FACTS againest MYTHS V0L-Ii-2-MAY-1995.pdf
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FACTS
VIKAS ADHYAYAN KENDRA
AGAINST
May’95 VOL II # 2
COMMENT
Other Mesamyths on
We Sardar Sarovar Project
(In response to requests on..the economic andfinancial as
pects of the SSP. a second issue is being devoted to the
Project.)
Economic development and environmental consciousness
are interrelated goals; the former is crucially dependent
on the environment and natural resources for goods and
services which directly and indirectly generate socioeco
nomic benefits. At the same time, however, economic de
velopment is often accompanied by significant adverse
impacts on the environment. This has led to the miscon
ception that economic development and environmental
consciousness are therefore contradictory goals. The re
ality is that environmental degradation and misuse of
natural resources results in losses in the long term, and
furthermore, undermines the basic objective of develop
ment, viz., the sustainable improvement of especially the
welfare of the poor. Adivasis, peasants and others dwellmg in these areas are directly dependent on natural reIBirces. Their welfare in both the short and long term is
inextricably linked to the productivity of these natural
ecosystems. Thus the socioeconomic effects of degraded
environments often hit them the hardest. It stands to rea
son then, that development depends also on the rational
use of environmental resources and on minimizing the
adverse impact of such development projects as the SSP.
Disenchantment with mega-projects is increasing world
wide. leading to intense debates on their justification, the
veracity of their benefits and their claims. The 1991 Con
gress of the International Commission on Large Dams,
for instance, had conceded: “In the future, attention (will)
more and more be shifted from the design and construc
tion of new dams, to the restoration of the structural and
operational safety of existing dams”. The debate has since
shifted from whether dams should be big or small, or
whether they make good engineering, hydrological and
economic sense, to how safe mega dams like the SSP,
Tehri, etc., eventually are. Little wonder, therefore, the
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Central Water Commission (CWC) has undertaken an In
dian Dam Safety Projects (IDSP), shortlisting 52 dams
spread over 15 States for a review of their disaster-risks.
In the meanwhile, incidentally, mega projects in many parts
of the world have been stopped: Franklin Dam in Austra
lia, Nam Chaon in Thailand; Nagmaros in Hungary; Babaquara in Brazil, Katun in Russia and Serre de la Earre in
France, among others1.
Yet, in the case of the SSP, the pro-dam lobbies continue to
manufacture myths and counter-myths. More pertinent, how
ever, the authorities have failed to present any valid cost
benefit analysis of the SSP. Had this been done the whole
Impacts of Multi-purpose Dam Projects1
Upland activities (farming, forestry,
agroforeslry. reads and settlements)
cause sail erosion, silt and chemical
pollution of streams; sediment is stored
in delivery system awaiting storm
events.
Sediment from eroded soil
is deposited in reservoir
and reduces storage
capacity
Turbidity
affects
fisheries
Valley dwellers displaced
Dam and
multi-purpose reservoir
Nutrient inflow
causes
eutrophication
and aquatic
weed
probems.
Irrigated agriculture
expands: silt in'waler
Electric
ing
reduced
' through sedimentalion: Silt damage to
turbine increases
requires dredging of canals
Salinization and water
logging of soils may occur
from improper irrigation
Irrigation return-flow to
river may carry toxic
chemicals and salts which
affect downstream fisheries
arid other water uses
FACTS against MYTHS
S
Migrants add to population
pressure on marginal
lands, increasing soil
erosion.
| FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION ONLY |
Severe storms re
sult in water release
and flood-plain dam
age.
May ‘95
Page j
project today would scarcely make economic sense.
What instead has been passed of as ‘cost-benefit analy
sis’ is a pattern of falsification. “Gross manipulation and
outright jugglery of figures have been resorted to in order
to keep the benefit- cost ratio above 1.5 as required by the
Planning Commission (i.e. for a project to be approved, it
must generate benefits of Rs. 1.5 for every rupee spent on
it...”) (Sardar Sarovar Project:An Economic, Environmen
tal and Human Disaster”, NBA (undated) However, the
financial costs are only a part of the costs of the SSP. The
more relevant costs are the social and environmental dis
ruptions, which are costs that the country will be paying for
the “cheap” source of power., that is:
• 240 villages affected by submergence
• over. 40,000 families displaced
• 5 villages evicted for the power centre
• 39,000 ha. submerged, 13,744 being forest land etc.
