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Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
NMML
MONOGRAPH
11
Tribal Livelihood and Globalisation: The
Potential of Non-Timber Forest Produce
Development in Central India
Archana Prasad
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
2005
© Archana Prasad, 2005
All rights reserved. No portion of the contents may be
reproduced in any form without the written permission
of the publisher. The views expressed in the article are
of the author and not of the Institution.
Published by
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
Teen Murti House
New Delhi-110011
e-mail: nmml@vsnl.net
ISBN: 81-87614-29-3
Price: Rs. 50/-; US $ 10
Typesetting by Velan Computers & Typesetters, Ghaziabad-2 and printed in India
at Nutech Photolithographers, C-74, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-I,
New Delhi-110020.
Introduction
ndependent India saw the emergence of Nehru’s Panchsheel as the
guiding principle for tribal development. In this vision, the
modernisation of tribal societies was to take place gradually, even
while this was to be done by protecting the traditional customs and
institutions. Keeping this in mind Nehru's India developed tribal welfare
programmes that largely focused on education and health. Though some
programmes were initiated in the agriculture, these were largely confined
to the expansion of plough cultivation. The nature of programmes
implemented, and the lack of rights on forests and non-agricultural land
led to the crisis of livelihood which was faced by tribal people since the
colonial times got accentuated after 1947. This resulted in the greater
dependence of the tribal people on the welfare state for basic services
and the lack of development of a self-reliant economy. The phase after
the late 1980s initiated the first moves for the withdrawal of the state in
the social sector thereby ensuring that any withdrawal of the state would
only lead to further marginalisation of tribal societies and economy. At
the same time it also started a process of peoples participation in forestry
and a process of decentralisation that aimed to simultaneously meet the
challenges of ecological security and the livelihood needs of local people.
Given these objectives, the importance of non-timber forest produce,
(NTFP), increased significantly as their development was considered
very important for the growth of a self-reliant tribal economy. This
monograph traces the genesis and studies the impact of the policies of
devolution and liberalisation within the forestry sector. In particular, it
sees this from the point of view of the survival strategies of tribal people
in the new tribal states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.
I
Essentially speaking, an exploration into the potential for NTFP
development can be a good entry point into analysis of the relationship
between tribal economies and the wider political economy. The post Rio
2
NMML Monograph No. 11
summit period has seen an increasing awareness and demand for green
products. Therefore NTFP exports have been growing as many products
like natural dyes, dried fruits, medicinal plants, fibres, lac, silk, plant
extracts and gums and others are in great demand in the Indian and
world market. Thus the development of this produce can enhance
employment and income for the tribal people who are dependent on it
for their very survival. Its processing through the introduction of smallscale technologies can also add value to the produce of the tribals and
at the same time cut the costs of intermediate processing by the large
industry. The potential for development of NTFP has to take the
relationship of tribals with industrialisation and wider trading networks
into account. This means that the way in which the link of the local
tribal economy with the rest of the economies has been visualised is
essential to the development of NTFP.
Though the scholarship on NTFP in India is in a nascent stage,
there is enough work in other countries that throws some light on the
issues raised above. The first question posed in this literature is
concerning whether non-timber forest produce was in fact the main
stay of the economy and whether its development can lead to the
alleviation of poverty in tribal areas. The available scholarship suggests
that more often than not the commercialisation of non-timber forest
produce is less about poverty alleviation and more about basic survival.
This means that non-timber forest produce usually bears out the
shortfalls in income and do not necessarily provide a way of socio
economic advancement. Dependence on non-timber forest produce is
significant amongst the most marginalised and the poorest of the poor
and this reflects their economic, geographical and social isolation in
the society. The question of what proportion non-timber forest produce
forms of the total income is integrally linked to these factors and the
type of land tenure which determine, not only forest rights but also
other forms of tribal livelihoods. The discussion in this monograph
tackles and bears out many of these propositions in the case of the
new tribal states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.
The second theme of importance in the debate, explicitly tackled
by this monograph, is the question of the role of the state in managing
forests and tribal development. Scholars and activists working on this
question have largely assumed that state institutions have not worked
Archana Prasad
3
because of their excessive bureaucratisation and widespread
inappropriate price setting. Apart from this state tenures also lead to
illegal extraction and a situation that is more or less like an open access
system in the wake of an inadequate institutional framework. The ways
of removing these infirmities are by ensuring the withdrawal of the
state from the trading of non-timber forest produce. However the
alternative to state tenure is seen in two contradictory ways by different
scholars: some people advocate customary tenures as one of the main
alternatives, whereas others advocate the free-market or laissez faire
market as a viable alternative. This monograph considers both these
alternatives in the context of the current forestry reforms and also sees
the implications of the demise of state capitalism in forestry for tribal
livelihood. It attempts to answer the question of what the role of the
state should be in the non-timber forest produce economy. It does this
with the aim of intervening in the value chain of specific products so
that tribals are able to have better control over the surplus generated
by their own activities.
In short, this monograph essentially makes two methodological
and theoretic points with regard to the interface of non-timber forest
produce development with tribal livelihood, both of which are
embedded within the socio-economic and power relations that define
limits of the larger political economy. These relationships are
characterised by the problem of unequal exchange in non-timber forest
produce trade which is in turn symptomatic of the imbalance in the
relationship of the local tribal economy with regional and national
political economies. Thus in order to unravel the different layers of the
political economy of tribal survival and its interface with forest
management systems, an integrated framework of analysis is needed.
Such an analysis should focus on the transformation of all social, political
and economic relationships in the light of the larger systemic changes
within the Central Indian region.
Land Tenures and the Mahajani System in Jharkhand
Tribal rights movements have been arguing for the restoration of
land rights in forest areas. Studies on non-timber forest produce also
show that land ownership and tenures have an important bearing on
issues related to the interface between forest management and tribal
4
NMML Monograph No. II
livelihoods. This section not only confirms this hypothesis but also shows
how ownership of land and produce have an important bearing on the
nature of forest rights, trade and use patterns in Central India. Two
trends can be identified in the history of the land tenure systems in the
Central Indian regions of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The first was
the permanent settlement regime in eastern India which resulted in
strengthening the hold of traders and moneylenders in the tribal
economy. Non-timber forest produce formed an important part of this
trade and facilitated the integration of the local tribal economy with the
regional economy. The situation in Chhattisgarh was slightly different
where another landholding pattern could be discerned. Here the
government owned most of the forests and this facilitated the penetration
of global industrial capital into forested areas. This displaced the local
traders to some extent but resulted in the integration of tribal labour
into the global capitalist system. The discussion that follows in the next
two sections will see the evolution of these systems in the colonial
period and analyse their implications for the post-colonial period.
The Chotanagpur plateau consisting of Ranchi, Palamu, Singhbhum,
Manbhum and Hazaribagh districts formed part of the Bengal Division,
which experienced British interventions since the late 18lh century. It
consisted of several tributary states and limited government-owned
areas that were settled after the Permanent Settlement of 1793.
However even after this period the estimates of the gross rentals, forest
rights and revenues in the Chotanagpur region were not known in an
authoritative fashion because a major portion of land and forest
resources were owned by private persons. According to one estimate
private persons owned 79% of the forests in these five districts till the
early 2O'h century. Hunter’s account of Bengal only corroborates this
by recording that there were only 2 protected forests in the Manbhum
district and some government estates in Palamu and Hazaribagh.1 It is
therefore not surprising that the emergence of a semi-feudal structure
informed the production and exchange relations in both the agricultural
and forest economies from the time of the land reclamation in
woodlands.
Several scholars have recorded this process of reclamation and
deforestation. K.S. Singh noted that the earliest deforestation for
cultivation took place under the Raja of Chotanagpur who brought in
Archana Prasad
5
outsiders as jagirdars in the area. These people in turn gave estates
to their relatives and creditors of the Raja, a considerable portion of
whom lived peaceably with their tenants. But Singh notes that this was
only possible because there was enough land for the Mundas to migrate
into the hills.2 At the same time Prabhu Mohapatra notes that the
expansion of arable by the time of the late 19,h century was uneven in
character with Ranchi, Manbhum and Singhbhum experiencing vigorous
expansion where as Hazaribagh and Palamu had reached a stagnation
point. But even within this expansion process the nature of holdings
remained under semi-feudatory character before survey operations
were started in the 20lh century.3 Within this semi-feudatory system,
Mohapatra notes, there were two types of trends. On the one hand
there were the landlords’ villages where the zamindars enjoyed all
rights over wastelands and jungles and on the other hand there were
the khutkutti villages, or villages where agricultural lands were held
jointly by the founders of the villages. These founders paid nominal
tributes to the zamindars and who also enjoyed exclusive rights over
jungles and wastelands. There was also another system of rights over
jungles called Korkar where ordinary rent paying tenants also had
some customary usufruct rights in forests and the exclusive rights to
reclaim wastelands.4
Subfeudation formed the basis of relative autonomy of control over
forest and land resources by local institutions like tribal panchayats or
headmen. The jungles of the Chotanagpur plateau were dominated by
the sal, asan, palas, mhowa and amla trees, of which sal was the
most prominent species. The main produce in mid 19lh century was
recorded as lac, silk, bee wax, dhaura or sal resin, leaves and roots.
Of these flowers, leaves and roots were also used to supplement the
diet of marginal and small cultivators. It also proved to be the sole
food that people had in times of famine. Apart from this mhowa was
used for making toddy and for ritual istic purposes.5 It was also one of
the most important local produces and was primarily collected by
women and children. The zamindar owned virtually all the mhowa
trees except the ones on the roadside. He in turn rented them out at
the market price at which rice wa: selling. Estimates of mhowa yield
show that a first class tree would yield 30 maunds of unprocessed
mhowa in a season i.e., a daily fall of about 2 maunds in 15 days.
6
NMML Monograph No. 11
However, Hunter who recorded this evidence believed that this estimate
was double of the actual amount that falls from a tree. The rent that is
charged of the collectors depends on the forces of demand and supply.
In Hazaribagh 2 or 3 small mhowa trees may come for a rupee where
as in Manbhum one large tree may come for the same amount of money.
The nature of rent in Manbhum may depend on the type of tree and
may range from 4 annas to 2 or 3 rupees per tree. The saved crop can
also vary much in price and can fetch from 2 to 8 maunds of mhowa
per rupee, but mostly the exchange with the mahajans is in kind.
They usually give 3-4 ser of rice and some salt for one maund of
mhowa.6
One of the other important features of the permanent settlement
areas was that the relatively autonomous control over local resources
by village level institutions co-existed with powerful nexus between
the contractors and the zamindars, who represented the state in these
areas. For example sal logs were sent out of the area for construction
of sleepers. Hunter records that trader of sal timber was controlled
by the local mahajans who sold them to the forest department for a
large profit. Officials often noted that the Government derived virtually
no benefit from the forest sector, the major portion of which was
appropriated by the mahajan who only paid a small royalty to the
zamindar for the use of his land.7 The mahajani system was dominant
in the trading of lac and silk cocoons also as it yielded high profits
even though their propagation was a labour intensive task which
required a high degree of knowledge and competence. The tussar silk
cocoon of Hazaribagh, Manbhum and Lohardaga was reared on the
asan tree and its eggs were collected from the jungle and hatched
either in the growers house or in specially erected huts in the jungle.
The system of taxes on the silk propagators differed from region to
region. In Manbhum every silk cocoon rearer paid Rs. 2 or 3 to the
landlord. It is estimated that the landlord collected 3 00 pounds a year
from such rent and the annual estimated produce was about 750
maunds from 1000 acres of land.8 In Lohardaga, the silk growers
paid three types of taxes. Khutkar or the rent demanded by the
proprietor of the land on which farmer propagated the silk. Then there
was the patkar or the revenue paid by the farmer of the cocoon to the
government. The third type of tax was known as the hansua or the
Archana Prasad
1
sickle tax which was levied on each person who lived in the plantation
where cocoon rearing took place and which usually took the form of a
royalty of Rs. 5 per person. The settlement officer of Palamu division
reveals that that there were 2000 hansuas in the division resulting in
3,140 cocoons or 3,190 maunds of silk yarn. In Hazaribagh on the
other hand the silk growers paid 6-8 annas to the zamindar and the
area on which silk was reared was not more than 30 square miles with
not more than 5 to 6 asan trees in an acre.9
While on the one hand the system of taxation varied from one
region to the next, the dynamics of the trading was almost the same in
every region. In most cases there was a nexus between the money
lenders and many times the trader was also the '‘sahukar' or the
moneylender. In Manbhum middlemen paid Santhals, Bhumijs, Kharias,
Paharias and other lower caste people to rear cocoons. These cocoons
were sold at the price of 213 cocoons to a rupee and were then
exported to Bengal. In 1871 the silk exports were estimated at 10,000
pounds.10 In Lohardaga district the cocoons were sold to the traders
for Rs. 5 to 7 per maund and exported to Mirzapur, Benaras, and
Patna. In Hazaribagh the middlemen supported the silk growers who
were mostly Santhals, Kurmis or Goalas while they were watching the
cocoons in the forest. Consequently the growers were obliged to sell
their cocoons to these middlemen at the rate of Rs. 5 or 6 for 1,680
cocoons. The banias in turn sold these cocoons to the mahajans for
Rs. 5 for 1,330 cocoons. The cocoons were then exported to Burdwan
or Gaya at the price of Rs. 15 per 1,000. They were also sold to the
tanti banias at the rate of Rs. 5 for 80 cocoons. The tanti banias are
weavers who take out the thread from the cocoons and weave them
into small pieces of silk and then they sell the pieces of silk to the
mahajans at Rs. 8 and 8 annas.11 The value addition to the cocoons
was mostly at the level of small towns and urban cities. There was
hardly any export of silk cloth from the region and most of the weavers
sold their cloth in urban areas or in local haats through the mahajans.
As in the case of silk, some small manufacturing units in the urban
centres of the region also did value addition to lac (i.e. the preparation
of lac dyes and stick lac).12 Ranchi, the capital of Chotanagpur was a
regional centre for the collection of lac. The mahajans brought lac
from the Central Provinces and it was then processed in the Ranchi
8
NMML Monograph No. 11
Lac Factory before stick lac was exported out of the region.13 But
whatever the variations in the system of exchange and value chains,
the mahajani system occupied a central position in the tribal areas of
colonial Bihar. Further it was not only confined to the non-timber forest
produce trade, but was also evident in agriculture and other spheres
oflife.
