NARMADA PROJECT (SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
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RF_E_2_SUDHA
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECTS :
ARE THE CRITICS RIGHT ?
V A H I N I - A R C H
This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented in the Seminar on 'Major Issues of
Sardar Sarovar Project' organized by the Department of Economics and the Agro-Economic
Research Centre at Vallabh Vidyanagar, 7-8 March 1991
30 April 1991
- /
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT'S :
ARE THE CRITICS RIGHT ?
A storm rages over lhe Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP). Situated in the eye of the storm is the
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R). It began almost imperceptibly and in a fitful fashion 1 1
years ago in 1980. VAH1NI - ARCH initiated the struggle. The tribals were unorganized, too
stunned and dazed by the sudden and imminent threat of land acquisition to offer even a token
resistance to bulldozing tactics of the government. They were highly fearful of the government and
relied almost totally on the mercy of lhe Sarkar-Maibap. The Government displayed total
indifference and callousness towards the plights and concerns of the tribal oustees with a
customary arrogance and imperiousness. Little did they then realise that the small trickles of
resistance and protest will swell into a big torrent in course of time to threaten the Project. Our
urgent and impassioned plea then that if SSP was going to be lhe ’Lifeline’ of Gujarat and was
going to bring boon to the dry areas of Gujarat, why ruin lhe poor, helpless tribals, met polite but
dishonest nod from the politicians and top bureaucrats.
In 197.8 a highly placed politician had cockily blurted out when asked about the resettlement of lhe
oustees. "we don't have to move a finger. When the water rises, these people will lx
*, flushed out
like rats from their holes". While in 1984, another highly placed politician shaken by lhe rising
tide of resistance of the oustees became more cautious. In an apperent show of sympathy but
without really feeling it, he said, "when we are going to spend billions of rupees, why should we
hurt the tribals? To give to the tribals what is their due (Minimm 5 acres of land per family) is to
dispense with one foot of centipede".
The drastic change in words notwithstanding, there was little change in non-commitment to R&R
in SSP in 1984?
Through the perseverance and doggedness of VAHINI-ARCH, 19 villages of Gujarat located in
the inaccessible, hilly terrain stretching along 60 kms on the bank of river Narmada learnt to
organize themselves, to know about their rights, enshrined in the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal
(NWDT) award and the Loan Agreement with lhe World Bank (WB) and to fight for their rights
within the frame of law. A remote tribal area, sleepy and docile until now, rose to its feel by
strength of sheer will-power to walk to Kevadia Colony, the Project headquarters on 8lh March,
1984 in a massive show of defiance and in an act of solidarity which this area had never witnessed
before. The struggle then gathered a momentum. A humble petitioner had got himself transformed
into a defiant, if still vulnerable, rebel who dared to look straight into the eyes of a mighty Slate
and demand his proper share which lhe power, in an unguarded moment, granted him with no
intention whatsoever to honour it. Earlier R&R policy (G.R. of 11-6-1979) which was a truncated
version of NWDT award, a reflection of pettiness and short-sightedness of policy makers, lay
tattered and rejected by the oustees of Gujarat. A demand for new radical policy was now
irresistible - Minimum 5 acres of land of choice to each major son, to each 'encroacher'. The
struggle look various forms including the boycot of the Project Authority, a Rasta Roko to stop
work on rock fill dyke, a writ petition in the Gujarat High Court from where to the Supreme Court
of India, a massive international campaign to lobby with the WB with lhe active support and
sustained involvement of an international NGO, Oxfam (UK) and of Survival International (UK)
in lhe initial stages. For three years, the Government of Gujarat (GOG) fought back hard,
knowing fully well that it could not stop birth of the new R&R policy which we were fighting for
and which lhe WB was fully supporting. The GOG could take no more. The SSP had met a really
threatening resistance on the R&R front in Gujarat for the first lime. In December 1987, radically
new R&R policy was announced by the GOG fully in line with our demands. We endorsed it
publicly.
Meanwhile a movement centered on the R&R issue was spreading to Maharashtra villages and
slovH\ taking roots in the last months of 1985. demanding better deal in the R&R. In Madhya
Pradesh (MP), also there was some awakening and a little ground level activity all focusing on
R&R. A lew articles examining the environmental aspects of the Narmada Valley Project including
SSP had apeared in some English language journals. This was all. There was no visible linkage
then between the environmental issues and the R&R centered movement, still less visible was any
evidence that the R&R centered movement was about to adopt an environmental platform and
transform itself into a movement against SSP. Indeed as late as Nov.1987 in a memorandum
submitted jointly to the Chairman of the Narmada Control Authority (NCA) by the Maharashtra
based Narmada Dharangrast Samiti (NDS) and MP based Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti
(NGNS), who spearhead the movement against the SSP now, had put forward 38 demands
virtually all related to R&R only. At the end of the memorandum thev had ci ven a warning that if
before 15th Dec. 1987 a clear and definite decision was not taken on these demands then a
movement will be launched to act these demands fulfilled.
In June 1987. the Central Government's Department of Environment and Forest (DOE&F). was
forced to issue a clearance to SSP and NSP. A letter of clearance and DOE’s note to P.M.
regarding this clearance, sent before the clearance, was leaked out to a few chosen activists in N.
Delhi. This provided first opportunity to open up an environmental plane. Serious environmental
rumblings against SSP in N.Delhi and other cities begun but the activists in the field were still
larely concentrating on R&R or so it seemed. The unexpected announcement of December 1987
Policy with its radically different contents and structure took everyone by surprise. It exposed for
the first time the vulnerability of the GOG. The monolithic view of the World Bank, a from of the
international capitalism working at tandem with the State Government pursuing the interests of the
ruling classes, nurtured so assiduously by the radical activists, had received a severe jolt. A large
hiatus between the WB and the GOG was clearly revealed. The scene began to be transformed
rapidly. Environmental issues rushed to the forefront. The turning point (new R&R policy) was
so sudden that these activists had hardly any time and opportunity to make a smooth and plausible
shift from R&R focus to a new focus - No SSP. The published letters, notes of the lime clearly
show that this transition was clumsy, contrived and highly non-plausible. The struggle for better
R&R in Maharashtra and MP was transformed into the struggle against SSP. Stopping the SSP at
any cost became the objective. With that, R&R attained a new status - from the end to be achieved
it became a means to fight the SSP. R&R that was worth attaining and possible goal untill then got
metamorphosed into R&R that was impossible in principle.
