same yield.
Neutron weapons can incapacitate armoured personnel carriers
(which usually withstand blast, unless they are in close proximity to
ground zero) by affecting the personnel.
Other types of nuclear weapons, according to the report, would
claim more victims and do worse damage to property because of other
effects, such as blast and heat radiation, in densely populated areas.
The report claimed that as a result of the improved warhead, the
use of nuclear weapons would be more effective, providing a restraint
against its rash employment. But even this document, intended to prove
the “expediency" of the fielding of neutron warheads, admitted that
they enhanced the possibility of the actual use of nuclear weapons in
fighting.
14

The political consequences of the deployment of “enhanced-ra­
diation” warheads, according to the authors of the report, stemmed from
their tactical and technical specifications, which applied to the entire
class of “enhanced-radiation" weapons rather than solely to the warhead
intended for the Lance missile. The report frankly admitted that this
type of weaponry depended for its effects on nuclear radiation rather
than on blast or heat. It is intended to hit primarily manpower and not
property. Some people may think, and with good reason, stressed
the report, that nuclear weapons of that type can be used easier on
the battlefield than others and may come to the conclusion that the
USA is more prepared to enter a nuclear war. In other words,
the development of “enhanced radiation" weapons by the United States
escalates the threat of war by lowering the nuclear threshold.
Taking issue with their own argument that the neutron bomb was
making a nuclear conflict more probable, the authors of the report also
tried to make it clear that the prospect of escalation remained for the
United States one of the main factors in deciding whether nuclear
weapons should be used regardless of the tactical and technical speci­
fications characteristics of a definite type of such weapons and that
no US decision on their use would depend on the deployment of
“enhanced-radiation" weapons.
The report argued, in a similarly groundless and myopic manner,
that there was no sign indicating that the NATO governments were
alarmed by the deployment of Lance missiles tipped with neutron
warheads. Nevertheless, the authors of the report made the reservation
that the public discussion of these problems could affect the NATO
positions.
The development and deployment of the W-70 warhead, the authors
of the report stated with satisfaction, would not be restricted by the
nuclear weapons tests ban because it did not cover underground tests of
warheads with an yield of up to 150 kilotons. However, a universal-ekban treaty would constrain the development of weapons of this type
because further tests were likely to be needed in the future. The report
stressed specifically that the West’s proposals on talks concerning
mutually balanced arms reductions did not cover the Lance missile;
they concerned only the elimination of some specific types of warheads.
However, the report rightly noted that the Soviet side could point to
the development and deployment of the W-70 warhead to prove that
the American proposals envisioned the elimination of obsolete weapons
while actually enhancing the combat potential of nuclear weapons
as a whole.
The National Security Council was apparently aware of the con­
sequences of the adoption of neutron weapons. The report sent to the
Congress drew a fairly realistic conclusion to the effect that if a decision
to deploy “enhanced-radiation" weapons was taken, certain govern­
ments could surmise that US strategy had been revised toward increased
probability of the use of nuclear weapons as tactical means of warfare.
The view that such development could interfere with the prevention of
15

the further non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was equally realistic.
The contributors to the report had also to admit that the new weapons
system would have an adverse effect — albeit insignificant, in their
opinion — on the ongoing arms control talks and that the decision to
cross the nuclear threshold would be the most painful decision ever
taken by any US president."
The US law-makers took account of the report of the National Se­
curity Council as they discussed appropriations for the W-70 program.
On July 1, 1977, following three-hour debates, the US Senate approved
by 43 votes, against 42, funds for the production of “enhanced-radiation”
nuclear munitions. That one-vote majority showed that almost one half
of the US senators, whose constitutional duty is to take care of the
security interests of their country, had not been convinced by the
arguments of the Administration, including the report of the National
Security Council, that a new area of the arms race, fraught with very
dangerous consequences, had to be tapped. The senators who voted
against appropriations for the manufacture of neutron weapons despite
the strong pressure of the Pentagon, the powerful militarist lobby and
the military-industrial complex, were firmly convinced that the new
program did not meet the US national interests.
The reactions of the advocates and opponents of the new arms
buildup program were quite symptomatic. Speaking on behalf of the
former, Senator John Stennis (D-Miss), Chairman of the Senate Armed
Forces Committee, stated that the funding decision was for him the best
news in many years. Speaking for the opposition, Senator Mark Hatfield
(R-Oreg) noted that it would be a mistake to field any weapon which
could obliterate the difference between conventional and nuclear types
of armaments.12
The US Senate thus approved the production of nuclear neutron
weapons £>y a one-vote majority, and it was now up to President Carter
finally to decide the fate of new weapons of mass destruction. The
President was not hesitant: he said in a letter to John Stennis, Chairman
of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, in July 1977 that the develop­
ment of that new type of weapon met the US national security interests
and seemed an “attractive option”.
In this way the Carter Administration paved the way for neutron
weapons by sanctioning preparations for their production and deploy­
ment. A propaganda campaign to popularize the neutron bomb as
a “clean” and even “humane” weapon immediately got under way
in the United States. Spokesmen for the White House, the Pentagon,
the Department of State and other federal agencies, “hawks” from
among congressmen, scientists and journalists, businessmen representing
the military-industrial complex and the powerful war lobby on the
Capitol Hill began to laud without a letup the dubious advantages of
‘‘neutron death”. The new atrocious invention meant to kill people
in the most effective way was advertised as a “guarantee of peace",
a “limited-action weapon”, a “dependable-defensive weapon”, a “new
means of the policy of restraint, deterrence and flexible response”, etc.

This large-scale propaganda campaign was aimed at exploiting
public ignorance of the true characteristics of the neutron bomb in
order to conceal from the people the horrendous properties of such
nuclear weapons of mass destruction, to keep secret the true goals
of their adoption, and to preclude the emergence of a broad national
and international movement of protest against the beginning of another
dangerous round of the arms race and the escalation of the threat of
nuclear catastrophe.
These designs of the advocates of “neutron death", however, suffered
a flop: they failed to deceive the peoples in Europe, America and other
continents. The world public saw through the propaganda campaign
launched by those who wanted to produce and deploy neutron weapons.
The formidable threat posed to peace and mankind by the neutron
bomb became clear to all people of goodwill.
A huge tide of outrage and protests of anti-war forces swept the
world. Actions against the neutron bomb continued unabated for about
ten months and Washington eventually was forced to halt its plans
to produce and deploy neutron weapons. President Carter announced
on April 7, 1978, that he had revised his decision and ordered the
production of neutron weapons to be postponed indefinitely.13
But even after the presidential announcement the work on neutron
weapons continued without interruption. Carter’s revised decision en­
visioned the continued upgrading of warheads for the Lance missile
and the 8-inch artillery shells. The goal was to promptly fit out warheads
and shells with enhanced-radiation components, that is, rfeutron muni­
tions. The White House noted at the time that the modernization program
would lake about two years.
Throughout the entire period after the White House’s announced
decision to suspend the manufacture of neutron weapons the press
fell silent about the developments regarding this program. Meanwhile,
the Pentagon and other US agencies kept their energetic preparations
for the deployment of this new weapon of mass destruction.
Though no information was forthcoming from Washington, spokes­
men for the right-wing forces, who had already begun their prepara­
tions for the 1980 presidential elections, every now and then voiced
their admiration for the new weapons. One of the frontrunners in the
presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan, the then Governor of California,
was quite enthusiastic about neutron weapons. In his 1978 broadcast
address, for instance, the future US President spoke in glowing terms
about the "advantages" of nuclear neutron weapons.
Reagan’s attitude during the election campaign left virtually no
doubts about his future actions as President. His electoral victory
in 1980 was followed by a dramatic change in US foreign policy. The
Republican Administration, representing the aggressive militarist forces
which relied on the military-industrial complex, laid emphasis in its
foreign policy on new, unprecedentedly extensive arms buildup prog­
rams with a view to gaining military edge over the USSR and acquiring
“positions of strength"' so as to be able to dictate to other nations.

16

17

Neutron weapons were to become one of the important and essential
elements of that huge arms buildup program.
As early as February 3, 1981. just a fortnight after the Reagan
Administration had been installed, the newly appointed Defense Secre­
tary, Caspar Weinberger, commented at the very first of his numerous
press conferences as the Pentagon chief on the “great potentialities”
of the neutron bomb and advocated the development of that weapon.
Although the White House promptly disavowed the premature state­
ment of the Defense Secretary and stared that no decision had been taken
on the production of neutron weapons, there were more and more
signs that the Administration was on the way to such a decision.
Information to this effect was coming from various sources, including
congressmen and people close to the White House.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the White House’s adviser
R. Pipes expressed themselves in favour of the deployment of neutron
weapons already during the early months of Reagan’s Presidency.
Caspar Weinberger, for one. admitted in a CBS interview on March 8,
1981, that individual components of the neutron warheads had been
designed and continued to be developed. The Congress was assured
that the suspension of neutron weapons production announced in 1978
had not interfered with preparations for their manufacture, in particu­
lar, with the development of cores for neutron devices. It was also
reported that the Pentagon's program to develop 350 warheads for
the Lance missile was gaining momentum and that a new 8-inch artillery
shell for the M-110-A9 howitzer had been designed.
All those development programs had to be financed, however.
What were the sources of funding for the secret programs involving
preparations for the production of neutron weapons? It turned out that
as early as December 17, 1980, the US Congress had approved appropria­
tions for the Energy Department (usually responsible for the US nuclear
development programs) instructing it to ensure the production of all
the components for neutron weapons and to make available nuclear
materials necessary for the purpose. By the summer of 1981, the Con­
gress, which had generously financed preparations for the production
of neutron weapons, was informed that the Energy Department had
effectively accomplished its task. On June 1, 1981, the United States was
ready to produce a new nuclear warhead for the Lance missile. By that
time the work to isolate tritium for the core components of warheads
had been completed, and the flow production of the 8-inch artillery
shell and its neutron components was planned to start in June.
The Reagan Administration, however, was still wary of publicly
assuming responsibility for the beginning of the production of nuclear
neutron weapons and officially announcing what virtually was a fail
accompli. Even when every preparation for this production had been
over, the Reagan Administration would not admit this fact. In early July
1981, the State Department spokesman D. Fischer claimed that the
Energy Department was only following congressional instructions in
its work. According to him, the Administration was still examining the
18

problem of enhanced-radiation weapons, in particular, the “confi­
guration" of the neutron warhead.
Apparently, these dragged-out manoeuvres of the Republican Ad­
ministration were explained by its intention to keep secret, as long
as possible, the horrendous fact that the US Army was going to adopt
the most inhuman variety of weapons of mass destruction. The Pentagon
strategists probably hoped to face the world with the fait accompli
of the neutron arms buildup, which, they thought, could help to secure
the consent of the US NATO partners to the deployment of neutron
warheads in Western Europe. The latter consideration seemed particu­
larly important because Europe -was already seething with protests
against the deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in
West European countries. The prospect of Washington's new militarist
moves was fraught with another flare up of world public indignation.
However, the time had come when it was no longer possible to
conceal with hypocritical rhetoric the activities which had been kept
secret so long. On August 6. 1981, the 36th anniversary of the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima, the US President, cynically trampling the
memory of the Hiroshima victims, announced the decision to go
ahead with the full-scale production of neutron weapons. The truth
thus came to. light: the neutron bomb was to be mass produced by the
US war industry.
The proponents of the new barbarous means of mass destruction
have always been doing their utmost to deceive the peoples as regards the
proportions of the danger posed by that decision and to prevent them
from grasping the gravity of the situation and the need for all people of
goodwill to energetically counter the threat. The militarists are trying
to convince the world public that it was a “routine" decision to improve
the weapons which the Pentagon already had, and a purely domestic
affair of the United States.
It is the duty of scientists to tell the public the true facts about
neutron weapons and to show the grave danger posed by them.
Awareness of the physical, military and technical properties of the
neutron bomb and of the actual medical and biological effects of
its use will help the public realize this danger.

BASIC MILITARY AND TECHNICAL PROPERTIES
OF NEUTRON WEAPONS AND
MEDICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THEIR USE

11.