Scholars also document the fact that most of these mahajans were
outsiders or dikus who accentuated the conflict between them and the
tribals. The sharp contradictions and differentiation between the locals
and dikus also underlined the class contradictions in Jharkhandi
society.14 This conflict took the form of various uprisings that have
also been well documented in the past by several scholars.15 In this
sense the non-timber forest produce system was part of the larger
agrarian system which was based on semi-feudal exploitation. By the
time the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act came into operation in the early
20°' century most of the tribals had already been pushed into marginal
tracts and were at least partially dependent on forests for their livelihood
since the productivity was low from their lands. In forestry too, attempts
were made to acquire private forests and enact a Private Forest Bill,
but these attempts failed quite badly. At best the zamindari forests
could be administered under Section 38 of the Indian Forest Act.16
This did not happen because of Jharkhand’s rich mineral strength; the
European managing agencies concentrated on trade in coal, mica, and
iron ore and did not penetrate the trade of non-timber forest produce.
For this reason there was some amount of co-existence between local
exchange and value addition with the use and trading networks at the
regional and global levels. The relationships of exchange and production
determined their livelihood systems and made them totally dependent
on the moneylender and trader for their survival.
Forest Produce and Capitalism in Chhattisgarh
State ownership and management of forest produce is not a new
phenomenon in India and has been a legacy of the colonial rule. One
such example of state control of forest produce lies in the history of
undivided Madhya Pradesh, ofwhich the new tribal state of Chhattisgarh
formed an important part. While the zamindari areas in Chhattisgarh
were confined to inaccessible parts of the highlands, the government
Archana Prasad
9
owned most other areas with rich sal and teak forests. The annexation
of the provinces in the mid nineteenth century led to a debate on the
nature of land settlements to be done in the Central Provinces. This
debate reviewed the permanent settlement experience of Bengal and
Orissa and decided that Munro’s ryotwari settlements were more
appropriate for these Provinces. Here private property rights were
given to farmers who in turn paid a rent to the state for the use of the
land. This meant that the state was the owner of all lands and had the
right to collect rents from them. By the same measure the state also
declared itself the proprietor of all forestlands by enacting the Forest
Act of 1865. Henceforth the forest department of the British
government would be directly responsible for the settlement of rights
and management of forests. By the late 19lh century it was clear that
there was little forestland under private control and most of the forests
were being either worked for timber or for nistari purposes.
Scholars of forest history in Central India have often argued that
colonial forestry, or ‘scientific forestry’ as it was called, concentrated
more on timber and less on produce that was used by local people in
their daily life. The railways has always been defined as a turning point
in ihe history of forestry in India as timber was harvested and sent to
the factories that produced railway sleepers. Because of this the colonial
programme of modern forestry was more bothered about timber and
less about the forest diversity on which local livelihoods were integrally
dependent. Under this mode of forest use the tribals lost their rights,
and their use patterns and knowledge were marginalised as foresters
preferred to look at the forests as an ‘economic resource’ and not as
a living system that was essential for all aspects of the life of tribal
people. This clash of visions reflected the differences between tribal
cultures and perceptions and those of the foresters and was responsible
for the neglect of non-timber forest produce in the colonial forestry
programme.
But a closer inquiry into priorities of the colonial government in the
forest sector show that this was not really true and two interrelated
developments in mid 19"' century had forced the colonial regime to
intervene in harvesting and managing of non-timber forest produce.
The first was the rise in global prices and demand for selected nontimber forest produce especially lac, dying and tanning agents. The
10
NMML Monograph No. 11
second was the need to maximise revenue through the incorporation
of the household economy within the system of colonial forestry. This
was done by the recognition and the reordering of customary rights of
peasant communities in forests. The resultant nistari settlements of
the 1930s were an attempt to extract revenue from forests that were
not rich in timber resources.17 Thus the working of the forests was
driven by the need to maximise revenue from all forests and this
necessitated the incorporation of village level institutions, local use
patterns and knowledge within the colonial system. Trade in and
propagation of non-timber forest produce in Chhattisgarh was one
such example of the integration and modification of local tribal
economies within the world capitalist system.
Within this framework the colonists attempted to try out several
systems to manage local rights. Of these the commutation system was
considered the most viable option. Under this system the unit of
assessment would be the household. Each household was to make a
small annual contribution to the government and in return earned the
right to pick firewood and grass, but purely for household needs. Of
course, the officials termed even this as a privilege, thus denying the
household all its customary rights.18 In this sense the provincial forest
policy followed Baden-Powell’s conventional position that recognised
custom as a privilege and not a right that the local people could demand.
At the same time Brandis’s philosophy of recognising that local
demands were crucial to the survival of colonial control over forested
areas was also acknowledged under the commutation system.19 The
most ambiguous part of the commutation system related to the definition
of‘household needs’. In Chanda the district administration held that
every village would be assessed at two annas per household. This
fixed rate would apply to the extraction of firewood and charcoal. In
other words the people were allowed to take firewood, fuel and
charcoal worth two annas. Other produce like mhowa. lac and harra
were fixed at a rate of three annas and an equivalent amount of this
produce could be collected by households who chose to pay this sum.20
Only firewood and fuel were considered essential for household needs
and therefore were fixed at a lower rate than other minor forest produce.
This meant that other produce like ritual food e.g. liquor, harra and
mhowa was considered a luxury. Within this limited view, officials
Archana Prasad
11
assumed that the needs of every household were similar and that the
consumption followed a uniform pattern - both in terms of quantity
and the kind of produce consumed. Whether the household contained
4 or 8 people, they were only entitled to 2 annas worth of fuel and
firewood. A chaukidar or a nakadar would check the quantity taken
out of the forest By defining needs in this manner the state sought to
regulate local practice by using the considerations of demand and supply
and balancing them against the working and regeneration of forest
produce so that long-term advantages could be drawn out of it. In the
same period grazing rights were also specified in forests. Before the
1880s grazing was done in ‘village forests’ as ‘reserved forests’ were
closed for this purpose. After the 1890s a new system was worked
out for the regulation of grazing rights. In the working plans of 189097 all forest ranges were divided into blocs, each of which was
systematically open to grazing. Grazing was a seasonal activity for
groups like the Banjaras, but for those who formulated the working
plans, the cycle of tree regeneration seemed to be more important
than the cycle of peasant subsistence. Grazing was permitted in the
forest for the removal of excess grass or the loosening of the soil to
facilitate tree growth. If a circle had a lot of grass or lacked trees of
commercial value it was declared to be a grazing circle. But such a
circle was also open to graziers for only 10-15 years as efforts were
made to regenerate these lands for long-term gains.21 Thus we see
that household use was redefined and local people were incorporated
into the system of colonial exploitation through a system of direct control
which aimed at eliminating the trader.
The best example of the elimination of the small trader is seen in
the relationship between tribal livelihood systems, the propagation of
lac and industrial capitalism in the forests of the Central Provinces.22
The first evidence of rising international demand for non-timber forest
produce was seen in the rising prices of lac that had many industrial
uses and was in great demand in America, England and Germany and
the exported lac was often converted into shellac in these countries in
the 19lh century.23 The initial attempts to modify the ways in which lac
was propagated failed in the Central Provinces. The government noted
that since the Province was not capable of yielding lac of real value it
was not worthwhile for the government to take up lac cultivation on its
12
NMML Monograph No. 11
own. Therefore it was considered better if private agencies and
contractors were given the right to propagate lac.24 The firms and
managing agencies had to incorporate the local methods of lac
propagation in their extraction of lac for export. In 1875 the government
debated whether it should grant Messrs. Jardine and Skinner, an
international managing agency, a contract for lac propagation in the
Loisinga and Barapahar forests of Sambalpur. The District
Commissioner of Sambalpur, Bowie reasoned that.
The propagation of lac is only carried on by Gonds, Binjiwars
and other jungle tribes who are poor and always require
advances to survive. While they propagate lac the government
can only give advances if it has the lease of the jungle. By
taking a royalty, the interests of the government and the firm
will be kept identical.25
This official assertion of the compatibility between Gond, official
and industrial interests was one of the first steps towards the inclusion
of Binjiwars into the world market. The royalty and advance were
indicative of the presence of the European agencies in the forest
economy.26
By 1919 the colonial government claimed that the methods used
by the tribal people were inefficient for mass propagation. R.S. Troup
contended that the methods of local lac propagation were inadequate
in at least two ways: the expense involved in searching for the lac
bearing shoots and large quantities of lac are lost due to the time taken
to collect lac.27 Troup carried out lac experiments to see the extent to
which these disadvantages could be minimised at the Forest Research
Institute. But as Troup pointed out these experiments led to no
conclusive results in the techniques for propagating lac significantly.
Troup held that the ambivalent results were due to the experiments
carried out in the lower Shivaliks, a region distinctly unsuitable for lac
cultivation. However he suggested some conditions under which lac
cultivation could be carried out more effectively. The annual pollarding
of lac trees, the growth of trees in an open position and the need for
thinning trees more regularly were identified as some of the desirable
steps to be undertaken.28 While these experiments were being carried
Archana Prasad
13
out the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces proposed that,
It would be better if the lac was produced without human aid
and the only labour used was for collecting it for then labour
would make its bargain before entering the forest. The fact is
that the lac produced by the Bhumia whose work it has been
for generations and the present system of leasing works very
badly as far as they are concerned, only tying them down to
one purchaser.... To remove the defects it is essential that the
producer has a right to produce in the open market to get a
better price
But free trade can only be granted in two,
ways: (1) By making the producer pay a certain sum on the
quantity produced or the number of trees used, (2) To give
passes to each producer to collect lac from its jungles.29
The Commissioner proposed the introduction of machinery in lac
cultivation. He felt that by introducing technological innovations in
forests the production of lac could increase and the production process
made efficient. This would save the effort of watching lac throughout
the season, and confine their labour to the collecting process. He refuted
the proposition that employment opportunities of the Binjiwars and
Gonds would be affected if this happened and instead stated that the
measure would help tribal lac collectors to strike a better bargain with
the representatives of managing agencies. In order to maximise
production and assess the value of lac several government sponsored
experiments were carried out in the early 20lh century. Several
techniques were tried to improve the quality of the seeds, minimise
labour required and reduce the injury to trees. But the reported failure
of all efforts, (according to the special lac officer), proved that the
methods used by forest dwellers and the peasants were more
effective.30 This prompted European managers to incorporate local
techniques for lac propagation within their own system of collection
and production. The efforts to mechanise the propagation of lac were
confined to rearing the cocoon and not to the collection of produce.
An attempt was made to increase the productivity of lac cocoons by
improving the propagation methods of lac. One of the main reasons
for this was the need for the continuous and rapid supply of lac and
shellac to the European industry in the inter-war period. It also saw a
significant difference in the nature of trade. While in the 19lh century
14
NMML Monograph No. 11
significant amounts of shellac was being produced outside the country,
in the pre and inter war period some shellac producing units came up
in urban areas on the hinterland. For example the Divisional Forest
Officer of Bilaspur Division noted that a button and shellac company
had been established in Champa by a European firm to reduce the
charges of the middleman and save on freight carriage to Europe.31
By the 1940s there were 35 shelllac factories in Chhattisgarh that
produced 16 per cent of the lac in the entire country.32
The influx of European capital in lac provided the tribals with
seasonal employment in the forest areas and helped to create labour
opportunities for the Bhumias and Gonds who started working or
managing agencies like Jardine and Skinner.33 The adverse first impact
of this was seen on the inter-linkages between the artisan and the forest
dwellers. The forest dweller started supplying lac to the agents of the
European firm instead of the artisan. The leasing system created
monopolies of managing firms over forests and labour, pushing out
smaller lac artisans from the market. It also put tribal lac collectors at
the mercy of European capitalist firms whose main interest lay in using
cheap labour to propagate lac and export it. In this context the main
failure of the lac experiments lay in the inability to develop the conditions
of their successful conclusion without incurring a substantial cost.
Therefore the effort to introduce new technologies in lac production
needed to be grounded in the willingness of the managing agencies to
incur some infrastructural cost to induce their success.
From the discussion above it is clear that non-timber forest produce
was used as an entry point for initiating a process of selective integration
of local society into the colonial and the global capitalist system. This
process of integration unleashed two trends. The first was one where
substitution of forest produce took place in industrial processes. The
most prominent example of this was the dyeing industry of the Province
where many natural dyeing methods were replaced by chemical dyes
for foreign cotton and synthetic fabric. This led to a certain amount of
deindustrialisation within the local economy as pointed out by Tirthankar
Roy. Another trend was the incorporation of local artisans into the
Imperial system of taxation and production as seen in the case of the
Agarias of the Central Provinces. These variegated trends however
Archana PrasacJ
15
underlined one common tendency, i.e., the manipulation of local
conditions to meet the needs of the world capitalist system through the
colonial machinery. This common thread in colonial policy was true of
both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh and showed that the differentiated
impact of colonialism was itself a manifestation of a larger process of
exploitation. At the core of this process lay the unequal trade and
economic relations between the metropolitan country and the colony.
This was also reflected in the relationship between tribal and non
tribal areas as well as between the plains and highlands.
Within this broad framework, the Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh
societies developed in divergent directions as far as the tribal livelihood
systems were concerned. By the end of the colonial rule, Jharkhand
and other zamindari areas in Chhattisgarh like Kawardha and Bastar
saw the strengthening of the semi-feudal relations within the tribal forest
economy. This meant that the tribal economy was subordinated to the
mahajan and sahukar and embedded in a semi-primordial feudal
system. In contrast, the influx of large industry was much greater in
forests owned by the colonial government of the Central Provinces.
This resulted in the greater incorporation of tribals into the national
and world capitalist system. In both cases, however, the productive
potential of the tribal economy was severely damaged and this trend
continued in the post colonial period. Thus the tribal economies formed
enclaves of capitalist and semi-feudal underdevelopment whose penury
was accentuated with their integration into the larger imperial system.
