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COMMUMITY HFAITH CEIL
367. "Srinivasa Nilaya"
Jakkasandr?’ I Main.
I Slock. Koramangala,
COUNTRY
STRATEGY
PAPER
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ACTIONAID VIETNAM
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ACTIONAID VIETNAM
COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER
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1994 to 1996
Hanoi, Vietnam
March 1994
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Most of ActionAid Vietnam’s programme and administrative staff have been involved
in some way in the preparation of this Country Strategy Paper (CSP). Representatives
of AAV’s Project Partners at Provincial level have also participated in many of the
discussions. The CSP provides AA Vietnam with a reference point for future strategic
decisions and a rationale for our operational plans. The strategic direction may need to
be reconsidered in the longer term.
Grady, wno
who proviaea
provided a couuuy
country
Helpful background papers were prepared by Heather Urady,
level analysis of poverty, and Siep Littooy who examined the role of key development
agents in alleviating poverty in Vietnam.
Insightful comments and perspectives on the draft document from a number of friends
and colleagues from other aid organisations both inside and outside Vietnam, were
received. In particular I would like to thank Marian Cadogan, Alan Johnson and Stuart
Rutherford. AAV also benefitted from Salil Shetty and Lina Payne’s participation at one
of the CSP workshops.
I would especially like to acknowledge the contribution of Carrie Turk, AAV’s Assistant
Director who, wrote several chapters of the document and is responsible for its layout.
Elizabeth McCall
Director
I
INTRODUCTION
I
Why produce a Country Strategy Paper?
ActionAid UK (AAUK) has asked that countiy programmes should produce a
Country Strategy Paper (CSP) "by the third year after starting work". It is anticipated
that by this time the country team will have developed a reasonable understanding o
the context in which they are working. Although AA has been supporting projects in
Vietnam since late 1989, we have only been actively involved in long-term poverty
focused work since the beginning of 1992. These past two years have seen an
acceleration away from the old command system towards a market economy. The
impact of the transition has brought tremendous changes at virtually eveiy level of
society: it continues to be an extremely dynamic environment within which to operate.
Before embarking upon producing a CSP, we gave serious consideration as to
whether the changes in Vietnam have been so rapid and far reaching that it would be
possible for ActionAid Vietnam (AAV) to produce a meaningful CSP. Were we not
in danger of spending considerable resources in articulating a strategy which mig it e
overtaken by events before it actually reached the Board of Management in London.
At a workshop of AAV staff in March, we discussed the advantages for the
programme in preparing a CSP. We recognised that the current context would make
strategic planning difficult but not impossible. We also wondered whether at this
stage it might not be more beneficial to concentrate our limited resources on
preparing the Long Term Perspective (LTP) for Son La (RDA1).
The team concluded that AAV could not use the continuing prospects for rapid
change as an excuse for not planning. We agreed that AAV could produce a CSP. I
was recognised that it would not be possible to detail definitive strategies for the
coming years, but that it should be possible to define a framework for strategic
decisionmaking. In some cases, it is possible to predict the decisions which wilI have
to be made. However, more flexibility is needed in other areas where it is^simpb'not
possible to predict changing circumstances. This represents an interim CSP co
g
three years 1994-1996 and the objectives are set out in the box overleaf.
(D
AAV decided that the objectives of producing the strategy paper were:
*
*
*
*
*
to focus our thinking and to help us define our role and future direction over
the next 3 years
.
to gain a better understanding of poverty and the major players involved in
eradicating it
to arrive at some conclusions as to the future of INGOs at a time of rapid
change
to express views on what we consider are some of the major issues facing poor
people at present
.
to produce a document which could serve as a basis for reflection in future
years
Box 1: Objectives of the CSP
Methodology
The work conducted as part of the CSP process focused on 5 key issues, which now
form the backbone of this document. These issues address fundamental questions
about AAs presence in Vietnam:
■In the context of a growing economy which is poised to receive
significant flows of international development assistance and private
foreign investment in the next few years, what is the role of
international NGOs (INGOs)?
1
Chapter 1 describes the current national context and the Chapter 3 sets
out the changes that the various commentators, including AAV, expect
to see over the coming years.
2
i
Do rapid economic growth and the structural reforms mean that poverty
will diminish across Vietnam?
Chapte- 2 anal-' ;s the extent and causes of poverty in Vietnam and
discusses the possible implications of macro-level changes on poverty
the micro level.
3
If so, what is AAV’s justification for a long term commitment to
working in Vietnam? and,
00
i
4
if not, what is the specific contribution that AAV can make towards the
alleviation of poverty in Vietnam?
Chapter 3 assesses what other agencies are doing to address poverty in
Vietnam and Chapter 4 highlights AAVs particular comparative
advantages (and disadvantages) in responding to rural poverty.
5
How will AAV ensure that it fulfils its contribution successfully?
Chapter 5 outlines the strategic framework and AAV’s priorities for the
period 1994-6 and links its planned direction to the earlier questions.
Chapter 6 raises some important operational implications of the
strategic analysis.
(iii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(*)
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT . . .
Population and Geography
Economic Overview . . . .
(1)
(1)
CHAPTER TWO
ANALYSIS OF POVERTY
Poor by international standards .
Defining Poverty in Vietnam . . .
Where are the poor?
The Causes of Poverty
CHAPTER THREE
MAJOR PLAYERS
The Government of Vietnam
Mass Organisations
Local NGOs..........................
Multilaterals/Bilaterals . . . .
International NGOs ............
I
(7)
(9)
(10)
• (15)
■
(18)
• (19)
■
■
(19)
(20)
CHAPTER FOUR
SWOT ANALYSIS
The External Environment
Internal Strengths and Weaknesses
(23)
(23)
CHAPTER FIVE
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK................
AAVs Mission and Aim
Key components of the Strategy .
Strategic Priorities
... (29)
(29)
(30)
(33)
CHAPTER SIX
ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Phasing . . .
Management and Organisation
Human Resource Development
Support Needs
Expenditure and Income . . . •
...
• ••
• ••
■
•
•••
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I
(7)
(40)
(40)
(42)
(45)
(45)
(46)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAV
AT
CSP
FAO
FC
IMF
FTP
MoU
NGO
PACCOM
PV
SRM
SWOT
UNDP
UNICEF
VWSG
WU
ActionAid Vietnam
Agricultural Technician
Country Strategy Paper
Food and Agriculture Organisation
Field Coordinator
International Monetary Fund
Long Term Perspective
Memorandum of Understanding
Non-Governmental Organisation
People’s Aid Coordinating Committee
Para Vet
Strategic Review Meeting
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 1 hreats
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Children’s Fund
Village Women’s Saving Group
Women’s Union
r
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The next few years will see profound and unpredictable change in Vietnam. Published
forecasts reflect recent and projected economic growth, but are unable to anticipate
in detail the likely impact of reforms and the subsequent growth at a micro level. It is
widely acknowledged, however, that the benefits of economic growth will accrue
unevenly across the country and across social groups, particularly in the short to
medium term. AAVs own research at a micro level indicates that the rural poor are
becoming increasingly vulnerable and face considerable constraints to benefiting from
the widely-reported economic boom. There is also some evidence that differentia
access to the benefits of economic growth is leading to a growing gap between rich
and poor.
The inflow of official aid will certainly change the position and influence of
international NGOs, who have, until now, enjoyed a high profile in the virtual
absence of official aid. AAV expects, however, that there will remain a role tor
international NGOs which will complement the large volume of development work
implemented by the Government of Vietnam (whether funded domestically ot by
official donors). For AAV in particular, this role will reflect our comparative
advantages and will be expressed in pioneering work exploring the causes of poverty
at village and household levels, finding methods of addressing this poverty and
bringing these methods to the attention of local agents committed to poverty
alleviation.
In this CSP, AAV outlines its strategic framework for the penod 1994-1996. We set
strategic parameters (termed "key components" in this document) which, wi 1^guide
decisions over the coming period. Within these parameters we identify strategic
priorities, which establish the rationale for our likely sectoral, geographic: and
operational emphases over the next three years while allowing essenfa
respond to inevitable, but unpredictable, changes. AAV wil be accountable for the
success (or failure) of this framework through the impact of its programmes.
The strategic parameters identified in this document articulate AAVs commitment to:
maintaining an essential link with poor households
although AAV hopes that the operational link with households will be fa^en over
S paXs AAV „ni always maintain a link at community level wh.eb ,s strong
enough to feed and inform bo’tb programme work (especially targe.mg) and advocacy
work;
developing the capacity of local government to the point where they can
plan and implement poverty-focused programmes
_
AAV will work together with local agencies in planning, implementing and monitoring
poverty-focused programmes. AAV will invest in programme activities and trmmng
but will expect local partners to show a commitment to meeting recurrent costs o
y
programme;
achieving an impact outside the narrow confines of our RDAs
AAV will seek to influence those who are in a position to make
make. productive
P'011"'1’™
the experience that AAV gains a. a locai level. Such people^m ght b
other donors and other development practitioners. Where
Where appropriate,
appropriate AAV
AA will
cohaborale w.’h other NGOs, .he voice of several
sever.! NGOs being more irnfluenrial
--------- a. a
central level than one NGO alone.
Within these guidelines, strategic priorities have been established’we
sxmnhacis derives directly from substantial household level research and r
,
Xe he commuX’s analysis of the causes of their poverty. Our g^raphne
not.
SreTyXrio?
al^Hty Jplan and operate effectively^overthe: coming
depend on
aTeedTo SS a baianeed
period
- - "O. .«ve AAV disp.oporiiona.eiy dependent
on any one particular donor.