History of R&R in India and Slate's usual approach and style in dealing with such problems has
been so dismal and discouraging that any worse-case scenario is immediately accepted. The
government's credibility is extremely low. This all pervasive pessimism -realistic as it is- allows
the activists such drastic transition of objectives and transformation of end to means smoothly and
imperceptibly. Hardly a question is asked, an eyebrow is raised.
This brief historical overview provides insight into a process in which at a certain stage a goal came
to be fixed as Rehabilitation is impossible, which is integral to the larger goal of "Stop SSP."
Once this radical transformation of end into means is understood, it provides a vantage point of
view to understand and analyse the pattern of ever-changing issues and shifting arguments
regarding R&R while the goal remains fixed: Impossible R&R.
R&R by GOG
Soon alter the December 1987 policy was declared and the movement in Maharashtra and MP
shifted to No dam - R&R is impossible - position in the middle of 1988, the criticism of R&R has
gone through several quite discernible phases.
Point - Counterpoint:
3
immediate arguments offered to substantiate this were: there wasn't enough land, not only in MP
and Maharashtra, but also in Gujarat. The new R&R policy was only a piece of paper, GOG had
no will and ability to implement the policy. The movement then drew heavily upon what had
happened, not only elsewhere in India, but also in Gujarat and in particular on what had happened
in SSP itself. If past is an important guide to what will happen in future this was a weighty
argument. Its impact was immediate and visible on others who were not directly involved but not
on the oustees of Gujarat. They could not afford to fall into the quagmire of this pessimism. They
had to give a hard and fair trial to the policy for which they had fought so long, so hard!
We reasoned and argued with the activists of the movement that oustees in Gujarat had in fact
succeeded in identifying the private lands of their choice and that in MP this was a clear possibility.
The counter-attack came in quick. "Poor and helpless oustees were being forced to roam and
wander about day in and day out with empty stomach in search of the land which was clearly a
responsibility of the government to find!" A bogey was raised that the oustees were forced to fix
the prices with the land owners in the Land Purchase Committee (LPC). This would only ruin the
oustees as they were no match to the land owners. It was further argued that land owners were
demanding exhorbitant prices. A demand of Rs.50,000 per acre was and has been repeatedly
quoted to prove the point.
To each of this point and others left out, there is a counter-point.
*
Identification of lands by oustees was primarily our move. This was initiated in pre
December 1987 days when the GOG was trying to stall our demand that minimum five acres of
land of choice should also include private lands by blandly maintaining that there wasn't enough
private land available for sale! The list of such private land available for sale was provided to the
WB expert just in the nick of the lime for him to successfully defeat the GOG's shortsighted and
mean strategy at a crucial meeting in New Delhi in September 1985. The identification and
selection of private lands by oustees, we believe, is the real exercise of choice. In the very early
days of implementation of the new R&R policy, there is a grain of truth in the claim that oustees
had to spend their resources to locate the private lands, but it is covered with a ton of exaggeration.
The stories of exhausted, depressed, hungry oustees returning home empty-handed at night bears
little relation to reality. Very soon, however, the oustees were being provided with vehicles to
move and view the land of their choice and by the end of 1988, six months afer the implementation
had begun in right earnest, the spontaneous offers to sell good lands in large chunks began to pour
in with Sardar Sarovar Nigam. 'This has surprised many people but this is no place to go into the
dynamics of land market in Gujarat and possibly in MP. Now the situation has changed beyond
recognition. Thousands of hectares of private agricultural land were offered for sale to Nigam
directly and most of these lands were approved by the oustees and bought and alloted to them by
the Nigam. However, even today, there are individual oustees who are identifying their own lands
of preference. Their cases are being brought to the LPC for fixing the prices and once the prices
are fixed, such lands are allotted to them. This must be viewed as exercise of free ano unfettered
choice by the oustees and not as an abdication of responsibility by the Government.
It is typical of the anti-dam critics to focus on difficulties and uncertainties of these first days of
transition to condemn the entire rehabilitation process long after the difficulties have been
surmounted and new healthy features have emerged in the evolving process. We will see again
and again that an evolving process is ignored and criticism is rivetted to a selected one or two
points in the process. This is puzzling. This puzzle disappears, however, if we recall that R&R is
not a problem to be solved but a mean to an end - stop the dam.
*
The Land Purchase Committee has been the focal point of severe criticism, most of which
is either misinformed, unfair or a product of deliberate neglect of facts. The oustees have never
been asked to bargain for the prices of the land either in LPC or outside. This has always been
done by the members of LPC themselves. Where is the question of the poor oustec entering into
4
bargain with 'wily' and 'crafty' landowners? The evolution of this institutional arrangement and
its true role has been deliberately misunderstood even by an expert of the WB, who was chiefly
responsible earlier (Sept. 85) in forcing the GOG to widen the scope of choice to include private
land. In April 1989, when he came again with the WB mission, he subjected us to torrents of
searching questions in a long and intense discussion we had on the nature, scope and actual
functioning of the LPC. He took copious notes of this discussion. Our hopes that he will provide
an authoritative account of the LPC were dashed when we saw his report, prepared on the same
day of our meeting, which however we saw after about ten months. He had totally ignored the
intense discussion he had with us and had simply repeated the uninformed charge of the antidam
critics. It is true that institutional arrangements like LPC are open to abuses of middlemen, touts,
etc., but the actual working of the LPC should be a test against which such plausible
apprehensions should be checked. The prices of lands of different qualities in different areas were
fixed in an open and frank manner right before the eyes and ears of at least a hundred observers,
oustees, members of LPC, officers and others. The LPC frequently went to day-long tours to
view the lands and check the claims made by the landowners in various areas from where large
offers of land had come. There was little scope for the middlemen and touts to influence all the
members of the LPC including us to steer the process of price fixing in the direction of their liking.