The leaders of the Washington Administration and their NATO accom­
plices are going to all lengths in their cynicism as they try to picture
neutron weapons as “humane" and quite harmless to the civilian
population. A Pentagon general claimed, for instance, that the blast of
a neutron warhead would not even cause clinking of glasses in the
cupboards of nearby houses. Another proponent of the “humane"
weapons, G. Krempa, a former director of Springer’s Welt am Sonntag,
said in that newspaper that the blast of a neutron bomb would keep
the beauty of Dresden intact, although killing its residents. The angry
words of the West German philosopher E. Bloch are a rebuff to these
inhuman statements: “You cannot shake off the thought that neutron
weapons are meant against people in general rather than against
enemies. Man in our society is superfluous. Unemployment and ratio­
nalization of production make a considerable part of human labour
resources redundant. Will we not see one day millions of people who
have become a drag on society killed off by those weapons?”14
The development and production of neutron weapons in the United
States is another indubitable “priority” of Washington in the nuclear
arms race. One important circumstance merits attention: the proponents
of that variety of nuclear weapons insist on calling it “enhanced-radiation weapons”. This attempt to “camouflage” the neutron bomb as
a conventional weapon is aimed at obliterating the basic difference
between the two kinds of weaponry, to lower the “nuclear threshold"
and to deceive the public about the true nature of the neutron bomb
as a nuclear weapon of mass destruction.
To give the lie to these claims, it is necessary to tell the reader in
greater detail, though in more or less simpler terms, about the physical
properties of neutron weapons and their specific affects on the human
organism and the environment.
The effects of nuclear weapons, as everyone knows, include blast,
light (heat), prompt penetrating radiation and residual radiation (ra­
dioactive fallout). The energy released in the blast of nuclear weapons
based on the reaction of heavy nuclei is distributed between those effects
roughly as follows: 45-55 percent goes into blast, 35 percent into
thermal radiation, some 5 percent is expended as penetrating radiation
and about 10 percent is released as residual radiation caused by the
fission products of heavy nuclei.15
20

The general rule says: as the yield of a nuclear explosion decreases,
the intensity of blast and thermal radiation diminishes considerably
faster as you move from the epicenter of the explosion than that of
penetrating radiation. For instance, if the yield decreases 1000 times
(e.g., from one megaton to one kiloton), the thermal radiation radius
diminishes roughly 25 times, the shock wave damage radius ten times
and the prompt radiation radius a mere three times.18 This shows that
as the yield of nuclear weapons decreases, the role of prompt radiation
as one of the effects of nuclear weapons relatively grows.
The explosion of a nuclear neutron device involves nuclear reactions
known as fission-fusion, in which nuclear fission, accompanied by
high temperatures, triggers the fusion of light nuclei. The reactions
of nuclear fusion, which play the major role in that weapon, involve
the interaction of deuterium and tritium ions and the release of neutrons
with energies of some 14 million electron-volts (Mev). Neutron energy
in fission is about 2 Mevs. In addition, nuclear fusion releases about ten
times as many neutrons as the reaction of fission of the same yield.
Neutrons released in nuclear fusion have a greater penetrating capacity
and travel at larger distances than fission neutrons. The redistribution
of the energy released in the explosion depends on the fission-fusion
correlation. According to the data available, fission and fusion stand
in the 50:50 proportion in the 203 mm 1 kiloton artillery shell and'
40:60 in the warhead of the Lance missile, while in the 2 kt neutron
munitions 70-75 percent of the total energy falls on fusion. Accordingly,
in the explosion of the neutron warhead of the Lance missile and the
203 mm artillery shell about 40 percent of the total energy goes into
blast, 25 percent into thermal radiation, 5 percent into radioactive
fallout and 30 percent into primary penetrating radiation.1' According
to other authors, even a larger portion of the released energy may go
into primary radiation.18
It is therefore clear that neutron weapons are intended to kill people
by penetrating radiation. This inhuman goal is achieved by a steep
enhancement of the intensity of high-energy neutron radiation in a
nuclear munition of a relatively small yield, actually a mini-thermo­
nuclear bomb.
Talking about nuclear weapons, we should bear in mind that the
term “small-yield nuclear munition” is relative: indeed, the explosion
of a one kiloton nuclear bomb is equivalent to the blast of 1,000 tons
of TNT!
This means, for instance, that if 40 percent of the yield of the
neutron warhead of the Lance missile goes into blast, the energy released
will be equivalent to the explosion of 400 tons of TNT, or 80 highexplosive bombs filled with 5 tons of TNT each! Neutron weapons,
therefore, do not exclude other nuclear bomb effects (save penetrating
radiation), as the Western proponents of the neutron bomb claim.
The argument that neutron weapons are “clean" does not stand
up to criticism either. Many stable (non-radioactive) elements exposed
to neutron radiation become radioactive. This phenomenon is known
21

as induced radioactivity. Since the explosion of a neutron device releases
about ten times as many neutrons as the explosion of an atomic bomb
of a similar yield, the neutron-induced radioactivity of the topsoil,
metal objects, food, etc. will be roughly ten times higher than in the
case of an atomic explosion. As a result, the terrain exposed to the
neutron radiation of this "clean" weapon and all the objects there will
be sources of radiation during a certain period of time. Incidentally,
it has been estimated that the Hiroshima survivors and rescue workers
could get an irradiation dose of some 130 rads each because of induced
radioactivity during the two days they stayed close to the epicenter
of the atomic explosion.19
All this exposes the falsity of the allegations that the neutron bomb
is “clean" and that its blast effects are “harmless”. As was noted above,
the main effect of neutron weapons is penetrating radiation, consisting
for the most part of fast neutrons and high-energy gamma-rays.
Irradiation doses beyond the radii of the shock wave and thermal radia­
tion caused by a neutron bomb explosion may reach tens of thousands of
rads. The minimum lethal irradiation dose for man is some 400 rads.
Neutron radiation has the highest lethal effect among all the other types
of ionizing radiation caused by nuclear explosions."'0
As compared with gamma-rays, the other component of the prompt
penetrating radiation of the nuclear explosion — neutron radiation has
a more pronounced effect at every level of biological organization,
from the molecules to the organism as a whole. For instance, acute
radiation sickness caused in man by neutron radiation is characterized
by graver clinical consequences and slower recovery than that induced
by gamma- or X-ray radiation; rehabilitation processes in the exposed
organism are slower and weaker and the effect of medical treatment
poorer.
Neutron radiation induces in man cataracts (a clouding of the
lens of the eye), malignant tumours and leukemia, and genetic defects.
According to various expert estimates, neutrons are 5 to 10 times more
dangerous than gamma-rays in this respect.
One dangerous aspect of neu-tron weapons is, the well-known British
geneticist J. Edwards believes, that its injurious effects on the human
organism are not limited in time: children crippled by radiation may
be born even several generations after the use of these weapons. In
other words, the neutron bomb is to a considerable degree a genetic
weapon. Neutron radiation is very dangerous for the embryo. Depend­
ing on the irradiation dose to which the expectant mother has been
exposed, the biologic consequences for the embryo range from imme­
diate death to diverse inborn deformities and development defects.
There is another important circumstance. Al present, prestigeous
international scientific organizations (such as the International Commi­
ssion on Radiological (Radiation) Protection and the UN Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) believe that in principle
even the slightest dose of ionizing radiation can cause with a definite
degree of certainty malignant tumours and genetic defects in exposed

people and their progeny. As regards neutron radiation, the risk of the
development of those grave pathological conditions in people exposed
to neutron radiation is higher than in the case of exposure to other
types of ionizing radiation.21 ■
Table 1 illustrates the points made above.
All reasonable people, even laymen, clearly realize that the argu­
ments of the proponents of the neutron bomb are false: that the
“most humane” weapon, presumably intended to kill enemy manpower
but guarantee the life and health of the civilian population, actually
is the most sophisticated and inhuman weapon of mass destruction.
Here are some of the published figures on the penetrating radiation
radii and irradiation doses in the explosion of a 1 kiloton neutron
device.-0 People on about 8 square kilometers around the epicenter
of the explosion will die instantly from lethal radiation.24 The ring-shaped
area in which irradiation doses will range from one to 100 rads will
measure 10 square kilometers. Consequences for exposed people will
be rather grave even in that area with relatively small radiation doses
because of the high biological effects of neutron radiation. These figures
give but a rough idea about the levels of irradiation at certain distances
after the explosion of a one-kiloton nuclear device.
Given these figures, we should bear in mind that a large number of
neutron warheads may be exploded over a densely populated area,
which fact exposes the false and absurd allegations that the civilian
population has nothing to fear from neutron weapons.
The United States intends to deploy neutron weapons in Western
Europe, but not in Texas. The deployment plans, according to press
reports, feature 380 neutron warheads for Lance missiles and 800 war­
heads for heavy howitzer shells. Undoubtedly, if it comes to the actual
use of neutron weapons, hundreds and even thousands of warheads
will be exploded.25
Given the high population density and urbanization in Western
Europe, with population centers separated by one or two kilometers,
one can well foresee an immense loss- of life among the civilian po­
pulation.
Dr. I. Miettinen, a notable Finnish expert on radiological protection,
points out in his paper "The Neutron Bomb and the Related Doctrine”:
“If troops take cover in urban zones from which the civilian popula­
tion has not been evacuated, the effect of the neutron weapon on the
civilian population will be far more injurious as compared to that of
the atomic weapon of equivalent yield... The number of civilians killed
will double, whereas the survivors will suffer from much higher
irradiation doses.”26 F. di Pasquantonio cites in his monograph "The
Neutron Bomb: Biological, Political and Military Consequences”,
published in Italy in 1980, the following figures: irradiation dose
at a distance of 400 meters from the epicenter of the explosion of the
1 kiloton neutron device is 418,000 rads. The author points out that
even people in a sound atomic shelter with a protective effect of 500
will be exposed to a lethal irradiation dose of 836 rads, while people
23

22

Table !~~

Effects of Neutron Weapons on Man

Distance
from the
epicenter
of 1 kt on
neutron
explosion
(meters)

Approximate
irradiation
doses (rads)

700

16,000

900

8,000

1,400

650

1,700

150

2,300

15

Effects on man

Immediate and total loss of capacity for
physical and mental activity. Painful death
within 1-2 days.
Total loss of capacity for physical activity
within several minutes. Death in 2-6 days.
Grave functional disorders within one hour
after exposure. Death from acute radiation
sickness in 2-3 weeks.
About 10 percent of the exposed persons
die within several months. A high incidence
of malignant tumours and leukemia in 15-25
years in the survivors.
No radiation sickness. Likelihood of malig­
nant tumours and leukemia in some of the
exposed persons. Adverse genetic consequ­
ences may recur in several generations of
the descendents of the initially exposed
people.

finding themselves after the explosion at 200 to 300 meters from the
epicenter will get during two hours 300 to 1,400 rads from neutroninduced radioactivity.2'
These estimates by scientists from different countries forcefully
show that the civilian population will be the first victim of neutron
weapons. From the point of view of their effects, neutron munitions are
to a certain extent similar to chemical and biological weapons.
The neutron bomb also is an ecological weapon. The US scientist
A. Westing estimates that the explosion of a one-kiloton neutron device
will affect 310 hectares of coniferous forest, 170 hectares of broad­
leaved forest or 140 hectares of hayland. An atomic bomb of the same
yield would affect only 50 hectares of woodland. It would take centuries
to restore the ecosystem after a nuclear neutron explosion.28
All these facts prompt the conclusion that neutron weapons are
at least as dangerous as chemical weapons, the use of which is prohibited
by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Article 23 of the Hague Convention respecting the laws and
customs of war on land prohibits the infliction of senseless suffering
24

on people by the use of combat weapons which are not superior to
other weapons. The use of neutron weapons would render that
convention null and void.
The practice of the past wars of the 20th century, particularly the
Second World War and the Vietnam war unleashed by US imperialism,
shows that the demand of international laws that no damage be done
to the civilian population is not respected and that civilians are often
exposed to bombings. Moreover, in certain instances no constraints on
the methods of use of weaponry are observed (suffice it to mention
the violation by the US Command of constraints on the tactical use
of tear gas in Vietnam). That is why such an “optimal" weapon as the
neutron bomb, bound to affect the civilian population, must not be
put into the hands of the military command, which often (if not always)
disregards humane considerations in its decisions on the use of weapons.
The “clean” neutron bomb has already polluted the political climate
in Europe and all over the world. In future it may become one of the
most atrocious means of mass annihilation.

III.

NEUTRON WEAPONS IN U.S. WAR PLANS

The appearance of one weapon or another in the war arsenal of a state
is explained by many factors, the most important of them being, perhaps,
the foreign policy of the given state. New types and systems of weaponry
are usually sought by those states which have aggressive and expansionist
ambitions and which formulate and carry out their foreign policies
accordingly. The goal of foreign policies of this sort usually is to
attain superiority, primarily in the military field, and to dictate to other
states. This foreign policy course determines the aggressive character of
military doctrine, strategy and tactics, of the arms buildup and of the
composition of the armed forces and armaments.
States basing their foreign policy on aggression and expansion are
constantly trying to outpace their potential adversary by acquiring
ever more fearsome and destructive types of weaponry which could re­
duce the other side to a weaker and even dependent position. If the
other side takes countermeasures to neutralize these activities in order
to protect itself and its interests against potential aggression and
succeeds in doing so, the expansionist state keeps looking for means
to achieve military superiority. As a rule, it tries to conceal its true
aggressive plans and to justify and rationalize its rampant hegemonistic
ambitions by resorting to a stereotype which is commonly known in
international practice, namely, to explain its arms buildup by the
need to defend itself against the threat presumably posed by the other
side.
But if both sides have roughly equal military, economic, scientific
and technical potentials, the latter, obviously, will not allow the former
to achieve superiority. Yet if the initiator of military rivalry would
not give up its plans and persists in the futile attempts to break ahead
and gain a new position of strength with regard to the other side, there
emerges between the two a dangerous and actually quite senseless
arms race. That race grows ever costlier and begins to involve many
other states. As a consequence, the international situation gradually
worsens, tension mounts, state-to-state relations become aggravated,
the threat of war escalates, and in the nuclear age the danger of the
annihilation of human civilization as a whole arises.
At the same time the burden of military expenditures keeps
growing, the economic situation of states deteriorates, appropriations
for social needs decrease, and inflation and unemployment rise.