Tribal Livelihood in an Era of State Capitalism
The case against state monopoly control over forests was first
made by neo-Gandhian environmental and tribal movements who have
been arguing that local people are intrinsically dependent on these
resources for their livelihood and thus have the greatest interest in
protecting and conserving these resources. They point out that local
tradition, knowledge and histories provided enough evidence about
the interface between the every-day needs of tribal people, and income
from non-timber forest produce formed a significant part of the tribal
income. This dependence, in turn, translated into a conservation system
guided by customary rules and institutions, and essentially informal
and decentralised in character. This was in sharp contrast with the
16
NMML Monograph No. 11
goals of the modern conservation system, which was centralised in
character and represented the interests of large industry in both the
colonial as well as post-colonial periods. This ‘industrial mode of forest
use’ focuses less on the harnessing of non-timber forest produce and
more on the exploitation of forests for timber because large industrial
houses demand wood for fuel and raw material. It is therefore natural
for post-colonial forestry to raise plantations of fast growing species
and regenerating forests for timber. This forestry regime not only has
a devastating impact on the biodiversity of tHe region, but also follows
a strict rights regime to ensure that peoples access to forests is limited
and controlled. This results in the marginalisation of people’s rights
(especially tribal rights) over their own resources and leads to the
destruction of their livelihood systems and accentuates the conflict
between the people and the state. The advocates of this position were
vociferous in their opposition to the state and argued that communities
should be given autonomous control over their own resources, and
local interests and their resources should be protected from commercial
exploitation.
The logical conclusion of this argument was that the state had no
place in the conservation of forest resources and autonomous
community control was the only institutional arrangement under which
the process of deforestation could be reversed. The colonial legacy of
state control over forests was strengthened in the immediate post
colonial period. The administration of tribal areas saw tire imposition
of a uniform system of governance in all states with the abolition of
zamindaris in India. All private and zamindari forests were put under
direct state control in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh under this system.
Henceforth forest conservation and harvesting of forest produce from
tribal areas was done with the aim of contributing to the construction
of a strong nation. This nation building process required that India
developed a strong industrial base and strengthened its food security
through the expansion of permanent cultivation.
In 1952 the first forest policy statement of Independent India
reflected these concerns when it stated that the needs of “forest
conservation” had to be subordinated to the larger objective of
“industrialisation”. In terms of tribal development however, the post
independence policy was quite contradictory and ambiguous. While it
Archana Prasad
17
created the monopoly control of the state over land and forest
resources, it also created some autonomous spaces of development in
the tribal areas. At the dawn of Independence these areas were
included in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution after much discussion.
These autonomous regions were under the direct administration of the
Government and some development agencies were set up for carrying
out the integrated social and economic development of these societies.34
But instead of providing access to resources and developing the
production capacity of tribal economies, the nation-builders sought to
transform and modernise the tribal people through a slow and protective
process that relied on welfare measures as its main instrument.
However it is important to note that these measures were not
sufficient to solve the fundamental problems of tribal development as
the pattern of industrialisation undertaken in this period only accentuated
the unequal relations between the tribal and the mainstream national
and regional economy. All minerals and forestlands were acquired and
managed by the State in both these provinces after the abolition of
zamindaris in Independent India. Till the mid 1970s, the emphasis of
the post-colonial forest department was on the raising of plantations
for industrial purposes. Natural forests were converted into plantations
for timber wood and farm forestry projects also encouraged fast
growing and commercially viable timber species. But non-timber forest
produce was not entirely ignored in this period and the forest
department harvested them from forests in order to auction the produce.
Till the 1960s most of this produce was harvested by contractors who
paid a royalty to the government. But by the 1960s several commercially
important produce like sal seeds, tendu leaves, harra flowers and
karaya gum were nationalised by several state governments like
Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. The monopoly and sale of these products
served the interests of the big business with in the country. Some
examples of the ways in which such monopoly trade worked till the
1980s are given below. The state monopoly over trading of produce
ensured that conservation aims were in line with the needs of industries.
In both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, state monopolies were set up for
non-timber forest produce trade for nationalised produce like tendu
leaves, sal seeds, karaya gum and harra. The rest of the non-timber
forest produce trade was in the hands of middlemen and this position
18
NMML Monograph No. 11
continues till today. In the 1960s the Government of Madhya Pradesh
enacted laws that control the trade of minor forest produce. The
Madhya Pradesh Tendu Patta (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam, 1964
created a monopoly over the trade of tendu leaves and the state
decided who should be the agents for affecting this sale. These agents
paid a royalty to the government and gave dues to the primary collectors
who they exploited thoroughly. Instead of eliminating the trader through
this nationalisation, the system ended up creating its own middlemen.
The appointed agents not only paid the collectors low wages but also
cheated the state by carrying on illegal trade. The agents appointed by
the government sold their produce to LAMPS or MARKFED and
paid a lump sum to government. This system prevailed till the first
decade of the 1980s, and although the government managed to secure
its own revenue under this system, it failed to protect the interests of
the tendu leaf gatherers.
Seeing this the government sought to replace the middlemen with
the view of benefiting gatherers. In 1984 the Madhya Pradesh
government set up the Madhya Pradesh State Minor Forest Produce
(Trading and Development) Co-operative Federation which brought
the produce directly from LAMPS and MARKFED. But traders once
again outdid the federation by bidding for areas contiguous to the
MARKFED areas and facilitating illegal packing of tendu leaves. Thus
a decision was taken to form primary collectors co-operatives under
the federation in 1988. It was felt that this would ensure that tire small
trader or the kochiya would be eliminated from at least the trade of
nationalised non-timber forest produce. The system set up a three-tier
mechanism of the primary forest produce co-operative societies whose
members are the produce collectors, district forest produce unions
headed by the district collector and the state level federation. Each
society and union were allotted commission rates on the amount they
sold and subsequently the federation sold the produce to industry.
Apart from nationalised produce like tendupatta, sal seed, harra
and others, non-nationalised produce like tamarind, amla and honey
was also bought by the MFPCF that was composed of many primary
production and collection societies. An order of the Madhya Pradesh
Government also held that 100% of the profits from non-timber
forest produce trade would be repatriated to the village. Of this
50% would go to the collector, 20% towards the regeneration
Archana Prasad
19
of forests and the rest towards village infrastructure.35 But this scheme
was only for the proceeds of nationalised produce over which the
state has some control. While there have been efforts to stream line
the management of non-nationalised forest produce, these have not
been very successful. Studies on the working of these co-operatives
have showed that they did not reflect the interests of the poorest
produce collectors.36
In Madhya Pradesh officials noted that the exploitation of tribal
labour was immense before nationalisation of produce. Here the
managing agencies were replaced by contractors under the pre-1969
regime and the primary collectors did not get even a living wage through
collection of produce. For example the tendu patta collection only
gave 30 days of work in one season. The contractors paid the labourer
Rs. 80 for collecting 50,000 leaves and one labourer could pick 30005000 leaves a day.37 This meant the seasonal income of the labourer
could be Rs. 200-240 in one season and even if two people worked
in one family than they would only make a seasonal income of Rs.
500. This was coupled with the lack of other employment opportunities
that also included the sale of fuel wood and fodder to peasants. This
function was also taken over by contractors and the forest department
who had depots for selling fuel wood. In Jharkhand too there are
instances to show that the incidence of indebtedness of the tribal people
increased in this period. Amit Prakash notes the serious threats to
land tenure security in this period as the amount of secured loans by
moneylenders increased considerably between 1960s and the 1980s.38
As far as non-nationalised produce was concerned, a similar act
titled Madhya Pradesh Vanupaj (Vyapar Viniyam) Adhiniyam was
formulated in 1969. The Act gave the government the right to collect
royalty and determine the agents for sale and distribution of minor
forest produce to industry.39 For example the mhowa seed was
squeezed for oil which was sold by sahukars to soap and medicine
making companies. Similarly tendu leaves were sold to bidi-making
industries and amla was sold to companies like Dabur, Baidyanath,
and Maharshi Ayurved as raw materials.40 Similar laws were enacted
in the 1970s in Bihar such as the Bihar Tendu Leaf (Regulation of
Trade) Act, 1973 and Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade)
Act, 1984. In case of Bihar the colonial system of extraction was left
20
NMML Monograph No. Il
in the initial decades after independence and this only increased the
indebtedness of the tribal cultivators and collectors.
As is evident from this system, the entrenchment of the traders in
the trade of non-timber forest produce is a result of the dearth of basic
amenities in the tribal areas. The lack of knowledge and access to
market is often the guiding factor of the collectors dependence on the
small trader. Studies of specific areas have noted that the collectors
preferred to sell their produce to the small traders because it eased
their burden and they did not have to carry the produce for long
distances. These traders also met the small credit needs of collectors
who often sold their produce in advance in return for money which
they needed to buy their daily provisions. The sahukars or the small
traders in turn got an advance from the big traders in the town in order
to buy the produce from the /laat-bazaars.41 Thus the terms of trade
in the AaaZ-bazaar were governed by the lack of rural credit, price
control and basic communication facilities in these tribal areas. For
example if we take the case of Chhattisgarh we find that most tribal
districts like Bastar and Sarguja only had 1 '/i kilometres of rural roads
per village and 21 km of metalled roads per 100 kilometres in 1996.42
In Bastar most ofthese metalled roads comprised of the state and national
highway which ran from Raipur to Vishakhapatnam. Activists also feel
that highways and the road network were strengthened in most of these
areas to facilitate the exploitation of mineral and forest resources in these
areas. The lack ofcommunications is reflected in the conditions of living of
the tribal people ofthese states. Below we give the status of living conditions
in the undivided states of Bihar and MP in 1991:
State
Total Percentages of STs with (1991)
(Rural figures in brackets)
Percentages of STs
Without These
(1991)
Safe Drinking
Water
Toilets
Electricity
Bihar
31.17(29.68)
3.33 (0.97)
5.94(2.9)
65.85
Madhya
Pradesh
42.12(40.75)
2.21(1.14)
28.49(27.51)
44.58
Source: India Human Development Report 2001, Planning Commission, New
Delhi, pp. 172-179.
Archana Prasad
21
This abysmal state of affairs is also reflected in the income and
employment opportunities for the tribals in these areas arising out of
the lack of surplus and limited nature of purchasing power of the people.
For example two thirds of the income of tribal people in MP and Bihar
was spent on purchasing food.43 The rest went in purchasing essential
goods such as clothes, soap, and other household articles. This means
that these economies had little or no surplus to invest in any productive
work or even in competitive trading in non-timber forest produce.
Instead they are forced to do distress selling of their produce and
collect the minimum collection price, getting reduced to providers of
cheap labour and raw materials. The relationship of unequal exchange
was accentuated and structured through a centralised forest
management system that created its own set of intermediaries before
the late 1980s.
The Era of Participatory and Joint Forest Management
The early 1980s saw the defense of customary institutions as the
natural protectors of the forest by both environmental scholars and
activists. Many of these arguements were a result of the documentation
of movements like Chipko. Such work ensured that the ideology of
the Indian environmental movement had enough historical backing and
legitimacy to gloss over the inequities that were inherent in traditional
structures. The stage was thus set for the debate over community versus
state control over forests. The debate gathered steam by the late 1980s
with the National Forest Policy of 1988 whose main aim was to ensure
the ecological security of the nation along with its economic security
for local people. One of the other significant features of this policy
was its stress on local participation in forest conservation : a principle
that cleared the way for the Joint Forest Management (JFM)
resolutions of 1990.
But this shift in policy was preceded by the Arabari initiative in
West Bengal where the Left Front government started its informal
experiment in decentralised participatory forest management. The
experiment was based on the experience that no sylvi-cultural
operations could be successful i. forests without the co-operation of
local people. Realising this the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO) of the
region, A. K. Banerjee, started motivating people to help in the natural
22
NMML Monograph No. 11
regeneration of sal in the Arabari Range. The officer took over 1,272
hectares of forests for rehabilitation and promised productive
employment to the local people through engagement in the process of
regeneration. It also grew fuel-wood for people and gave it to them at
cost price and worked out a system of rotational grazing. Above all, it
allowed people to grow paddy on forestlands (and sell it at cost price
to those who were maintaining the forests) in 700 hectares that were
demarcated for the regeneration of natural degraded sal and acacia
trees. In the end, it was promised that the local communities would get
25% of the net produce if the scheme succeeded.
The first fifteen years of the West Bengal project were rooted in
an attitudinal change and a feeling of mutual trust between the forest
department and the local people. By 1987. the Left Front government
of West Bengal had begun to recognise this as a viable method of
forest regeneration, and passed orders that formalised the benefit sharing
mechanism between the forest department and the village communities.
The impact of the initial experiments was very good and it was noted
in later studies that the lost biodiversity of the region was beginning to
regenerate, and that the benefits received from non-timber forest
produce harvesting were increasing.44 It is important to remember that
these efforts were preceded by a whole process of social engineering,
dcmocratisation of local institutions and land reforms that had already
led to some amount of empowerment of the rural poor and facilitated
the institutionalisation of participatory forestry systems in the early
1980s. Though the protection committees were village level committees,
many of the funds to them were channeled through the Zila Parishad
and Panchayats, thus involving the local government in the programme.
For fifteen years before the Ford Foundation finally stepped in with an
evaluation report, Arabari followed the informal agreements between
the foresters and the local population. And this arrangement was not
only true of Arabari, forDFOs in other parts of the state also began to
emulate Arabari and it came to be known as the Joint Forest
Management (JFM) experiment. This initiative was unique and was
introduced under specific conditions where the area had already come
under the influence of progressive social and political movements.
Archana Prasad
23
By 1990 the Government of India had accepted it as a viable
strategy for forest conservation and set out the guidelines for the
implementation of JFM. Fifteen states had begun to issue guidelines
and implement the programme in their areas by the year 1995 and
JFM became a norm rather than an exception in forestry management.
The forest protection committees that were formed as a result of these
guidelines had the forest guard as their secretary. They performed the
policing functions that the forest department had earlier been
performing. The introduction of JFM was a departure from the social
forestry practices of the 1970s and 1980s that were meant to generate
employment and restore the depleting forest cover within the country.
To this end externally aided projects were let into the sector to facilitate
the participation of people in the forestry sector. However the nature
of forestry remained much the same that the foresters had followed in
the colonial times. Plantation forests were created for industrially and
commercially viable species through the participation of farming and
school communities. In Jharkhand for example there was a big SIDA
assisted project from 1985-92. Here village protection committees
were formed to do plantations and farm forestry along with protecting
degraded forested tracts.45 But the system of management remained
much the same as before as the forest department prescribed the
technology and harvested all the benefits from the forests. What is
significant about these developments is that the state monopoly over
non-timber forest produce only tightened in the 1980s when these
programmes were introduced.46
This changed with the Government of India Resolution of 1990
which saw the adoption of JFM at an all India level. The shift in policy
was propelled by the beginning of economic liberalisation in India with
the express aim of cutting state spending and investments. This also
signaled the advent of different donor agencies in funding the
implementation of sectoral reforms. In the 1990s the JFM programme
was a part of such long-term reforms of the forestry sector and attracted
huge amounts of funding. Such funding rested on a firm critique of the
role of the state in this sector and was exemplified by the World Bank
24
NMML Monograph No. 11
Strategy of 1991 which clearly outlined the weaknesses in the following
manner:
•
The forestry sector in India was ridden with externalities that
interfered with market forces with a potential to bring about
socially desired outcomes.
