FACTS againest MYTHS V0L-Ii-6-SEPTEMBER-1995
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- FACTS againest MYTHS V0L-Ii-6-SEPTEMBER-1995
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VIKAS ADHYAYAN KENDRA
INFORMATION BULLETIN
September '95 VOL II # 6
THE MYTHS ON PERSONAL LAWS
COMMENT
A major political issue confronting the country today is the
^Bitroversy over the Uniform Civil Code versus the*Per
sonal Laws of various religious groups. It has led to a bitter
polarisation of opinion, aggravating relations between es
pecially Hindus and Muslims. In the situation the ques
tion ultimately is how to reconcile the inherent pluralism of
the Indian social order with a demand for uniformity. This
assumes relevance as on the one hand the notion of legal
uniformity is supposed to promote unity but it mitigates the
very spirit of cultural diversity. On the other
hand, existing personal laws promote cul
tural diversity but fail to provide social jus
tice particularly equal rights for women. Be
sides, the controversies and implications
of the issues have been inextricably linked
with the political agendas of the various
political groups. The Government policy
on this has always been based on narrow,
myopic political considerations.
The genesis of these controversies and
^/erse implications can be traced, first, to
British colonial rule1. Between 1860 and
1870 the British had carried out a number
of reforms with several legislations being
passed. Two of these were the Indian Pe
nal Code and Indian Contract Act that form
the bedrock of our present-day judicial sys
tem. For the British rulers these were im
portant enactments as it helped them in their
colonial policy — indirect rule in adminis
trative affairs and divide-and-rule in military affairs — of
consolidating their political control when laying down uni
form laws for civil transactions and for governance of crime
and punishment.1 It was during this period the term ‘per
sonal’ came to be applied in the legal sphere.
Strictly speaking, there are only two broad categories of
laws—civil and criminal—and laws by their very nature are
public. The British however made a distinction between ‘pub
lic’ and ‘personal’ sphere of every-day life, leaving the ‘per
sonal domain out of the realm of uniform legislations for
fear that this would spark of unnecessary conflict and un
rest.1 The relevant point, however, in the current context of
the controversy is the manner and form in which the Hindu
personal law had been codified and “reformed” virtually in
total disregard of women’s interests. And today, forty-one
years later, the noble sentiments and high expectations that
this reformed law was supposed to achieve for women is
intrinsically male-chauvinist.
At another level, the debate on personal laws reveal an utter
confusion of the scheme of values. Right
from the Constituent Assembly debate on,
the present Article 44 of the Constitution
directing the State to endeavor to secure a
uni form civil code for all citizens, to the Su
preme Court Judgment on the Sarla Mudgal
case and all that has occurred since, it be
comes obvious that the major source ofcon
fusion is the obsessive and manic insis
tence on uniformity by especially commu
nal groups as against the demand for equal
rights and justice for women.
Reacting to the almost unanimously orches
trated view of these communal forces for a
uniform civil code, deriving from their spu
rious concerns on appeasement of minori
ties ;!hd polygamy among Muslims, the
Muslim fundamentalists have also been
equally paranoid with the notion of their
religio-cultural identity being threatened, as
if the body of laws improvised and enacted by British
colonialists are the centre-piece of their identity!
Against the communal demand of the forces like the RSS for
a Uniform Civil Code, any debate on the reform of personal
laws and gender justice is projected as a challenge and a
threat to their tenuous security by the Muslim fundamental
ists. Thus, when a woman seeks justice to establish her rights,
it at once becomes a subject of claims arising from these and
September *95
FACTS against MYTHS
^(+•1
FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION ONLY
|
Page 1
other religious communities for reasons other than gender
justice. And in the power play of the various communal
forces, etc., women’s welfare becomes the battering ram in
their campaigns for and against this issue. The objectifica
tion of women in this way can be traced to a number of
popular prejudices and fallacies rooted in the communal
demands of not just Hindu and Muslim but in all personal
laws that are heavily loaded against women.
In de-communalising these demands the need is also to
expose the various misconceptions and stratagems of the
communal forces on these issues.
MYTH
Personal laws are divine as they are based on reli
gious scriptures and therefore are immutable and
cannot be changed.
FACT
Formulations made by theologians, the clergy, jurists,etc,
— based on values,principles that are rooted in the reli
gious scriptures — cannot be confused to be the handi
work Of god. These formulations are man-made regardless
ofthe source from which it is inspired, etc. Like,for instance,
the "Shari’ah" of Islam or the laws of other religions on
personal and family matters like marriage, divorce, succes
sion and inheritance. These formulations have been enun
ciated in a very clearly defined, historical context, within a
very specific social milieu and have accordingly governed
theologians in the light of also their own experiences.