Once the price of selected, sizable land of an area, taluka was fixed in an open atmosphere of frank
bargaining, that became the price for the whole area and all the subsequent sellers of the area got
the same price, provided oustees selected their lands. One would have to invoke a giant
conspiracy of not only first group of land owners, but also of the subsequent sellers of land with
all (he members of LPC and the middlemen to maintain that the middlemen had a field day!
The average price of the land fixed by the LPC turned out to be around Rs. 13,000 per acre, far
below the much flaunted and feared price of Rs.50,000 per acre. This was the puce quoted for
Dabhoi land which is a prime quality land of about 4,000 acres with assured irrigation. The
ultimate price they got after two and half years of wrangling and arbitration of the Ex Chief Justice
of the Gujarat High Court Mr. B J Diwan was Rs.23,000 per acre, less than half the price they had
demanded. Again the same tendency of the anti-dam critics to pounce upon a selected point in the
early stage of evolving process, a point according to their calculation and strategic consideration is
a weak point in the whole process and to continue to hammer at that point only after a considerable
time has lapsed and the process has evolved further is revealed.
*
The anti-dam activists have persistently argued and the WB expert in 1989 has uncriticaly
supported them that villages are broken down into fragments because private lands are not availabe
in large - contiguous chunks. According to the WB expert even LPC is responsible for this!
This WB expert and even a noted supporter of the anti-dam movement Mr. B.D. Sharma have been
astute enough to record that tribal villages are not homogenous entities and their social units are
hemlets, not villages. Dr. Scudder has gone even further to say that cluster of their choice should
be the unit of resettlement. This cluster approach is what one observes in the dispersion one sees.
In many large sites where thousands of acres of contiguous or nearly contiguous lands were
available for R&R, what one observes is several clusters from several villages, not even the whole
hemlets have selected the land. One observes a mosaic of different no. of clusters from different
villages whose traditional neighbours may have chosen to go to different sites although the option
to settle at the same site was available to them. The mechanical approach of counting clusters of
displaced village is obviously an unfruitful, wrong and misleading exercise. The real question is
whether these clusters made a genuine choice to go where they did? We believe that in an
overwhelming number of cases except perhaps in case of pre-1987 R&R the answer is in
affirmative.
*
The issue of non-availability of land in Gujarat and elsewhere has received a very curious
treatment and has been a subject of serious distortions.
5
As soon as ’No Dam' became the objective of the movement, 'land is not available' became
transfixed in the minds of anti-dam critics. It almost became gospel truth to them. Even while the
LPC and its functioning was severely lampooned and the news of allotment of land of choice to the
oustees was received with open ridicule, the critics continued to maintain that the land was not
simply available.
Thus Baba Amte, in his now famous book, 'Cry, the Beloved Narmada', published in July 1989
when it was a public knowledge that more than 1,(X)() oustees including major sons, encroachers
and landless were being allotted 5 acres each of the land of choice, resorted to quoting an outdated
minutes of NCA meeting of June 3. 1988 to 'prove' his point that land for relocation of oustees is
not available even in Gujarat I!
The WB expert, in April 1989 meeting who was informed that more than 900 oustees were soon to
be given possession of the land, chose to ignore this information, like he did regarding LPC and
dispersal of oustees, and resorting to sheer technicality observed in his report that only 5 persons'
documentations were complete. (This report, like the NCA minutes and DOE notes, was
selectively leaked out to the anti-dam activists who naturally made huge propoganda capital out of
this report.)
Another supporter of the anti-dam movement, when confronted with these facts, reacted sharply to
say that all the documentation was a fraud and nobody was going to get any land! Such a rejection
of realitv!
J
While land has already been allotted to about 3000 oustee families and the remaining families are in
the process of allotment, some critics have sought to belittle this process involving oustees of all
the 19 villages of Gujarat as being a showpiece of rehabilitation of only 2-3 villages by employing
excessive resources.
In Maharahstra, at the time of writing this, many concerned and interested citizens, groups are still
being fed with the false information that virtually nobody in Gujarat has been alloted land
according to new R&R policy! At Ferkuva it soon became very obvious and clear that the oustees
of Maharashtra and MP were being deliberately kept in dark about the new R&R Policy in Gujarat
and its level and extent of implementation. So much for freedom of information!
Vijay Pranjape as late as in June 1990 in his book 'High Dams on Narmada' finally admits that
1718 families in Gujarat have been allotted agriculture land till February 1990. He proceeds,
however, to raise another problem, out of 11,850 families, land has been acquired for less than
15% of the oustees.' But this is a different problem which we will deal with later on.
*
While the denial of fact of availability and allotment of land in Gujarat to the oustees of
Gujarat and MP continued unabated, the critics like Baba Amte opening another front of attack do
not mind mixing the mistakes, blunders and malpractices of pre-1987 R&R process with that of
post December 1987 to malign the whole R&R process in Gujarat. Baba Amte writing in July
1989 (op cit) quotes a dated report to make a point that in 5 resettlement sites created around 1983
some oustees had received lands which carried encumberances of Bank debts incurred by the
original landowners. Now this was a fact and a scandal, but their encumberances were removed in
August 1988 and the matter was reported in National Newspapers, a full one year before Baba
wrote his book. This fact Baba either did not know or did not want to know becuase his objective
was to attack R&R to attack the dam!
This all pervasive denial of facts, of forcing facts to fit into pre-conceptions have led the anti-dam
critics to a queer and curious situation. It does not allow them to see an assertion of political will,
hitherto conspicuous by its absence, to work for the R&R in Gujarat. Curiously enough, the
critics have themselves argued repeatedly and forcefully that the new R&R policy is only a piece oi
6
paper, because the political will io implement it is absent! If there was any case of 'head I win, tail
You lose,' this is the case!
