RF_SOS_1_SUDHA.pdf
Media
- extracted text
-
RF_SOS_1_SUDHA
L
Z
•
Social Comparison
Processes
1
Theoretical and Empirical
Perspectives
Edited by
Jerry M. Suls
State University of New York at Albany
Richard L Miller
Genera! Research Corporation
McLean, Virginia
1/1
0
I
HEMISPHERE PUBLISHING CORPORATION
Washington
London
A HALSTED PRESS BOOK
JOHN WILEY & SONS
i
Contents
Contributors
Preface
xi
1
Copyright © 1977 by Hemisphere Publishing Corporation. All rights
reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by
photostat, microform, retrieval system, or any other means, without
the prior written permission of the publisher.
X
SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY AND RESEARCH:
AN OVERVIEW FROM 1954
Jerry M. Suls
Introduction
1
Festinger’s Social Comparison Theory
2
Developments in the 1950s to the mid-1960s
8
Developments Since 1966, and the Present Volume
References
17
1
15
Hemisphere Publishing Corporation
1025 Vermont Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005
Distributed solely by Halsted Press, a Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
New York.
1234567890
DODO
783210987
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Social comparison processes.
Includes indexes.
1. Social psychology. 2. Self-perception.
3. Attitude (Psychology) I. Suls, Jerry M.
II. Miller, Richard L.
HM299.S58
301.1
77-8572
ISBN 0-470-99174-7
Printed in the United States of America
CHOICE OF COMPARISON PERSONS IN EVALUATING
ONESELF
Charles L. Cruder
21
Introduction
21
Motivational Issues
22
Reinforcement via Uncertainty Reduction
22
Two Functions of Social Comparison
23
Conflict Between Self-Evaluation and Self-Enhancement
24
Preference for Self-Evaluation
24
Preference for Self-Enhancement
25
Satisfaction of Self-Evaluation and Self-Enhancement
29
Focus on Evaluated Trait or Ability
30
Additional Comparison Dimensions
34
Measuring Self-Enhancement and Self-Evaluation
36
Summary and Conclusions
37
References
38
Hi
i
(3)
AFFILIATION, SOCIAL COMPARISON, AND SOCIALLY
MEDIATED STRESS REDUCTION
Nickolas B. Cottrell and Stephen W. Epley
Preferences for Dissimilar Comparison Others Who Have Become
Nonthreatening
82
Deeper Relationships and the Increased Value of
Dissimilarity
83
The Superiority of Dissimilar Comparison Others for Purposes
of Self-Definition
84
When It Is Better to Be Different
85
Desirability of Available Comparison Others: II. Feedback and
Attraction
85
Dissimilar Others as Sources of More Potent Comparative
Feedback
85
The Two-Edged Sword Effect: Dissimilar Others as Less Potent
Sources of Affective Feedback
87
Conclusions and Implications
94
Limitations of the Evidence: Reasons for a Cautious Conclusion
Social Comparison and Siblings: Contrast Versus Identification
Comparison with Prior Acquaintances
97
Social Comparison and a Comprehensive Theory of
Self-Evaluation
98
References
98
43
Introduction
43
43
Emotional Antecedents of Affiliation
Fear Prompts Affiliation
44
44
Firstborns Affiliate When Afraid, But Later-Borns Do Not
Affiliation and Other Emotional States
44
Emotional Comparison Theory
46
Fear Produces Affiliation for Social Comparison
46
49
Uncertainty Produces Affiliation for Social Comparison
Emotionality and Uncertainty as Joint Determinants
of Affiliation
51
52
Emotional Comparison and Social Influence
53
Looking at Other Persons for Social Comparison1
56
Emotional Comparison Theory: Progress and Prospects
57
Socially Mediated Stress Reduction
58
Self-Reported Reactions to Stress
59
Physiological Responses to Stress
60
Task Performance in Response to Stress
65
Socially Mediated Stress Reduction: Conclusions
5
Summary
66
References
66
4
v
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
iv
SOCIAL COMPARISON AND INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION:
THE CASE FOR DISSIMILARITY
David R. Mettee and Gregory Smith
69
Purpose and Overview—The Value of Being Different
Definition and Scope
69
Social Comparison for Purposes of Self-Evaluation-What It Is
and What It Isn’t
69
72
Self-Evaluation Needs Served by Social Comparison
72
Attraction Effects of Social Comparison Feedback
The Nature of the Comparison Event in Which Comparison
Feedback Is Generated
74
76
Basic Conceptual Framework: The Case for Dissimilarity76
Blunted Affective Consequences and Dissimilarity
77
Dissimilar Others as Sources of Better Information
Desirability of Available Comparison Others: I. Comparison
Preferences
79
Aroused Need for Self-Evaluation and Affiliation Preference
for Comparison Others-The Superior Usefulness of
79
Information Derived from Dissimilar Comparison Others
AFFILIATION PREFERENCES AS A FUNCTION OF ATTITUDE
AND ABILITY SIMILARITY
Richard L. Miller and Jerry M. Suls
Introduction
103
104
Predictions from Festinger’s Theory and Prior Research
Study I: The Effects of Ability on Affiliation Preferences
in Cooperative and Competitive Interactions
105
Study II: Ability Considerations in Partner Selection for
Cooperative Work
108
Study III: Ability and Size of Group Considerations for
Partner Selection
112
Study IV: Attitude and Ability Considerations in Partner Selection
Study V: Attitude and Ability Considerations-A Replication and
Extension
118
Study VI: The Effects of Attitude and Ability Similarity
on Satisfaction with Cooperative Interaction
118
Summary and Conclusions
121
122
Implications for Social Comparison Processes
References
124
69
6
94
95
103
115
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE SOCIAL COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES
Carl H. Castore and John A. DeNinno
Introduction
125
129
Study I
125
xii
PREFACE
assistance with the indexing. We are grateful to our wives and children for their
affection and support during this project. Finally, we would like to dedicate this
volume to the memory of Nick Cottrell and David Mettee, whose untimely
deaths during the production of this book have left us all with a sense of loss.
Jerry M. Suls
Richard L. Miller
Social Comparison
Theory and Research
1
An Overview from 1954
Jerry M. Suls
State University of New York at Albany
INTRODUCTION
The question of how people come to understand themselves has always been
asked. For centuries, however, the question appeared to be exclusively the
property of theologians and philosophers. Their proposed answers varied con
siderably but reflected a fundamental dichotomy. Platonists and theologians
believed the process of self-understanding and self-evaluation stemmed from
comparison with absolute standards (e.g., The Absolute, God). Others, such as
Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics, interpreted self-evaluation as a social
process in which people compared themselves with other people. Of course, both
processes may work simultaneously; neither excludes the other.
What has changed in recent times is the emphasis placed on the social
underpinnings of the self-concept. By self-concept, we mean individuals’ feelings
of self-worth, their perceived personal characteristics, and their evaluations of
their abilities, opinions, and values. The social sciences have played a large role in
this shift of emphasis. It is now widely accepted that one’s self-concept is vitally
affected by social comparison. That is, one’s self-concept is based in part on how
one compares to other individuals with regard to traits, opinions, and abilities.
This notion suggests that the self is relativistic in its nature, since it depends on
the particular comparison others available. It may be more than coincidence that
this notion should emerge in the same century that our view of the physical
world has also taken a relativistic turn.
The present volume brings together the work of several psychologists who
have examined the processes by which individuals learn about themselves through
comparison with others. These psychologists’ efforts have, in one way or another,
been directed by one of the more influential theories of self-evaluation, Leon
Festinger’s theory of social comparison processes (1954a). This theory attempts
to stipulate why comparison is used, with whom comparisons are made, and
what effects comparison has. The purposes of the present chapter are to review
briefly the major tenets of this theory and to summarize the work that serves as
The author is indebted to Gerald Gaes, Bruce Layton, and Fred Tesch for their
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
i
I
2
J. M. SULS
SOCIAL COMPA.
the point of departure for the theoretical and empirical developments presented
in subsequent chapters. The summary in this chapter is selective, focusing only
on those aspects of the theory that have received the most attention.
FESTINGER'S SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY
Festinger’s social comparison theory developed from a broad range of
conceptual and empirical advances that began in the late nineteenth century.
These developments suggested that the social environment is an important factor
in determining individuals’ concept of self and their behavior. The writings of
James (1890), Cooley (1902), and Mead (1934) argued that people’s self-concept
is dependent on how others view and react to them. Cooley referred to this idea
as the “looking-glass self.” Other psychological and sociological discussion
considered the normative and comparative functions of the social environment.
The normative function refers to the setting and enforcing of standards of conduct
and belief. The comparative function refers to the notion that the social group
serves as a standard or comparison point against which people measure themselves.
Empirical work soon followed that documented these observations. Notable
examples included Sherifs work on conformity (1936), demonstrating the
powerful influence of others in making even the simplest judgments, and
Newcomb’s Bennington study (1943) showing the impact of one’s social group on
resulting opinions and values. Both of these classic studies illustrated the normative
and comparative functions of the social group, but in this research it is difficult to
separate out the effects of each function. The comparative function, which is the
focus of comparison theory, can be seen clearly and dramatically in the work of
Hyman. In 1942, Hyman coined the term reference group to explain the data he
collected concerning how individuals understand their own subjective socio
economic statuses. Hyman said that individuals’ reported status was a function not
of their actual attributes such as education and income but rather of what social
groups they employed as standards (their reference groups). What was most
interesting was that individuals frequently used as their reference groups, groups of
which they were not even members.
These and other developments set the stage for Festinger’s theory. Neverthe
less, social comparison theory marked an important departure from previous
work. First, it attempted to provide a full-scale, logically developed theory of
self-evaluation. Second, unlike the previous theories, it provided testable experi
mental hypotheses and was tied to experimental data. That Festinger attempted
to outline a theory with hypotheses, corollaries, and derivations so early in the
history of experimental social psychology is perhaps proof of his brilliance and
his boldness. The experimental emphasis is understandable, however, since his
most direct sources of inspiration came from experimental work initiated in the
1930s and 1940s by his teacher Kurt Lewin. Two programs of research were
especially important: the first studied how individuals set goals or levels of
aspiration, and the second was concerned with the dynamics of social communi
cation.
i
JN THEORY AND RESEARCH
3
The level of aspiration research involved placing subjects in an achievement
situation, giving them some practice with a task, and then asking them, “How
well would you like to do on the next trial?” This research showed that
individuals are generally happier if their performance matches or exceeds their
level of aspiration and unhappy if it does not. But what was more important for
Festinger was that when standards of comparison (group norms) are available and
when individuals find that they have performed comparably to the norms, they
show greater stability in evaluating their ability and a more consistent aspiration
level across trials (Gardner, 1939; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944). But
comparison with others can, in some cases, produce shifts in individuals’ level of
aspiration. For example, Festinger (1942) showed that subjects lowered their
aspiration level if they scored above the group average and raised their aspiration
level if they scored below the group average. The fact that individuals tried to
achieve uniformity with their group and responded to discrepancies between their
own performance and that of their reference group is important in social
comparison theory, as we will see shortly.
The second research program examined the effects of informal communication
in small groups. In this research, Lewin, Festinger, and their associates observed
the variety and direction of interpersonal communication. Their results revealed
that group members communicate with one another in order to attain uniformity
or agreement on group-opinion issues. This uniformity served two purposes. First,
a degree of uniformity was necessary to successfully coordinate behaviors to
achieve group goals. Second, it was found that group members desired uniformity
because it provided them with confidence in their beliefs when there were no
simple objective tests of validation or correctness. Both functions were used to
derive a series of hypotheses, articulated by Festinger in 1950, to explain the
results of several studies on group communication and the rejection of opinion
deviates. The fact that interpersonal information and uniformity are such potent
determinants of behavior was another key for social comparison theory.
In 1954, Festinger (1954a) extended his earlier statement and changed the
emphasis of his ideas. The earlier theory of social communication stressed the
power of the group over the individual. Social comparison theory, in contrast,
stressed how individuals use the group to fulfill their informational needs to
evaluate their opinions and abilities. In other ways, the theories are quite similar.
In fact, Festinger freely used the experimental evidence inspired by informal
communication theory to support social comparison theory.
The basic tenet of social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954a) is that humans
have a drive to evaluate their opinions and abilities (Hypothesis I). Festinger
assumed that this drive had survival value, that without an accurate appraisal of
one’s abilities and opinions, one could not survive effectively. The theory stipulated
that people first attempt to evaluate their opinions or abilities through objective,
nonsocial means. If such means are unavailable, however, they evaluate themselves
through comparisons with the opinions or abilities of other people (Hypothesis II).
Although it is not always clear when physical-objective standards are present
or absent, Festinger (1954b) gave some informative examples:
4
J. M. SULS
If an individual thinks the temperature outside is below freezing he could
look at a thermometer or put a dish of water outside and wait to see if it
freezes.... If he wants to know whether his ability is good enough to
accomplish the single purpose, namely, can he shoot squirrels with an air
rifle, it is possible for him ... to try to do it and find out whether indeed
he can. (p. 194)
In some cases, however, a “physical” test is not possible. There is no reality
test available for opinions or beliefs about the existence of ESP or the
inevitability of war. Similarly, with regard to ability, one cannot know if one
possesses adequate ability to obtain a college degree before actually trying to do
so. Since there are many occasions where the physical or objective standards are
not available (and some cases where they never can be), Festinger proposed that
people must employ other people as standards for comparison. If for some
reason neither physical nor social comparisons are available, then individuals’
evaluation of their ability or opinion should be unstable (Corollary HA). This
instability may be reflected in the individuals’ behavior (erratic performance) or
in their shifting self-reports about their opinions or abilities. This is an
undesirable state of affairs according to the theory and continues until the
individuals find a physical or social comparison that provides an adequate and
appropriate means for self-appraisal.
The focal point of the theory concerns the choice of particular others when
social comparison is necessary (Hypothesis III). Festinger (1954a) theorized that
“given a range of possible persons for comparison, someone else close to one’s
ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison” (Corollary IIIA, p. 121). The
rationale for this proposition is that “if the only comparison available is a very
divergent one, the person will not be able to make a subjectively precise
evaluation of his opinion or ability” (Corollary IIIB, p. 121).
This similarity hypothesis is probably the most widely cited aspect of the
theory. The theory reasons that only similar others provide truly useful
information. In the case of opinion evaluation, it is suggested that only if the
individuals’ opinion agrees with those held by others with whom they associate
(assumed to be similar in important respects) do the individuals feel the opinion
is correct. If there is a difference in opinion, the individuals should feel that
theirs may be incorrect and their evaluation of their opinion should be unstable
and imprecise (Festinger, 1954b, p. 196).
With regard to the evaluation of one’s ability, the theory states that the
individuals should compare themselves with others whose performances are
relatively similar to their own. Festinger reasoned that if individuals’ performance
is greatly discrepant from that of other persons, then all the individuals know is
that their own performance possibilities are unique. This is negative knowledge,
however, since the individuals cannot know from this information precisely what
they themselves can do. If, in contrast, similar-ability others are available for
comparison, the individuals [know that their] own possibilities for action in the
environment are identical or very similar to those of these other persons
(Festinger, 1954b, p. 197).
SOCIAL COMF.
SON THEORY AND RESEARCH
5
Radioff (1966) has expressed the case for similar-ability others in a somewhat
different way by using the example of a person who is superior to all the people
he knows. In this case, Radloff states:
Even his shoddiest performance is superior to the best efforts of the person
closest to him in abdity. Imagine further that there are no objective
standards by which to judge performance. The only way of judging quality
is by comparison with the performance of others. Clearly such a person
would have great difficulty knowing which of his efforts were better than
others, (p. 8)
However, if persons of similar ability are available for comparison, then the
individual might determine which of his efforts are better than others. (We
should note that Festinger’s notion that only similar others provide a precise
basis for self-evaluation is open to argument. As Latan^ (1966) noted, a novice
chess player might compare his ability with a chess master’s to see what can be
achieved and to see how far he is from excellence even though the chess master
is highly dissimilar.)
What is meant by similarity in the previous paragraphs and in Hypothesis III
and related corollaries is, of course, similarity on the dimension that is under
evaluation. However, Festinger had another kind of similarity in mind also. In
Hypothesis VIII, Festinger (1954a) proposed, “If persons who are very divergent
from one’s opinion or ability are perceived as different from oneself on attributes
consistent with the divergence, the tendency to narrow the range of comparabdity becomes stronger” (p. 133). Festinger appears to be suggesting that other
persons who are similar on attributes related to the ability or opinion to be
evaluated will serve well for comparison. As has been noted, “We do not merely
seek out someone with an opinion similar to ours but rather seek out someone
who ought to have, by virtue of similarity to ifs on attributes related to the
opinion issue, a similar opinion” (Wheeler, Shaver, Jones, Goethals, Cooper,
Robinson, Cruder, & Butzine, 1969, p. 231). This aspect of Festinger’s statement
has frequently been overlooked (see Patchen, 1961, and Wilson, 1973, for
notable exceptions) but becomes a critical aspect of Goethals and Darley’s
attributional approach to social comparison (Chapter 11 in this volume).
Since only similar others are seen as providing stable and accurate self-evalua
tion, persons should compare themselves with someone whose ability or opinions
are similar to their own and should be attracted to situations where others are
similar to them (Derivation C). In addition, since comparison with extremely
divergent others produces imprecise and unstable evaluations (Corollary IIIB),
such comparison situations should be avoided by the individuals.
Of course, there may be instances when comparison others are neither
completely simUar nor completely dissimilar. In these cases where others have
moderately discrepant opinions or abilities, the theory posits that individuals
display tendencies to change their own evaluation of the opinion or ability in
question (Derivation D,). In other words, the individuals move toward the
comparison others in order to reduce the existing discrepancy and to achieve an
6
J. M. SULS
accurate and stable evaluation. Alternatively, the individuals may try to bring the
comparison persons close to themselves (Derivation Dj). For opinion evaluation,
the individuals may employ persuasion techniques; for ability evaluation, they
may offer advice. Both strategies, changing either themselves or others, attempt
to produce uniformity. It is through uniformity that the individuals are presumed
to achieve a stable and precise evaluation.
Comparison theory stipulates that any factors that increase the drive to evaluate
some ability or opinion increase the pressure toward uniformity. These factors were
adopted from Festinger’s informal communication theory (19 50). The factors include
the importance of the ability or opinion, its relevance to immediate behavior (Corol
lary to Derivation E), one’s attractiveness to the group (Corollary VIIA), and the
relevance of the group to the ability or opinion (Corollary VIIB). As one or more of
these elements increase, individuals are more motivated to achieve uniformity with
relevant others and to reject discrepant others. In addition, as I mentioned earlier, the
tendency to reject very discrepant others becomes stronger if the others “are
perceived as different from oneself on attributes consistent with the divergence”
(Hypothesis VII, Festinger, 1954a, p. 133). In other words, once a reason for the
discrepancy or dissimilarity is known, the tendency to cease comparison is increased.
Since the previous discussion focused on the degree of discrepancy between
individuals and the possible comparison others, the reader may ask how it is
possible to define a moderate discrepancy. Festinger was not explicit on this
matter, although Pettigrew (1967) suggested that what Festinger presumably
meant by a somewhat different referent individual is someone within what Sherif
and Hovland called the “latitude of acceptance.”
Thus far, we have treated the social evaluation of opinions and of abilities as
synonymous in order to discuss the general formulation of the theory. However,
Festinger (1954a) outlined two important differences between abilities and
attitudes that have important implications for the comparison process. First,
“there is a unidirectional drive upward in the case of abilities which is largely
absent in opinions” (Hypothesis IV, p. 124). This drive, which may be culturally
derived, refers to the value that is placed on doing better and better. However,
since there is a simultaneous pressure toward uniformity, Festinger suggested that
“the individual is oriented toward some point on the ability continuum slightly
better than his own performance or the performance of those with whom he is
comparing himself’ (p. 126). Thisjneans that . even if _gpup„ uniformity is
achieved, the unidirectional drive continues to operate and competition in the
group continues. As a result, Festinger declared that with respect to the
evaluation of abilities, social quiescence can never be reached. Since there is no
unidirectional drive posited to operate for opinions, uniformity of opinion is
possible and when achieved produces a state of social quiescence (see Harris,
1976, for a critical discussion of this derivation).
Festinger did not specify how this drive might affect comparison choice.
Festinger only suggested that individuals would strive toward a point slightly
better than their present performance and the performance of comparison others.
Wheeler (1966) interpreted this to mean that individuals will try to compare
social comparison theory and research
7
themselves with others of slightly superior ability, a choice that represents a
compromise between the simharity force and the unidirectional drive upward.
Latan£ (1966) noted that the unidirectional-drive notion does not specify
whether individuals will compare themselves with someone slightly better off
than they or someone slightly worse. In the case of individuals’ choosing
someone slightly worse, Latan^’s reasoning was that the individuals could look
better by comparing themselves with someone who was worse. Such downward
comparison might allow for satisfaction of the unidirectional drive without
making it necessary to improve one’s performance.