From time to time as experience continue to emerge from
various sources these religious principles, values, etc., get
re-formulated and implemented to suit present-day realities.
After all, religious laws and doctrines are made more for the
people and not the other way around,”What is sacred and
immutable is principle, not its application. Thus while prin
ciple is devine, its application is certainly human”2
On a more theoretical level a number of Islamic scholars3
like Dr.Asghar Ali Engineer of the Centre for the Study of
Society and Secularism, Bombay, among others, maintain
that the Qur’an, (sometimes transliterated as “Koran”), as
the 0/7/7 source of Islamic law and ofanon-human origin is
incorrect. The 'sunnah1 or tradition of Prophet Mohammed
comprises the second basic important source, of law. But
the sources which contributed towards its development for
centuries, during which time it was formulated - - 'rai' (opin
ion), 'qiyas" (analogy), "ijma" (consensus) etc - - are neither
accepted by all Muslims alike nor claim to have divine
origin.That is, while the Qur’an elucidates the essentials of
Islam,the details of the code of rule and regulation relating
to all legal aspects of a Muslim’s life and commulatively
referred to as Jigh\ cannot be regarded as devine as the
Qur’an categorically rules out the possibility of any human
person (including the Prophet, the Imams of the Shias and
the great Islamic scholars) to be divine.
than by Muslim 'Qazis'. Today it is administered by Indian
(mostly Hindu) judges who mimic this colonial legacy. The
Anglo-Indian-Muslim (as also Anglo-Hindu) family laws
are a hodge-podge of British court officials’ records of cus
tomary practices with interpretations of the Quran and the
"Shariah". by European judges who misunderstood Islam,
its actual customs of Indian Muslims and were even preju
diced. Yet theirjudicial verdicts on these matters have come
to acquire the force of law because British (and now Indian)
jurisprudence allow court judgments to acquire the force of
binding precedents, enforced first by the colonial and now
post-colonial Indian State. Pathetically enough, the Mus
lim leadership rallies around this ossified Anglo-Indian-Islamic law and defends it as though its judgements conform
to the enunciation of the Holy Prophet in the Qur’an.
MYTH
Uniform Civil Code (UCC) is a ‘sine qua non’ for
national unity and integration - “one country, one
nationality,one citizenship and one legal system”.
FACT
At best, this is merely a probability. In reality, however, (IT?
necessary connection between a uniform civil code and
national integration does not exist. Most laws in India are
uniformingly applicable to all its citizens. Yet, since the 60s
especially, communal conflicts, etc., have risen rather than
diminished. Common laws did not prevent the split up of
old Pakistan.(Sources promoting national unity are far more
complex and multifarious than just sharing common laws).
As an axiom, this claim sounds wonderful. There is how
ever very little proof to suggest that “one legal system” is
a cause for “one nationality”5. And, the call for national
integration is different from the call to join the “national
mainstream” demanded from minorities by communal
groups like the RSS, BJP and others. The aggressiveness
and the virulence with which they go about campaigning
for it only exposes their bent to snuffout minority identities
rather than in honestly promoting national unity.
This question of “unity” also manifested itself in the con
text of a Supreme Court judgment in the Sarla Mudgajjj
case on May 10,1995 relating to bigamy wherein One ofthe
learned judges, Justice Kuldip Singh, had observed that
while the “Hindus along with Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains
have forsaken their sentiments some other communities
would not”. This observation was in reference to the re
formed Hindu law. This Law Was not established for the
sake of “national unity or integration”. It was extended to
these communities because they never had had any scrip
ture-based personal law of
their own. Even
"
And, finally, what goes by the name of Muslim family Jaw is
actually an Anglo-Indian Islamic-Law4 as it developed in
the 19th and early 20 th centuries under British colonial rule
in British courts, administered by Christian judges rather
MAMlSHi NaS9p5
FACTS against MWMS
September ‘95
Page
before 1955-56 these communities had been governed by
Hindu law subject to some customary usages of their own.
For obvious reasons this Law could not have been extended
to Christians, Muslims and Parsis. Surely, this was not so
due to any lack of feeling of national unity or loyalty on
their part6 and incidentally, Hindus had never dissolved
their separate personal laws or forsook “their sentiments”,
they had merely codified and “reformed” the laws.