Till recent years, hydropower was found “cheap” as all
these social costs had not been considered. It was cheap
at the expense of the Adivasis, the environment, etc.!
The SSP is an object lesson on how conventional analy
sis has been applied in the construction of this Project
— focussing entirely on the dam, the reservoir, the irri
gated land and on electricity generation. The benefits
are thoroughly evaluated: water storage, flood control.
fisheries and irrigation. The costs would be those of con
struction, operation and maintenance and some atten
tion to resettling the displaced. However, current wis
dom on the relevance of the natural boundary of the
Sardar Sarovar, the length and breadth of the river basin,
must be taken into account. But, this is not reflected in
the analysis.
The limitations and failures of a number of such mega
projects clearly illustrate the “necessity of natural sys
tems analysis. Without it the chances are that externali
ties will not be recognised in sufficient time to take the
least-costly countermeasures, nor to calculate the trade
offs between prevention and acceptance of damage”1
The gross negligence of various aspects of the construc
tion of the SSP has generated widespread criticism and
even condemnation particularly with regard to its faulty
planning and design component and implementation pro
cedures; the warped development paradigm on which it
was envisaged; and to the human rights violations. This
has led to the widespread cal! to suspend all construc
tion activities of the Project and review it afresh in terms
of the contentious issues surrounding it; to consider all
the various options — not only those that were consid
ered by the formulators of the SSP but also those that
were earlier ignored whether consciously, conveniently
or through sheer ignorance. It is of course human to err
in decision-making and in reviews of decisions— but
there must be a guarantee that such errors are minimal
and reversible, not gigantic and irreversible. In Calcutta
the height of the new Howrah Bridge was based on the
claim that ocean-going liners would pass under it. Be
fore the bridge was built, it became clear that would not
happen because the Hoogly port would decline and the
importance of Haldia port would increase. But the deci
sion-makers, reviewers of decisions and implementors
FACTS against MYTHS
stuck to their false claim. Today, no liners are passing
under the bridge! The result was enormous infructuous
expenditure of which the only beneficiaries were the steel/
cable structural manufacturers, the erection contractors,
etc. Fortunately, there was little human and environmen
tal damage. But, in the case of the Sardar Sarovar Project,
it is totally different.
MYTH:
Finance for the SSP is not a problem. It will be available
through private investments, by floating public bonds and
through financial loans acquired through various fundraising schemes with a compound interest ranging from
17.5% to 19%, which will all be repaid within seven years.
FACT:
The option of borrowing the necessary funds from the open
market is practically impossible. In 1991 the Chairman of
the Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd (SSNNL),
Mr.C.C.Patel, had observed that in the first 18 months of
the Scheme (Kisan Vikas Patra Yojana) itself could gamer
merely Rs.30 crore as deposits. The NRI bonds had also
failed to generate the required amount. Mr.Patel had sub
sequently admitted that there was a deficit of Rs.2fl^
crore, without taking into consideration the cut in the
Eighth Five Year Plan outlay. (SSP: Financial Resources
by L.CJain, December 20,1994)
Further in its Report of August 1992, the SSNNL had ad
mitted a shortfall of Rs.2350 crores and Gujarat's Eighth
Five Year Plan (1992-1997) states : “Given the experience
of the recent past and difficulties in raising resources...it
is perhaps unrealistic to expect that the SSNNL will be able
to raise....Rs.2355 crores during the Eighth Plan. Even rais
ing Rs.277 crores during 1992-93...” is likely to be a problem
(op.cit). On the other hand the expected contributions from
the affected States have not surfaced; not even being ear
marked in their annual Budget for the Project.
In all this, however, the SSP authorities have simply over
looked other essential expenditures that will just have to
be incurred if the benefits claimed by them are to accrue
eventually. These will naturally raise the project-costs still
higher making repayment all the more difficult. At any rate
these costs, as studies 2on the Project by Vijay Paranjm^
shows, include
WP
• Expenditure of M&l water-supply system: .