In an overenthusiasm to condemn the R&R in Gujarat by rejecting facts wholesale, the anti-dam
activists have also condemned and inadvertently undermined the struggle of oustees of Gujarat and
their judgment and ability to understand the problems and solve them.
R&R in Maharashtra: Impossible?
In Maharashtra, the issue of non-availability of land has taken even a more curious turn. We have
already refered above that in November 1987, just a month before Gujarat's new R&R policy of
Dec. 1987 was declared, NDS in Maharashtra and NGNS in MP had submitted to NCA a list of 38
demands related to R&R. One of the most crucial demands related to the release of denuded forest
land for the resettlement. Within months of submission of these demands, these organizations
changed their objective. No-dam became an objective and what was a goal untill Nov' 87 - R&R
became one of the means to achieve the final goal of No-dam.
The demand for release of forest land came in very handy to prove that R&R was impossible in
Maharashtra because land was not going to be available. The activists were fully convinced that
the DOE&F will not release the denuded forest land of Taloda for R&R, taking shelter behind the
Forest Conservation Act, 1980. The Environment Defence Fund (EDF), USA, which spearheads
the anti-SSP movement in North America supported this demand before the Congressional
Hearings in USA.
DOE&F, of course, having first leaked out to the selected activists of the movement in N. Delhi its
note to the P.M. in April 1987 followed by two letters of clearance (June 1987 and Sept.87) to
provide a major weapon to the movement, was fully in tune with the requirements of the movement
and would most willingly oblige. In fact the DOE&F had gone to the extent of putting in a
condition (No.vii) in its letter of Sept'87 (refered to’above): 'No forest land will be utilised for the
rehabilitation of oustees.' This was all very well in so far as the conservation of forest was
concerned, but in May 1985 the Government of India (GOI) with other three concerned states had
already entered into a Loan Agreement with the WB in which it was accepted by the GOI that it
would take all action necessary to release forest land reserved by the Forest (conservation) Act
1980 within the boundaries of all three states if required for the pupose of implementing the SSP
including the resettlement and rehabilitation program and plan. This is all very' clear and
unambiguous! Full 2 years after the Agreement was signed by GOI with the WB, the DOE&F
(GOI's own department) put such a precondition in its letter which is directly in conflict with what
GOI had committed before!
Due to the peculiarities of political dispensation then - nature of power equilibrium between the
Centre and the States - the Maharashtra Government also did not even forward the demand for the
release of denuded forest land of Taloda to the Central Government - DOE&F for quite some time.
The non-availability of land could legitimately be. claimed by the anti-dam movement. The state of
suspense continued even when the Janata rule1 was installed at the Centre in Nov. 1989. The
DOE&F headed by Ms. Maneka Gandhi continued to stall the demand for release of forest land.
In April - May 1989 had come the WB mission. Prof. Scudder, the WB expert, in his scathing
report of April 1989, cited three reasons for the unlikelihood of satisfactory' implementation of
R&R programme in SSP:
1.
2.
3.
The impasse between the GOM and the GOG.
The unwillingness of GOI to release forest land for R&R.
The unwillingness of NCA io play a strong oversight role
7
and had then proceeded to list 9 recommendations to overcome these problems.
Prof. Scudder who had also recommended permanent or temporary suspension of loan, had clearly
seen where a pan of the important problem was, for in his final repon of May 28 1989, he had this
to say:
"Since the passage of the Forest Conservation Act in 1980, the Department of Environment and
Forests has been unwilling to release denuded and degraded forest land for SSP oustees, even
though tribal people, for example, could play a major role in the rehabilitation of such lands.
Although it is stipulated in May 10, 1985 Agreement with the World Bank that GO1 will release
forest land if necessary, as recently as Dec 19, 1988 in the meeting of NCA R&R subgroup the
Additional Secretary of Environment and Forests reiterated the Department's opposition to
releasing forest land for oustee rehabilitation."
It was obvious for anyone, especially for the anti-dam activists, to see that the real, formidable,
material block to satisfy Prof Scudder's stringent conditions to achieve satisfactory R&R was his
second condition, i.e. release of Taloda forest land in Maharashtra.
In July 1989 the World Bank officials were 'gheraoed' in N. Delhi by the activists for among other
things and mainly for asking the denotification of Taloda forest lands’ The activists' hopes had
soared however because they had some 'inside' information that "the GOI (i.e. DOE&F) had
rejected the proposal, irrespective of the fact that it was a condition in the WB agreement". But
later they realised that the hope was premature. The DOE&F was, in fact, being forced to consider
the proposal. The activists who had so persistently and clamorously demanded this forest land and
who had argued so vehemently that because of the non availability of land, R&R in Maharashtra
was impossible (NDS Maharashtra had demanded this land at least five times before Dec.1987’.)
thought nothing of such extraordinary somersault. Completely oblivious to the paradox they were
in, the activists went on arguing that denotification of Taloda Forest land is not a solution because
either it is encroached upon or degraded to the point of being non-cultivable. They went even
further.: "Fifty to sixty thousand hectares of the SSP and 150000 hectares for NSP would be
required...Obviously no People's movement would agree to such a huge environmental disaster."
(No basis was given for arriving at such outrageously high figures. Only about 3000 Ha.was
demanded by GOM!)
The activists waited with a bated breath. The WB had set a limit of June 1990. In June 1990, the
Taloda forest land was released! On 31st July 1990 the same organization NDS, which had
demanded this land on innumerable occassions before Dec. 1987, submitted a memorandum to the
District Administration rejecting 2769 Ha. of forest land identified for the rehabilitation of the
oustees because 'the land was already used by 30-40 local tribal villages’. NDS went even further
than what it and the other activists had done in N. Delhi in July 1989. "It is reprehensible that the
Central government agreed to release forest land in Maharashtra for rehabilitation in clear violation
of the conditional clearance given to the SSP which clearly stated that no forest land can be used
for resettlement purposes..., the clearance is then tentamount to selling of India's ecological and
social future at t le behest of a foreign 'agency'.