I f uni formity is the hallmark of unity why should there be a
federal system?. Or reservations on the basis of caste and
special tax benefits to Hindu joint-families? Why should
the Adivasis enjoy customary rights of their own? The uni
formity thereby losses its relevance especially with regard
to the existing stark inequalities between the sexes. For
instance the legal inequalities in the BJP ruled States. These
have not been amended. Brinda Karat7 reveals that a legis
lation which was unanimously passed by the Haryana As
sembly in 1987 (including assent by both the BJP and the
Congress), the equal rights granted to Hindu women in
non-ancestral property were cancelled. It was also specifimentioned that women would not have equal rights to
a^rcultural land as it would divide and fragment families.
Indeed, how would a UCC be conducive to national unity
when uniform laws for crimes, transfer, and constitutional
rights have largely failed to promote it till today?! Besides,
these laws in a way are comparatively more uniform than
even those of the US where each State has its own laws. If
this uniformity has not led to nation’s integration, why
should a Uniform Civil Code be any different? The unity
and integrity of nation can never depend on a set of laws.
This argument, incidentally, is also referred to Article 370
on J & K. If merely laws can strengthen national unity then
our nation should not be facing any challenges to its unity
at all as 9.0% of our laws are common.
The issue of national integration thus goes beyond unifor
mity. The crucial factor is not uniformity but equality be
cause it is equality that strengthens integration.
MYTH
u family laws having long since been reformed,
us are already being governed by uniform per
sonal laws. Thus gender justice and equality within
the community already exists.
FACT
Hindu law as applicable today is not altogether uniform for
all Hindus. It only provides a skeletal framework and leaves
much to the customary laws prevalent among the Various
Hindu communities.
Prior to codification, Hindu law was divided between two
main schools,— the 4mitakshara' and 'dayabhaga' schools.
Under the Hindu Marriage Act there are two types of mar
riages8 —described aS religious and secular or civil marriage
- Section 7(1) and (2). Section 7(1) reads: “A Hindu mar
riage may be solemnised in accordance with the customary
rites and ceremonies of either party thereto and (2) Where
such rites and ceremonies include the ‘saptapadi’ (i.e. the
taking ofseven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly
FACTS against MYTHS
before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and
binding when the seventh step is taken”.
Obviously, these Sections have nothing to do with religion.
Moreover, Section 5(iv) and (v) of the same Act shows
that there is no common civil code governing marriage
among Hindus, It lays down conditions subject to which
marriage may be solemnised, namely, “(7y) the parties are
not within the degrees of prohibited relationship,unless the
custom of, or usage governing, each of them permits of a
marriage between the two. (c) the parties are not 'sapindas'
of each other unless the custom or usage governing each
of them permits of a marriage between the two”.
Elaborating further, Communalism Combat3 illustrates the
emormous diversity within all the personal laws, viz.,
• The different rules for taking a child in adoption
© Adivasis who are governed by customary law. Among
the Santals and Bhils women cannot hold property.lt is
only recently they have begun demanding protection
against polygamy;
• Christians in Assam and Coorg and other Christians
among Adivasis in Bihar and Orissa have been ex
empted from the application of the Indian Succession
Act, 1925;
• Even the Shari’ah Act of 1937 codifying Muslim law
and binding civil courts to apply its provisions to all
Muslims relating to matters offamily laws and relations
is out of bounds for Muslims ofJ&K where the existing
customary law takes precedence over it;
• For the Muslims of Goa, the Portuguese Family Law
and Succession Laws continue to apply;
© For the Sunni Bohras of Gujarat and the Muslim
Ghirasias of Bharuch, Hindu customary law has been
applied pre-and post-independence “in the interest of
uniformity”,
• Muslims of Kerala have retained their 'marnimakadayam' system. It is not shared by Muslims in other
parts of the country.
Undoubtedly the reform of Hindu law through codification
did have some positive impact. It carried forward the tradi
tion, already established during the national movement, of
legitimising notions of women’s equality in the policy and
in society at large. It paved the way for further gradual
reform, e.g. the introduction of di vorce by mutual consent
into the Hindu Marriage Act. On the whole, however, the
impact of codifying law only for Hindus without giving
them any option; and of trying to eradicate diversity in the
name Of “Hindu Unity”10 was very detrimental. In the pro
cess it diffused the myths that
• Hindu women had achieved equal legal rights;
• the reformed Hindu law is “secular”, not “religious”
or “personal” like the Muslim personal law which apart
from being “backward” can therefore be secularised
only by Hinduising it;
• Hindu men were worse off than Muslim men because
the former have been deprived of ‘rights’ that the
g____ .