Rs.4025 crore
* Additional cost of rehabilitation of the displaced/dispossessed
by canals/distributaries:
Rs.3773 crore
* Compensation to fisherfolk living downstream of reservoir for
loss of employment:
Rs. 90 crore
Total financial gap:
.. Rs. 9888 crore
Apart from these costs there are still other costs, viz. the
environmental mitigative3 and other measures for the SSP.
For instance, drainage measures, the total costs of which
alone are over Rs,3600 crores will simply be ignored as
has been done in so many projects all over the country.
This would result in severe waterlogging and salinization
over most parts pf the SSP command area.
No estimates are available for fisheries development,
healthcare, weed and vector control measures, downstream
impact control measures, sanctuary protection, etc. All
these costs add up to over Rs.2000 crores *which is only
the base cost.(op.cit)
May‘>5
Page 2
Costs of Ameliorative & Mitiqative Environmental Steps.
Estimated Cost
(Rs. crores)
Catchment areas treatment for only the
critically erodible, directly draining land
draining land
.........
Compensatory afforestation
.........
Major drainage works only (excluding
over 50 major bridges, countless minor
bridges, and the substantial energy
costs of pumping out groundwater)
for regions 5-13 (CES 1992),
.........
and
for regions 1-4 (Core Consultants 1982) .........
146.43
72.57
The costs remaining to be spent till the end of the 1993-94
financial year were arrived at in each case starting with the
base costs, deducting the money spent and inflating the
remaining costs at the actual inflation rates each year.
INFLATION RATES
Year
1600.00
200.00
Kalpavriksh, a Delhi environmental group, which closely
scrutinised the costs of the SSP arising out of the environ
mental aspects of SSP, showed that the World Bank esti
mated the base cost of the SSP as Rs.6264 crores and the
total cost at Rs. 13,640 crores in 1985.” Using similar ra
tios, the cost of environmental mitigative and amelio
rative measures could rise to well over Rs.4300 crores'..
Obviously, then, any future capital borrowings would
tterefore lead to higher interest burdens pulling the
into an inevitable debt trap.
On the repayment of all these borrowings within 7 years,
this will also not be possible. First, because given the above
financial constraints the entire annual budget of the Gujarat
Government is presently less than the total interest amount
that will accumulate by the year 2000. The Ex-Chairman
of the SSNNL himself, Sanat Mehta, confirmed this:
“Since Gujarat does not have adequate revenue surplus a
sizable portion of the cost has to be borne on the capital
account from borrowings which leave a liability for the
future both by way of interest payment and loan pay
ment... There will be an appreciable interest burden ev
ery year”.4
Moreover as the Gujarat Government has been regularly
taking over-drafts from the RBI, it clearly indicates that
the internal revenue generation capacity of the State ex
chequer is unrealisable. Yet, on June 21,1995 the Gujarat
Finance Minister, Suresh Mehta, announced a total out
lay of Rs. 1500 crores, over 200 % increase over last year's
c^fenditure on the Project of Rs.463 crores!! (Times of
I^rna,26.6.95)
MYTH:
The base-cost escalation is merely marginal/insignificant.
Thus the current inflation-rate will not affect the timely
completion of the Project.
FACT:
According to Project Officials and others including legis
latures of the Gujarat Assembly there will be a major
base-cost escalation. The estimated costs5 for the SSP
had first been fixed at Rs.25,000 crores; later Rs.35,000
crores by the World Bank. The World Bank, Gujarat Gov
ernment, and M/s.C.C.Patel & Associates (CCPA) esti
mated the costs by assuming an inflation rate of 8.5% till
1980/91 and 6% thereafter. However, the NBA maintains
that if ever the Project is completed the costs will be
around Rs.44,000 crores. Their analysis was based on
the costs of the Project, (remaining to be spent) updated
to current price levels. The official cost-estimates of the
FACTS against MYTHS
Project had taken into account the estimates of the TECS,
the World Bank, the GOG and the CCPA estimates.
(op.cit)
82
83
84
85
88
az
88
83
3Q
31
22
23
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
4.4.