In this situation every new area of the arms race dramatically
aggravates the entire complex of the problems faced by mankind, serious
as they are, and pushes the world closer to the brink of nuclear cata­
strophe. AU this holds true in full measure both for the genuine
military and political reasons of Washington’s decision to go ahead
with the full-scale production of neutron weapons and for the con­
sequences of that step.
The fielding of neutron weapons by the United States is, perhaps,
more important to its future nuclear weapons policy than any other de­
cision since the order to drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities in 1945 and
the go-ahead on the development of the thermonuclear bomb in 1950.
The adoption of neutron weapons by the US army, on the one hand,
is an immediate consequence of the aggressive foreign policy of the
White House and the strategy and tactics of the Pentagon and, on the
other, exerts considerable influence on the military, primarily nuclear
strategy and tactics of that country and its NATO allies.
This development cannot help affecting the defence aspects of the
policies of those countries against which the neutron bomb is primarily
meant. The military, political and psychological effects of Washington’s
decision on the full-scale production of neutron weapons, in particular,
on the destinies of detente and peace, especially in Europe, are so
serious and manifaceted as to require a thorough analysis.
Having developed nuclear neutron devices, the United States has
chosen and prepared proper delivery vehicles, in particular, the tactical
Lance missile with a range of up to 120 km and the 8-inch (203.2 mm)
artillery shell fired by self-propelled howitzers. The press reports that
in future nuclear neutron warheads may be fitted on to even more
advanced delivery vehicles, including strategic missiles. According to
military experts, for instance, the tactical and technical specifications
of neutron weapons make them suitable for the shells of ship artillery,
for missiles of different types and also for air bombs and cruise missiles
of different ranges. Even the variety of the neutron munitions existing
today can exert all-round effects against troops, the civilian population,
property, technology and the environment.
Any weapon, when used in combat conditions, is to exert all
its effects and it is their totality that determines the combat potential
of that weapon and its employment in warfare, although each of them
is meant to pursue a specific purpose. This is especially true of nuclear
weapons and their inhuman, barbarous variety, neutron weapons.
The main purpose of neutron weapons is to kill as many people
as possible, and it is for this reason that a US Senator has characterized
them as “even more repugnant than usual and literally dehumanizing."29
However, neutron weapons also produce blast and heat radiation,
and however hard the proponents of “neutron death" may try to
present the neutron bomb as a humane weapon, the logic and doctrines
of warfare show that it will be used in every type of combat for different
purposes.
In view of the exceptionally injurious effects of neutron weapons

26

27

mentioned above, US military planners not only intend to use them for
the mass-scale annihilation of enemy manpower, as they argue (and
which is inhuman in itself), but also to accomplish a number of
other combat tasks. In particular, Lance missiles with neutron war­
heads are going to be used to put out enemy missile launchers and for
other purposes.
Another major delivery means for neutron warheads is going to
be the self-propelled 203.2 mm howitzer and, perhaps, the 155 mm
howitzer. These weapons have been modernized, in particular, to almost
double their range (to 30 km), which has made it possible to use them
and, hence, neutron warheads for a considerably broader range of
purposes.
The development of a warhead for the new medium-range missile
system Pershing-2 (having a range of 1,800 km) and for cruise
missiles would become a qualitatively new and particularly destabilizing
factor in the plans for using neutron weapons. According to press
reports, this development work has already begun in the United States.
In late 1983, the United States and its NATO allies went ahead with the
deployment of Pershing-2s and cruises in Western Europe, namely,
in West Germany, Britain and Italy.
In this way the United States thwarted the Geneva talks on the
limitation of nuclear arms in Europe because their continuation under
these circumstances would only mean a cover for the fulfilment of
the US militarist plans. The Soviet Union believes that the deployment
of these new US medium-range nuclear missiles is a strategic develop­
ment because they can reach targets in its territory from sites in
Western Europe in a mere 5-7 minutes. Obviously, the possible use
of enhanced-radiation nuclear warheads on Pershing-2s and cruises
deployed by the United States in Europe drastically upsets the strategic
balance between the USSR and the USA in the latter’s favour and,
moreover, poses a grave neutron threat to targets in the Soviet Union’s
deep rear. However, these are only some of the plans that are being
laid by the Washington militarists for the use of nuclear neutron weapons.
Their other designs are based on those characteristics of the neutron
bomb which are touted particularly stridently by its proponents, namely,
its presumed capacity only to kill troops on the battlefield without
affecting the civilian population. It is this “efficiency” of the neutron
weapon in killing enemy manpower that pleases their advocates so
much and gives them reason to extol it as a new “superweapon”, to
impute to it fantastic properties, and even to speculate on “a revolution
in strategy". This enthusiasm over the neutron bomb on the part of
the more aggressive military and political circles of the United States
and NATO is largely explained by their intention to put into practice
their dangerous concept of the possibility and admissibility of the
use of neutron weapons in a "limited" war. All that enthusiasm also
belies the Pentagon’s desire to sell the public on the fatal illusion that
a nuclear war can be constrained in scope and duration, that it will
not escalate into a global war and that it is quite survivable.

Militarily, according to specialists, these calculations are absurd,
while the assertions that neutron weapons will spare the civilian
population are a big fraud. Plans for combat operations, for instance,
do not coniine them solely to sparsely populated areas, isolating
population centers from the probable theatre of operations, as is
evidenced by the US Army Manual. The latter stresses specifically
that critical serious conflicts in Germany are bound to entail recurrent
and virtually incessant fighting for large cities, small towns and
villages.
Moreover, the reassuring statements of certaitt US generals about
the humane character of neutron weapons are based, as a rule, on the
use of single warheads. However, Pentagon spokesmen admit that,
depending on military “expediency”, missiles and shells with neutron
warheads may be used in groups or clusters of 30-50 munitions, both
regular nuclear and neutron ones. The cumulative effect of such group
explosions would enlarge manifold the radius of the eftects of neutron
weapons and therefore their toll of the population.
The advocates of neutron weapons claim that the latter have
far smaller side effects than other nuclear weapons, in particular, as
regards the civilian population and US and friendly troops. Thus they
are trying to prove that neutron weapons can be used in own territory
or the territory of an ally for defensive purposes, primarily to fight
attacking tanks.
This argument, like many others in the discourses of US and NATO
generals, is based on a fabricated “Soviet military threat” and a probable
massive attack of Soviet tanks westwards across the plains of Central
Europe. According to US and NATO officials, the West has no other
effective means except neutron weapons to counter the presumably
superior “tank potential" of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The neutron
warhead, they claim, is the most effective weapon against Soviet
tanks, which makes it essential to the West European defences. That was
how President Carter, for one, explained the West’s need for neutron
weapons which, as he said at a press conference on April 25, 1978,
were meant to “counterbalance that inequality".
Allegations of the Soviet Union’s military superiority over the United
States and NATO in one type of armaments or another have long become
a stereotype propaganda ploy used by the West to rationalize its own con­
stantly escalating arms buildup programs. That ploy is invoked over and
over again whenever a new type or system of weapons is going to be deve­
loped, or whenever additional appropriations for military purposes are
debated. These allegations, misrepresentations and downright lies are al­
ways used to mislead other countries and the world public. "Soviet mi­
litary superiority" is being harped on even while senior officials of the
US Administration have to admit the existence of parity between the
USSR and the United States, between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization.
The history of the armed forces of the two sides, their military doc­
trines, strategies and tactics as well as their military technologies have de­

28

29

veloped in different ways, just as their geopolitical situations are different.
That is why each of the sides laid emphasis on different types of arma­
ment, and as a consequence each come to have more of particular types
of armament. However, in the aggregate, the military potentials of the
two sides became roughly equal. So while at present the USSR and the
Warsaw Treaty Organization have a certain superiority in tanks, the USA
and NATO are stronger in other respects, in particular, in airforce, non­
nuclear anti-tank defences, etc. When all is said and done, however, over­
all parity neutralizes the superiorities of the sides in individual areas.
This fully applies to the problem of tanks and anti-tank weapons. The
“high anti-tank" abilities of neutron weapons are called in question, and
with good reason, by a number of Western military experts, who point
out that these can be effective only against major tank groupings but
hardly so against tanks scattered in combat operations.
The North Atlantic Alliance has for a few years now been speedily
carrying on a program of improving and stockpiling of different non-nu­
clear anti-tank weapons. This program is at odds with NATO’s allegations
that neutron weapons are being fielded first and foremost to bolster anti­
tank defences.
NATO is supposed to possess a total of more than 190,000 units of
non-nuclear anti-tank weapons. So why do they need in addition neutron
weapons to fight tanks if they propose to have and already have such a
huge number of conventional anti-tank weapons? Are neutron weapons
really meant for anti-tank defences, as their advocates claim, or are they
assigned a very different role in the US and NATO war plans?
We may recall in this context that the first batch of neutron war­
heads — about 30 of them — were fitted onto surface-to-air Sprint missi­
les, i.e., were meant for anti-missile defences. This fact shows that
neutron weapons can be used for a variety of purposes rather than as only
anti-tank weapons.
The military and technical properties of the neutron bomb and the
possible medical and biological effects of its use indubitably make it one
of the worst weapons of mass destruction intended for offensive rather
than defensive purposes. Neutron weapons require large areas and for
this reason are unsuitable for defence operations because if using them
against an advancing enemy prepared for a radiation attack the defending
side would willy-nilly annihilate its own defenceless civilian population
and part of its troops. Neutron weapons are therefore much more effec­
tive in the offensive, as is also proven by the fact that induced radioactivi­
ty as a result of their use, according to US expert estimates, is gradually
declining, which enables the troops using neutron weapons promptly to
enter the target area and occupy it.'1
Those characteristics of the neutron bomb as an offensive weapon
have been underlined by many notable politicians and military leaders
in the West. For instance, Egon Bar, a member of the Presidium of the
Social-Democratic Party of Germany, a deputy to the West German
Bundestag and Chairman of the Bundestag Armaments Commission,
said in an interview to the weekly Die Zeil: “An aggressor seeking to
30

clear, so to speak, of defenders an area it wants to conquer and, if possi­
ble, have its industry intact should have an interest in using neutron wea­
pons. In other words, neutron weapons hold out a great promise pre­
cisely as offensive weapons."
Neutron weapons cannot be considered purely defensive," former
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt pointed out. “Like most other
weapons in the world, they, naturally, can well be used for offensive pur­
poses.
Confirming the justified comments of politicians on the offen­
sive character of neutron weapons, General Krause of West Germany no­
ted that having delivered a strike with neutron weapons, the attacking
side can exploit their effects to thrust deep into enemy formation."
The same point has been made on more than one occasion by Soviet
leaders in their statements. Addressing the seamen of the Pacific Fleet
in Vladivostok on April 7, 1978, Leonid Brezhnev described the neutron
weapons in the following way: “This is a mass destruction weapon
of a new type. Any talk about such weapons being allegedly defensive in
character does not correspond to reality. This is a nuclear offensive wea­
pon, moreover, designed chiefly to destroy human life."33
Losses in manpower inflicted on the enemy, undoubtedly, are of little
concern to the aggressor. At the same time lesser destruction and lower
contamination levels caused by neutron weapons as compared with re­
gular nuclear munitions are quite in accord with the aggressor’s inten­
tions. On the one hand, these factors help the aggressor promptly to deve­
lop its offensive and, on the other, ensures for it larger spoils.
All this convincingly shows that the discourses of the advocates of
neutron weapons about their “purely defensive” character are absolutely
groundless. The claims of the US and NATO leaders that nuclear neutron
weapons are intended to "counterbalance” the Warsaw Treaty countries’
superiority in tanks or that they are necessary to “catch up” with the
Soviet Union in armaments are similarly false.
Authoritative military experts both in East and West have been expo­
sing the falsity of these “arguments” for many years. The Warsaw Treaty
member countries indeed have a sufficient'military potential. However,
they have never sought superiority, limiting themselves to maintaining mi­
nimally sufficient defences to protect the peaceful constructive efforts
of their peoples in the face of the ever growing military potential of
NATO. If we evaluate the military balance between the two sides objective­
ly, without singling out any type of weaponry or arms but correlating
the total military potentials of the sides on the basis of such factors as rhe
numbers of weapons, their qualitative characteristics, and the combat ca­
pabilities and organization of troops, we will come to the conclusion that
there is a rough parity of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
Organization.
The attempts to demonstrate the Warsaw Treaty countries' superio­
rity in individual types of armaments belie the desire to conceal the huge
scope of the aggressive war preparations of the USA and NATO, with
neutron weapons now assigned a major role in them. The true reason be­
hind the US decision to go ahead with the production of neutron war31

