

**INTERNATIONAL PEACE  
AND DISARMAMENT**

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**Against  
Neutron Death**

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## INTRODUCTION

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Two major international conflicts, involving most of the world population, broke out in the 20th century. The two world wars killed, maimed or visited countless privations upon tens of millions of people and did immense damage to world civilization. About 140 regional and local armed conflicts have flared up on our planet during the less than 40 years since the Second World War. International tensions have pushed the world to the brink of suicidal nuclear catastrophe on more than one occasion during that period. The threat of nuclear war sometimes receded thanks to the efforts of all the peace forces and to realism and statesmanship displayed by governments, as was the case during the 1970s, but only to escalate anew.

Today the dark shadow of nuclear war again is looming large over the world. The threat looks even more formidable than before, and more difficult to remove.

The main cause of this dangerous turn in world developments is the growing activity of the aggressive forces, which are trying ever harder to subvert peaceful coexistence, this only sensible basis for relations between states with different social and political systems. It is those forces that are seeking to destroy the fabric of detente, woven so effectively by the joint efforts of the peoples during the 1970s. It is they that call in question the peaceful foundations of state-to-state relations and stymie the development of political contacts, mutually beneficial economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations and other useful ties between nations by resorting to various sanctions or advancing patently unacceptable conditions. Pursuing their selfish ends, these forces are trying to exploit rapid scientific and technical progress which makes it possible to develop qualitatively new types and systems of weapons, including nuclear ones.

In these circumstances the arms race is acquiring a new, far more dangerous dimension, and embracing all types of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, all kinds of military activity, and virtually all regions of the world. It is becoming even more difficult to control both existing and emerging conflict situations, and no progress is made in the solution of outstanding global problems, including those related to socio-economic development. The arms race is consuming an ever larger share of the resources badly needed to cope with unemployment and inflation and to heal many other social ills. The situation is compounded by

the fact that today the talks in virtually every field of the restriction of the arms race and disarmament have been interrupted or deadlocked. In other words, pursuing their selfish interests, the forces of aggression and war aggravate the international situation, worsen social problems, escalate international tension and mount the threat of war, particularly nuclear war.

The fate of mankind as a whole has been jeopardized as a result of this policy. Everyone needs peace. That is why the international community of states should pool all their efforts and resources to accomplish the most important task ever facing humanity, namely, to safeguard peace and remove the threat of nuclear war looming over the peoples.

Aware of the urgency of this problem, the Soviet Union jointly with other socialist countries is constantly making energetic and consistent efforts to secure the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, to prevent nuclear war and to achieve disarmament. "A durable, dependable and lasting peace is the first and most compelling need of all people, of all nations, of all humankind." These words, which express the sincere feelings of the Soviet people, resounded during the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the USSR in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses as the Address of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the CPSU Central Committee "To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties and Peoples of the World" was read out. Representatives of the Soviet people solemnly stated that the USSR, following its Leninist policy of peace and international cooperation, would do everything in its power to avert war, the threat of which was being aggravated by the perceptible escalation of international tension through the fault of the imperialist forces, first and foremost the US leaders with their ideology of aggressive militarism and their reckless drive toward world domination.

In its approach to the focal problem facing mankind, the Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that at present the most effective and reliable way toward a lasting peace is to put an end to and reverse the arms race and to carry out universal and complete disarmament under effective control. A world without wars and armaments, which can be ensured through universal and complete disarmament, is the ideal which mankind has always sought and will continue to seek. "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism,"<sup>1</sup> Lenin wrote in his day. However, the realities of international affairs make it impossible to reach that ultimate objective overnight. Progress toward general and complete disarmament is going through a number of stages made up of individual steps in various fields of disarmament. It is in this way that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries approach the problem of disarmament. They have always believed that the most important measure in this field is the limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. "The task of curbing the arms race and going over to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is central to the struggle for averting war,"<sup>2</sup> read the Political Declaration adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member states in January 1983.

The limitation of the arms race and disarmament, which are consistently advocated by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, are not



an end in itself but the best way to ensure the security of every individual state and international security as a whole. That is why any step taken to expand war preparations eventually subverts both national and global security and worsens the threat of war. And it is such steps that are taken by the reactionary forces in the United States and other NATO countries as they carry on their arms buildup, appropriate unprecedentedly large funds for militarist purposes, develop and deploy new types and systems of weaponry and establish and enlarge their military presence in different parts of the world, particularly its flashpoints. These gigantic and intensive militarist efforts of the more hawkish forces in the United States and NATO are aimed primarily at tipping military-strategic parity and reaching military superiority over the socialist world.

Countering that policy of the Western powers led by the United States with the Soviet Union's principled and constructive approach to the problems of war, peace and disarmament, the 26th CPSU Congress stressed: "We have not sought, and do not now seek, military superiority over the other side. This is not our policy. But neither will we permit the building up of any such superiority over us."<sup>3</sup> Pointing to a realistic course of actions in the situation which was dangerous to the cause of peace, the supreme forum of the Soviet communists noted: "Not to try to upset the existing balance and not to impose a new, still more costly and dangerous round of the arms race — that would be to display truly wise statesmanship."<sup>4</sup>

It is this kind of wisdom that the world public is calling for in its well-justified worry over rampaging militarization, initiated by the imperialist reactionary forces and manifest to a particularly dangerous degree in the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and in the concepts of a "limited" nuclear war and of the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The anti-war movement, which has mounted particularly high in Western Europe and the USA during the past few years, voices worry over the survival of European and world civilization and protests on behalf of the multimillion mass of the population against the inordinate burden of military spending. Huge appropriations for military purposes considerably aggravate socio-economic problems, acute as they are, first and foremost unemployment, inflation and other crisis phenomena. During the 1970s, unemployment in the developed capitalist world alone doubled to exceed 20 million in 1983. At the same time spending on social programs was drastically cut down.

Military spending is skyrocketing as the living standards of the overwhelming majority of the population continue to decline. The production costs of means of warfare and related spending are growing virtually every month. Over the recent period the world military spending has been rising in real terms by roughly two percent a year and now amounts to 25-30 percent of the gross world product. At the end of 1983, it was estimated at 500 billion dollars (in the 1980 prices) and is likely to reach 820 billion dollars by the year 2000. In 1984, the United States alone will spend for military purposes 274.1 billion dollars, whereas the

figure in 1981 was 186 billion dollars. The Pentagon is going to spend 1.5 trillion dollars during the current five years.

Meanwhile, 30-40 million people starve to death in the world every year, 800 million cannot read and write, and 1.5 billion have no basic health care. The world has as many soldiers as it has teachers, spending on health care is a mere 60 percent of military appropriations, and the funding of medical research is just one-fifth of that of military research and development projects.

Although the arch right-wing forces in the West, particularly in the USA, are trying to justify the runaway arms race by the "Soviet threat" myth, the military buildup is actually rooted in the economic foundations and class nature of imperialism, which still counts on armed force as a tool of its foreign policy.

The constructive initiatives made by the 26th CPSU Congress and, subsequently, by leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state during 1982-1983 effectively gave the lie to the "Soviet military threat" myth and supplied fresh proof of the fact that efforts to lessen the threat of war have always been central to the Soviet Union's activities on the world scene. These initiatives constitute a broad complex of proposals which is known as the Soviet Peace Program for the 1980s and which embraces the more important and urgent problems of strengthening peace, promoting detente and bridling the arms race, such as the very acute problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments, refusal of the deployment of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, their reduction and elimination, the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of armed force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty states, confidence-building measures in Europe and the Far East, the just solution of the Mideast problem, and the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, in particular, in the context of the security problems of the Persian Gulf, as well as a wide range of other major problems.

These and other Soviet proposals were broadly supported by the international community, by all the peace forces. Accord on the above problems would make a major contribution toward arms limitation and disarmament. The Warsaw Treaty countries characterized in the Political Declaration adopted by them in Prague in 1983 the prohibition of neutron weapons along with a ban on nuclear weapon tests and the prohibition of chemical weapons as the more important specific questions which should be resolved as soon as possible through talks.

Efforts to secure the prohibition of neutron weapons constitute one of the most important areas of the large-scale struggle waged by the peace forces to remove the threat of war, to secure arms limitation and reduction and to achieve disarmament. The neutron nuclear bomb, a new type of weapons of mass destruction, is especially inhuman and can give an impetus to new dangerous rounds of the arms race.

Weapons of mass destruction are those means of warfare which are vastly superior to conventional weapons from the point of view of their devastating, deadly effects. Only two types of those means of warfare,



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Weapons of mass destruction are those means of warfare which are vastly superior to conventional weapons from the point of view of their devastating, deadly effects. Only two types of those means of warfare,

chemical and biological weapons, were known until the end of the Second World War. In 1945, when the United States dropped atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were added to that class of weaponry. According to a definition made by the United Nations in 1948, weapons of mass destruction include nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, and also any other weapon which may be developed in future and may have the devastating effects comparable to those of the above types of weapons of mass destruction, or exceed them.

The first step toward prohibiting the use of individual types of weapons of mass destruction was the Geneva protocol of June 17, 1925, prohibiting the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons in warfare. Although extremely important politically this document was not sufficiently effective because it did not prohibit the production and stockpiling of weapons of this type and their delivery means. Moreover, many states, including the USA, did not ratify it for a long time.

Throughout the post-war period the USSR and other socialist countries have worked hard both at the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament to ensure contractual prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, among them nuclear, radiological, chemical and bacteriological. A major step along this line was the enforcement in 1975 of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which became virtually the first real disarmament measure in the history of international relations that removed the possibility of unleashing a war with the use of those weapons. In 1972, the USSR and other socialist countries submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention banning all chemical agents. Certain progress toward this goal was made at the Soviet-American talks, which begun in 1976 and were unilaterally broken off by the United States out of political considerations in 1980.

The USSR has consistently opposed to the arms arsenals of states being supplemented with new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Although there is no official definition of new types of weapons of mass destruction yet, it is common practice to mean by them those weapons which use qualitatively new principles of action, and whose devastating effects are comparable to those of the known weapons of mass destruction or exceed them.

The Soviet Union for its part suggested the following definition of new types of weapons of mass destruction: "New types and new systems of the mass destruction include weapons which may be developed in the future, either on the basis of scientific and technological principles, that are known now but that have not yet been applied severally or jointly to the development of weapons of mass destruction or on the basis of scientific and technological principles that may be discovered in the future, and which will have properties similar to or more powerful than those of known types of weapons of mass destruction in destructive and/or injuring effect."<sup>6</sup>



The possibility of appearing of such weapons in the arsenals of some states would open up new channels in the race for awesome types of weaponry and increase manifold the threat to international peace and security and all human race.

That is why the world public has been worried by the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction for over ten years now. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Western scientists publicly voiced their concern about the fact that military departments in certain countries were showing particular interest in some scientific and technological research projects which could be used for qualitatively new types of weapons, among them neutron and radiological weapons, whose destructive effects were produced by radioactive materials; radiation weapons, which used strong flows of charged or neutral particles; and subsonic weapons, using acoustic oscillations in a certain frequency band.

The rapid progress of science and technology, particularly over the past few years, breeds new engineering decisions based on scientific discoveries which may make the development and production of the above weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction quite feasible. These achievements include elementary particle accelerators, which are constantly growing in capacity and diminishing in size. Bearing in mind the fact that the effect of high-energy particles on biological organisms is similar in many ways to the effect of radiation produced by a nuclear blast, it is easy to see that those who seek a new weapon of mass destruction can use, in the near future, research into radiation weapons as a technical basis for the development of a new type of weapons of mass destruction.

According to foreign publications, if used purposely, electromagnetic waves in radio frequency bands can affect the cardiovascular and central nervous systems.

Acoustic oscillations of a low (subsonic) frequency, which spread virtually without attenuation over vast distances and which penetrate all obstacles, cause in people dizziness and pain and make them generally unwell and disoriented.

Certain types of weapons of mass destruction may have quite appalling selective effects. In view of the existing biological and chemical differences between certain ethnic groups (blood types, skin pigmentation, etc.), a number of new weapons of mass destruction can be used as "ethnic weapons", causing genetic change, degeneration and extinction.

Even a superfluous glance at the consequences of the use of some new types of weapons of mass destruction causes a feeling of horror. It is the duty of every person with sober thinking to work toward the prohibition of these weapons before they are developed. The thought that the arms race may involve new, awesome weapons of mass destruction in the near future is horrifying. It seems that talks should be initiated as soon as possible to achieve a general ban on new types of weapons of mass destruction or to prohibit them individually, all the more so since the Soviet Union already tabled a draft agreement to this effect in 1975 and supplemented it in 1977.

Regrettably, only one type of weapons of mass destruction — radiological — has so far been the subject of active negotiations. The Committee on Disarmament holds mere discussions, not talks, on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and on nuclear disarmament. As for new types of weapons of mass destruction, there are no even such discussions in the Committee. Moreover, only a limited number of delegations, mostly from socialist and non-aligned countries, insist on the prohibitions of weapons of mass destruction in the Committee having 40 member states. This state of affairs is explained by unwillingness of some Western powers to discuss in a businesslike manner the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction. They argue that certain types of such weapons have not yet emerged and are not likely to do so. Western delegates suggest discussing such weapons upon their appearance only. However, it is perfectly clear that it is easier to prohibit some type of weaponry in advance than to seek ways to eliminate it after its emergence. That Western powers' positions are untenable is revealed by their attitude to nuclear weapons. Their delegates behave as if there are no problems of new types of weapons of mass destruction, although some time ago they participated in the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and in a number of regular UN General Assembly sessions which passed resolutions stressing the need to reach agreements in this area. Today these countries are even opposed to the establishment of a special group of experts, who could follow scientific and technical developments so as to keep the Committee on Disarmament abreast of these complex matters and help it to act concretely and constructively to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

Neutron weapons — the so-called "clean" nuclear explosive device intended primarily to kill people by ionizing radiation — are a particularly inhuman type of mass destruction weapons. Way back in March 1978, the USSR jointly with other socialist countries put forward a draft convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons, but that proposal failed to win support from the Western powers. Moreover, in 1981 the USA decided to initiate the large-scale production of neutron weapons and some of its allies make no secret of their intention to deploy these weapons. It was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress that the Soviet Union was not going to manufacture neutron weapon if it did not appear in other countries and that it was prepared to reach an agreement banning this weapon once and for all.

International developments and practice in general imperatively demand that, following the bacteriological means of warfare, all the other types and systems of weapons of mass destruction be outlawed. This booklet discusses neutron weapons, their military and technical aspects, the medical and biological consequences of their application and the efforts to ban them.