THE
NATIONAL
CONTEXT
• densely populated,
homogenous ethnically
relatively
• growing donor community, both in
number of agencies and in volume of
funds
• rapid and uneven economic growth
forecast, but this contingent upon skilful
macroeconomic management
• a number of factors may constrain or
threaten this growth
• possible destabilising factors include
growing unemployment and corruption
• the Party likely to remain dominant
throughout plan period
J
I
CHAPTER
ONE
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT
Population and Geography
Vietnam with a population of around 68 million at the end of 1992, expected to grow
beyond 82 million by the year 2000, is the 13th most populous country in the worltb
Approximately 80% of the population lives in rural areas, but the^proportmn of ur a
dwellers is expected to increase to just under 30% by the year 2000 . Agricultural
is in short supply, with 900 people per square kilometre of agricultural land,
compared with 300 per km2 in neighbouring Thailand and China.
Historically Vietnam has been divided into three regions: the north including the Red
River Delta and centring on Hanoi and Haiphong: the C^ntr^a;e1as,ar°.U"d2J“e an
Danang and the Southern Mekong Delta area including Ho Chi Minh City. They
were administered separately under the French colonial system and indeed until 1975,
Vietnam was two separate countries. Despite efforts to promote na lona
development, substantial differences remain between various regions of Vietnam.
The Kinh or ethnic Vietnamese people represent about 90% of the population and
Vietnamese is the official national language. Over 50 other ethnic groups
p
the remaining 10% of which the largest are the Chinese, the Montagnards
Khmer This relative ethnic homogeneity amongst the vast majority of the popula
has been cited as the basis for the strong sense of national identity which proved so
important during the war periods.
Economic Overview
Growth. Inflation and Public Investment
The growth prospects for Vietnam during the period of this
and tie economy is expected to grow at around 7% P- annum n W9^and 99^
Inflation during 1992 was 17% and is expected to fall to under 10 /o m 1995.
1 UNDP, Human Development Report, 1991
2 Hainsworth, pl61
(1)
analysts anticipate an increase in inflation in 1994/95 as economic output develops .
There is concern amongst some deputies from the National Assembly that the high
level of the budget deficit will push up inflation. Some have advocated a reduction of
government investment. The Government maintains that public investment
expenditure is comparatively small and that further cuts would lead to problems in
the future. Tax evasion and the lack of an adequate infrastructure for revenue
collection hampers the government’s attempts to balance the budget .
At the National Assembly in June, the Government pledged to reform the state sector
over the next two years. In August the Prime Minister said that the sector needed to
be "rearranged". He confirmed that inefficient enterprises will be dissolved. Politically
this is an extremely sensitive area and progress is expected to be slow.
International Aid
The recent relaxation of the US embargo, which had prevented most bilateral and
multilateral donors from making any significant contributions, paved the way for
initial loans of just under $1000 million from the IMF, World Bank and Asia
Development Bank. At the Paris Meeting for donors in 1993, donors pledged a total
of $1.86 billion in assistance. All these lending institutions are m broad agreement
with Vietnam’s strategy for moving from the centrally planned economy to the open
market.
The Private Sector
The Government continues to place priority on attracting private foreign investment
to fund various infrastructure investments and technology transfer. A t oug t e
northern part of the country has been targeted for investment, the south, particularly
Ho chi Minh city remains a more attractive option for investors.
Alongside the drive to attract foreign investment, there is a general recognition of the
need to mobilise domestic savings. In an interview with the "Vietnam Investment
Review" the Prime Minister stressed the importance of savings in avoiding
dependence on foreign investment.
Tackling the high unemployment rate is a high priority for the GovernmentJrivate
sector growth is expected to absorb some of the excess labour but the lack
appropriate skills amongst workers in the urban centres ^^^^Y/X/into011
problem. There is a critical need for training/retrainmg of people who can put into
practice new ideas and technology. Meanwhile the Government is investing $28
million in the current financial year on job creation programmes .
3 South East Asia Monitor, 1993
4 Economist Intelligence Unit, 3rd Quarter., 1993
5 Economist Intelligence Unit, 3rd Quarter Report, 1993
(2)
Agriculture
I
With roughly 80% of the population living in rural areas, the Government of Vietnam
is giving high priority to developing agriculture and agro-based activities. Tire new
land law6 passed by the National Assembly in July 1993 is a key plank of the
Government’s strategy. Whilst making no formal provision for the privatisation of
land, it gives the broadest possible rights to the land user including the right to
transfer, assign, rent and inherit land. Farmers will now be allocated land on the basis
of 20 years for annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops. In addition, to
encourage farmers to maximise use of all cultivable land, the government has
reduced agricultural land use tax by approximately 30%. The Government is anxious
to contain rural-urban migration and avoid exacerbating rural underemployment In
order to tackle this problem emphasis is being placed on crop diversification with
emphasis now being placed on intensive cultivation of food grains, increasing the area
devoted to cash crops and developing rural industries, infrastructure and services
Recent Developments
Over the last few years, Vietnam has been; moving away rapidly from a centrally
planned economic system towards a market economy. Although there are concerns
over macro-economic stability, it is generally recognised that the Government ot
Vietnam’s strategy for achieving a reduction of the imbalances has had some success.
Inflation continues to fall and the Vietnamese currency, the dong, has stamlised.
Despite the recent and projected high growth rates, there are a number of constraints
which will hinder development in Vietnam. Outlining its strategy in a report for the
first Donor Conference on Vietnam, the Government gives pnority to addressing
these areas:
• corruption
• inefficient public administration
• poor quality education at every level
• lack of skilled/experienced workforce
• low level of domestic savings
• inefficient financial system, and
• poorly developed legal/regulatory framework
It is possible that there may be some political change in Vietnam in the longer term;
at a time when economic reforms have been proceeding apace there has been little
evidence of evolution in the political environment. Despite modifications to the
and the role of tXe National Assembly in 1992, one-part., co—
continues to underlie and inform the political system. Changes are permitted bu
within the one-party system.
6 Law on Land approved by the Legislature of the National Assembly on 14.7.93
(3)
y
It is assumed that the Communist Party of Vietnam will remain the dominant political
force during the period of this strategic overview and that political stability will
prevail with the reform process being largely confined to the economy. This
authoritarian style of government, hand in hand with economic liberalisation, would in
the view of many party officials be inJine with other countries in the region such as
China, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. However several political commentators
take the view that if the Party is going to maintain its power, political reform is
inevitable as the economy grows.
Some possible destabilizing factors need to be taken into account in this oveiwiew.
• unemployment
Approximately 20% of the workforce is estimated as un/underemployed7. This figure
is set to rise still further with the impending civil service wage reform and the
continuing redundancies in the state enterprises and the army. More than one million
people join the job market each year. Unemployment in Hanoi is reported to be
particularly high with a working population of 1.2 million of which only 900,000 are
estimated to have full time employment. Unemployment is particularly acute amongst
the young. Of the approximately 39 million workforce of working age, 50% are in the
15 - 30 age group. Efforts to ease unemployment to date have not been very
successful. It is possible that a prolonged period of unemployment could change the
younger members of the workforce, from being relatively apolitical, into political
activists.
• corruption
Over the last couple of years development has largely taken place without regard for
the law. The National Assembly in June spent considerable time addressing the issue
of how to ensure implementation of the new laws in an environment which has
increasingly become a free for all. These laws are designed to provide a legal
framework for Vietnam’s future development. Closely linked to this is the desire on
the part of the Government to reduce corruption and smuggling. Increased priority
has been given to the campaign against corruption which reportedly permeates all
levels of the administration, mass organisations and the mihtaiy. However, this is stil
judged to be largely inadequate and a considerable proportion of revenue continues
to be lost to the state in this way.
7 Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd quarter 1993
(4)
• widening gap between the north and south of the country
Investment in Ho Chi Minh city produces over 30% of tax rJven^’
p® bkaS,S
for possible future dissatisfaction and resentment on both sides. The World
estimates8 that there is a fi^ofold
»y
' l^finh (T'itv and its
(northern and central areas) and the wealthiest (defined as Ho Chi Minh City and its
surrounding provinces).
• relations with China
Although recent months have seen a reduction of tension between Vietnam and
China, dre Vietnamese authorities remain uneasy over China s ambitions in the
region. There remain several unresolved issues including the disputes over the
northern land border and the Paracel and Spratly islands.
8 vjct Nam: Transition to the Market, p202
(5)
1
ANALYSIS
OF
POVERTY
• one of the word’s poorest countries
with per capita GNI* of less than $200pa
• with high economic growth aggregate
poverty may fall, but AAV believes that
inequality and vulnerability will increase
• no nationally-accepted definition c>f
poverty, though government now officially
recognises that relative poverty exists
• reforms are having a differential impact
across regions and social groups
• there is high mobflity between socio
economic groups so targeting, while
essential, is difficult and requires constant
household contact and research
I
CHAPTER
TWO
ANALYSIS OF POVERTY
Vietnam is popularly described now in terms of its recent, rapid economic growth. In this
chapter, we consider what effect this growth is having on poverty and discuss the recent
trends. In particular, we address the following questions:
• Is Vietnam poor enough to warrant AAVs commitment?
• How can we define poverty in Vietnam9
• Where are the poor in Vietnam?
• What are the effects of economic reforms and growth on the poor9
Poor by international standards
Standard indicators used to compare levels of poverty across countries (per capita GNP,
the Human Development Index) reveal Vietnam to be relatively poor internaUonaHy, the
World Bank assesses per capita income at less than $200pa . Serious e o s sin
1950s to provide education and health services for all have meant that Vietnam report y
fares better on some of the national level social indicators
‘
associated with such low levels of per capita income (and certainly bette Hhan some As
neighbours) Recent surveys suggest, however, that previously high national literacy ra
as ;aibsidies are removed and UNICEF rs predicting a deter,orat.on the
nutritional status of children in food deficit areas.