heads is Washington’s hope to achieve military superiority over the War­
saw Treaty countries in tactical nuclear weapons.
It is common knowledge, however, that the existing rough parity bet­
ween the USA and the USSR and between NATO and rhe Warsaw Trea­
ty Organization was and remains one of the major conditions making
it possible to lower the level of armed confrontation with due respect for
the security interests of both sides. This circumstance is admitted by Wes­
tern officials as well. It was the West’s recognition of the rough military
parity of the two sides that paved the way to all the multilateral and bila­
teral arms limitation agreements and treaties concluded during the 1970s.
It was that fact that underlied all those achievements in the strengthening
of peace and international security that came to be known as detente.
That was why the implementation of the US plans to manufacture
neutron weapons meant nothing short of an attempt of the reactionary,
adventuristic forces in the USA to introduce a new destabilizing factor
in the international military and political situation in the hope to upset the
existing balance of forces and to achieve military superiority. Those plans
indicated intentions of Washington and its allies to subvert the security
of socialist countries, to aggravate international tension and to provoke
another, particularly dangerous round of the arms race.
One of the more widespread arguments in defence of neutron wea­
pons is that they presumably can make nuclear war “limited" or “con­
trolled". It is based on the assumption that in case of a local conflict neu­
tron weapons will ensure the West military superiority over the Warsaw
Treaty countries and prevent that conflict from escalating into an all-out
nuclear war. The authors of this concept view neutron weapons as a
“safe" way of resolving Europe’s political problems militarily, one that
will ensure the survival of the European countries and save them from
extensive devastation.
The view of neutron weapons as a means of fighting a “limited" nu­
clear war on the European continent is. perhaps, more adventuristic than
any other current military-political concept and is fraught with catast­
rophic consequences both for Europe and for the whole world. This ap­
proach to neutron weapons totally disregards the realities of the military
situation, the organization of the armed forces and the existence of huge
nuclear arms arsenals. It also ignores the lessons of political and military
history, which convincingly refutes the hopes of US and NATO generals.
Blurring the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare
and between tactical and strategic weapons, the neutron bomb drastically
lowers the nuclear threshold and enhances the risk of a nuclear outbreak
and of its eruption into a universal nuclear war. In this way neutron wea­
pons can play the sinister role of a fuse of world nuclear catastrophe.
Since most of the present-day nuclear neutron weapons are intended
to be deployed and used in Europe, it is the Europeans that will bear the
brunt of the grave consequences of the US leaders’ decision. Europe is
viewed by the Pentagon as the main theatre of operations in a possible war
against the Warsaw Treaty countries. The production of neutron muni­
tions and the development of new medium-range missiles are consistent

and mutually complementing measures to weave the concept of a "limited
nuclear war” into a material fabric. These measures affect the vital inte­
rests of the European countries and pose a grave threat to their popula­
tion. They also testify to the US intention to force its NATO allies to emb­
race this military doctrine.
While claiming that neutron munitions will so far be stockpiled in the
USA, the Pentagon makes no secret of the fact that they are intended
for delivery vehicles which have already been deployed in Western Eu­
rope, mostly in West Germany. It is planned at first to manufacture 380
neutron warheads for Lance missiles and 800 for 8-inch artillery shells.
Symptomatically, the US President’s decision has been supported by the
more reactionary forces in West Germany. Their leader, Franz-Josef
Strauss, called for the immediate deployment of new US deadly weapons
in West Germany, which already has NATO’s largest arms arsenal in
Europe.
The West European NATO countries have so far given no official
consent to the deployment of neutron weapons in their territory. Mean­
while, even before the Reagan Administration announced its decision
on the full-scale production of neutron weapons, Washington had begun
energetically to pressure its NATO partners to win their consent to the
deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe. In early February
1981, the US Defense Secretary said he was going to convince the
West Europeans of the need and usefulness of this step. He admitted
a month later that intensive consultations with European partners were
under way on that subject. He also stated that certain European statesmen
and politicians had a favourable view of neutron weapons.
After the decision to pul nuclear weapons on stream had been taken,
the United States made fresh attempts to convince its allies, concentrating
on those who seemed more complaisant. In late August 1981, Weinberger
paid a visit to Britain. Commenting on his visit, the British Guardian no­
ted that the United States expected Britain immediately and uncondi­
tionally to adopt neutron weapons for its Rhine Army artillery. The US
believed that the key to the deployment of neutron weapons in Western
Europe should be a decision of a NATO ally to provide its own troops
with these weapons. Washington chose Britain as its target,
and small wonder: the military and political course of the Thatcher go­
vernment is closer to Washington's militarist policy than that ot any other
NATO country. In addition, the British army has Lance missiles and
203.2 mm self-propelled howitzers, which makes it technically easier
to field neutron weapons.
Another likely recipient of US neutron weapons, Washington be­
lieves, is West Germany. Way back in 1978, the West German government
was not averse to having neutron munitions in the territory of this
country. The plan to do so, however, was blocked by massive demonstra­
tions and anti-war protests which swept the country. However, that ques­
tion, which is crucial to West Germany as well as to other European
countries, has not yet been buried.
Practice shows that the United States far from always reckons with its

32

33

partners in such matters. Washington may even go along without such
a consent and again face the European countries with a fait accompli. In­
deed, the Lance missiles and munitions for the 8-inch artillery guns that
have been deployed in Europe can quickly be fitted out with neutron
warheads.
Moreover, legally Washington does not need the consent of the go­
vernment of West Germany to bring neutron warheads to its territory.
A prominent West German politician pointed out recently that under
the existing military treaties between the USA and West Germany, inclu­
ding a 1952 agreement, the Federal Government has no right to expect
even to be consulted before the US troops stationed in the country get
neutron weapons. This was confirmed by US Assistant Secretary for De­
fense R. Perle, who stated that the US Army had no need to ask per­
mission for the deployment of new weapons.
Of course, Washington would not like to quarrel with its allies but,
obviously, it believes itself fully empowered to decide the West Europeans’
destiny. As US Defense Secretary Weinberger has observed, the prompt­
ness with which neutron weapons can be brought to Europe makes any
protracted debates superfluous.
Washington’s disregard for the West Europeans' interests is clearly
becoming common practice in Atlantic relationships. The West Euro­
peans are growing ever more aware of the true worth of American pledges
from such facts as the promise to ratify the SALT-2 Accord in exchange
for the consent of the other NATO countries to deploy new US medium­
range missiles. The United States secured the consent to the deployment
of missiles in West Germany, Britian and Italy and continues to exert
pressure on Belgium and the Netherlands. At the same time it would not
ratify the SALT-2 Accord. For this reason, one can hardly explain the at­
titude of certain West European leaders, backing Washington’s propa­
ganda allegations that the problem of neutron weapons is a US internal
affair with no bearing on Europe.
However, not all the governments of the NATO countries, despite the
strong pressure brought to bear from across the ocean, are as willing as
Britain and West Germany to accept US neutron munitions. Trying to
push through its plans, the United States exerted immense diplomatic ef­
forts, primarily with regard to its allies, in order to neutralize the world­
wide public movement against the neutron threat. In particular, the US
Administration tried in every way to provoke the West European
governments into appealing to the United States to launch the production
and deployment of neutron munitions. Washington’s allies, however,
refused to go along.
Moreover, there emerged in Western Europe quite sizeable opposition
to neutron weapons, represented, in particular, by Greece, Denmark, Ice­
land and Norway. Belgium and the Netherlands voiced grave doubts over
the plans to produce and deploy neutron weapons in Western Europe.
Opposition among the US allies led to the cancellation of a special NATO
conference planned at the headquarters of the Alliance in March 1978,
to discuss the production and deployment of neutron weapons. That was
34

a rare incident in the more than 30-year history of such conferences, one
testifying to the strong potential of the anti-war movement.
Since that time the United States, far from giving up, has intensified
its efforts to drag the allies into its neutron venture. According to Western
news agencies, in early August 1982, the United States launched
another attack on its West European partners in a bid to make them agree
to the deployment of munitions of a new, small-sized type.
An official spokesman for the NATO headquarters in Brussels told
a Reuter correspondent on August 2, 1982, that the United States had not
consulted its NATO allies on a secret military program which could
double its neutron weapons arsenal. It became known from sources
close to the US Congress that the research personnel of American
governmental agencies were working on a small-sized nuclear artillery
shell which was likely to produce six times as much deadly radioactive
radiation as standard nuclear weapons. The production of those shells
could double or even triple the number of the units of neutron weapons
planned for production. That shell, codenamed “W-8”, was meant to be
deployed primarily in West European countries.
Yet earlier one of the US news services, quoting informed sources,
had reported that the US Administration had ordered the production of
an additional 1,000 units of neutron-tipped artillery shells with a range
of 18 miles. Those shells are intended for the 155 mm howitzers used
by the NATO armies in Western Europe. According to press reports,
the Pentagon’s “neutron program", its main component being the pro­
duction of 2,200 neutron warheads, will cost the US tax payer 2.5 bil­
lion dollars.
The reports of the Western news agencies graphically illustrate Wa­
shington’s resolve to introduce new nuclear neutron weapons in Europe
at all costs, despite the Europeans’ opposition.
As for the Americans themselves, Washington is trying to reassure
them by claiming that the neutron bomb, presumably a tactical weapon,
is intended to be used on the European theatre of operations and will thus
help to spare the territory of the United States in case of a nuclear missile
war. The Americans are being deliberately deceived because official
propaganda never mentions the fact that the lowering of the nuclear
threshold on the European continent simultaneously increases the possi­
bility of bringing into play all the other types of nuclear weapons of mass
destruction, including strategic armaments. The escalation of a nuclear
conflict will by no means spare the territory of the United States.
US politicians and military leaders cling to the erroneous view that,
having unleashed a nuclear conflict in Europe, they will be able to rest­
rict it to the Old World. In fact, they hope by means of neutron weapons
to accomplish their own strategic goals with NATO’s help and at the
expense of their European allies. Further proof of these hopes is the fact
that the questions of neutron weapons were discussed at almost every
meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group since 1973, although the
neutron bomb featured in the agendas as “death rays" or "mini-charges".
In other words, Washington has been working on its NATO partners for a
35

decade now in an attempt to drag them even deeper in its own adventuris­
tic plans. Preparations for that pressure campaign had begun even earlier.
As a result of Washington’s efforts, NATO took in the late 1960s
and early 1970s a series of decisions which altered the Alliance’s nuclear
policy and strategy in Europe. That alteration actually boiled down to the
lowering of the “nuclear threshold" on the continent. The USA effectively
sold its allies on the concept of NATO’s possible first use of nuclear wea­
pons against socialist countries even in the early stages of an armed con­
flict in Europe. Under those revised plans, NATO adopted new, simplified
procedures for decision-making on the use of those weapons. So the fiel­
ding by the USA of neutron munitions intended specifically for NATO
seemed to accomplish several tasks simultaneously. It was in accord with
the US strategic plans, made the Europeans the target of the consequen­
ces of a possible conflict, promoted Washington's policy of modernizing
NATO’s nuclear systems in Europe, lowered the European “nuclear
threshold", fitted NATO’s simplified procedure for decision-making on
the use of nuclear weapons, and ensured military superiority over the
Warsaw Treaty countries in the most important area, in nuclear ar­
maments.
At the same time the United States was getting fresh possibilities to
carry further the dangerous tendency of lowering the.“nuclear thre­
shold". In addition, Washington intended to exploit its monopoly
of the production of neutron weapons in NATO to strengthen its poli­
tical and military positions in the alliance.
The emergence of a qualitatively new, barbarous means of mass de­
struction would undoubtedly be one of the many dangerous consequences
of the US decision to produce neutron weapons on a mass scale. In this
way other nuclear powers may be encouraged to develop such weapons.
Reports in the foreign press that France is energetically developing neut­
ron weapons and is virtually on the brink of producing them caused much
worry. Although the French government denied the reports that France
intended to begin producing neutron munitions and fielding them, it has
never said there are no plans to develop such weapons.
The world public also is alarmed by the dispatches of Western news
agencies about Israel’s and South Africa's plans to develop neutron wea­
pons. The appearance of these weapons in those countries would mean
a fresh threat to peace and security in the Middle East and in southern
Africa. Also, there are forces in certain non-nuclear countries which
would like them to acquire neutron weapons. It is not so very difficult
to develop knowhow for the production of neutron weapons in our age
of rapid scientific and technical progress. Undoubtedly, such develop­
ments in international affairs would have extremely dangerous con­
sequences.
Practice shows that the emergence of any new type of weaponry leads
to another round of the arms race, to the development of such or similar
weapons by other countries and prompts them to look for and eventually
produce and field counterbalancing arms systems. This is particularly
true of the present-day weapons of mass destruction and, of course, neut­

ron weapons. Nevertheless, the proponents of these weapons continue to
claim with senseless obstinacy that their production and deployment will
not entail another round of the arms race. They usually argue that neut­
ron weapons are just a modernized variety of the existing tactical wea­
pons presumably meant to replace them. However, they never mention or
belittle the qualitatively new effects of neutron warheads, the use of
which, particularly in the theatre of operations, will drastically upset the
balance of forces in favour of the United States and NATO. The possible
employment of medium- and long-range missiles and cruises as delivery
vehicles for neutron warheads would have even graver consequences
from the point of view of military doctrine, strategy and tactics.
The fielding of neutron weapons gives an impetus to the development
of what is known as third-generation nuclear weapons. According to spe­
cialists, the neutron bomb is a transitory element to third-generation
nuclear weapons, or, as they say, their “primitive forerunner”. Those
future nuclear weapons, based on the principle of the enhanced-radiation
neutron warhead, go even a longer way toward the implementation
of the idea of a controlled nuclear explosion.
Judith Miller, a senior New York Times correspondent, reported on
October 28, 1982, that third-generation nuclear weapons, on which US
theorists were already working, would make it possible to use even more
selectively the thermal, radioactive and blast effects, which would be an
improvement on the existing weaponry. The journalist had obtained that
information from Pentagon officials, from sources in the Department of
the Presidential Science Adviser, and also from researchers of the Law­
rence Livermore National Laboratory which is doing a considerable
part of R&D on new weapons, just as was the case with.the neutron bomb.
According to them, the latest breakthroughs in physics and electronics
will enable the United States to develop weapons which can be used on
land, in the air or in outer space against targets in the theatre of opera­
tions or against nuclear weapons, while minimizing undesirable side ef­
fects.
The new concepts on nuclear weapons were approved by the Senate
Armed Forces Committee. The Committee suggested in its report on a nu­
clear arms development program for fiscal 1983 that the Energy De­
partment, responsible for the development and production of atomic
weapons, draw up a purposeful many-year program based on those
concepts and stressed that it would carefully follow the implementation of
the program during the next few years.
Officials of the US referred to several types of new weapons planned
by specialists. These may be bombs producing a strong electromagnetic
pulse to disable enemy communications systems, lasers to make
atomic explosions generate X-rays, which in turn, will supply energy for
laser beams to destroy enemy missiles, and a "controlled energy weapon
intended to destroy targets with minimal side effects. The new weapons,
specialists believe, can be used for offensive purposes.
According to US scientists and officials, great progress has been
achieved in laser technology. At the Nevada testing range for under37