## I. A GLIMPSE OF THE HISTORY OF EMERGENCE OF NEUTRON WEAPONS

According to press reports, the United States began to develop neutron weapons in the late 1950s. At about the same time there came speculations on the possibility to create a nuclear explosive device whose main destructive effect is to be produced by neutron, or penetrating radiation. R&D in this field was shrouded in secrecy from the outset during almost 20 years. Occasionally, however, the press, particularly in the USA, hinted that one of the US atomic laboratories was developing "the most secret of all secret weapons," a "superweapon" which would be able to kill all life and leave property intact.

Even at that time the sparse news of the Pentagon's plans to create a new weapon of mass destruction provoked outrage all over the world. The Soviet Union was one of the first to draw public attention to the dangerous consequences of this development of this particularly inhuman type of nuclear weapons. A Statement issued by the Soviet Government on August 31, 1961, pointed out that there was "talk in the United States about projects for creating the neutron bomb that would kill all living beings but would not destroy material values. Only aggressors dead set on rapine, on the seizure of foreign territory and foreign property, could concentrate scientific effort on the production of such a weapon."

Indeed, the very idea of the development of another type of weapons of mass destruction, particularly such an inhuman one, intended specifically to kill people in the most efficient way, seems crazy. Who decided to appropriate huge funds and to mobilize large-scale scientific efforts to develop a new awesome type of weaponry in utmost secrecy? Why did the United States go ahead with the implementation of that mad idea at a time when its arsenals in different parts of the world were overflowing with both nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, let alone the colossal stockpiles of conventional weaponry? One can hardly avoid drawing the conclusion that these plans reflected first and foremost the aggressive ambitions of the US ruling elite and its attempts to acquire military superiority over the Soviet Union at all costs, mostly by upgrading the weapons of mass destruction.

Faced with worldwide public outrage over the Pentagon's plans to develop neutron weapons, the US Presidents from Eisenhower to Carter were keeping them top secret for a long time. Meanwhile, the work on this "superweapon" proceeded at full tilt.

Most of the research to develop a neutron device was entrusted to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, California, which had long been notorious as the US major "hatchery" of ideas and experiments aimed at developing new types of weapons of mass destruction.

The first nuclear neutron device was tested at the Nevada proving range in the spring of 1963. However, there was no official statement on the experiment: Washington apparently feared that the news could provoke another tide of public protests and affect further work on the neutron weapons program.

The results of the blast in Nevada were subsequently used by the self-same Livermore Laboratory to create the first neutron bomb, the W-63. The "father" of the Pentagon's new toy was Dr. S. Cohen, and major contributors to the project included H. Brown, the future Defense Secretary in the Carter Administration, and physicist H. York, an advisor to the Pentagon. The world public was still unaware of the nature of the development work and experiments that were being carried on, although the *Army* magazine in 1972 and the *New York Times* in January 1974 published articles of general nature on that subject. The newspaper article indicated that the US government was exploring the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons capable of destroying manpower on the battlefield by enhanced radiation. To all appearances, in 1974 the Pentagon was on the brink of actually fielding neutron munitions.

It came to light later on that as early as 1975 the United States had fitted neutron warheads with a yield of several kilotons each onto about 30 Sprint-type anti-missile defence missiles deployed at the Grand-Fox airforce base in North Dakota. However, since any anti-missile defence system in that area was prohibited by the SALT-I Accord, the plan to use neutron warheads for those missiles came to naught. The improvement of the new nuclear munitions continued at the test sites in Nevada while the Pentagon kept looking for a missile system to carry neutron warheads.

It soon transpired that even at that stage the USA had had consultations with its NATO allies on the possible deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe. According to the November-December 1977 issue of the *Survival* magazine, the neutron bomb, under different designations, had been a constant subject of discussion in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group ever since 1973.<sup>9</sup> The United States hoped to keep the development of new warheads secret until they were deployed in Western Europe. Washington and its NATO allies hoped to face the world, first and foremost the Europeans and the Soviet Union, with a *fait accompli* by deploying neutron weapons on the borders of the socialist countries. This was pointed out by the Western press in the summer of 1977, when new details of the plans for development, testing, production and deployment of neutron weapons had come to light.<sup>10</sup>

Those details became public knowledge in June 1977, when the US Congress began hearings into the draft bill on budgetary appropriations for the Department of Energy Research and Development for fiscal 1977/78. In particular, the US press reported that money for the development of neutron weapons featured in the Department budget as resources



for the construction of dams and sewage facilities. According to the sources, those concealed appropriations had been sanctioned by President Ford as early as April 1976. The program, hidden in the budget under the heading "Public Works", was titled "W-70, model 3 (enhanced-radiation nuclear warhead for the Lance missile)."

As the US Congress discussed appropriations for the new program, which had proven to be quite militaristic, the law-makers requested a special paper from the US National Security Council on additional characteristics of the "enhanced-radiation" weapon and its effect on arms control. The report submitted by the National Security Council to the Congress in July 1977 described in brief the program in question and outlined with obvious omissions its goals.

According to the report, the W-70 warhead was being developed to meet the needs of the US Army in a small-yield "enhanced-radiation" warhead for the Lance Missile System.

The Lance is a mobile earth-to-earth missile system capable of rendering tactical nuclear support on the battlefield by hitting both immobile and mobile targets (such as tank battalions in troop concentration areas).

The Lance nuclear missile, according to the report, has a maximum range of 130 km with a probable error to target of 400—450 meters. The Lance had replaced the Honest John and Sergeant missiles in the US forces in Europe and was now replacing those missiles in the armies of most NATO countries (such as Britain, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy). In addition, two battalions of Lance missiles would be based in the United States, one of these to be deployed in the Pacific if need be. The Lance is more dependable and sensitive than the outgoing missile systems and has a variable yield. Thanks to its larger range, it can be installed farther from the frontline of defences and thus be better protected. In addition, its larger range makes for better targeting over friendly forces.

The report also said that the "enhanced-radiation" warhead had a better capacity for destroying targets, first and foremost manpower. The side effects, including blast wave and heat radiation, were reduced. The "enhanced-radiation" warhead was said to destroy standard war technology to a lesser degree than the nuclear fission weapons of the same yield.

Neutron weapons can incapacitate armoured personnel carriers (which usually withstand blast, unless they are in close proximity to ground zero) by affecting the personnel.

Other types of nuclear weapons, according to the report, would claim more victims and do worse damage to property because of other effects, such as blast and heat radiation, in densely populated areas.

The report claimed that as a result of the improved warhead, the use of nuclear weapons would be more effective, providing a restraint against its rash employment. But even this document, intended to prove the "expediency" of the fielding of neutron warheads, admitted that they enhanced the possibility of the actual use of nuclear weapons in fighting.

The political consequences of the deployment of "enhanced-radiation" warheads, according to the authors of the report, stemmed from their tactical and technical specifications, which applied to the entire class of "enhanced-radiation" weapons rather than solely to the warhead intended for the Lance missile. The report frankly admitted that this type of weaponry depended for its effects on nuclear radiation rather than on blast or heat. It is intended to hit primarily manpower and not property. Some people may think, and with good reason, stressed the report, that nuclear weapons of that type can be used easier on the battlefield than others and may come to the conclusion that the USA is more prepared to enter a nuclear war. In other words, the development of "enhanced radiation" weapons by the United States escalates the threat of war by lowering the nuclear threshold.

Taking issue with their own argument that the neutron bomb was making a nuclear conflict more probable, the authors of the report also tried to make it clear that the prospect of escalation remained for the United States one of the main factors in deciding whether nuclear weapons should be used regardless of the tactical and technical specifications characteristics of a definite type of such weapons and that no US decision on their use would depend on the deployment of "enhanced-radiation" weapons.

The report argued, in a similarly groundless and myopic manner, that there was no sign indicating that the NATO governments were alarmed by the deployment of Lance missiles tipped with neutron warheads. Nevertheless, the authors of the report made the reservation that the public discussion of these problems could affect the NATO positions.

The development and deployment of the W-70 warhead, the authors of the report stated with satisfaction, would not be restricted by the nuclear weapons tests ban because it did not cover underground tests of warheads with an yield of up to 150 kilotons. However, a universal-ek-ban treaty would constrain the development of weapons of this type because further tests were likely to be needed in the future. The report stressed specifically that the West's proposals on talks concerning mutually balanced arms reductions did not cover the Lance missile; they concerned only the elimination of some specific types of warheads. However, the report rightly noted that the Soviet side could point to the development and deployment of the W-70 warhead to prove that the American proposals envisioned the elimination of obsolete weapons while actually enhancing the combat potential of nuclear weapons as a whole.

The National Security Council was apparently aware of the consequences of the adoption of neutron weapons. The report sent to the Congress drew a fairly realistic conclusion to the effect that if a decision to deploy "enhanced-radiation" weapons was taken, certain governments could surmise that US strategy had been revised toward increased probability of the use of nuclear weapons as tactical means of warfare. The view that such development could interfere with the prevention of



the further non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was equally realistic. The contributors to the report had also to admit that the new weapons system would have an adverse effect — albeit insignificant, in their opinion — on the ongoing arms control talks and that the decision to cross the nuclear threshold would be the most painful decision ever taken by any US president.<sup>11</sup>

The US law-makers took account of the report of the National Security Council as they discussed appropriations for the W-70 program. On July 1, 1977, following three-hour debates, the US Senate approved by 43 votes, against 42, funds for the production of "enhanced-radiation" nuclear munitions. That one-vote majority showed that almost one half of the US senators, whose constitutional duty is to take care of the security interests of their country, had not been convinced by the arguments of the Administration, including the report of the National Security Council, that a new area of the arms race, fraught with very dangerous consequences, had to be tapped. The senators who voted against appropriations for the manufacture of neutron weapons despite the strong pressure of the Pentagon, the powerful militarist lobby and the military-industrial complex, were firmly convinced that the new program did not meet the US national interests.

The reactions of the advocates and opponents of the new arms buildup program were quite symptomatic. Speaking on behalf of the former, Senator John Stennis (D-Miss), Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, stated that the funding decision was for him the best news in many years. Speaking for the opposition, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Oreg) noted that it would be a mistake to field any weapon which could obliterate the difference between conventional and nuclear types of armaments.<sup>12</sup>

The US Senate thus approved the production of nuclear neutron weapons by a one-vote majority, and it was now up to President Carter finally to decide the fate of new weapons of mass destruction. The President was not hesitant: he said in a letter to John Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, in July 1977 that the development of that new type of weapon met the US national security interests and seemed an "attractive option".

In this way the Carter Administration paved the way for neutron weapons by sanctioning preparations for their production and deployment. A propaganda campaign to popularize the neutron bomb as a "clean" and even "humane" weapon immediately got under way in the United States. Spokesmen for the White House, the Pentagon, the Department of State and other federal agencies, "hawks" from among congressmen, scientists and journalists, businessmen representing the military-industrial complex and the powerful war lobby on the Capitol Hill began to laud without a letup the dubious advantages of "neutron death". The new atrocious invention meant to kill people in the most effective way was advertised as a "guarantee of peace", a "limited-action weapon", a "dependable-defensive weapon", a "new means of the policy of restraint, deterrence and flexible response", etc.

This large-scale propaganda campaign was aimed at exploiting public ignorance of the true characteristics of the neutron bomb in order to conceal from the people the horrendous properties of such nuclear weapons of mass destruction, to keep secret the true goals of their adoption, and to preclude the emergence of a broad national and international movement of protest against the beginning of another dangerous round of the arms race and the escalation of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

These designs of the advocates of "neutron death", however, suffered a flop: they failed to deceive the peoples in Europe, America and other continents. The world public saw through the propaganda campaign launched by those who wanted to produce and deploy neutron weapons. The formidable threat posed to peace and mankind by the neutron bomb became clear to all people of goodwill.

A huge tide of outrage and protests of anti-war forces swept the world. Actions against the neutron bomb continued unabated for about ten months and Washington eventually was forced to halt its plans to produce and deploy neutron weapons. President Carter announced on April 7, 1978, that he had revised his decision and ordered the production of neutron weapons to be postponed indefinitely.<sup>13</sup>

But even after the presidential announcement the work on neutron weapons continued without interruption. Carter's revised decision envisioned the continued upgrading of warheads for the Lance missile and the 8-inch artillery shells. The goal was to promptly fit out warheads and shells with enhanced-radiation components, that is, neutron munitions. The White House noted at the time that the modernization program would take about two years.

Throughout the entire period after the White House's announced decision to suspend the manufacture of neutron weapons the press fell silent about the developments regarding this program. Meanwhile, the Pentagon and other US agencies kept their energetic preparations for the deployment of this new weapon of mass destruction.

Though no information was forthcoming from Washington, spokesmen for the right-wing forces, who had already begun their preparations for the 1980 presidential elections, every now and then voiced their admiration for the new weapons. One of the frontrunners in the presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan, the then Governor of California, was quite enthusiastic about neutron weapons. In his 1978 broadcast address, for instance, the future US President spoke in glowing terms about the "advantages" of nuclear neutron weapons.

Reagan's attitude during the election campaign left virtually no doubts about his future actions as President. His electoral victory in 1980 was followed by a dramatic change in US foreign policy. The Republican Administration, representing the aggressive militarist forces which relied on the military-industrial complex, laid emphasis in its foreign policy on new, unprecedentedly extensive arms buildup programs with a view to gaining military edge over the USSR and acquiring "positions of strength" so as to be able to dictate to other nations.



Neutron weapons were to become one of the important and essential elements of that huge arms buildup program.

As early as February 3, 1981, just a fortnight after the Reagan Administration had been installed, the newly appointed Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, commented at the very first of his numerous press conferences as the Pentagon chief on the "great potentialities" of the neutron bomb and advocated the development of that weapon. Although the White House promptly disavowed the premature statement of the Defense Secretary and stated that no decision had been taken on the production of neutron weapons, there were more and more signs that the Administration was on the way to such a decision. Information to this effect was coming from various sources, including congressmen and people close to the White House.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the White House's adviser R. Pipes expressed themselves in favour of the deployment of neutron weapons already during the early months of Reagan's Presidency. Caspar Weinberger, for one, admitted in a CBS interview on March 8, 1981, that individual components of the neutron warheads had been designed and continued to be developed. The Congress was assured that the suspension of neutron weapons production announced in 1978 had not interfered with preparations for their manufacture, in particular, with the development of cores for neutron devices. It was also reported that the Pentagon's program to develop 350 warheads for the Lance missile was gaining momentum and that a new 8-inch artillery shell for the M-110-A9 howitzer had been designed.