Defining Poverty in Vietnam
The issue of relative poverty has only recently been addressed explicitly in
^ntl1
X when economic reforms began in earnest, the notion that there were poor people
and 'rich" people was - rhetorically, at least - incompatible with the prevailing
organisation of production and distribution of wealth and income. As a
9 Viet Nam: Transition to the Market, pl99
(7)
example of the changing attitudes at a central level, the General Statistical Office
(GSO) was not allowed to use the term "poor" in 1989 survey of living standards, but
is now working on establishing a national definition of poverty. Policymakers at a
national level are now beginning to acknowledge that the recent economic changes
have already and will continue to generate regional, ethnic and even village-level
disparities in wealth. Policy documents recognise that certain areas are likely to
remain disadvantaged in the short term, but are hopeful that by concentrating on
development projects which produce the best economic return for the nation as a
whole, the longer term will eventually bring an improvement in living standards tor
poorer areas (a strategy endorsed by the World Bank10).
The growing awareness of the existence of both relative and absolute poverty in
Vietnam has encouraged some Vietnamese institutions (Ministry of Agriculture,
Vietnamese Women’s Union, National Institute of Social Sciences amongst others) to
consider possible definitions of poverty. These commonly include evidence o .oo
deficits, household income and household assets as indicators of the existence of
poverty The GSO is developing definitions of different socio-economic groups using
the above indicators, supplemented with information on literacy, employment and
access to health care.
None of the UN organisations working in Vietnam has yet developed a consistent
national definition of poverty, although UNICEF has anatysec^alth indica*°rs’
each province to provide a basis for their targeting. Other INGOs have conducted
surveys at local level, but most have not adopted any countrywide definition, ror a
number of reasons, AAV does not consider it appropnate to use various indicators
that other agencies are using to develop a "poverty map" of Vietnam:
•
while these indicators and national definitions may describe to some extent the
circumstances of poor groups, they are not always the most aPPr°PQff
indicators to apply at the micro-level. For a national level ind,cator °f
to be meaningful to AAXUheT^uld be some consistency with the poverty
indicators being used at a micro level. For example, it has been extremely
difficult at a fidd level to develop a clear picture of the duration and nature> of
food deficits - one of the most commonly cited cuharactenStl“]of P°7nMemttic
how these relate to poverty. Household income has been similarly Pr0^1™1*0
to measure and, importantly, neither the income nor asset.me^^e^og^
a true picture of the household’s potential (see Ranking e ' g
This is important given the high mobility that AAV has noticed between
different socio-economic groups in areas where we work.
.
there are many questions about the mtegntyjdthedata which would be used
to measure these indicators at a national level. AAV knows from its own
experience echoed by many others, that the data provided by government
agenXs on a range o'f indicators do not accurately depict the conditions found
at village and household level. National level poverty-mapping which uses
sec
Viet Nam: Transition to the Market, p!99, para 8.3
(8)
published data as a guide could easily misrepresent true poverty levels.
Circumstances vary so much across the country that there are real dangers of
missing areas of poverty by using a narrow definition, but a broader definition,
based on a basket of indicators, is yet more difficult to measure accurately.
While inter-provincial differences in living standards are probably the reality in
many countries where AA works, it is possible that this is more marked in
Vietnam, which has only been one united country for less than 20 years (in
modern history).
Where are the poor?
The extent of poverty in Vietnam is open to interpretation. Different government^
agencies estimate variously between 15-30% of the population is living in poverty .
Using 1989 Census data, UNESCO/UNDP suggest that as much as 46% of the
population are vulnerable (including low-income groups, minority groups, shifting
farmers, handicapped and urban-slum dwellers)1 .
In the absence of an overall, measurable definition of poverty which might be used to
map the poor across the country, AAV will be guided, in part, by the general
concensus of various development agencies active in Vietnam about how poverty is
spread across the countiy. The mountainous areas of the north and centre are
considered poor because they are populated by ethnic minorities (a designated target
group for special assistance), suffer low/declining agricultural Pjo^ctivity witn
perennial food deficits, are remote and are inadequately served by
social seivices. The disaster-prone areas in the central coastal zone
devastated in the war are also considered to be particularly poor. Various studies
have shown that the central areas suffer from chronic food shortages, lhe
government has defined "priority areas" where it feels that the P10^1™' °J
are greatest, which corroborates the evidence of others that these are particu y
poor areas. The conclusion that poverty is concentrated in three main arem; - the
central highlands, the north central coast and the northern mounta n ' ^ re^^Ced
bv a recent World Bank report. Using preliminary results from a Living Standards
Xorement Su^y (LSMS), which coilecis da., from 4800 hou^hoids „at.onw,de,
they draw attention to the regional dimension of poverty in Vietnam.
The various reforms implemented over the last few f
‘^^X^rioriL
poverty for some will also begin to be a problem outside these . ad tional pnonty
areas Unemployment has meant that poverty is ^coming an ssue m urban areas
in areas where state-owned industries are rationalising sta« n^TS
h bers is
National Context). The full impact of the reduction in public sector staff numbers
I
11
t
r r ta
iqq? nlR- a sneech bv the Prime Minister, transcribed in
11 See, for example, Nguyen Huu Dung, 1992, pIX, a speecn ny uic
Vietnam News, 30 April 1993, pl; and, Trinh Duy Luan (1993).
12 Education and Human Resources Sector Analysis (Synthesis Report^ p 12
13 Viet Nam, Transition to the Market, p202
(9)
(
I
I
I
I
employment in the coal mines is un ermiiy g
country not just the designated
The Causes of Poverty
Trends at the macro level...
• one fifth of labour force either
under- or unemployed
With persistent economic growth and consi era e
increases in agricultural product.on over the past fe
• school enrolments falling,
vears it is not possible to argue that Vietnam as a
particularly for ethnic minorities
nation is becoming more impoverished. However, these
ver,' positive macroeconomic trends have b«en
• rising infant malnutrition in
associated with what may appear to be contradic ry
some areas
trends in other factors which may determine levels
poverty (or at least characterise high levels of Pove^)’
One fifth of the labour force is either “^mployed
'Jer^pioyed and further cutbacks
in thequality and efficiency
that'lhe
are .nev.tabie. There is evidence (hat
groups laEging behind,
and that school enrolments have dropp . th
achieved over
The World Bank is forecasting that the gains i
infant mainutrition
the last three decades will be under ^rea ; ^lfh
that the transition to a market
rates are rising11. The Ministry of Health itself note
differentiation
economy has "more negative than P0Sltlve
ted increasing levels of poverty and
between rich and poor is becoming more
Urbanisation, a trend often associated
exacerbating ill health and quality of services^
enough to cause problems.
with growing rural poverty, is beginning to be rapid enoug
The period since 1986 has been one^of ihave had an impact
market-based economy has necesst
At a macro level, the public sector
from the macro level right down to th
considerable need to keep public
is being reformed and rational
■
cervices have been reduced or
expenditure under control; subsidies for s
services. State industries are
abolished and there is an attempt to make user p y
b
ld off or cclosed
iOsed
being required to operate more commercta y nd
I
Xment is likely to
x:
xr-
~ - •» “
14 vict Nam: Population, Health and Nutrition Sector Review, pn
15 Jan Valdeline el al, 1992, p27
(10)
iiM'a
The expectation is that areas with a richer tax base will become wealthier, while the
poorer areas with their limited tax bases will be unable to fund a similar level of
development activities.
...impact at the micro level
The reforms are not changing all parts of the country equally. First, some areas are
more able to bear the reduction in state subsidies than others, altenng the scope for
taking advantage of some of the more positive aspects of the transition. As the World
Bank notes, "the initial response to market conditions will vary because of different
endowments of infrastructure, industry, capital and labor throughout the countiy as
well as different environmental challenges" 16. Secondly, new policies have been
interpreted slightly differently in different parts of the countiy and the pace with
which the new policies have been implemented varies across the country. Viewed in
aggregate, rapid economic growth may mean that poverty diminishes, but it likely that
inequality will increase with the result that poverty for some may not reduce at all. It
is possible to generalise to some extent about the impact of the reforms on househo
economies. This, perhaps, is a more useful way of trying to understand the dynamics
of poverty in Vietnam than the examination of poverty at a national level.
After a period of collectivised agriculture, responsibility for agricultural production
has been handed back to the individual household. Households may be allocated the
right to use land for up to 50 years, depending on the type of land. Over this period
they may transfer the rights to use the land to others. Children may inherit the right
to use their parents’ land as long as the lease is still valid. The new land law is being
applied at vaiying paces throughout the countiy - some districts have already
allocated all categories of land while others seem only to have allocated the paddy
land, not the upland or forestry land.
The gap widens
Many decisionmakers, particularly at local level, have assumed that since land is
equitably distributed at the time of allocation there is little difference in the
socioeconomic status of farming households. AAVs micro-level research in itsforking
areas indicates that paddy land has been fairly equitably distributed relative to needs.
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that not all households are beginning
from the same basic level of wealth and that despite the many (in the n
)y
communal agricultural organisation, some farmers have more resources; than others.
The capacity to make full use of the allocated land vanes from household to
LusSd Li one .nigh, expect to see those with mote inputs (P’^Xet
draught power, technical knowhow and cash/credit) reaping cumulatively hig
16 Viet Nam: Transition to the Market, pl99
17 Law on Land approved by Legislature IX of the National Assembly of SRV at its 3rd session on
July 14, 1993
(11)
)
I
I
returns from their land. Key constraints that the poorer households are facing include,
lack of credit, lack of facilities for cash savings and the collapse of village level
seivices, such as extension, health and education. This is exacerbated by the removal
of subsidies, that once ensured that health, education and childminding seivices were
available to most (if not all) rural households. The gap between poorer and less poor
farmers is becoming increasingly conspicuous as formerly disallowed activities such as
informal money-lending (at high interest rates) and day labour are "o longer covered
up. There are indications that this gap is not simply becoming more visible, but that it
is also growing. It is now common for farming households to admit to being
chronically endebtded; the woriy must be that now land has become essentia y
transferable that these endebted households could lose their land rights to impatien
moneylenders. This is a fear that some local officials are now beginning to express
quite openly18.