Apart from the fact that the DOE&F had clearly crossed the boundary when such a condition was
laid down in the first place, this episode is illustrative of the no holds barred technique adopted by
the No-dam strategists. We now quote from the memorandum of NDS which it had submitted to
the GOM in April 1986.
"For the oustees to be resettled in Maharashtra, if no other land is likely to be available in large
quantity (to be able to settle them as village-units, as per the principle agreed to in the WB
Agreement) forest land available in the near by talukas (near the present settlements) Akkalkuva.
Taloda. and Sahada should be released for the resettlement purpose. This should be inspite of the
8
Forest Conservation Act 1980, as is agreed to in WB Agreement.
As late as June 1987 (but pre Dec. 1987) Medha Patkar of NDS read paper at a Seminar on
Narmada Valley Project in Bombay. We quote: "The only alternative left is to buy private lands at
a very high cost
or to release large chunks of denuded forest land which the Centre is
reluctant to do, taking a rigid view of Forest Conservation Act 1980. The tribal - forest linkage too
is not viewed seriously or not considered in planning alternatives, whatever may be the state policy
in the seventh five year plan!’
Contradiction between the first and the later two sets of statements, separated by 3-4 years but
juxtaposed here tor the readers to see for themselves, is fatal. No further comments are necessary.
As to the encroachment by local people in Taloda land we have checked from various sources that
no encroachment worth the name has occured in these lands. In Nov. 1990, four months after the
NDS memorandum, the World Bank mission visited this area. They reported theie is a great deal
of misinformation among oustees in Maharashtra about the extent of encroachment in Taloda and
the hostility of villages around it. Essentially there is no encroachment and no hositility of
surrounding villages was evident - reported the WB mission.
In 1st April 1991 issue of Gujarati magazine 'Bhoomi-putra' Medha Patkar, the leader of NDS,
argued that 60 tribal families living on this land were forcibly evicted by police in last two months
i.e. in Jan-Feb. 1991.
In a previous paragraph, we have reported that in Nov. 1990 the WB mission had seen no
encroachment and reported so. In April 1991 Medha Patkar reports that in Jan-Feb. 1991 the
encroachers (60 odd families in 2600 ha of land) were forcibly evicted!
>
Obviously when in April 1986, June 1987 and Nov. 1987 the activists in Maharashtra were
demanding forest land the goal probably was proper R&R. In a changed context of post 1987
period when the goal was shifted to 'No dam' and R&R in order to serve as a means to this end
had to be rendered impossible, the forest land became a usefull instrument to fight the dam. Then
in June of 1990 suddenly the forest land was released and latent contradiction of'head I win, tail
you lose’ came to surface again when the World Bank officials were 'gheraoed' in N.Delhi in July
1989 and when in July 1990, the NDS in its memorandum to District Officer Dhule branded the
WB Agreement so visciously, renounced its own demand and reversed its verdict on DOE&F
without balling an eyelid!
Madhya Pradesh: A Conundrum of R&R?
Now we are reaching the hard core of R&R imbroglio. Extrapolating from the figures of 19
villages of Gujarat, the critics have projected for 36 villages of Maharashtra and 193 villages of MP
that 90% of the oustees obviously and logically belong to these two states and M.P., because of
the sheer numbers, takes a lion's share. The argument is so intutively appealing and persuasive
that practically everyone has accepted this projection.
*
Based on such projection, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) has put up a claim that not
less than 50,000 hectares of land will be required for the resettlement of SSP oustees, which
implies that about 45000 hectares will be needed for about 22000 families of MP and Maharashtra.
No source for this information is cited by the NBA.
*
Vijay Paranjpe in his book (High Dams on the Narmada) claims that even high officers of
the GOMP have accepted that about 24(X)0 hectares of land will be required for the R&R of MP
oustees. 1le derives his information from Alvares and Billory (Damning the Narmada. 1988. Page
77.)
9
When we checked this source, to our great surprise and even dismay, we found out that whereas
the figure of 24000 hec. is quoted correctly, this figure was mentioned by S.C. Verma in the
context of the R&R of NSP and not SSP. There is no scope of misunderstanding here, because
Paranjpe unambigiously writes about SSP while the other two are discussing R&R of NSP with
Shri Verma. But Paranjpe's purpose is served. The huge magnitude of the problem of R&R
(SSP) in MP is made apperant and even visible.
*
Other leading activists -more careful and cautious- have altogether avoided the number
quoting, but have adopted the less risky and much more readily acceptable argument from
extrapolation, (i.e. 90% oustees in MP and Maharashtra.) And it has stuck, implying that R&R is
impossible.
GOMP, far from conceding such figures was busy analysing the base line information it already
possessed. The information it came out with in early 1989 was disquietening, if not so dramatic as
the release of forest land in Maharashtra, for the anti dam activists. The basic force of M.P.'s
revelation is that in as many as 116 out of 193 villages in M.P., very little agricultural land will get
submerged (less than 20 hec. in each village.) and only in 77 villages, more than 20 hec. of
agricultural land will be submerged. The devastating effect of this simple revelation is obvious.
The argument from extrapolation - 90% of oustees in M.P., Maharashtra - simply collapses. Only
about 6 to 7 thousand hec. out of about 50,000 hec. of agricultural land in these villages will be
submerged, (about 13%) Primafacie the case of massive displacement in MP does not stand.
Only Vijay Paranjpe amongst all the activists has acknowledged this fact in his book. But he too
merely mentions it. He neither questions the authenticity of the analysis, nor does he acknowledge
the obvious significance of this on the quantum of displacement in M.P. Indeed not only he more
or less skips this vital information but ignoring it, he continues to maintain later on in the same
book that the total number of oustee families in SSP, who have to be alloted alternative land is
11850.
This has a direct bearing on the question of land requirement for R&R of SSP oustees and the
availability/non availability of land and therefore of the highy surcharged slogan of impossible
R&R.