•
Strong incentives to cut trees.
•
Weak property rights in many forestry and wooded areas.
•
Inappropriate government policies particularly concession
arrangements.
In order to remove these deficits the Bank sought an environment
where global externalities could be internalised locally and where the
efforts of governments and international organisations could be co
ordinated effectively. This meant that legal reforms were to be carried
out to ensure that market forces could begin operating in a proper
manner. At the same time these measures were couched in ideological
radical terminology that helped to justify them in the name of
decentralisation. For example the second phase of the Andhra Pradesh
Community Forest Management Project called for a “Community
Driven Development” approach, where the community would be
empowered to take all decisions for protecting and developing the
forests; and harvesting and distribution of the harvest.
In this context, JFM was introduced in 15 states of India including
undivided Bihar and Madhya Pradesh in 1990 and was a part of this
larger process.47 By 1996 there was a total of 1,652 Village Forest
Protection Committees in undivided Bihar protecting 0.72 million
hectares of forestland. But this formed only a quarter of the entire
forested area in Bihar and out of this about three fourths lies in the
present day state of Jharkhand. In Madhya Pradesh too, the situation
was somewhat similar. About 50% of the forest and village forest
protection committees were in present day Chhattisgarh in 1998. The
total number of committees was about 8,301 in 19 9 8.48 The first
positive impact of these committees was meant to be on the forest
cover of these regions. The JFM decentralised forest protection and
Archana Prasad
25
gave the responsibility of forest protection to the local committees in
degraded forestlands and hoped that community pressures would work
to ensure that the natural regeneration of forests was allowed. Therefore
it is worth looking at the nature of the forest cover in these states
before and after the introduction of JFM. In the tables given below we
look at the changing nature of forest cover in these two states and in
India as a whole and in terms of its degradation.
Details of Forest Cover
Year
Actual Forest Cover
(m hectares)
Recorded Forest Cover
(m hectares)
Bihar
MP
India
Bihar
MP
India
1985-87
2.92
1 5.54
75.78
2.69
13.32
64.01
1987-89
2.92
15.54
77.01
2.67
13.58
63.92
1989-91
2 92
15 54
77.01
2.66
13.54
64 01
1991-93
2 92
15.54
76.52
2.66
13.52
63.96
1993-95
2.92
15.54
76.52
2.65
13.12
63.34
Source: Fifth Citizens Report. CSE. pp 60-63.
Details of Nature of Forest Cover
Year
Dense Forest Cover
(m hectares)
Open Forest Cover ScrubForcst Cover
(m hectares)
(m hectares)
Bihar
MP
India
Bihar
MI’
India
Bihar MP
1987-89
1.33
9.54
38.50
0.89
4.04
25.00
0.07
0.01 1
5.96
1991-93
1.33
9.52
38.58
0.84
4.00
24.93
0.06
0.008
6.05
1993-95
1.33
8.37
36.73
0.83
4.85
26.13
0.06
0.008
5.72
India
Source: Fifth Citizens Report, CSE. pp.64-65 <<■ 67.
The tables show that there is hardly any change in the nature of
forest cover in the undivided states of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh of
26
NMML Monograph No. 11
which a significant portion lay in the Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh areas.
The figures between 1985 (after the introduction of the social forestry
programme) and 1995 (four years after the operationalisation of the
JFM committees) show only marginal mends in the changes in the overall
forest cover.49 What is surprising is that there seems to have been a
slight decline in the actual forest cover of these states after 1991. Again
significantly the rate of this decline seems to have been marginally higher
in MP than in Bihar. This is also seen in the changing nature of forest
cover in these states. It is important to note that there was a decline in
the dense forest cover and increase in the open forest cover of both
the states. Since JFM was mainly meant to lead to the conservation
and regeneration of degraded forest areas this aim seems to have failed
in these states. What is especially important is that this decline seems
to have increased marginally between 1993-95, i.e., five years after
the notification of JFM in these states. Another important indicator of
this failure was the loss of forest cover in tribal districts.50
The JFM was also meant to make forest administration and
conservation programmes more people oriented. It was hoped that
centralised forest departments would become more transparent and
change their attitude towards local people, knowledge and their
customs. However these hopes were belied after the first few years as
the design of the programme in fact promoted its demise in areas where
the conditions for its introduction were not ripe. The structure of the
forest department and laws governing the sector remained largely the
same; only the attitude of individual foresters underwent a change.
The most radical change was noted in the case of West Bengal, where
the administration was under the influence ofthe Left Front government,
and where the programme had been started as an unconventional system
of forest conservation. This change is noted by almost all field studies
of the West Bengal programme, i.e., that a major reason for the change
was the prevailing socio-economic climate of the state, where there
was a political commitment to make the bureaucracy more accountable
to the people. Beat officers and local officials were forced to go and
negotiate with local people and institutions rather than dictate to them.
In other cases the situation was different from this, as forest officers
tended to impose pre-determined conditions on the communities rather
than formalise an already existing informal system.51
Archana Prasad
27
Thus, groups mediating between the forest department and the
local people felt that the programme was one where there was
decentralisation of policing, and centralisation of decision-making
especially in aspects like choice of species, how the funds are to be
spent, and benefit sharing. In all states, including West Bengal, the
government cornered a majority of the benefits of JFM, thus in short
changing the Forest Protection Committee. The system became socially
and politically unviable in areas where there were no social movements
to protect the Forest Protection Committee, and bargain for a fair
deal for them . This was especially true in cases where the programme
was introduced as a way of meeting the establishment costs of the
forest department through externally aided projects. Many studies have
shown that the amount spent on infrastructure and establishments was
a significant part of the project. For example, Samata, an organisation
based in Vishakhapatnam, noted that the amount of money passed
down to the people for the regeneration of forests has been quite
disproportionate to the rest of the expenditure. This reveals a lack of
seriousness in the implementation of JFM.52
The advent of these projects at the threshold of economic reforms
is itself indicative of the fact that state governments had started looking
for alternative methods to sustain their departments. This led to their
dependence on funds from externally funded projects that have acted
like catalysts in the opening up of the forest sector. This analysis has
also been true of externally aided projects in other states like Madhya
Pradesh, which have received the largest amount of aid for the forest
sector. In this situation the introduction of Joint Forest Management
and other such programmes have actually led to the disempowerment
of groups that had spontaneously tried to protect and regenerate forests.
Several organisations like the Ekta Parishad, Kisan Adivasi Sangathan
and Adivasi Mukti Morcha have been making this point in Central
India. In a report of the Joint Mission on the Madhya Pradesh Forestry
Project, some representatives of movements opposing the process of
globalisation stressed that there was an urgent need to review and
rethink the project.53
28
NMML Monograph No. 11
Their main suspicion was that the JFM programmes and the
devolution of power were more a way of privatising forest management
than providing any real powers to local institutions. The replacement
of spontaneous efforts of forest protection by state programmes that
are superimposed on the people are evident in the example of the van
panchayats of Uttaranchal, formed under a 1931 Act. The Act
empowered the village communities to make their own decisions
regarding forest use. Studies have shown that many of these van
panchayats used customary rules to regulate access to forests and
enjoyed some autonomous control over their own resources. These
were mostly informal arrangements that had the tacit support of the
forest department and the Gram Sabha. According to recent forest
department estimates, there are 6,069 van panchayats protecting
4,05,426 hectares of forestland; but their authority has been weakened
by many developments in the post-colonial era. Van panchayal rules
were changed in 1976 after the introduction of the social forestry
programme, and though this space was curtailed, it continued to have
some relevance within the system of forest management. It is not as if
this arrangement was an ideal one, with no adverse impact on women
and the poorest people in the community. But, despite these negatives,
the arrangement provided benefit to a large number of people, and
also led to the regeneration of forests. However, the stiffest challenge
to their authority has come in the wake of the introduction of the Village
Forest Joint Management Programme in 1994, where the World Bank
funded the forest department to bring the van panchayats under JFM.
This has reinforced the department’s claim of being the monopoly holder
and controller over forests, thus disempowering the panchayats?4
If this is tine case than one might ask the question about what impact
such decentralisation has had on the management and trade of non
timber forest produce. It is well known that degradation of forests has
an adverse impact on the propagation and regeneration of non-timber
forest produce and this therefore also affects tribal livelihoods badly.
Recognising this the donor agencies and governments of the present
day have attempted to involve people in non-timber forest produce
management. Regeneration, collection and management systems of an
apparently participatory nature are set up through decentralised systems
of governance. The mechanisms for this may be manifold. As far as
Archana Prasad
29
non-timber forest produce is concerned, the MP state government
has attempted one of the most popular schemes such as devolution of
power. The Van Dhan Scheme and the Imli Andolan was started by
district administration in Bastar in 1999. As a part of this A ndolan the
Krishi Upaj Mandi Act was enforced to ensure that no buying took
place outside designated markets. This meant that the kochiyas could
not buy any produce outside the haat bazaars and their practices of
valuation and weightment were being monitored and checked. The
designated institutions collecting the produce were village forest
development samitis and TRIFED co-operatives. As a result of this
effort the forest produce gatherers received an additional income of
Rs. 300 lakh in 1999 and the designated agencies made an additional
income of Rs. 95 lakhs.
In this context the Van Dhan Scheme was started in 2000 to
eliminate the middlemen from the haat. The concept of van dhan was
evolved by the collector of Bastar and the van dhan samitis set up
shops in village haals. They were to be the legitimate agents to buy
forest produce from the gatherers. This produce was later sold to the
TRIFED. By 2001 there were 750 van dhan samitis which had a
membership of 10 members each. A study on the implementation of
these initiatives shows that kochiyas had managed to infiltrate the van
dhan samitis tlirough their informal involvement with its working. This
was facilitated by the presence of the traditional moneylender network
that had strong links with the marketing network of non-timber forest
produce. Small traders were an integral part of the power structure
that dominated the area for long and enjoyed sufficient political support
and influence to ensure that trading continues on terms that are
favourable to them.55 Visits to Bastar in the end of 2001 and the
beginning of2002 showed that people complained that the government,
which was meant to pay a higher price than traders, was not paying an
adequate price and did not have the money to purchase the entire
produce. They also took the produce on credit of seven days which
was not convenient to the tribal people who sold most of their produce
under distress. Thus the local people were not in favour of the scheme
and the poorest tribals preferred to sell their produce to the small
trader in the region rather than the van dhan samiti.56
30
NMML Monograph No. 11
Similar is the case with Lok Vaniki Scheme under which farm
forestry could be done on private lands. Experiences in Bastar have
shown that even though farmers planted trees on their private lands.
they were harvested and purchased for a significant sum of money by
the private traders. This was especially true of lands where the farmers
had Malik Makbuja where they could sell their timber trees. Private
contractors and traders brought these lands at cheap rates from non
tribal small landholders and acted as agents for getting farmers pennits.
Through this process they made huge profits while the landholder only
got a fraction of the price.57 Such problems exist with the limited
attempts to decentralise forest management in Jharkhand also. Peopie
were only getting seasonal wages out of forest produce trade, thus
belying the underlying assumptions that peoples own control over their
non-timber forest produce can substantially alter the nature of tribal
life. Given these problems it is pertinent to ask why the state has failed
to achieve its stated objective of tribal development through
decentralised non-timber forest produce management? Further arc the
voluntary agencies and grassroots movements limited in their
perspective when they confine their demands to local control over
non-timber forest produce and a proper pricing structure? The answer
to these questions is quite complex and has to be located in the general
infrastructural conditions of tribal areas. The truth of the matter is that
neither tribals nor the tribal areas find themselves in a position to take
advantage of the benefits that can accrue from local non-timber forest
produce.
The reasons for the failures of these efforts arc embedded in the
larger context of decentralisation programmes. The beginning of the
sectoral reforms in the late 1980s saw the intervention of donor agencies
in many sectors of the Indian economy, of which forests was one of
the first. Under the forest sector reforms projects agencies like the
World Bank and the Ford Foundation argued that a long period of
state capitalism in forests had led to poverty and degradation of natural
habitat. They argued that the withdrawal of the state from the forestry
sector would be the first step towards the empowerment of people.
But as several prominent researchers have pointed out, the devolution
process has led to the extension of the state’s power rather than giving
real decision making power to local community institutions.58 While
Archana Prasad
31
this may be true to a large extent, the motivation behind these
decentralisation efforts is the privatisation of the commons rather than
the extension of state control. The definition of the private in the sectoral
reforms includes farmers, community institutions, gatherers, NGOs and
of course private companies. Donor agencies argue that comparative
advantage of the gatherers because they possess the knowledge and
cheap labour that is required for a fair bargain in the open market. But
this perception and argument seems to ignore the ground realities in
the herbal states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Here non-nationalised
forest produce trade can be identified as the prime reason for the
excessive exploitation of tribal people.
Can Focus on NTFP Revive Tribal Livelihoods?
An analysis of field level situations shows that the domination of
the mahajan-sahukar and large landholder nexus has become greater
with initiative in decentralised forest management. The experience of
the last decade in forestry sector reforms has some important lessons
for evaluating the role of non-timber forest produce as one of the pillars
for rebuilding tribal livelihoods in forested areas. There is a conception
in all forestry sector reform projects that NTFP development can lead
to the rejuvenation of the tribal livelihood systems in the country
because they have formed a major part of the tribal livelihood patterns.
But this proposition has yet to be substantiated by empirical evidence.
Literature from different parts of the world shows that dependence on
NTFP may induce and accentuate poverty rather than reducing it as
tribals get very low returns from them. But at another level if we look
at the nature of tribal livelihoods and see the contribution of agriculture
in it than we find that its percentage in total income though higher than
forests, is also quite low in overall terms. This is true for almost all the
tribal landholders most of whom live on marginal landholdings with
low productivity. In the wake of this factor a major portion of the
tribal economy is dependent on daily wage labour for their livelihood.
This is illustrated by the two case studies in this section.
The Baiga area of Dindori dist ict in Madhya Pradesh and Jungur
village of Latehar district in Jharkhand form an important part of the
tribal majority areas of Central India. While Latehar has been carved.