All those development programs had to be financed, however. What were the sources of funding for the secret programs involving preparations for the production of neutron weapons? It turned out that as early as December 17, 1980, the US Congress had approved appropriations for the Energy Department (usually responsible for the US nuclear development programs) instructing it to ensure the production of all the components for neutron weapons and to make available nuclear materials necessary for the purpose. By the summer of 1981, the Congress, which had generously financed preparations for the production of neutron weapons, was informed that the Energy Department had effectively accomplished its task. On June 1, 1981, the United States was ready to produce a new nuclear warhead for the Lance missile. By that time the work to isolate tritium for the core components of warheads had been completed, and the flow production of the 8-inch artillery shell and its neutron components was planned to start in June.

The Reagan Administration, however, was still wary of publicly assuming responsibility for the beginning of the production of nuclear neutron weapons and officially announcing what virtually was a *fait accompli*. Even when every preparation for this production had been over, the Reagan Administration would not admit this fact. In early July 1981, the State Department spokesman D. Fischer claimed that the Energy Department was only following congressional instructions in its work. According to him, the Administration was still examining the

problem of enhanced-radiation weapons, in particular, the "configuration" of the neutron warhead.

Apparently, these dragged-out manoeuvres of the Republican Administration were explained by its intention to keep secret, as long as possible, the horrendous fact that the US Army was going to adopt the most inhuman variety of weapons of mass destruction. The Pentagon strategists probably hoped to face the world with the *fait accompli* of the neutron arms buildup, which, they thought, could help to secure the consent of the US NATO partners to the deployment of neutron warheads in Western Europe. The latter consideration seemed particularly important because Europe was already seething with protests against the deployment of US medium-range nuclear missiles in West European countries. The prospect of Washington's new militarist moves was fraught with another flare up of world public indignation.

However, the time had come when it was no longer possible to conceal with hypocritical rhetoric the activities which had been kept secret so long. On August 6, 1981, the 36th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the US President, cynically trampling the memory of the Hiroshima victims, announced the decision to go ahead with the full-scale production of neutron weapons. The truth thus came to light: the neutron bomb was to be mass produced by the US war industry.

The proponents of the new barbarous means of mass destruction have always been doing their utmost to deceive the peoples as regards the proportions of the danger posed by that decision and to prevent them from grasping the gravity of the situation and the need for all people of goodwill to energetically counter the threat. The militarists are trying to convince the world public that it was a "routine" decision to improve the weapons which the Pentagon already had, and a purely domestic affair of the United States.

It is the duty of scientists to tell the public the true facts about neutron weapons and to show the grave danger posed by them. Awareness of the physical, military and technical properties of the neutron bomb and of the actual medical and biological effects of its use will help the public realize this danger.



## II. BASIC MILITARY AND TECHNICAL PROPERTIES OF NEUTRON WEAPONS AND MEDICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THEIR USE

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The leaders of the Washington Administration and their NATO accomplices are going to all lengths in their cynicism as they try to picture neutron weapons as "humane" and quite harmless to the civilian population. A Pentagon general claimed, for instance, that the blast of a neutron warhead would not even cause clinking of glasses in the cupboards of nearby houses. Another proponent of the "humane" weapons, G. Krempa, a former director of Springer's *Welt am Sonntag*, said in that newspaper that the blast of a neutron bomb would keep the beauty of Dresden intact, although killing its residents. The angry words of the West German philosopher E. Bloch are a rebuff to these inhuman statements: "You cannot shake off the thought that neutron weapons are meant against people in general rather than against enemies. Man in our society is superfluous. Unemployment and rationalization of production make a considerable part of human labour resources redundant. Will we not see one day millions of people who have become a drag on society killed off by those weapons?"<sup>14</sup>

The development and production of neutron weapons in the United States is another indubitable "priority" of Washington in the nuclear arms race. One important circumstance merits attention: the proponents of that variety of nuclear weapons insist on calling it "enhanced-radiation weapons". This attempt to "camouflage" the neutron bomb as a conventional weapon is aimed at obliterating the basic difference between the two kinds of weaponry, to lower the "nuclear threshold" and to deceive the public about the true nature of the neutron bomb as a nuclear weapon of mass destruction.

To give the lie to these claims, it is necessary to tell the reader in greater detail, though in more or less simpler terms, about the physical properties of neutron weapons and their specific affects on the human organism and the environment.

The effects of nuclear weapons, as everyone knows, include blast, light (heat), prompt penetrating radiation and residual radiation (radioactive fallout). The energy released in the blast of nuclear weapons based on the reaction of heavy nuclei is distributed between those effects roughly as follows: 45-55 percent goes into blast, 35 percent into thermal radiation, some 5 percent is expended as penetrating radiation and about 10 percent is released as residual radiation caused by the fission products of heavy nuclei.<sup>15</sup>

The general rule says: as the yield of a nuclear explosion decreases, the intensity of blast and thermal radiation diminishes considerably faster as you move from the epicenter of the explosion than that of penetrating radiation. For instance, if the yield decreases 1000 times (e.g., from one megaton to one kiloton), the thermal radiation radius diminishes roughly 25 times, the shock wave damage radius ten times and the prompt radiation radius a mere three times.<sup>16</sup> This shows that as the yield of nuclear weapons decreases, the role of prompt radiation as one of the effects of nuclear weapons relatively grows.

The explosion of a nuclear neutron device involves nuclear reactions known as fission-fusion, in which nuclear fission, accompanied by high temperatures, triggers the fusion of light nuclei. The reactions of nuclear fusion, which play the major role in that weapon, involve the interaction of deuterium and tritium ions and the release of neutrons with energies of some 14 million electron-volts (Mev). Neutron energy in fission is about 2 Mevs. In addition, nuclear fusion releases about ten times as many neutrons as the reaction of fission of the same yield. Neutrons released in nuclear fusion have a greater penetrating capacity and travel at larger distances than fission neutrons. The redistribution of the energy released in the explosion depends on the fission-fusion correlation. According to the data available, fission and fusion stand in the 50:50 proportion in the 203 mm 1 kiloton artillery shell and 40:60 in the warhead of the Lance missile, while in the 2 kt neutron munitions 70-75 percent of the total energy falls on fusion. Accordingly, in the explosion of the neutron warhead of the Lance missile and the 203 mm artillery shell about 40 percent of the total energy goes into blast, 25 percent into thermal radiation, 5 percent into radioactive fallout and 30 percent into primary penetrating radiation.<sup>17</sup> According to other authors, even a larger portion of the released energy may go into primary radiation.<sup>18</sup>

It is therefore clear that neutron weapons are intended to kill people by penetrating radiation. This inhuman goal is achieved by a steep enhancement of the intensity of high-energy neutron radiation in a nuclear munition of a relatively small yield, actually a mini-thermo-nuclear bomb.

Talking about nuclear weapons, we should bear in mind that the term "small-yield nuclear munition" is relative: indeed, the explosion of a one kiloton nuclear bomb is equivalent to the blast of 1,000 tons of TNT!

This means, for instance, that if 40 percent of the yield of the neutron warhead of the Lance missile goes into blast, the energy released will be equivalent to the explosion of 400 tons of TNT, or 80 high-explosive bombs filled with 5 tons of TNT each! Neutron weapons, therefore, do not exclude other nuclear bomb effects (save penetrating radiation), as the Western proponents of the neutron bomb claim.

The argument that neutron weapons are "clean" does not stand up to criticism either. Many stable (non-radioactive) elements exposed to neutron radiation become radioactive. This phenomenon is known



as induced radioactivity. Since the explosion of a neutron device releases about ten times as many neutrons as the explosion of an atomic bomb of a similar yield, the neutron-induced radioactivity of the topsoil, metal objects, food, etc. will be roughly ten times higher than in the case of an atomic explosion. As a result, the terrain exposed to the neutron radiation of this "clean" weapon and all the objects there will be sources of radiation during a certain period of time. Incidentally, it has been estimated that the Hiroshima survivors and rescue workers could get an irradiation dose of some 130 rads each because of induced radioactivity during the two days they stayed close to the epicenter of the atomic explosion.<sup>19</sup>

All this exposes the falsity of the allegations that the neutron bomb is "clean" and that its blast effects are "harmless". As was noted above, the main effect of neutron weapons is penetrating radiation, consisting for the most part of fast neutrons and high-energy gamma-rays. Irradiation doses beyond the radii of the shock wave and thermal radiation caused by a neutron bomb explosion may reach tens of thousands of rads. The minimum lethal irradiation dose for man is some 400 rads. Neutron radiation has the highest lethal effect among all the other types of ionizing radiation caused by nuclear explosions.<sup>20</sup>

As compared with gamma-rays, the other component of the prompt penetrating radiation of the nuclear explosion — neutron radiation has a more pronounced effect at every level of biological organization, from the molecules to the organism as a whole. For instance, acute radiation sickness caused in man by neutron radiation is characterized by graver clinical consequences and slower recovery than that induced by gamma- or X-ray radiation; rehabilitation processes in the exposed organism are slower and weaker and the effect of medical treatment poorer.

Neutron radiation induces in man cataracts (a clouding of the lens of the eye), malignant tumours and leukemia, and genetic defects. According to various expert estimates, neutrons are 5 to 10 times more dangerous than gamma-rays in this respect.

One dangerous aspect of neutron weapons is, the well-known British geneticist J. Edwards believes, that its injurious effects on the human organism are not limited in time: children crippled by radiation may be born even several generations after the use of these weapons. In other words, the neutron bomb is to a considerable degree a genetic weapon. Neutron radiation is very dangerous for the embryo. Depending on the irradiation dose to which the expectant mother has been exposed, the biologic consequences for the embryo range from immediate death to diverse inborn deformities and development defects.

There is another important circumstance. At present, prestigious international scientific organizations (such as the International Commission on Radiological (Radiation) Protection and the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation) believe that in principle even the slightest dose of ionizing radiation can cause with a definite degree of certainty malignant tumours and genetic defects in exposed

people and their progeny. As regards neutron radiation, the risk of the development of those grave pathological conditions in people exposed to neutron radiation is higher than in the case of exposure to other types of ionizing radiation.<sup>21</sup>

Table 1 illustrates the points made above.

All reasonable people, even laymen, clearly realize that the arguments of the proponents of the neutron bomb are false: that the "most humane" weapon, presumably intended to kill enemy manpower but guarantee the life and health of the civilian population, actually is the most sophisticated and inhuman weapon of mass destruction.

Here are some of the published figures on the penetrating radiation radii and irradiation doses in the explosion of a 1 kiloton neutron device.<sup>23</sup> People on about 8 square kilometers around the epicenter of the explosion will die instantly from lethal radiation.<sup>24</sup> The ring-shaped area in which irradiation doses will range from one to 100 rads will measure 10 square kilometers. Consequences for exposed people will be rather grave even in that area with relatively small radiation doses because of the high biological effects of neutron radiation. These figures give but a rough idea about the levels of irradiation at certain distances after the explosion of a one-kiloton nuclear device.

Given these figures, we should bear in mind that a large number of neutron warheads may be exploded over a densely populated area, which fact exposes the false and absurd allegations that the civilian population has nothing to fear from neutron weapons.

The United States intends to deploy neutron weapons in Western Europe, but not in Texas. The deployment plans, according to press reports, feature 380 neutron warheads for Lance missiles and 800 warheads for heavy howitzer shells. Undoubtedly, if it comes to the actual use of neutron weapons, hundreds and even thousands of warheads will be exploded.<sup>25</sup>

Given the high population density and urbanization in Western Europe, with population centers separated by one or two kilometers, one can well foresee an immense loss of life among the civilian population.

Dr. I. Miettinen, a notable Finnish expert on radiological protection, points out in his paper "The Neutron Bomb and the Related Doctrine": "If troops take cover in urban zones from which the civilian population has not been evacuated, the effect of the neutron weapon on the civilian population will be far more injurious as compared to that of the atomic weapon of equivalent yield... The number of civilians killed will double, whereas the survivors will suffer from much higher irradiation doses."<sup>26</sup> F. di Pasquantonio cites in his monograph "The Neutron Bomb: Biological, Political and Military Consequences", published in Italy in 1980, the following figures: irradiation dose at a distance of 400 meters from the epicenter of the explosion of the 1 kiloton neutron device is 418,000 rads. The author points out that even people in a sound atomic shelter with a protective effect of 500 will be exposed to a lethal irradiation dose of 836 rads, while people



Table 1<sup>22</sup>

## Effects of Neutron Weapons on Man

Distance from the epicenter of 1 kton neutron explosion (meters)	Approximate irradiation doses (rads)	Effects on man
700	16,000	Immediate and total loss of capacity for physical and mental activity. Painful death within 1-2 days.
900	8,000	Total loss of capacity for physical activity within several minutes. Death in 2-6 days.
1,400	650	Grave functional disorders within one hour after exposure. Death from acute radiation sickness in 2-3 weeks.
1,700	150	About 10 percent of the exposed persons die within several months. A high incidence of malignant tumours and leukemia in 15-25 years in the survivors.
2,300	15	No radiation sickness. Likelihood of malignant tumours and leukemia in some of the exposed persons. Adverse genetic consequences may recur in several generations of the descendants of the initially exposed people.

finding themselves after the explosion at 200 to 300 meters from the epicenter will get during two hours 300 to 1,400 rads from neutron-induced radioactivity.<sup>27</sup>

These estimates by scientists from different countries forcefully show that the civilian population will be the first victim of neutron weapons. From the point of view of their effects, neutron munitions are to a certain extent similar to chemical and biological weapons.

The neutron bomb also is an ecological weapon. The US scientist A. Westing estimates that the explosion of a one-kiloton neutron device will affect 310 hectares of coniferous forest, 170 hectares of broad-leaved forest or 140 hectares of hayland. An atomic bomb of the same yield would affect only 50 hectares of woodland. It would take centuries to restore the ecosystem after a nuclear neutron explosion.<sup>28</sup>

All these facts prompt the conclusion that neutron weapons are at least as dangerous as chemical weapons, the use of which is prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Article 23 of the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land prohibits the infliction of senseless suffering

on people by the use of combat weapons which are not superior to other weapons. The use of neutron weapons would render that convention null and void.

The practice of the past wars of the 20th century, particularly the Second World War and the Vietnam war unleashed by US imperialism, shows that the demand of international laws that no damage be done to the civilian population is not respected and that civilians are often exposed to bombings. Moreover, in certain instances no constraints on the methods of use of weaponry are observed (suffice it to mention the violation by the US Command of constraints on the tactical use of tear gas in Vietnam). That is why such an "optimal" weapon as the neutron bomb, bound to affect the civilian population, must not be put into the hands of the military command, which often (if not always) disregards humane considerations in its decisions on the use of weapons.

The "clean" neutron bomb has already polluted the political climate in Europe and all over the world. In future it may become one of the most atrocious means of mass annihilation.