There is an important further consideration, however. By positing a drive to
do better or at least to appear better than others, Festinger specified an
ego-enhancement function of social comparison that goes beyond the informa
tional function emphasized in his theory. The notion of self-enhancement as a
distinct component of the comparison motive was considered only briefly at
various points in the 1954 statement (Festinger, 1954a).. It has, however,
generated much of the subsequent work on social comparison processes (see
Chapters 2, 5, and 7 of this volume).
A second element that distinguishes abilities and opinions is “non-social
restraints which make it difficult or even impossible to change one’s ability.
These non-social restraints are largely absent for opinions” (Hypothesis V,
Festinger, 1954a, p. 125). By this, Festinger meant that people can change their
opinion when they want, but no matter how motivated individuals may be to
improve their ability, other elements (e.g., physical liabUities) may make this
impossible. The consequence of this difference between abilities and opinions is
relatively straightforward. While individuals may change their opinions to achieve
uniformity with others, they are unlikely to be able to achieve this with regard
to some abilities.
The differences between opinions and abilities also suggested to Festinger that
cessation of comparison in the case of discrepant others may differ as a function
of whether an opinion or an ability difference is at issue. In brief, it was
proposed that cessation of comparison for opinion discrepancy would be
accompanied by hostility or derogation but that ability discrepancy would not
(Corollary VIA). The reasoning behind this corollary was that opinion discrep
ancy implies that one’s opinions are incorrect, whereas no negative implications
necessarily accompany ability discrepancy. To support this corollary, Festinger
cited work by himself, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt Back (1950) showing that
people with discrepant views were rejected by the group and seen as unattractive.
In a study by Hoffman, Festinger, and Lawrence (1954) that involved ability
comparison, low scorers ceased comparing with a high scorer but showed no
hostility toward him. Thus the available evidence supports the notion that
opinion discrepancy engenders hostility while ability discrepancy does not.
Although Festinger (1954a) proposed and derived several other propositions in
his statement, the preceding summary outlines the major points of the theory.
The bulk of Festinger’s remaining discussion attempted to specify the implica
tions of the social comparison process for group formation and for social
8
J. M. SULS
structure. As the reader may have anticipated, the selection of comparison others
and the consequences of comparison produce social groupings possessing a high
degree of uniformity on the opinions and abilities important and relevant for the
grouping. We should, therefore, find relative similarity in abilities and opinions
among persons who associate with one another. In addition, the segmentation of
groups produces status in society. According to Festinger, this segmentation
functions to allow individuals to ignore differences between themselves and the
members of another group and to compare themselves only with their own
group.
Festinger noted, however, that perfect incomparabihty is probably never
achieved. This, Festinger thought, may be especially true of minority group
members. Without complete incomparability with other groups, minority group
members may have less-secure self-evaluations, which will create stronger pres
sures toward uniformity within the group and less tolerance of differences in
ability or opinion.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1950s TO THE MID-1960S
Throughout his theoretical statement, Festinger (1954a) cited relevant experi
mental evidence to support his arguments. Much of this evidence came from
research on level of aspiration and on informal communication in groups. For
example, Festinger supported the hypothesis that individuals change their own
evaluation toward that of others who are somewhat different, by citing several
level of aspiration studies (Chapman & Volkmann, 1939; Festinger, 1942). These
demonstrated that individuals who find out that “others like themselves” have
scores different from their own change their stated level of aspiration toward the
performance of the others. In presenting the hypothesis concerning the relation
ship between the relevance of an opinion or an ability and the pressure toward
uniformity, Festinger cited the now classic study by Schachter (1951), which
demonstrated that the tendency to reject deviates was stronger in high-relevance
conditions.
In reading through Festinger’s statement, one notes that nearly every proposi
tion, corollary, derivation, or hypothesis is accompanied by some citation to
relevant supportive data. As Singer (1966) has noted, however, “Most of the data
Festinger used to illustrate this theory were reinterpretations—plausible, but not
unequivocal” (p. 104).
In the same issue of Human Relations in which Festinger’s theory paper
appeared, there were three articles that more directly tested various aspects of
the theory. Hoffman, Festinger, and Lawrence (1954) reported a study in which
half of the groups tested were told that the three persons in the group had been
selected to take a test together because they were about equally intelligent
(homogeneous condition). The other half of the groups were told that one of
the three persons in the group was superior to the other two, but this was done
in a way that precluded any subject’s thinking he was the superior one
(heterogeneous condition). The subjects worked on a three-person competitive
SOCIAL C
'ARISON THEORY AND RESEARCH
9
bargaining task in which they could form coaHtions to win more points. Results
indicated that subjects in the homogeneous condition continued to compete
against the confederate who scored considerably better than they did. When the
subjects thought one of them was clearly superior (heterogeneous condition),
they competed considerably less with the confederate and tended to compete
against each other. These results are consistent with the social comparison
hypothesis stipulating that comparison (as through competition) ceases when a
perceived difference with the other is consistent with a divergence in ability.
Since no hostility was shown toward the superior other, the study also supported
the contention that differences in ability do not result in hostility or derogation.
In the second article, Dreyer (1954), using a level of aspiration paradigm,
found some support for the contention that individuals cannot make a precise
self-evaluation when only divergent comparison others are available. In this
experiment, subjects were given feedback that they had performed better, worse,
or about the same as their reference groups and were then asked, “How well do
you feel you did?” The results revealed that the subjects were more satisfied
with their performances when they had performed comparable to their reference
group, a finding consistent with social comparison theory predictions.
The third study that accompanied Festinger’s theoretical statement was by
Festinger, Torrey, and Willerman (1954), and it tested the hypothesis that
stronger attraction to a group should induce stronger pressure toward uniformity.
The authors reported some marginal support for this hypothesis in an ability
setting.
Singer (1966) noted that the theoretical paper and the three empirical papers
marked an auspicious beginning for a theoretical advance. It was clear, however,
that more research testing the theory’s basic tenets was needed. Unfortunately,
progress was slow, perhaps in part because Festinger himself turned to the theory
of cognitive, dissonance (1957), which was to be the focus of his and his
students’ and associates’ attention for several years.
A major development for social comparison processes occurred in 1959 with
the publication of Stanley Schachter’s Psychology of Affiliation. This book
reported a series of experiments that showed that fear induces affiliation in
humans (at least among subjects who were firstborns or only children). Schach
ter’s experiments suggested that the fear-affiliation relationship is partly predica
ted upon the comparison motive, that is, individuals desired to affiliate with
others in a similar state, who also expected to be shocked, in order to evaluate
their own emotional state. As Schachter (1959) said, “Misery doesn’t love any
kind of company, it loves only miserable company” (p. 24). These results were
important because they supported the comparison hypothesis that individuals
prefer to compare themselves with similar others. They also had another
consequence, since they suggested that Festinger’s basic statement could be
extended to emotions as well as opinions and abilities.
As a result of Schachter’s ground-breaking efforts, considerable research
attention was given to the psychology of affiliation and the role of the
comparison motive in evaluating emotional states. The 1960s saw numerous
J. M. SULS
social comparison theory and research
efforts following up and refining Schachter’s original work, and these efforts
continue to the present. A comprehensive critical review of the fear-affiliation
literature can be found in Chapter 3 in this volume. While this work on the
comparison of emotional states had a general salutary effect and maintained
interest in social comparison processes, studies of the comparison process as it
affects opinion and ability evaluation tended to take a back seat. In addition,
because Schachter’s principal dependent measure was affiliation choice, subse
quent researchers adopted this as their primary measure and gave less attention
to evaluation accuracy and evaluation stability as dependent measures.
Schachter himself, however, examined the social and cognitive determinants of
emotional states. In their classic study, Schachter and Singer (1962) demon
strated that when individuals are physiologically aroused without any apparent
reason, they take on the emotion of those they are with. According to Schachter
and Singer, the unexpected arousal produces an ambiguous state that the
individuals need to label. Other people may be one source of information about
a label for the individuals’ physiological state. While these results are clearly
consistent with social comparison theory, they also go further by suggesting that
bodily states may in some instances induce the comparison motive.
This study is pivotal for another reason: it suggested the importance of
attribution processes and partly inspired the recent interest in self-perception
theory (Bern, 1967; Kelley, 1967). It is perhaps unfortunate that Schachter and
Singer’s work is usually linked to attribution theory and research when it really
followed logically from Schachter’s work on comparison and affiliation. Although
we are anticipating the argument of Chapter 11, the fact that Schachter and
Singer’s study was inspired by interest in social comparison and became an
important development in the study of attribution processes suggests that
attribution and social comparison are similar processes. Goethals and Darley, in
fact, use attribution theory as a framework for a reinterpretation and extension
of social comparison theory.
One major advance and extension proposed in the early and mid-1960s was J.
Stacy Adams’s theory of inequity in social exchange (1965). This theory
represents a synthesis of cognitive dissonance theory, Homan’s concept of
distributive justice, and social comparison theory. According to Adams, compari
son is not restricted to attitudes and abilities but also includes an individual’s
“inputs” (effort, qualifications, etc.) and “outcomes” (pay, rewards, etc.).
Specifically, the theory states that two (or more) individuals compare the ratios
of their inputs and outcomes from a similar situation to determine whether they
have been treated fairly or justly. For example, employee A compares his salary
(outcome) with respect to the time, effort, and qualifications he puts into his
work (input) with a similar ratio for employee B in a similar situation. Inequity
results when these ratios are perceived as unequal:
Adams posited that the perception of inequity generates tension, which promotes
either behavior change to equalize the ratios or a cessation of comparison. Much
research has accumulated since Adams proposed his theory, and the research
supports the theory’s propositions (see Berkowitz & Walster, 1976).
In a representative study, Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) recruited college
students to proofread page proofs. One group of subjects was led to believe that
they were well qualified to receive the standard proofreading rate of 30 cents a
page. Questioning about this pay rate indicated that subjects felt the situation to
be fair and equitable. Another group of subjects was led to believe that they
were unqualified but would be paid at the standard rate anyway. Questioning
indicated that these subjects felt they had received an undeserved privilege.
Adams and Rosenbaum then examined the actual quantity and quality of work
performed by subjects in the two groups and found that those subjects who felt
benefited by inequity put in twice the amount of work as the subjects who felt
qualified. In other words, the subjects in the inequity condition tried to earn
their pay and so restore equity. Other research shows that subjects who perceive
negative inequity (feel underpaid compared to others) put in less effort and do
lower-quality work as a result.
This work on equity suggests that comparison is as important in evaluating
“objective” stimuli such as pay as it is in evaluating one’s abilities or opinions. In
addition, equity theory and therefore comparison processes have also been
implicated in reactions to harmdoers, in reactions to victims, and in helping
behavior, among other phenomena. Berkowitz and Walster (1976) offer a
collection of papers discussing these developments. Austin in Chapter 12 of the
present volume reviews equity theory and its relevance to comparison processes.
Another major development in the mid-1960s was the publication of a special
supplemental volume to the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, edited
by Bibb Latan£, devoted to “Studies on Social Comparison.” The research
reported there represented the work of a group of students and associates of
Stanley Schachter’s at the University of Minnesota and at Columbia University.
This empirical research attempted to test some of the basic tenets of comparison
theory. For this reason, we consider these efforts in some detail.
Gordon (1966) tested the hypothesis that subjects who are uncertain of the
correctness of their opinions choose to compare themselves with people who
hold similar opinions. In addition, Gordon proposed an influence hypothesis,
stipulating that persons who are certain of the correctness of their opinion (and
thus not in need of comparison) will attempt to influence others who hold
dissimilar views. Gordon’s subjects were led to believe that they were either
correct or incorrect in their judgments of two case studies. The subjects were
asked to consider a third case study and received information that the other
group members had opinions slightly discrepant or highly discrepant with their
own. Subsequently, subjects indicated whether or not they wished to discuss the
third case study in a second session. Gordon’s results indicated that, consistent
with the comparison hypothesis, uncertain subjects (based on feedback on the
two prior case studies) preferred to affiliate with others who held similar views.
10
Outcome A
Input A
outcome B
input B
J
11
12
J. M. SULS
In contrast, subjects who believed they were correct on past trials and therefore
had less need to evaluate their opinions, prefened to associate with the
discrepant group, presumably in order to influence them.
Hakmiller (1966a) also examined the hypothesis that individuals compare
themselves with similar others when they are uncertain but, in this case, in regard
to ability. Hakmiller had his subjects, in groups of four, receive feedback that
they were correct or incorrect on a bogus social reasoning test. Over a series of
four trials, each subject was led to believe that one other, two others, or three
others concurred with him. Subjects then indicated whose response they would
like to see on a second set of problems. Presumably, subjects in the one-concurrer condition had less certainty in their judgements and therefore had a greater
need for social comparison, particularly with a similar other. In contrast, when
two others agreed with the subject, he had less need for evaluation and
comparison choices were random.
In three experiments, Radloff (1966) tested the comparison hypothesis that
the absence of similar comparison others leads to inaccurate and unstable
self-evaluations. Radloff reasoned that subjects of extremely high or low ability
should be less accurate and less stable in evaluating their performances than
should average subjects who have a larger number of similar others available for
comparison. Radloff had his subjects perform a pursuit rotor task and asked
them to judge their performance from trial to trial. Radloff reported, consistent
with his hypothesis, that nonaverage subjects were less accurate and more
unstable in their estimates of their performance. Of greater interest, however, was
the finding that when nonaverage subjects learned that others performed at a
comparable level (nonaverage), stability and accuracy became as good for them as
for average performers. This finding is strong evidence for social comparison
theory. We might note that another aspect of this experiment makes it of special
interest. It is the only study in the literature that specifically considered the
effects of comparison on the accuracy and stability of performance.
Three other papers in the same supplement examined individuals’ choices of
comparison others in evaluating personality traits. Reasoning from the unidirec
tional drive hypothesis, Wheeler (1966) proposed that individuals would compare
themselves to someone they believe to be slightly superior in ability and that this
tendency would be stronger when the individuals are motivated to do well. To
test these hypotheses, Wheeler administered a bogus personality test for the
purpose of selecting students for a seminar-type course that was described in
highly desirable terms (high motivation) or in highly undesirable terms (low
motivation). Subsequently, subjects were given a bogus score and the rank order
of the other members of the testing group. The results indicated that subjects
chose for comparison the score of someone who ranked above or adjacent to
them. Also, this tendency to make upward comparisons was stronger under
conditions of high motivation. Both results were consistent with Wheeler’s
hypotheses, but Wheeler noted that the results might seem paradoxical, since
upward comparison forces individuals to evaluate themselves as inferior. Upward
comparison, however, was most likely when the subjects assumed that
SOCIAL C
,’ARISON THEORY AND RESEARCH
13
they had a score quite close to that of the individual directly above
them.
Thornton and Arrowood (1966) also employed the rank-order paradigm and
examined comparison choices as a function of the positivity/negativity of the
trait being evaluated. Subjects were administered a bogus personality test
described as measuring either a positive or a negative trait, and then they
received a bogus score. They then indicated which score in the rank ordering
they wished to see. The choice data revealed that subjects chose someone better
than themselves more frequently when the trait tested was described as positive.
Thornton and Arrowood argued that the results were best interpreted in terms
of two motives that operate in social comparison, self-evaluation and self
enhancement. They proposed that the first motive is best served by easily
interpretable information—that is, by comparing oneself with someone who
exemplifies the trait (a positive instance) rather than by comparing oneself with
someone who has a low score (a negative instance). The self-enhancement motive,
however, is best served by asking, “How far am I from the best-off other?”
Employing this reasoning, Thornton and Arrowood proposed that for a positively
valued trait, the positive instance and the best-off other lie at the same end of
the rank order, the high scorer. For the negative trait, the positive instance is the
high score, but the most desirable score is the low score. Thornton and
Arrowood argued that since the positive instance and the best-off other are
represented by the same point on the positive trait continuum but not on the
negative trait continuum, the choice of a better-off other is stronger for positive
traits.
A second study by Hakmiller (1966b) also implicated the importance of the
evaluation and enhancement motives. In this experiment, subjects who had
previously taken the MMPI were told they could expect a low score on a
“hostility to one’s parents” measure. This trait was described by the experi
menter in positive (low-threat) or negative (high-threat) terms. Subsequently, the
subjects received a much higher score than expected and were given the
opportunity to see someone else’s score in the rank ordering. Hakmiller’s results
revealed that the highly threatened subjects demonstrated a stronger tendency to
compare with the worst-off person in the group, while the low-threat subjects
chose to compare with others of superior status. These findings were interpreted
by Hakmiller as supporting the self-enhancement component of social comparison
since by comparing themselves with someone worse off, the threatened subjects
could reduce the threat to their own self-esteem.
These three studies by Wheeler, Thornton and Arrowood, and Hakmiller
extended comparison theory to the evaluation of personality dimensions. They
also suggested the importance of the unidirectional drive and of self-enhancement
as factors in determining comparison choice. Of special note is that fact that
similar others are not always chosen for comparison, a finding contrary to one of
Festinger’s basic hypotheses. The inconsistencies were attributed by various
investigators “to the fact that the conditions under which predictions derived
from Festinger’s theory will hold have not been sufficiently specified” (Cruder,
14
SOCIAL
J. M. SULS
1971, p. 473). In Chapter 2 of the present volume, Cruder reviews this and
subsequent research on the rank-order paradigm.
Three other papers in the supplement followed up Schachter’s research on the
psychology of affiliation. Darley and Aronson (1966) investigated whether fear
reduction or the comparison motive was the most important determinant of the
fear-affiliation relationship. To distinguish between these two components, Darley
and Aronson gave subjects the choice of waiting alone, waiting with a
slightly more fearful other, or waiting with a considerably calmer other.
These researchers reasoned that since the second associate was more similar
to the subject, the social comparison motive would be best served by
affiliating with her. On the other hand, the associate in the third condition
was calmer and should provide fear reduction. Darley and Aronson reported
that their subjects showed a clear preference for the more similar other,
suggesting the greater importance of the comparison motive. As further
evidence, Darley and Aronson ran an additional condition in which subjects
had the choice of waiting with someone who was equally nervous or waiting
with someone who was more nervous. The results showed that subjects
chose to wait with the equally nervous other, which is again consistent with
social comparison theory.
In another study examining the effects of emotional arousal and affiliation,
Latand and Wheeler (1966) interviewed Naval personnel who had participated in
clean-up operations at an airplane crash site. Some of those interviewed about a
week after the crash had been involved in traffic control around the site; others
had searched for and put together pieces of human bodies. All subjects were
administered the Lykken Activity Preference Inventory (Lykken, 1957), which
measures emotional responsiveness. The results of the interviews indicated that
the men who were classified on the Lykken instrument as highly emotional and
who had participated in the body search indicated little desire to talk to others
in the week following the crash and also had written fewer letters home. The
nonemotional men, however, showed a greater desire to talk and had written
more letters home than did the emotional men. These results suggest that
particularly intense emotional arousal may in some cases lead to decreased
affiliation. It is conceivable that the intensity of the arousal made the arousal
state unambiguous and therefore the individual required no further evaluation
through social comparison. It is also possible that this intense situation embar
rassed some of the individuals involved. Sarnoff and Zimbardo (1961) have
reported that embarrassment may lead to decreased affiliation.
In another study, Latan£, Eckman, and Joy (1966) hypothesized that people
who are present in an ambiguous stressful situation may become attractive
because they provide evaluative information through social comparison. In this
study, subjects worked in dyads and either shared or did not share electric shock.
Attraction ratings taken after the manipulation showed that firstborn subjects
liked their partners more in the shared-shock condition. Although Latand et al.
noted that a fear-reduction hypothesis could explain their data, post-experimental
data indicated that shared-shock subjects reported the shock as more disturbing
JPARISON THEORY AND RESEARCH
15
and unpleasant, so it appears unlikely that their partners were attractive because
they served a pain- or fear-reducing function. Consistent with a social comparison
interpretation are the facts that (1) the effect held for firstborns, the individuals
who show the fear-affiliation relationship most strongly (Schachter, 1959), and
(2) there were data showing that subjects in the shared-shock condition were
more accurate at estimating their partner’s degree of disturbance than were
subjects in the other conditions, which would be expected if the social
comparison motive was induced in this situation and if individuals in a similar
situation were present.
All together, the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Supplement
presented the results of ten original experiments that supported and/or extended
Festinger’s social comparison theory. This support was by no means unqualified.
The authors realized that some of the studies were subject to alternative
explanations and asked for further research to clarify the issues. Much of the
subsequent research on social comparison was directly or indirectly inspired by
the efforts recorded in that valuable document.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1966, AND THE
PRESENT VOLUME
r
Since 1966, social psychologists have given increasingly more attention to the
study of social comparison processes and self-evaluation. This increase is reflected
partly in the number of published articles and dissertations on this topic.
However, as Wheeler (1974) has observed, “Investigators in the area of social
comparison have not carried on the systematic limited-variations-on-a-themeresearch. ... Nor are they particularly wedded to Festinger’s 1954 theory. The
spirit of the work is best characterized as a search for situations that may lead to
new insights” (p. 326). Perhaps this is the reason why many of the recent
developments in the social comparison area have come from research on related
topics such as interpersonal attraction, prosocial behavior, decision making in
groups, and equity behavior.