09843
-
32
NifML Monograph No. 11
out from the older district of Palamu. called Dalton Ganj in the new
state of Jharkhand, Dindori remains in Madhya Pradesh and is the fifth
schedule area of the erstwhile district of Mandla and was later carved
out as an independent district. However the similarities between the
two study areas end here as the historical status and social profiles of
the tribal people living in these areas vary. For example, the Baigas of
Dindori are largely a group of landless people and very marginal land
holders. Of the 204 households surveyed our findings are that two
thirds of the people are landless. This is not true of the Santhals of
Jungur each of whom have atleast some marginal holdings in the area.
The second important sociological difference in the two areas is that
despite having land the Santhals of Jungur migrate from 6 to 9 months
a year, where as none of the Baiga report this trend. Both these
differences arise out of different historical settings of the Baiga and the
Santhal areas. For example, the creation of the Baiga Chak and the
Baiga Development Agency at the advent of Independence had ensured
that the state established its monopoly rights over the forest lands on
which the Baiga lived. For this reason these tribal people did not own
any land and were primarily dependent on the forest department for
their employment. The same is not true of Jungur, which is located
near a protected forest in Jharkhand. Because of the nature of the land
tenure system in the region most of the forests were protected forests
and the tradition of tribal unrest had ensured that tribal land rights
were unalienable and maintained under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.
But the low productivity of lands has ensured that most households,
including the 55 surveyed, migrate for at least 6 to 9 months a year.
This village is at the heart of the Marxist Co-ordination Committee
belt where there is no influence of administration.
Despite these basic differences, the patterns of livelihood show
that within a particular poverty bracket the status of tribal people is
similar. According to a recent survey of the National Council for
Economic and Applied Research there are four poverty groups in
Central India. The highest or the most poor group is in the range of an
household income of Rs. 8,161.00, and the next category has a mean
income of Rs.12,359. The middle and lower poverty groups consist
of a mean household income of Rs. 21,424 and Rs. 57,302 per annum
respectively. The survey also states that the STs and SCs are amongst
the first two income brackets which is the poorest of the poor amongst
Archana Prasad
33
the poor. The results of surveys in Dindori and Jungur have been
classified and according to this classification show the following
differentiation amongst the tribal poor of these regions:
Table Showing Class Differentiation amongst Tribals By Income
Annual Household
Income (Rs.)
Dindori Survey (Percentage
of Surveyed Population)
Jungur Survey(Pcrcentage
of Surveyed Population)
No Response
16.7
0.1
Upto 8161
31.4
19.3
8162 to 12359
12.7
10.8
12360 to21424
15.2
22.8
21425 to57302
23.0
42.0
Above 57303
1.0
5.3
The table above shows that the Jungur has far more people in the
lower poverty bracket than Dindori whose mean per household income
appears to be less than Jungur in Jharkhand. This is primarily because
of the nature of land ownership and the patterns of employment in the
two states that differ from each other significantly:
Percentage o.f
Total Income/
Forests
(%)
All Labour
(%)
Agriculture
(%)
Income from
Migration as
%agc of Labour
D
J
D
J
D
J*
D
J
0 Percent
11.8
39.6
0.0
0.0
59.4
0.0
0.0
14.3
Below 25%
29.4
29.2
49.4
14.3
25.3
81.6
0.0
2.4
25 % to 50 % 58.8
18.8
25.6
10.2
15.3
9.2
0.0
9.3
50% to 75%
0.0
6.3
25.0
18.4
0.0
1.0
0.0
16.7
Above 75%
0.0
6.3
0.0
57.1
1.0
8.2
0.0
57.1
D- Dindori
J-Jungur
♦This includes agriculture as a part of other occupations.
The one striking feature about the table above is that both forests
and agriculture form less than half of the total household income and in
34
NMML Monograph No. 11
i
most cases the tribals are dependent on all types of labour for their
livelihood. Most of the income from labour in Jungur comes from
migratory labour that is mostly in brick kilns in Banaras or in other
construction works. We can see that more than 75 per cent of the
labour based income of 57 per cent of all labouring people in Jungur
comes from migratory labour. Typically except for one adult (mostly
woman) and children, the whole family migrates for labour, the women
typically getting 5 or 10 rupees less than the men in daily wages. As
for those who do not migrate in these areas, they mostly work on the
lands of a few large holders in their own and neighbouring villages.
Most of these people are not ST but Scheduled Castes who are even
worse off than the lower rung of the tribals. Most of these people are
sharecroppers, who get about 2 kilograms of rice and 20 rupees per
day. One other thing about this region is that most of their forest
dependency is for fuelwood and most respondents report that they
only use it for home consumption in this area. It is only in Piraiya Tola,
a village of basket weavers, where most of the income is from forest
based activity. However the only people for whom forest income
forms a substantial portion of their income are from the forest-based
cottage industry of making brooms and mats. For the rest of the people.
income from tendu patta or mhowa gathering is below 25% of their
income.
In contrast to this the Baiga case is slightly different from Jungur as
the dependency on forests is higher and constitutes about 25 to 50
per cent of the total income. It is also significant that a major portion
of the sample surveyed in Dindori was in the high poverty bracket with
about 55 per cent ofthe households earning less than Rs. 12,359 per
annum. This is not true of Jungur where about 58 per cent of the
households earn more than Rs. 27,425 per annum and less than
Rs. 57,302 per annum. This means that many households are in the
lower poverty bracket. In keeping with this we find that dependence
on forests is much higher amongst the Baiga of Dindori as a much
larger percentage of people depend on the forests for their daily needs.
This means that for most people forest income formed about 25 to 50
per cent of the total income. In the combined sample of Jungur and
Dindori only 6 households have a total income contribution from 20 to
50 per cent front forests. All these people belong to three villages
Archana Prasad
35
surveyed in Jungur and Chandwa blocks and most of them are small
traders who are buying forest produce from more than 5 villages and
selling them to traders in bigger markets.
In the Baiga area a third of the men report their main occupation to
be head loading where as the same number of women consider it their
supplementary occupation. Most of the women consider themselves
as agricultural labourers who work either on the field of their own
households or others. The other factor that emerges is that more women
consider themselves dependent on sale of non-timber forest produce,
but the sale of such produce is mostly a supplementary occupation
and no family fully depends on it. Both these facts clearly highlight the
worsening situation for the family and the reported per month income
has decreased to about Rs. 500 to 800 at an average. Thus it is possible
to conclude that households face a decline in incomes when their
dependence on forests increases. In this context it is pertinent to
consider the relationship between the income and land distribution and
forest dependency. The tables below illustrate the point that all those
in the poverty zone depend on forest produce to some extent or the
other:
Baiga Forest Dependency by Household Income
Count
Percentage of Forest Income
Household Income
Below 5% 5 to 25%
25 to 50% Total
(Rs.)
0 %
Below 8161
13
2
22
27
64
8162 to 12359
6
10
4
6
26
12360 to 21424
1
6
3
21
31
21425 to 57302
-
2
1
44
47
Above 57302
-
-
-
2
2
20
20
30
100
170
Total
36
NMML Monograph No. 11
Forest Dependency by Income Distribution, Jungur
Count
Household Income
(Rs.)
Percentage of Income from Forest
0 %
Below 25
25 to 50
50 to 75 Above 75 Total
Below 8161
2
-
-
-
1
3
8162 to 12359
4
1
1
-
-
6
12360 to 21424
8
1
4
-
-
13
21425 to 57302
4
10
4
3
2
23
Above 57302
1
2
-
-
-
3
Total
19
14
9
3
3
48
If we compare the two tables above we find that the poorest of
the poor people depend more on forest produce than the people in the
lower poverty bracket in Dindori. This means that the Baigas
dependence on forests is propelled by their poverty. In the case of
Jungur the situation is quite different. Since most of the population is
dependent on migratory labour, forest use patterns are dependent upon
the amount of time that these people spend in the village which is
dependent on their agriculture. Hence the possession of cultivable land
is a necessity for some months of permanent residence which in turn
influences forest use patterns in the Jungur area. The ownership of
land and security of tenure are some of the most important factors
influencing forest use as can be seen in the following tables.
Archana Prasad
37
Percentage of Income from Forests by Land Ownership, Jnngur
Count
Land (acres)
Forest Income as Percentage of Total Income
0.00
Below 5 5 to 20
21 to 50 Above 50
Total
0.00
11
1
1
-
-
13
Below 0.75
5
7
2
1
1
16
0.76 to 1.5
1
5
4
2
2
14
1.5 to 4.0
1
1
2
-
-
4
4.0 to 5.0
1
-
-
-
-
1
19
14
9
3
3
48
Total
Income Distribution by Land Ownership, Baiga
Count
Land
(Acres)
Annual Household Income (Rs.)
No
Below
Response 8161
8162 - 12360 - 21425 - Above
12359 21424 57302 57302
Total
0.00
30
27
14
18
39
2
130
0.1 to 1
2
18
4
5
2
-
31
1.1 to 3
o
19
5
5
3
-
34
3.1 to 5
-
-
1
2
1
-
4
5.1 to 8
-
-
2
1
1
-
4
Above 8
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
34
64
26
31
47
2
204
Total
Perhaps one of the most striking fact emerging from these tables is
that most of the landless people depend on forests as a source of
38
NMML Monograph No. 11
supplementary income. In the case of the Baiga. dependence on income
from forests goes down progressively with the ownership of land. In
the case of Jungur, this situation gets reversed. For the landless, which
constitute one fifth of the total surveyed sample, labour is a more
lucrative option than collection of forest produce. Forest produce only
starts forming a part of an important supplementary income once
agriculture becomes a primary occupation. But even here the
dependence on income from forests is less than one fifth of the total
income in most cases. More than 20% of income comes from forests
in case of small farmers with marginal holdings, dlius one may conclude
that under the current circumstances it is impossible to argue that the
development of income from forests in both the Baiga and the Santhal
case can be an important poverty alleviation mechanism. Rather the
Baiga case supports the view that dependence on forests is accentuated
by lack of alternatives and poverty. In contrast the Jungur case shows
that labour is a more lucrative and better option to raise ones income,
the dependence on forests is only a small supplement.
Other surveys and case studies from Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh
indicate the same trends when we analyse the average income and
consumption pattern of the tribal family. Here I take one case study
from a survey done in 2002 in Bastar, a tribal area in Chhattisgarh
having one of the richest NTFP inventory in the country. This survey
was done in Kondagaon, one of the newly carved out districts after
the formation of the new tribal state. However despite the hand over
of political power to the new tribal elite, the situation with regard to
tribal livelihoods remained much the same as shown in table in the next
page.
If these average estimates are correct in terms of range, then the
tribals can make about Rs. 12,249.00 per family per annum if they are
able to sell their rice. For farmers who have less than 1 acre of land or
dry lands even this limit would be hard to achieve. In a region where
the net area of cultivation is approximately 32% only with more than
two thirds being non-irrigated, and still 73.2% of the people depend
on agriculture the situation becomes even more precarious. We can
therefore surmise that most people sell their produce, but only in distress
and without keeping enough for themselves for periods of crisis as
shown in the following table:
Arcliana Prasad
39
Sources of Livelihood for Tribal People in Kondagaon
Source of Revenue
Unit Rate
Quantity/Remarks
Total
Rice Cultivation
Rs2.50-3/kg.
Most tribals of the area
have 0.5-1.0 acre of land
that does one rain fed
crop in a year.
Rs. 1200
The production is about
720 kg/acre in one year.
The cost of the seed if
they buy certified seed is
Rs. 60.00/acrc. Most
tribals prefer not to sell
rice but end up selling
about 50%-60% as and
when they need money.
Here we assume they sell
400 kg per year if the crop
is good.
50 days per person by
MPFD estimates
Rs. 3000
NTFP Collection
Details in Section on
Exchange
Rs. 5049
Other labour for
construction or
during harvesting
Rs. 35-50/day 60 days by peoples
depending on estimates. One male
work.
member goes out. We take
Rs. 50.00- average daily
wage for male worker.
Rs. 3000
Collection of
produce for forest
department.
Total (approx)
Rs 60/day
Rs. 12,249
Given this source of income it is now pertinent to see the nature of
expenditure that is made by a tribal living in that area. While considering
this it is important to remember that the expenditure made by tribal people
can be divided into two categories. The first are the expenses ofa permanent
nature like clothes, salt, oil, and even some toiletries like soap and
toothpaste. The second is seasonal expenditure on mhowa and rice that
they buy from the trader. In the first case the nature of unequal exchange
can be gauged from the fact that some tribals exchange even chironji for
40
NMML Monograph No. 11
salt. For example some families in Bunagaon told me that they exchange
one pehli (i.e., 1 kilo and 200 grams) of chironji for five pehli of rice.
This means that 6 kilograms of rice cost about Rs. 190 through this
exchange mechanism. In the second case too. tribal people get severely
cheated by the traders. For example the mhowa that they sell to the trader
for Rs. 200-300 quintal in the season of collection, gets sold back to them
for Rs. 15-20 per kilogram in the off season. This mhowa is stored in the
cold storage after bulk purchases in the season. A small trader, Girdharilal
Golcha of Kondagaon estimates that 1500 trucks of mhowa were sold in
tribal haats every year.59 Similarly the rice that they sell for Rs 2-3 per
kilogram during the harvest time gets sold to them for Rs 6-7 per kilogram
during a period of distress.00 While there are few estimates of the amount
ofrice and mhowa brought from the trader but there are studies to suggest
that since independence the tribals of undivided Madhya Pradesh were
spending about 75% to 90% of their income on food and the rest on
essential items.01 This shows that trade in forest and other essential
products is the bulwark that fulfils the essential needs of tribals on the one
hand and is also a source of major exploitation of tribals on the other side.
The reasons for this are not hard to find if we see the systems of trade,
exchange and value addition in these areas.
Tribals and the Political Economy of NTFP Trade
It has often been argued that the easing state control over NTFP will
benefit the tribals who can compete for the best price for their produce. In
this section we examine this proposition and examine its implications and
impacts in two tribal areas: Kondagaon (Chhattisgarh) and Tundi
(Jharkhand).
Kondagaon: One of the most striking characteristics of trade of
non-nationalised non-timber forest produce is that it is non-specialised
in nature. This means that there is no local trader who trades only in
non-timber forest produce. In fact the trader to trade in non-timber
forest produce also trades in rice, pulses, and may be even local soaps.