The appearance of one weapon or another in the war arsenal of a state is explained by many factors, the most important of them being, perhaps, the foreign policy of the given state. New types and systems of weaponry are usually sought by those states which have aggressive and expansionist ambitions and which formulate and carry out their foreign policies accordingly. The goal of foreign policies of this sort usually is to attain superiority, primarily in the military field, and to dictate to other states. This foreign policy course determines the aggressive character of military doctrine, strategy and tactics, of the arms buildup and of the composition of the armed forces and armaments.

States basing their foreign policy on aggression and expansion are constantly trying to outpace their potential adversary by acquiring ever more fearsome and destructive types of weaponry which could reduce the other side to a weaker and even dependent position. If the other side takes countermeasures to neutralize these activities in order to protect itself and its interests against potential aggression and succeeds in doing so, the expansionist state keeps looking for means to achieve military superiority. As a rule, it tries to conceal its true aggressive plans and to justify and rationalize its rampant hegemonistic ambitions by resorting to a stereotype which is commonly known in international practice, namely, to explain its arms buildup by the need to defend itself against the threat presumably posed by the other side.

But if both sides have roughly equal military, economic, scientific and technical potentials, the latter, obviously, will not allow the former to achieve superiority. Yet if the initiator of military rivalry would not give up its plans and persists in the futile attempts to break ahead and gain a new position of strength with regard to the other side, there emerges between the two a dangerous and actually quite senseless arms race. That race grows ever costlier and begins to involve many other states. As a consequence, the international situation gradually worsens, tension mounts, state-to-state relations become aggravated, the threat of war escalates, and in the nuclear age the danger of the annihilation of human civilization as a whole arises.

At the same time the burden of military expenditures keeps growing, the economic situation of states deteriorates, appropriations for social needs decrease, and inflation and unemployment rise.

In this situation every new area of the arms race dramatically aggravates the entire complex of the problems faced by mankind, serious as they are, and pushes the world closer to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. All this holds true in full measure both for the genuine military and political reasons of Washington's decision to go ahead with the full-scale production of neutron weapons and for the consequences of that step.

The fielding of neutron weapons by the United States is, perhaps, more important to its future nuclear weapons policy than any other decision since the order to drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities in 1945 and the go-ahead on the development of the thermonuclear bomb in 1950. The adoption of neutron weapons by the US army, on the one hand, is an immediate consequence of the aggressive foreign policy of the White House and the strategy and tactics of the Pentagon and, on the other, exerts considerable influence on the military, primarily nuclear strategy and tactics of that country and its NATO allies.

This development cannot help affecting the defence aspects of the policies of those countries against which the neutron bomb is primarily meant. The military, political and psychological effects of Washington's decision on the full-scale production of neutron weapons, in particular, on the destinies of detente and peace, especially in Europe, are so serious and manifold as to require a thorough analysis.

Having developed nuclear neutron devices, the United States has chosen and prepared proper delivery vehicles, in particular, the tactical Lance missile with a range of up to 120 km and the 8-inch (203.2 mm) artillery shell fired by self-propelled howitzers. The press reports that in future nuclear neutron warheads may be fitted on to even more advanced delivery vehicles, including strategic missiles. According to military experts, for instance, the tactical and technical specifications of neutron weapons make them suitable for the shells of ship artillery, for missiles of different types and also for air bombs and cruise missiles of different ranges. Even the variety of the neutron munitions existing today can exert all-round effects against troops, the civilian population, property, technology and the environment.

Any weapon, when used in combat conditions, is to exert all its effects and it is their totality that determines the combat potential of that weapon and its employment in warfare, although each of them is meant to pursue a specific purpose. This is especially true of nuclear weapons and their inhuman, barbarous variety, neutron weapons.

The main purpose of neutron weapons is to kill as many people as possible, and it is for this reason that a US Senator has characterized them as "even more repugnant than usual and literally dehumanizing."<sup>29</sup> However, neutron weapons also produce blast and heat radiation, and however hard the proponents of "neutron death" may try to present the neutron bomb as a humane weapon, the logic and doctrines of warfare show that it will be used in every type of combat for different purposes.

In view of the exceptionally injurious effects of neutron weapons



mentioned above, US military planners not only intend to use them for the mass-scale annihilation of enemy manpower, as they argue (and which is inhuman in itself), but also to accomplish a number of other combat tasks. In particular, Lance missiles with neutron warheads are going to be used to put out enemy missile launchers and for other purposes.

Another major delivery means for neutron warheads is going to be the self-propelled 203.2 mm howitzer and, perhaps, the 155 mm howitzer. These weapons have been modernized, in particular, to almost double their range (to 30 km), which has made it possible to use them and, hence, neutron warheads for a considerably broader range of purposes.

The development of a warhead for the new medium-range missile system Pershing-2 (having a range of 1,800 km) and for cruise missiles would become a qualitatively new and particularly destabilizing factor in the plans for using neutron weapons. According to press reports, this development work has already begun in the United States. In late 1983, the United States and its NATO allies went ahead with the deployment of Pershing-2s and cruises in Western Europe, namely, in West Germany, Britain and Italy.

In this way the United States thwarted the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe because their continuation under these circumstances would only mean a cover for the fulfilment of the US militarist plans. The Soviet Union believes that the deployment of these new US medium-range nuclear missiles is a strategic development because they can reach targets in its territory from sites in Western Europe in a mere 5-7 minutes. Obviously, the possible use of enhanced-radiation nuclear warheads on Pershing-2s and cruises deployed by the United States in Europe drastically upsets the strategic balance between the USSR and the USA in the latter's favour and, moreover, poses a grave neutron threat to targets in the Soviet Union's deep rear. However, these are only some of the plans that are being laid by the Washington militarists for the use of nuclear neutron weapons.

Their other designs are based on those characteristics of the neutron bomb which are touted particularly stridently by its proponents, namely, its presumed capacity only to kill troops on the battlefield without affecting the civilian population. It is this "efficiency" of the neutron weapon in killing enemy manpower that pleases their advocates so much and gives them reason to extol it as a new "superweapon", to impute to it fantastic properties, and even to speculate on "a revolution in strategy". This enthusiasm over the neutron bomb on the part of the more aggressive military and political circles of the United States and NATO is largely explained by their intention to put into practice their dangerous concept of the possibility and admissibility of the use of neutron weapons in a "limited" war. All that enthusiasm also belies the Pentagon's desire to sell the public on the fatal illusion that a nuclear war can be constrained in scope and duration, that it will not escalate into a global war and that it is quite survivable.

Militarily, according to specialists, these calculations are absurd, while the assertions that neutron weapons will spare the civilian population are a big fraud. Plans for combat operations, for instance, do not confine them solely to sparsely populated areas, isolating population centers from the probable theatre of operations, as is evidenced by the US Army Manual. The latter stresses specifically that critical serious conflicts in Germany are bound to entail recurrent and virtually incessant fighting for large cities, small towns and villages.<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, the reassuring statements of certain US generals about the "humane" character of neutron weapons are based, as a rule, on the use of single warheads. However, Pentagon spokesmen admit that, depending on military "expediency", missiles and shells with neutron warheads may be used in groups or clusters of 30-50 munitions, both regular nuclear and neutron ones. The cumulative effect of such group explosions would enlarge manifold the radius of the effects of neutron weapons and therefore their toll of the population.

The advocates of neutron weapons claim that the latter have far smaller side effects than other nuclear weapons, in particular, as regards the civilian population and US and friendly troops. Thus they are trying to prove that neutron weapons can be used in own territory or the territory of an ally for defensive purposes, primarily to fight attacking tanks.

This argument, like many others in the discourses of US and NATO generals, is based on a fabricated "Soviet military threat" and a probable massive attack of Soviet tanks westwards across the plains of Central Europe. According to US and NATO officials, the West has no other effective means except neutron weapons to counter the presumably superior "tank potential" of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The neutron warhead, they claim, is the most effective weapon against Soviet tanks, which makes it essential to the West European defences. That was how President Carter, for one, explained the West's need for neutron weapons which, as he said at a press conference on April 25, 1978, were meant to "counterbalance that inequality".

Allegations of the Soviet Union's military superiority over the United States and NATO in one type of armaments or another have long become a stereotype propaganda ploy used by the West to rationalize its own constantly escalating arms buildup programs. That ploy is invoked over and over again whenever a new type or system of weapons is going to be developed, or whenever additional appropriations for military purposes are debated. These allegations, misrepresentations and downright lies are always used to mislead other countries and the world public. "Soviet military superiority" is being harped on even while senior officials of the US Administration have to admit the existence of parity between the USSR and the United States, between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The history of the armed forces of the two sides, their military doctrines, strategies and tactics as well as their military technologies have de-



veloped in different ways, just as their geopolitical situations are different. That is why each of the sides laid emphasis on different types of armament, and as a consequence each came to have more of particular types of armament. However, in the aggregate, the military potentials of the two sides became roughly equal. So while at present the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have a certain superiority in tanks, the USA and NATO are stronger in other respects, in particular, in airforce, non-nuclear anti-tank defences, etc. When all is said and done, however, overall parity neutralizes the superiorities of the sides in individual areas.

This fully applies to the problem of tanks and anti-tank weapons. The "high anti-tank" abilities of neutron weapons are called in question, and with good reason, by a number of Western military experts, who point out that these can be effective only against major tank groupings but hardly so against tanks scattered in combat operations.

The North Atlantic Alliance has for a few years now been speedily carrying on a program of improving and stockpiling of different non-nuclear anti-tank weapons. This program is at odds with NATO's allegations that neutron weapons are being fielded first and foremost to bolster anti-tank defences.

NATO is supposed to possess a total of more than 190,000 units of non-nuclear anti-tank weapons. So why do they need in addition neutron weapons to fight tanks if they propose to have and already have such a huge number of conventional anti-tank weapons? Are neutron weapons really meant for anti-tank defences, as their advocates claim, or are they assigned a very different role in the US and NATO war plans?

We may recall in this context that the first batch of neutron warheads — about 30 of them — were fitted onto surface-to-air Sprint missiles, i.e., were meant for anti-missile defences. This fact shows that neutron weapons can be used for a variety of purposes rather than as only anti-tank weapons.

The military and technical properties of the neutron bomb and the possible medical and biological effects of its use indubitably make it one of the worst weapons of mass destruction intended for offensive rather than defensive purposes. Neutron weapons require large areas and for this reason are unsuitable for defence operations because if using them against an advancing enemy prepared for a radiation attack the defending side would willy-nilly annihilate its own defenceless civilian population and part of its troops. Neutron weapons are therefore much more effective in the offensive, as is also proven by the fact that induced radioactivity as a result of their use, according to US expert estimates, is gradually declining, which enables the troops using neutron weapons promptly to enter the target area and occupy it.<sup>41</sup>

Those characteristics of the neutron bomb as an offensive weapon have been underlined by many notable politicians and military leaders in the West. For instance, Egon Bar, a member of the Presidium of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, a deputy to the West German Bundestag and Chairman of the Bundestag Armaments Commission, said in an interview to the weekly *Die Zeit*: "An aggressor seeking to

clear, so to speak, of defenders an area it wants to conquer and, if possible, have its industry intact should have an interest in using neutron weapons. In other words, neutron weapons hold out a great promise precisely as offensive weapons."

"Neutron weapons cannot be considered purely defensive," former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt pointed out. "Like most other weapons in the world, they, naturally, can well be used for offensive purposes."<sup>42</sup> Confirming the justified comments of politicians on the offensive character of neutron weapons, General Krause of West Germany noted that having delivered a strike with neutron weapons, the attacking side can "exploit their effects to thrust deep into enemy formation."

The same point has been made on more than one occasion by Soviet leaders in their statements. Addressing the seamen of the Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok on April 7, 1978, Leonid Brezhnev described the neutron weapons in the following way: "This is a mass destruction weapon of a new type. Any talk about such weapons being allegedly defensive in character does not correspond to reality. This is a nuclear offensive weapon, moreover, designed chiefly to destroy human life."<sup>43</sup>

Losses in manpower inflicted on the enemy, undoubtedly, are of little concern to the aggressor. At the same time lesser destruction and lower contamination levels caused by neutron weapons as compared with regular nuclear munitions are quite in accord with the aggressor's intentions. On the one hand, these factors help the aggressor promptly to develop its offensive and, on the other, ensures for it larger spoils.

All this convincingly shows that the discourses of the advocates of neutron weapons about their "purely defensive" character are absolutely groundless. The claims of the US and NATO leaders that nuclear neutron weapons are intended to "counterbalance" the Warsaw Treaty countries' superiority in tanks or that they are necessary to "catch up" with the Soviet Union in armaments are similarly false.

Authoritative military experts both in East and West have been exposing the falsity of these "arguments" for many years. The Warsaw Treaty member countries indeed have a sufficient military potential. However, they have never sought superiority, limiting themselves to maintaining minimally sufficient defences to protect the peaceful constructive efforts of their peoples in the face of the ever growing military potential of NATO. If we evaluate the military balance between the two sides objectively, without singling out any type of weaponry or arms but correlating the total military potentials of the sides on the basis of such factors as the numbers of weapons, their qualitative characteristics, and the combat capabilities and organization of troops, we will come to the conclusion that there is a rough parity of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The attempts to demonstrate the Warsaw Treaty countries' superiority in individual types of armaments belie the desire to conceal the huge scope of the aggressive war preparations of the USA and NATO, with neutron weapons now assigned a major role in them. The true reason behind the US decision to go ahead with the production of neutron war-



heads is Washington's hope to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries in tactical nuclear weapons.

It is common knowledge, however, that the existing rough parity between the USA and the USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization was and remains one of the major conditions making it possible to lower the level of armed confrontation with due respect for the security interests of both sides. This circumstance is admitted by Western officials as well. It was the West's recognition of the rough military parity of the two sides that paved the way to all the multilateral and bilateral arms limitation agreements and treaties concluded during the 1970s. It was that fact that underlied all those achievements in the strengthening of peace and international security that came to be known as detente.

That was why the implementation of the US plans to manufacture neutron weapons meant nothing short of an attempt of the reactionary, adventuristic forces in the USA to introduce a new destabilizing factor in the international military and political situation in the hope to upset the existing balance of forces and to achieve military superiority. Those plans indicated intentions of Washington and its allies to subvert the security of socialist countries, to aggravate international tension and to provoke another, particularly dangerous round of the arms race.

One of the more widespread arguments in defence of neutron weapons is that they presumably can make nuclear war "limited" or "controlled". It is based on the assumption that in case of a local conflict neutron weapons will ensure the West military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries and prevent that conflict from escalating into an all-out nuclear war. The authors of this concept view neutron weapons as a "safe" way of resolving Europe's political problems militarily, one that will ensure the survival of the European countries and save them from extensive devastation.