5.8
8.1
7.5
7.4
10.3
13.7
10.G
8.2
Infla lion rate %
4.9
7.5
6.4
The NBA document further shows that in the case of all
the above four official costs estimates the costs remain
ing till the end of the 1993-94 financial year is greater
than the base costs. That is, the rise in the Project cost
due to inflation is greater than whatever is spent till date
as the Table below indicates:
BASE COSTS & THE COSTS LEFT TO BE SPENT
(Rupees Crores)
Estimate
TECS
World Bank
Gujarat Govt.
CC Patel & Assoc.
Base cost
(Base year)
Costs left to be
spent at ’93-94 end
4,887
(1981-82)
7,067
(1984-85)
8,350
(1986-87)
8,096
(1986-87)
7,678
10,142
11,203
10,728
N.B. The base costs exclude the price contingency but include the
physical contingency. From the official cost estimates, the costs that
were to be incurred in the Project, till date, were also calculated and
were compared with the costs actually incurred. (See Table below)
COSTS INCURRED COMPARED TO WHAT WAS TO BE
SPENT BY 1993-1994 (Rs. Crores)
Estimate
World Bank
Gujarat Govt.
CC Patel & Ass.
Costs that were
to be incurred.(A)
Annual expenditure
as % of A
7.203
5,928
7,274
47.68
7.94
47.22
The above Table makes it clear that the Project is lagging
behind the official schedule, financially, by over 50%.
(op.cit) The implication of such delays on the economic
viability of the Project is much greater. CC Patel & Asso
ciates also maintain that the rescheduled project is al
ready about 50% behind even the new schedule pro
posed by it, and the Project by these calculations has
therefore already become economically unviable. Simi
larly the WB Staff Appraisal Report of 1985 based on its
risk analysis, concluded that the present value of the
Project’s benefits have become zero.
MYTH:
The cost of impounding per unit volume of water stored
reduces with height. That is, the cost reduction per unit of
water stored is a linear function of increase in the volume
of water stored at one reservoir.
FACT:
The engineers are convinced that the advantages of scale
May *95
Page 3
are endless! However, the cost per unit reduces with
increase in scale only up to an optima! point and that it
begins to rise quite significantly when the scale of im
pounding increases beyond the optimal point. Obviously,
the engineers have been using the economic law on costs
only partially and out of context. The theory of costs, how
ever, maintains that the increase in the scale of production/output (in this case to be read as scale of impound
ing), the cost per unit falls only up to a limit, and beyond
this optimal limit the cost per unit starts rising at an in
creasing rate. This has been clearly demonstrated by
costs of mega-dams having increased uncontrollably.
Related to this is the issue of height of the SSP. NWDT
had ruled that the FRL (Full Reservoir Level, or, the height
of the dam) of 436 ft. was sufficient to deliver the irriga
tion benefits to Gujarat and Rajasthan but the dam FRL
was increased by 19ft. from 436 to 455 ft. for supposedly
increasing the power benefits (op.cit.). This extra height
implies a 455 ft. embankment that would lead to the sub
mergence of240 villages, 40,000 families, and 39,000 hect
ares (of which 13.744 hectares is prime forests). More
over, the submergence of 5 villages in Gujarat, the socalled Rock Fill Dyke villages, was necessary for the
CHPH to be able to act as a peaking station. While the
power benefits are to go largely to M.P., the extra height
increased the gross areas submerged in M.P. by about
35%, the cultivated areas by 50% and the population
affected by about 70%! Yet, the power to be generated
would rise only marginally. As pointed out by the
NWDT, “unless the FRL of Sardar Sarovar is fixed at
4453 there would be a loss of 230 to 350 million units per
year...”, less than 10% of the firm power generation.
Evidently, this height increase was not aimed to provide
any increase in the peaking power, the main benefit of
the SSP hydro. It could be availed of at the same height.
It was aimed merely to increase the generation.
MYTH:
The cost of power generation for the Project is the same
for other conventional generation schemes and, compara
tively, less costly.