September '95
Page 3
latter enjoy;
MYTH
The reformed Hindu law governing Hindus today
goes beyond religion and is a secular,progressive
law.
FACT
The reform towards the codification of Hindu laws had met
with stiff resistance both, from within the Hindu Law Com
mittee established on January 25,1941 under chairmanship
of B.N. Rau and from without.The opposition ranged from
President Dr.Rajendra Prasad, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad
the Congress President (1950), the RSS chief, M.S.Gollvalkar
including Shankaracharya of Sankeshwar Peeth who could
not tolerate an untouchable reforming Hindu society”. He
alleged that Ambedkar was trying to destroy Hinduism by
marrying a Brahmin girl. The other reasons for the opposi
tion were:
• The woman always gets a sizable share in the family
wealth by way ofjewellery and as dowry at the time of
her marriage;
• It will introduce a stranger into the family, i.e., the sonin-law, and this is very undesirable;
• It will lead to friction between the brother and the sis
ters;
• As her affections are transferred to her husband’s fam
ily it is not advisable to give her a share in her father’s
property.
Even the introduction of a clause outlawing the crime of
bigamy was strongly opposed even in some high courts12
e.g. in the Bombay High Court when Chagla was a Chief
Justice. The argument was that a son is an absolute neces
sity if a Hindu is to attain salvation and that therefore po
lygamy was integral part of Hinduism. One becomes po
lygamous in pursuit of a son and not for any other reason.
Secondly, only Hindus have been singled out for this dis
criminatory treatment,not Muslims who practice polygamy
However in 1952, the Congress, on winning the Elections
pushed the bill after diluting it considerably^ in lieu of the
progressive elements, to placate these conservatives. How
ever this led to Dr. Ambedkar resigning in protest. The Code
was enacted with four different piecemeal legislations, viz.,
• The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (1950)
• The Hindu Marriage Act (1955)
• The Hindu Succession Act (1955)
• The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (1956)
As for its secular nature, the four Acts are instead more
Hindu than Secular.12 Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956
for instance, conversion from Hinduism immediately pro
vides a ground for divorce for the other spouse. The ques
tion of reconciliation during the tendency of proceeding as
a step to avert divorce is of no avail and judicial separation
as an interim measure to enable the separated couples to
rethink their stand and come together is not available either.
FACTS against £Vl¥Tlf S
Difference in religion creates incompatibility and the statu
tory provision encouraging divorce is both anti-secular and
is also in derogation of Article 25
Aga in,under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act
one must be a Hindu to be able to .adopt and the person
capable of being adopted should also be a Hindu. Thus the
principle that persons belonging to two religions can live
together is anathema.
Under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act ceasing
to be a Hindu deprives either spouse to claim guardianship
over the children. The law of succession though it does not
deprive right of succession to a convert the children and
the descendants of the convert are denied the right to suc
ceed to the property of the Hindu relative unless such chil
dren or descendants are Hindu when succession opens.
In 1976 the Indian Succession Act till then compulsorily
applicable to ail those who voluntarily opted for the secular
marriage law or the Special Marriage Act was made wholly
inapplicable to the Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs
henceforth to be governed by the religion-based Hindu
Succession Act even if they married under the Special MdQ
riage Act. While in the same situation members ofthe other
communities would be still governed by the Indian Succes
sion Act. And, finally, to enact a law with a sticker, “Hindu”,
is hardly a secular move!
MYTH
By incorporating all the best elements from exist
ing personal laws the Uniform Civil Code will be a
model for ail communities to emulate.
FACT
As far as gender issues are concerned there are no existing
laws which are “best elements”. There may be laws which
are comparatively better but these are still based on glaring
inequalities between the sexes and cannot therefore form
the basis for an umbrella legislation, a Uniform Civil Code.
For instance, which existing family law of a community or
even the secular law would be the basis for equal laws on
inheritance?. Muslim women may have enhanced rights in
this area as compared with Hindu women under tlw
'mitakshra' system but they are still not equal with men/
No existing law deals with the problem of disinheritance of
the female heir through a will. Which law would apply or be
the basis for a law outlawing the crime of bigamy?. Pre* sently, the law is so weak that it is virtually impossible to
prove the crime, which is why there are so few convictions
in spite of the increase in bigamous relationship and mar
riages.