We have done our own analysis of the basic village wise data, prepared by GOMP, which amongst
other information gives the basic details regarding land and house submergence for each of the 193
villages. This basic data is widely available including to the anti-dam activists. The table below
gives the salient findings:
10
TABLE
Pattern of Agricultural Land and House Submergence in 193 villages of MP (SSP)
Village categories
based on % Agri.
land going under
submergence.
1.
No. of
villages.
Sub.Ag.
land
Hec.
3.
%
houses
Sub.
Total
land
Hec.
%
land
Sub.
Sub.
houses
No.
Total
houses
No.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
0%
34
0
5949
0.0
1870
2983
62.6
1 - 5 %
52
300
16000
1.8
4247
6377
66.6
5 - 10%
26
633
8676
7.6
2134
3191
66.8
10-25%
33
1770
10605
16.6
3883
4742
81.8
25 - 35%
8
668
2256
29.6
659
876
75.2
35 - 50%
12
1189
2828
42.0
997
1097
90.8
50 - 75%
15
1541
2582
59.7
1367
1456
93.8
75- !()()%’
13
724
841
86.0
395
509
77.6
193
6855
49937
13.7
15552
21231
73.3
TOTAL
*
Out of total of 49937 Hec. of Agricultural land in these 193 villages only 6855 Hec.
(13.7%) will be submerged. Whereas out of total 21231 houses 15552 (73.3%) will be
submerged. This figure includes houses that would be affected by back water effect, i.e. the
houses situated between 455 and 460 R.L.
*
In 34 villages no land submergence will occur, but 1870 out of total 2983 (62.6%) houses
will be submerged.
*
In 78 villages (1 - 10% category) 963 Hec out of total 24876 (3.8%) will be submerged.
As to the hotises 6381 out of 9568 (66.7%) will be submerged.
*
In the next category (10 - 25%) of 33 villages land submergence is 16.6% whereas house
submergence is as large as 81.8%.
*
Pattern continues in the 20 villages of next two categories.
*
Only in 28 villages (last 2 categories of +50%) we find that 2265 Hec. out of total 3423
Hec. (66%) will be submerged and 1762 out of 1965 (89.6%) houses will be submerged.
The findings are striking, startling and even counter intuitive. The most outstanding feature is that
a very high proportion of houses is going to be submerged and contrary to the common sense
'/
includes 7 forest villages, for which, as the details of total agricultural land were not
available, it has been assumed here that 1 (X)% lands in these villages are submerged.
11
expectation the land submergence is very modest, if not low. (ony 13.7% of total, i.e. 6800 Ha.
out of about 50000 Ha.)
This somewhat unexpected submergence pattern of houses and agricultural land is because of the
fact that the river bed is a deep gorge. As a result, the reservoir of SSP is a long, narrow but deep
trough. As we go further upstream only, the houses on the river bank are affected, agricultural
lands which are further away from the bank are spared. Therefore we see this peculiar pattern of
more houses and relatively less land getting affected.
This peculiar submergence pattern has obvious implications for the R&R. Total number of
families affected is indeed very high - about 15(X)() or more. But an overwhelming proportion of
them would loose their houses only. They need to be relocated, no doubt. But all that will have to
be done will be to get their houses shifted to a higher plane in the same village where their lands arc
located unsubmerged. Their main problem its to reconstruct so many houses and not that of non
availability of alternative land. This would mean that most of the affected families would be living
near the edge of the reservoir, after submergence. This would help in mitigating, to a large extent.
the problems of landless labourers, fishermen, boat-men etc, whose number in M.P. though
unknown is likely to be significant. A big move is already on to develop fishieries in SSP
reservoir. The affected fishermen and landless must be given proper legal fishing rights and they
must be directly linked to market outlets so that they are not al the mercy of middlemen or
government machinery for marketting their catch. Also most of the submerging lands (including
the lands of river bank and present dwellings) in these villages will open up for draw-down
cultivation as the water level begins to fall in late monsoon, through winter and summer. The legal
rights for draw-down cultivation must also be given to these land ess families who are affected. If
these entitlements are legally given to these categories of people now, before powerful vested
interests move in, this will go a long way to improve their standard of living.
The number of families who have to be given alternative land is bound to be muc h less than the
figure of 11850 quoted by Vijay Paranjpe as the number of families affected by land submergence
in M.P. would naturally be quite low, compared to the total affected families. GOG, basing its
analysis on the GOMP data, gives a figure of 2100 families out of about 15000 families in these
villages who will be substantially affected by land submergence. This may or may not be an
accurate figure. Issue is not, however, that of exact number but that of a sense of proportion and
of the peculiar pattern of submergence. Those who are loosing substantially in terms of land are
already making a silent move towards Gujarat. Of the 28 villages in which more than 50% of the
total land is submerging, oustees of 7 villages have already viewed and selected lands in Gujarat,
the din and dust of Ferkuva notwithstanding. As the process moves ahead, the true facts of R&R
in Gujarat reach the affected people, inspite of the movement's effort to black out the information
from them, and the fact of land availability is more widely known, more and more people from the
really affected villages will take the next step.
R&R efforts in Gujarat thus fall in a proper perspective and the attempts to show them to be
insignificant by Dr. Scudder or Prof. Vijay Paranjpe do not stand scrutiny as the villagewise land
submergence pattern obviously has a very different tale to tell!
R&R is Impossible: Shifting of Ground
With the argumenmt of non-availability of land becoming increasingly untenable in Gujarat and
Maharashtra and faced with the fact that extent of human displacement in MP had shrunken, the
argument is fast losing its potency and relevance. The protagonists of 'R&R is impossible' are
fading the prospects that 'R&R might be possible after all!' The anti-dam movement has now
come up wih a new strategy. Who is oustee? How is he to be defined ? They have started raising
such basic questions, all of a sudden sometime from around middle of 1990 (Say June 1990.) By
making out a case that the definition of the oustee is very restrictive and inappropriate and by
12
widening its scope they have sought to raise the number of oustees!. Their list of oustees now
includes those who are losing their lands in the canal network of SSP, the tribals of the proposed
Shoolpaneshwar Sanctury and those who are going to be affected by compensatory afforestation
etc. In the whole critical literature of Rehabilitation of displaced persons in irrigation projects
beginning with Goldsmith's famous volumes on Big Dams, one does not see these categories of
people included as oustees. And why look into the general literature? Even the overwhelming
proportion of existing literature published by the anti-dam movement does not, untill one time
point, even mention these categories of people to be included as oustees!! Let us reemphasise a
point of time when these latest additions were effected by unilaterally changing the definition of
oustees!