Ranking the village
In a rapidly changing country AAV feels that it is more useful to define poverty at a
local rathe? than national level. Even at the micro-level, the dynamics.ofpoverty hav
been difficult to unravel. Wealth-ranking has been used for targetmg by £AV >1^
RDA. Mapping and interviewing (over 10% of the househol s) i
Son District have provided important insights mio the socio-economic relation
village level. This information has provided the basis for AAV’s - sbl embty^ socio-economic categorisation of households. Four categories attempMoMescnb
households in terms of current status (rich or poor) and potential (striving o
declining) It is particularly important to capture the potential; socioeconomic mobility
“‘ZbeS S high, ^e^fe-cyele of the household has an
over socio-economic standing - newly married couples often. bemg ptw bu
good prospects and ageing couples being relatively wealthy but ^h poor prospe
The fragilitv of many of the households means that an isolated event, such as a bout
~
s±y^-
real needs.
The policy reforms instigated at central level have
given households
household level. The reorganisation o atg"C“nusuajPt0 find farmers complaining of
greater control over their hvelihc> . I
improvement. However, this change
this change and it is commonly regarded as an in‘P
extension services) as
taken place in a virtual vacuum of household le-I support
the cooperatives withdraw from the provision o
p
investment in the land,
changes in the land law will almostcertainty mc.ase ^er mves^
but may be accompanied by growing landless^ .
y
f
iod but in
minority groups means that they are exempt from certain taxes tor p
.
« ,n AAV, RDAI b, S.b.A Rv.bctord, 1992. .bd Un. Ray™
18 This has been identified as
et al, 1993
(12)
other parts of the country farmers are complaining about the package of
commune-level taxes and fees which may absorb up to 25% of their income 19. AAVs
access to information about the impact of reforms and policy initiatives at a local
level is important for programming but also for its planned advocacy role .
wi
direct an increasing part of its resources to trying to pass on this information to
policymakers.
19 see Viet Nanr. Transition to the Market p206, para 8.21
(13)
I
I
MAJOR
PLAYERS
• virtual absence of official aid until 1993 resulting
in high profile for effective INGOs, now set to
change
> Government of Vietnam is overwhelmingly the
most important development agency at every level,
though their poverty alleviation strategy has many
gaps
• official donors are now pledging funds to support
the Government’s investment programme, but some
are expressing concern over absorptive capacity
♦ absence of local NGOs as AAV understands the
term
• INGOs have a comparative advantage in:
0 their capacity to collect and use information about
poverty at a micro level and to focus assistance on
the poor
0 their ability to spend funds directly
0 their position to inform and influence policymakers
0 their flexibility in operational planning
I
CHAPTER
THREE
MAJOR PLAYERS
A number of national institutes and international organisations will have some role to
play in poverty eradication in Vietnam. Some will focus efforts on supporting central
and provincial government in their efforts to provide for more vulnerable groups.
Others, particularly INGOs, will have an important role to play in targeting assistance
at a village level. In order to optimise the contribution that foreign donor assistance
can make to Vietnam, the Government is placing considerable emphasis on
coordinating donor funds and has restated its commitment to increasing the
effectiveness of aid coordination. The State Planning Committee will take the lead
role in coordinating all donor funds. A number of other government agencies will also
have a coordinating function, most notably the People’s Aid Coordinating Committee
(PACCOM) who has responsibility for coordinating the work of INGOs.
In this chapter we look at the contribution that five major players will make to
poverty alleviation in Vietnam:
• the Government of Vietnam
• the mass organisations
• local NGOs
• the multi- and bilateral donors
• international NGOs
I
The Government of Vietnam
By far the most important player in development in Vietnam is the Government. The
Government's development strategy is "aimed at developing a strong and st
multi-sectoral economy with increasingly strong links with the inte™^10"®
community. It envisages a development process that makes the people p p
and the country strong, advancing towards modernisation m a society where the
working peopte are masters, where compassion, cultural values and discipline preva
(15)
and where everyone enjoys a prosperous, free and happy life .
The strategy is implemented by the Party and State on behalf of the people of
Vietnam. The Party is the most important political force in Vietnam and the
Government’s political authority is derived from it. The Party and the Government
operate through parallel structures from central government right down to commune
level.
Currently any international organisation wishing to implement development
programmes at a village level in rural areas will need to work either with or through
central or local government or one of the mass organisations. In order to do so
effectively they must have a full understanding of the authority and responsibility
levels of each tier of government.
The Party, through the Peoples’ Councils, is responsible for setting and controlling
policies. This is the principal forum for political consultation. They in turn elect
representatives to the People’s Committees, the administration, responsible for the
implementation of policy.
There are four tiers of administration: central, provincial, district and commune. In
the current dynamic situation, central government is seeking to clarify and redefine
the role of the administration and the Party and their relationship with each other at
every level.
There is a trend towards centralising policy and decision-making. This is an essential
step in the process of developing policies which are in the national interest and
establishing nationwide norms. The provincial authorities remain responsible for
strategic planning and development at local level. Local implementation of national
policy directives will largely depend on their appropriateness to the locality and the
amount of funding made available by central government. Central government has
the authority to change or rescind provincial level decisions when "interests ot the
nation are at issue".
The District now takes responsibility for levying/collecting taxes and for land
registration /allocation. It will also take full responsibility for the organisation and
implementation of agricultural extension, health and education programmes.
At village level, an elected village manager has delegated responsibility from the
District for ensuring that information about various policy initiatives is communicated
to all households.
20 Vietnam: A Development Perspective, p37
(16)
I
The Government’s Policy Priorities
The Government recognises the need for balanced regional development. However,
immediate attention is being paid to the development of priority economic zones
which are expected to have the greatest influence on national development by
providing high returns and benefits. These in turn are intended to facilitate the
development of other regions. Priority projects tend to be concentrated in three mam
areas: Ho Chi Minh City and its environs, the key central area including Danang and
the critical northern area of Hanoi/Haiphong/Quang Ninh.
The Government’s development strategy formulated in 1991 and is guided by a strong
emphasis on sustainability and the environment. It identifies a number of key
components, which include:
i
(
• investing in people
Ethnic minorities are included within this component. The Government has
indicated that those areas where ethnic minorities live have been targeted for
assistance. These tend to be mountainous regions in the north and west of the
ely degraded land and relatively
country bordering China and Laos, with severely
poor social services.
• building on comparative advantages and sectoral strengths
The Government recognises that Vietnam has a number of comparative
advantages. These include the critically important sector of agriculture which is
the economic mainstay for the vast majority of people in Vietnam. Not
surprisingly therefore, recent reforms and policy development have singled out
this sector for considerable attention. The recently enacted land law and the
extension policy exemplify this.
Increasingly funds are being directed by the Government to this sector
particularly in the form of rural credit. Significant efforts are being made to
make credit accessible to farmers throughout Vietnam. H°wever many pool
rural households, unable to provide any collateral, are excluded from the
system.
• strengthening investment, savings, and efficient resource allocation
• flexibility in implementation of the development strategy.
(17)
I
The Government’s Poverty Alleviation Strategy
The Government has a defined poverty alleviation strategy with a number of
components. The World Bank, in its review of this programme, concludes that "the
program consists of several components which would seem to be directed more at^
improving living standards in general, rather than alleviating poverty specifically..
This programme has a number of components which include.
• ad hoc targeted/grant schemes
• a centrally supported local initiative programme
• employment generation loans
• availability of rural credit
• emergency assistance, and
• training centres
It is likely that the work of the NGOs will augment the Government’s own poverty
alleviation strategy rather than duplicate it. There are considerable gaps in the
strategy, which provides no real basis for targeting the poor at the village level. The
provision of adequate health and education services is neglected as part of the
strategy.
II
Mass Organisations
The mass organisations, formed to link the Party to the people, have to date played a
key role in the political process and in the overall development of Vietnam. 1 he
Fatherland Front is the umbrella organisation for the mass organisations and
coordinates their work with the Government. Their role may change and their
influence diminish as Party membership slowly declines and the country continues its
move towards a market economy. It is possible that as the largely family-based market
economy develops, members of mass organisations may have less and less time
available to devote to voluntary work in the public sphere. However with eir
members active at eveiy level of Vietnamese society, they are considered as partners
by foreign donors for the implementation of projects focusing on the poor. Two mass
organisations in particular have received donor funds for poverty alleviation work.
• The Women’s Union
poor It is already working with several INGOs and is well positioned to work with
other foreign donors and take advantage of increasing aid flows.
21 Viet Nam: Transition to the Market, p213
(18)
I
i
• The Peasants’ Association
The peasants’ association has considerable influence at a central level, where it has an
input into agricultural policy formation. Its ability to implement.village-level activities
is constrained by the lack of an effective vertical structure which reaches from the
centre to the village. Where it has intervened at a local level, it has tended to focus
on the development of "good" farmers, with "good" equivalent to wealthy.
III
Local NGOs
Several INGOs currently work with local branches of the Women s Union and the
Peasants’ Association. Some partnerships have been more successful than others.
These mass organisations are often referred to as local "peoples organisations .
However, because of their strong links to the Party, they can not really be compared
to local NGOs which exist in many other countries in Asia, particularly India>
Bangladesh and the Philippines. The Government has yet to issue details on the
future role of local NGOs.