The view of neutron weapons as a means of fighting a "limited" nuclear war on the European continent is, perhaps, more adventuristic than any other current military-political concept and is fraught with catastrophic consequences both for Europe and for the whole world. This approach to neutron weapons totally disregards the realities of the military situation, the organization of the armed forces and the existence of huge nuclear arms arsenals. It also ignores the lessons of political and military history, which convincingly refutes the hopes of US and NATO generals.

Blurring the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare and between tactical and strategic weapons, the neutron bomb drastically lowers the nuclear threshold and enhances the risk of a nuclear outbreak and of its eruption into a universal nuclear war. In this way neutron weapons can play the sinister role of a fuse of world nuclear catastrophe.

Since most of the present-day nuclear neutron weapons are intended to be deployed and used in Europe, it is the Europeans that will bear the brunt of the grave consequences of the US leaders' decision. Europe is viewed by the Pentagon as the main theatre of operations in a possible war against the Warsaw Treaty countries. The production of neutron munitions and the development of new medium-range missiles are consistent

and mutually complementing measures to weave the concept of a "limited nuclear war" into a material fabric. These measures affect the vital interests of the European countries and pose a grave threat to their population. They also testify to the US intention to force its NATO allies to embrace this military doctrine.

While claiming that neutron munitions will so far be stockpiled in the USA, the Pentagon makes no secret of the fact that they are intended for delivery vehicles which have already been deployed in Western Europe, mostly in West Germany. It is planned at first to manufacture 380 neutron warheads for Lance missiles and 800 for 8-inch artillery shells. Symptomatically, the US President's decision has been supported by the more reactionary forces in West Germany. Their leader, Franz-Josef Strauss, called for the immediate deployment of new US deadly weapons in West Germany, which already has NATO's largest arms arsenal in Europe.

The West European NATO countries have so far given no official consent to the deployment of neutron weapons in their territory. Meanwhile, even before the Reagan Administration announced its decision on the full-scale production of neutron weapons, Washington had begun energetically to pressure its NATO partners to win their consent to the deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe. In early February 1981, the US Defense Secretary said he was going to convince the West Europeans of the need and usefulness of this step. He admitted a month later that intensive consultations with European partners were under way on that subject. He also stated that certain European statesmen and politicians had a favourable view of neutron weapons.

After the decision to put nuclear weapons on stream had been taken, the United States made fresh attempts to convince its allies, concentrating on those who seemed more complaisant. In late August 1981, Weinberger paid a visit to Britain. Commenting on his visit, the British *Guardian* noted that the United States expected Britain immediately and unconditionally to adopt neutron weapons for its Rhine Army artillery. The US believed that the key to the deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe should be a decision of a NATO ally to provide its own troops with these weapons. Washington chose Britain as its target, and small wonder: the military and political course of the Thatcher government is closer to Washington's militarist policy than that of any other NATO country. In addition, the British army has Lance missiles and 203.2 mm self-propelled howitzers, which makes it technically easier to field neutron weapons.

Another likely recipient of US neutron weapons, Washington believes, is West Germany. Way back in 1978, the West German government was not averse to having neutron munitions in the territory of this country. The plan to do so, however, was blocked by massive demonstrations and anti-war protests which swept the country. However, that question, which is crucial to West Germany as well as to other European countries, has not yet been buried.

Practice shows that the United States far from always reckons with its



partners in such matters. Washington may even go along without such a consent and again face the European countries with a *fait accompli*. Indeed, the Lance missiles and munitions for the 8-inch artillery guns that have been deployed in Europe can quickly be fitted out with neutron warheads.

Moreover, legally Washington does not need the consent of the government of West Germany to bring neutron warheads to its territory. A prominent West German politician pointed out recently that under the existing military treaties between the USA and West Germany, including a 1952 agreement, the Federal Government has no right to expect even to be consulted before the US troops stationed in the country get neutron weapons. This was confirmed by US Assistant Secretary for Defense R. Perle, who stated that the US Army had no need to ask permission for the deployment of new weapons.

Of course, Washington would not like to quarrel with its allies but, obviously, it believes itself fully empowered to decide the West Europeans' destiny. As US Defense Secretary Weinberger has observed, the promptness with which neutron weapons can be brought to Europe makes any protracted debates superfluous.

Washington's disregard for the West Europeans' interests is clearly becoming common practice in Atlantic relationships. The West Europeans are growing ever more aware of the true worth of American pledges from such facts as the promise to ratify the SALT-2 Accord in exchange for the consent of the other NATO countries to deploy new US medium-range missiles. The United States secured the consent to the deployment of missiles in West Germany, Britain and Italy and continues to exert pressure on Belgium and the Netherlands. At the same time it would not ratify the SALT-2 Accord. For this reason, one can hardly explain the attitude of certain West European leaders, backing Washington's propaganda allegations that the problem of neutron weapons is a US internal affair with no bearing on Europe.

However, not all the governments of the NATO countries, despite the strong pressure brought to bear from across the ocean, are as willing as Britain and West Germany to accept US neutron munitions. Trying to push through its plans, the United States exerted immense diplomatic efforts, primarily with regard to its allies, in order to neutralize the worldwide public movement against the neutron threat. In particular, the US Administration tried in every way to provoke the West European governments into appealing to the United States to launch the production and deployment of neutron munitions. Washington's allies, however, refused to go along.

Moreover, there emerged in Western Europe quite sizeable opposition to neutron weapons, represented, in particular, by Greece, Denmark, Iceland and Norway. Belgium and the Netherlands voiced grave doubts over the plans to produce and deploy neutron weapons in Western Europe. Opposition among the US allies led to the cancellation of a special NATO conference planned at the headquarters of the Alliance in March 1978, to discuss the production and deployment of neutron weapons. That was

a rare incident in the more than 30-year history of such conferences, one testifying to the strong potential of the anti-war movement.

Since that time the United States, far from giving up, has intensified its efforts to drag the allies into its neutron venture. According to Western news agencies, in early August 1982, the United States launched another attack on its West European partners in a bid to make them agree to the deployment of munitions of a new, small-sized type.

An official spokesman for the NATO headquarters in Brussels told a Reuter correspondent on August 2, 1982, that the United States had not consulted its NATO allies on a secret military program which could double its neutron weapons arsenal. It became known from sources close to the US Congress that the research personnel of American governmental agencies were working on a small-sized nuclear artillery shell which was likely to produce six times as much deadly radioactive radiation as standard nuclear weapons. The production of those shells could double or even triple the number of the units of neutron weapons planned for production. That shell, codenamed "W-8", was meant to be deployed primarily in West European countries.

Yet earlier one of the US news services, quoting informed sources, had reported that the US Administration had ordered the production of an additional 1,000 units of neutron-tipped artillery shells with a range of 18 miles. Those shells are intended for the 155 mm howitzers used by the NATO armies in Western Europe. According to press reports, the Pentagon's "neutron program", its main component being the production of 2,200 neutron warheads, will cost the US tax payer 2.5 billion dollars.

The reports of the Western news agencies graphically illustrate Washington's resolve to introduce new nuclear neutron weapons in Europe at all costs, despite the Europeans' opposition.

As for the Americans themselves, Washington is trying to reassure them by claiming that the neutron bomb, presumably a tactical weapon, is intended to be used on the European theatre of operations and will thus help to spare the territory of the United States in case of a nuclear missile war. The Americans are being deliberately deceived because official propaganda never mentions the fact that the lowering of the nuclear threshold on the European continent simultaneously increases the possibility of bringing into play all the other types of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, including strategic armaments. The escalation of a nuclear conflict will by no means spare the territory of the United States.

US politicians and military leaders cling to the erroneous view that, having unleashed a nuclear conflict in Europe, they will be able to restrict it to the Old World. In fact, they hope by means of neutron weapons to accomplish their own strategic goals with NATO's help and at the expense of their European allies. Further proof of these hopes is the fact that the questions of neutron weapons were discussed at almost every meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group since 1973, although the neutron bomb featured in the agendas as "death rays" or "mini-charges". In other words, Washington has been working on its NATO partners for a



decade now in an attempt to drag them even deeper in its own adventurist plans. Preparations for that pressure campaign had begun even earlier.

As a result of Washington's efforts, NATO took in the late 1960s and early 1970s a series of decisions which altered the Alliance's nuclear policy and strategy in Europe. That alteration actually boiled down to the lowering of the "nuclear threshold" on the continent. The USA effectively sold its allies on the concept of NATO's possible first use of nuclear weapons against socialist countries even in the early stages of an armed conflict in Europe. Under those revised plans, NATO adopted new, simplified procedures for decision-making on the use of those weapons. So the fielding by the USA of neutron munitions intended specifically for NATO seemed to accomplish several tasks simultaneously. It was in accord with the US strategic plans, made the Europeans the target of the consequences of a possible conflict, promoted Washington's policy of modernizing NATO's nuclear systems in Europe, lowered the European "nuclear threshold", fitted NATO's simplified procedure for decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons, and ensured military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries in the most important area, in nuclear armaments.

At the same time the United States was getting fresh possibilities to carry further the dangerous tendency of lowering the "nuclear threshold". In addition, Washington intended to exploit its monopoly of the production of neutron weapons in NATO to strengthen its political and military positions in the alliance.

The emergence of a qualitatively new, barbarous means of mass destruction would undoubtedly be one of the many dangerous consequences of the US decision to produce neutron weapons on a mass scale. In this way other nuclear powers may be encouraged to develop such weapons. Reports in the foreign press that France is energetically developing neutron weapons and is virtually on the brink of producing them caused much worry. Although the French government denied the reports that France intended to begin producing neutron munitions and fielding them, it has never said there are no plans to develop such weapons.

The world public also is alarmed by the dispatches of Western news agencies about Israel's and South Africa's plans to develop neutron weapons. The appearance of these weapons in those countries would mean a fresh threat to peace and security in the Middle East and in southern Africa. Also, there are forces in certain non-nuclear countries which would like them to acquire neutron weapons. It is not so very difficult to develop knowhow for the production of neutron weapons in our age of rapid scientific and technical progress. Undoubtedly, such developments in international affairs would have extremely dangerous consequences.

Practice shows that the emergence of any new type of weaponry leads to another round of the arms race, to the development of such or similar weapons by other countries and prompts them to look for and eventually produce and field counterbalancing arms systems. This is particularly true of the present-day weapons of mass destruction and, of course, neu-

tron weapons. Nevertheless, the proponents of these weapons continue to claim with senseless obstinacy that their production and deployment will not entail another round of the arms race. They usually argue that neutron weapons are just a modernized variety of the existing tactical weapons presumably meant to replace them. However, they never mention or belittle the qualitatively new effects of neutron warheads, the use of which, particularly in the theatre of operations, will drastically upset the balance of forces in favour of the United States and NATO. The possible employment of medium- and long-range missiles and cruises as delivery vehicles for neutron warheads would have even graver consequences from the point of view of military doctrine, strategy and tactics.

The fielding of neutron weapons gives an impetus to the development of what is known as third-generation nuclear weapons. According to specialists, the neutron bomb is a transitory element to third-generation nuclear weapons, or, as they say, their "primitive forerunner". Those future nuclear weapons, based on the principle of the enhanced-radiation neutron warhead, go even a longer way toward the implementation of the idea of a controlled nuclear explosion.

Judith Miller, a senior *New York Times* correspondent, reported on October 28, 1982, that third-generation nuclear weapons, on which US theorists were already working, would make it possible to use even more selectively the thermal, radioactive and blast effects, which would be an improvement on the existing weaponry. The journalist had obtained that information from Pentagon officials, from sources in the Department of the Presidential Science Adviser, and also from researchers of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory which is doing a considerable part of R&D on new weapons, just as was the case with the neutron bomb. According to them, the latest breakthroughs in physics and electronics will enable the United States to develop weapons which can be used on land, in the air or in outer space against targets in the theatre of operations or against nuclear weapons, while minimizing undesirable side effects.

The new concepts on nuclear weapons were approved by the Senate Armed Forces Committee. The Committee suggested in its report on a nuclear arms development program for fiscal 1983 that the Energy Department, responsible for the development and production of atomic weapons, draw up a purposeful many-year program based on those concepts and stressed that it would carefully follow the implementation of the program during the next few years.

Officials of the US referred to several types of new weapons planned by specialists. These may be bombs producing a strong electromagnetic pulse to disable enemy communications systems, lasers to make atomic explosions generate X-rays, which in turn, will supply energy for laser beams to destroy enemy missiles, and a "controlled energy" weapon intended to destroy targets with minimal side effects. The new weapons, specialists believe, can be used for offensive purposes.

According to US scientists and officials, great progress has been achieved in laser technology. At the Nevada testing range for under-



ground nuclear weapons tests, staff members of the Livermore Laboratory carried out a small nuclear explosion to produce X-rays which generated a tiny laser beam in a vacuum chamber simulating outer space.<sup>34</sup>

It is no one's surprise now that Dr. Edward Teller, "the father of the hydrogen bomb," is a vigorous champion of the third-generation weapons. Dr. Teller met President Reagan in October 1982 and urged him to increase appropriations for the development of new concepts. Delivering a speech at the National Press Club on October 26, Dr. Teller criticized the proposed freeze on nuclear weapons and claimed that it would interfere with the development and testing of new "defensive weapons", which, according to him, could considerably enhance national security.

The Administration's support for third-generation weapons is strongly opposed by the champions of the nuclear arms freeze and by certain scientists. Richard Garvin, a physicist of the Thomas Watson Research Center, International Business Machines Corporation, stated that a comprehensive nuclear weapon tests ban agreed with the Soviet Union would meet national interests to a far greater extent.

Hugh E. De Witt, a physicist with the Livermore Laboratory, sent a letter of protest to the President of the University of California, to which the laboratory is attached. The protest was against the recent attempts of Dr. Teller and other scientists of the laboratory to lobby for higher appropriations and new generation weapons, qualifying the promises of the champions of the new weapons technology as misleading and dangerous.

Christopher Payne of the Federation of American Scientists characterized third-generation weapons as a dangerous ploy encouraged by arms-makers to guarantee orders. In his words, those so-called concepts can only lead to the continued arms race.<sup>35</sup>

All these statements give the lie to the claims of the proponents of the neutron bomb that it was not escalating the arms race to an even more dangerous level. Moreover, many specialists believe that the emergence of neutron weapons will greatly speed up R&D of certain conventional weapons (such as armoured personnel carriers, tanks and self-propelled artillery) in order to devise new defences against neutron radiation. There will also be a search for ways to physically counter a flow of non-charged nuclear particles. The press reports that neutron weapons can entail the arms race involving the development of basically new technology for land warfare, such as a machine on the air cushion, "mole-type" subterranean facilities, etc.