Only after June 1990 or thereabout when the forest land for the Maharashtra oustees was released
by the Central Government one sees this new definition of oustees and a new set of oustees
making their sudden appearance. Almost all the major publications of anti-dam movement2
published before June 1990 do not even mention these categories of oustees, whereas after that one
suddenly finds these categories.3 Vijay Paranjpe provides the best evidence of this rapid switch
around one time point in his two closely related publications, one before June 1990 in Sept 1989
and another in June 1990. The first one 'The Narmada Valley Project - A Holistic Evaluation of
the Sardar Sarovar and Indira (Narmada) Sagar Dams', Intach - New Delhi, Sept. 1989 which is in
fact the draft - an unabridged prepublication release of the second book, 'High Dams on the
Narmada: A Holistic analysis of river valley projects', Intach - New Delhi, June 1990. The first
(Sept. 1989) does not even mention the category of canal oustees while the second (June 1990) has
a whole section on it. The fact of displacement by canal system must have been known from the
very begining, but it is made into a big issue only after June 1990! Paranjpe even gives a figure of
80000 without giving any supporting evidence!
One can not but get struck by such a well differentiated clustering of omissions and commissions
of specific issues so sharply located around one point in time (when a significant event from R&R
point of view took place.)! Coincidence? Hardly!
A yet another insight into the anti-dam strategists' thinking to turn R&R into a weapon - a means to beat the dam. Implications of this well-planned and well-executed strategy for fair and humane
R&R not only in SSP but anywhere in India in future are horrendous and frightening. Not only an
opportunity, even if slender and tenons to begin with, to get a R&R Progamme as reasonable as
can be to be implemented is thrown away so callously and so coolly! Even more, R&R is turned
into a potent weapon, without regards to human lives involved, to achieve a 'higher' objective of
'No dam'! The triumph of 'end justifies the means' is total!.
We do not delve into deeper processes and finer teasing of the time frame to reject or ignore the
case, if any, of human plight arising because of SSP. Our idea is to show, to what arT
extraordinary length, the anti-dam activists will go, repeatedly and relentlessly as we have shown,
to use R&R as a weapon - a means to an end. If the problem is there, it must be recognised.
2/
'The Narmada Valley Project - A Critique' by Kalpavriksh, April 1988, 'Sardar
Sarovar - Vikas Ki Vinash' (Marathi) by Medha Patkar, November 1988, 'Narmada Yojna: Kona
Mate? Kona Bhoge?' (Gujarati) by Girish Patel 1988, 'Cry, the Beloved Narmada' by Baba Amte,
July 1989, 'Sardar Sarovar Narmada - Open Letter to Sanai Mehta' by Medha Patkar in the
Economic Times, Mid-Week review, September 1989, 'Sardar Sarovar Controversy - are the
Critics Right?' Buisness India, October - November 1989.
3/
'Sardar Sarovar project - An Economic, Environmental and Human Disaster' by
Narmada Bachao Andolan, Narmada ki Ghati men ab Ladaj Jari Hai' Dhule Jille Narmada
Dharangrast Sahayak Samiti, July 1990.
13
acknowledged and dealt with as such.
A huge network of canals is going to hit an unknown number of small and marginal farmers very
adversely. This human problem must be assessed properly and a solution to mitigate this problem
must be given a proper and timely consideration. While the Nigam - may not react favourably to
the demand put forward by motivated activists to treat them as project oustees and give them all the
benefits of R&R programme, it is equally unacceptable and unbecoming of the Nigam to take
shelter behind the technicalities of Land Acqusition Act and NWDT Award. It is well known that
relatively well-off and organized fanners losing land in canals are successfully getting more
compensation by taking recourse to litigation. The Nigam must and will have to come up with a
better deal than that at present.
Regarding the tribals in the Sanctuary area, first of all there is not going to be any displacement of
any person in these villages and secondly VAHINI - ARCH and the tribals of the affected villages
are actively opposing the very idea of the Sanctuary as proposed so far. Where is the question of
R&R when there is not going to be any displacement? At the same time we do acknowledge that
there is a problem of wildlife and forest preservation in this area. A sensible way out of this
delicate dilemma has to be found out. Fortunately the Nigam and the WB have initiated the
process, keeping the tribal interest in the centre.
We started the story with the struggle we had to undertake against the GOG. We have described.
if harshly but certainly not unfairly, the bureaucracy's style and method in dealing with such
sensitive and delicate issues like R&R of the tribals. The situation in Gujarat in last three years has
gone through a sea-change largley because of the continuing pressure from developing activism
and growing awareness at the grassroot level in Gujarat, pressure from WB and also because of
willingness and ability of the strategically placed individuals in politics and bureaucracy to see the
situation in broader perspective and in a larger time frame than the politicians and senior
bureaucrats are credited with. Between pre-1987 period and post 1987 period, the most
outstanding difference is to be seen in the area of political will. This, we have discussed above.
This, however, still leaves large gaps in the capabilities and functioning of administrative
apparatus. Fatiguing delays, petty-minded dilations, petty corruptions, sheer apathy and
incompetence, which are the hallmarks of state apparatus in India and the ills which afflict the
larger system, affect its sub-system also i.e. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited (SSNNL).
This is an improtant problem to be solved as well as one can and not a cause or an excuse to reject
the Project, because then logically speaking practically everything must be rejected, stopped.