FACT?
would be more expensive than the SSP which is the next
most expensive choice (cf: diagram )
The cost supply curve, (above figure), shows the cost
and the potential of eight generation and savings op
tions, ordering them by increasing life-cycle costs (Rs/
KW). For comparison, the cost of potential of the SSP is
also marked to provide the yardstick for comparison. The
area under the curve yields the total life cycle cost for
each option. What this cost-supply curve reveals is that:
• the capacity claimed by SSP can be achieved at much
lower cost with a combination of a few of the alternatives,
and specifically at about 49 % of the cost with a combi
nation of efficiency improvements in lighting and irriga
tion pumpsets and other PSTOR schemes;
• with the same capital outlay as that estimated for the
SSP, a least-cost mix of alternatives can yield 65 % more
electrical benefits than the SSP;
• an enormous realistic potential of over 4,000 MW —;
roughly 2.7 times what has been claimed to be the output
of the SSP —: is available by utilising energy optics
cheaper than the SSP;
• other options also lead to much smaller social and
environmental impacts than the SSP (Unlike other hydro
electric, power projects, the SSP cannot.be considered a
renewal source because conventional generation will come
down to negligible levels as the irrigation systems develop,
and pumped storage will increase with the pumping being
done with electricity generated to a considerable extent from
the combustion of fossil fuels.
Thus, the economics of alternative energy options as also
its achievable power potential are notably superior to
that of the SSP. As against these alternatives, the SSP
does not provide greater environmental and social com
patibility. Significantly, the power component is thus
being acknowledged to be both uneconomical and
shortlived! By 2004, according to present calculations,
the two power generating stations will only be produc
ing a miserly 110 MW. In fact, the RPBH will be produc
ing no power at all within 15 years of commencement.
A.K.Reddy of the International Energy Initiative and Girish
Sant, an energy analyst, maintain that the costs6 so far
for power generation of the SSP is far higher than even
the conventional centralised generation alternatives.
MYTH:
The figures show that only coat-based thermal power
FACT:
A
Along with other benefits the SSP will also provide adoT
tional benefit of 1450 MW of power for the whole Western
region.
Initially, when the Eight Five Year Plan was being drawn,
the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) recommended
48,000 MW capacity but due to heavy resource constraints
it was drastically cut down to 30,538 MW. According to
Dharmadhikari7 and others even this will however be diffi
Life-cycle Cost versus Potential of
Various Options for Western Grid
cult to meet.
0
1CCO
2000
3000
Potential (MW at bus-bar)
FACTS against MYTHS
4000
The power plant of the SSP will operate in two distinct
phases. In Phase One, corresponding to Stage I and II of
the irrigation development in the Valley, the power serves
as a Generating Station actually producing electricity. In
the second phase, corresponding to Stage 111 in irriga
tion, the power station will generate negligible electric
ity (as per the GOG, zero in the Riverbed Power House
(RBPH). In this phase, it will act primarily as peaking
May *95
Page 4
facility by providing pumped storage. In between these
Stages there will be a transition phase, where the genera
tion component will decline and the SSP will increas
ingly act as a pumped storage. SSP will not generate
peaking power but only provide a peaking facility or
pumped storage_(op.cit) to help match the peak loads.
The pumped storage function of the SSP is considered
to be the most attractive part of the SSP Hydro with the
task of i) generating electricity and ii) pumped storage.
In the former — the 1450 MW mentioned is only the
installed capacity — the actual energy generated on an
average non-stop basis is much less. The repeatedly
bandied figure of “1450 MW of electricity” often con
veys a benefit out of proportion.(op.cit)
“There are two places in the SSP where power will be
generated — the River Bed Power House (RBPH) and
the Canal Head Power House (CHPH). The installed ca
pacity of these is 1200 MW and 250 MW respectively.
— a total of 1450 MW. However, at the RBPH and CHPH,
the turbines will operate for only a part of the year. Also
as the abstractions for the irrigation increase on develraurient of irrigation, the amount of water diverted for
®rer generation will decrease. Thus, initially itself, the
average continuous power at RBPH will be 415 MW,
decreasing over the years to zero; and the CHPH will
have an average continuous generation of 24 MW gradu
ally increasing to 50 MW. There would also be some
seasonal generation averaging 1621 MU in the initial
stages, going down to 865 MU in the final stages. Thus,
on an average, the power generation at SSP will decrease
from 439 MW to only 50 MW over the years!