The main non-timber forest products marketed in the tribal regions of
Archana Prasad
41
Chhattisgarh are imli, amla, mhowa, safed musli and chironji. The
system of trading and processing has four tiers in the Kondagaon region
and is explained below:
Diagram Showing the Trading Pattern of Non-Timber Forest
Produce in Kondagaon
The diagram above elucidates the structure of trade and processing of
non-timber forest produce in the Kondagaon block of Chhattisgarh. It
42
NMML Monograph No. II
shows that there is hardly any value addition to the produce within the
region. What is even more surprising is the fact that despite being
designated a “herbal state" there is no plant for processing herbs within
the state. Let alone this, even Madhya Pradesh does not have such a
plant within its boundaries. Large traders tell us that there was a Dabur
plant in Northern Madhya Pradesh a few years back but it shut down
because of infrastructural problems.62 This suggests that there is an
unequal exchange between Chhattisgarh and the rest of the country
which structured the relationships of exchange at all levels shown in
the diagram and elaborated in the discussion ahead.
The lowest level of exchange is the haat or the weekly market
held in a medium size tribal village on a specified day. Tribals ofvillagcs
around the radius of 5 kilometres may visit this haat and sell their
produce. The haat is not only the lowest centre of business forNTFP
but it is also the lifeline of the tribal society. Here tribals, apart from
selling their produce also get their daily needs like clothes, toilet articles.
oil and salt from traders. Some traders also hire trucks and come to
these haats in order to pick up the produce from the tribals. The main
produce traded in the area around Malakot (14 kilometres from
Kondagaon). Kondagaon and Chichpolan (10 kilometres away from
Kondagaon) and their prices are given in table in the next page.
The villagers report that Behara, one of the most valuable NTFPs.
is not available in their forests any more. They also report that the
season for amla has been particularly bad and that they are collecting
minimum amounts. Further there has been illegal felling of the amla
tree at a large scale and this has led to the virtual extinction of amla in
the area.63 Given this state of affairs the average seasonal income of a
family may be around Rs. 4,128.00 if tribals decorticate the imli and
chironji seed and dry their amla. If they do not do this it would be
even lower. Most of the collection is done by women and children and
they work for about 5 hours a day from 6-7 a.m. when they go to the
jungle, to about noon when they come back. This means that they get
about 130-150 person days of work. The labour cost of this would be
about Rs. 30-50 per day that seems to be the average wage of this
area.M The total cost of labour collection works out to about Rs. 4,5005,000 if we take it on the lower side of the estimate.
Archana Prasad
43
Prices and Income from Non-Timber Forest Produce
in Bastar Haats, 2001-2002 Season
Name of Produce
Tamarind with Seed
Prices Per Kg.
Rs. 2.00
Approx. Seasonal
Approx. Per Capita
Quantity Collected
Seasonal Income
by a Family
(Rs.)
3-4 Quintal per tree.
Rs. 800.00
One family collects
an average of this
Tamarind without
Rs. 4.00
Tribals report that if
Rs. 1600.00
they decorticate the
tamarind they loose
Seed
about 5% in the
process. So we can
assume about 3.8
quintals
Amla Dry
Rs. 7
4 kg
Rs. 28.00
Amla Green
Rs. 3.50
6 kg (= 4 kg Dry Amla)
Rs. 21.00
Mhowa
Rs.3
6 quintals
Rs. 1800.00
Chironji with Seed
Rs. 20
5 kg in 15 days season
Rs. 100.00
4 kg (= 5 kg with seed)
Rs. 600.00
Chironji Without Seed Rs. 150.00
Rs. 100.00
Safed Musli
Marra
Rs. 3.00
Not currently
available.
The above estimates do not take the processing cost into account
because it is assumed that the tribals do not process any produce.
However on closer inspection we find that some preliminary processing
of the produce takes place at the local level. Drying of amla and
decorticating of inili and chironji seeds is common and gets a higher
price than green produce. But this price rarely covers the cost of
collection let alone the processing costs. Apart from this the tribals
also process the mhowa for their own subsistence purposes. They
make toddy out of the flowers and press the seed to take out oil for
home consumption. The ratio for taking out the oil is 1:3, i.e., if 3 kgs
of seeds are pressed then 1 kg of oil will be obtained. While the
44
NMML Monograph No. 11
mhoxva oil is never sold, the flowers are almost always sold to the
small trader after some are kept for current use. These are mostly
distress sales to obtain immediate cash to fulfil short-term needs.
The unequal exchange between the tribal and the small trader is
reflected at every level of trading. Therefore it is worth exploring the
level at which the small trader operates. An interview with Girdharilal
Golcha revealed that there were about 300 retailers cum small traders
in Kondagaon. They visited about 7-8 haats per week and collected
produce from the tribals. They operated on a margin of about 10%15% and simply transported produce from the haats to the godown
of the block level trader. There were two such traders in Kondagaon:
Ranoo Das Sancheti and TMK. Though Ranoo Das Sancheti and other
middle traders refused to reveal their margins, the Kochiyas (small
traders) contend that these margins are about 5%-10%. But these are
all estimates, as margins are trade secrets like in any other trade.
However some evidence also gives us broad estimates of the income
of these traders. For example it is estimated that if a trader visits two
haats per week than his turnover is about Rs. 15,000, and if he visits
7 haats per week his turnover is about 50,000 per month. If there are
three hundred such traders than the turnover of two middle traders
can vary from 50 lakhs to 1 crore per month depending on the level of
collection.65 Unfortunately the scale and margins of the traders in
Dhamtari are not known, but some idea of the margins can be gauged
from the final sale prices of the produce in Dhamtari and other markets.
Sale Prices of Major Non-Timber Forest Produce
at Different Destinations
Items
Collectors Price
(Rs/Kg)
Amla
3.50
15.00
22.00-32.00
Imli
(decorticated)
4.00
12.00-15.00
32.00-34.00
Chironji
(decorticated)
150.00
200.00-250.00
350.00-400.00
Safed Musli
100.00
-
250.00-1200.00
Dhamtari
(Rs/Kg)
Bom bay/Delh i/Others
(Rs/Kg)
Archana Prasad
45
This structure of trade and marketing of non-timber forest produce
reveals that the maximum amount of exploitation exists at the lowest
level: that is at the level of the collector. The collectors receive barely
enough, if at all, to cover their labour costs, but only if the system of
measurement is correct and fair. Most tribals believe that they are
cheated of at least 30-50% of their produce because they do not
measure their own produce when the trader buys it from them. They
also believe that the balances possessed by the trader are tampered
resulting in the sale of twice the amount of produce than they should
ordinarily be selling. Further individual tribals themselves have little
idea of weights and measures unless they belong to some self-help
group or the other.66 Apart from this their labour costs for processing
the produce is not recovered in the price that is paid by the trader. In
most cases the produce collected from the tribal is considered as
“unprocessed”. These lacunae will have to be removed if non-timber
forest produce is to serve as a good instrument for tribal development.
The voluntary sector in Bastar has made some progress towards
thinking and taking some steps on these issues. One such organisation
based in Kondagaon is Vikas Mitra started by a group of young people
working in CAPART in 1994. The organisation aimed at undertaking
science and technology interventions for people oriented development
and decentralised local development. To this end their main target
groups have been women self help groups that can be trained to weigh,
grade and process the non-timber forest produce. They purchase nontimber forest produce and honey from the collectors and process them
at a nearby village.67 In all there are 5-6 villages in which non-timber
forest produce purchase is going on. These groups are given balances
and trained in weighing the produce so that they are able to get a fairer
deal. The price that they get for their produce is the same as the haat
prices, the difference being that they get the stated price for the right
amount of produce and therefore their income is about 30%-50%
higher than when they deal with the small trader. The self-help group
itself gets an additional Rs. 1.50 per kilogram for processing and
packing the produce. It is then marketed through Vikas Mitra, which
adds its own transport and overhead costs to the collection, packaging
and processing costs of the self help group. The groups had collected
about 6 quintals of imli last year and sold it at the rate of Rs 15 per kg
in Delhi.68
46
A'A/A/Z, Monograph No. 11
Apart from collection and selling of non-timbcr forest produce
Vikas Mitra intervenes to improve methods of honey collection and
bee keeping. The project was first started two years ago when people
from Wardha trained beekeepers in eco-friendly methods of processing
and collecting honey. Maldhari, today the master trainer at the
Chichpolan centre run by Vikas Mitra, was once himself a bee-keeper
and collector. He says that earlier methods of honey collection severely
damaged the beehive as bee-keepers would cut them open fully. The
bees escaped and only one comb of honey was possible. Further
beekeepers were prone to injury and had no insurance against failures
from crop.6’ Vikas Mitra made some changes in these techniques.
They provided protective gear and insurance to the beekeepers and
also trained them to cut only one third of the entire hive at one time.
This allowed them to comb one beehive at least once or twice. The
beekeepers used to move in groups of 3-5 people and their honey
was to be processed in the centre. Today there are about 100 trained
beekeepers with 55 people regularly providing honey to the centre.
The level of collection has also gone up significantly since this new
technique was used. According to Maldhari one group of 5 people
can collect one quintal of honey from a hive with this technique.
Comparing this with the earlier level of collection they say that collection
was erratic and varied from 4 to 5 kilos per person. The centre buys
this honey from beekeepers and gives them Rs. 600.00 per quintal as
a minimum support price. Through this process about 15 tonnes of
honey was collected at the centre that gave the beekeepers an income
of about 9 lakhs or Rs. 3,300.00 per beekeeper if this is to be divided
by 55 beekeepers. Under other circumstances beekeepers usually
market their produce to the traders and get about Rs. 40.00 per
kilogram from them.70 Once collected, tire honey is taken to the mother
unit at Chichpolan and processed. It is also tested for purity and its
protein, vitamin and sugar content. Further the honey is then bottled
and marketed by Vikas Mitra under the brand name Wild's. The third
intervention in forest-based industries is in the processing of medicinal
plants. The centre at Chichpolan cultivates some medicinal plants like
Satawari and Ashwagandha. It also collects wild Bhringraj and trains
women to take out its oil. All these are marketed by the organisation.
Archana Prasad
47
The organisation has managed to increase the income and the
employment of its region by 10-15% through these interventions. The
centre at Chichpolan is able to generate about 180 person days of
work for about 40 women who arc associated regularly at the centre.
They work for about 4 hours a day and arc paid Rs. 25.00 per day for
their labour. This means that the total wages associated with the centre
are about Rs. 4,500.00. Apart from this the women also get money
for the produce that they gather and sell to the centre and carry on
doing their agriculture and other gathering jobs. They also get a bonus
of about 50% at the end of each year. The total income of these forty
women is thus approximately Rs. 1,180.00 higher than the time before
they started working at the centre.71 There are also another 100 women
of the Self I lelp Groups who are associated with the centre and these
women collect and sell non-timber forest produce as described earlier.
There are seasonal fluctuations in their prices and they get a bonus of
about 15% every year. However the constraints of marketing and
working capital often curtail the progress of the work. The co-ordinator
of the organisation opines that an alternative marketing network and
larger scale of value addition needs to take place if the stranglehold of
the trading network has to be effectively challenged in the tribal areas
of Bastar. Clearly there is no state support for it so far.72
Sal Leaf Plate Making Trade in Tundi: In stark contrast with
Kondagaon district. Tundi has no dense forests any more. There are
signs of obvious deforestation on the way to the foothills that separate
Tundi from Topchachi and the Ranchi Plateau. This is even reflected
in the conversations with the people who live there today. By and
large these people say that there was thick forest in the region which
had many more species than they can remember now and now there
are only two species: sal and mliowa. Women also recollect that they
have to now walk about two hours more than before. After much
probing they do state that they had to walk even 10 years ago to get
their fuelwood and enough sal leaves to make the plates for the
Kochiyas. The system of marketing and production of leaf plates and
cups could be the following:
48
NMML Monograph No. 11
Diagram Showing the Marketing and Processing of Sal Leaf
The diagram above shows the trading network that is characteristic
of an area whose major non-timber forest produce is the sal leaf. The
best season for collecting the sal leaf is September and October when
the leaf falls heavily. There after it is also possible to get some leaves in
November and December. Women and children of the household go
to the forest for about 3-4 hours every morning once the season arrives.
The women from Bhalgada and Lodharia panchayats of Tundi block
hold that the collection time is not only increasing but they also have to
walk for longer distances with forest degradation each year. Once
they come back they do their household chores and in the afternoon
prepare to make pattals out of leaves. These pattals form the base
and the basic raw materials that are used by the leaf cup and plate
manufacturers. One pattal is made out of 6 leaves that are pinned
together in a circular circumference with small flexible bamboo twigs
that are the size of a matchstick.73 According to one study in another
area it takes 49 hours to make and sell 1500pattals per person. This
means that one person is able to sell 6000 pattals in a month. The
Archana Prasad
49
author and his group's survey of 888 households in Madhupur shows
that they do this work for about 10 months and each family gets an
annual income of about Rs. 2,124.00 from this work.74 Ifwe use this
as a correct estimate for Tundi than we can assume that women of
about 20 households go into the forest together and collect leaves for
pattals in one village. However unlike Ghanshyam’s study it would be
unrealistic to assume that this collection andpattal making is done for
10 months. My estimate is made on the basis of the fact that the leaf
falls for four months in season (as told by the women) and the work
may carry on for another two months when the leaf falls but not so
heavily. This would be the most optimistic estimate and it would mean
that 36,000pattals are made by woman in one season.75 Thepattals
are sold in bundles of 1000 to the traders whereas the wholesalers sell
the pattals in terms of hunda or 350 pairs of pattals to a hunda.
Their prices in different haats and markets are given below:
Reported Price of Pattals Sold at Different Markets
Name
Village/Haat Price
(Rs. per bundle)
Bhalgada
50-70
Piprahaat
60
Saunad
Wholesale Price
60-70
Jharia (Dhanbad)
80-100 per bundle sold by women
who can go to Jharia.