A key development in the late 1960s was the publication of Thomas
Pettigrew’s wide-ranging essay on social evaluation theory (1967). This essay
considered the convergences among a number of psychological and sociological
theories that have comparison as a major component and suggested the applica
tion of comparison processes to social problems. This essay has generated
enthusiasm among social scientists that a general formulation of social evaluation
may be possible that draws on psychological and sociological work. Finally, we
might add to these developments the study of attribution processes, an important
current pursuit for experimental social psychologists. Although the relationships
between social comparison processes and attribution processes have not always
been fully appreciated, as I mentioned earlier, both processes focus on “the
factors motivating the individual to obtain causally relevant information” (Jones,
Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1971, p. x). The two theories are
concerned, although in different ways, with the processes and consequences of
16
J. M. SULS
self-evaluation. Apparently, the study of self-evaluation is becoming one of the
major and crucial interests in social psychology.
The present volume reports the results of a variety of theoretical and
empirical endeavors in the study of social comparison and self-evaluation. Some
of the contributions are critical reviews of specific research areas, other contribu
tions suggest new theoretical approaches, and still others report original data
relevant to the social comparison process.
All of the contributors share the assumption that comparison is a primary
component in social behavior, but they are not in full agreement on the validity
of specific points of Festinger’s theory. Many contributors are in fact highly
critical of the theory or of some of the research interpreted as empirical support
for the theory. All of the contributors consider it important to define the
theory’s boundary conditions.
This book covers a broad range of theoretical and empirical issues. The
chapters in the first half of the book consider basic issues in the theory or classic
phenomena associated with the theory (e.g., fear and affiliation). The chapters in
the second half are more concerned with the relationship between social
comparison and other social phenomena.
In Chapter 2, Cruder summarizes the research literature on the choice of
comparison others for evaluating oneself on ability or personality traits. Cruder
focuses on research using the rank-order paradigm that suggests the joint
influence of self-evaluation and self-enhancement. Cottrell and Epley (Chapter 3)
offer a critical discussion of the fear-affiliation literature and the evidence for
socially mediated fear reduction. Cottrell and Epley are particularly concerned
with whether the comparison interpretation of the fear-affiliation relationship is
supported by the existing evidence.
In Chapter 4, Metee and Smith consider the arguments and theoretical basis
for the comparison proposition that only similar others can furnish stable and
accurate evaluation information. Mettee and Smith argue that a case can be made
for the influence of dissimilar others as well. The authors outline a theoretical
framework to explain when similar others or dissimilar others will be important
and also review findings relevant to their arguments.
In Chapter 5, Miller and Suls report the results of a series of studies
examining the influence of ability and attitude similarity on affiliation prefer
ences. This research suggests that features of the affiliation setting (e.g.,
evaluated-nonevaluated, competitive-cooperative, large group-small group) are
influential in determining whether attitude or ability similarity is an important
consideration in choosing an interaction partner.
Castore and DeNinno (Chapter 6) consider whether the selection of compari
son others is affected by overall attitudinal similarity or by specific attitudinal
similarity on task- or situation-relevant issues. Although social comparison theory
appears to suggest that similarity is perceived along task-relevant or situation
relevant dimensions, Castore and DeNinno report evidence that the selection of
comparison others is effected by overall similarity, not task-relevant similarity. It
SOCIAL
^PARISON THEORY AND RESEARCH
17
would seem that individuals prefer others who are generally similar, regardless of
their appropriateness in any particular situation.
In Chapter 7, Brickman and Bulman propose that in many instances people
have the desire to avoid social comparison and prefer to compare themselves with
dissimilar rather than similar others. These authors report the results of several
experiments that support this contention. Brickman and Bulman argue that this
desire to avoid social comparison derives from the social costs involved when
people compare themselves on valued dimensions.
In the second half of the book, the relationships between comparison
processes and other social behaviors are considered. Allen and Wilder (Chapter
8) summarize the literature on conformity and consider its relation to social
comparison and self-eval nation theory. In Chapter 9, Berger first considers how
modeling phenomena touch on the comparison process and then turns to the
specific problem of the effects of modeling and comparison on observer
perseverance. Jellison and Arkin (Chapter 10) discuss a self-presentation-social
comparison analysis of the decision-shift phenomenon. In developing this
approach, these authors suggest a reinterpretation of the social comparison process
and its functions. In Chapter 11, Goethals and Darley discuss the links between
attribution and social comparison processes, showing how the attributional
perspective may shed more light on comparison. Austin (Chapter 12) outlines
critical issues in equity theory and expounds on the relationships between equity
and social comparison. In Chapter 13, Cook, Crosby, and Hennigan critically
review the theoretical and empirical status of the concept of relative deprivation.
In the concluding chapter, Ladd Wheeler and Miron Zuckerman review all of the
contributions and suggest where these developments may lead.
REFERENCES
Adams, J. S. Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Academic Press, 1965.
Adams, J. S., & Rosenbaum, W. E. The relationship of worker productivity to
cognitive dissonance about wage inequity. Journal of Applied Psychology,
1962, 46, 161-164.
Bern, D. J. Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance
phenomenon. Psychological Review, 1967, 74, 183-2 00.
Berkowitz, L., & Walster, E. (Eds.). Advances in experimental social psychology
(Vol. 9). New York: Academic Press, 1976.
Chapman, D. W., & Volkmann, J. A. A social determinant of the level of
aspiration. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1939, 34, 225-238.
Cooley, C. H. Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribner’s, 1902.
Darley, J. M., & Aronson, E. Self-evaluation vs. direct anxiety reduction as
determinant of the fear-affiliation relationship. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 66-79.
Dreyer, A. Aspiration behavior as influenced by expectation and group compari
son. Human Relations, 1954, 7, 175-190.
I
18
J. M. SULS
Festinger, L. Wish, expectation, and group standards as factors influencing level
of aspiration. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1942, 37, 184-200.
Festinger, L. Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 1950, 57,
Tn-TXl.
Festinger, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 1954, 7,
117-140. (a)
Festinger, L. Motivation leading to social behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.),
Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1954. Lincoln, Neb.: University of
Nebraska Press, 1954. (b)
Festinger, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. New York: Row, Peterson, 1957.
Festinger, L., Schachter, S., & Back, K. Social pressures in informal groups. New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.
Festinger, L., Torrey, J., & Willerman, B. Self-evaluation as a function of attraction
to the group. Human Relations, 1954, 7, 161-174.
Gardner, J. W. Level of aspiration in response to a prearranged sequence of
scores. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1939, 25, 601-621.
Gordon, B. F. Influence and social comparison as motives for affiliation. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 55-65.
Cruder, C. L. Determinants of social comparison choices. Journal of Experi
mental Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 473-489.
Hakmiller, K. Threat as a determinant of downward comparison. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 32-39. (a)
Hakmiller, K. Need for self-evaluation, perceived similarity and comparison
choice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1,
49-54. (b)
Harris, R. J. The uncertain connection between verbal theories and research
hypotheses. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 210-219.
Hoffman, P. J., Festinger, L., and Lawrence, D. H. Tendencies toward group
comparability in competitive bargaining. Human Relations, 1954, 7, 141-159.
Hyman, H. H. The psychology of status. Archives of Psychology, 1942, No. 269,
James, W. Principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Henry Holt, 1890.
Jones, E. E., Kanouse, D. E., Kelley, H. H., Nisbett, R. E., Valins, S., & Weiner,
B. Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. Morristown, N.J.: General
Learning Press, 1972.
Kelley, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.),
Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vol. 15). Lincoln, Neb.: University of
Nebraska Press, 1967.
Latane, B. Studies in social comparison—Introduction and overview. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 1-5.
Latane, B., Eckman, J., & Joy, V. Shared stress and interpersonal attraction.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 95-102.
Latane, B., & Wheeler, L. Emotionality and reactions to disaster. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 92-102.
Lewin, K., Dembo, T., Festinger, L., & Sears, P. S. Level of aspiration. In
Personality and behavior disorders (Vol. 1). New York: Ronald Press, 1944.
Lykken, D. T. A study of anxiety in the sociopathic personality. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 55, 6-10.
Mead, G. H. Mead, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.
Newcomb, T. M. Personality and social change. New York: Dryden Press, 1943.
SOCIAL C
ARISON THEORY AND RESEARCH
19
Patchen, M. A conceptual framework and some empirical data regarding compari
sons of social rewards. Sociometry, 1961, 24, 136-156.
Pettigrew, T. F. Social evaluation theory: Convergences and applications. In D.
Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation. Lincoln, Neb.: University of
Nebraska Press, 1967.
Radloff, R. Social comparison and ability evaluation. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 6-26.
Sarnoff, I., & Zimbardo, P. Anxiety, fear and social affiliation. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 356-363.
Schachter, S. Deviation, rejection and communication. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 1951,46, 190-207.
Schachter, S. The psychology of affiliation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1959.
Schachter, S., & Singer, J. E. Cognitive, social and physiological determinants of
emotional state. Psychological Review, 1962,69, 379-399.
Sherif, M. The psychology of social norms. New York: Harper and Brothers,
1936.
Singer, J. E. Social comparison—Progress and Issues. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 103-110.
Thornton, D., & Arrowood, A. J. Self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and the locus
of social comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966,
Supplement 1, 40-48.
Wheeler, L. Motivation as a determinant of upward comparison. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 27-31.
Wheeler, L. Social comparison and selective affiliation. In T. Huston (Ed.)
Foundations of interpersonal attraction. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
Wheeler, L., Shaver, K. G., Jones, R. A., Goethals, G. R., Cooper, J., Robinson,
J. E., Cruder, C. L., & Butzine, K. W. Factors determining the choice of
comparison other. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5,
219-232.
Wilson, S. R. Ability evaluation and self-evaluation as types of social compari
sons. Sociometry, 1973, 36, 600-607.
A
IB’
?
|jg
I
I
r
g
I
..
I
Choice of
Comparison Persons
in Evaluating Oneself
H
-
Charles L. Cruder
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle
*1
INTRODUCTION
Perusal of the chapters in this book reveals that research on social comparison
processes has developed, broadly speaking, in two directions. Tests of the theory
as it was originally presented by Leon Festinger (1954) comprise one direction,
and implications of the theory for various categories of social behavior comprise
the other. The present chapter reviews some of the research in the first category,
specifically studies of the characteristics of other persons who are selected as
standards for comparison in evaluating onself.
Festinger presented what was, for social psychology, a formally stated theory
that has served the important function of generating research. However, many
would argue that social comparison theory has probably been cited post hoc
when convenient at least as much as it has been used a priori as a predictor.
Moreover, the theory may be less formal than it originally appeared to be—at
least one apparent internal inconsistency has been identified by formalizing the
theory in functional terms (Harris, 1974). Social comparison theory is broad, and
this breadth has been the source of both strength and weakness. Although it has
been a useful theory, it has not been sufficiently tested to allow a reasonably
complete assessment of it-for instance, it has not been tested to the point where
it is possible to rewrite it. Perhaps the chapters in this volume will provide the
information necessary for this task.
The basic assumption of social comparison theory is that persons have a drive
to evaluate their opinions and abilities (Hypothesis I, Festinger, 1954, p. 117).
Festinger hypothesized that persons prefer objective criteria, what he termed
physical reality, as standards for self-evaluation. For example, if a person wants
to find out how fast he or she can run a mile, the person can run a mile and
record the elapsed time with a stop watch. Festinger recognized, of course, that
physical reality is often not available: How does a person determine how well he
or she plays the guitar? How does a person know if his or her recommendations
for controlling economic inflation would be effective or not? How does a person
know if nuclear fusion breeder reactors or meditation or health foods are
beneficial or detrimental to a better life? Festinger argued that in the absence of
The author wishes to thank Ladd Wheeler for his comments on a draft of this chapter.
21
ll
■
r!.
"s
■
-
’
'•
■
8
'■ w
22
C. L. CRUDER
adequate physical reality, persons will seek out social reality, that is, other
persons, as a source of information (Hypothesis II, Festinger, 1954, p. 118).
Festinger called the search for information from social reality the process of
social comparison.
As mentioned, research that was designed to identify the determinants of
social comparison choices will be reviewed in this chapter. This research is most
relevant to Festinger’s Hypothesis III, its Corollaries IIIA and IIIB, and Deriva
tions A and B from Hypotheses I, II, and III. Hypotheses I and II have already
been described, and the others> are reproduced here for reference (Festinger,
1954):
Hypothesis III: The tendency to compare oneself with some other specific
person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and
one’s own increases, (p. 120)
Corollary IIIA: Given a range of possible persons for comparison, someone
close to one’s own ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison, (p
121)
Corollary IIIB: If the only comparison is a very divergent one, the person
will not be able to make a subjectively precise evaluation of his opinion
or ability, (p. 121)
Derivation A (from Hypotheses I, II, III): Subjective evaluations of
opinions or of abilities are stable when comparison is available with
others who are judged to be close to one’s opinions or abilities, (p. 122)
Derivation B (from Hypotheses I, II, HI): The availability of comparison
with others whose opinions or abilities are somewhat different from
one’s own will produce tendencies to change one’s evaluation of the
opinion or ability in question, (p. 122)
We will first consider motivational issues raised by these components of the
theory. These issues suggest an organizational framework for presentation of
research on the choice of comparison persons in evaluating oneself.
CHOICE OF COM'
’SON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
23
good idea of the feasibdity, the potential for success, the popularity, and so
forth, of the solutions he or she proposes for the constituency’s problems. The
existence of uncertainty about one’s abilities or opinions, then, constitutes an
obstacle to effective functioning. The person is motivated to reduce such
uncertainty because its existence is aversive and its elimination will, therefore, be
rewarding.
This interpretation of the motivation underlying social comparison implies
that comparisons should be preferred to the extent that they reduce uncertainty
in general, or provide useful information in a specific situation. Findings
obtained by Jones and Regan (1974) and by Wilson (1973) are particularly
relevant to this interpretation. In one experiment, Jones and Regan gave subjects
the opportunity to see comparative norms that they could use to evaluate their
own scores on a trait measure. Subjects wanted to see this comparison
information only when it would be useful to them in making a decision; they did
not want to see it when they had already made the decision. In a second
experiment, these investigators demonstrated that Festinger’s prediction that
individuals will prefer to compare themselves with someone who is similar in
ability held where the other had experiences relevant to the individuals’ subse
quent actions but not where the other did not have such experiences. Wilson
gave subjects a score that ostensibly represented their problem-solving ability.
Subjects who were led to believe that their score was close to the group mean
were more certain about their ability and said the information was more helpful
in evaluating their score than subjects who were led to believe that their score
was far from the mean. It is not surprising that other evidence (see the section
“Satisfaction of Self-Evaluation and Self-Enhancement,” later in this chapter)
reveals that uncertainty reduction and usefulness of the comparison information
not only produce main effects, but also effects that can be moderated by other
variables.
Two Functions of Social Comparison
MOTIVATIONAL ISSUES
Reinforcement via Uncertainty Reduction
Festinger’s Hypothesis I (1954) has been treated more as an axiom than as a
hypothesis. A postulate that there is a drive to evaluate oneself seems somewhat
unsatisfying, perhaps because teleological or other motivational attributions are
lacking. Jones and Gerard (1967, p. 312) focused on the usefulness of self-evalua
tion to the person. In effect, they began reasoning from the postulate that
persons are uncertain about aspects of themselves. In other words, persons lack
information about themselves, information that is useful, and indeed necessary,
in everyday living. A high school student needs information about his or her
intelligence, emotional maturity, career goals, and so on, in order to make a
decision about whether to go on to college. A political candidate must have a
Festinger s theory contains the notion that in addition to being motivated to
evaluate an attribute of the self, persons have a preference for what that
evaluation should reveal. Students want not only to discover how well they did
on the exam, but also to find out that they did well. These two goals are explicit
in the notion of a unidirectional drive upward for abilities (Hypothesis IV,
Festinger, 1954, p. 124), and implicit with respect to opinions. However, it
seems reasonable that this desire for a favorable evaluation is not restricted to
abilities and other attributes for which the positively valued direction is
culturally specified, a priori. With respect to opinions, emotions, or other
self-attributes, it can be expected that persons will desire to possess the
appropriate direction and degree of the attribute, once appropriateness is
determined by engaging in social comparison.
Thus it has been inferred from Festinger’s statement of social comparison
theory and from later work that two motivations underlie how a person engages
J
I*hI.
fe'
I
It
■
Ik®
Kl-f
I
|
II
iy
I
24
C. L. CRUDER
in social comparison. Thornton and Arrowood (1966) called these self-evaluation
and self-enhancement, while Singer (1966) called them evaluation and validation
of the self. A similar distinction has been drawn in other social-psychological
contexts, and is perhaps best represented by Jones and Gerard’s constructs of
information dependence and effect dependence (1967). Information dependence
refers to a person’s reliance on others for knowledge about the environment;
effect dependence refers to socially mediated reinforcement, or the consequences
(“effects”) one person’s behavior has for another. Information dependence and
effect dependence seem to represent a rather general distinction, while self
evaluation and self-enhancement represent a specific distinction relevant to social
comparison processes. As Jones and Gerard point out, there are at least three
other similar distinctions that are of intermediate generality: Kelley’s comparison
and normative functions of reference groups (1952); Deutsch and Gerard’s
informational and normative social influence (1955); and Thibaut and Strick
land’s task and group sets (1956).
CONFLICT BETWEEN SELF-EVALUATION
AND SELF-ENHANCEMENT
It is not always obvious how both the self-evaluation and self-enhancement
functions of social comparison can be served. In fact, as Singer (1966) and
Pepitone (1968) have pointed out, the attempt to serve both functions simul
taneously may produce a conflict for the person. As an example, a people who
have questions about their strong fear of flying are motivated to compare their
own feelings with other persons’ feelings in order to discover whether their own
fear is inordinately high, just average, low, etc. However, by engaging in such
comparison, these people run the risk of finding out that their own fear is so
great as to exacerbate the problem and to produce a serious blow to their
self-esteem. In other words, the pursuit of self-evaluation via social comparison
can actively countervail against the pursuit of self-enhancement. Are comparison
persons chosen in a way that satisfies (or suffices for) both motives simul
taneously? Is one motive predominant—do choices of comparison persons serve
one motive primarily and the other secondarily? What situational and personality
variables influence the process of motive satisfaction? These are some of the
questions addressed by the research reviewed below.
First, we will review research that has revealed conditions under which persons
try to satisfy one or the other of these motives, and then we will turn to
research that has probed situations in which persons try to satisfy both.
Preference for Self-Evaluation
Stanley Schachter (1959) conducted an important and influential research
program on the determinants of affiliation-why persons choose to be with
others rather than to be alone. He made subjects afraid to varying degrees and
measured their desire to be with others.
CHOICE OF COM
ISON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
25
Presumably, self-evaluation would involve determining how afraid one actually
was and whether this level of fear was appropriate to the situation. Self-enhance
ment would involve demonstrating that one was not too afraid, that one did not
lack courage, etc.; this motive would be served by fear reduction. The bulk of
the evidence from Schachter’s original studies and evidence from several follow
up studies (Becker, 1967; Miller & Zimbardo, 1966; Wrightsman, 1960; Zimbardo
& Formica, 1963) implied that fearful subjects were motivated primarily to assess
their fear (self-evaluation) rather than to reduce it (self-enhancement). (See the
detailed account of this and related research in Chapter 3 of this volume.)
Preference for Self-Enhancement
Feasibility
Following the line of research begun by Schachter, Darley and Aronson
(1966) found that subjects attempted to evaluate their feelings only when
self-enhancement was not possible; their affiliative choices were directed to
self-enhancement when it was feasible to satisfy this motive. Evidence from an
experiment by Willerman, Lewit, and Tellegen (1960) appears to be consistent
with Darley and Aronson’s interpretation of their own results. Willerman et al.
found that subjects who were high in fear of failure had a greater preference for
a self-enhancing alternative (i.e., they avoided self-evaluation) when self-enhance
ment appeared feasible than when it did not.
g
Specific Threat to Self-Esteem
There is also evidence that suggests a second condition under which the
preference for self-evaluation is likely to be subordinated to the desire for
self-enhancement: a specific threat to self-esteem. Samoff and Zimbardo (1961)
hypothesized and found that subjects whom they made anxious (as opposed to
afraid) preferred isolation to affiliation. They interpreted this as a preference in
the subjects for self-enhancement rather than self-evaluation because being alone
in their situation would protect the self from threatening impulses. Teichman
(1973) was able to replicate this finding, but she also showed that it did not
occur when the anxiety-arousing threat was not specific. That is, when she
aroused general anxiety, subjects preferred affiliation, a tendency she attributed
to the uncertainty about the threat. (This research, too, is reviewed in more
detail in Chapter 3 in this volume.)
Thus, where there is a specific threat to self-esteem, and where avoidance of
this threat is feasible, persons tend to seek this self-enhancing alternative, even at
the expense of obtaining valid information about the self.