On the matter of divorce rights related issues of mainte
nance and custody of children are extremely weak. In this,
Christian women are even worse off since the Indian Di
vorce Act 1869 applicable to them discriminates on ground
of divorce. Adultery on its own is not a basis for divorce for
women although it is for men.
The so-called secular laws are also woefully inadequate.
Thus, the very framework of the “finest” of laws for a UCC
is severely limited. For example, the incidence of violence
September *95
Page 4
within the family against women has increased alarmingly
in all communities but there is no comprehensive legisla
tion to deal with it. There is increasing problem of child
abuse within the family and increasing incidence of deser
tion. In such cases there is no law to ensure that the prop
erty accumulated to the couple after marriage would be in
both their names. At present such property is invariably
claimed by the male as he is often the earning member.
Studies of the statutes of the Act reveal that the legal uni
formity leads to the sacrifice of women’s right by the dele
tion ofseveral local customs which granted rights to women.
MYTH
Enforcing monogamy through the enactment of
the Hindu Marriage Act abolished polygamy thus
preventing Hindu men to enter into polygamous
marriages by converting to Islam.
FACT
Hindu men do not commit the crime ofbigamy only through
their conversion to Islam. They mostly violate the Hindu
Mhw of monogamy itself and through other devious routes.
’"For instance,
• Through the custom of 'karewa' marriage (marrying a
widow to her late husband’s brother) practised among
the Haryanavis and Punjabi Jats with the aim of pre
venting the widow from inheriting her husband’s share
of the property. Often the brother chosen may be al
ready married;
® Since Hindu marriage law does not require all marriages
to be compulsorily registered, for most people a mar
riage is a marriage if the families concerned and their
relatives give the social seal of approval to them as a
married couple. A Hindu man may commit bigamy with
impunity (as many actually do) as long as his family
recognises his second marriage and his first wife lacks
the necessary power and other resources to “prove”
bigamy in the courts;
• Through the various loopholes in the law itself even
while remaining within the fold of Hinduism. A number
of such cases13 have come up for hearing in the vari
ous courts, viz.,
• In 1956 Bhaurao Lokhande married Indubai and 6 years
later in February 1962 married another woman Kamlabai
forcing Indubai to file a case of bigamy against him. On
being convicted Bhaurao appealed to the Supreme
Court. In the proceedings Indubai stated that Bhaurao’s
second marriage was according to a local customary
marriage, *gandharva'. The court on determining this
form of marriage wherein the two most essential pre
requisites for such a legitimate Brahminical Hindu mar
riage are (i) '‘vivaha home? (invocation before the sa
cred fire) and (ii) 'saptapadi' — concluded that a
Indubai failed to prove that these ceremonies had been
performed by Bhaurao and Kamalabai and thus the
marriage between them was invalid and Bhaurao was
acquitted.
FACTS against MYTHS
• In 1948 Suresh Chandra married Priya Bala as per Hindu
rites. On ill-treating her he forced her to escape to her
mother’s. In 1962 he married Sandhya Rani and Priya
Bala charged him with bigamy but he denied in court to
having married Priya Bala. He even stated that even if
he had married her, so long as she could not prove that
he and Sandhya Rani had had performed the two es
sential ceremonies, he could not be convicted. Ulti
mately, the Supreme Court on confirming that the two
ceremonies had not been performed acquitted him even
on Suresh Chandra’s admission of the second marriage.
A further random citation of some reported judgements14
during the intervening period of 30 years from Bhaurao
Lokhande in 1965 to Sarla Mudgal in 1995 shows the hol
lowness of the provision of monogamy, viz.,
• 1965,Jammu & Kashmir - Hindu law does not penalise
concubinages;
© 1969, Assam & Nagaland - Court acquits bigamous
husband:
© 1970, Mysore - Courts invalidates first marriage at
Tirupathi temple;
© 1972, Kerala - Nair marriage invalidated;
• 1973, Bombay High Court invalidates Neo-Buddhist
marriage;
• 1975, Calcutta High invalidates marriage under the secu
lar SMA ceremony;
• 1985, Bombay High Court invalidates first marriage
• 1989, Andhra Pradesh - marriages ceremonies of the
Kamas;
1990, Karnataka - lingayat marriage ceremony
invalidated
• 1992, Allahabad - Dalit
ceremony of Raidas _
invalidated
• 1995, Madras - pa
ternity of child
through second
marriage not
recognised.
WIFEI
The above illustrate that the
courts have upheld the Brah
minical rituals of ‘homa’
Aop'jUttxiMA.NUSHf No. 85 p7
'saptapadi' and ^kanyaddif on the basis of the first wife
failing to produce evidence of these two ceremonies. All
this makes the imposition of the Hindu law of monogamy a
farce.