36

ground nuclear weapons tests, staff members of the Livermore Labora­
tory carried out a small nuclear explosion to produce X-rays which gene­
rated a tiny laser beam in a vacuum chamber simulating outer space.34
It is no one’s surprise now that Dr. Edward Teller, “the father
of the hydrogen bomb," is a vigorous champion of the third-generation
weapons. Dr. Teller met President Reagan in October 1982 and urged
him to increase appropriations for the development of new concepts.
Delivering a speech at the National Press Club on October 26, Dr. Teller
criticized the proposed freeze on nuclear weapons and claimed that
it would interfere with the development and testing of new “defensive
weapons", which, according to him, could considerably enhance national
security.
The Administration’s support for third-generation weapons is
strongly opposed by the champions of the nuclear arms freeze and by
certain scientists. Richard Garvin, a physicist of the Thomas Watsom
Research Center, International Business Machines Corporation, stated
that a comprehensive nuclear weapon tests ban agreed with the Soviet
Union would meet national interests to a far greater extent.
Hugh E. De Witt, a physicist with the Livermore Laboratory, sent
a letter of protest to the President of the University of California, to
which the laboratory is attached. The protest was against the recent
attempts of Dr. Teller and other scientists of the laboratory to lobby
for higher appropriations and new generation weapons, qualifying
the promises of the champions of the new weapons technology as
misleading and dangerous.
Christopher Payne of the Federation of American Scientists charac­
terized third-generation weapons as a dangerous ploy encouraged
by arms-makers to guarantee orders. In his words, those so-called
concepts can only lead to the continued arms race.'1'’
All these statements give the lie to the claims of the proponents
of the neutron bomb that it was not escalating the arms race to an
even more dangerous level. Moreover, many specialists believe that the
emergence of neutron weapons will greatly speed up R&D of certain
conventional weapons (such as armoured personnel. carriers, tanks
and self-propelled artillery) in order to devise new defences against
neutron radiation. There will also be a search for ways to physically
counter a flow of non-charged nuclear particles. The press reports
that neutron weapons can entail the arms race involving the development
of basically new technology for land warfare, such as a machine on
the air cushion, “mole-type" subterranean facilities, etc.
An objective analysis of the cosequences of the development
and adoption of neutron munitions therefore leaves no doubt that
neutron weapons are not merely a variety of the existing nuclear
weapons. They open a new dangerous area in the arms race which
will be ever more difficult to control. The new round of the arms
race added to international tension, aggravated armed confronta­
tion, lessened mutual trust and eventually enhanced the threat of

another world war.
38

Having decided to go ahead with the production of neutron
weapons, the US leadership made it even more difficult to tackle
problems of arms control and limitation. The desire to qualitatively
upgrade nuclear weapons is, perhaps, one of the reasons behind
Washington’s announcement in the summer of 1982, when the Second
Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarma­
ment was in progress, that it was withdrawing from the tripartite talks
with the USSR and Britain on the prohibition of underground
nuclear weapon tests and also behind its continued attempts to block the
solution of the problem of ending and prohibiting nuclear weapon
tests at the Committee on Disarmament.
The full-scale production of neutron weapons has an adverse
effect on virtually all the talks on arms limitation and disarmament.
Can the United States be considered an honest and reliable partner
in talks aimed at plugging one channel of the arms race or another
if Washington is simultaneously opening up another area of that
race? Acting in this way, the USA subverts the efforts of the
world community in this vital field.
At the same time neutron weapons complicate agreement on
verification procedures in drafting arms control and disarmament
agreements. Small-sized neutron warheads can be fitted onto small
delivery vehicles, which could seriously complicate effective monitoring
of the production, deployment and even proliferation of neutron
weapons.
The problems caused by the emergence and production of neut­
ron weapons have had a noticeable braking effect on the process
of international detente. The development and fielding of new
weapons of mass destruction constituted a serious step of the more
“hawkish” forces in the United States in subverting detente and
reviving the cold war.
At the same time Washington tried to use the new weapons
as leverage in its unseemly political gamble toward the Soviet
Union with a view to wrenching from it unilateral political con­
cessions in the problems of detente and in limiting and re­
ducing armaments, holding back progress in both fields. Although
the development of neutron weapons and their full-scale produc­
tion in the United States are already facts accompli, the dan­
gerous consequences of Washington’s steps continue to worry the
peaceloving states and the public at large all over the world.
That is why all the peace forces today continue their vigo­
rous efforts against neutron weapons, against “neutron death".
These efforts are part and parcel of the struggle for peace and
international
the security of the peoples, 'for *the
1_" relaxation of mrprnanonal
race, for disarmament, and
tension, for the limitation of the arms
for the preservation of life on earth.

IV. EFFORTS OF PEACE FORCES
TO BAN NEUTRON WEAPONS

From its early years the Soviet Union has been a committed and active
participant in the drive of nations for peace and disarmament. It
has consistently worked for the prohibition of war as a means
of resolving international problems, for the limitation and reduction
of armaments, and, particularly, for a ban on weapons of mass
destruction.
At the very first major international forum it attended, the
Genoa conference of 1922. the Soviet Union declared its firm
support for any proposals aimed at complete prohibition of the
more barbarous of the then known forms of warfare: “poisonous
gases, airborne warfare and others, especially the use of the means
of destruction directed against civilian population,”31' The Soviet
Union was among the first states to ratify the 1925 Geneva Pro­
tocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
In subsequent years the Soviet Union continued to intensify
its efforts in this direction. On November 30, 1927, at the IV
session of the preparatory commission of the disarmament conference
the Soviet delegation submitted for consideration by the par­
ticipating states a plan for general and complete disarmament.
The plan provided not only for the elimination of all chemical
means of warfare, but also for the discontinuation by legal procedure
of the issue of patents for different types of weapons and means
of annihilation with a view to removing the incentive to their deve­
lopment.1' A few months later the Soviet delegation tabled to the
said commission a draft convention providing for the elimination
of all means of warfare which represented a special threat to
civilians who were not involved directly in hostilities.
In 1932—1935 the Soviet Union took a most active part in the
work of the Geneva disarmament conference convened on the deci­
sion of the League of Nations, although it was not the latter’s
member at the time. In those years the major imperialist powers
were trying to exploit the conference for the weakening of their
potential enemies and for the strengthening of their own mili­
tary might. The Soviet Union was the only participant in the
conference to seek consistently the solution of the disarmament
40

problem. On February 18, 1932, the Soviet' Union suggested that
the conference should place the principle of general and comp­
lete disarmament at the foundation of its work. At the same time
the USSR tabled two drafts for the consideration of the confe­
rees: one on general, complete and immediate disarmament and
the other on proportionate reductions of armed forces.
But these projects, like the proposals submitted by the USSR
to the Preparatory Commission and to the disarmament confe­
rence in subsequent years were turned down due to'the position
of the leading capitalist powers which had deadlocked this important
forum. Despite the failure of the conference, the Soviet Union
did not discontinue its active diplomatic efforts to limit arma­
ments, achieve disarmament and prevent imminent World War II.
In the first years after the war the USSR again led the drive
of peace forces for the consolidation of international peace
and security, and for the prohibition of the weapons of mass
destruction, primarily atomic weapons whose development and
production had been launched in the United States. In this drive
the Soviet Union was widely using its participation in the United
Nations which was established in 1945.
The Soviet delegation tabled a draft convention on the pro­
hibition of the production and use of atomic weapons at the se­
cond session of the UN commission on atomic energy on June 19,
1946. The draft also provided for the destruction of all atomic
weapons in a three months’ time after the coming of the conven­
tion into force. Violations of the convention’s provisions were
viewed as serious crimes against humanity. Under the draft, all
participating slates were to introduce in their legislation strict
measures to punish those guilty of these violations.
Despite the broad support of the world public for the So­
viet proposal, it was rejected due to the resistance of Western
powers led by the United States which was launching its prepa­
rations for the Cold War, for the accelerated development and
production of the powerful brand-new weapons, and for the build­
up of its own atomic potential.
On February 13, 1947 the United Nations set up a Conventio­
nal Arms Commission with active participation of the USSR.
The Soviet delegation was vigorously working for the new body to
concern itself with the elaboration of practical measures per­
taining not only Io the limitation and reduction of conven­
tional arms, but also to the prohibition of the production and
use of atomic weapons, other means of mass destruction and their
stockpiles.
In the August of 1948 the Commission gave a definition of
the weapons of mass destruction. It included into this category
atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal
chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in
the future which have characteristics comparable in destruc­
41

tive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned

above.1'1
,
This definition of weapons of mass destruction by the autho­
ritative UN body remains valid up to now. It clearly covers such
later varieties of weapons of mass destruction as thermonuclear
and neutron weapons. They meet it by their scientific and tech­
nical characteristics, medical and biological consequences of their
use and destructive effect.
In the years that followed the Soviet Union continued to work
persistently in the United Nations and other international forums
for banning all types of weapons of mass destruction, above all
nuclear arms and also those new types and systems of mass
destruction weapons which might be developed. In the post-war
decades the Soviet Union repeatedly made various proposals with this
aim in view.
When reports about the projects for the development of neut­
ron weapons in the United States appeared in the late 1950s early 1960s, the Soviet Government resolutely denounced these
projects -and .pointed to their dangerous consequences."' The
Soviet Union's position on this issue logically flowed from its
consistent, historically corroborated foreign policy course towards
strengthening peace, limiting armaments, preventing the appearance
of new types of weapons and achieving disarmament.
This course and specific steps taken by the Soviet Union to
prevent the use of scientific and technical advances for the de­
velopment of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruc­
tion meet the aspirations of all peace forces which are working
to remove the threat of war. strengthen peace and curb the arms
race. This explains why Soviet proposals in this field enjoy such
a broad support of other peaceloving states and the world public.
The fact that the foreign policy course of the USSR, meets the
interests of the world public creates a firm foundation for
the pooling of their efforts in the solution of vital global problems,
such as the promotion of peace, limitation and reduction of armaments,
and prohibition of the development of new types of weapons.
Guided by the desire to prevent the emergence of new deadly
weapons, and considering the mounting demands of the world pub­
lic to ban the use of scientific and technical advances for the
development of powerful and especially dangerous armaments, the
Soviet Union proposed in June 1975 that all states, primarily
big powers, should sign an agreement banning the development of
new types of mass destruction weapons and new systems of such
weapons. “The level of contemporary science and technology is
such that there is a serious danger of the development of even
more dreadful weapons than even the nuclear ones. The common
sense and conscience of mankind dictate the necessity of putting
an insurmountable barrier in the way of emergence of such wea­
ponry,”" said the proposal. The Soviet Union called on all
42

countries, the United States and other big powers in the first place,
to pool their efforts in solving this task.
In furthering this initiative, the Soviet Union brought to the
agenda of the 30th session of the UN General Assembly the question
"On the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New
Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such
Weapons” as an important and urgent issue. The Soviet delega­
tion also submitted to the session its draft agreement on the said
issue. The draft provided for a broad range of measures linked
to the commitment by the signatory states not to develop and manu­
facture new types and systems of mass destruction weapons.42 A rele­
vant draft resolution contained, for one, a request to the Commitee
on Disarmament to begin the drafting of the proposed agreement
with the participation of experts as soon as possible.41
The importance of the Soviet proposal was borne out by its active
discussion at the session and by its appreciation by many states which
showed much interest in it." The results of the voting on the said
draft also pointed to the constructive character and topicality of the
Soviet proposal: 115 countries voted for it with 15 abstaining, including
the United Slates, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Israel.
Indicatively, the draft was backed by many NATO members (Canada,
Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Portugal and Greece) and also Japan.
The subject and scope of the prohibition provided for by the
Soviet draft and a relevant General Assembly resolution created a good
foundation for the attainment of the proposed agreement in the
Committee on Disarmament on the prevention of the appearance of new,
especially lethal and destructive armaments, including neutron weapons,
in the arsenals of states.
However, the US-led Western powers occupied initially a passive
position and then resorted to undisguised obstruction in the Committee
on Disarmament which began debates on new types of weapons of
mass destruction in 1976. Declaring that it was too early to draft
agreements on individual new types of weapons in this category, they
opposed the signing of a comprehensive agreement at the same time.
After the then President Carter recognized in public that the
United States had neutron weapons and plans for their large-scale
manufacture and subsequent deployment in Western Europe, the Soviet
Union made a statement which drew the attention of the world
public to these criminal plans. The statement published on July 31, 1977
exposed Washington’s attempts to advertize this new weapon of mass
destruction on the pretext that it kills humans while sparing material
values. The statement emphasized that the arguments to the effect
that neutron warheads were “clean" weapons of restricted range, and
that they were to be used primarily as tactical weapons, were designed
to prove that it was possible to use nuclear weapons in general and on a
“limited" scale in particular.
“The inconsistency and danger of such arguments are obvious,”
stressed the document. “They betray the attempts which can bring the
43