Evidence from the Rank-Order Choice Experimental Paradigm
There is evidence from a different experimental paradigm that can be
interpreted as consistent with this hypothesis. Hypothesis III of Festinger’s
theory of social comparison processes (1954) states that persons prefer similar
11
I
■
26
C. L. CRUDER
others for social comparison. Hakmiller (1966) hypothesized that persons might
actually prefer to compare themselves with dissimilar others when their selfesteem was threatened. He argued that the motivation to preserve self-esteem
under these conditions would lead the person to make a “defensive comparison.”
To test his hypothesis, Hakmiller had subjects complete a bogus personality
inventory that ostensibly measured a trait (“hostility toward one’s own parents”)
that was described to some subjects as a highly undesirable and threatening trait
and to others as a positive trait. Subjects were informed that their score was the
second lowest in a group of six subjects. Thus subjects had five comparison
others, and where possessing the trait was threatening, four were worse off with
higher scores and one was better off with a lower score. Under these conditions,
where possession of a great deal of the trait constituted a threat to self-esteem,
54 percent of the subjects chose to compare with the worst-off other, as
Hakmiller predicted. The suggested interpretation of these data was that subjects
were responding to the threat to their selves by comparing defensively, that is,
by trying to demonstrate that they were different from a person who surely
possessed this most unflattering characteristic.
Hakmiller recognized, however, that his threat manipulation may have been
confounded with the degree of the subjects’ involvement in the experimental
situation. His finding could have been the consequence of subjects in the
low-threat condition not being interested in the task and decisions, and hence
making their choices arbitrarily (Wheeler, Shaver, Jones, Goethals, Cooper,
Robinson, Cruder, & Butzine, 1969).
Friend and Gilbert (1973) pointed out that Hakmiller had also confounded
the manipulation of threat with creation of a “positive instance.” That is, in the
course of making the personality characteristic threatening to the subject, the
experimenter implied that the highest score was a clear example of the
characteristic. Friend and Gilbert, therefore, defined the personality characteristic
independently of the manipulation of its threatening nature. They found that
threatened subjects were more likely to engage in defensive comparison by
avoiding comparison with better-off others, in general, and with the best-off
other, in particular. This pattern was restricted to subjects who had been
identified as chronically high in fear of negative evaluation, as identified by a
measure developed by Watson and Friend (1969); there was no effect of threat
for subjects low in this fear. Although these investigators claimed that threatened
subjects also sought comparison with worse-off others, as Hakmiller’s subjects
did, the evidence supporting this claim was weak, at best. Thus this evidence
does indicate that when self-esteem is clearly and specifically threatened, subjects
respond by attempting to protect their self-esteem rather than by trying to
evaluate the nature and extent of their feelings.
It seems reasonable that the strengths of the motivations for self-enhancement
and self-evaluation are likely to differ for persons with different amounts of a
trait or an ability. Thus they would be expected to resolve the conflict between
these motivations differently from persons possessing more or less ability than
they. For example, if in the course of learning the range of a trait or ability in a
CHOICE OF COMI
SON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
27
reference group, persons discover they are relatively lacking in it, they might well
be more concerned with self-enhancement than with further self-evaluation.
Several studies have in fact found that the relative level of a subject’s ability
influences the processes and consequences of social comparison. For instance,
Samuel (1973) found that the level of the subjects’ ability interacted with others*
global similarity and ability similarity to determine the subjects’ desire to
compare with them. Subjects who were told that their performance on the
ability test had been inferior—in distinction to subjects who were told that their
performance had been superior or average, or who had been given no informa
tion-showed little preference among “superior,” “average,” “inferior,” and
“similar” comparison persons when these persons were members of a globally
similar comparison group. However, when the comparison group was globally
dissimilar, inferior subjects were more discriminating: they preferred an “average”
comparison person and shunned an “inferior” one, relative to other subjects’
preferences. In the globally similar condition, inferior subjects tended to show
the reverse pattern of preferences for “average” and “inferior” comparison
persons. Inferior subjects in both the globally similar and dissimilar conditions
preferred comparison with a “similar” person and shunned comparison with a
“superior” person, relative to other subjects. This is, needless to say, a complex
pattern of data, but it can be interpreted as consistent with the hypothesis that
when threatened, persons avoid comparisons that might confirm the threat.
Brickman and Berman (1971) found that the quality of the subjects’ own
performance interacted with their expectancy for how well they would perform
and the amount of information they had about their own and others’ scores in
determining the extent of the subjects* actual search for additional social
comparison information.1 They found that subjects who were given full informa
tion (own score and grade) and were disappointed (high expectancy and low
performance) searched most to interpret their scores. Although the main effect
for performance was due primarily to this one cell, low-performance subjects
searched more than high-performance subjects in every cell.
Although it is difficult to interpret comparisons between studies, it is
nonetheless noteworthy that both Samuel (1973) and Brickman and Berman
(1971) found that the social comparison behavior of inferior performers was
affected by other variables. Samuel found that inferior performers wanted to
compare with persons who were labeled “similar” or who were slightly better
off, and avoided comparison with persons who were, like the subject, labeled
“inferior” and with persons who were much better off. Brickman and Berman
found that inferior performers engaged in more social comparison, particularly
when they had just failed unexpectedly. These findings can be interpreted as a
tendency for self-enhancement, in part because those subjects who suffered the
greatest loss in self-esteem were the ones who showed the significant effects. The
1 Note that this study differed from most of those considered earlier in that the subjects*
actual expectations and performances were used, and in that the extent, rather than the
object of, social comparison choices was studied (i.e., the rank-order choice paradigm was
not used).
OS
‘a
1
28
C. L. CRUDER
social comparison behavior of Samuel’s subjects, at least, can be characterized as
“cautious” with respect to implications for their self-esteem: they avoided
comparisons that were potentially threatening to their self-esteem. Comparing
with “superior” others would, by contrast, almost guarantee an unfavorable
evaluation, while comparing with others labeled “inferior” carried the danger that
subjects would be forced to confirm their similarity to these others, whose
performance had received the same unflattering label as their own.
Evidence from Projection of Threat Experimental Paradigm
Although Bramel (1962, 1963), Pepitone (1964), and Steiner (1968) were not
studying affiliation or social comparison directly, they too found evidence for
self-enhancement when self-esteem was subject to a specific threat and the threat
could be avoided. The reasoning that guided this research was that by attributing
(“projecting”) greater levels of undesirable personality traits to another than to
oneself, one maintains or protects one’s own relative standing. Bramel (1962)
found evidence supporting his hypothesis that defensive projection is a direct
function of the cognitive dissonance aroused by learning that one possesses an
undesirable trait. Subjects were given either favorable or unfavorable information
about themselves, designed to influence their self-concepts. Then when all
subjects were led to believe that they became homosexually aroused, this
information was dissonant for the favorable group but not for the unfavorable
group. As expected, subjects in the favorable group, who experienced dissonance,
attributed the same degree of homosexual arousal to another as to themselves,
while subjects in the unfavorable group attributed less arousal to another than to
themselves. This difference in arousal was especially apparent when the subject
evaluated the other positively, in general. In a subsequent study (Bramel, 1963),
college students attributed homosexual motivation to another student more when
they believed that they themselves had such motivation than when they did not.
However, college students’ attributions regarding a criminal did not differ as a
function of whether they experienced dissonance by receiving self-threatening
information. Bramel interpreted these results in terms of social comparison
theory: by attributing an undesirable trait to others with whom the subjects
would be likely to compare themselves, the subjects were generating evidence
that they did not deviate from the others on this trait—that is, that there was a
uniform social reality.
Using basically the same procedure as Bramel, Pepitone (1964) expected that
subjects would attribute more of undesirable traits to another subject than to
themselves when this would be self-enhancing, namely, when subjects were made
to have high self-esteem and were told that they had an undesirable trait (“latent
homosexuality”), or where they were made to have low self-esteem and were
told that they had a desirable trait (“basic virility”). Although Pepitone did not
find the expected pattern of results for the projection of sexuality (homo
sexuality and virility), he did find it for two other unfavorable traits, shame and
diffuse anger.
Steiner (1968) suggested that Pepitone (1964) may not have obtained
CHOICE OF COMP
>ON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
29
complete support for his hypothesis because his after-only design did not enable
measurement of change in evaluation (which was what he actually predicted),
and/or because the desirable and undesirable trait treatments might not have
been of psychologically equal magnitude. To remedy the first problem, Steiner
matched subjects on initial levels of self-esteem, and to remedy the second, he
attempted to raise self-esteem in one condition and to lower it to an equal
extent in another. Steiner found, consistent with his predictions and with
Pepitone’s findings, that subjects whose self-esteem was diminished projected the
evaluation they received of themselves onto an average fellow student more than
did subjects whose self-esteem was enhanced. Subjects whose self-esteem was
diminished also changed their self-evaluation less in response to the bogus
evaluation they received than did subjects whose self-esteem was enhanced.
Presumably, subjects in the diminished self-esteem group avoided changing their
self-evaluation in response to the undesirable feedback because this would
constitute reduction rather than enhancement of self-esteem. Pepitone’s and
Steiner’s results provided evidence that persons will interpret information about
themselves and others so as to maximize self-esteem, even where a less flattering
interpretation is just as valid given the evaluative information.
SATISFACTION OF SELF-EVALUATION
AND SELF-ENHANCEMENT
I f
...
SB■
s /
fe
I
r
Si
t?-
|L
■
is
fl
£
g
Thus far, we have considered some of the factors that influence the resolution
of the potential conflict between self-evaluation and self-enhancement in favor of
the satisfaction of one or the other of these two motivations. Of course, a person
may try to resolve the conflict between these motivations by attempting to
satisfy both motivations. The research reviewed next is relevant to the way in
which such attempts seem to proceed. Seen in another way, this research has
revealed determinants of social comparison choices where no one motivation
predominates. The majority of studies considered in this section focused on the
trait or ability being evaluated, while some investigated the effects of introducing
additional comparison dimensions.
Festinger (1954) was as concerned with explaining changes in group members*
opinions and abilities subsequent to engaging in social comparison as he was with
explaining the processes of comparison per se.
Derivation D (from Hypotheses I, II, III) : The existence of a discrepancy in
a group with respect to opinions or abilities will lead to action on the part
of that group to reduce the discrepancy, (p. 124)
In addition, Festinger maintained that in Western culture, persons are motivated
to improve their abilities (Hypothesis IV). Thus, when group members discover
discrepancies in ability among themselves, they will be motivated to reduce these
discrepancies and, simultaneously, each member will be motivated to improve his
or her own ability. This will be recognized as the problem of self-evaluation and
J
r
30
C. L. CRUDER
self-enhancement. Festinger proposed that a member could achieve both goals if
he improved to the point where he was slightly better than the other members of
the group. But from the perspective of the group as a whole, this hypothetical
state of equilibrium is impossible to attain, since not everyone can be slightly
better than everyone else! Even if all members who are inferior in ability
improve, making all members similar in ability, there will be variability remain
ing, with some members being superior to others. In other words, an implication
of Festinger’s notion that each group member strives to be slightly better than
the other members is, in Lewin’s term, a kind of “quasi-stationary equilibrium.”
As Festinger put it, “With respect to the evaluation of abilities, a state of social
quiescence is never reached” (1954, p. 125).
Wheeler (1966) interpreted this reasoning as a prediction that persons will
choose to compare themselves with others who are similar to but slightly better
than themselves in attempting to evaluate their level of an ability by social
comparison. The logic is that persons choose to compare themselves with a
similar other in order to evaluate their ability accurately, and with a better-off
other in hopes of being able to confirm their similarity to this superior other.
Wheeler noted, though, that comparison with a better-off other might actually
have a result opposite to that desired: if the persons are indeed not similar to the
superior other with whom they chose to compare their ability, self-evaluation
would l)e served only at the expense of self-enhancement.
Wheeler found evidence consistent with Festinger’s expectation that subjects
would prefer to compare themselves with similar others who were better off than
they were. Subjects were told they ranked fourth in a group of seven on a
measure of a positively valued personality trait. In addition to their own score,
they were told the scores of the highest and lowest scorers. Half the subjects
chose to learn the score of the third-ranking subject-the next highest-scoring
subject. An additional third of the subjects wanted to learn the score of the
second-ranking subject. Moreover, there was a positive correlation between
assumed similarity and choice.
Focus on Evaluated Trait or Ability
Thornton and Arrowood (1966) tested the generality of Wheeler’s finding and
probed the notion of assuming similarity to better-off others. As in Wheeler’s
study, subjects were told that they scored at the median in a group of seven.
However, half were led to believe either that their score was close to better-off
others and far from worse-off others, or far from better-off others and close to
worse-off others. For half of each of these groups, the personality trait was
desirable, so better-off others had higher scores than the subject; for the other
half of each of these groups, the trait was undesirable, so better-off others had
lower scores. Based on Festinger’s theory and Wheeler’s findings, Thornton and
Arrowood expected their subjects to compare themselves with better-off others
when they were close to these others, but not when they were far from them.
Only in the close conditions would assuming similarity to better-off others be
>1
CHOICE OF COMP,
ON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
;j
31
likely to be confirmed. They did not expect the desirability of the trait to have
any effects-close subjects should prefer better-off others regardless of the
desirability of the trait.
Although trait desirability was not expected to affect comparison choices, a
greater proportion of subjects in the desirable conditions than in the undesirable
conditions compared themselves with better-off others. Thornton and Anowood
appealed to the two functions that social comparison is thought to serve—self
evaluation and self-enhancement—in order to account for this unexpected effect
of trait desirability. Comparing oneself with better-off others in the desirable
conditions presumably would satisfy both motivations, because a higher scorer
constitutes, at once, an attractive standard with which the subject wanted to
assume similarity (self-enhancement) and a “positive instance” or defining
example of the trait (self-evaluation).2 Comparing oneself with better-off others
in the undesirable conditions, however, satisfies only the motivation for self
evaluation. These assumptions provided a post hoc explanation of why subjects
in the desirable conditions prefened higher-scoring comparison others more than
subjects in the undesirable conditions did.
Thornton and Arrowood’s second finding seemed to disconfirm directly the
prediction based on Festinger’s theory and Wheeler’s findings. A greater propor
tion of subjects who were told that they were far from the better-off others than
those who were told that they were close selected the better-off others for
social comparison. As Thornton and Arrowood suggested, this finding could have
been due to a weak far-close manipulation. Indeed, as Wheeler et al. (1969)
subsequently noted, the subjects’ own scores were above the reported mean in all
conditions, and this was inconsistent for those subjects who were also told that
their score was among the four lowest. This procedural flaw may have, in effect,
eliminated the critical difference between the far and close conditions, making it
just as likely for far subjects as for close subjects to believe that an assumption
of similarity to better-off others would be confirmed through social comparison.
Wheeler et al. (1969) attempted to synthesize the findings of Hakmiller
(1966) and Thornton and Arrowood (1966) and to specify when persons will
prefer to compare with similar others as Festinger predicted they would. Wheeler
et al. reasoned that persons would compare themselves with similar others only
when they first knew, and thus could compare their scores with, the extreme
scores (cf. Pettigrew, 1967, p. 246). Therefore, subjects in their experiment were
either told the extreme scores (range) or not told them (no range). In addition,
as in Thornton and Arrowood’s study, the trait that ostensibly was being assessed
was either desirable or undesirable. This 2X2 design was replicated with
different dependent variables: about half the subjects were given a choice of
which other groups member’s score they would like to learn, and the other half
'■ 1
n
i
si
III
nil
II
I
■
’ From a more conservative standpoint, it would seem that the highest scorer is closest to
being a “positive instance** in the sense in which this term is used in the study of concept
formation. However, it also seems reasonable that any other who receives a higher score than
the subject is more of a “positive instance” than the subject himself.
■®
32
C. L. CRUDER
were given a choice of which other person they would Jike to work with on a
subsequent task.
As expected, Wheeler et al. found that when the subjects had been told the
range of scores in their group, they most prefened to compare their score with
the score of a similar other. Moreover, as Thornton and Arrowood had predicted
in their study, subjects in the range conditions preferred to compare themselves
with the most similar better-off other. Given a second choice, these same subjects
chose to learn the score of the most similar worse-off other. When the subejcts
had not been told the range, they most prefened to compare their score with the
score of the highest-scoring other, regardless of whether the trait was desirable or
undesirable. On their second choice, these subjects predominantly chose to learn
the score of the lowest-scoring other. A final result of interest was that when
subjects chose another person to interact with, their choices were more evenly
distributed over the alternatives. Choices in the person replication reflected
preferences to compare oneself with the two most desirable others, with the two
most similar others, and with the two most extreme scorers.
Wheeler et al. interpreted their results as specifying one condition under which
Festinger’s prediction that persons prefer to compare themselves with similar
others will hold. When subjects knew the range of the group on the dimension
being evaluated, they preferred comparison others who were close to them on
the dimension. When subjects did not know the range, they attempted to
identify this range by choosing to learn the highest and lowest scores. This
pattern was altered substantially when comparison involved face-to-face inter
action while subjects were engaged in a joint task; undoubtedly, under these
circumstances motivations other than those associated with social comparison
came into play to determine choices. Indeed, Wilson and Benner (1971) obtained
a similar result, finding that 78 percent of subjects who were asked to choose
which other subject they wanted to observe chose the highest scorer, while only
48 percent of subjects who were asked to choose which other they wanted to
participate with chose the highest scorer. They explained this difference as being
a consequence of the private nature of the former choice and the public nature
of the latter one. That is, they proposed that in the private conditions (similar to
Wheeler et al.’s score treatment) the subjects* primary motivation was to gain
information to reduce uncertainty about their score, while in the public
conditions (similar to Wheeler et al.’s person treatment) this motivation was
inhibited by the possibility of an unfavorable comparison. Moreover, Wilson and
Benner found that in the public conditions, where subjects appeared to choose
defensively, males who were made uncertain about their own scores were more
likely to choose the highest scorer than males who were made certain. This could
have occurred because the greater uncertainty enhanced these subjects* desire for
information, and the uncertainty would also be associated with the additional
information, thus mitigating the implications of an unfavorable comparison. Also
in the public conditions, high self-esteem males were more likely than lows to
choose the highest scorer. This effect was strongest in the certain conditions.
Presumably, this occurred because highs are less threatened than lows by the
CHOICE OF COMI
SON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
■ •i i
33
possibility of an unfavorable comparison. This difference is emphasized when the
information is certain, because an unfavorable comparison would be hard to
deny.
Arrowood and Friend (1969) argued that Wheeler et al.’s results (1969) were
also consistent with the position that subjects choose others so as to satisfy the
self-evaluation motivation. Subjects chose the highest scorer in order to deter
mine how much of the trait they had, and they chose in the desirable direction
in order to determine how far they were from the better-off others.
Cruder (1971) and Cruder, Korth, Dichtel, and Glos (1975) continued this
line of research to see if it was possible to integrate more satisfactorily the
findings reviewed above. Using basically the same paradigm, they expanded the
factorial designs on the assumption that comparison choices in these additional
treatment combinations might shed light on the appropriateness of the alternative
explanatory principles that had been proffered. Experiment I reported by Cruder
(1971) replicated the results of Wheeler et al. (1969) where subjects chose scores.
Experiment II involved a variation on the design of Experiment I: instead of the
highest score being a positive instance of a desirable or undesirable trait, as was
the case in earlier studies, the lowest score was a positive instance or the lowest
and highest scores were both positive instances. These treatments allowed for the
estimation of the independent effects of positive instance, desirability, and
extreme score (highest or lowest). Subjects were not given the score range and, as
in Experiment I, were given opportunities to learn others’ scores. Where the
lowest score only was the positive instance of the trait, subjects compared
themselves predominantly with the best-off other. This is to be contrasted with
the result where the highest score only was the positive instance in earlier
experiments and subjects preferred the highest-scoring other. In the conditions
where both extremes of the trait dimension were defined, subjects preferred to
compare themselves with the highest-scoring other rather than the lowest-scoring
other when high scores were desirable; they showed no clear preference between
the highest-scoring and lowest-scoring others when low scores were desirable. The
majority of subjects in all four conditions used their two comparison choices to
learn the two most extreme scores.
The complex pattern of choices obtained in Experiment II and in the
comparable no-range conditions of Experiment I could not be explained by any
one of the hypotheses that had been offered previously. To account for these
results, Cruder (1971) suggested that these hypotheses, instead of being mutually
exclusive, might be complementary. That is, the data seemed to indicate that in
satisfying the motivations underlying social comparison, it is important whether
possessing the trait or ability is desirable, whether the comparison other
represents a positive instance and, independent of these factors, whether the
comparison other is the highest scorer.
With respect to the third factor, Wheeler et al. and Cruder found that subjects
sought the range of scores almost invariably by choosing first the highest score
and then the lowest score. Cruder suggested that the highest score may have
been the primary choice in carrying out this range-seeking strategy because
0
fl
I
1
bl
I
M
ii
k; I
k
■
iI
1 si
ul
34
C. L. CRUDER
subjects were more uncertain about it than about the lowest score. Learning the
highest score, therefore, would provide more information (i.e., reduce more
uncertainty) than learning the lowest score. Subjects may have been less
uncertain about the location of the lowest score because zero is a frequent and
“logical” lowest score on tests of various kinds, and the existence of such an end
anchor may lead to greater confidence in estimates of what the lowest score is
(Volkmann, 1951). Singer and Shockley (1965) demonstrated that subjects who
were less certain about their level of an ability, by virtue of receiving no
information, preferred to affiliate with others, while subjects who were more
certain preferred not to affiliate. On the other hand, Brickman and Berman
(1971) found that the amount of information provided subjects about an ability
had no effect on the amount of their social comparison activity. In this study,
the relationship between information and certainty was reversed: subjects who
had been given no information were most certain about their estimates of the
group’s average, and subjects who had been given the most information were
least certain.