An objective analysis of the consequences of the development and adoption of neutron munitions therefore leaves no doubt that neutron weapons are not merely a variety of the existing nuclear weapons. They open a new dangerous area in the arms race which will be ever more difficult to control. The new round of the arms race added to international tension, aggravated armed confrontation, lessened mutual trust and eventually enhanced the threat of another world war.

Having decided to go ahead with the production of neutron weapons, the US leadership made it even more difficult to tackle problems of arms control and limitation. The desire to qualitatively upgrade nuclear weapons is, perhaps, one of the reasons behind Washington's announcement in the summer of 1982, when the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament was in progress, that it was withdrawing from the tripartite talks with the USSR and Britain on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests and also behind its continued attempts to block the solution of the problem of ending and prohibiting nuclear weapon tests at the Committee on Disarmament.

The full-scale production of neutron weapons has an adverse effect on virtually all the talks on arms limitation and disarmament. Can the United States be considered an honest and reliable partner in talks aimed at plugging one channel of the arms race or another if Washington is simultaneously opening up another area of that race? Acting in this way, the USA subverts the efforts of the world community in this vital field.

At the same time neutron weapons complicate agreement on verification procedures in drafting arms control and disarmament agreements. Small-sized neutron warheads can be fitted onto small delivery vehicles, which could seriously complicate effective monitoring of the production, deployment and even proliferation of neutron weapons.

The problems caused by the emergence and production of neutron weapons have had a noticeable braking effect on the process of international detente. The development and fielding of new weapons of mass destruction constituted a serious step of the more "hawkish" forces in the United States in subverting detente and reviving the cold war.

At the same time Washington tried to use the new weapons as leverage in its unseemly political gamble toward the Soviet Union with a view to wrenching from it unilateral political concessions in the problems of detente and in limiting and reducing armaments, holding back progress in both fields. Although the development of neutron weapons and their full-scale production in the United States are already *facts accompli*, the dangerous consequences of Washington's steps continue to worry the peaceloving states and the public at large all over the world.

That is why all the peace forces today continue their vigorous efforts against neutron weapons, against "neutron death". These efforts are part and parcel of the struggle for peace and the security of the peoples, for the relaxation of international tension, for the limitation of the arms race, for disarmament, and for the preservation of life on earth.



#### IV. EFFORTS OF PEACE FORCES TO BAN NEUTRON WEAPONS

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From its early years the Soviet Union has been a committed and active participant in the drive of nations for peace and disarmament. It has consistently worked for the prohibition of war as a means of resolving international problems, for the limitation and reduction of armaments, and, particularly, for a ban on weapons of mass destruction.

At the very first major international forum it attended, the Genoa conference of 1922, the Soviet Union declared its firm support for any proposals aimed at complete prohibition of the more barbarous of the then known forms of warfare: "poisonous gases, airborne warfare and others, especially the use of the means of destruction directed against civilian population."<sup>46</sup> The Soviet Union was among the first states to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

In subsequent years the Soviet Union continued to intensify its efforts in this direction. On November 30, 1927, at the IV session of the preparatory commission of the disarmament conference the Soviet delegation submitted for consideration by the participating states a plan for general and complete disarmament. The plan provided not only for the elimination of all chemical means of warfare, but also for the discontinuation by legal procedure of the issue of patents for different types of weapons and means of annihilation with a view to removing the incentive to their development.<sup>47</sup> A few months later the Soviet delegation tabled to the said commission a draft convention providing for the elimination of all means of warfare which represented a special threat to civilians who were not involved directly in hostilities.

In 1932—1935 the Soviet Union took a most active part in the work of the Geneva disarmament conference convened on the decision of the League of Nations, although it was not the latter's member at the time. In those years the major imperialist powers were trying to exploit the conference for the weakening of their potential enemies and for the strengthening of their own military might. The Soviet Union was the only participant in the conference to seek consistently the solution of the disarmament

problem. On February 18, 1932, the Soviet Union suggested that the conference should place the principle of general and complete disarmament at the foundation of its work. At the same time the USSR tabled two drafts for the consideration of the conferees: one on general, complete and immediate disarmament and the other on proportionate reductions of armed forces.

But these projects, like the proposals submitted by the USSR to the Preparatory Commission and to the disarmament conference in subsequent years were turned down due to the position of the leading capitalist powers which had deadlocked this important forum. Despite the failure of the conference, the Soviet Union did not discontinue its active diplomatic efforts to limit armaments, achieve disarmament and prevent imminent World War II.

In the first years after the war the USSR again led the drive of peace forces for the consolidation of international peace and security, and for the prohibition of the weapons of mass destruction, primarily atomic weapons whose development and production had been launched in the United States. In this drive the Soviet Union was widely using its participation in the United Nations which was established in 1945.

The Soviet delegation tabled a draft convention on the prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons at the second session of the UN commission on atomic energy on June 19, 1946. The draft also provided for the destruction of all atomic weapons in a three months' time after the coming of the convention into force. Violations of the convention's provisions were viewed as serious crimes against humanity. Under the draft, all participating states were to introduce in their legislation strict measures to punish those guilty of these violations.<sup>48</sup>

Despite the broad support of the world public for the Soviet proposal, it was rejected due to the resistance of Western powers led by the United States which was launching its preparations for the Cold War, for the accelerated development and production of the powerful brand-new weapons, and for the build-up of its own atomic potential.

On February 13, 1947 the United Nations set up a Conventional Arms Commission with active participation of the USSR. The Soviet delegation was vigorously working for the new body to concern itself with the elaboration of practical measures pertaining not only to the limitation and reduction of conventional arms, but also to the prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons, other means of mass destruction and their stockpiles.

In the August of 1948 the Commission gave a definition of the weapons of mass destruction. It included into this category atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destruc-



tive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.<sup>39</sup>

This definition of weapons of mass destruction by the authoritative UN body remains valid up to now. It clearly covers such later varieties of weapons of mass destruction as thermonuclear and neutron weapons. They meet it by their scientific and technical characteristics, medical and biological consequences of their use and destructive effect.

In the years that followed the Soviet Union continued to work persistently in the United Nations and other international forums for banning all types of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear arms and also those new types and systems of mass destruction weapons which might be developed. In the post-war decades the Soviet Union repeatedly made various proposals with this aim in view.

When reports about the projects for the development of neutron weapons in the United States appeared in the late 1950s — early 1960s, the Soviet Government resolutely denounced these projects and pointed to their dangerous consequences.<sup>40</sup> The Soviet Union's position on this issue logically flowed from its consistent, historically corroborated foreign policy course towards strengthening peace, limiting armaments, preventing the appearance of new types of weapons and achieving disarmament.

This course and specific steps taken by the Soviet Union to prevent the use of scientific and technical advances for the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction meet the aspirations of all peace forces which are working to remove the threat of war, strengthen peace and curb the arms race. This explains why Soviet proposals in this field enjoy such a broad support of other peace-loving states and the world public. The fact that the foreign policy course of the USSR meets the interests of the world public creates a firm foundation for the pooling of their efforts in the solution of vital global problems, such as the promotion of peace, limitation and reduction of armaments, and prohibition of the development of new types of weapons.

Guided by the desire to prevent the emergence of new deadly weapons, and considering the mounting demands of the world public to ban the use of scientific and technical advances for the development of powerful and especially dangerous armaments, the Soviet Union proposed in June 1975 that all states, primarily big powers, should sign an agreement banning the development of new types of mass destruction weapons and new systems of such weapons. "The level of contemporary science and technology is such that there is a serious danger of the development of even more dreadful weapons than even the nuclear ones. The common sense and conscience of mankind dictate the necessity of putting an insurmountable barrier in the way of emergence of such weaponry,"<sup>41</sup> said the proposal. The Soviet Union called on all

countries, the United States and other big powers in the first place, to pool their efforts in solving this task.

In furthering this initiative, the Soviet Union brought to the agenda of the 30th session of the UN General Assembly the question "On the Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons" as an important and urgent issue. The Soviet delegation also submitted to the session its draft agreement on the said issue. The draft provided for a broad range of measures linked to the commitment by the signatory states not to develop and manufacture new types and systems of mass destruction weapons.<sup>42</sup> A relevant draft resolution contained, for one, a request to the Committee on Disarmament to begin the drafting of the proposed agreement with the participation of experts as soon as possible.<sup>43</sup>

The importance of the Soviet proposal was borne out by its active discussion at the session and by its appreciation by many states which showed much interest in it.<sup>44</sup> The results of the voting on the said draft also pointed to the constructive character and topicality of the Soviet proposal: 115 countries voted for it with 15 abstaining, including the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Israel. Indicatively, the draft was backed by many NATO members (Canada, Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Portugal and Greece) and also Japan.

The subject and scope of the prohibition provided for by the Soviet draft and a relevant General Assembly resolution created a good foundation for the attainment of the proposed agreement in the Committee on Disarmament on the prevention of the appearance of new, especially lethal and destructive armaments, including neutron weapons, in the arsenals of states.

However, the US-led Western powers occupied initially a passive position and then resorted to undisguised obstruction in the Committee on Disarmament which began debates on new types of weapons of mass destruction in 1976. Declaring that it was too early to draft agreements on individual new types of weapons in this category, they opposed the signing of a comprehensive agreement at the same time.

After the then President Carter recognized in public that the United States had neutron weapons and plans for their large-scale manufacture and subsequent deployment in Western Europe, the Soviet Union made a statement which drew the attention of the world public to these criminal plans. The statement published on July 31, 1977 exposed Washington's attempts to advertize this new weapon of mass destruction on the pretext that it kills humans while sparing material values. The statement emphasized that the arguments to the effect that neutron warheads were "clean" weapons of restricted range, and that they were to be used primarily as tactical weapons, were designed to prove that it was possible to use nuclear weapons in general and on a "limited" scale in particular.

"The inconsistency and danger of such arguments are obvious," stressed the document. "They betray the attempts which can bring the



world closer to nuclear catastrophe."<sup>15</sup> The statement also pointed to the far-reaching negative consequences which the development of neutron weapons by the United States had for the process of detente, the interests of peace, nuclear non-proliferation, and arms limitation talks. The statement also stressed that the plan for siting US neutron weapons on the territory of Western Europe were glaringly at variance with the task of strengthening peace and security in Europe, and with the noble goals sealed in the Final Act of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. The Soviet Union called on the US leaders to realize in full the responsibility they assumed by launching a new round of the arms race, and expressed the hope that common sense and political realism would prevail in Washington.

But the West responded to this appeal to peace and reason by a clamorous campaign to advertize the neutron bomb as a "defensive" weapon which is supposedly "cleaner" and "more humane" than the ordinary nuclear bomb. This praise of the neutron bomb was meant to cover up the new round of the arms race behind the smoke-screen of deception and false allegations about a "Soviet threat."

Although the propaganda campaign in defense of neutron weapons evoked a certain response among those in the West who were led into error, deceived or ill-informed, the world public strongly condemned this new means of mass destruction. By doing so the world public displayed its increased competence and maturity in the understanding of international problems and of the impending danger. Showing a high capacity for cohesion and mobilization, the movement for banning neutron weapons quickly swept alle continents, drawing in the representatives of the broadest sections of the population. It was foined by different political parties, scientists, religious workers, intellectuals, workers, farmers, prominent public leaders and statesmen.

The Communist and workers' parties of Europe, the United States and Canada were among the first political organizations to launch the drive against the neutron bomb. In their appeal signed on August 9, 1977, the anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedy, these parties declared that they opposed the plans of the US Government to begin the production of the neutron bomb and denounced this barbarous weapon designed for killing people in cold blood. Pointing to the serious consequences of neutron weapons production for international peace, the spokesmen for the said parties called on all nations and peace forces to come out for the continuation of detente, cessation of the arms race and complete prohibition of the weapons of mass destruction.<sup>16</sup> The statement of the Communist and workers' parties of 28 European countries, Canada and the United States made a contribution to the mobilization of the movement of the public for a ban on neutron weapons.

Peace champions in all countries launched numerous manifestations, rallies and campaigns in the mass media, demanding a ban on the new monstrous means of warfare. Tens of millions of people, including those who had been passively watching dangerous developments before,

took an active part in the International Week of Action Against the Neutron Bomb, which was held in August 1977. The success of this campaign was largely facilitated by experts, scientists, lawyers, physicians, physicists, sociologists, biologists, politologists, politicians and military specialists who used their professional knowledge and prestige to expose the especially barbarous and inhuman character of neutron weapons in the press, on the radio and television, and at rallies and symposiums which discussed the said weapons.

The President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academician A. Alexandrov made a typical speech at the extraordinary seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in October 1977. "The neutron bomb is being advertized now as a humane and strictly defensive weapon," said he. "But this talk is sheer deception. In real fact the neutron bomb is doubtless an offensive weapons which makes it possible not only to seize a territory, but also to 'free' it of the population which inhabits it. This bomb is designed to play the role of those maidaneks and oswiecims which helped the Nazis to annihilate the population during the last war. This weapon not only kills. There will be ten people with different radiation doses for every dead person. Some of them will die at different time, while the survivors will be giving birth to deformed children due to the affected genetic, hereditary structures. The neutron bomb is a weapon of mass destruction directed against our posterity. It is a weapon provoking an unlimited thermo-nuclear war which would be the greatest misfortune for mankind."<sup>17</sup>

Participants in the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, who pointed to the danger of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction as early as in the beginning of the 1970s, spoke about long-term disastrous consequences of the use of neutron weapons with anxiety and concern at their meeting in Munich in the August of 1977.<sup>18</sup> In a special declaration adopted at one of its meetings, the Pugwash Council called for the cessation of the deployment of new weapons of the neutron bomb type. The neutron bomb is to be deployed in the heart of Europe, said the declaration. Sometimes it is called a "clean" weapon or a weapon which does not do any material damage. But in real fact, both its lethal radiation, and the immediate and long-term biological damage which it might inflict, is much greater than that which can be done by the existing types of nuclear weapons, concluded the document.<sup>19</sup>

The neutron bomb was resolutely condemned also by the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the International Institute for Peace in Vienna, prominent leaders of Socialist, Social-Democratic, Liberal and a number of other parties, religious communities, the Helsinki conference of the Socialist International, the Geneva International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on Disarmament, the Lisbon session of the Interparliamentary Union and many other organizations and forums. In 1977—1978 the mass actions of protest against the plans to produce and deploy neutron weapons swept not only those NATO countries where neutron devices were to be sited, but also



other states. The US and NATO plans were denounced by public organizations in many countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, America and Australia.