It is unclear at this stage whether the next 3-5 years will see the development of local
NGOs which become a significant vehicle for tackling the problems o the
marginalised and vulnerable groups. If this does not happen, INGOs are ikely to
continue to collaborate with the mass organisations as well as working directly with
the poor.
IV
Multilaterals/Bilaterals
sectoral interests and criteria for aid disbursement The °°™nj i^devetoment
that US$ 40 billion of investment is required in order to imp
,
,
f i
uatesv to the year 2000. Virtually all official aid will be channelled through central
government to provinciai government and line ministries. Almost cerimnly it w.ll not
be focused directly on the poor.
Many international donors have reported some eoncem on
Som'e^'ot
authorities to absorb funds/implement projects effectively. The official donors cannot
“erme om^e the govemmeS. structure. Unl.he INGO,a whs. often^p—
field level contact, they are reliant on government or INGO sources tor field
(19)
This8presents INGOs with an opportunity to feed into much larger poverty allevi
programmes than they could take on themselves.
i
V
International NGOs
The arrival of large sums of aid from the multilaterals is likely to have a profound
effect on the way INGOs operate in Vietnam in the future. The absence of offic
a!d has allowed INGOs a profile which they do not usually enjoy m countn^s where
A A onerates- for many years, NGOs were the major overseas donor. Th s will clearly
and raises an important question about how NGOs^11 seek to mamtarn
their influence while the contributions become relatively small. More enicral than
I
is the question...
... if Vietnam is set to receive a large volume of development funds from official
donors, what can be the future role for INGOs?
It must be recognised that funds from NGOs are likely to pale into i^gnificance as
Ihe money from the big donors starts to flow to those provinces which have been
designated priority areas by the central government. It is therefore essenitial
NGOs like AAV identify those gaps which the larger donors are un i y
certainly in the short and medium term.
SSSBSsS?
Many local authorities, whilst accepting
P
of the poor, are investing in sectors and those^people who are se» ts
provincial and district
authorities
produce the greatest returns in term
middle fanners benefit from this approach
off is widespread within government.
more
different socio-economic groups requires field-contact and ongoing research.
!
(20)
,NCOs may b. ideall); placed ,o
»
XSM
able <o contribute positively to poverty alleviation in
Vietnam for some time to come:
!
• ability to disburse funds directly on programme activities
• flexibility to adapt activities, within a strategic framework
• constant field-level contact
providing...
a situation of high fluidity between socio• good targeting skills in
economic groups
• well-researched methodology
• effective programmes
In spite of their more rigorous planning, reporting
are likely to continue to have a certain amount of leve age> aHocal 1
that individually NGOs will be able to• exe>t -y^ecial -Au-ce
na^
However, working in collaboration with o
rou’h8their WOrk at household level
donors, there may be significant opportunities throng^mr worK
to inform and hopefully influence the policy at the na
/o r' Li0R&RV
AND
DOCUMtNTATlON
V
>r-l
(21)
i
SWOT
analysis
• growing economy and poiiticaJ‘
provide a helpful environment for AAVs
work
• collaborative donor scene, but
uncertainty about the impact of official aid
on the work of INGOs
• issues concerning; relationships with
constitute the
the most
local partners constitute
important threats and weaknesses
. sound roots in
programme work serve as the basis for
most identified strengths
• weaknesses include programme, staffing
and funding constraints
CHAPTER
FOUR
SWOT ANALYSIS;
AAVs strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
The External Environment
The national context, analysis of poverty and the examination of major P^rs Jorm
the external environment within which AAV operates and attempts to achieve
mission AAV has drawn out the following elements from the external environment
which it considers may either provide further opportunities or which may constja^m n
AAV in its work over the next 3-5 years. As part of the C
proce ,
threats
planning how to make best use of the opportunities and how to mmim.se the
Opportunities
Political stability will mean that AAV will be able to operate in an
environment which is dynamic but not completely unpredictable over the
coming years. This will facilitate planning and operations.
Economic growth is likely to be sustained over the next few years. It is
arguably easier to assist microeconomic development in the.co"^
microeconomic growth than in a situation of macroeconomic stagnation.
as ,1’e ricl"r men,be,S °f tl,e
more
interest in activities directed at the poor - other opportunit,es becoming more
i
attractive to them.
A larger pool of local expertise, particularly technicians
language skills, will develop. This will improve the quality of technical advice
that AAV has available and reduce the cost. AAV plans to establish strong
links with appropriate local research institutes (who have a formal role to p ay
in national polky formation) in order to maximise the potential contribution of
local expertise.
Easier access to communities. As foreign organisations are regarded with
greater trust and their co^ribution is valued more by both villagers and local
authorities, so it becomes less problematic working directly with poo
communities. This increases the scope for effective Pa.r!C1Patl.7h;brhanges
planning and more appropriate impact. It is also possible that the ch g to
government’s administrative structures will lead to the development or
identification of new project partners who have stronger links with po
(23)
I
communities (the next few years may conceivably see the development of local
NGOs - see chapter three).
i
I
There is considerable cooperation and collaboration within the donoj
community in Vietnam, not just between NGOs but also between NGOs and
official donors. There are a number of sectoral/issue-based groups which
provide a forum for information exchange and experience-sharing. By
establishing links with large official donors and by collaborating with other
NGOs on advocacy issues AAV hopes to achieve a level of influence which
might not be attainable working outside these networks. The aim is to achieve
an impact over a wider area than that defined by the RDA boundaries.
Threats
The maintenance of good relationships with project partners is cntical to the
success of AAV’s programme work. AAV is not always in a position to choose
the most committed and/or most able people as counterpart project managers
and where AAV and project partner priorities differ slightly, lack of
commitment has caused a problem in the past. The identification of honest
committed project partners who fully share AAV’s aims and objectives will be
an important consideration in the selection of a second RDA.
Both project partners and communities may have expectations of AAY which
are not necessarily in line with AAVs own views, which stems in part from a
lack of familiarity about what NGOs do and how they operate^ As a chantable
organisation, there is an expectation that activities such as credit should be
heavily subsidised, that inputs such as seed or fruit trees should be handed o
and that local contributions in community time (such as credit group leaaers)
should be renumerated. Repeated training and exposure to the way in which
NGOs operate will hopefully convince local government counterparts that
handouts are not the most sustainable way of proceeding. Study tours to other
areas where subsidised practices have been phased out has been a useful
training tool.
Large flows of official aid have been pledged to Vietnam over the next ten
years. While it is uncertain what impact this might have on AAVs work, it is
clear that the relative prominence of NGOs as donors will greatly diminish.
There is little evidence that any official donor will be working in such a way as
to interfere directly with AAV’s current programme, but it is possible that
project partners will be distracted by the larger aid flows offered elsewhere. It
is to be hoped that local governments will see the value that NGOs may add o
the development work in Vietnam and will continue to work with them.
Corruption is a major concern of the government. With government staff
earning minimal salaries well below the consumption needs of the average
household, it is perhaps not surprising that this is an issue. AAVs commitment
to financial accountability and probity will not be compromised. This has
(24)
I
Wheadons for .he degree of
XSdo„esr forSS^ership which local projec. partner may
develop.
I
I
AAVs capacity lo work with the poor ^^""/"^'
“ready be experiencing a
iy already be experiencing
to o^nXnT^ bkeiy to be a part.cnlarly sensitive issue and
which
<— one
-
AAV is extremely alert to.
Project partnem, pari.cniari, at dj.net ievd, am
and under-trained. This is a situati
Y
imp|ementation, monitoring
AAVs involvement. Their
Continual training and
and evaluation differ greatly
are to have tlwcapacityTo
institutional support is critical if these a enc
absorb AAV funds mi±use2heinAffgct^
International companies anc’ ^^"Xng Torec^t Vietnamese staff who
Vietnam in large numbers. All wi'l.^ se* working with international
have good English and some
’ ations for NGOs like AAV. Unable
organisations. This will have maj
P
are Hkely to find it
M pro”"“ a"d dis,rict ,evels
Internal Strengths and Weaknesses
The review of strengths and we^D^
to make clear
programme review than on issues
g
J
amme management). As with
to project partners the catena^o^andi^amount of senior staff time
the external environment, AA
P
knesses to strengths over the coming
in a ra
XT™'
<"!VelOPi”8 Pr08r!'m'"e
over
the coming years.
will be repeated regularly and updated
Strengths
.
AAV has .aaaged .o devdop —
AAV a
are effective in
developed (eg extension ne or
Their link with permanent
encouraging poor farmers to pa icip'
h siistainability and
government structures gives good prospects tor
replication across a wider area.
(25)
i
AAV has an increasingly well-trained but small national staff who share a
commitment to working with the poor.
AAVs ongoing commitment to participative research into issues influencing the
lives of ethnic minority groups living in mountainous areas enhances the
quality of programme activities but also allows AAV to speak with authority
and credibility to an outside audience.
!
AAV’s aims and objectives are in line with those of local government - AAVs
programme therefore should complement provincial and district governments
own development programmes. AAV is working with a nationally-designated
target group (ethnic minorities) in one of central government s declared
priority areas, keeping AAV in line with central government poverty-alleviation
policy.
Over the past three years AAV has gathered valuable field level experience in
certain sectors, such as agriculture and savings and credit. Through household
level research, AAV has developed some understanding of the dynamics of
poverty in mountainous areas.
By building accommodation in the RDA, AAV has been able to demonstrate a
long term commitment to working in Mai Son District and to collaborating
with district government.
AAV has a secure source of funds for current programme work. With the
growth of official aid and burgeoning private sector investment in Vietnam, the
prospects for raising programme funds locally are good.
AAV is able to benefit from the collective experience of other AA
programmes across the world.