Cruder et al. (1975) attempted to test the one previously untested component
of the three-component hypothesis generated by the earlier results—uncertainty
about the highest score. Specifically, subjects’ uncertainty about the highest score
was manipulated, along with whether the highest or lowest score was a positive
instance and whether the personality trait was desirable or undesirable. The
predictions were derived from the simple rule that the extreme score, which was
characterized by two or three of the three attributes (i.e., desirability, positive
instance, uncertain highest score), would be preferred for social comparison.
Subjects were expected to be indifferent to the extreme scores that were
characterized by equal numbers of these attributes. Uncertainty was manipulated
differently in two experiments, and the results were the same in both, demon
strating two important facts. First, the highest score was chosen more when its
location was uncertain then when its location was certain. Second, the complex
hypothesis that integrated the three components was supported because the main
effects and interactions predicted by this hypothesis occurred and were sufficient
to explain the data.
Additional Comparison Dimensions
Festinger’s Hypothesis III—persons prefer to compare themselves with similar
others-seems to refer to similarity on the trait dimension being evaluated, and
this was the focus of the research reviewed in the preceding section. As many
have noted (Patchen, 1961; Wheeler et al., 1969; Wilson, 1973; Zanna, Goethals,
& Hill, 1975), though, similarity along other dimensions is also important in
determining comparison choices, particularly dimensions thought to be related to
the one being evaluated. For example, a weekend tennis player may want to
compare his or her tennis-playing skills with those of a person of the same sex,
age, physical condition, general athletic prowess, etc., as much as with a person
who progressed as far as the player did in a local elimination tournament.
CHOICE OF COMP/
ON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
35
Ij
Wilson (1973) defined ability evaluation as a function of comparison along the
primary dimension: “How good am I compared to others?” And he defined
self-evaluation as a function of comparison along secondary, related dimensions:
“How good am I compared to how good I should be?” He found, as predicted,
that variations on the primary dimension (problem-solving ability), but not on a
secondary dimension (similarity in educational level), affected measures of ability
evaluation. However, measures of self-evaluation were affected additively by
variations on both dimensions: subjects were most satisfied when their scores
were similar to more advanced students’ scores.
Zanna et al. (1975) also found that social comparison choices made to
evaluate an ability were influenced by similarity on a related dimension.
Ninety-seven percent of their subjects chose comparison groups of their own sex
when evaluating what was described to them as a sex-related ability. By
describing the opposite-sex group as possessing more of the ability, the investi
gators placed the desire to compare with the same-sex group in conflict with the
desire to compare with the best-off group. All but two of the subjects in those
conditions (indeed, the only two in all the conditions!) resolved this conflict by
choosing the same-sex comparison group. As evidence that a conflict actually did
exist, subjects in these conditions were significantly more likely than subjects for
whom a conflict did not exist to compare with the opposite-sex group when
given a second choice. The virtually uniform preference for same-sex comparison
others is, of course, convincing evidence that similarity on a dimension closely
related to the ability being evaluated influences comparison choices. In this
instance, the related dimension, sex, was defined as very strongly correlated with
the ability, a large sex difference existing in the normative data.
Morin and Jones (1972) found that blind juveniles preferred comparing
themselves with blind persons to comparing themselves with less similar groups,
or did not compare themselves at all; moreover, this trend was stronger on issues
relevant to the blind than on irrelevant issues. In a naturalistic setting, on the
other hand, Strauss (1967) found that blind persons preferred to compare
themselves with blind persons to comparing themselves with less similar groups, or
to not comparing themselves at all; moreover, this trend was stronger on issues
dependence on sighted persons) may have mediated this effect.
Castore and DeNinno’s subjects (1972) rated the desirability of potential work
partners for a task that ostensibly required either attitude diversity or uniformity
within work groups. Others’ attitudes were presented as either generally similar
or dissimilar to the subjects’, and as similar or dissimilar on a task-relevant issue.
These investigators found that task-relevant similarity did not affect subjects’
ratings. Overall similarity produced the only effect, similar partners being
preferred to dissimilar ones. They replicated these results in a second experiment.
Wheeler et al. (1969) found that a measure similar to Castore and DeNinno’s,
choosing a work partner, yielded different results from the more typical social
comparison measure, choosing to learn another’s score. So perhaps this difference
in dependent variables could account for why Castore and DeNinno failed to find
an effect of similarity along a relevant dimension, where previously cited studies
*
i'l
!
'1
II
I
R|
1
PI
hl
I
i
i* •
36
C. L. CRUDER
found one. It must be remembered, though, that Jones and Regan (1974) used a
partner-choice measure and did find an effect of task-relevant similarity in their
second study.
Following Festinger, one might expect similarity on related dimensions to
become less important, the less correlated the two dimensions are. Samuel
(1973), however, found that subjects preferred comparison others whom they
had judged as “globally” more similar to themselves (by virtue of being
undergraduates at the same rather than a different university), despite the fact
that they had little reason to believe that this dimension was related to the
ability dimension (strategies for solving problems posed by the environmentunrelated to IQ). Recall that in two studies described earlier, Castore and
DeNinno (1972) also found that subjects preferred as work partners others who
were generally similar to themselves and that Morin and Jones (1972) found that
blind subjects preferred blind comparison others. Thus it appears that similarity
is an important determinant of comparison; moreover, at this time it appears that
the strength of the relationship between the similarity dimension and the ability
dimension is not critical.
Measuring Self-Enhancement and Self-Evaluation
All of the research considered in this chapter has focused on subjects’ social
comparison choices-choosing to affiliate or not, or with whom the subjects
want to compare themselves. An inherent problem in this dependent variable is
that it is difficult to identify the motivation that underlies the choice. Is
self-evaluation being served? self-enhancement? both?
One way to deal with this problem is to assess these motivations separately
with independent measures. To this end, Cruder and Dichtel (1975) made
self-enhancement possible by giving subjects an opportunity to work on exercises
that would virtually guarantee an improvement in their performance, and they
made self-evaluation possible by giving subjects an opportunity to scrutinize
others* performance scores and the score distribution. Before performing a skill
task, subjects were led to expect a superior, average, or inferior performance, and
following the task they were told that their performance was, in fact, superior,
average, or inferior. These manipulations thus created nine experimental treat
ment conditions.
Expectancy, but not peformance feedback, affected subjects’ desire for com
parison information and for performance improvement.3 Specifically, subjects
who expected to perform poorly volunteered to spend more time working on the
Perhaps expectancy had effects but performance did not because subjects perceived the
expectancy manipulation as reflecting their “true ability,” and the performance manipulation
as reflecting less stable features of their behavior in the situation. Herrenkohl (1967),
however, did find that performance feedback affected desire for social comparison: subjects
who were told their performance on a test of intellectual ability was average desired
information about others’ scores more than did subjects who were told that they had either
passed or failed.
CHOICE OF COMI
SON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
37
improvement exercises than did subjects who expected to perform either average
or well. This finding is consistent with the findings cited earlier (Brickman &
Berman, 1971; Samuel, 1973) that demonstrated that self-enhancement can serve
as the predominant motive for persons whose self-esteem is threatened. Subjects
in the present study who were told that they were, in one sense, inferior
volunteered to work to improve more so than did subjects who were told they
were either average or superior.
The measure of the desire for self-evaluation revealed a different effect of the
expectancy manipulation: subjects who had expected to give an average perform
ance on the skill task wanted to spend less time in studying the other persons’
scores in order to clarify their own. This finding is interpretable in terms of a
derivation from social comparison theory that we have not yet considered.
Persons who believe that they are average are, by definition, in the highfrequency range of the normal distribution, and thus should feel they have many
comparison others available. Radloff (1966) found that these persons are more
accurate and stable in evaluating their ability on a task, a prediction he derived
from social comparison theory. And Wilson (1973) found that these persons are
more certain of their ability. If average subjects in the experiment under
discussion had not believed that their ability was discrepant from the abilities of
a majority of the other subjects, they should have been able to make satisfactory
self-evaluations. In other words, they would not have been as motivated to
increase the accuracy of their self-evaluations as subjects who expected to
perform either well or poorly. This explains, at least in part, why these subjects
said they would spend less time scrutinizing others’ performance scores. In sum,
observation of different effects on the separate measures of self-evaluation and
self-enhancement provides direct evidence that supports the hypothesis that these
two motivations are, at least in part, independent determinants of social
comparison. Moreover, these effects were interpretable in terms of Festinger’s
social comparison theory.
IPl
J
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It seems that the conflict between self-enhancement and self-evaluation is a
viable hypothesis regarding social comparison choices. We have made a start in
gaining an understanding of when each of these motivations predominates in the
processes of social comparison, and how they operate simultaneously when
neither predominates. Although self-evaluation is an important goal for a person
facing a new situation, self-enhancement appears to become more important
when this situation presents a specific threat to self-esteem and, of course, when
there is a way to defend the self, for example, by avoiding the threat.
When neither self-enhancement nor self-evaluation is dominant, the person’s
choices of comparison others reveals his or her strategy for resolving the conflict
between the two. Persons want to find out how they stand-and that their
standing is respectable. In order to do this, they want very much to leam about
the highest-scoring other, apparently because he or she represents the most
I
38
C. L CRUDER
uncertainty and is, therefore, important in interpreting'the meaning of any other
position on the dimension. They are also interested, for the same reason, in the
other who best represents a definition of the dimension, the “positive instance.**
And they want to compare themselves with others who are better off than they
are on the dimension, presumably to allow them to assess the extent to which
they are similar to these fortunate others. Finally, persons prefer to compare
themselves with others who are similar to themselves on dimensions other than
the one being evaluated. However, contrary to what might be expected, the
strength of the relationship between the evaluation dimension and the other
dimension does not appear to moderate the influence of similarity on the other
dimension.
The role of secondary comparison dimensions may be important in relating
social comparison theory to other theories in social psychology. For instance,
Pettigrew (1967) has suggested that social comparison processes may be studied
as instances of broader principles of social evaluation and judgment. Other
people are used as sources of criteria and standards for evaluation. But we do
not, in every instance of self-evaluation, turn to real people, to social reality.
Quite often, we can and do compare our experience with an internalized
standard. A number of theories of social evaluation and judgment (e.g., Helson,
1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Upshaw, 1969) incorporate such constructs or
processes. The notion is, then, that we can and do evaluate novel stimuli and
make decisions without direct reference to either physical or social reality.
Instead, our judgments and actions are mediated by cognitive standards that
develop over repeated experiences with relevant physical and social reality. And,
indeed, the formation of such internal standards may be the primary purpose of
social comparison processes. Thus everyday comparisons may take as a reference
internal standards, which themselves are based on firsthand experience.
REFERENCES
Arrowood, A. J., & Friend, R. Other factors determining the choice of a
comparison other. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5,
233-239.
Becker, G. Affiliate perception and the arousal of the participation-affiliation
motive. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1967, 24, 991-997.
Bramel, D. A dissonance theory approach to defensive projection. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1962, 64, 121-129.
Bramel, D. Selection of a target for defensive projection. Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology, 1963, 66, 318-324.
Brickman, P., & Berman, J. J. Effects of performance expectancy and outcome
certainty on interest in social comparison. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 1971, 7, 600-609.
Castore, C. H., & DeNinno, J. Role of relevance in the selection of comparison
others. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Associa
tion, Honolulu, September 1972.
CHOICE OF COM
ISON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
39
l
Darley, J. M., & Aronson, E. Self-evaluation vs. direct anxiety reduction as
determinants of the fear-affiliation relationship. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 66-79.
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. A study of normative and informational social
influence upon individual judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol
ogy, 1955, 51, 629-636.
Festinger, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 1954, 7,
117-140.
Friend, R. M., & Gilbert, J. Threat and fear of negative evaluation as deter
minants of locus of social comparison. Journal of Personality, 1973, 41,
328-340.
Cruder, C. L. Determinants of social comparison choices. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1971, 7, 473-489.
Cruder, C. L., & Dichtel, M. Behavioral consequences of social comparison.
Unpublished manuscript. University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, 1975.
Cruder, C. L., Korth, B., Dichtel, M., & Glos, B. Uncertainty and social
comparison. Journal of Research in Personality, 1975, 9, 85-95.
Hakmiller, K. L. Threat as a determinant of downward comparison. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 32-39.
Harris, R. J. This is a science? Social psychologists* aversion to knowing what
their theories say. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychologi
cal Association, New Orleans, September 1974.
Helson, H. Adaptation-level theory. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
Herrenkohl, R. C., Jr. Motivation and social comparison (Doctoral dissertation,
New York University, 1966). Dissertation Abstracts, 1967, 27, 3936A. (Order
No. 67-6029)
Kelley, H. H. The two functions of reference groups. In G. E. Swanson, T. M.
Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds.), Readings in social psychology (2nd ed.).
New York: Holt, 1952.
Jones, E. E., & Gerard, H. B. Foundations of social psychology. New York:
Wiley, 1967.
Jones, S. C., & Regan, D. T. Ability evaluation through social comparison.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, 10, 133-146.
Miller, N., & Zimbardo, P. Motives for fear-induced affiliation: Emotional
comparison or interpersonal similarity? Journal of Personality, 1966, 34,
481-503.
Morin, S. F., & Jones, R. L. Social comparison of opinions among blind children
and adolescents. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological
Association, Honolulu, September 1972.
Patchen, M. A conceptual framework and some empirical data regarding compari
sons of social rewards. Sociometry, 1961, 24, 136-156.
Pepitone, A. Attraction and hostility. New York: Atherton, 1964.
Pepitone, A. An experimental analysis of self-dynamics. In C. Gordon & K. J.
Gergen (Eds.), The self in social interaction (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley,
1968
Pettigrew, T. F. Social evaluation theory: Convergences and applications. In
D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 15). Lincoln, Neb.:
University of Nebraska Press, 1967.
Ii
I
a
'I
■HI
i|
Pl
I
1
■ '1
40
C. L. CRUDER
Radloff, R. Social comparison and ability evaluation. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 6-26.
Samuel, W. On clarifying some interpretations of social comparison theory.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 450-465.
Sarnoff, I., & Zimbardo, P. G. Anxiety, fear, and social affiliation. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 356-363.
Schachter, S. The psychology of affiliation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1959.
Singer, J. E. Social comparison-progress and issues. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 103-110.
Singer, J. E., & Shockley, V. L. Ability and affiliation. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 95-100.
Steiner, I. D. Reactions to adverse and favorable evaluations of one’s self. Journal
of Personality, 1968,56, 553-563.
Strauss, H. M. A study of reference group and social comparison processes among
the blind (Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1966). Dissertation
Abstracts, 1967, 27, 3939A. (Order No. 67-5837)
Teichman, Y. Emotional arousal and affiliation. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 1973, 9, 591-605.
Thibaut, J., & Kelley, H. H. The social psychology of groups. New York: Wiley,
1959.
Thibaut, J., & Strickland, L. H. Psychological set and social conformity. Journal
of Personality, 1956, 25, 115-129.
Thornton, D. A., & Arrowood, A. J. Self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and the
locus of social comparison. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1966,
Supplement 1, 40-48.
Upshaw, H. S. The personal reference scale: An approach to social judgment. In
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 4). New
York: Academic Press, 1969.
Volkmann, J. Scales of judgment and their implications for social psychology. In
J. H. Rohrer & M. Sherif (Eds.), Social psychology at the crossroads. New
York: Harper, 1951.
Watson, D., & Friend, R. M. Measurement of social evaluative anxiety. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1969,55, 448-457.
Wheeler, L. Motivation as a determinant of upward comparison. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1966, Supplement 1, 27-31.
Wheeler, L., Shaver, K. G., Jones, R. A., Goethals, G. R., Cooper, J., Robinson,
J. E., Cruder, C. L., & Butzine, K. W. Factors determining choice of a
comparison other. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 5,
219-232.
Willerman, B., Lewit, D., & Tellegen, A. Seeking and avoiding self-evaluation by
working individually or in groups. In D. Willner (Ed.), Decisions, values, and
groups (Vol. 1). New York: Pergamon, 1960.
Wilson, S. R. Ability evaluation and self-evaluation as types of social compari
sons. Sociometry, 1973, 56, 600-607.
Wilson, S. R., & Benner, L. A. The effects of self-esteem and situation upon
comparison choices during ability evaluation. Sociometry, \91\,34, 381-397.
Wrightsman, L. S., Jr. Effects of waiting with others on changes in the level of
felt anxiety. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 216-222.
CHOICE OF COW
ISON PERSONS IN EVALUATING ONESELF
41
Zanna, M. D., Goethals, G. R., & Hill, J. F. Evaluating a sex-related ability:
Social comparison with similar others and standard setters. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 86-93.
Zimbardo, P. G., & Formica, R. Emotional comparison and self-esteem as
determinants of affiliation. Journal of Personality, 1963, 31, 141-162.
F
Introduction to Sociology
Figure 5.1. Castes of the Hindu Society of India
Brahmans
(E.g. priests, teachers, etc.)
Kshatriyans
(E.g. warriors, landlords, etc.)
Vaishyas
(E.g. merchants, traders, etc.)
Sudras
(E.g. Peasants, servants, etc.)
Haryans
(Untouchables)
Social outcasts (e.g. leather workers,
sweepers, etc.)
Adapted from Henslin and Nelson, 1995. Down-to-Earth
Sociology. Canadian Edition. Ontario: Allyn and Bacon
174
pH i n-
Equity in health
Alma Ata Declaration emphasized health, as a fundamental human right, and a world-wide social goal. The population
health is 'multi-dimensional' and Indicators are used to 'measure the health status of a community, but also to compare
the health status of one country with that of another'1. 'Equity in health can be defined as the absence of systematic
disparities in health and inequities are 'differences in health that are unnecessary, avoidable, unfair and unjust . Equity
is an Ethical Concept and is placed under the larger frame of Social Justice.
WHO commission on Social determinants further specifies that "inequities in health, avoidable health inequalities, arise
because of the circumstances in which people grow, live, work, and age, and the systems put in place to deal with
illness. The' relationship between society and Health is challenging', for an economist the health can be a marker for
keeping a way of keeping score of how well the society is doing in delivering well-being. In case of public health these
inequalities are a manifestation of the social influences on health'3. The goal of studying social inequalities in health is to
understand social determinants of health, and, increasingly, to explain the mechanisms or pathways that lead to the
observed social differences in health outcomes3'4-. The whole medical profession's approach to health is only one among
others, and its partiality may impede finding solutions to pressing health problems. So people advocate for Social model
of Health as opposed to medical model of health, based on Amarthya Sen's Capability approach 3.
During the mid ninghty's a network of researchers, policy makers and NGO activists collaborated on a process entitled
the Global Health Equity Initiative, which evolved into developing an Equity Guage. Equity Gauge concept is an
understanding that the determinants of health inequities are largely socio-political in nature, and just distribution of
resources needed for health requires some degree of social and political mobilization.
•
Assessment and Monitoring, to analyse, understand, measure, and document inequities
•
•
Advocacy, to promote changes in policy, programs, and planning
Community Empowerment to support the role of the poor and marginalized as active participants in change
rather than passive recipients of aid or help.5
"Inadequate information on health inequities in many countries offers one explanation for a lack of action to combat
these problems. Moreover, less information is routinely collected about the distribution of social and environmenta1
risks for ill health than about biological risk factors". Obtaining quality information (available routine data, surveys and
should be taken into account) and disaggregating by social "stratifi ers" (which include age, income, education, class,
ccupation, sex, ethnicity (or "race" in some jurisdictions), disability, and place of residence) to the smallest
administrative unit possible and selecting indicators and targets are the recommended ways to use data for feed back
into policy and action on social determinates of health6.
People's health movement (phm)lndia(Jan Swasthaya Abhiyan) has been actively involved in the rights based
approaches to health care and has been involved in community action for health and its state chapters are actively
involved in rising the rights based issues concerned with health and health care. With my involvement and personal
understanding in more emphasis have been laid on rights based approaches to health care, (revitalize PHC) in terms of
data collection on health care facilities, services availability and utilization, and also advocacy for betterment of service^.
Similar approaches are now being considered for taking up the issue of malnutrition.
A lot of data is available for India for various levels
1.
Census data- Available till district level
2.
SRS- Census blocks based on fertility Indicators
3.
NFHS-state Level
4.
5.
DLHS- District Level
Annual Health Survey- District Level
6.
7.
NSSO- District Level
Assessment reports by agencies and others
More can be done with data if guided by well defined indicators.
1. Appropriate Indicators to monitor.
2. Strengthening network. (Identification of appropriate indicators to
3. Advocate for action
Selection of appropriate Indicators o Monitor
More importantly fixing and defining the problem
Possibilities of including qualitative aspects into this ?!
1.