While the world anti-war movement was stepping up its efforts to combat the neutron threat, the question of banning the neutron bomb was submitted for discussion by the international community of states. This discussion was initiated by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at the 32nd session of the UN General Assembly in the context of the problem of prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation was backed by spokesmen for Britain, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Guinea-Bissau, Mongolia and other countries. In his speech at the session the Soviet delegate condemned the attempts to advertize the neutron bomb as a "humane" weapon. He noted that the very use of this notion as regards the neutron bomb was monstrous in view of the destructive impact which its rays exerted on human organism. The Soviet delegate urged all states to curb the plans for the production of all types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the neutron bomb.<sup>30</sup> At that time the Western delegations passed this question over in silence.

Addressing the session devoted to the 60th anniversary of the October 1917 Socialist Revolution on November 2, 1977, the Soviet President proposed a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all states. He said that this would apply to all types of nuclear weapons, whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or projectiles. At the same time the Soviet Government appealed on all governments and nations to place the energy of the atom at the service of peace alone.<sup>31</sup> In the December of the same year the Soviet Union declared that it was resolutely against the neutron bomb and that it understood and fully backed millions of people all over the world who were protesting against it. Striving to prevent a new dangerous round of the arms race as a result of the appearance of neutron weapons, the USSR made a proposal to Western powers on reaching agreement on the mutual renunciation of their production.<sup>32</sup>

The United States did not give a specific, unequivocal answer to these Soviet proposals. Instead, in his speech on December 30, 1977, President Carter made the discussion of neutron weapons with the USSR dependent on the completion of the talks on SALT-2. He used the neutron bomb to exert political pressure on the USSR and to try and get concessions from it.<sup>33</sup>

At their meetings with American colleagues in the January of 1978 Soviet parliamentarians pointed to the danger of the US position and the alarm which it caused all over the world. They noted that in conditions when the talks on the limitation of weapons, nuclear arms included, were being held on a broad scale, and when the US President himself repeatedly declared US readiness and the need to halt the nuclear arms race, the very fact that the United States was going to launch a new round of the

arms race could not be justified. The head of the Soviet delegation said that if the decision to produce neutron weapons were adopted, the USSR would be compelled to respond to it by developing a new weapon for defense purposes.<sup>34</sup>

The drive of the world public against the neutron bomb was mounting in the latter half of 1977 and early 1978. The ranks of the opponents of neutron weapons were joined by some prominent leaders of bourgeois parties, a number of former NATO generals and part of the Western press. Reflecting their concern over the plans to deploy the neutron bomb the French newspaper *Le Soir* wrote: "To agree with the neutron bomb production means to prepare to commit suicide."<sup>35</sup>

"Isn't mankind ready to go mad?" Under this headline the newspaper of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, *Vorwärts*, carried an article by the then General Secretary of the Party Egon Bahr. "The neutron bomb is a symbol of perverted mentality," wrote he, stressing that conscience and reason would rise against this weapon.<sup>36</sup> "The decision to deploy in Europe a new generation of nuclear weapons would be tantamount to a catastrophe,"<sup>37</sup> wrote Dr. Frank Barnaby, the then Director of the International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm (SIPRI).

Dozens of world-renown scientists, workers in the field of culture and religious figures spoke in detail about the technical characteristics of neutron weapons, their effects and the baneful consequences of their use. Among them were Italian Senator and former Supreme Allied Commander Deputy, Europe, Nino Pasti, Professor of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Chairman of the Pugwash Movement Dr. B.T. Feld, President of the World Federation of Scientific Workers Erick Buhrop, President of the Pax Christi International Catholic Peace Movement Cardinal Alfrink, member of the Board of the International Institute for Peace in Vienna Professor von Bredow, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and the Nobel Prize for Chemistry L. Pauling, and the former President of the World Council of Churches M. Niemöller.<sup>38</sup>

The campaign of protest launched by the world public gained in strength and scope in the months preceding President Carter's decision to start the production of the neutron bomb. Multithousand-strong rallies, meetings, manifestations and peace marches, the collection of signatures under the appeals to governments and legislative bodies with the demand to outlaw the neutron bomb became a daily occurrence in the public life of many countries of the world, especially Western Europe which had gone through the tragedy of two world wars.

In October 1977, the Congress of the Belgian Socialist Party made a statement denouncing the manufacture of the neutron bomb. At the same time the Belgian Peace and Development Association sent a letter to the US President, demanding that he should abandon the production of neutron weapons. The conference of the British Labour Party, held in Brighton in early October, adopted a resolution urging its National Executive Committee to express itself against the production of neutron warheads and to work against it during its election campaign.

A number of prominent Danish politicians and public figures, among



them MPs from the Christian People Party, the Radical Left-Wing Party and the Party of Left-Wing Socialists, initiated the massive collection of signatures under the appeal "No to the Neutron Bomb!" which was presented to the Government of Denmark. The appeal said that its signatories protested against the development of the neutron bomb by the United States, and called on the Danish Government to express its discontent with the plans for the production of neutron weapons. Many prominent Danish writers and workers in the field of culture supported the appeal.

Mass public manifestations took place in Canada. The Canadian Peace Congress published a pamphlet exposing the neutron threat and stressing the need to prevent new attempts by the "hawks" to break the balance of forces with the help of the neutron bomb and cruise missiles.

The Executive Committee of the Labour Party of the Netherlands expressed its concern over the development and production of neutron weapons. A national forum was held in Amsterdam under the motto "Stop the Neutron Bomb". It set up a group which initiated a large-scale collection of signatures under a popular petition of protest.

The women's and youth organizations of the Norwegian Labour Party condemned the US plans to launch the manufacture of neutron weapons and to site them in Europe.

In Portugal the National Peace Council sponsored the collection of signatures under a declaration against the neutron bomb. The whole country was swept by the rallies of protest.

Mass rallies and public manifestations in which members of the elective bodies of cities and states took part were held in 126 cities of the United States in the fall of 1977. A group of American legislators — 5 Senators and 26 members of the House — sent a cable to president Carter in which they urged him to repudiate his sinister plans.

In the fall of 1977 alone, actions against the neutron bomb took place in more than 40 West German cities, including the biggest ones. West German peace champions staged an action of protest in front of the US Embassy in Bonn. Telegrams of protest and appeals demanding a ban on the neutron bomb were adopted by the West German public during numerous actions of protest and sent to the West German Government and the White House.

Similar massive actions were staged in France, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Japan and many other countries. Appeals and telegrams of protest were adopted by numerous international public organizations, including the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Peace Council, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Plenary Assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations, the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the Christian Peace Conference, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Federation of Resistance Movements, the World Council of Churches, the International Organization of Journalists, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, and a number of international labor union associations.

The powerful opposition of the world public to the neutron bomb compelled a number of NATO governments either to adopt a wait-and-see attitude or to express themselves against the deployment of neutron weapons on their territory.

The firm position of the USSR and other socialist countries on this issue and their consistent efforts to solve it in the international arena, rendered important support to the movement for the prohibition of the neutron bomb.

On March 9, 1978, a group of socialist countries made an important proposal in the Committee on Disarmament, directed at banning nuclear neutron weapons. It tabled to the Committee a draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling, Deployment and Use of Nuclear Neutron Weapons.

The socialist countries expressed the gist of their proposal in simple and clear terms in Article I of the draft Convention which said: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to produce, stockpile, deploy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons."<sup>(1)</sup>

The draft provided, among other things, for control over compliance with the proposed Convention.

The authors of the draft adduced the following arguments to justify it: — the neutron bomb is an especially barbarous weapon of mass destruction with indiscriminate action, which can be used in an attack;

— the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe would be incompatible with the relaxation of international tensions and with the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act of the European Conference;

— the development and deployment of the neutron bomb would lead to counter measures, thereby elevating the arms race to a higher and more dangerous level;

— the appearance of the so-called "clean" tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would lower the threshold of a nuclear conflict;

— the neutron bomb is not a "clean" weapon in real fact, but, to the contrary, would induce persistent radioactive fallout;

— the adoption of this bomb would exert a destabilizing impact on the established alignment of forces and on disarmament negotiations.<sup>(2)</sup>

The peace proposal of the socialist countries evoked a positive response in the Committee on Disarmament. It was met with special interest and understanding by the delegations of nonaligned countries. Expressing the opinion of many other members of the Committee, the spokesmen for India, Ethiopia, Egypt, Yugoslavia and neutral Sweden condemned the neutron bomb, having pointed to many pernicious consequences of its adoption by armies. But this reasonable position was opposed by the delegations of the United States and its NATO allies, which continued making attempts to justify and whitewash neutron weapons. At the same time they wanted to belittle the danger of US plans as regards these weapons, asserting that Washington had not yet taken its decision to produce and deploy them.<sup>(3)</sup>

Faced with the powerful opposition to neutron weapons, President Carter was compelled to announce his decision on April 7, 1978, to sus-



pend their production.<sup>62</sup> However, as subsequent developments made it clear, this step was just a manoeuvre aimed at heading off the mounting public protest against the neutron bomb. As early as on October 18 of the same year the US President declared the decision to retain an opportunity of siting neutron weapons in connection with the started production of the new 8-inch artillery projectile and warheads for Lance missiles. At the same time he ordered the manufacture of some elementary neutron warheads.<sup>63</sup> This decision marked the first step towards fullscale production of neutron weapons.

President Carter's statement on the suspension of neutron weapons production did not mislead the peaceloving forces. The efforts to ban the neutron bomb continued on the diplomatic arena as well.

At the UN General Assembly First Special Session on Disarmament, held in May-June 1978, the socialist countries again raised the question of banning neutron weapons.<sup>64</sup> In his letter to the UN Secretary-General of May 26, 1978,<sup>65</sup> Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko made a special emphasis on this problem. During general debates at the session statements on neutron weapons were made by the delegations of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. In addition to this, the Soviet Union made a proposal to include an item on the prohibition of the development and deployment of neutron weapons into the final document's program of action. But this proposal was not adopted due to resistance of the US-led Western powers.

During the 33d and subsequent sessions of the UN General Assembly and at the meetings of the Conference on Disarmament, socialist countries and other states continued to demand a ban on the neutron bomb. But each time their demands were blocked by Western states.

On August 6, 1981, the Reagan Administration adopted a decision on full-scale manufacture of neutron weapons. This decision was met with profound indignation and anxiety in many countries, including the majority of NATO states. Trying, as before, to mislead the public in order to weaken its indignation over the United States, US Administration officials began to assert that the produced neutron warheads would be stockpiled on US territory, and for this reason their production was supposedly a "purely domestic affair" of the United States.

On August 14, 1981, TASS published a statement on Washington's decision on full-scale production of neutron weapons. It noted, among other things, that "it is clear to everyone that neutron weapons are created to be used not on US territory and that any day they may find their way to the European continent or another region which the White House would like to proclaim 'a sphere of US vital interests'. As a consequence, what is referred to as a US 'domestic affair' today will bring about the death of millions of people on other continents and mark the outbreak of a worldwide nuclear conflagration, the flames of which will engulf the United States as well."<sup>66</sup>

By its decision to launch neutron weapons into a fullscale production the United States wanted to face its NATO allies with a fait accompli: first to create the stockpiles of neutron weapons on its territory and then

to compel the allies to host them on theirs. Washington thereby confirmed that its foreign policy course relied on force, the buildup of the war potential, the fanning of international tensions and the attempts to undermine disarmament negotiations.

Several days after Washington made public its decision on full-scale manufacture of neutron weapons, the Soviet delegation in the Committee on Disarmament made a proposal to urgently set up in the Committee a special working group for the drafting of an international convention banning the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. Simultaneously the socialist countries, co-authors of the 1978 draft convention on this question, made a statement censuring US decision to start the production of neutron weapons. It was published as a working document of the Committee.

On August 19, 1981, the Committee on Disarmament held an unofficial session at Soviet initiative to discuss the Soviet proposal on setting up a special working group in the Committee at an early date. This proposal was backed by the delegations of the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Mongolia, as well as of Mexico, Argentina, India, Pakistan and Zaire. The United States and some of its NATO allies (West Germany, Britain, France, Italy and Belgium) expressed themselves against this proposal, thereby demonstrating again their reluctance to discuss an important practical issue pertaining to the prohibition of neutron weapons. Contrary to common sense they explained their position by saying that Washington's decision to manufacture neutron weapons was supposedly "within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."

However, even some of the US allies in the Atlantic Alliance were compelled not only to dissociate themselves from Washington's position on the issue, but even to strongly condemn the decision of the Reagan Administration. This applies, for one, to statements by former Prime Minister of Norway H. Brundtland, and Foreign Minister of Denmark K. Olesen. They reaffirmed the refusal of their countries to host neutron weapons and voiced their discontent over the way in which the governments of allied countries had been advised of the US decision. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also declared that the decision of the US President to produce neutron weapons was fraught with dangerous consequences for the whole world. Profound concern over Washington's actions was expressed by the governments of Finland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Tanzania, Sweden, Iran, Iceland, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mexico, Cuba, Cameroon, Peru, Vietnam, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Argentina, Laos, Syria, Bolivia, Libya and other countries.

The US decision to manufacture neutron weapons infuriated the world public. More rallies, manifestations and protest marches were staged in many countries. The peace forces on all continents raised their voice in protest against this militaristic move by Washington and demanded the cancellation of its decision. But the US Government turned a deaf ear to the massive denunciation of its decision to produce neutron weapons.



But despite the White House's stance on the question, the efforts to ban the neutron bomb continued at many levels, including international forums. At the 36th session of the UN General Assembly a group of socialist countries tabled a draft resolution on banning nuclear neutron weapons. In its resolution on this draft the General Assembly declared that it shared the worldwide concern over the production and intended deployment of nuclear neutron weapons, which had been voiced by many member States and non-governmental organizations.

The resolution noted that the introduction of neutron weapons in the military arsenals of states escalated the nuclear arms race and significantly lowered the threshold of nuclear war, thereby increasing the danger of such a war. It pointed to the inhumane effects of neutron weapons and the grave threat which they constitute, particularly for the unprotected civilian population. The resolution requested the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, and to submit a report on that question to the next session of the General Assembly.<sup>67</sup> This resolution was opposed only by 14 states, among them the United States and a several of its allies.

The communique of the meeting of foreign ministers and heads of the delegations of non-aligned countries, held during the 36th session of the UN General Assembly on September 25 and 26, 1981, voiced serious concern over the appearance of neutron weapons. In early 1982 the council of the agency to ban nuclear weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) passed a resolution calling on states to prevent the danger inherent in the production of neutron weapons. Similar resolutions were adopted by many other international governmental and non-governmental forums.

When the question of banning neutron weapons was discussed at the session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1982, many delegations condemned the position of those states which continued their efforts to prevent the beginning of talks on this pressing issue. Much was said about the problem of banning neutron weapons at the UN General Assembly Second Special Session on Disarmament, but due to the obstruction of the United States and its closest allies no progress was made in its solution in these two highly prestigious international organizations.