Weaknesses
AAV has failed in some instances to communicate clearly to local government
its position on certain issues such as the handover of management
responsibilities. AAV has, perhaps, at times failed to be sensitive enough o
the local conditions and management culture. There has consequently been
some disappointment and misunderstanding. AAV has not fully succeede in
modifying some of the expectations which the local project partners had hel
of partnership with AAV.
There is no core funding for AAV overheads and administration
There has been inadequate time and attention paid to networking and the
development of links with Vietnamese institutions at a national eveh lhe
strategy for coming years will ensure that these activities are included in all
(26)
(
i.
I
I
I
staffs workplans.
Programme staff, while committed, have no previous experience of working
with NGOs. There is a considerable need for non on-the-job training in areas
such as rural development management, basic management skills and report
writing. There are no senior female programme staff and few of the seconded
or voluntary extension staff are women. This reflects the difficulties of finding
female staff prepared to travel regularly to remote mountainous areas.
I
AAV has no senior programme staff who are members of ethnic minorities
(speaking minority languages) which can cause communication problems,
particularly with women who are less likely than men to speak more than one
language. The problem will be alleviated in part by building up skills at a
village level. Neither of the expatriate staff speak good Vietnamese.
There has been little systematic monitoring or evaluation to date. Staff have
now been allocated to this task.
(27)
I
STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK
• AAV endorses the AAUK mission
statement and has developed an overall
aim in line with this
• Stated hypotheses shape AAVs
definition of its role over the next three
years
• the framework allows the neccesary
flexibility to adapt annual workplans to
respond to unpredictable changes
• A strategic framework is presented with;
0 Key Components setting the direction
for our work
and
0 Strategic Priorities describing that likely
programme emphasis
CHAPTER
FIVE
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
AAVs Mission and Aim
AAV endorses the mission statement set out by AAUK:
To help children, families and communities in the world s poorest countries to
overcome poverty and secure lasting improvements in the quality of their lives.
In addition, AAV has developed its own overall aim which guides its work in Vietnam.
This is articulated as:
To improve the socioeconomic position of poor households, enabling them to
take lasting control over key aspects of their daily life.
This aim reflects AAVs belief that it is
poverty (or the poor socioeconomic
position) which denies many households
control over the most basic elements of
their lives - the consumption of
sufficient food, maintenance of good
health and the ability to educate their
children. To take lasting control of
these aspects household economies
need to be secure and individuals need
to be informed about the choices
available to them. In the Vietnamese
context where economic growth is
creating opportunities for individual
households, taking control requires that
poorer families are not marginalised by
lack of capital, lack of good health,
illiteracy or food insecurity.
AAV seeks to achieve this aim both
directly by working with poor
communities and indirectly by informing
and influencing the government and
other major players of the conclusions
AAVs
HYPOTHESES
• Poverty is widespread in rural Vietnam.
The Government’s poverty alleviation
programme is unlikely to reach all
vulnerable groups in the plan period
• AAV is well placed to research the
extent, causes and dynamics of poverty at
the village and household level
• AAV is well placed to develop and
implement (directly and
indirectly)
methods of addressing this poverty
• AAV has the capacity to bring these
messages to the attention of implementors
and policymakers who are <committed
----------- to
the alleviation of poverty
• The niche that AAV fills may change as
the development scene in Vietnam evolves
(29)
I
drawn from our grassroots experience. The essence of AAVs '*'or^^V(S
°“L r
analysis of poverty at the local level and an examination of what AAV has to offer
against the many other institutions involved in development work here. Underlying our
presence and work in Vietnam are the hypotheses in the box above.
I
What follows is not an attempt to predict our activities over the coming years, in a
intensely dynamic environment, a strategy must allow flexibility.
ove a , w
that this strategic framework will allow us to respond to the problems of poverty wi h
imagination, allowing us to continue to expenment whilst recognising that not
innovation leads to success. Below we outline the four key components and five
strategic priorities which form our strategic framework for the medium term. It
describes some of the issues that AAV will have to confront and sets the Par^eter^
for strategic decisions. Where possible, criteria are identified for decisionmaking
principles are established for operational direction.
Key components of the Strategy
AAV has identified four important strategic parameters that will set the boundaries to
and direction of our activities in the next three years. These are:
• maintenance of a strong link with poor households
• working through local government and organisations
• influencing government at central and provincial level
e collaboration with other donors
1
Strong link with poor households
Although AAV will usually be implementing programme activities either through or m
uncdon wrth local project partners, it will be important^to. retarn a d,rem
poor communities. Few of the potential project partner have, much
Lgeting the poor, eommumty eonsultatron or part.c.p"Lnhe
order to ensure that programme,> are bhllve
and intei^entions are appropriate, it will be essenna
grass roots contact.
The possibility of sustaining a targeted programme after AAV withdrawal (even if lorn
partners target actively durrng the period °
T-turned,^ at
the wider interests of district governmen .
nrosoects for sustainability in
a village level, recognising that in some instance
Jtside the formal government
some activities may be through strengthening structures outside the torm g
system.
(30)
r
I
In some circumstances, where AAV and project partner priorities differ, it may be
desirable in the short term to implement activities directly at community level, rather
than through a local partner. Caution is needed here, since agencies (such as the Party)
may already be experiencing a loss of authority at this level and may find community
support for NGOs threatening. Even well-intentioned district governments find
community-based activities difficult; their budgets do not allow for extensive contact
with the poor. Government structures at the village level are unable to back up their
directions with resources. When well-funded NGOs appear in villages, some may fear
that community support might easily be diverted away from government.
Working through local government
2
Programme activities are likely to be implemented through local governmental partners
with operational partners likely to be district level government agencies or branches ot
mass organisations. AAV will seek agreement from local government partners to
explore the possibility of working with other groups during the plan period - perhaps
user groups or embiyonic local NGOs. Good relationships with these government
partners are crucial to effective programme implementation. Although there has been
little trouble agreeing programme aims and objectives, priorities (particularly in terms
of targeting) are often more contentious. Where it is likely that priorities will not e
reconciled with those of the target group, it may be necessary for AAV to work directly
with groups of poor farmers (see above).
Ideally, project partners would absorb the programme into their ongoing development
programme and take full management responsibility for the programme. In the absence
of adequate systems of planning, reporting, community consultation and financial
accountability it is often not possible to give full management responsibility to the
partner at the beginning of the programme. In the short term it is likely to be
necessary for AAV to have a high level of involvement in the management of the
programme activities with the longer term aim of handing over responsibilities as
capacities increase. This stage may be problematic if partners expectations of a rapid
handover are disappointed or if there is misunderstanding about respective role .
Control, both managerial and financial, may be an issue of particular importance
Training and capacity-building will remain essential if AAV s aim of handing over
programme work to partners is to be realised. AAV does not underestimate t
amount of resources, in terms of training and management time, that will be necessary
in order to achieve an effective transfer to local partners.
3
Influencing government at central and provincial level
AAV believes that the potential for achieving an impact outside the limits of its RDA
XnsideJable. Maximising impact by communicating
-P^rtoTZlVs
failures to a wider audience of decision-makers forms an important part of AAVs
strategy. AAV will achieve this in a number of ways:
or
(31)
I r
i<
i
• direct contact with central government: AAV already has links with the Ministry o
Foreign Affairs and a good collaborative relationship with PACCOM (the NGO
coordinating agency). Over the coming period, AAV will try to strengthen relationships
with relevant line ministries (such as the Ministry of Agriculture) and central agencies
such as the State Planning Committee;
• direct contact at provincial level: senior provincial officials in both provinces where
AAV works have been closely involved in AAVs work. Effective influence at this level
represents, perhaps, the greatest opportunity for replication of activities. Provinces are
divided into a number of districts. By demonstrating successful models in one particular
district of a province, AAV hopes that certain activities and pnncip es (such as
targeting the poor) might be absorbed into development work in other districts, there
is already some evidence that this is happening to a limited extent in Son La Province,
(
I
• indirect influence at provincial and central
central level: we may try to use our contacts a
provincial level to influence decisions at central level (and the other way aroun ).
Having strong links at any level of government improves our credibility at other levels.
Our collaboration at district level enhances our authority at provincial and central
levels. Good contacts at provincial level strengthen our influence at district and central
levels. Sound relationships at a central level may help our links at provincial and
district levels. The degree to which we might influence central level policymakers via
our relationships at provincial and district government may be partly dependent on the
profile that particular province has at central level.
• indirect influence via multi- and bilateral donors: major donors have links at
central level which NGOs find more difficult to cultivate. Official donors work throug
the State Planning Committee, a powerful central agency which has not, in the past
had much contact with NGOs. With good relationships with some of the Multilaterals
(UNICEF, EC and UNDP) AAV may be able to reach central governmen agenci
that do not usually have direct links with NGOs.
• research: AAV hopes to be able to tie local research institutes into its research
work. These institutes operate at a national level and have strong links with ’"e
ministries and often have a formally acknowledged role in the fo™Xeminarine
policy. AAV hopes that this might prove to be an effective means of dissemina g
findings across a broad and influential audience.
4
Collaboration with other donors
I
As the volume of official aid to Vietnam escalates, the influence of any' one NOTns
likely to diminish, particularly at a national level. Working collaboratively with other
NGOs on specific issues will be one way in which AAV will seek to mam am
influence.
Collaboration with other donors, both within the NGO
^GOs
and official donors, is good in Vietnam (perhaps unusually good). Other donor
(32)
experience which AAV is eager to learn from and apply, where appropriate, at an
operational level.
In an environment where INGOs are relatively established and official donors are
largely newcomers, official agencies are keen to listen to NGO experience and even
replicate it where appropriate. The Ministry of Health and UNICEF were closely
involved with SCF-US in the development of their pilot nutritional rehabilitation
programme. UNICEF is now planning to replicate the programme across a large
stretch of the country. While AAV may not have this degree of success, there is good
potential for influencing other donors (with very large budgets) at this time and
perhaps influencing their programme design.