2.
Park, K. Park's Textbook of Preventive and Social Medicine, Jabalpur, Banarsidas Bhanot. 2011
Braveman,P., Gruskin, S„ Defining Equity in Health. Journal of Epidemiology and Community
3.
Health,2003;57:254-258
.
Anand, S., Peter, F„ Sen, A., (ed) Public Health Ethics and Equity. NewYork, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp 37-
4.
5.
6.
62
Bonnefoy, J„ Morgan, A., Kelly, M. P„ Butt, J., Bergmen, V., Tugwell, P, Robinson, V., Elworty, M, Mackenbach,
J P Popay, J., Pope, C., Narayan, T„ Mayer, L., Simpson, S„ Howeling, T., & Jadue, I., Constructing the e^ence
base on the social determinants of health: A guide, The Measurement and Evidence Knowledge Network (MEKN)
of the WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health. 2007
The Global Equity Guage Alliance., The Equity Gauge: Concepts, Principles, and Guidelines. Durban, Global Equity
Gauge Alliance and Health Systems Trust. 2003.
WHO closing the gap : policy into practice on social determinants of health : discussion paper. Wor
conference on social Determinants of Health, rio de Janeiro, Brazil 19-21 October, 2011, Brazil, WHO, 2011.
Introduction to Sociology
may never know each other. However, gradually, a
meaningful social grouping can grow out of a category.
Examples of a social category include: all female
students in higher learning institutions in Ethiopia; all
female engineers in Ethiopia; all students from rural
background, HIV positive persons, etc.
Table 4.1. Summary of types of groups
1.
Type of group
Basic features
Examples
Primary social
Face-to-face interaction;
A family; a peer
groups
informal an personal
group; a dormitory
interaction;
of students; etc
Small size;
An end in itself
Common values, norms and
belie system;
Feeling of unity
2.
Secondary
Relatively large group size;
An anti-AIDS club;
social groups
impersonal and formal social
a university; a
interaction; a means to an
hospital; etc
end; bureaucratic structure;
136
Introduction to Sociology
3.
Aggregates
A quasi social group; mere
A group of people
physical proximity/
standing on
togetherness; lack of unifying
queues; a group
features; not functionally
people taking a taxi
integrated
or a bus; people
walking a in busy
city street; a group
of patients sitting or
standing in a
waiting room of a
hospital, etc
4.
Category
Quasi social group; dispersed
All women aged 60
collectivity; members
an above; all HIV
belonging to similar
patients in the
socioeconomic background
world; all rural
people in Ethiopia;
etc
5.
Dyads
A two-person, primary social
Husband and wife;
group;
a two -person peer
group; etc
137
Introduction to Sociology
identical with the dominant groups. Assimilation involves
the acceptance or the internalizing of the larger or
dominant group's culture, values and life styles by the
smaller or minority group. Assimilation could imposed or
voluntary.
In this age
of globalization
there are
westernization processes, vyhereby peoples of the Third
World are taking up the values, notions and practices of
the Industrialized West.
______ ______________________________________ __
Box 5.1. Modes of social processes
gs
•
Competition
•
Cooperation
•
Conflict
•
Accommodation
*
Assimilation
r sy
-------------------- --------------
5.3. Social Stratification
. aw
c 6
5.3.1. Definition
Social stratification is one of the outcomes of the
continuous occurring of social processes. Every society
is segmented in to different hierarchies. In virtually all
167
Introduction to Sociology
societies, some people are regarded as more important
than others (more worthy of respect than others), either
within the society as a whole or in a certain situations.
Social stratification is the segmentation of society into
different hierarchical arrangement or strata. It refers to
the differences and inequalities in the socioeconomic life
a
of people in a given society. It represents the ranking of
“individuals or social positions and statuses in the social
structure. The term is borrowed from geology where it is
used to explain the hierarchical arrangement of rocks
and mineral in the earth’s surface. When applied to the
world of people, it refers to hierarchical arrangement of
people into different classes or strata which is the
division of a population into two or more layers, each of
which is relatively homogenous, between which there
are differences in privileges, restrictions, rewards and
obligations (Macionis, 1997; Henslin and Nelson, 1995;
Calhoun et al 1994).
168
Introduction to Sociology
5.3.2. The Importance of Studying Social
Stratification
The study of social stratification is particularly important
for sociologists. Some of the reasons for this may
include (Giddens, 1995):
•
To
ipye^flgate
individuals
in
*f
the
the
class
’ W&mbership
(
’
society
with
the
aim
of
of
' understanding the type of life people live. That
is, knowing what type of life individuals in a
* given social group or stratum live is very
important for sociological analysis.
•
To explore the bases for the assignment of
individuals into various hierarchies of the social
structure. What are the bases for stratifying
individuals into a specific stratum?
•
To
understand
the
relationship
between
individuals assigned into different hierarchies.
What kind of interaction and relationship exist
between individuals located into different strata?
•
To
investigate
the
relationship
between
individuals or groups belonging to the same
169
Introduction to Sociology
hierarchy. What kinds of relationship exist
between people in the same stratum?
•
To understand what type of social system gives
rise to what or which types of hierarchies. That
is, the type of social stratification varies across
cultures, times and types of social systems.
5.3.3. Theories of Social Stratification
There are various theories of social stratification
concerning its importance, origin and value, of which
two important theories are the following.
1. The functionalist theory of social stratific^iorF
2. The conflict theory of social stratification
According to the proponents of the functionalist theory,
segments or hierarchies and social inequalities exist in
all societies. Moreover, their main argument is that
social stratification is functional and purposeful and also
essential in any society. They contend that no society is
classless or unstratified, and social stratification is
universally necessary. Social stratification in short is
170
Introduction to Sociology
universal, functional, inevitable, and beneficial and
something which can’t be avoided.
The
proponents
of the conflict theory of social
stratification also accept the fact that social inequality
exists in every society. But they do not believe that
stratification, is functional. According to conflict
social stratification.
• .'".T
theorists, .it is
the5 way of oppressing one group of people
by another (Calhoun et al., 1994).
zk.
5.3.4. Forms of Social Stratification
| 11
Social Class
s°Ciai ci^s-^rej groups of people who are stratified
into different categories. In a more general sense, social
class can be defined as a category or level of people
found in similar positions in the social hierarchy. The
criteria or the bases for dividing people in a given
society into different social classes may include wealth,
occupation, education, sex, family background, religion,
income, among others. The societies in modern world
have been divided usually into three; low class, middle
class and upper class. Each of these three classes is
usually divided in to sub-classes.
171
Introduction to Sociology
Social class is often characterized as an open and
flexible system. Thus, we have societies which can be
characterized as open system, as opposed to societies
having closed system. This form of social class is
common in industrialized, modern, heterogeneous and
literate societies, Such system generally works in most
contemporary societies of the world (Stockard, 1997).
Caste^
wBWBMMk
%
Another well-known form of social stratification is the
caste system. The system is based on religious and
other strongly rooted traditional belief that canngbe
changed or are very difficult to change. This is the form
of social stratification whereby classification of people
into different .strata, is made on the basis of usually
religious and other very strong conventions/ traditions
that are difficult to change. Some of the features of
caste system include:
•
It is a very rigid and closed system.
•
People belonging to the same stratum practice
endogamy.
•
Intermarriage between strata is not permitted.
172
Introduction to Sociology
•
There are occupational differences between
strata; i.e., each stratum is usually assigned a
particular type of occupation.
•
Food sharing, social drinking, friendships, etc.,
are permitted
only within a stratum,
not
between strafa^ e
■
•
This form, of social stratification characterizes most
traditional, agricultural societies. However, the best
example of caste is the Hindu caste system of India.
This has existed for some 3000 years and was only
officially nullified in 1947. Hindu caste system divides
the society into five major strata. These are Brahmans,
i I I rWPLiiiiiJmriiWiiiifiii
Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Sudras and Maryans (Indrani,
1998)
-■11
—
■
^«3
. ar#
173
#
Introduction to Sociology
Figure 5.1. Castes of the Hindu Society of India
Brahmans
(E.g. priests, teachers, etc.)
Kshatriyans
(E.g. warriors, andlords, etc.)
Vaishyas
(E.g. merchants, traders, etc.)
e
Sudras
(E.g. Peasants, servants, etc.)
■
Haryans
(Untouchables)
Social outcasts (e.g. leather workers,
sweepers, etc.)
Adapted from Henslin and Nelson, 1995. Down-to-Earth
Sociology. Canadian Edition. Ontario: Allyn and Bacon
174
Introduction to Sociology
In ancient Roman and Hebrew societies and other
ancient and medieval civilizations, slaves, woman and
children were
often given
lower and
stigmatized
positions in society. They were not, for example,
considered when the population census was conducted.
In rural Ethiopian society, this form bt stratification has
a,
existed for/centuries and it still persists. Individuals in
such traditional occupations as pottery, blacksmith,
tannery, weaving, carpentry, and others such as so
called slaves have been given lower places and are
often denied free membership and social participation in
various social affairs. Among the Wolayta, for example,
such kinds of people are called by various names such
as the qhinasha (potters), degella (tanners), wogachia
(blacksmiths), shimagnia (weavers) and aylia (slaves).
These groups of people are not allowed to create marital
and other important social bonds with the gokka
(meaning
the
decent
groups).
Similar
types
of
stratification may also be found among the Sidama,
Kambata, Guraghe in the southern region of Ethiopia,
and elsewhere in other regions throughout the country.
175
Introduction to Sociology
It is believed that such conditions have contributed to
the slow socio-economic development of the country.
5.3.5. Consequences of Social Stratification on
the Lives of Individuals
Social stratification has crucial implications for the health
and well-being of people. Social stratification is directly
related to the issue of inequality, power imbalance etc,
and these directly or indirectly influence the life chances
of individuals in the social strata. Health status of
individuals is among one of these life chances which
can be significantly affected by one’s location in the
stratification system.
The different stratification systems on the basis of age,
sex, gender, ethnicity, religion, occupation, etc, directly
or
indirectly
promote
unequal
chances
of
living
standards.
The key concepts in the relation between health and
social stratification are the concepts of vulnerability, risk
and hazard. Vulnerability is a sociological concept
176
Introduction to Sociology
which refers to the “characteristics of individuals and
social groups [along the lines of gender, age, ethnicity,
occupation etc;] that determine [their capacity] to protect
themselves, withstand and recover from disasters,
including health hazards based on their access to
material
and
non-material
resources”
communication Dr Teketel Abebe,
(Personal
Department of
Sociology and Social A dministration, Addis Ababa
University)^
is.-
ML
5.4 Social Mobility
s j 4 l] j
5.4.1. Definition of Social Mobility
Every society has different strata in it. The different
individuals and groups who occupy a certain social
in that position permanently.
position may not remain
is.
Some may move from one position to another, from
higher social class position to lower social class position,
and vice versa. Social mobility implies a set of changes
in
opportunities,
relationships,
social
incomes,
status
membership.
177
lifestyles,
and
personal
ultimately
class
Introduction to Sociology
Social mobility is a type of movement but it is not
physical movement over geographical space although
social mobility could involve, and be brought about by,
physical mobility. It is movement in the social space, the
ss^pr
shifting or changing of statuses
or class positions
positions. Social
mobility is a ssdcferprocess that takes place among
..............
A
>ty, as they
individual members or groups in a society,
interact with each other. It is a- process by which
individuals or groups move from one status to another;
or from one class or stratum to another.
S
1 1 11 1 I I
Social mobility describes thelvolume and quality of
movement among strata. That is the kind of movement
that people make between the different social classes.
Our unit of analysis in social mobility may be an
individual, of a social group or a nation.
178
Introduction to Sociology
5.4.2. Types of Social Mobility
Sociologists have identified different types of social
mobility. The following is a brief discussion of the
different types of social mobility (Team of Exeprts,
2000).
Vertical Social Mobility
Vertical social mobility is a type of social mobility that
individuals experience when they move from their social
status to other higher or lower social status. It is a
radical social change in an individual's position. It is a
movement between different social classes and it
■
involves a change in social position of an individual, a
8*^
family or a group. It may be upward or downward.
Horizontal Social Mobility
Horizontal social mobility is also called lateral social
mobility. It is movement within a social class or a social
position where the individual slightly improves and/or
declines in his social position with in his/ her class level.
Unlike vertical social mobility, it doesn't involve drastic
changes.
179
Introduction to Sociology
Inter-generational Social Mobility
This type of social mobility involves the movement up or
down,
between the social class of one or two
generations of a family, or a social group. In this
mobility, our focus of attention is a social group, like the
family. Here we look at change in the status position of
the familj^pVer two or more generations, i.e., the social
position of the grandfather, the father and the son.
II
M11 -
If a child, for example, whose father was an upper class
person as a result of his wealth becomes only a laborer
..jlm
*
I
in his own time, then he has experienced a downward
intergenerational social mobility.
Intra-gerierational mobility
This concerns individual changes in positions during
one’s lifetime, ft may also refer to the change that occurs
in social groups or a country’s socioeconomic position
over a specified period of time. In other words, through
achievement or other means one can move up from
being a poor primary school teacher to a high court
judge. Unlike the Inter-generational social mobility, intra-
180
Introduction to Sociology
generational social mobility is with in one generation.
But like inter-generational social mobility, it may be an
upward or downward social mobility. Unlike the intergenerational social mobility, our focus here is on a
specific individual or group. Here, we observe change in
the social position of an individual or a group over the
life cycle of tbW^individual himself -or the group either
upward or.Jn some cases downward. For example, a
person
his/her lifetime may rise up from a lower
position such as shoeshining, and climb up the social
ladder until he or she becomes a member of privileged
social and economic position. Or, others may happen to
lose their once prestigious socio-economic position and
as a result move down until they end up in destitution.
'-/s-r'- '
5.4.3. Avenues of Social Mobility
/C?
The avenues of social mobility are the doors through
which a person moves upward in the social hierarchy.
The major avenue to social mobility in most modern
societies is access to appropriate modern education.
Change of profession/ occupation and geographical
mobility are also avenues. There are also some sudden
181
Introduction to Sociology
or short cut avenues to social mobility. These include
windfall gains in terms of inheritance, gambling, theft or
financial corruption, winning a lottery game, etc. Such
mobility is rare, bearing in mind that most inheritance is
within the same social group.
The opportunities for upward social^mbbility are great in
modern societies which have open systems. In such
societies, there is freedom of vertical social mobility, and
any member of a society may move up or down the
social hierarchy. There are no legal and/or traditional
restrictions that are put on social mobility on either
direction. What count a
lot are personal
merits,
competitions and efforts for achievement On the other
hand, in societies with closed system vertical, especially
upward, is very difficult. In such societies, individuals
.
. A.
...
.
■
xl_
X
born to a certain social position remairi- within that
category
for
their
lifetime.
The
1._
most
important
determinants here are hot individual's achievements,
merits or personal effort, but what counts most are one's
ancestry, racial background, family background, religion,
sex, ethnicity, etc. (Henslin and Nelson, 1995)
182
Introduction to Sociology
5.4.4. Barriers to Upward Social Mobility
These are factors that make it difficult to individual
families or groups to move from one status position to
another. Such barriers may include various social,
and other
psychological, cultural, economic, ^political
,
related
factors.
Lack
of
4|y,
oppdrtuhiL
motivation,
commitment, interest, or positive attitude, etc., is very
crucial psychosocial factors. Other" most important
barriers may include one's own physical condition, lack
of
to
access
an
appropriate
modern
education;
inequality in the distribution of inherited wealth; one's
color or ethnic origin, religion, etc. These are the most
■
obvious barriers to social mobility.
________
Box 5.2. Types of social mobility
.
Vertical social mobility
•
Horizontal social mobility
•
Intra-generational social mobility
•
Inter-generational social mobility
183
. _ __________ ________
Introduction to Sociology
5.5. Social Change
5.5.1. Definition and Basic Characteristics of
Social Change
may be defined as the alteration or
Social change ma
transformation at large scale level in the social structure,
social institutions,, social organization and patterns of
social behavior in a given society or social system.
Social change can also be defined as the alteration,
rearrangement or total replacement of phenomena,
11 mJ 1 1 1 Lb J
Sy
acti|ies,^u|: or processes through time ina society
in
a
succession
of
events.
The
alteration
or
rearrangement may involve simple or complex changes
in the structure, form or shape of the social phenomena.
Sometimes it may mean the complete wiping out of the
phenomenon and their total replacement by new forms
(Calhoun et al, 1994).
Some minor changes that take place in the lives of
individuals and small, limited groups may not be
regarded as social changes although these kinds of
changes may be the manifestations or effects of
184
Introduction to Sociology
changes that are taking place at larger scale. Changes
in the material and non- material contents of a culture
also may not be regarded as social changes. However,
it is very difficult to separate social changes from cultural
change. Because the two are usually interdependent,
social change may uspglly^introd,pce cultural changes,
and vice versa^J^’
—
Some of the basic characteristics of social change are
the following (Indrani, 1998; Team of Experts, 2000):
a,;
•
Social change occurs all the time. Its process
“SS may be■imperceptible
ib i I I
9
and can be cumulative,
i.e., one may not easily perceive the processes
of social change, although it is always taking
•
There is no society that is static and unchanging.
All societies are susceptible to social change. In
other words,
social change is a universal
phenomenon (it is every where and anywhere). It
is spread both over time and space.
185
Introduction to Sociology
Change occurs both at micro-level and macro
•
level. The point here is that while social change
often refers to noticeable changes in social
phenomena, we must not lose sight of the fact
that small changes in minor relationships can
also be significant
The
influence c*
of ------------change in one area can have an
. ^influence
•
impact on other related areas. That is, social
change is contagious, like infectious diseases.
Xi"
.
xXX - :
:i • '
- .,
Social change has a rate; it can be rapid or slow.
S
|B J I I * # H
..cries of Social Change
5.5.2. Theories
Theories
of social
change
have
;zr
Atbeen
generally
concerned with the direction of change and the manner
in which change occur. Sociologists want to explain the
nature, direction, cause and effects of social change.
Some of the theories of social change are the following
(Calhoun et al, 1994; Rosenberg, 1987; Macionis,
1997).
186
Introduction to Sociology
Structural Functionalist Theory
This theory states that social change takes place as the
diversification and division of labor increases in the
social system of a given society. Structural functionalists
focus on the cohesion, order and stability of social
system. Change disrupts the orderly functioning of the
system. Structural- functionalist theory .focuses on
cr. the
effect of social change on the structure of society, the
function and dysfunction of change,
»
.
.
stability and
i a zt-
.
equilibrium of the social system. When change takes
place, it affects the order and equilibrium of the social
system and thus the system has to bring itself back to
the equilibrium,: to smooth functioning of the system?
Je
.
W
* ;
■
Conflict Theory
: .v. '
•
_
This theory states that social change takes place due to
the ever-present class conflicts in the social system for
the better or worse. According to this theory, thus, social
change is the result of social conflicts and is essential
and beneficial. Every social system contains within itself
the seeds of change as far as it is a system wherein
exploitation of one group by another exists. Social
187
Introduction to Sociology
change continues to become inevitable until a classless
society emerges, one in which conflicts cease to exist.
Cyclic Theory
This theory states that society undergoes change in
circular manner. Social change takes a cyclic form, from
worse to better, back again from better to worse. Social
....
change is not always for the better. Societies may grow,
advance; and reach peak stage of development, and
»: ? - thenithey may stagnate and finally collapse, with the
potential for rising again.
T/ieory
I | ■
^5^
ST
Thisgheory
char
ieory states that change
takes place in a linear
manner. The direction of social change is from worse to
better/simple
better,
simple to complex and backward to modern. In
other words, according to linear theory, social change is
____ ...
evolutionary; it is always towards the better way until
perfection is achieved.
188
Introduction to Sociology
Modernization Theory
This theory of social change may be regarded as an
extension of linear, evolutionary theory. It states that the
change that is being experienced by most Third World
societies
is
by
imitating
or copying
the
values,
experiences, and .-wgels of already modernized
societies. It is b>^^)pung; assimilatin^^d internalizing
those aspects of the industrialized societies which if
copied would bring about an improved social, economic
and political development to the society.
5.5.3. Factors That Facilitate and Hinder
Positive Social Change
The various factors that promote or hinder social change
may
be
......................
generally
categorized
as
socio-cultural,
psychosocial, economic, natural, demographic, political,
and so on.
Natural factors may include climate
N'
changes, the discovering of natural resources such as,
minerals,
petroleum,
etc.,
are
those
which
are
considered as having positive effects on society. Other
natural factors are natural disasters such as earthquake,
flood, famine, drought, and pestilence and so on. The
189
Introduction to Sociology
emergence of HIV /AIDS as pestilence is for example
having great effects on the social arrangement and
organization of societies.
Demographic factors-migration, urbanization, population
growth, etc., are also important ones in bringing about
socio-cultural change. Political factors such as planned
...
•
change by government, change of state ideology, etc.,
are also important Other factors such as war, scientific
invention and discoveries, diffusion of non-material and
material elements of culture through education and
trade relations, etc., also promote social change.
last but not the least psychosocial factors like beliefs,
vested interests, sacred values, attitudes, resistance to
change or to accept arid entertain new things and
•
•
■•
X _
■ a
XL-—.
x-xx
z“> |
\ //^
/
intending t/^iaintain the status quo are also very
1
" "
important force^^^ ®
\V’
important forces.