world closer to nuclear catastrophe."1'’ The statement also pointed to
the far-reaching negative consequences which the development of
neutron weapons by the United States had for the process of detente,
the interests of peace, nuclear non-proliferation, and arms limitation
talks. The statement also stressed that the plan for siting US neutron
weapons on the territory of Western Europe were glaringly at variance
with the task of strengthening peace and security in Europe, and with
the noble goals sealed in the Final Act of the European Conference
on Security and Cooperation. The Soviet Union called on the US
leaders to realize in full the responsibility they assumed by launching
a new round of the arms race, and expressed the hope that common
sense and political realism would prevail in Washington.
But the West responded to this appeal to peace and reason by a
clamorous campaign to advertize the neutron bomb as a “defensive”
weapon which is supposedly “cleaner" and “more humane” than the
ordinary nuclear bomb. This praise of the neutron bomb was meant
to cover up the new round of the arms race behind the smoke-screen
of deception and false allegations about a “Soviet threat.”
Although the propaganda campaign in defense of neutron weapons
evoked a certain response among those in the West who were led into
error, deceived or ill-informed, the world public strongly condemned
this new means of mass destruction. By doing so the world public
displayed its increased competence and maturity in the understanding
of international problems and of the impending danger. Showing a
high capacity for cohesion and mobilization, the movement for banning
neutron weapons quickly swept alle continents, drawing in the repre­
sentatives of the broadest sections of the population. It was foined by
different political parties, scientists, religious workers, intellectuals,
workers, farmers, prominent public leaders and statesmen.
The Communist and workers' parties of Europe, the United States
and Canada were among the first political organizations to launch
the drive against the neutron bomb. In their appeal signed on August
9, 1977, the anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedy, these
parties declared that they opposed the plans of the US Government to
begin the production of the neutron bomb and denounced this barbarous
weapon designed for killing people in cold blood. Pointing to the
serious consequences of neutron weapons production for international
peace, the spokesmen for the said parties called on all nations and
peace forces to come out for the continuation of detente, cessation of
the arms race and complete prohibition of the weapons of mass
destruction."’ The statement of the Communist and workers' parties of
28 European countries, Canada and the United States made a
contribution to the mobilization of the movement of the public for a
ban on neutron weapons.
Peace champions in all countries launched numerous manifes­
tations, rallies and campaigns in the mass media, demanding a ban on the
new monstrous means of warfare. Tens of millions of people, including
those who had been passively watching dangerous developments before,

took an active part in the International Week of Action Against the
Neutron Bomb, which was held in August 1977. The success of this
campaign was largely facilitated by experts, scientists, lawyers,
physicians, physicists, sociologists, biologists, politologists, politicians and
military specialists who used their professional knowledge and prestige
to expose the especially barbarous and inhuman character of neutron
weapons in the press, on the radio and television, and at rallies and
symposiums which discussed the said weapons.
The President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academician
A. Alexandrov made a typical speech at the extraordinary seventh
session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in October 1977. “The
neutron bomb is being advertized now as a humane and strictly
defensive weapon," said he. “But this talk is sheer deception. In real
fact the neutron bomb is doubtless an offensive weapons which makes it
possible not only to seize a territory, but also to 'free' it of the
population which inhabits it. This bomb is designed to play the role of
those maidaneks and oswiecims which helped the Nazis to annihilate
the population during the last war. This weapon not only kills. There
will be ten people with different radiation doses for every dead person.
Some of them will die at different time, while the survivors will be
giving birth to deformed children due to the affected genetic, hereditary
structures. The neutron bomb is a weapon of mass destruction directed
against our posterity. It is a weapon provoking an unlimited thermo­
nuclear war which would be the greatest misfortune for mankind."47
Participants in the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World
Affairs, who pointed to the danger of the development of new types
of weapons of mass destruction as early as in the beginning of the
1970s, spoke about long-term disastrous consequences of the use of
neutron weapons with anxiety and concern at their meeting in Munich in
the August of 1977.1'* In a special declaration adopted at one of its
meetings, the Pugwash Council called for the cessation of the deployment
of new weapons of the neutron bomb type. The neutron bomb is to be
deployed in the heart of Europe, said the declaration. Sometimes it is
called a “clean” weapon or a weapon which does not do any material
damage. But in real fact, both its lethal radiation, and the immediate and
long-term biological damage which it might inflict, is much greater
than that which can be done by the existing types of nuclear weapons,
concluded the document.4'1
The neutron bomb was resolutely condemned also by the World
Federation of Scientific Workers, the International Institute
for
Peace in Vienna, prominent leaders of Socialist, Social-Democratic,
Liberal and a number of other parties, religious communities, the
Helsinki conference of the Socialist International, the Geneva Interna­
tional Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on Disarmament,
the Lisbon session of the Interparliamentary Union and many other
organizations and forums. In 1977—1978 the mass actions of protest
against the plans to produce and deploy neutron weapons swept not only
those NATO countries where neutron devices were to be sited, but also
45

44

other slates. The US and NATO plans were denounced by public organi­
zations in many countries of Europe. Asia, Africa, America and
Australia.
While the world anti-war movement was stepping up its efforts to
combat the neutron threat, the question of banning the neutron bomb
was submitted for discussion by the international community of stales.
This discussion was initiated by the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries at the 32nd session of the UN General Assembly in the
context of the problem of prohibiting the development and production
of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation
was backed by spokesmen for Britain. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the
GDR, Guinea-Bissau, Mongolia and other countries. In his speech at
the session the Soviet delegate condemned the attempts to advertize the
neutron bomb as a “humane" weapon. He noted that the very use of
this notion as regards the neutron bomb was monstrous in view of the
destructive impact which its rays exerted on human organism. The Soviet
delegate urged all states to curb the plans for the production of all
types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the
neutron bomb.’" At that time the Western delegations passed this
question over in silence.
Addressing the session devoted to the 60th anniversary of the
October 1917 Socialist Revolution on November 2, 1977, the Soviet
President proposed a radical step: that agreement be reached on a
simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all states.
He said that this would apply to all types of nuclear weapons,
whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or projectiles. At the same
time the Soviet Government appealed on all governments and nations to
place the energy of the atom at the service of peace alone.'1 In the
December of the same year the Soviet Union declared that it was
resolutely against the neutron bomb and that it understood and fully
backed millions of people ail over the world who were protesting against
it. Striving to prevent a new dangerous round of the arms race as a
result of the appearance of neutron weapons, the USSR made a
proposal to Western powers on reaching agreement on the mutual
renunciation of their production.’2
The United States did not give a specific, unequivocal answer to
these Soviet proposals. Instead, in his speech on December 30, 1977,
President Carter made the discussion of neutron weapons with the
USSR dependent on the completion of the talks on SALT-2. He used
the neutron bomb to exert political pressure on the USSR and to try
and get concessions from it.5'1
At their meetings with American colleagues in the January of 1978
Soviet parliamentarians pointed to the danger of the US position and the
alarm which it caused all over the world. They noted that in conditions
when the talks on the limitation of weapons, nuclear arms included, were
being held on a broad scale, and when the US President himself repeated­
ly declared US readiness and the need to halt the nuclear arms race, the
very fact that the United States was going to launch a new round of the

arms race could not be justified. The head of the Soviet delegation said
that if the decision to produce neutron weapons were adopted, the USSR
would be compelled to respond to it by developing a new weapon for de­
fense purposes.’1
The drive of the world public against the neutron bomb was mouniing
in the latter half of 1977 and early 1978. The ranks of the opponents of
neutron weapons were joined by some prominent leaders of bourgeois
parties, a number of former NATO generals and part of the Western
press. Reflecting their concern over the plans to deploy the neutron bomb
the French newspaper Le Soir wrote: “To agree with the neutron bomb
production means to prepare to commit suicide."’'’
“Isn’t mankind ready to go mad?" Under this headline the newspaper
of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Vorwarts, carried an article
by the then General Secretary of the Party Egon Bahr. “The neutron
bomb is a symbol of perverted mentality,” wrote he, stressing that consci­
ence and reason would rise against this weapon. ’" “The decision to deploy
in Europe a new generation of nuclear weapons would be tantamount
to a catastrophe,”” wrote Dr. Frank Barnaby, the then Director
of the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm (SIPRI).
Dozens of world-renown scientists, workers in the field of culture
and religious figures spoke in detail about the technical characteristics of
neutron weapons, their effects and the baneful consequences of their use.
Among them were Italian Senator and former Supreme Allied Comman­
der Deputy, Europe, Nino Pasti, Professor of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and Chairman of the Pugwash Movement Dr. B.T. Feld,
President of the World Federation of Scientific Workers Erick Buhrop,
President of the Pax Christi International Catholic Peace Movement
Cardinal Alfrink, member of the Board of the International Institute for
Peace in Vienna Professor von Bredow, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize
and the Nobel Prize for Chemistry L. Pauling, and the former President
of the World Council of Churches M. Niembller.”'
The campaign of protest launched by the world public gained in
strength and scope in the months preceding President Carter’s decision to
start the production of the neutron bomb. Multithousand-strong rallies,
meetings, manifestations and peace marches, the collection of signatures
under the appeals to governments and legislative bodies with the demand
to outlaw the neutron bomb became a daily occurrence in the public life
of many countries of the world, especially Western Europe which had go­
ne through the tragedy of two world wars.
In October 1977, the Congress of the Belgian Socialist Party made
a statement denouncing the manufacture of the neutron bomb. At the sa­
me time the Belgian Peace and Development Association sent a letter
to the US President, demanding that he should abandon the production
of neutron weapons. The conference of the British Labour Party, held
in Brighton in early October, adopted a resolution urging its National
Executive Committee to express itself against the production of neutron
warheads and to work against it during its election campaign.
A number of prominent Danish politicians and public figures, among

46

47

them MPs from the Christian People Party, the Radical Left-Wing Party
and the Party of Left-Wing Socialists, initiated the massive collection of
signatures under the appeal "No to the Neutron Bomb!" which was pre­
sented to the Government of Denmark. The appeal said that its signatories
protested against the development of the neutron bomb by the United Sta­
tes, and called on the Danish Government to express its discontent with
the plans for the production of neutron weapons. Many prominent Danish
writers and workers in the field of culture supported the appeal.
Mass public manifestations took place in Canada. The Canadian Pea­
ce Congress published a pamphlet exposing the neutron threat and stres­
sing the need to prevent new attempts by the “hawks" to break the ba­
lance oi forces with the help of the neutron bomb and cruise missiles.
The Executive Committee of the Labour Party of the Netherlands
expressed its concern over the development and production of neutron
weapons. A national forum was held in Amsterdam under the motto
"Stop the Neutron Bomb". It set up a group which initiated a large-scale
collection of signatures under a popular petition of protest.
The women’s and youth organizations of the Norwegian Labour Par­
ty condemned the US plans to launch the manufacture of neutron wea­
pons and to site them in Europe.
In Portugal the National Peace Council sponsored the collection of
signatures under a declaration against the neutron bomb. The whole
country was swept by the rallies of protest.
Mass rallies and public manifestations in which members of the electi­
ve bodies of cities and states took part were held in 126 cities of the United
States in the fall of 1977. A group of American legislators — 5 Senators
and 26 members of the House — sent a cable to president Carter in which
they urged him to repudiate his sinister plans.
In the fall of 1977 alone, actions against the neutron bomb took place
in more than 40 West German cities, including the biggest ones. West
German peace champions staged an action of protest in front of the US
Embassy in Bonn. Telegrams of protest and appeals demanding a ban
on the neutron bomb were adopted by the West German public during
numerous actions of protest and sent to the West German Government
and the White House.
Similar massive actions were staged in France, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Japan and many other countries. Appeals and telegrams of pro­
test were adopted by numerous international public organizations, inclu­
ding the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Peace Council,
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the Plenary
Assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, the
International Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the
Christian Peace Conference, the Women's International Democratic
Federation, the International Federation of Resistance Movements, the
World Council of Churches, the International Organization of Journa­
lists, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union
of Students, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, and a num­
ber of international labor union associations.