Strategic Priorities
Within the parameters set by the key components, AAV has identified five strategic
priorities. These identify AAVs likely approach to essential programme development
decisions over the next 3 years. The particular areas investigated are.
• sectoral emphasis
• geographic emphasis
• approach to HRD
• research priorities
• non-RDA work
Sectoral Priorities
Programme activities will be determined locally by the understanding of the cause of
poverty, but will also depend crucially on the kind of working re ationship which is
forged with project partners (see key components 1 and 2 above). As a pnnciple, AA
wilf work in sectors in which it has already developed some expertise am wh>di seem
from our analysis of poverty, to be of greatest importance to poor households Jo
an decisions on the sectoral division of activities in RDA1 have been b^d
household level, participative research and this practice will continue
.
work (see paragraph 4 below) will be pivotal in keeping our inten/entions appropna
to community-identified problems.
(33)
I
!
Likely areas of inteivention over the coming years are detailed below. AAV may not
be active in all sectors at the same time in any given commune. Decisions about which
activities will act as entry points and how other activities will be phased may vary from
commune to commune depending on local circumstances and needs.
iI
are a common feature of poverty. This assumption is backed up by our Jnd*ng®
village level. It is central government policy that all districts should establish exten
systems that have proper representation at village level, although sufficient .^sources
have not yet been allocated to the development of such a network. AAV will continue
to assist authorities at district and provincial levels to establish appropnate extension
systems through the development of working models at a village level.
• financial services for the poor: limited access to facilities for profitable saving and
reasonably-priced credit has been identified as a key constraint for poor households.
AAV has begun working through the Women’s Union, a mass °rga™ation with good
links at village level, to provide such seivices to households in Mai Son District in Son
La ProvinceSBy arranging study tours from other provinces, AAV hopes to spread the
principles across a wider area.
• health: although AAV has not yet formulated a detailed health plan it **
that there will be health components to any programme; poor health - adult heal
particular - has been identified as common cause of poverty in AAVs RDA. Ukely
areas of inteivention are: malaria prevention (malaria being identifie as a keyJwakh
problem); support to district EPI services and, perhaps, water supply and sanitation
work.
AAV will also consider the possibility of involvement in education activities in its
RDAs This has not, as yet, been identified as a critical problem by our target group
HowXe? access to pXaty education, particularly for ethnic minont,.women
tn
mountainous areas is so limited that AAV feels that tins ts an area whteh should ne
considered further.
n and policy-makers is central to AAVs work,
• advocacy work: influencing decision
upon AAVs ability to
The success of the operational work is partly
i
, dependent
.
’
; on our behalf. Gaining
influence local authorities who are often implementing activities
pproaches is a significant
their commitment to the programme and encouraging new aj.
Xo “ireptabiBty of .he work is dependent on soeeessfoi ndvoe.e, a.
described above in
provincial and central levels. AAVs strategies for advocacy work
the "influencing government" section.
2
Geographic
AAV will chose the areas in which it works according to a number of criteria which
draft example). The existence
will be analysed in a weighted matrix (see Table 1 for a
(34)
I
i
I
of poverty will be the most basic test applied to a new area. Following from the
analysis of poverty, AAV will look for evidence of low agricultural returns, high levels
of indebtedness and inadequate health seivices as general, preliminary indicators of
poverty This will be examined more closely during the feasibility study stage, and will
probably be the subject of protracted research before and during programme design
and implementation. It is not likely to be difficult to find a population both poor and
dense enough to constitute a feasible RDA; it will not be necessary for AAV to
confine itself to the declared poorest provinces in order to find a suitable RDA since
pockets of poverty are widespread across Vietnam. AAV will take logistica
considerations into account, aiming to keep overhead costs to a m.ntmumI-Wtbtrugh
Quang Ninh will be a strong contender as a choice for the next RDA,
at other provinces who are in the three poorest regions (see chapter 2).
Table One: Draft Weighted Matrix for Selection of New RDA
Criteria
Weighting
1 Existence of poor communities who may be
reached effectively by AAV
yes or no
2 Existence of other donors funding alternative
poverty alleviation work
yes or no
3 Identification of honest officials, committed
to the alleviation of poverty and willing to
facilitate an AAV programme
x3
4 Agreement on priorities with local partners &
good prospects for achieving impact
x3
5 Opportunity to use experience gained
elsewhere
x2
6 Opportunities for advocacy work
XI
7 Ease of access
XI
The area should provide AAV with an opportunity to make best use of the exPe"Jnce
that it has gained in Son La - in upland agriculture (particularly agricultural e™on),
savings and8credit and health interventions. Most efficient use of resources, not^bly
management time and capacity, may mean that components are phasec1 in sequentially
across a "creeping" RDA rather than taking place in all areas simultaneously.
EduStiou "Xilies. for example, might begin once other aet.v.ties (such as ,agncul.ure
and savings and credit) have been well established and have moved into new
communes.
AAV will consider potential project partners as an important part °f the
aonraisal process The need to find honest local counterparts who share AAVs
.
priorities and who will provide AAV with a meaningful link with poor people wiH b
critical to programme success. Ideally, district and provincial partners .should have a
relatively high national profile, improving AAVs potential for replicating the impact
(35)
f
its work across a wider area.
Mindful of these criteria, there would have to be compelling grounds NOT to choose a
poorer pocket of Quang Ninh as the base for our second long term development area.
Capitalising on the considerable volume of work which we have already implemented
in Quang Ninh (more than $700,000 to date) and the good relations which we have
cultivated at provincial and district level provide a solid foundation for future
collaboration.
3
Human Resource Development
0)
Developing community skills
Where local partners are unlikely to commit themselves to sustaining activities after
AAV withdrawal, it may be necessary to develop alternative, village-based service
delivery systems. In extension, for example, the most sustainable strategy might
develop the skills of village-based technicians who might be paid by the fa™ersh
Savings and credit groups are being run by trained village representatives and the
cash-flow centres on a commune bank. In health, the establishment o a‘
e
team in the village may be more appropriate than the upgrading of district capaciUes.
Community training (even if it is implemented indirectly through district level staff)
will absorb a significant proportion of AAV resources.
(ii)
Building capacity of local partners
AAVs belief that impact will be maximised if it operates through local
underlies much of the medium term strategy. AAV recognises that workmg■ ^ough
government is only likely to be possible if a significant proportion o P™gr“
resources are directed towards capacity building and ,nstltut'°n^UpP°Jn^t and
considerable portion of the budget will go towards training of staff at dis net
programme management.
(iii)
Developing full potential of AAV staff
Most of AAVs small, national staff have come from a career ™
“pidl, adjusting to the demands that AAV is
“X
gaps remain. Trmnmg rn basic mmmgement ^kdIs mpor.
g
ZXd beSrXthm m^nSoLl NGOs p,ay in development in other
countries.
(36)
i
4
Ongoing research work
Continuing research work is needed to fill gaps in understanding of the communities in
which we work and to inform our programme and lend our advocacy work greater
authority. In a period of rapid change, the research work will help AAV to adjust and
fine-tune activities and to ensure that they are appropriate for an evolving rural
environment. The choice of interventions to date has been based on community
priorities derived from household level research. Priority areas of research over the
next year are likely to include:
further analysis of the dynamics of poverty in Mai Son District
(particularly seasonal changes in well-being and the adjustments that
households are making following the economic reforms);
community perceptions of improvements in their living conditions;
the impact of the new land law on farming decisions and social relations
in the village;
the community’s views on the value of primary education; and,
the role of opium in the household economies and an analysis of how
AAV may assist households dependent on the production of opium for
income.
Starting work in a new RDA may necessitate the introduction of further topics.
Where possible and appropriate, AAV hopes to be able to feed into research work
coordinated
coordinated by
by AAUK.
AAUK. AAV
AAV will
will make
make full
full use of Vietnamese research institutions
and will collaborate with other NGOs conducting similar research in other provinces.
5
Work outside AAV RDAs
AAV wishes to maintain the innovative nature of its work in Vietnam, but recognises
that there may be constraints to piloting new ideas and activities within an established
programme area. AAV may choose to develop new activities outside their RDA for
later application within the RDAs. The choice of area for non-RDA work will depend
on similar criteria as the choice of an RDA - there will have to be a demonstrated
need to be met and good working relationship with local authorities. There may also be
a case for implementing particular activities in "high profile" areas so that they attract
wider attention.
AAV has implemented some successful infrastructural projects in Quang Ninh
province. It is possible that AAV may fund further infrastructural work if a ngorous
project appraisal process indicates that many people will benefit relative to the cost.
AAV will become involved in emergency work within the RDAs or where it is felt that
AAV has something particular to offer. AAV has conducted emergency work in both
RDAs in the last 3 years. In future years, AAV may examine the possibility of urban
work, but this is an area in which AAV currently has little expertise.
(37)
Given the amount of aid flowing into Vietnam over the coming years, it is possible that
funds may be available locally for non-RDA work. Since AAV has no sponsorship
income and hence no flexible or national funds, non-RDA work will be conditional
upon the securing of funds.
I
i
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I
(38)
I
ORGANISATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
• total estimated costs, of implementing
the strategy are £2.3 million over 3 years
• AAV will grow, but does not expect to
employ more than 20 people by the end
of 1996
• major emphasis on HRD, for AAV and
local partners
• RDA2 cannot go ahead without secure
long-term funding
• AAV looks forward to close regional
cooperation, enhanced by the opening of
the regional office
I
I
CHAPTER
SIX
ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Much of this chapter refers back to AAVs identified strengths
IsstSs discussed specifically include:
• phasing
• management and organisation
• HRD
• Support requirements
• Trends in expenditure and income
I
Phasing
Table 2 overleaf shows AAVs strategic direct’°"
crMerationafcontact is
always maintaining a strong link at community level,the
expected to diminish in favour of encouraging
p
AAV’s advocacy
programme work into their institutional ^^^J^ee" nd^ontacts in the new
work will increase over the three years dr?‘
RDA and the ongoing research work. Colla
8^
donors is Hkeiy to start
Q95 We anticipate the level
SXSP noioLorl planned for
1994, but this may become more substantial in later year
Phasing of activities is discussed under "Sectoral Priorities" in Chapter Five.