5.6. Chapter Summary
In the organized social relationship of human groups,
social processes take place. Social processes are
repetitive forms of actions, patterns of social behaviors.
190
Introduction to Sociology
Social processes manifest themselves through various
modes such as competition, conflict, cooperation,
accommodation and assimilation. These processes take
place on continuous basis at micro and macro levels.
These modes of social processes are interrelated and
each may yield the othej, and^tbey Jtake place in cyclic
manner.
Social stratification, social mobility and social change
are the three important aspects of social processes.
Social stratification refers to the classification of society
into different social strata that involve inequalities or
J g ’ J
E 8
differences in lifestyle and jiving standards of people.
8vhiiimJLh
They refer to power imbalance and unequal distribution
of resources among people. The word stratification is
originally used in geology to differentiate one rock type
from the other. By the same token, that is, society in
general is segmented.
There are two forms of social
WO 13 WP
stratification. These are Social class and caste system.
The former refers to a category of people belonging to
the same stratum- having more or less similar socio
economic standards. The latter is a closed and rigid kind
of social stratification.
The
191
position
or
ranks of
Introduction to Sociology
individuals in the stratum or groups is determined by
age-old,
traditional,
religious
values,
norms
and
principles, which are strong and difficult to change.
Social mobility refers to the movement of individuals and
groups in the social space. Physical mobility is not social
mobility but may contribute to social mobility. Social
mobility may/ be vertical or horizontal and
intra
generational or intergenerational.
The other aspect of social processes is social change.
The study of social change has been a major concern in
*8B*
Ji
I
j|*J
the discipline of sociology. Sociologists are particularly
interested in this dynamic aspect of social system.
Social
change
refers
to
large-scale
(significant)
alterations; in the organization and institution of a
population (a society). A change which is limited to
individuals or certain groups, families, etc, is not a social
change although it is important. However, we cannot
dissociate social and cultural changes for they are
interdependent; social change may bring with it cultural
change, and vice versa.
192
Introduction to Sociology
There are many theoretical explanations of social
change. Of this, structural-functionalist theory focuses
on social order, consensus and stability. It states that
social change occurs due to growth, complexity in social
structure-due
to
Modernization
theory,, focuses
growth
in
modernization/Moderhization
social
on
differentiation.
the
idea
of
is increasing ability to
master environment. According to this theory, change
occurs in Third World societies when they make effort to
imitate advanced western societies in various respects.
The conflict school of thought stands against the school
of structural functionalism. According to the latter,
conflict is the main factor behind social change and is
_ 1 W I.. P-useful and necessary for change.
193
Introduction to Sociology
which began in Great Britain during 18th century, gave
rise to the emergence of a fourth type of society called
the Industrial Society. An industrial society is one in
which goods are produced by machines powered by
fuels instead of by animal and human energy (Ibid.).
Sociologists also have come up with a fifth emerging
type of society called post-industrial society. This is a
society
based
on
technology, ’ rather
information,
on
than
and
high
materials
and
services
raw
manufacturing. The highly industrialized which have now
passed to the post-industrial level include the USA,
Canada, Japan, and Western Europe.
2.2. The Concept of Culture
2.2.1. Definition
Before going any further, it may be important to note
that common people often misuse the concept of
culture. Some misconceptions about the to term culture
include:
1. Many people in the western world use the term
culture in the sense that some people are more
"cultured" than others. This basically emanates
69
Introduction to Sociology
from the idea associated with the root word of
the term culture, “kulture” in German, which
refers to “civilization". Thus, when one is said to
be “cultured”, he or she is said to be civilized. For
sociologists
anthropologists,
and
"culture
includes much more than refinement, taste,
sophistication, education and appreciation of the
fine arts. Not only college graduates but also all
people are ‘cultured’” Kottak (2002: 272).
2. A second commonly used misconception is that
which equates “culture" with things which are
colorful, customs, cloths, foods, dancing, music,
etc. As Kottak (op. cit p.525) argues, “... many
[people] have come to think of culture in terms of
colorful
customs,
music,
dancing
and
adornments clothing, jewelry and hairstyles....
Taken to an extreme, such images portray
culture as recreational and ultimately unserious
rather than something that ordinary people live
everyday of their lives not just when they have
festivals” (Ibid. P. 525).
70
Introduction to Sociology
3. A third misconception about what culture is and
what it constitutes is that which
may be
entertained by many common people here in
Ethiopia. This misconception is similar to the
second one, but it differs from it in that most
people here think culture (as conceptualized in
its local language for example, bahil in Amharic)
is that which pertains to unique traditional
material objects or non - material things of the
past. According to this view, the cultural may not
include things (material or non - material), which
are modern, more ordinary, day-to - day, life
aspects.
Here,
the simple,
ordinary social,
economic and other activities, ideas and affairs
are regarded as not cultural or somewhat “less
cultural" although not clearly stated.
The concept of culture is one of the most widely used
notions in sociology. It refers to the whole ways of life of
the members ’of a society. It includes what they dress,
their marriage customs and family life, art, and patterns
of work, religious ceremonies, leisure pursuits, and so
forth. It also includes the material goods they produce:
71
Introduction to Sociology
bows and arrows, plows, factories and machines,
computers, books, buildings, airplanes, etc (Calhoun, et
al, 1994; Hensiln and Nelson, 1995).
The concept of culture has been defined by hundreds of
times by sociologists and anthropologists, emphasizing
different dimensions. However, most often scholars
have focused on eh symbolic dimension of culture; that
culture is essentially symbolic (see below).
2.2.2. Basic Characteristics of Culture
1. Culture is organic and supra-organic: It is organic
when we consider the fact that there is no culture
without human society. It is supra organic, because
it is far beyond any individual lifetime. Individuals
come and go, but culture remains and persists
Calhoun (op cit).
2. Culture is overt and covert: It is generally divided
into material and non-material cultures. Material
culture consists of any tangible human made objects
such as tools, automobiles, buildings, etc.
72
Non-
Introduction to Sociology
material culture consists of any non-physical aspects
like language, belief, ideas, knowledge, attitude,
values, etc.
3. Culture is explicit and implicit: It is explicit when we
consider those actions which can be explained and
described easily by those who perform them. It is
implicit when we consider those things we do, but
are unable to explain them, yet we believe them to
be so.
4. Culture is ideal and manifest (actual^: Ideal culture
involves the way people ought to behave or what
they ought* to do. Manifest culture involves what
people actually do.
5.. Culture is stable and yet changing: Culture is stable
when we consider what people hold valuable and
are handing over to the next generation in order to
maintain their norms and values. However, when
culture comes into contact with other cultures, it can
change. However, culture changes not only because
. of direct or indirect contact between cultures, but
73
Introduction to Sociology
also through innovation and adaptation to new
circumstances.
6. Culture is shared and learned: Culture is the public
property of a social group of people (shared).
Individuals get cultural knowledge of the group
through socialization. However, we should note that
all things shared among people might not be
cultural, as there are many biological attributes
which people share among themselves (Kottak,
2002).
7. Culture is symbolic:
It is based on the purposeful
creation and usage of symbols; it is exclusive to
humans. Symbolic thought is unique and crucial to
humans and to culture. Symbolic thought is the
human ability to give a thing or event an arbitrary
meaning and grasp and appreciate that meaning
Symbols are the central components of culture.
Symbols refer to anything to which people attach
meaning and which they use to communicate with
others.
More
specifically,
symbols
are
words,
objects, gestures, sounds or images that represent
74
Introduction.to Sociology
something else rather than themselves. Symbolic
thought is unique and crucial to humans and to
culture. It is the human ability to give a thing or event
an arbitrary meaning and grasp and appreciate that
meaning. There is no obvious natural or necessary
connection
between
a
and
symbol
what
it
symbolizes (Henslin and Nelson, 1995; Macionis,
1997).
Culture
thus
emphasizing
works
in
meaning,
the
symbolic
rather
than
domain
the
technical/practical rational side of human behavior.
All actions have symbolic content as’well as being
action
in and of themselves.
Things, actions,
behaviors, etc, always stand for something else than
merely, the thing itself.
75
Introduction to Sociology
Box 2.1. Basic features of culture
•
Culture is organic and supraorganic
•
Culture is implicit and explicit
•
Culture is stable and changing
•
Culture is overt and covert
Culture is learned and shared
•
Culture is symbolic
•
Culture is ideal and manifest
2.2.3. Elements of Culture
Culture includes within itself elements that make up the
essence of a society or a social group. The major ones
include: Symbols, values, norms, and language (See
Henslin and Nelson, 1995; Calhoun et al. 1994).
Symbols
Symbols are the central components of culture. Symbols
refer to anything to which people attach meaning and
which they use to communicate with others. More
specifically,
symbols
are
words,
objects,
gestures,
sounds or images that represent something else rather
76
Introduction to Sociology
than themselves. Symbolic thought is unique and crucial
to humans and to culture. It is the human ability to give a
thing or event an arbitrary meaning and grasp and
appreciate that meaning. There is no obvious natural or
necessary connection between a symbol and what it
symbolizes.
Language
Language, specifically defined as a system of verbal
and in many cases written symbols with rules about how
those symbols can be strung together to convey more
complex meanings, is the distinctive capacity and
possession of humans; it is a key element of culture.
Culture encompasses language, and through language,
culture is communicated
and transmitted.
Without
language it would be impossible to develop, .elaborate
and transmit culture to the future generation.
Values
Values are essential elements of non-material culture.
They may be defined as general, abstract guidelines for
our lives, decisions, goals, choices, and actions. They
are shared ideas of a groups or a society as to what is
77
Introduction to Sociology
right or wrong,
correct
or
incorrect,
desirable or
undesirable, acceptable or unacceptable, ethical or
unethical, etc., regarding something. They are general
road maps for our lives. Values are shared and are
learned in group. They can be positive or negative. For
example, honesty, truth - telling, respect for others,
hospitality, helping those in need, etc are positive
values. Examples of negative values include theft,
indecency, disrespect, dishonesty, falsehood, frugality,
etc. The Hippocratic Oath in medical profession dictates
that practitioners should among other things, keep the
secrets of patients, provide them whatever help they
can, do no harm to patients willingly, etc. This is an
example of positive value.
Values are dynamic, meaning they change over time.
They are also static, meaning they tend to persist
without any significant modification. Values are also
diversified, meaning they vary from place to place and
culture to culture. Some values are universal because
there
is
bio-
psychological
unity
among
people
everywhere and all times. In other words, they emanate
from the basic similarity of mankind’s origins, nature and
78
Introduction to Sociology
desires. For example, dislike for killing people, concepts
and practices of disease management, cleanliness,
personal hygiene, cosmetics, incest taboo, etc.
Norms
Norms are also essential elements of culture. They are
implicit principles for social
-
.
;
■
-
life,
relationship and
-
interaction. Norms are detailed and specific rules for
specific situations. They tell us how to do something,
what to do, what not to do, when to do it, why to do it,
etc. Norms are derived from values. That means, for
every specific norm, there is a general value that
determines its content.
Individuals may not act according to the defined values
and norms of the group. Therefore, violation of values
and norms and deviating from the standard values and
norms are often common. Social norms may be divided
into two. These are mores and folkways
Mores: Are important and stronger social norms for
existence, safety, well-being and continuity of the
society or the group or society. Violation of, and
79
Introduction to Sociology
deviation from these kinds of norms, may result in
serious reactions form the groups. The strongest norms
are regarded as the formal laws of a society or a group.
Formal laws are written and codified social norms. The
other
kinds
of
are
mores
called
conventions.
Conventions are established rules governing behavior;
they are generally accepted ideals by the society.
Conventions may also be regarded as written and
signed agreements between nations to govern the
behaviors of individuals, groups and nations.
Folkways: Are the ways of life developed by a group of
people. They are detailed and minor instructions,
traditions or rules for day-to-day life that help us function
effectively and smoothly as members of a group. Here,
violating such kinds of norms may not result in a serious
punishment unlike violating mores. They are less
morally binding. In other words, folkways are appropriate
ways of behaving and doing things. Examples may
include table etiquette, dressing rules, walking, talking,
etc.
80
Introduction to Sociology
Conformity to folkways usually occurs automatically
without any national analysis and is based upon custom
passed from generation to generation. They are not
enforced by law, but by informal social control. They are
not held to be important or obligatory as mores, or moral
standards, and their violation is not as such severely
sanctioned. Although folkways are less binding, people
have to behave according to accepted standards. Some
exceptional behaviors are regarded eccentric behaviors.
Folkways are distinguished from laws and mores in that
they are designed, maintained and enforced by public
sentiment, or custom, whereas laws are institutionalized,
designed, maintained and enforced by the political
authority of the society. Folkways in turn may be divided
into two sub types; fashion and custom.
Fashion: Is a form of behavior, type of folkways that is
socially approved at a given time but subject to periodic
change. • Adherents
combine
both
conformity to norm of a certain group.
81
deviation
and
Introduction to Sociology
Custom: Is a folkway or form of social behavior that,
having persisted a long period of time, has become
traditional and well established in a society and has
received some degree of formal recognition. Custom i$ a
pattern of action shared by most or all members of a
society. Habit is a personality trait, where as the custom
is
a
group
trait.
Fashion and
customs can
be
differentiated in that while custom changes at slower
rate, fashion changes at a faster rate.
Figure 2.1 A diagrammatic representation of social
norms
Social Values
Social Norms
Folkways
Fashion
Mores
Custom
82
■r
Convention
Laws
Introduction to Sociology
Box 2.2. Elements of culture
Values
Norms
Symbols
Language
Folkways
Mores
Customs
Fashion
Laws
2.2.4. Culture Variability and Explanations
Cultural variability refers to the diversity of cultures
across societies and places. As there are different
societies, there are different cultures. The diversity of
human culture is remarkable. Values and norms of
behavior vary widely from culture to culture often
contrasting in radical ways (Broom and Sleznki, 1973).
For example, Jews do not eat pork, while Hindus eat
pork but avoid beef. Cultural diversity or variability can
be both between societies and within societies. If we
83
Introduction to Sociology
take the two societies, Ethiopia and India, there are
great,
sharp cultural
diversities
between the two
societies. On the other hand, within both societies, there
is remarkable cultural variability. Cultural variability
between societies may result in divergent health and
disease conditions. For example, variations in nutritional
habits are closely linked to the types of diseases. The
prevalence of tapeworm among raw-meat eating people
may be a case in point.
We use the concept of subculture to denote the
variability of culture within a certain society. Sub culture
is a distinctive culture that is shared by a group within a
society (Stockard, 1997). We call it sub culture, because
groups (with their sub cultures) exist within and as a
smaller part of the main, dominant culture. Examples of
subculture could be the distinctive culture of university
students, street children and prostitutes in Addis Ababa,
the culture of medical professionals, etc.
Why cultures vary from society to society? Sociologists,
anthropologists, cultural geographers and other social
scientists have studied the causes for cultural variations
84
Introduction-to Sociology
among (between) societies. Various arguments have
been provided the variation, including geographical
factors, racial determination, demographic factors, span
of interest and mere historic chances. Those who
argued for racial determination believe that cultural
variation is genetically determined. Geographic factors
include: climate, altitude, and so forth. Included in
demographic
factors
are
changes
population
in
structure, population increase, etc., whereas by span of
interest is meant cultures vary as people's interest in life
also varies. Cultural variation is due to mere historical
chances; a particular group of people may develop a
culture
as
it
is
exposed
to
certain
historical
circumstances and opportunities.
However, no one explanation is sufficient by itself;
anthropologists
now
reject
particular
deterministic
explanation such as those based on race; rather cultural
variations
are
accounted
explanations.
85
for
by
more
holistic
Introduction to Sociology
2.2.5. Ethnocentrism, Cultural Relativism and
Culture Shock
Ethnocentrism
We often tend to judge other cultures by comparison
with our own. It is not logically possible and proper to
underestimate or overestimate or judge other cultures
on the basis of one's cultural standard. Ethnocentrism,
in general, is an attitude of taking one's own culture and
ways of life as the best and the center of all and on the
other hand, regarding other ethnic groups and cultures
as inferior, bad, full of errors, etc. It is the tendency to
apply one's own cultural values in judging the behavior
and beliefs of people raised in other cultures. It is a
cultural universal. People everywhere think that familiar
explanations, opinion, and customs as true, right, proper
and moral. They regard different behavior as strange or
savage (Macionis, 1997; Hensllin and Nelson, 1995).
Cultural Relativism
Every society has its own culture, which is more or less
unique. Every culture contains its own unique pattern of
behavior which may seem alien to people from other
cultural
backgrounds.
We
86
cannot
understand
the
Introduction to Sociology
practices and beliefs separately from the wider culture of
which they are part. A culture has to be studied in terms
of its own meanings and values. Cultural relativism
describes a situation where there is an attitude of
respect for cultural differences rather than condemning
other people's culture as uncivilized or backward
(Stockard, 1997).
Respect for cultural differences involves:
•
Appreciating cultural diversity;
•
Accepting and respecting other cultures;
•
Trying to understand every culture and its
elements in terms of its own context and logic;
•
Accepting that each body of custom has
inherent dignity and meaning as the way of
• life of one group which has worked'out to its
. environment, to the biological needs of its
members, and to the group relationships;
•
Knowing that a person's own culture is only
one among many; and
•
Recognizing that what is immoral, ethical,
acceptable, etc, in one culture may not be so
in another culture.
87
Introduction to Sociology
Cultural relativism may be regarded as the opposite of
ethnocentrism. However, there is some problem with the
argument that behavior in a particular culture should not
be judged by the standards of another. This is because
in its extremeness, it argues that there is no superior,
international or universal morality.
To sum up the issues of ethnocentrism and cultural
relativism,
the
concepts
dilemmas
and
contradictions
exchanges
and
relationships
involve
difficult
choices,
regarding
cultural
between
and
within
societies. The dilemmas and contradictions become
clear when we see that the traditional anthropological
position
maintains that every cultural
beliefs and
practice, including for example the ones which . are
termed as “harmful traditional practices” in‘Ethiopia, are
part and parcel of the general cultural system of a
society and therefore they should not be judged and
undermined by any outsider. On the other hand, the
dilemma is taken to the extreme cultural relativism
appears to entail a fallacy, in that it implies that there are
no universal cultural or moral standard by which actions
88
Introduction to Sociology
and beliefs have to be judged. Yet still, even cultural
anthropologists accept the idea that there are some
cultural
standards
are
which
universally
found
everywhere, expressed for example in the world’s major
religions.
In any case there may be no ready made solutions to
this dilemma; however, what we can at present maintain
is that cultural diversity has to be respected and yet
international standards of justice and human rights have
to be taken into account.
Culture Shock
shock
is
the
psychological
maladjustment
at
micro
or
Culture
macro
and
level
social
that
is
experienced for the first time when people encounter
new cultural elements such as new things, new ideas,
new concepts, seemingly strange beliefs and practices.
No person is protected form culture shock. However,
individuals vary in their capacity to adapt and overcome
the influence of culture shock.
Highly ethnocentric
people are exposed widely to culture shock. On the
other hand, cultural relativists may find it easy to adapt
89
Introduction to Sociology
to new situations and overcome culture shock (Henslin
and Nelson, 1995).
2.2.6. Cultural Universals, Alternatives and
Specialties
Cultural Universals
Although there are as many different and unique
cultures as societies, there are some cultural practices
that are universal. Amid the diversity of human cultural
behavior, there are some common features that are
found in virtually all societies. Cultural universality
refers to those practices, beliefs, values, norms, material
objects, etc., which are observed across all societies in
the world, or across different social groups within a
society.
For example, every culture has a grammatically complex
language. All societies have some recognized form of
family system in which there are values and norms
associated with the care of children. The institution of
marriage, religious rituals, and property rights are all
cultural universals. All societies have some form of
incest prohibition. Anthropologist have identified variety
90
Introduction to Sociology
of more cultural universals including the existence of art,
dancing, bodily adornments, games, gift giving, joking
and rules of hygiene. Cultural universals condition
behavioral similarity among individuals in a given society
or across societies. They do not allow differences in
actions and behaviors, lifestyle, attitude, behaviors, etc
(Broom and Selzenki, 1973).
Table 2.1. A list of some cultural universals
age grading
faith healing
joking
pregnancy usages
athletics
family
kin groups
property rites
bodily adornments
feasting
kin terminology
puberty customs
calendar
fire making
language
religious rituals
community organization
folklore
magic
residence rules
cooking
food taboos
marriage
sexual restrictions
cooperative labor
funeral rites
91
Introduction to Sociology
mealtimes
soul concepts
cosmology
games
medicine
status differentiation
courtship .
gestures
modesty
trade
dancing
gift giving
mourning
tool making
decorative labor
greetings
music
visiting
division of labor
hair styles
mythology
weaning
dream interpretation
hospitality
numerals
weather control
education
housing
obstetrics
ethics
hygiene
personal names
ethnobotany
incest taboos
population policy
etiquette
inheritance rules
postnatal care
Source: Scupin, Raymond and Christopher R. DeCorse
(1995). Anthropology, a Global Perspective'. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
92
Introduction to Sociology
Cultural Alternatives and Specialties
There are many different options for doing the same
thing. For example, care for a patient is a universal
aspect of cultures; but the way people care for patients
varies. There are many diverse ways of doing the same
thing. This is called cultural alternative. In other words,
cultural alternatives refer to two or more forms of
behavior in a particular society which are acceptable in
a given situation. These alternatives represent different
reactions to the same situations or different techniques
to achieve the same end. Cultural alternatives are (also)
the types of choices that allow for differences in ideas,
customs and lifestyles. Modern industrialized societies
offer far more cultural alternatives than had many
societies of the past.