The position of the USA and its allies remained unchanged at the 37th session of the UN General Assembly, although the majority of states censured the US dangerous plans of escalating the neutron threat. In its resolution the Assembly again expressed its concern over the production and planned deployment of nuclear neutron weapons and requested the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations with a view to concluding a convention to prohibit these weapons.<sup>68</sup> But just as the year before, the US-led NATO countries voted against this resolution.

At the regular session of the Committee on Disarmament in February 1983 the delegation of the GDR presented a working document on nuclear neutron weapons to the Committee and proposed that it should set

up a special working group to deal with that question. This proposal was made by the GDR on behalf of a group of socialist countries and in line with a relevant resolution of the UN General Assembly. But the United States and its allies again blocked the very idea of talks on drafting a convention to outlaw neutron weapons. They continue doing this up to this day.

The peoples of the whole world and the majority of states have already declared in no uncertain terms their absolutely negative attitude to the barbarous neutron weapons which they consider to be an especially inhumane type of weapons of mass destruction. Neutron weapons must be completely prohibited. This is a command of our time. The struggle against neutron death continues and must be crowned with the victory of all peace forces of the world.

## CONCLUSION

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The effort to ban neutron weapons is a major direction in the drive of all peace forces for the prevention of war.

In a bid to multiply the destructive power of its war potential the United States has recently adopted and is implementing programs for the development and production of mass destruction weapons, such as the neutron bomb and other nuclear arms based on the latest breakthroughs in science. Neutron weapons are one of the most barbarous and man-hating inventions in the category of weapons of mass destruction. This is why the development of these weapons and the US decision to launch them into full-scale production evoked especially strong indignation and protests all over the world. The Reagan Administration's decision to produce neutron weapons is part and parcel of the arms buildup policy which is being pursued by the United States and some of its allies with a view to gaining military superiority, and which is undermining international stability.

The advancement of new military programs, including the plan for neutron weapons, is inseparably connected with the development of strategic and tactical concepts and doctrines, such as "a first disarming nuclear strike", "a limited nuclear war", "a protracted nuclear war", and a "warning nuclear shot on the battlefield." All these aggressive and dangerous-for-peace concepts are based on the erroneous premise that it is possible to win a nuclear war by using nuclear weapons first. The neutron bomb is especially dangerous because it may become the detonator which will trigger off an all-out nuclear catastrophe.

Now it is clear to all realistic people that any hopes for victory in a nuclear war are insane. If a nuclear war breaks out, there will be no winners in it. It will inevitably lead to the death of whole nations, tremendous destruction and disastrous consequences for civilization and the very life on Earth.

This realistic understanding of world developments and their potential consequences was graphically manifest in the Political Declaration which the Warsaw Treaty member-countries adopted at the Prague session of their Political Consultative Committee in January 1983.<sup>(6)</sup>

Participants in the session stated that it was possible to overcome the dangerous stage in international developments despite the complexity of the world situation. They emphasized that to do this it was above all

necessary for all states, especially nuclear powers, to display political will and a striving for cooperation.

Considering that the task of curbing the arms race and going over to disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, is central to the drive for the prevention of war, the socialist countries set forth a whole package of measures aimed at fulfilling this task. The proposal to speed up the attainment of agreement on the drafting of a convention to ban neutron weapons ranks high on the list of priorities in the Declaration.

All peace forces must strengthen their ranks, and the governments, international organizations and the world public must step up their actions for the success of the efforts to outlaw neutron weapons. The battle against the neutron death can and must be won. Reason and life must triumph.



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- <sup>2</sup> *New Times*, 1983, No.3, p.6.
- <sup>3</sup> Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1981, p.30.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p.23.
- <sup>5</sup> Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures. The United Nations Organization. New York, 1978, pp.42-61.
- <sup>6</sup> Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Doc. CCD/511, Rev.1, Geneva, 1976.
- <sup>7</sup> Documents and Resolutions. Op.cit., p. 36.
- <sup>8</sup> *New Times*, 1983, No.37, p.37.
- <sup>9</sup> *Survival*, Nov.-Dec.1977, p.193.
- <sup>10</sup> See, for example: *Flight International*, 16 July 1977, p.193.
- <sup>11</sup> See: *Time*, July 25, 1977; *US News and World Report*, July 25, 1977.
- <sup>12</sup> *Flight International*, 16 July 1977; *US News and World Report*, July 25, 1977.
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- <sup>14</sup> In: Lübert K. Neutronenbombe. Eine saubere Waffe, die nur Leben zerstört. Verlag Marxistische Blätter, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1981.
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- <sup>16</sup> *Ibidem.*
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- <sup>22</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>23</sup> Nedelya, No. 33, 10-16 August, 1981.

- <sup>23</sup> F. di Pasquantonio. La bombe N. Conseguenze biologiche, politiche e militari. Prefazione de R. Fieschi, Tesi editore, 1980.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>25</sup> See: Kaplan F. M. Op. cit.; Miettinen I. K. Op. cit.
- <sup>26</sup> Miettinen I. K. Op. cit.
- <sup>27</sup> F. di Pasquantonio. Op. cit.
- <sup>28</sup> *New Scientist*, 1978, vol. 79, No. 1114, p. 325.
- <sup>29</sup> *Flight International*, 16 July 1977.
- <sup>30</sup> MEIMO, No. 7, 1978.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>32</sup> *Flight International*, op. cit.
- <sup>33</sup> *New Times*, No. 16, April 1978, p. 5.
- <sup>34</sup> *New York Times*, 28 October, 1982.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibidem.*
- <sup>36</sup> Документы внешней политики СССР. М., 1961, т. 5, с. 193.
- <sup>37</sup> 50 лет борьбы СССР за разоружение. Сборник документов. М., 1967, с. 61-62.
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- <sup>39</sup> The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970. New York, 1970, p. 28.
- <sup>40</sup> *Pravda*, 31 August, 1961.
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- <sup>43</sup> See: UN Doc. A/Res./3479.
- <sup>44</sup> See: UN Doc. A/RV. 2373, A/PV. 2358, A/C. I/PV. 2077.
- <sup>45</sup> *Pravda*, 31 July 1977.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 9 August 1977.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 7 October 1977.
- <sup>48</sup> See: Pugwash Newsletter, July-October 1977, vol. 15, No. 1 and 2, p. 5.
- <sup>49</sup> Международный форум по связям миролюбивых сил. Бюллетень №1, янв. 1978, с. 29.
- <sup>50</sup> See: UN Doc. A/C. 1/32/PV. 7, p. 33.
- <sup>51</sup> *Pravda*, 3 November 1977.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 24 December 1977.
- <sup>53</sup> See: Presidential Documents: Jimmy Carter, 1978, vol. 14, No. 14, Wash., p. 702.
- <sup>54</sup> *Pravda*, 27 January 1978.
- <sup>55</sup> *Le Soir*, 14 December 1977.
- <sup>56</sup> *Vorwärts* 21, 1977.
- <sup>57</sup> Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, No. 8, 1977, S. 914.
- <sup>58</sup> См.: Международный форум по связям миролюбивых сил. Бюллетень №1, янв. 1978.
- <sup>59</sup> Doc. CCD/559.
- <sup>60</sup> Doc. CCD/378.
- <sup>61</sup> Doc. CCD/PV. 783, 786, 793.
- <sup>62</sup> Presidential Documents: Jimmy Carter. Op. Cit.
- <sup>63</sup> See: *Washington Post*, 19 October 1978.
- <sup>64</sup> See: Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session. Plenary Meetings, 1st to 25th and 27th Meetings.
- <sup>65</sup> US Doc. A/S-10/AC. 1/4, annex.
- <sup>66</sup> *Pravda*, 14 August 1981.
- <sup>67</sup> UN Doc. Res. 36/92-K.
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## ANNEX

### Draft

(Co-sponsored on 9 March 1978 by the Soviet delegation in the Committee on Disarmament together with the delegations of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia)

## CONVENTION

### on the Prohibition of the Production, Stockpiling, Deployment and Use of Nuclear Neutron Weapons

#### *The States Parties to this Convention.*

*Expressing* the profound interest of States and peoples in preventing the use of the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

*Desiring* to contribute to the halting of the arms race, particularly in the field of means of mass destruction,

*Realizing* the danger which nuclear neutron weapons present to the peace and security of peoples,

*Have agreed as follows:*

#### *Article I*

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to produce, stockpile, deploy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons.

#### *Article II*

1. Control over compliance with this Convention shall be exercised by the States Parties, using their national technical means of verification which are at their disposal, in a manner conforming to the universally recognized rules of international law.

2. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultations and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

3. Any State Party to this Convention which claims that any other State, Party may be acting in breach of the obligations assumed under this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

#### *Article III*

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

#### *Article IV*

This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.

#### *Article V*

1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who is thereby designated as the Depositary.

2. This Convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by ..... Governments.

#### *Article VI*

1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary in Accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.



## TASS STATEMENT

On August 6, the day when the Hiroshima victims were commemorated, US President Reagan took the decision to start unfolding the production of neutron weapons. As a consequence of this decision, taken with cynical disregard for the will and interests of the peoples of the globe, the US nuclear arsenal, vast as it is, is being replenished with a new, especially barbarous means of mass destruction.

This step of the US Administration is another striking example of an approach to international relations that is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. If we put the measures taken by the United States during the past few years in a row, among them a steep increase in military spending, the frustration of the ratification of the SALT-2 accord, preparations for the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and lastly, the decision on the production of neutron weapons, it becomes absolutely clear that Washington has taken a course for the runaway arms race and for destabilizing the world situation.

It is no accident that the latest decision of the US Administration has evoked especial indignation and alarm in many countries of the world and even in the majority of the NATO countries. Actually, Peking alone has dared to overtly approve it.

Trying to mislead the peoples in order to weaken the explosion of indignation against the US, Washington is now claiming that neutron charges, as they are produced, will be stockpiled on American territory and that, therefore, this is a "purely domestic affair" of the United States.

But it is clear to everyone that neutron weapons are created to be used not on US territory and that any day they may find their way to the European continent or another region which the White House would like to proclaim "a sphere of US vital interests." As a consequence, what is referred to as a US "domestic affair" today will bring about the death of millions of people on other continents and mark the outbreak of a worldwide nuclear conflagration, the flames of which will engulf the United States as well.

Washington has obviously decided to face its NATO allies with a *fait accompli*, that is, first to create stockpiles of neutron weapons and then to force them to accommodate those weapons on their territories.

This is not the first instance of Washington not even thinking it necessary to reckon with the opinion of nations, including US allies, in matters affecting their very existence. All the more irresponsible is the position of certain leaders of West European countries who are actually playing up to the criminal American plans in an attempt to create the impression that the decision taken by Washington does not concern them.

The US President's decision on the production of neutron weapons spotlights with particular clarity the hypocrisy of Washington's allegations about its intention to seek agreements on nuclear arms reduction.

In reality everything that has been done by the present US Administration so far goes in the opposite direction, in the direction of building up the US military potential, of heightening international tension and complicating talks in the sphere of disarmament. The United States is now banking on force. Meanwhile, the experience of the past decades proves irrefutably that this is not the road which can ensure peace and the security of peoples, including the people of the United States. Quite the contrary.

The appearance of neutron weapons in military arsenals would lead to a dangerous lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, or, to put it in simpler terms, to a greater risk of an outbreak of nuclear war, and the entire responsibility for this will rest with the United States of America.

The assertion that the neutron charge is a "clean", almost "humane" weapon is a dangerous illusion that the US strategists are trying to instill in the minds of people. And this is being said about the weapon that is meant specifically for the destruction of humans, the consequences of the use of which, as scientists warn, will last a very long time and will have a deleterious effect on the coming generations. This is "humanism", Washington style.

All honest people must raise their voice in defense of man's primary right, the right to live, frustrate the barbarous plans of the US military connected with neutron weapons. Reason says that the stockpiling of ever new means of warfare must be countered decisively with the alternative of curbing, reducing and eventually eliminating armaments, including nuclear weapons.

As is known, the Soviet Union has suggested more than once that agreement be reached on mutual renunciation of the production of neutron weapons and on banning them. The concrete draft of an international convention that has been submitted by socialist countries is on the negotiating table in the Disarmament Committee in Geneva.

The Soviet leading circles are convinced as ever that such a decision suits in the best possible way the task of strengthening peace and would meet the interests of all states and peoples.

At the same time, no one should have any doubts that, in the light of the steps taken by the United States of America, the Soviet Union will appraise the situation that is emerging accordingly, and take the necessary measures to ensure its own security and the security of its friends and allies.

*Pravda, 14 August 1981*

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 36TH SESSION  
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A / RES / 36 / 92)

Prohibition of the Nuclear Neutron Weapon

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons,

*Stressing* that the termination of the qualitative arms race and the use of scientific and technological achievements solely for peaceful purposes are in the interests of all States and peoples,

*Sharing* the world-wide concern over the production and intended deployment of nuclear neutron weapons expressed by numerous Member States and by many non-governmental organizations,

*Considering* that the introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in the military arsenals of States escalates the nuclear arms race and significantly lowers the threshold of nuclear war, thereby increasing the danger of such a war,

*Aware* of the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly for the unprotected civilian population,

*Recalling* the proposals for the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons,

*Desiring* to contribute to halting the arms race, particularly in the field of weapons of mass destruction,

1. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session an item entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon."

RESOLUTION OF THE 37TH SESSION OF THE UN  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON NEUTRON WEAPONS

Prohibition of the Nuclear Neutron Weapon

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiations of agreements, *inter alia*, on the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems,

*Stressing* that the nuclear neutron weapon represents a further step in the qualitative arms race in the field of nuclear weapons,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 36/92 K of 9 December 1981, entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon",

*Sharing* the world-wide concern expressed by Member States, as well as by non-governmental organizations, over the continued and expanded production and introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in military arsenals, which escalates the nuclear-arms race and significantly lowers the threshold of nuclear war,

*Aware* of the inhumane effects of that weapon, which constitutes a grave threat, particularly to the unprotected civilian population,

*Noting* the consideration by the Committee on Disarmament during its session held in 1982 of issues connected with the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon,

*Regretting* that the Committee on Disarmament was not able to reach agreement on the commencement of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament or on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon in an appropriate organizational framework,

1. *Reaffirms* its request to the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations within an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear neutron weapons;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly at its twelfth special session and at its thirty-seventh session;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon."



## BRIEFLY ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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He is an expert in the field of radiobiology and radiation medicine; the author of many works, including a series of monographs on medical and biological problems of protection of man and the environment from baneful effects of ionizing radiation. He published, jointly with Academician Ye. Chazov and Professor A. Guskova, the book *The Danger of Nuclear War: Soviet Physicians' Viewpoint* (1982, in Russian, English, French, German and Spanish).

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