MYTH
The recognition of her economic dependence, the
right to maintenance, which is legally available to
women is adequate to protect especially her eco
nomic interests and oompensate her for the contri
bution she makes to her family and society at large.
September a95
Page 5
FACT
For the amount of labour she provides by way of child
bearing, child-rearing, and domestic labour like cooking.
washing and running the home the maintenance that has
been made available to her is woefully inadequate and
unenforced. As researchers Gangoli and Solanki point out
(Tinies ofIndia, 27.9.95)
• Women have known to have received maintenance as
little as Rs.50/- for themselves and Rs.25/- for their mi
nor children under HAMA (as in a 1992 judgment of
the Bombay High Court in the case of Viswanath
Pundlik Chauhan vs Nirmala & others)
• The IDA applicable to Christian women holds that a
woman after divorce is entitled to an amount that
“shall in no case exceed one-fifth of the husband’s net
income”.
Above all women find it very difficult to secure these rights
speedly,without going through a lengthy battle. Even un
der the SMA while Section 125 has been communalised
especially after the Shah Banu controversy.
At any rate, maintenance can neither in principle nor in
practice adequately compensate women. Firstly, the very
basis ofa right to property, more specifically to matrimonial
property, is a recognition of a contribution to the acquisi
tion of property. It recognises that, but fora woman’s non
monetary contribution to the family, her husband would
not have been able to acquire the property.
The right to maintenance, however, is based on a recogni
tion of women’s economic dependency.lt is not an entitle
ment based on contribution, but rather, based on providing
for on economic need.15
Maintenance rights are also governed by Section 125 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C). However, this
right is qualified by these personal laws,thus restricting the
scope of a women’s entitlement to the same. For example:
• Section 25(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, pro
viding for permanent alimony and maintenance, allows
Facts Against Myths is a monthly
bulletin of factual information on
a number of development myths
and fallacies, etc, including infor
mation against alien development
models, paradigms and false con
cepts on caste, creed and gender.
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the Court to rescind the order of maintenance if it is
convinced that the wife has not remained chaste;
• Section 37 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and Sec
tion 40 of the Parsi Marriage & Divorce Act, 1936
provides the same:
• Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. states that the wife’s claim
for maintenance would be defeated if she lives in aduk- •
tery;
f
i
• The Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on
vorce Act. 1986. Section 125 has been made opiionSi
for a divorce Muslim women (though it continues^r'x; y.
apply to Muslim married women, daughter and1?otb>’> iy.
ers). This Act provides that the former husbancX^ to”
maintain the divorced woman during the period of
'iddaf up to 2 years from the date of the birth of their
children, after which the burden is shifted to her pater
nal relations.
All this only reveals that the purported objective of main
tenance is hardly realised.
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O
‘Agnes, F.’Thc Hidden Agenda Beneath The Rhetoric of Women’s Rights".
Towards Secular India. #1.Bombay. 1996
-Engineer, A.A "Uniform Civil Code: An Indian Perspective”. Centre For
the Study of Society & Secularism. August.Bombay 1995.
’Code & Conduct, Communalism Combat. # 8-9.1995
■'Kishwar, M.’’Stimulating Reform, Not Forcing It” Manushi, *89.New
Delhi 1996
’Uniform Civil Code, The Secularist, # 154, Pune, 1995
" Mahmood. T.”The Hold-back Factor”, The Secularist. #!54.Pune 1995
’Karat, B.”Uniformity vs Equality”, Frontline. November 17.1995
"Seervai, H.M. “Judiciary Oversteps its Briel”, The Secularist.
155.Pune.1995
‘'Uniform Civil Code or Gender Justice, Communalism Combat.
March.Bombay 1994
'“Kishwar, M .’’Codified Hindu Law", EPW,# 33,Bombay 1994
"Yasin. M "Hindu Code Bill & B.R.Ambedkar”. Towards Secular India.
# I. Bombay. 1996
’’Kannabiran. K.G. "Outlawing Oral Divorce”. EPW. # 25. Bombay. 1994
"Saumya. “Bigamous Marriages by Hindu Men’’,The Lawyers. No. 10-11.
Bombay 1995
'■‘Agnes, F.”Hindu Men, Monogamy & Uniform Civil Code”, EPW, # 50,
Bombay 1995
15 “Community of Properly Regime”. National Law School Journal. Na
tional Law School of India University. Bombay, 1993.
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