The powerful opposition of the world public to the neutron bomb
compelled a number of NATO governments either to adopt a wait-andsee attitude or to express themselves against the deployment of neutron
weapons on their territory.
The firm position of the USSR and other socialist countries on this
issue and their consistent efforts to solve it in the international arena,
rendered important support to the movement for the prohibition of the
neutron bomb.
On March 9, 1978, a group of socialist countries made an important
proposal in the Committee on Disarmament, directed at banning nuclear
neutron weapons. It tabled to the Committee a draft Convention
on the Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling, Deployment and Use
of Nuclear Neutron Weapons.
The socialist countries expressed the gist of their proposal in simple
and clear terms in Article I of the draft Convention which said: “Each
State Party to this Convention undertakes not to produce, stockpile, dep­
loy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons.”'‘''
The draft provided, among other things, for control over compliance
with the proposed Convention.
The authors of the draft adduced the following arguments to justify it:
— the neutron bomb is an especially barbarous weapon of mass
destruction with induscriminate action, which can be used in an attack;
— the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe would be incompa­
tible with the relaxation of international tensions and with the spirit of the
Helsinki Final Act of the European Conference;
— the development and deployment of the neutron bomb would lead
to counter measures, thereby elevating the arms race to a higher and mo­
re dangerous level;
— the appearance of the so-called “clean" tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe would lower the threshold of a nuclear conflict;
— the neutron bomb is not a “clean" weapon in real fact, but, to the
contrary, would induce persistent radioactive fallout;
— the adoption of this bomb would exert a destabilizing impact on
the established alignment of forces and on disarmament negotiations.
The peace proposal of the socialist countries evoked a positive respon­
se in the Committee on Disarmament. It was met with special interest
and understanding by the delegations of nonaligned countries. Expressing
the opinion of many other members of the Committee, the spokesmen
for India, Ethiopia, Egypt, Yugoslavia and neutral Sweden condemned
the neutron bomb, having pointed to many pernicious consequences
of its adoption by armies. But this reasonable position was opposed by the
delegations of the United States and its NATO allies, which continued
making attempts to justify and whitewash neutron weapons. At the same
time they wanted to belittle the danger of US plans as regaids these
weapons, asserting that Washington had not yet taken its decision to
produce and deploy them."
Faced with the powerful opposition to neutron weapons, President
Carter was compelled to announce his decision on April 7, 1978, to sus­

48

49

pend their production.b" However, as subsequent developments made
it clear, this step was just a manoeuvre aimed at heading off the mounting
public protest against the neutron bomb. As early as on October 18 of
the same year the US President declared the decision to retain an oppor­
tunity of siting neutron weapons in connection with the started producti­
on of the new 8-inch artillery projectile and warheads for Lance missiles.
At the same time he ordered the manufacture of some elementary neutron
warheads.1'3 This decision marked the first step towards fullscale pro­
duction of neutron weapons.
President Carter's statement on the suspension of neutron weapons
production did not mislead the peaceloving forces. The efforts to ban the
neutron bomb continued on the diplomatic arena as well.
At the UN General Assembly First Special Session on Disarmament,
held in May-June 1978, the socialist countries again raised the question
of banning neutron weapons.'3 In his letter to the UN SecretaryGeneral of May 26, 1978,63 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromy­
ko made a special emphasis on this problem. During general debates at the
session statements on neutron weapons were made by the delegations of
Bulgaria, Cyprus. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania
and Sweden. In addition to this, the Soviet Union made a proposal to
include an item on the prohibition of the development and deployment of
neutron weapons into the final document’s program of action. But this
proposal was not adopted due to resistance of the US-led Western powers.
During the 33d and subsequent sessions of the UN General Assembly
and at the meetings of the Conference on Disarmament, socialist coun­
tries and other states continued to demand a ban on the neutron bomb.
But each time their demands were blocked by Western states.
On August 6. 1981, the Reagan Administration adopted a decision on
full-scale manufacture of neutron weapons. This decision was met with
profound indignation and anxiety in many countries, including the maj­
ority of NATO states. Trying, as before, to mislead the public in order
to weaken its indignation over the United States, US Administration of­
ficials began to assert that the produced neutron warheads would be
stockpiled on US territory, and for this reason their production was sup­
posedly a "purely domestic affair" of the United States.
On August 14, 1981, TASS published a statement on Washington’s
decision on full-scale production of neutron weapons. It noted, among
other things, that “it is clear to everyone that neutron weapons are crea­
ted to be used not on US territory and that any day they may find their
way to the European continent or another region which the White
House would like to proclaim ‘a sphere of US vital interests’. As a con­
sequence, what is referred to as a US 'domestic affair’ today will bring
about the death of millions of people on other continents and mark the
outbreak of a worldwide nuclear conflagration, the flames of which will
engulf the United States as well.”06
By its decision to launch neutron weapons into a fullscale production
the United States wanted to face its NATO allies with a fait accompli:
first to create the stockpiles of neutron weapons on its territory and then

to compel the allies to host them on theirs. Washington thereby confirmed
that its t oreign policy course relied on force, the buildup of the war poten­
tial, the fanning of international tensions and the attempts to undermine
disarmament negotiations.
Several days after Washington made public its decision on full-scale
manufacture of neutron weapons, the Soviet delegation in the Committee
on Disarmament made a proposal to urgently set up in the Committee a
special working group for the drafting of an international convention
banning the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron wea­
pons. Simultaneously the socialist countries, co-authors of the 1978 draft
convention on this question, made a statement censuring US decision
to start the production of neutron weapons. It was published as a working
document of the Committee.
On August 19, 1981, the Committee on Disarmament held an unoffici­
al session at Soviet initiative to descuss the Soviet proposal on setting up
a special working group in the Committee at an early date. This proposal
was backed by the delegations of the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Mongo­
lia, as well as of Mexico, Argentina, India, Pakistan and Zaire. The
United States and some of its NATO allies (West Germany, Britain,
France, Italy and Belgium) expressed themselves against this proposal,
thereby demonstrating again their reluctance to discuss an important
practical issue pertaining to the prohibition of neutron weapons. Contrary
to common sense they explained their position by saying that Washin­
gton’s decision to manufacture neutron weapons was supposedly “within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."
However, even some of the US allies in the Atlantic Alliance were
compelled not only to dissociate themselves from Washington’s position
on the issue, but even to strongly condemn the decision of the Reagan
Administration. This applies, for one, to statements by former Prime Mi­
nister of Norway H. Brundtland, and Foreign Minister of Denmark
K. Olesen. They reaffirmed the refusal of their countries to host neutron
weapons and voiced their discontent over the way in which the govern­
ments of allied countries had been advised of the US decision. Indian Pri­
me Minister Indira Gandhi also declared that the decision of the US Pre­
sident to produce neutron weapons was fraught with dangerous conse­
quences for the whole world. Profound concern over Washington’s
actions was expressed by the governments of Finland, Austria, Yugo­
slavia, Cyprus, Tanzania, Sweden, Iran, Iceland, Rwanda, Afghanistan.
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mexico, Cuba, Cameroon, Peru, Vietnam, Mali,
Mongolia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Laos, Syria, Bolivia, Libya and
other countries.
The US decision to manufacture neutron weapons infuriated the
world public. More rallies, manifestations and protest marches were sta­
ged in many countries. The peace forces on all continents raised their
voice in protest against this militaristic move by Washington and deman­
ded the cancellation of its decision. But the US Government turned a
deaf ear to the massive denunciation of its decision to produce neutron
weapons.

50

51

But despite the White House’s stance on the question, the efforts to
ban the neutron bomb continued at many levels, including international
forums. At the 36th session of the UN General Assembly a group of soci­
alist countries tabled a draft resolution on banning nuclear neutron wea­
pons. In its resolution on this draft the General Assembly declared that
it shared the worldwide concern over the production and intended dep­
loyment of nuclear neutron weapons, which had been voiced by many
member States and non-governmental organizations.
The resolution noted that the introduction of neutron wea­
pons in the military arsenals of states escalated the nuclear arms race and
significantly lowered the threshold of nuclear war, thereby increasing the
danger of such a war. It pointed to the inhumane effects of neutron wea­
pons and the grave threat which they constitute, particularly for the un­
protected civilian population. The resolution requested the Committee on
Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate orga­
nizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the pro­
hibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear
neutron weapons, and to submit a report on that question to the next ses­
sion of the General Assembly.'" This resolution was opposed only by
14 states, among them the United States and a several of its allies.
The communique of the meeting of foreign ministers and heads of the
delegations of non-aligned countries, held during the 36th session of the
UN General Assembly on September 25 and 26, 1981, voiced serious
concern over the appearance of neutron weapons. In early 1982 the
council of rhe agency to ban nuclear weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) passed a resolution calling on states to prevent the danger inherent
in the production of neutron weapons. Similar resolutions were adopted
by many other international governmental and non-governmental
forums.
When the question of banning neutron weapons was discussed at the
session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1982, many delegations
condemned the position of those states which continued their efforts
to prevent the beginning of talks on this pressing issue. Much was said
about the problem of banning neutron weapons at the UN General As­
sembly Second Special Session on Disarmament, but due to the obstruc­
tion of the United States and its closest allies no progress was made in its
solution in these two highly prestigeous international organizations.
The position of the USA and its allies remained unchanged at the 37th
session of the UN General Assembly, although the majority of states cen­
sured the US dangerous plans of escalating the neutron threat. In its reso­
lution the Assembly again expressed its concern over the production .and
planned deployment of nuclear neutron weapons and requested the Com­
mittee on Disarmament to start negotiations with a view to concluding a
convention to prohibit these weapons.'’'' But just as the year before,
the US-led NATO countries voted against this resolution.
At the regular session of the Committee on Disarmament in February
1983 the delegation of the GDR presented a working document on nuc­
lear neutron weapons to the Committee and proposed that it should set
52

up a special working group to deal with that question. This proposal
was made by the GDR on behalf of a group of socialist countries and in
line with a relevant resolution of the UN General Assembly. But the Uni­
ted States and its allies again blocked the very idea of talks on drafting
a convention to outlaw neutron weapons. They continue doing this up to
this day.
The peoples of the whole world and the majority of states have alre­
ady declared in no uncertain terms their absolutely negative attitude to
the barbarous neutron weapons which they consider to be an especially
inhumane type of weapons of mass destruction. Neutron weapons must
be completely prohibited. This is a command of our time. The struggle
against neutron death continues and must be crowned with the victory of
all peace forces of the world.

CONCLUSION

The effort to ban neutron weapons is a major direction in the drive of all
peace forces for the prevention of war.
In a bid to multiply the destructive power of its war potential the
United States has recently adopted and is implementing programs for the
development and production of mass destruction weapons, such as the
neutron bomb and other nuclear arms based on the latest breakthroughs
in science. Neutron weapons are one of the most barbarous and man-ha­
ting inventions in the category of weapons of mass destruction. This is
why the development of these weapons and the US decision to launch
them into full-scale production evoked especially strong indignation and
protests all over the world. The Reagan Administration’s decision to pro­
duce neutron weapons is part and parcel of the arms buildup policy which
is being pursued by the United States and some of its allies with a view to
gaining military superiority, and which is undermining international sta­
bility.
The advancement of new military programs, including the plan for
neutron weapons, is inseparably connected with the development of stra­
tegic and tactical concepts and doctrines, such as “a first disarming nu­
clear strike", “a limited nuclear war", "a protracted nuclear war", and a
“warning nuclear shot on the battlefield." All these aggressive and dangerous-for-peace concepts are based on the erroneous premise that it is pos­
sible to win a nuclear war by using nuclear weapons first. The neutron
bomb is especially dangerous because it may become the detonator which
will trigger off an all-out nuclear catastrophe.
Now it is clear to all realistic people that any hopes for victory in a
nuclear war are insane. If a nuclear war breaks out, there will be no win­
ners in it. It will inevitably lead to the death of whole nations, tremendous
destruction and disastrous consequences for civilization and the very life
on Earth.
This realistic understanding of world developments and their poten­
tial consequences was graphically manifest in the Political Declaration
which the Warsaw Treaty member-countries adopted at the Prague ses­
sion of their Political Consultative Committee in January 1983.1,1
Participants in the session stated that it was possible to overcome the
dangerous stage in international developments despite the complexity
of the world situation. They emphasized that to do this it was above all
54

necessary for all states, especially nuclear powers, to display political
will and a striving for cooperation.
Considering that the task of curbing the arms race and going over
to disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, is central to the drive
for the prevention of war, the socialist countries set forth a whole package
of measures aimed at fulfilling this task. The proposal to speed up the
attainment of agreement on the drafting of a convention to ban neutron
weapons ranks high on the list of priorities in the Declaration.
All peace forces must strengthen their ranks, and the governments,
international organizations and the world public must step up their acti­
ons for the success of the efforts to outlaw neutron weapons. The battle
against the neutron death can and must be won. Reason and life must
triumph.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Ibidem.
17 Kaplan F.M.’Enchanced-Radiation
Weapons.
Scientific
American,
1978. vol.238, No.5, p.41-45.
"* Sittkus A. Die Kernstrahlenwirkung
kleiner (taktischer) Atomwaffenexplosionen.— In: Sittkus/Mbnig.
Beitrage zur Neutronenwaffe (Zivilschutzforschung. Bd. 8, Osanverlag. 1978, S. 9-38; Scoville H. Ein
Vergleich der
Wirkungen von
Neutronenbotnben und herkbmmlichen Atomwaffen.— In: Arzte
warnen vor dem Atomkriegsgefahr.
Hamburg, 1981, S. 34-35.
Miettinen I. K. The Neutron Bomb
and the Related Doctrine. In: Proc.
of the Twenty-seventh Pugwash
Conference on Science and World
Affairs. “Peace and Security in a
Changing World". Munich, F.R.G.,
24 August, 1977, p. 367-369.
Yevgeni I. Chazov, Leonid A. Ilyin,
Angelika K. Guskova. The Danger
of Nuclear War. Soviet Physicians’
Viewpoint. Moscow, 1982.
IJjlbUH JI. A. 0 HeKOTOpblX MeflnKO-6MortornMecKMX nocjieacTBwsix
npMMeneHMst HeiiTpoHHoro opyxna.
floK/tan Ha KOHcftepeHtiHH «BpaMH
OPT aa npeaoTBpauienne HflepHoii
BOHHbi», FaxtSypr, 19-20 ceHT5t6pn,
1981 r.
21
Ibidem.
22 Nedelya, No. 33, 10-16 August,

1 V. I. Lenin. Collected Works.
Moscow, 1964, vol.23. p.94.
■ New Times, 1983, No.3, p.6.
3 Documents and Resolutions. The
26th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow,
1981, p.30.
' Ibid., p.23.
' Economic and Social Consequences
of the Arms Race and of Military
Expenditures. The United Nations
Organization. New York. 1978,
pp.42-61,
11 Geneva Conference of the Com­
mittee on Disarmament. Doc.
CCD/511, Rev.l, Geneva. 1976.
■ Documentsand Resolutions. Op.cit.,
p. 36.
" New Times, 1983, No.37, p.37.
'' Survival,
Nov.-Dec. 1977, p. 193.
See, for example: Flight Internatio­
nal, 16 July 1977, p. 193.
11 See: Time, July 25, 1977; US News
and World Report, July 25, 1977.
Flight International. 16 July 1977;
US News and World Report, July
25, 1977.
1:1 Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Papers, vol.14, No. 14, April 10.
1978, p,702.
14 In: Liibert K. Neutronenbombe.