(40)
I
1
Trends in Strategic Emphasis (1994 -1996)
Year
Working Directly with Households
Working Through Government
Influencing Government & other
Decision Makers
Collaboration with other donors
Research
Number of RDAs
Non- RDA work
1994
1995
1996
I
Management and Organisation
Currently AAV has a total of 12 staff. This team is responsible for the development of
the existing RDA (Son La) as well as supervising projects in Quang Ninh. In order to
provide appropriate management, supeiwisory and monitoring support to programme
components over the next three years, AAV will need to make some adjustments to its
current organisational structure. Organograms showing the structure now and the
structure we are aiming towards are presented on the following pages.
During 1994 we expect to move towards the appointment of a Programme Coordinator
who will take overall responsibility for coordinating the development of RDA1 in close
liaison with local Government. A Programme Coordinator will also be appointed tor
RDA 2 after Board approval has been given for a new area.
In order to support the work of both RDAs and to assist in spreading the impact of
our work outside their confines, a Programme Development Cell will be created. Staff
will work closely with the Director, Assistant Director and RDA Coordinators on
research, advocacy and networking issues. This cell will also take responsibility for
I
producing information for donors.
Transferring ideas and knowledge to Government staff and farmers will be a key aspect
of the work of field staff. To develop this critically important component AAV expects
to establish a Technical Assistance and Training Unit which will provide support o
both RDA and local Government staff. Staff from this unit would also be available to
collaborate with other aid agencies/donors to provide more general training assistanc
to central government.
During this period, the administration and finance functions will be united^under one
manager. Both sections will be strengthened in order to provide the necessaiy support
to the programme.
The positions of director and assistant director are likely to remain expatriate
appointments during the interim plan period.
The total complement of staff is not expected to exceed 20.
The availability of key skills, such as accounts and administration, is likely to continue
"be a XU »11 Continue to develop existing staff asnsoehas p^.e g.ven
the needs of the organisation, but recognises that there may still be limitations.
I
(42)
ActionAid VietNam -1994 Structure
Director
Assist
Director
I
Prog.
Coordinator
Agriculture
_____
Prog.
Coordinator
Savings & Credit
~
Project
Support
Officer
I
Prog.
Coordinator
Health
I
Administration
----- 1
Accounts
Rctlonfiid Viet Na« - 1996 Structure
Director
- Assistant Director
ROA 1
Coordinator
Prj Officer X 3
RDA Staff
RDA 2
Coordinator
Prj Officer X 3
RDA staff
Tech Assist &
Training
Programme
Development
CeU
Administrative
Management
Accounts Assist
Admin Officer
Human Resource Development
• AAV
Our small team has made considerable progress in a number of areas in the two years
since the office was set up in Hanoi.
This has been largely achieved by on-the-job experience. More time now needs to be
devoted to developing a more comprehensive strategy for enhancing staffs capacity.
During 1994 work will begin on a human resource development strategy. Such a
strategy should not only meet the needs of a growing organisation but should also
allow staff to feel that it provides them with the opportunity to grow and develop
within the agency.
• Local partner
The strategy makes certain assumptions about the degree to which local government
will be able to incorporate programme activities into their ongoing work and evolving
institutional structures. The speed with which local counterparts can take on some of
the activities is not possible to predict at the moment. AAV has some control over this
through its work in institutional capacity-building.
Support Needs
Regional Support
i.
j
AAV welcomes closer regional collaboration with other AA programmes in the region
and recognises the value of exchanging experience within the agency^ Vietnam has
fewer similarities with South Asian countries than with other South East ^ian
countries and intends to exploit fully the resources available within this (SE Asian
region. Thailand and the Philippines are both countries which are nch m technical
expertise which is appropriate to the Vietnam situation. Study tours to other AA
programmes will continue to be valuable in demonstrating to staff and counterparts the
□ of methodologies that NGOs adopt in their work. Study tours and trarmng w.lhtn
the SE Asian region are likely to be more valuable in terms of developing specifi ,
locally-appropriate skills.
Support from the UK
• Finance
i
It is unlikely that AAV will be able to locate a locally trained financial
“ th'
foreseeable future, although good accounts’ assistants may be tra.ned and de.doped
ft.rthpr Indeed AAVs accounting system is currently well-managed by an accounts
“unt'^d' heZfion” us. aV. whether it absolutely necessa^ to^ jo have a
financial controller. AAV will appreciate the continued assistance of the AAUK
(45)
I 1
I
Overseas Accountant at that time.
• HRD
n. s.r.teg, puces
«X
»
• Representation
AAV does not underestimate the importance
the’seniority to access
™IMrabiliv of
hndi"g posi,ion
makes this especially important.
Expenditure and Income
Trends in Expenditure
As Table 3 shows, expenditure is forecast to rise
^v‘^°both
in 1994 to £925,000 in 1996, representing the expansio
geographically and in scope.
,• un /r^rr, £221,000
000 to
to £280,000)
£280,000) as health activities
RDA1 expenditure grows slightly (fro
, savin«s and credit expenditure will stay
become more widespread, but agncuIturei and saving
moreorless constant over the penodI (.
be feasible) to remain active in
This reflects AAVs current plan (which may’
introducing them to a range
a core area of 5 communes, piloting new te
q
wiU replicate successful
of farmers. It is hoped thai with AAV support the
training nd
components to other communes wrthin fte> Dis
.1
me across ollier d,stncts
support by AAV, may introduce some dernems o
p
Md rf he
s
xs
X: XXX Xctty s^endy to « -
work.
(46)
Table 3: Budget 1994-1996, EOOO’s
1994
1995
1996
RDA1
221
250
280
RDA2
72
160
260
non-RDA
48
70
80
Administration
77
100
110
Indirect
Overheads
140
180
195
TOTAL
558
760
925
Most of the increasing expenditure may be attributed to the development of a second
DA (from £72,000 to E260.000 in 1996). TTte, rise in 1995.includes
anTXSg) rM Iran'ge" of activities in the new DA.
Expenditure on ’j"”"
over which AAV has little control).
an upgrade of the
Administration projections; include the likelihood of needing
accounting system over the
t.-~ medium term.
Trends in income
A Urge portion of the strateg,- win not be.
available. At the time
y funds’currently available tor RDA2, nor
RDA1 comes from the ODA. There are
1994 for the second area will
for RDA2’s share of the °ver^Sb“ and
tly by the fundraising section in the
UK^^^o'o^Saft buih up
« “Xds, since the rese.e position vdH not support
a further drawdown on reserves.
I
(47)
• Official Income
I
for RDA1 over the period. In the interests of maintaining a balanced funding port
'(LwedZ £
ma, eome Iron. NON^l --
,
i
I
• Child and community sponsorship
fnr RDA2 at oresent. It is the view of AAV that child
There is no income source for RDA2 at present, i
DA is
sponsorship is not feasible anyw ere m n
though probably not in the plan
likely to be situated). This situation may c ang ,
g .
an RDA level and
period. "Ownership" of programme funds is
®
P • prO£ramme development. If
can cause intense management prob ems w
h.ldren these difficulties may well be
income is tied very conspicuously to individualthese
as visible
AAV does feel, however, that some
management
may constitute the mos^su,t^b’e S°K jn dl^loping an appropriate model for use in
i
Xm. proposed changes to the organza! "ni^P—
-OKS decision as to
whether or not this will be feasible from the UK side.
I
• Local fundraising
Local fundraising (from official sources)i mayP^'^kh’will be discrete
likely that these funds will be best sui ed to non-B.DA^k
Commitment to
projects which local donors could,
being av^lable - AAV has no
non-RDA work will have to depend
national or flexible funds to draw on. It is hoped that t
research work can be incorporated into RDA budgets
(48)
of advQ
and
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Economist Intelligence Unit, Indochina- Vietnam, Laos,.Cambodia 2nd and 3rd
Quarter 1993 reports
Grady, Heather, A Glimpse into Poverty in Vietnam (unpublished report of AAV,
1993)
H—h, Geoffrey B. Human R,soer^e^^V;e= fa
Tan
(eds), Vjetnanfs Dilemmas and Options The ^nenge ot gggn
1990s (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 19 )
Litrooy, Siep, U±1oyerBcAlle.ia.ion fa y.et Nam
(unpublished report of AAV, 1993)
Payne, Lina & Houghton, G, yliLt
(unpublished report of AAV, 1993)
District of Northern Vietnam
I
Rutherford, Stuart, A Peasant Econmny_ReadjustsjnA
(unpublished report of AAV, 1992)
• i
South East Asia Monitor VietnamJ993 (London, 1993)
Soeiahst Repfatlie of V.e.oam, Vis!aS^$12Em£faI!^
1993)
Trinh Duy Loan, 1 ivinf Standards and'^ntralW^en’s Union
l
of Soeioiogy. W93)
UNDP, Human Development Report, 1993 (Oxford, 1993)
UNICEF, UNICEF in V.et Namjapogun^^
(Hanoi, 1993)
Valderline, Jan et al, DoiJyloLanlH^ (Stockholm: SIDA, 1992)
I
The World Bank.
(Washington DC: World Bank, September 1992)
The World Bank, Viet Nam: TransilioiMsMheMarket (Washington DC: World Bank.
I
September 1993)
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