Dariyapur (Patna)
60 per hunda to manufacturer
or Rs 80-100 per thousand
The level of exploitation in the pattal trade is itself evident in the
table above. If women can go to Jharia to sell their pattals than the
rate of exploitation is about 41.1 per cent. However if the trader goes
to the haat and picks up the pattals than the price difference is about
64.4%. The price that tribal women can get in Jharia is about 10-20%
more than the price in their village. The truth is that hardly any women
find it convenient to go to Jharia that is about 35 km away from the
block headquarters at Tundi. Given this state of affairs one woman is
50
NMMI. Monograph No. //
able to earn about Rs. 2.160.00 per season from sellingpattals. But
most women, especially in remote panehayats like Saunad and Maniyari
leel that this is the best case scenario lor them. Apart from this most
tribals in the region have 0.5-1 acre land but do not generally sell their
rice. 1 hey only get enough for their own use. Further the men of their
village may get labour for 2 months of the year making about Rs 3.600
a year if we assume that they are paid at the rate of Rs. 60 for an eight
hour day. During harvest time too, women go to work in other farms
and their annual income from this is about Rs. 1200 per year.76
Therefore total income of a family can be about Rs. 6.960.00 per
year. Apart from this if they were able to sell mhowa their income
would increase by another Rs. 1000 - 1200 per year. However the
sale of mhowa is erratic as the ecological degradation has reduced
the mhowa in their region. Therefore it is clear that the trade in sal
pattals forms the major portion of the tribal livelihood system in this
region. However it is also clear that thepattals from Jharkhand hardly
go beyond Ranchi or Jharia. Il is mostly the pattals from Orissa that
are used in Patna and Danapur as they are considered to be of a
better quality.
Once the pattals arc given to the trader, they may follow two
separate paths of reaching the manufacturer. In the first system the
small manufacturer who may be located in a big village or the mohalla
town in the same block. There may also be small, medium and big
producers located in bigger towns like Jharia. Patna and other areas.
Both these categories of plate manufacturers have different types of
links with the tribal people and the pattals that arc made and sold to
them. An analysis of their trade shows that even small scale processing
of sal leaves may not be as viable as it is made out to be as many of
the small producers are not taking their labour costs into account when
they calculate their sale price. This estimate is done on the basis of
interview of a small producer in Piprahaat and parameters of analysis
as provided by AMI machine manufacturers. We assume that the
machine works for 8 hours a day and produces about 1000 thalis per
day for 30 days a month given the fluctuation of the electricity. The
production of each thali requires 2 pattals. Though the cost ofjust
the plate making electrical machine is estimated at Rs. 6,690.00
according to the AMI manufacturers, this particular producer, like many
Archana Prasad
51
others bought his machine second hand for Rs.3000.00. Work is done
by the producer himself or through family labour. On the basis of these
assumptions the cost-benefit analysis of the block level producer is the
following:
Details of Items
Monthly Cost (Rs)
Monthly Income (Rs)
RAW MATERIALS
•
60.000 pattals for 1000 thalis
per day i.e 30,000 thalis @
Rs 70 per 1000 pattals.
4.200.00
•
1kg of polythene strips to
make them leak proof @ Rs
70.00
70 per kg
“ Total
4,270.00
OTHER COSTS
•
Maintenance
50.00
•
Depreciation
100.00
•
Electricity/ Kerosene Oil
100.00
■
Marketing Expenses
100.00
•
Miscellaneous
■ Total
50.00
400.00
MONTHLY SALES
•
7.200.00
30.000 Thalis @ Rs 24.00 per 100
thalis in Jharia.
TOTAL
PROFIT
4,670.00
7,200.00
2,530.00
From the above table we can see that the margin of profit of a
small producer is about 50%. However we also notice that the labour
of even one person is not costed in this operation. If it takes 8 hours to
produce these many plates and the total cost of producing these plates
@ Rs. 3 per 100 is Rs. 900. This itself reduces the profit of the .
enterprise to about Rs. 1,630.00 a month. In general we see that
small producers do not cost their family labour when it comes to the<
production of leaf plates.
G)~'OO „
09343 1 '
ji^' /
E(
52
NMML Monograph No. //
The AMI manufacturer states that 1200 thalis or 2500 katoris
can be made per day if the machine runs for 8 hours for a total of 25
days a month. The producer interviewed. Saket Kumar of Bhartiya
Patta Udyog, who has a machine with two plates that can produce
either 5-6 thalis at one time or 3 thalis and 4 katoris at one time
depending on what dies are used. He said his production was of about
3000 thalis and 1500 katoris per day if the machine worked for 8
hours. The manufacturer of thalis and katoris has provided th is estimate
and we assume that it is his current practice. The manufacturer usually
hires labour to achieve his production target that costs about Rs. 3 per
100 for the thalis and Rs. 5 per 1000 for the katoris. Further he
elaborated on his economics in the following manner:
Cost and Benefit Analysis of the Leaf Cup Value Chain
Item
Quantity
Produced
Cost of
Production
(Rs)
Sale Price
to Wholesaler/
Retailer (Rs)
Retailers
Retailers
Price in
Price at
Dariyapur/
Delhi
Danapur (Rs)
Thalis
2.000/day
12 per 70
19 per 70
40 per 100
55 per 100
Katoris
1.500/day
4.5 per 80-100
5.5 per 80-100
15 per 100
20-25 per 100
The total monthly income and cost of production of the producer
as he perceives it can be the following:
Monthly Cost, Income and Profit of Town Level Producer
Item
Monthly
Production
Monthly
Cost (Rs.)
Monthly
Income(Rs.)
Monthly
Profit(Rs.)
Thalis
60,000
10,285.00
162285.00
6,000.00
Katoris
45,000
2,025.00
2,475.00
450.00
12,310.00
18,761.00
6,450.00
Total
The margin of profit as elucidated by this producer is about 48%.
However the figures of the producer are not accurate as his cost of
production is barely equal to the cost of the leaf. That
Archana Prasad
53
means that his margin of profit will reduce drastically once his other costs
are taken into account. It may also mean that the small producers are
either doing other jobs or going to haats and trading in pattals
simultaneously to make their operations more cost effective. In most cases
trading and leaf cup and plate making was a combined operation.77
The modalities of feasibility and the type of systematic intervention
needed are only relevant in this context when we look at the possibilities
for alternatives to the current system of livelihood in tribal areas.
However one thing that is quite clear from the analysis of the sal leaf
cup making and trading system is that price that tribals get for their
produce is a fraction of the selling price of the final product. Assuming
that two pattals are used in the creation of one plate we can see the
share of the tribal collector in terms of the percentage of the final cost
at different points.
Percentage Share of Tribals in Final Sale of
Sal Leaf Plates after Processing
Place of Sale
by Tribals
Cost of 2
Pattals(Rs.)
Final Selling Price
Plates (Rs.)
Tribal Selling Cost as
approx, percentage of
Final Sale Price
Jharia
Patna
Delhi
Jharia
Patna Delhi
0.12
0.28
0.35
0.50
42
34
24
Sale at Tund
0.14
0.30
0.40
0.55
46
35
25
Sale at Jharia
0.16
0.30
0.40
0.55
50
40
29
Village Haat
Sale
It can be seen from the table above that tribal people get the best
sale price when their produce is sold directly in Jharia and when they
sell to the local markets. It is also seen that margins of the middlemen
(manufacturers or traders) increase once the plates are produced and
the produce is sold in non-local markets. Given these conclusions and
experience of tribal people that has been documented in this section,
the Self Help Groups formed by the Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti in
Tundi have suggested two remedies that can improve their situation to
54
NMML Monograph No. 1!
a considerable extent. The first is co-operative marketing oipattals
through a federation ol the existing Self Help Groups and the second
is the setting up a mother unit of the sal leaf cup making machine at the
local level.
Globalisation, Forestry and Tribal Livelihoods
By the end of 2002 the women of Tundi started their leaf cup
making co-operative with the help of the Jan Shikshan Kendra. After
an initial value chain analysis done through a study and a survey, the
women started to produce leaves. They made co-operatives for
gathering and processing the produce, and started saving money for
buying off the machine from the Jan Shikshan Kendra. At an average
the women were making five hundred rupees per month and had saved
six thousand rupees in two seasons in their group. But after running for
two seasons the work stopped suddenly because the families of the
women involved in the exercise were forced to migrate from their village.
Activists informed us that the reason for this was that agriculture of the
area had failed and that most of the tribals had begun to depend on
casual labour fortheir livelihoods. This scenario, is however, not limited
to Tundi. Most of the surveyed areas in Central India yield the similar
results and the efforts made at generating surplus income at the local
level meets the same fate as Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti’s initiative in
Tundi. The reasons for this are structural in nature and this monograph
has tried to explore them in order to understand impact of state
monopolies and free market policies on tribal livelihoods.
In the preceding discussion we have seen that an exploration into
NTFP management and control serves as a good entry point into the
study of the impact of state monopolies and the open market. The
management ofNTFP shows that most forest produce is traded in the
open market with only a few of the produces being nationalised in the
1960s and the 70s. The background of the emergence of this system
was conditioned by the land settlement patterns of the British and the
advent of industrial capitalism in forested areas. Thus the relationship
between forest rights and land tenure and agriculture was an integral
one and formed the fulcrum of tribal livelihood systems. This basic
factor has been usually ignored by donor agencies who argue that
NTFP development can lead to solving the problems of tribal livelihood.
Archana Prasad
55
Contrary to this our analysis has shown that dependence on NTFP is
conditioned by poverty and that NTFP dependence is more a matter
of survi val than of improving the livelihood status of tribal people. An
analysis of the system of NTFP trade, management and processing
shows that the negative impact of the current processes of devolution
of powers in forest management are a result of the structural constraints
and inequalities within which these initiatives are embedded. Thus this
monograph has attempted to unravel the extent and parameters of
these structural constraints in the age of globalisation.
The devolution of powers within the forestry sector and new
initiatives in tribal development described in this monograph have to
be seen in the context of the current phase of neo-liberalisation in this
country. Under this economic programme, the Government of India
and donor agencies have stepped to ease the way of the trans-national
companies who are interested in capturing the Indian markets for their
goods. Within this framework sectoral reforms have been initiated where
donor agencies are involved in the sectoral reforms in forests, one of
the first to undergo such changes. These reforms are in keeping with
the ideological principles of laissez faire capitalism that advocates the
loosening of state control over all areas of development. The social
sector and social welfare measures have been particularly hit by these
measures and the consequent lack of infrastructural development in
marginal areas has increased the inequities between the people living
in these areas and others. It is therefore difficult to understand how
these reforms will help and solve the problems of tribal people, many
of whom are confined to the marginal economies that are worst
impacted by the economic reforms. In line with this thinking the
advocates of neo-liberal globalisation have also been arguing that the
creation of wealth and the loosening of state controls will have a trickle
down effect and improve the lot of the tribal people. But in order to
ensure this and reduce the resistance to reform process premier
institutions like the World Bank have been arguing that there needs to
be a “human face” of this neo-liberal policy.
There are two important elements of globalisation programmes in
forestry: decentralisation and development of non-timber forest
produce. It is hoped that through these measures the tribal economies
can upgrade themselves to suit the needs of the globalised economy.
56
A'A/A/Z. Monograph No. 11
Essentially speaking the forestry sector reforms aim to meet the needs
of the global capitalism by supplying essential raw materials to many
industries. But this monograph has shown that the existing devolution
projects are neither new and nor do they ensure that the unequal
relationship between the tribal people, trader and the industry is
eliminated. Rather it assumes that the abolition of state monopoly over
forests will inevitably lead to better terms of trade for the tribals. It will
also provide the space for “community driven" initiatives, which they
hope will tilt the balance towards the toiling masses.
This is not the first time that arguments have been made in favour
of processes of decentralisation and community rights and ownership
of land and produce in forests. In fact, tribal rights movements and
activists of all hues have been arguing that local people arc intrinsically
dependent on these resources for their livelihood and thus have the
greatest interest in protecting and conserving these resources. They
point to that local tradition, knowledge and histories provided enough
evidence about the interface between the every-day needs of tribal people
and the income from non-timber forest produce which formed a significant
part of the tribal income. This dependence, in turn, translated into a
conservation system guided by customary rules and institutions, that
were essentially informal and decentralised in character. This was in
shaip contrast with the goals of the modern conservation system, which
was centralised in character and represented the interests of large
industry in both the colonial as well as post-colonial periods. This
‘industrial mode of forest use' focuses less on the harnessing of non
timber forest produce and more on the exploitation of forests for timber
because large industrial houses demand wood for fuel and raw material.
It is therefore natural for post-colonial forestry to raise plantations of
fast growing species and regenerating forests for timber. This forestry
regime not only has a devastating impact on the biodiversity of the
region, but also follows a strict rights regime to ensure that peoples
access to forests is limited and controlled. This results in the
marginalisation of people’s rights (especially tribal rights) over their
own resources and leads to the destruction of their livelihood systems
and accentuates the conflict between the people and the state. The
advocates of this position were vociferous in their opposition to the
state and argued that communities should be given autonomous control
over their own resources, and local interests and their resources should
Archana Prasad
57
be protected from commercial exploitation. This meant that
environmental and tr ibal movements have also been essentially arguing
against the introduction of market forces in the tribal areas. In this
sense these activists are fundamentally against the free market economy
being proposed by the donor agencies even though some of their
important themes have been incorporated within that framework. They
argue that the process of decentralisation of forest and NTFP
management has in fact led to greater state control, rather than
providing space to communities for local management of forests. But
the commitment to a position that demands a withdrawal of the state
from forest conservation has in fact blunted their attack on neo-liberal
globalisation even though they are against it in principle.
Refuting both these positions this monograph has shown that an
argument for the withdrawal of the state in favour of the community is
inappropriate at this juncture. As seen in the case of NTFP, the free
market was operating in the case of non-nationalised forest produce
since independence. However local institutions were unable to take
advantage of this system because of the mahajan trader nexus that
has existed in these areas since time immemorial. This means that any
meaningful devolution and decentralisation has to be accompanied by
a change in the semi-feudal relations within this area. Given the state
of infrastructure and development of tribal regions, I have shown that
tribal people are unable to take advantage of any free trade. Rather
the withdrawal of the state only works in favour of the entrenched
semi-feudal interests and makes them even more powerful than before.
Therefore any NTFP development has to be rooted in initiatives that
work towards the rejuvenation of the tribal agrarian system and
establishment of an egalitarian social and economic order. It is also
clear that neither systems of state monopoly nor free market systems
have worked towards this in independent tribal India. This is because
neither of these systems or their practitioners aim to use these
programmes towards building a larger movement for social engineering
in tribal India. In conclusion, the initial impact of globalisation has sent
warning signals to grassroots movements of all hues: it has shown the
urgent need for grassroots movements and advocates of tribal rights
to develop a more nuanced understanding of the role of the state in
tribal development. If this does not happen than their ideological
positions will be vulnerable to incorporation by the Imperial globalisers.
58
NMML Monograph No. 11
References
1 For this point see W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account ofBengal, volumes xvixvii, Delhi, 1976, reprint, first published 1877. Also see B.B. Sinha, Socio-Economic
Life in Chotanagpur, 1858-1935, Delhi. 1979. pp. 139-40.