Eine saubere Waffe, die nur Leben
zerstbrt. Verlag Marxistische Blat­
ter, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1981.
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.
Washington, 1957.

1981.
56

23

F. di Pasquantonio. La bombe
N. Consequenze biologiohe, politiche e militari. Prefazione de R. Fieschi, Tesi editore, 1980.
24 Ibidem.
25 See: Kaplan F. M. Or. cit.; Mietti­
nen I. K. Op. cit.
26 Miettinen I. K. Op. cit.
27 F. di Pasquantonio. Op. cit.
28 New Scientist, 1978, vol. 79,
No. 1114, p. 325.
29 Flight International, 16 July 1977.
30 ME1MO, No. 7, 1978.
31 Ibidem.
32 Flight International, op. cit.
33 New Times, No. 16, April 1978, p. 5.
34 New York Times, 28 October, 1982.
35 Ibidem.
36 AoKyneHTbi BHeuiHeit hojimthkh

46
47
48

Ibid., 9 August 1977.
Ibid., 7 October 1977.
See: Pugwash Newsletter,

July-

October 1977, vol. 15, No. 1
and 2, p. 5.
49 MexayHapoftHMM tjtopyM no cbh3SM MHpOJno6HBblX curt. Bio/uieTeHb
Nsl, hhb. 1978, c. 29.
50 See: UN Doc. A/C. 1/32/PV. 7,

51
52
53

p. 33.
Pravda, 3 November 1977.
Ibid., 24 December 1977.
See: Presidential Documents: Jim­

my Carter, 1978, vol. 14, No. 14,
Wash., p. 702.
54
Pravda, 27 January 1978.
55 Le Soir, 14 December 1977.
56
Vorwats 21, 1977.
57
Blatter fur deutsche und Internatio­

CCCP. M., 1961, t. 5, c. 193.
nale Politik, No. 8, 1977, S. 914.
50 aeT 6opb6bt CCCP 3a paaopyxte- 58 Cm.: MexayHapoAHbtH tjtopyM no
HHe. CSopHHK AOKyMCHTOB. M.,
CBH3SM Mup07no6nBbtX CIUI. BlOn1967, c. 61-62.
jiereHb Nel, hhb. 1978.
38 OtjlHlXHaJlbHbie OTHeTbl Komhcchh 59 Doc. CCD/559.
60 Doc. CCD/378.
no aTOMHOit OHeprnH, nepBuit rofl,
61 Doc. CCD/PV. 783, 786, 793.
Ns2, 2-e 3ace«aHHe, c. 26-28.
39 The United Nations and Disarma­ 62 Presidential Documents: Jimmy
37

Carter. Op. Cit.
ment, 1945-1970. New York, 1970,
63 See: Washington Post, 19 October
p. 28.
40 Pravda, 31 August, 1961.
1978.
41 L. I. Brezhnev. Our Course: Peace 64
See: Official Records of the Gene­
ral Assembly, Tenth Special Ses­
and Socialism. Moscow, 1977, p. 39.
42 CoBeTCKMH Cok>3 b 6opb6e aa pasosion. Plenary Meetings, 1st to 25th
and 27th Meetings.
pyxenne. C6. aoxyMeHTOB. M.,
65 US Doc. A/S-10/AC. 1/4, annex.
1977, c. 233-237.
66 Pravda, 14 August 1981.
43 See: Un Doc. A/Res./3479.
44 See: UN Doc. A/RV. 2373, A/PV. 67 UN Doc. Res. 36/92-K.
68 UN Doc. Res. 37/78-E.
2358, A/C. I/PV. 2077.
69 New Times, 1983, No. 3 pp. 5-11.
45 Pravda, 31 July 1977.

ANNEX

Draft
(Co-sponsored on 9 March 1978 by
the Soviet delegation in the Committee
on Disarmament together with the
delegations of Bulgaria, Hungary,
theGDR, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania
and Czechoslovakia)

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying
out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the
complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the
States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article III

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
Article IV

This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.
CONVENTION
on the Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling,
Deployment and Use of Nuclear Neutron Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention.
Expressing the profound interest of States and peoples in preventing the use of
the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and
production of new types of weapons of mass destruction,
Desiring to contribute to the halting of the arms race, particularly in the
field of means of mass destruction.
Realizing the danger which nuclear neutron weapons present to the peace and
security of peoples.
Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Article V
1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instru­
ments' of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations who is thereby designated as the Depositary.
2. This Convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of
ratification by .... Governments.

Article VI

1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian,
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.
2. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary in Accordance with

Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to produce, stockpile.
deploy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons.

Article ll
1. Control over compliance with this Convention shall be exercised by the
States Parties, using their national technical means of verification which are at
their disposal, in a manner conforming to the universally recognized rules of
international law.
2. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and
to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the
objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.
Consultations and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken
through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the
United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
3. Any State Party to this Convention which claims that any other State
Party may be acting in breach of the obligations assumed under this Convention
may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations.
58

59

TASS STATEMENT

On August 6, the day when the Hiroshima victims were comme­
morated, US President Reagan took the decision to start unfolding the
production of neutron weapons. As a consequence of this decision,
taken with cynical disregard for the will and interests of the peoples of
the globe, the US nuclear arsenal, vast as it is, is being replenished
with a new, especially barbarous means of mass destruction.
This step of the US Administration is another striking example of
an approach to international relations that is fraught with extremely
dangerous consequences. If we put the measures taken by the United
States during the past few years in a row, among them a steep increase
in military spending, the frustration of the ratification of the SALT-2
accord, preparations for the deployment of new medium-range nuclear
missiles in Western Europe and lastly, the decision on the production
of neutron weapons, it becomes absolutely clear that Washington has
taken a course for the runaway arms race and for destabilizing the
world situation.
It is no accident that the latest decision of the US Administration has
evoked especial indignation and alarm in many countries of the world
and even in the majority of the NATO countries. Actually, Peking alone
has dared to overtly approve it.
Trying to mislead the peoples in order to weaken the explosion
of indignation against the US, Washington is now claiming that
neutron charges, as they are produced, will be stockpiled on American
territory and that, therefore, this is a "purely domestic affair" of the
United Stales.
But it is clear to everyone that neutron weapons are created to
be used not on US territory and that any day they may find their way to
the European continent or another region which the White House
would like to proclaim "a sphere of US vital interests.” As a consequence,
what is referred to as a US “domestic affair” today will bring about
the death of millions of people on other continents and mark the
outbreak of a worldwide nuclear conflagration, the flames of which
will engulf the United States as well.
Washington has obviously decided to face its NATO allies with a
fait accompli, that is, first to create stockpiles of neutron weapons
and then to force them to accommodate those weapons on their
territories.
This is not the first instance of Washington not even thinking
it necessary to reckon with the opinion of nations, including US allies,
in matters affecting their very existence. All the more irresponsible is
the position of certain leaders of West European countries who are
actually playing up to the criminal American plans in an attempt to
create the impression that the decision taken by Washington does not

concern them.

The US President s decision on the production of neutron weapons
spotlights with particular clarity the hypocrisy of Washington’s allega­
tions about its intention to seek agreements on nuclear arms reduction.
In reality everything that has been done by the present US
Administration so far goes in the opposite direction, in the direction of
building up the US military potential, of heightening international
tension and complicating talks in the sphere of disarmament. The
United States is now banking on force.Meanwhile, the experience of the
past decades proves irrefutably that this is not the road which can
ensure peace and the security of peoples, including the people of the
United States. Quite the contrary.
The appearance of neutron weapons in military arsenals would lead
to a dangerous lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, or, to put it
in simpler terms, to a greater risk of an outbreak of nuclear war, and
the entire responsibility for this will rest with the United States of
America.
The assertion that the neutron charge is a “clean", almost "humane”
weapon is a dangerous illusion that the US strategists are trying to instill
in the minds of people. And this is being said about the weapon that is
meant specifically for the destruction of humans, the consequences of
the use of which, as scientists warn, will last a very long time and will have
a deleterious effect on the coming generations. This is "humanism",
Washington style.
All honest people must raise their voice in defense of man’s
primary right, the right to live, frustrate the barbarous plans of the US
military connected with neutron weapons. Reason says that the stockpi­
ling of ever new means of warfare must be countered decisively
with the alternative of curbing, reducing and eventually eliminating
armaments, including nuclear weapons.
As is known, the Soviet Union has suggested more than once that
agreement be reached on mutual renunciation of the production of
neutron weapons and on banning them. The concrete draft of an
international convention that has been submitted by socialist countries
is on the negotiating table in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva.
The Soviet leading circles are convinced as ever that such a
decision suits in the best possible way the task of strengthening
peace and would meet the interests of all states and peoples.
At the same time, no one should have any doubts that, in the light
of the steps taken by the United States of America, the Soviet
Union will appraise the situation that is emerging according y, an
take the necessary measures to ensure its own security and the security
of its friends and allies.
Pravda, 14 August 1981

61
60

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 36TH SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A / RES / 36 / 92)

RESOLUTION OF THE 37TH SESSION OF THE UN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON NEUTRON WEAPONS

Prohibition of the Nuclear Neutron Weapon

Prohibition of the Nuclear Neutron Weapon

The General Assembly.
Recalling paragraph 47

The General Assembly,

of the Final Document of the Tenth
Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that
nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and that
it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in order
to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,
Stressing that the termination of the qualitative arms race and
the use of scientific and technological achievements solely for peaceful
purposes are in the interests of all States and peoples,
Sharing the world-wide concern over the production and intended
deployment of nuclear neutron weapons expressed by numerous
Member States and by many non-governmental organizations,
Considering that the introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon
in the military arsenals of States escalates the nuclear arms race
and significantly lowers the threshold of nuclear war, thereby
increasing the danger of such a war.
Aware of the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes
a grave threat, particularly for the unprotected civilian population,
Recalling the proposals for the prohibition of the production,
stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons,
Desiring to contribute to halting the arms race, particularly in
the field of weapons of mass destruction,
1. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay
negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view
to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production,
stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee
on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this
question by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;
3. Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report
on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty­
seventh session an item entitled “Prohibition of the nuclear neutron
weapon.”

Recalling paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth
Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that
the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent ne­
gotiations of agreements, inter alia, on the cessation of the qualitative
improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems,
Stressing that the nuclear neutron weapon represents a further step
in the qualitative arms race in the field of nuclear weapons,
Reaffirming its resolution 36/92 K of 9 December 1981, entitled
“Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon",
Sharing the world-wide concern expressed by Member States,
as well as by non-governmental organizations, over the continued
and expanded production and introduction of the nuclear neutron
weapon in military arsenals, which escalates the nuclear-arms race
and significantly lowers the threshold of nuclear war,
Aware of the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes
a grave threat, particularly to the unprotected civilian population,
Noting the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament during
its session held in 1982 of issues connected with the cessation of
the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as the
prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon.
Regretting that the Commitee on Disarmament was not able
to reach agreement on the commencement of negotiations on the
cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament or on
the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon in an appropriate
organizational framework,
1. Reaffirms its request to the Committee on Disarmament to
start without delay negotiations within an appropriate organizational
framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition
of the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear
neutron weapons;
.
2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee
on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this
question by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session and
at its thirty-seventh session;
.
3 Requests the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report
on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;
4 Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth
session the item entitled “Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon.

63
62

BRIEFLY ABOUT THE AUTHORS

L. Ilyin, Academician, Professor, Doctor of Medicine, Director
of the Biophysics Institute of the Ministry of Health of the USSR,
Chairman of the National Commission for Radiation Protection,
Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Committee "Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War."
He is an expert in the field of radiobiology and radiation medi­
cine; the author of many works, including a series of monog­
raphs on medical and biological problems of protection of man
and the environment from baneful effects of ionizing radiation.
He published, jointly with Academician Ye. Chazov and Profes­
sor A. Guskova, the book The Danger of Nuclear War: Soviet
Physicians'
Viewpoint
(1982,
in
Russian,
English,
French,
German and Spanish).

T. Dmitrichev, Doctor of History, studies diverse aspects of the
theory and practice of diplomacy, the arms limitation and disar­
mament. There is a series of works to his credit dealing with
these problems. He is a member of the Disarmament Commission
of the Soviet Peace Committee.

L. Ilyin, T. Dmitrichev
AGAINST NEUTRON DEATH
’■International Peace and Disarmament"
Series (Issue 25)

JI. A. H.ibitH, T. <P. AMHTpti'tcn
flPOTMB HEfiTPOHHOn CMEPTH

Cepust «MetKayHapoziHbiH MHp h pa3i>py«eiiiie»
(BwnycK 25)
na BHrttHHCKoM ttswtie
He Ha 40 K.

General Editorial Board
for Foreign Publications
NAUKA Publishers
Media
268.pdf

Position: 2244 (4 views)