The power-generation at SSP will also be affected by:
• the total yield of the river itself which has been over
estimated by about 17%. While the NWDTA has taken
the yield to be 28 Million Acre Feet (MAF), more accu
rate figures show that the yield to be only 23 MAF;
• substantial part of the power benefits depend upon
the regulated release of water from the upstream Narmada
Sagar. This release itself is dependent on ample rainfall.
If the NSP is not built, the power benefits will substan
tially suffer.
NWDT itself in 1979 held that “without regulated
releases from the Narmada Sagar, Sardar Sarovar (Full
Reservoir Level) FRL + 455 will not be able to utilise its
allotted share of water... there would be a loss of 17.8%
in irrigation and power benefits at Sardar Sarovar...” The
Tribunal did not give a breakup of the loss of benefits in
power and irrigation separately but gave a combined fig
ure, and ruled that SSP would therefore have to pay a
part of the NSP cost.
In its appraisal of the Project, prior to sanctioning the credit,
the World Bank had calculated that without the SSP, the
power benefits would decrease by 25%. Moreover, the
loss in the firm power would be substantially higher than
this decrease of 25% in the total power generation
(op.cit.). In fact, the study by the Narmada Planning
Group, Government of Gujarat, based upon the “Fourth
Reservoir Model”, puts this figure as high as 28%. Quot
ing this study, the GOG publication, “Planning for Pros
perity” states, “Delay in coming up of the Narmada Sagar
FACTS against MYTHS
in M.P. when Gujarat is at Stage 1 produces a reduction
of 28% in power releases at the SSP which can be con
sidered as very significant”. It also points out that it is
not only the non-construction of NSP, that will lead to
the loss in power benefits, but also to a delay, as the
power benefits from the SSP are significant only in the
Stage 1. Even if the NSP is built, the power benefits may
still suffer.(op.cit)
A detailed study of the hydrology of the river by the
Morse team had concluded: “...the prospects of the con
struction of the NSP does not obviate our concerns about
the performance...of the Sardar Sarovar...(and) that if
Madhya Pradesh does, in affect appropriate its allotment
of water according to the Tribunal Award, the Sardar
Sarovar will still not operate as assumed”. Thus the hy
drology, and the (lack of) upstream regulation will result
in substantial decrease in the benefits on account of
power generation. While the combined effect of these
two (lower yield and non-construction of NSP) has not
been quantified, it is bound to be substantial. Moreover,
this impact is the maximum in the earlier stages, when
the generation benefits are expected to be the maximum.
(op.cit)
Pertinently, the SSP itself will consume large quantities of
power, mainly in Gujarat and hence, the net power benefit
from the Project, will be marginal, even if it did deliver as
promised.
MYTH:
The SSP is a resen/oir of cheap, clean and non-polluting
energy, the least-cost solution to the Western Region Ex
pansion Programme, benefiting the concerned States
immensely.
FACT:
The claim of being the least-cost solution was backed by
the World Bank. The present worth of the economic cost
of the SSP was compared with the “most realistic alter
native plan without the project”. The “practical alterna
tive” to the Project was given as a minemouth thermal
plant in the Vindhyachal region and a load centre thermal
facility located near the SSP. The alternative plant ca
pacity was taken to be 2000 MW. Thus, not surprisingly,
the SSP turned out to be the least-cost solution when
compared as above. The very selection of the thermal
plant as a “realistic alternative” loaded the final outcome
in the favour of SSP.
However, even in these comparisons, the financial costs of
the SSP have been seriously underestimated. Dharmadhikary (op.cit) points out that the NCA in 1990 placed
the cost of hydropower from the SSP at Rs.l 1,750 per
KW installed as capital costs, while the cost of energy
were worked out as 80 paise per unit in the initial stages
of the operation. Clearly, therefore these were serious
underestimates. The total outlay on the hydropower sec
tion of the project was put at Rs.2700 crores in early
1993. This itself works out to be Rs. 18,620 per installed
KW; in an increase of 58.5% in just three years.
Similarly, the cost of energy too is clearly an underesti
mate with only the cost in the initial stages being men
tioned, where the cost will be the least as generation is high
est. If the decrease in energy generation over the years
May '95
Page 5
is taken into account the cost of generation will work out
to be much higher with the increased cost.