2 K.S. Singh, Birsa Munda and his Movement, Oxford University Press, Delhi,
1983, p 10.
’ Prabhu Mohapatra, ‘Class Conflict and Agrarian Regimes in Chotanagpur’,
Occasional Paper Number XV, 1990, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library,
pp.10-11.
4 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
' Hunter, Statistical Account ofBengal, volume xvi-xvii, descriptions of forest
for Singhbhum, Manbhum and Hazaribagh districts.
6
Ibid., volume xvii, p. 315.
7
Ibid., volumexvii, p.260.
8
Ibid., volume xvi, p. 168.
’ Ibid., volume xvi, pp. 168 and 348-49.
10 Ibid., volume xvi, pp. 106 and p.315.
" Ibid., volume xvi, pp. 169 and 348-49.
12 Tirthankar Roy, Traditional Industry in the Economy of Colonial India.
(London: Cambridge University Press. 1999), Chapter 3 on Handlooms and Textiles
which discusses the special case of silk.
13
Hunter, Statistical Account ofBengal, volume xvi, pp.416-420.
14 Prabhu Mohapatra, ‘Class Conflicts and Agrarian Regimes in Chotanagpur’,
pp. 15-20, and K.S. Singh, Birsa Munda and his Movement, Chapter 2.
15 Singh, Birsa Munda and his Movement, Susan Devalle. Discourses of
Ethnicity: Culture and Protest in the Jharkhand, New Delhi, Sage, 1992.
16 B.B. Sinha, Socio-Economic Life in Chotanagpur, 1858-/935, Delhi, 1979,
pp. 141-42.
17 There were four systems of managing peasant use of forests between 186090. They were the kham system; leasing forests for nistar; summary settlements;
and the commutation system. While the first two were systems of indirect
management, the last two were considered more important for administrative
purposes as they involved a system of direct control. For more details of all these
systems see Archana Prasad, ‘Forests and Subsistence Economies of Colonial
India: A Case Study ofthe Central Provinces’, chapter 5 (Ph.D. thesis, JNU, 1994).
18
CPSR Forest Department, Compilation No: 416 of 1872, p. 30.
Archana Prasad
59
Historians like Guha and Sundar have often argued that Brandis was the
father of current day participatory forestry that has characterised Joint Forest
Management.
20
CPSR Forest Department, Compilation No: 229 of 1878, pp. 1 -2.
21 Most working plans of the 1890s show this. There were not more than one
or maximum two grazing circles in one forest. In over populated areas this was not
enough.
22 The lac seed swarmed twice a year, in June and December. Labour for its
collection was available in June-July for the baisakh crop and in October-November
for the kartik crop. Thereafter lac was taken to the markets where the forest dwellers
sold it to the craftsmen. The main lac market was in Seoni where lac was in great
demand. After collection stick lac was cleared of the wood and then placed the
encrusted twigs and barks in long cotton bags. These bags were put before the fire
and heated, and the lacquer gum squeezed from the sticks and mixed with clay and
other materials to make toys and bangles. Since the best business for the Lakheras
(or artisans working on lacquer goods) was in the season of festivals, their income
was seasonal and any transaction of the forest communities to propagate lac must
take that into account. While the main markets of the Lakheras were in small towns
like Mandlaand Seoni, they also sold bangles in the villages till the late 19"’century.
(CPSR, Forest Department, Case File No 22, ‘B’ Progs, April 1919. (henceforth Lac,
1919), 3. Also See CPSR Forest Department, Compilation 50(6), 1875 (henceforth
Lac, 1875), 85-86. Also see Russell and Hiralal, Tribes and Castes ofthe Central
Provinces, volume 3, 106).
23
Lac 1919, p.51.
24
Lac 1875, pp.32-33.
25
Lac 1875, p.8.
26 Ibid., pp.26-30. In the wake of such demand there were two courses open to
the government. First they could allocate leases according to the axioms of a
competitive market. The highest bidder (for the payment of royalty) was to get the
contract. While the cultivator had a right to sell his labour at a price he decided, in
practice the lessee was the only purchaser of this labour. The lessee was to pay the
labour for lac propagation and fix the wage rate according to the number of maunds
produced. Thereafter the lessee acquired an ownership right over produce.
According to the logic of this system, the government royalty would remain static,
while the lessee’s profits rose or declined according to the fluctuations of the
market. Alternatively the government would plan to receive a minimum royalty (to
be fixed at 25 per cent) of the income earned through the sale of produce by the
lessee. Here the government would fix the wages ofthe lac cultivator as well as the
price at which the lessee could sell lac in the market. The maximum price at which the
lessee was allowed to sell lac in the market was Rs. 10 per maund or Rs. 30 per
bullock load. By fixing the price thus, the government attempted to narrow the gap
between the profit of the leaseholder and the price paid to the lac propagator.
60
NMML Monograph No. 11
27 R.S. Troup, 'Experiments in the pollarding odd Butea Frondosa for lac
cultivation’, Indian Forester. May 1919, p.225.
28 Ibid, pp.227-228. Troup and his team carried out experiments over ten years.
They divided the forested tracts with trees of different girth and ages into strips
and applied the lac worm at different times. At each time they recorded the amount
of lac that they got from the tree. In this way they determined the ideal conditions
for the harvest of lac.
29
Lac 1919, pp.85-89.
10 Madhya Pradesh Secretariat Records Bhopal (Hereafter MPSR), Forest
Department, file No: 114, September 1920.
21 James Best. Messrs. Becker & Co.’s Lac Factory at Champa in Bilaspur
District, C.P, Indian Forester, 1912, p.514.
32 Provincial Industries Committee Report, 1946. (Nagpur: Government Press,
1947), p.67.
33 These opportunities were important for their survival in the wake of
restrictions over forest use especially after the reservation of forests in 1878. Other
authors like Rangarajan, Fencing the Forests: Conservation and Ecological Change
in India’s Central Provinces: 1860-1914, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996 and
Ramachandra Guha, ‘Forestry in British and Post-British India’, have described this
process.
34 For the details of the debate see Savyasachi, Tribal Self Rule in India The
Constituent Assembly Debates. Provisions of the Fifth Schedule arc reproduced in
Savyasachi, Tribal Forest Dwellers and Self-Rule: The Constituent Assembly
Debates on Fifth and Sixth Schedules, (Delhi: Indian Social Institute, 1998), pp. 5458. This view was a result of the debates within the Constituent Assembly that
focused on the provisions that were laid down under the Government of India Act
of 1935. The debate itself was dominated by the situation in the North East and
Bihar where the demand for self-rule had attained considerable importance and
resulted in the imposition of the Fifth Schedule in large parts of Jharkhand and
Chhattisgarh. The Fifth Schedule under which partially excluded areas were to be
governed, were to be administered by the Governor with the help of the Tribal
Advisory Council that was to consist of tribal representatives in considerable
numbers. They were not to be excluded from the working of the Constitution except
in respect of provisions concerning marriage, social customs or land distribution if
the Governor deemed it necessary. Mandla and all other partially excluded areas of
the Central Provinces were included in the Fifth Schedule. Congress nationalists,
however, felt that the provisions would only create separatist movements and
identities in the country and prevent the forging of a broad unity and interests
under the umbrella of a common nationalist sentiment. The leader of the Adibasi
Sabha, Jaipal Singh, demanded a separate Jharkhand State in Bihar in 1939. The
Chief Minister of the time. Shri Krishna Saha, in turn accused the leader of exploiting
the sentiments of the people to keep Chotanagpur a backward region. Following
Archana Prasad
61
from this analysis the nationalists of the Constituent Assembly roundly accused
the Christians of fanning separatist tendencies in the country, especially in the
North East. Rajendra Prasad Papers, I/M 1939, pp.3 and 15-17.
35
MP Human Development Report, p.40.
30 Ranu Bhogal and Manish Shankar, ‘Nationalised Forest Produce: A study of
Tendu Patta Policy of Madhya Pradesh, India: A Devolution or a Welfare Policy’,
July 2000 (Unpublished Paper for CIFOR).
37 Pethya, B. P„ Collection and Marketing ofTendu Leaves in Sehore Division,
(Bhopal: IIFM, 1993), pp.5-6.
38 Amit Prakash, Jharkhand: Politics of Development and Identity, Orient
Longman. 2001, p. 166.
39 Expert Report of Committee on Conferring Ownership Rights of MFP on
Panchayat/Gram Sabhas, (New Delhi: January 1998), Annexure 8 on Madhya
Pradesh.
40 Khandit, Vasudev, A Study of NTFP in Local Economy of a Tribal Area of
Betul District, M.P. (Bhopal: Indian Institute of Forest Management (hereafter
IIFM), 1996), pp.40-45.
41 Ranu Bhogal and Manish Shankar, ‘Van Dhan Initiative in Central Bastar’.
July 2000 (Unpublished Paper for CIFOR).
42
MP Human Development Report, p.200.
43 India Human Development Report 2001, pp. 153-154. According to the
figures given in this table for expenditure of food in 1991 are 74.1% for tribals in
undivided Bihar and 71.99% for tribals in undivided MP.
14 K.C. Malhotra et al., ‘Joint Management of Forest Lands in West Bengal: A
case of Jamboni District’ in S.B. Roy, Policy to Commissioning of Joint Forest
Management, pp. 160-208.
45 Jha and Kumar eds. Development of Bihar and Jharkhand, Forestry and
Development, p.l 51.
46 National Forest Policy Resolution. 1988. The Forest Protection Act of
1980 had already attempted to limit commercial and industrial activity in forest.
47 Fora larger critique of Joint Forest Management see N.C. Saxena, The Saga
ofParticipatory Forest Management, CIFOR Publications, 1997.
18 For these figures see Forestry Development in Bihar, Chief Conservator of
Forests (Development), Ranchi, 1996 and Madhya Pradesh Human Development
Report, 1998, p.35.
49 For a greater analysis of JFM in Bihar see Sarah Jewitt, Environment,
Knowledge and Gender: Local Development in India s Jharkhand, Ashgate, 2002.
62
NMML Monograph No. 11
50 State of India's Environment: The Citizens Fifth Report. CSE, volume II,
1999, pp.71-73.
51 Mark Poffenberger and Betsy Mcgean eds., Fillage Voices, Forest Choices:
Joint Forest Management in India. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996, introduction.
32 Joint Forest Management: -A Critique Based on Peoples Perceptions,
published by Samata Hyderabad, and CRY Net, Vishakhapatnam. 2001, p.iv.
33 Report ofthe Joint Mission ofthe Madhya Pradesh Forestry Project (Bhopal:
Circulated by Ekta Parishad, 1999), 12. Instead of using the systems of local
governance that prevail within the ambit of formal government structures these
agencies are attempting to control the natural resources of the country by creating
parallel systems of control. The Village Resource Development institution is one
such institution that is generating social unrest and conflict in remote tribal areas.
34 Madhu Sarin, ‘Defenders of the Forests: Disempowerment in the name of
‘participator)'’ forestry-Village forests joint management in Uttarakhand, India’ in
Forest, Trees and People, NewsletterNo: 44. April 2001, FAO For other instances
of the disempowerment of local institutions see Madhu Sarin, ct al.. Devolution as
a Threat to Democratic Decision-Making in Forestry? Findingsfrom Three Stales
in India. Working Paper 197, Overseas Development Institute, London.
33 Ranu Bhogal and Manish Shankar, ‘Van Dhan Initiative in Central Bastar",
July 2000 (Unpublished Paper for C1FOR), pp.26-27.
36
Visit to Malakot and Buna Villages, December 2001.
’’Nandini Sundar, Roger Jeffery and Neil Thin, Branching Out: Joint Forest
Management in India, OUP 2001, p.72.
” For this point see Madhu Sarin et al., Devolution as a threat to democratic
decision making, see the concluding chapter.
” Interview, Girdharilal Golcha, Kondagaon. 26.01.2002.
" This phenomenon has also been noted in other hunger prone zones like
Kalahandi, Bolangir and Sarguja. For this point see Archana Prasad, The Political
Economy ofHunger, Frontline, September 2001.
61
See D.S. Nag on Baigas and MP Human Development Report.
62
Interview Ranoo Das Sancheti, Kondagaon, 28.01.2002.
63
Interview Members of Self Help Groups, Bunagaon, 27.01.2002.
w The average wage for a woman worker is Rs. 35 per day and for a male worker
Rs. 50 per day when they harvest for others.
63 This is based on the estimates of Girdharilal Golcha and after cross checking
the prices in the market in January 2002. Market survey and conversations with
Dhamtari traders took place on 29.01.2002.
Archana Prasad
63
66
Visit to Malakot and Kondagaon haat in Kondagaon block, January 2002.
67
Interview Dhanraj Kuidip, Coordinator Vikas Mitra, Kondagaon, 26.01.2002.
68 This information was gained from Radha, the Self Help Groups at Chichpolan
and Bunagaon.
69
Interview Maldhari, 28.01.2002, Chichpolan, Kondagaon.
70 Maldhari’s estimates are based on his own experience before and after training.
His record of the amount of honey collected is available at the processing centre
that he runs. During the lean season Maldhari travels to different villages to attempt
to induce other beekeepers to undertake improved techniques of honey collection.
71
Meeting with the village workers at Chichpolan, 28.01.2002.
72
Meeting with Dhanraj Kuidip, Coordinator Vikas Mitra, 27.01.2002.
72 Meeting with 20-25 women of Lodharia and Bhalgada panchayats, 19.03.2002
and 20.03.2002.
74 Ghanshyam, Jharkhand: Vikas Par Vimarsh, Abhiyan, Madhupur Deogarh,
1994,pp.104-106.
75 These estimates are based on the basis of meetings with village Self Help
Group representatives in: Sheetalpura (Maniyari Panchayat), Kolhar (Bhalgada
panchayat), Piprahaat (Bhalgada Panchayat), Gopinathpur di (Lodharia Panchayat)
and Saunad (Hathrasa Panchayat) in Tundi block. Each meeting was attended by
45-50 people from different villages of the Panchayat.
76 The estimates of other income are taken from interviews at Gopinathpur di
and Saunad, 23.03.2002.
77 This conclusion is also supported by an earlier study that also argued that
differentiation amongst the producers was increasing and small producers were
forced to combine leaf cup making with other activities like trading and grocery
shops etc., because the economic viability factor. See Dinesh Abrol et al., Evaluation
ofRural Technologies ofCSIR, March 1998.
Archana Prasad is Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Studies, Nehru
Memorial Museum and Library, Teen Murti House, New Delhi.
ISBN: 81-87614-29-3
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