On the other hand, cultural specialties' refer to the
specific skills, training, knowledge, etc. which is limited
to a group or specific members of society. They are
those elements of culture which are shared by the
members of certain social groups but which are not
shared by the total population. Cultural specialties cause
93
Introduction to Sociology
behavioral differences among people as opposed to
cultural universals.
2.2.7. The Concepts of Culture Lag and Culture
Lead
Culture is dynamic. When culture change occurs, the
change is usually not evenly distributed across material
and non-material dimensions of culture. The rate of
change is not balanced. Material culture may change at
a faster rate than non- material culture. The growth in
science and
technology
in western,
industrialized
societies for example, does not seem to be matched by
the necessary changes and appropriate adjustment of
adaptive culture. That is non-material culture changes
slowly. This condition is termed as culture
lag.
Associated with the rapid growth in material culture are
usually crisis in the realm of amorality, social and
cultural dilemmas, which in turn result in various social
pathologies such as extreme form of individualism,
alienation, the state of normlessness, suicide, etc (Team
of Experts, 2000).
94
Introductiorrto Sociology
On the other hand, in some less developed societies,
the change of non-material culture may outpace the
material culture. When this occurs, it is called culture
lead. Due to the effect of globalization and rapid
assimilation processes, people in the Third World are
accustomed to the ideology and cultures of the Western
World, though their material culture is not changing
keeping pace with non- material culture.
2.2.8. Global Culture and Cultural Imperialism
Before closing this chapter, it may be important to note
few things on the issues of cultural exchange in today’s
globalizing
world.
One
of the
main
aspects
of
globalization is that a relatively uniform world culture is
taking shape today in the world. The global culture may
entail all speaking the some language, share the same
values and norms,
and sustain common
und of
knowledge as of residents of the same community
(Kottak 2002). Global culture may also be associated
with
cultural
imperialism,
the
unequal
cultural
exchange in the global system whereby western
material and non-material cultures have come to occupy
95
Introduction to Sociology
a dominating and imposing roles over the indigenous
cultures of the Third World peoples.
The global culture is often promoted by:
-
The global spread of capitalism- •
Consumerism and the consumer culture
-
The growth of transnational media, particularly
electronic mass media such as BBC, CNN, etc.
The transnational
media
have often promoted the
aggressive promotion that its value system is superior
and preferable to those of other non-western cultures
2.3. Chapter Summary
The concepts of society and culture are central to
sociology. A society is an autonomous grouping of
people who inhabit a common territory, have a common
culture (shared set of values, beliefs, customs and so
forth) and are linked to one another through routinized
social interactions and interdependent statuses and
roles.
Societies may be conceptualized
as
having
different levels: at global, continental, regional, nation-
96
Introduction to Sociology
state and ethic group levels. Depending on various
criteria, societies may be classified in to various
categories, such as First World, Second World, Third
World and Fourth World Societies (based on economic
development and overall socio-economic status); and
hunting and gathering, pastoral, agrarian, industrial and
post industrial societies (based on temporal succession
and major means of livelihood).
The term "culture" refers to the whole ways of life of the
members of a society. It includes what they dress; their
marriage customs and family life; art and patterns of
work; religious ceremonies; leisure pursuits and so forth.
Culture has various dimensions such as material and
non-material, implicit and explicit, organic and supra
organic, ideal, and actual, dynamic and static and overt
and covert. The essential elements of culture include
symbols, language, values and norms. Other important
aspects of culture such as culture variability; ethno
centrism, cultural relativism and culture shock; cultural
universals, alternatives and specialties; and culture lag
and lead are discussed.
97
Introduction to Sociology
Table 1.1. Summary of sociological theories
S.
No.
T"
2.
Name of the
theory_____
Structural
Functionalism
it Key concepts
What does
state?
Sees society as a Consensus,
complex
system social order,
whose parts work structure and
in
together to promote „ function
solidarity
and
Emphasis
on
stability and order
while
neglecting
conflict
and
changes which so
vital in any society
________
its
Social conflict • Sees society in a Class cohfliet;
-i,; ^For
overemphasis on
theory
framework of class alienation;
inequality
and
conflicts . . .and competition;
division,
for
focuses on the ^domination
neglecting the fact
struggle for scarce
of tfdw
. how shared
resources
by
values
and
different groups in a
interdependence
given society
22
generate
unity
i
. among members of
^ciegr^fit is also
critici^d for its
explicit
political
goals.________
Too
much
Stresses
the Symbols;
Symbolic
emphasis on micro
interactidnism analysis of how our processes;
level
analysis;
behaviors depend interaction;
neglect of larger
on how wc define meaning'
social processes
others
and
It
ourselves,
on
concentrates
process, rather than
structure,
and
keeps the individual
actor at the center.
J . I I
3.
Its weaknesses
32
Introduction to Sociology
extreme
Some
Feminist sociology Women;
views such as
focuses on the gender;
feminism
radical
exploitation;
particular
seem
unrealistic
male
disadvantages,
supremacy
including
and
oppression
exploitation faced
by
women in
society
" Focuses on the
Social
costs and -------benefits
Exchange
theory
which people obtain
%
in social interaction,
&
including money,
goods, and status.
.
It is based on the
principle
that
nonnlo
people ahwavQ
always act
act
konafit
to
maximize
benefit.
___
Assumes ‘ |3hat|
Balonal
will
choice theory individuals i
operate in rational
&
way and will seek to
MF
benefit themselves
in the life choices
_________
.they make
Underlying < % Views societies as
Denies any basis uiiuuiiymy
Structuralism
static and do not
for. humans being structures;
help very much in
active, since human language
explaining variation
consciousness is
among societies;
no longer seen as
treats culture as a
the
basis
of
given order and
meaning
in
fails to explain the
language
adaptive
of
dimensions
culture.
Feminism
4
5.
6.
7.
■
■■
33
••
Introduction to Sociology
8.
Post
structuralism
Argues
that
humans
cannot
arrive anything they
can confidently call
the (universal) truth.
There is no link
between the words
.55^ w/ff >
Argues power has
Post
modernismpWy ^become
decentralized .and
fragmented
in
contemporary
societies
____
Denial of objective,
I sociological
knowledge
%
Modernity;
postmodernity;
subjective
<.........
1.2. The Significance of Learning
■
.
Sociology
• V* ’
'r
’’v
*
Generally, learning sociology provides us with what
sociologists
call
the
sociological
imagination.
Sociological imagination is a particular way of looking at
the world around us through sociological lenses. It is a
way of looking at our experiences in light of what is
going on in the social world around us. This helps us to
appreciate the social and non-biological forces that
affect, influence and shape our lives as individuals,
groups, and communities (Giddens, 1982). Sociological
34
Introduction to Sociology
1.1. Definition and Subject Matter of
Sociology
1.1.1. What is Sociology?
Before attempting to define what sociology is, les us
look at what the popular conceptions of the discipline
seem. As may be the case with other sciences,
sociologyJs often misconceived among the populace.
Though many may rightly and grossly surmise that
sociology is about people, some think that it is all about
“helping the unfortunate and doing welfare work, while
■■
others think that sociology is the same as socialism and
■A
‘
i I i
'
\s a means ofr\bringing revolution to our schools and
■
•
■
.
colleges” (Nobbs, Hine and Flemming, 1978:1).
The first social scientist to use the term sociology was
'w
a Frenchman by the name of Auguste Comte who lived
from
1798-1857. As coined by Comte,
the term
sociology is a combination of two words. The first part of
the term is a Latin, socius- that may variously mean
society, association, togetherness or companionship.
The other word, logos, is of Greek origin. It literally
means to speak about or word. However, the term is
2
Introduction to Sociology
generally understood as study or science (Indrani,
1998). Thus, the etymological, literal definition of
sociology is that it is the word or speaking about society.
A simple definition here is that it is the study of society
and culture.
__________ * OfflUBox 1.1. A simpteMefinition of sociology
-•-•-••___________________ ic
_____
Sociology is the study of society
,4,
Although the term “sociology” was first used by the
French social philosopher august Comte, the discipline
y.
■|
T I L J
W.
was more firmly established by such theorists as Emile
Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber (Nobbs, Hine and
Flemming, 1978).
Before going any further, let us note that the concepts
“society and “culture” are central in sociology. While
each concept shall be dealt with later in some detail, it
appears to be appropriate here to help students
differentiate between these two important concepts.
Society generally refers to the social world with all its
structures, institutions, organizations, etc around us, and
specifically to a group of people who live within some
3
Introduction to Sociology
type of bounded territory and who share a common way
of life. This common way of life shared by a group of
people is termed as culture (Stockard, 1997).
Box 1.2. Distinguishing between society and culture
Society: ajrfpyfPpf peopile’.whp live withini some
type dRbbunded
Abounded territory ahi; who share a
common way of life
.......................................
Culture: is common way of life shared by a
society or a group.
Now, turning to the definitional issues, it is important that
in addition to this etymological definition of the term, we
need to have other substantive definitions. Thus,
sociology may be generally defined as a social science
that studies such kinds of phenomena as:
•
The structure and function of society as a
system;
•
The nature, complexity and contents of
human social behavior;
•
The fundamentals of human social life;
4
Introduction to Sociology
•
Interaction
of human
beings
with
their
external environment;
•
The indispensability of social interactions for
human development;
•
How the social world affects us, etc.
................... .
A more formal definition of sociology may be that it is a
social science which studies the processes and patterns
of human individual and group interaction, the forms_of
organization of social groups, the relationship among
them, and group influences on individual behavior,:and
vice versa, and the interaction between one social group
and the other (Team of Experts, 2000)Shtapr
Sociology is the scientific study of society, which js
interested in the study of social relationship between
people in group context. Sociology is interested in how
we as human beings interact with each other (the
pattern of social interaction); the laws and principles that
govern
social
relationship
and
interactions;
the
/influence of the social world on the individuals, and vice
versa (Ibid.). It deals with a factually observable subject
matter, depends upon empirical research, and involves
5
Introduction to Sociology
attempts to formulate theories and generalizations that
will make sense of facts (Giddens, 1982).
Regarding the detective and expository nature the
science, Soroka (1992:34) states that “Sociology is a
debunking science; that is, jt looks for levels of reality
other than those presented in official interpretations of
society and people’s common sense explanations of the
world.
social
understanding
are
Sociologists
what
and
is
do
not
value
make
jud^nts.”^
I
4
■:
I I
5
1
M
ii
in
interested
sa™™,™,
trief Historical Overview
F
Sociology and other social sciences emerged from a
common tradition of reflection of social phenoimena;
.
.
.
.
■
interest in the nature of human social behavior and
society has probably always existed; however, most
people in most past societies saw their culture as a fixed
and god-given entity. This view gradually was replaced
by more rational explanations beginning from the 17th
century especially in Western
Europe (Rosenberg,
1987). The sociological issues, questions and problems
6
Introduction to Sociology
had been raised and discussed by the forerunners
starting
from
the
ancient
Greek
and
Roman
philosophers' and Hebrew prophets' times.
Sociology as an academic science was thus born in 19th
century (its formal establishment year being 1837) in
Great Britain and Western Europe)rfes^glly in France
and GermaM and't greatly advanced through out 19th
and 20th centuries:gft''
»
The development of sociology and its current contexts
have to be grasped in the contexts of the major chaSges
that have created the modern world (Giddens, 1986).
Further, sociology originated in 18th century philosophy,
political economy and cultural history (Swingwood,
The major conditions, societal changed, upheavals and
social ferments that gave rise to the emergence and
development of sociology as an academic science
include the Industrial Revolution which began in Great
Britain, the French Political Revolution of 1789, the
Enlightenment and advances in natural sciences and
7
Introduction to Sociology
technology.
These
had
revolutions
brought about
significant societal changes and disorders in the way
society lived in the aforementioned countries. Since
sociology was born amidst the great socio-political and
economic and technological changes of the western
world, it is said to be.the science xrf rpodern society.
nl0%^
pioneering sociologists were very much concerned
The pioneerihg
about the great changes that were taking place and they
felt that the exciting sciences could not help understand,
explain, analyze and interpret the fundamental laws that
■
■
■
■
■
'
govern the social phenomena. Thus sociology was born
out of these revolutionary contexts.
The founders or the pioneering sociologists are the
following (Henslin and Nelson, 1995; Giddens, T996;
Macionis, 1997):
•
Auguste Comte, French Social Philosopher
(1798- 1857)
Comte was the first social philosopher to coin and use
the term sociology (Nobbs, Hine and Flemming, 1978).
He was also the first to regard himself as a sociologist.
8
Introduction to Sociology
He defined sociology as the scientific study of social
dynamics and social static. He argued that sociology
can and should study society and social phenomena
following the pattern and procedures of the natural
science. Comte believed that a theoretical science of
society and the systematic /investigation of human
behavior were needed to improve socfeM He argued
that the new science of society could and should make a
critical contribution towards a new and improved human
society, Comte defined sociology as the study of social
dynamic and social static, the former signifying the
changing, progressing and developmental dimensions of
society, while the latter refers to the social order and
those elements of society and social phenomena which
tend to persist and relatively permanent, defying
chan9^^
•
Marx
Karl Marx (German, 1818-1883)
was
sociologist
a
world-renowned
and
economic
social
historian.
philosopher,
He
made
remarkable contributions to the development of various
social sciences including sociology.. He contributed
greatly to
sociological
ideas.
9
He
introduced
key
Introduction to Sociology
concepts in sociology like social class, social class
conflict, social oppression, alienation, etc. Marx, like
Comte, argued that people should make active efforts to
bring about societal reforms.
According to
Marx,
economic forces are the keys to underestimating society
and social change.,
believe^ that the history of
human society has been that of class conflict. He
•
■
•
■
dreamed^□fl and worked hard towards rf|§lizing, a
classless society, one in which there wil
will- be no explloitation and oppression of one class by another, and
wherein all individuals will work according to their
abilities and receive according to their needs. Marx
’ J
EK
introduced one of the major perspectives in sociology,
called social conflict theory (Macionis, 1997)
•
Harriet Martineau, British Sociologist (1802-
1876)> ~
At a time when women were greatly stereotyped and
Wil
denied access to influential socio-political and academic
arena, it is interesting to ha a female academic to be
numbered among the pioneering sociologists. Harriet
was interested in social issues and studied both in the
United States and England. She came across with the
10
Introduction to Sociology
writings of Comte and read them. She was an active
advocate of the abolition of slavery and she wrote on
many crosscutting issues such as racial and gender
relations,
and
popularize the
she
ideas
traveled
widely.
and writings
She
of
helped
Comte
by
translating them into English (Henslin and Nelson,
1995).
•
Herbert Spencer, British Social Philosopher,
(1820-1903)
Spender was a prominent social philosopher of the 19th
century. He was famolisHor the organic analogy of
’ j
■ ■
human society. He viewed society as an organic system,
having its own structure and functioning in ways
analogous to the biological system. Spencer’s ideas of
the
evolution of human society from the lowest
("barbarism”) to highest form ("civilized”) according to
fixed
laws were famous.
U was
called
"Social
Darwinism", which is analogous to the biological
evolutionary model. Social Darwinism is the attempt to
apply by analogy the evolutionary theories of plant and
animal development to the explanation of human society
and social phenomena (Team of Experts, 2000).
11
Introduction to Sociology
•
Emile Durkheim, French Sociologist, (1858-
1917)
Durkehiem was the most influential scholar in the
academic and theoretical development of sociology. He
laid down some of the fundamental principles, methods,
concepts and theories of sociology; he defined sociology
as the study of social facts. According to him, there are
-
-
■
■
■
'
.
O''’
social facts^ n/Ri
which 'ires
are distinct from KiiJM/sTnif'ol
biological onrj
and
.w
.
psychological facts. By social facts,
— he
... ..meant- the
patterns of behavior that characterize a social group iin a
oil irlicsrl
given society. They should hn
be studied
objectively.; ' The
)Ciologist, therefore, is to uncover social facts
job of a sociologist,
and then to explain them using other social facts. Some
regard Durkheim as the first sociologist to apply
statistical methods to the study of social phenomena
(Macionis, 1997; Clahoun, et al, 1994/
•
Weber
Max Weber, German Sociologist (1864-1920)
was
another
prominent
social
scientist.
According to him, sociology is the scientific study of
human social action. Social action refers to any “action
oriented to influence or influenced by another person or
persons. It is not necessary for more than one person to
12
Introduction to Sociology
be physically present for action to be regarded as social
action....” (Team of Experts, 2000). It is concerned with
the interpretive understanding of human social action
and the meaning people attach to their own actions and
behaviors and those of others. Weber was a renowned
scholar who like Marx, wrote in several academic fields.
He agreed with much Marxian theses but did not accept
his idea
economic forces are cera^to social
change.
Weber argues that we cannot understand
human behavior by just looking at statistics. Every
activity and behavior of people needs to be interpreted.
He argued that a sociologist must aim at what are called
subjective meanings,
the ways in which people
interpret their own behavior or the meanings people
attach their own behavior (Henslin and Nelson, 1995;
Rosnet^, 1987).
13
Introduction to Sociology
Box 1.3. Pioneering founders of sociology
August Comte, French, 1798-1857; key concepts:
social static and social dynamic
Karl Marx, German, (1818-1883), key concepts:
class conflict, alienation^ historical materialism, etc
Emile Durkheim, French, 1858-1917; key concept:
socwfct
%
Max Weber, German, 1864=1920; key concepts:
social action; subjective meanings
Herbert Spencer, British, 1820-1903; key concept:
I b d
"
I
I
IU, British, | 1802-1876; active
Harriet Martineau
social Darwinism
m
. -> f'-
.
.,A
advocate of abolition of slavery and gender issues
_______
*4
1.1.3. Subject Matter, Scope and Concerns of
The scope of sociology is extremely wide ranging, from
the analysis of passing encounter between individuals
on the street up to the investigation of global social
processes The discipline covers an extremely broad
range that includes every aspect of human social
14
Introduction to Sociology
conditions; all types of human relationships and forms of
social
behavior
(Indrani,
1998).
Sociologists
are
primarily interested in human beings as they appear in
social interaction and the effects of this interaction on
human behavior. Such interaction can range from the
first physical contacts of the new bom baby with its
mother to a philosophical discussio I at an international
■
'
-
conference, from a casual passing on the street to the
most intimate of human relationships (World Book
Encyclopedia 1994. Vol. 18, PR. 564-567). Sociologists
are interested to know what processes lead to these
interactions, what exactly occurs when they take place,
***
>
i
J
SB
and what their short run and long run consequences
are.
'
..........
The major systems or units of interaction that interest
sociologists are social groups such as the family or peer
groups; social relationships, such as social roles and
dyadic relationships, and social organizations such as
governments, corporations and school systems to such
territorial organizations as communities and schools
(Broom and Selzinki, 1973).
15
Introduction to Sociology
Sociologists are keen to understand, explain, and
analyze the effect of social world, social environment
and social interaction on our behavior, worldviews,
lifestyle,
personality,
attitudes,
decisions,
etc.,
as
creative, rational, intelligent members of society; and
how we as such create the social, reality.
- W-
'
...
1.1.4. Levels of Sociological Analysis and Fields
of Specializations in Sociology
There are generally two levels of analysis in sociology,
which may also be regarded as branches of sociology:
micro-sociology and macro- sociology (Henslin and
MB
.
- ’.................... -
Nelson, 1995). Micro-sociology is interested in small-
scale level of the structure and functioning of human
social groups; whereas macro-sociology studies the
large-scale aspects of society.
Macro-sociology focuses on the broad features of
society. The goal of macro-sociology is to examine the
large-scale social phenomena that determine how
social groups are organized and positioned within the
social structure. Micro-sociological level of analysis
16
Introduction to Sociology
focuses on social interaction. It analyzes interpersonal
relationships, and on what people do and how they
behave when they interact. This level of analysis is
usually
employed
by
symbolic
interactionist
perspective.
Some writers also add a third
called
meso-levelVanalysis, which analyzes human social
phenomena in between the micro- and macro-levels.
..
Reflecting their particular academic interest sociologists
may prefer one form of analysis to the other; but all
levels of analysis are useful and necessary for a fuller
understanding of social life in society.
__________________________________________________
Box 14. Levels of analysis in sociology
Micro-sociology: Analyzing small scale social
ph^gna
Macro-sociology: analyzing large-scale social
phenomena
Meso-sociology: analysis of social phenomena in
between the micro- and macro- levels.
17
Position: 3926 (1 views)