Independent estimates(op.cit) worked out as late as Sep
tember *93 indicate that the cost of the energy from SSP
would be Rs. 1.12 per KWH i.e. 1.12 per unit, and a delay
of even two years would push up this to Rs. 1.41 per unit
(at Rs. 1993 prices)
MYTH:
All is well with the Sardar Sarovar Project and the port
ents are good.
FACT:
How well everything is with the SSP and how it is progress
ing can be gauged by these events in the recent past:
• In September '94 the stilling basins in Bays, 1,2',3, and
4 were damaged by monsoon floods at the base of the
dam,' throwing up 1.3 lakh cu. metres of cement; The
damage also revealed the problems RBPH was facing. It
had already been weakened by water seepage during the
floods. The protective wall around the tail-race channel
of the powerhouse broke, filling it with 20 metres of wa
ter. As a result, machinery and equipment worth Rs.3
crores was submerged;
• On December 14, a report by a 6-member all-party team
of MLAs from M.P. the Sardar Sarovar Displaced In
quiry Committee, stated that only 2 % of 33,014 families
in the submergence area, had been rehabilitated;
• the rehabilitation sites were water logged, amenity
less, barren, waste and fallow-land;
• 75 % of the land allocated to the dispossessed was of
appalling standard. “Even after three years, there are still
tin sheds on the rehabilitation sites, a approach roads
and water supply have been provided and Rs. 10,000 for
making house foundation (sic) have not been given”
• the Jayant Patil Committee reported that the 8,214 vil
lages and 135 urban centres that would be provided
with drinking water are still to be named;
• the drinking water project was not properly defined and
its funding not spelt out. Above all, it pointed out that there
would be no water available for the next 10-12 years;
Facts Against Myths is a monthly
bulletin of factual information on
a number of development myths
and fallacies, etc, including infor
mation against disinformation
campaigns, propaganda and ca
nards spread by communal & fun
damentalist forces.
Produced and Published by:
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• it called for a census of all PAPs (Project-Affected
People) revealing the lack of accurate data on displace
ment. Like.water availability will be substantially lower
than the original 28 MAF. This has cast doubt that ulti
mately only 23 MAF will be available. If this becomes
true not only will less area be irrigated and less power
produced but the entire project will have to scaled down
• the academy for Mountain Environics (AME), in a
geo-scientific survey of April 1995 found that the area
around SSP has a fractured zone similar to that associ
ated with the Latur earthquake and therefore the Project
is no longer considered safe. The AME has therefore
suggested freezing construction at its existing height.
The above however is merely tip of the iceberg. There are
already a number of other reports passirft
*
strictures on the
Sardar Sarovar Project shattering the Government myth that
all is well with the Project.
REFERENCES
DixonJ.A. (et.al) “Economic Analysis of the EnvironmwRI
Impact of Development Projects”, Earthscan Publications, Lon
don, 1992.
Paranjpye,V."Final Submission to Mr.B.Morse, Chairman.
2.
World Bank Independent Review, Sardar Sarovar Projects,
March 25, 1992.
Kothari,A & Ram.R.N.”Environmental Aspects of the Sardar
3.
Sarovar Project”, Kalpavriksh.New Delhi. 1994.
4. Paranjpye. V. “Economic and Financial Viability of the Sardar
Sarovar Project”, Paper Presented at the Delhi School of
Economics, Delhi, 1993.
A Reappraisal of Sardar Sarovar Financial Costs.CanThis Project
5.
Ever Be Financed, Narmada Bachao Andolan, Baroda, Sept.
1994.
Reddy.A.K.N.& Sant,G.”Power from the Sardar Sarovar.An in
6.
efficient Plan”.Survey of the Environment. 1994, Madras. 1994.
Dharmadhikari. S. “Hydropower at Sardar Sarovar: Is it Neces
7.
sary, Justified and Affordable?. September 30. 1993.
8. Patel J. “The Myths Exploded”. EDSA-PPA, Pune 1994.
I.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: We are extremely grateful to Mr.Vijay
Paranjpye for offering us his valuable material for this issue.
Space constraints, however,did not permit us to present all the
data on his detailed analysis of the SSP.
Printed Matter
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