Prof. Scudder, the WB consultant, who wrote a scathing report in April 1989 for all his faults, can
not be faulted for pointing out that if the GOG had taken the promise it had made to the GOMP in
1982-83 seriously and acted on it, the fund of good-will it would have created in MP villages,
would have been great. The GOG thought of nothing in discarding the promise and losing the
opportunity to build the good-will. Obviously, the GOG did not act in the best interests of the
SSP. One could have thought that the government must have learnt its lessons painfully, but
apparently not. In the post December 1987 period, a group of Maharashtra oustees had shown
their willingness to resettle in Gujarat, the lands were shown and approved by the oustees. The
Maharashtra administration provided the authentic lists and cleared a 1 the administrative hitches for
the allotment of these lands and for some inexplicable and unscrutinizable reasons, this was not
done by the Nigam for a long lime. Only recently this was done. One can quote many more
examples to substantiate the contention that old habits die hard. We believe there there is no room
for complacency, let alone smugness and euphoria, that all is well with the R&R and with the
bureaucracy. But then it must also be recognised that things are moving - even if haltingly and in
the right direction.
If the SSP is not indeed a planned disaster, and if R&R is not to be used as a means to fight the
SSP. but to be treated with repsect as an end in itself and if the ground level reality regarding the
14
state administration being what it is, the implementation of the R&R programme calls for an
objective, fair and continuous watch-dogging. Critical feedbacks and correctives are necessary, if
reasonably good quality of R&R is to be achieved. But a much more serious and perhaps a lethal
threat to inherently delicate and fragile R&R Programme arises from the radical critics of R&R or
still belter to say from those strategists who have no qualms to turn R&R into a weapon - a means
to some 'lofty' end.
VAHINI - ARCH
MANGROL, Tai, Rajpipla.
Gujarat. Pin 393150
30 April 1991.
Open Letter To V.C.Shukla, Mater Resources Minister
Narmada Dam- Tribals the Sacrificial Lambs
A succession of Congress(I) and BJP govts
*
in Madhya
Pradesh have succumbed to political pressure and the lure
of money in the fast developing tragedy for the people of
M.P. in the shape of the Narmada dam. They have been aided
and abetted by the partisan actions of the various govts.
at the Centre as well as by the World Bank. In the 1950’s
a similar attempt was made by Punjab to bully Himachal Pra
desh over the Pong dam, with the help of the Central govt.
and the World Bank; an attempt which was fortunately foiled
in time to save the fertile and beautiful Sundernagar valley
in H.P. from being inundated. As Gujerat is doing in the case
of the Narmada dam, there Runjab had planned to sacrifice
the fertile lands and people of the valley under the back-
waiters of the Pong dam, in order to generate more power for
the Punjab grid.
In the Narmada dam, there could be fevz worse examples of an
elected govt<
sacrificing the interests of its own state
and peoples at the altar of greed and strangely more for the
benefit of another state! Especially, when the re were less
r
harmful alternatives available for achieving more or even
better ends. This was nothing short of criminal! An exercise
is now supposed to be under way to cover up the crime but
not to undo its consequences. The cry is to save the oustees
of
only. What about the losss in perpetuity nature’s bounty
which is mainly land that cannot be re-created! There seems
to be no indication of rethinking of the suitability of the
Narmada dam and its long term impact on the fortunes of M.P.
and its peoples. At long last wisdom has dawned on the World
Bank which has washed its hands off this ill-conceived project
but the M.P. govt, is pursuing the same suicidal course.
Power generation, to benefit industries in Gujerat, seems
to have been the primary reason for opting for the high level
Narmada dam on the border with Gujerat, instead of series of a
medium or low level dams spread over Narmada valley, which would
have benefitted M.P. more than Gujerat and would perhaps yield
more power and irrigation jointly and displace much fewer people
than the Narmada dam. Technology for generating power from low
dams has now advanced much to discount the importance given to
high dams in the past for this purpose.
One other objection which is often voiced against a series
of low level dams is the difficulty of finding suitable sites
for impermeable foundations and consequent seepage. But even
this objection does not hold good, because seepage from one dam
would be trapped by the dam or dams lower down. The Narmada
valley is fortunate in having several rock outcrops suitable for
dam foundations, much more than in Rajasthan, where the system
of gravity earth filled dams in tandem has been successfully in
vogue since ages.
Let no further work be done on the Narmada dam until a detailed
review is made by technocrats of 14.P., without interference or
"assistance" from Gugerat or the World Bank. A comparison should
be made between the relative merits of having the Narmada dam
vis-a-vis more than one low level dam. It should be comprehensive
and include statistics to show: area likely to be submerged
permanently, number of outstees, area irrigated, power generated.
Fiscal and time of completion considerations should come in last
because these are variable,although the history of large and
small pfojects in this country shows that the larger a single
work the longer the delays and the greater the increase in cost.
Therefore, here also the Narmada dam suffers in comparison with
a series of smaller dams. Likewise,the gestation period for
larger dams is much more; consequently the benfits more delayed.
MORSE-BERGER REVIEW OF SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECTS:
-A Counterview
In March 1991, the World Bank asked Mr. Bradford Morse to review the performance regarding resettlement
and rehabilitation :'R&R) of the oustees and environmental safe)cards in the Sardar Sarovar Project
(SSP). This was an unprecedented move by the World Bank, which had clearly yielded to the campaign
built up by some Northern NGOs against the SSP The critique developed by the anti-dam movement
was seriously flawed. There was little reason for the Bank to appoint such a high level inquiry commission,
but many NGOs like ARCH-VAHINI critically supporting the SSP welcomed the decision. We were primarily
guided by the fact that Mr. Morse, an ex-Administrator, UNDP and his Deputy Mr. Thomas Berger, an
ex-High Court Judge of Canada were highly reputed individuals and held in high esteem by international
community for their robustness, experience and knowledge. We were sure that they will investigate and
study the crucial issues thoroughly and with an objectivity the issues deserved. In the event, the MorseBerger Review has completely negated such reasonable and sensible expectations.
In June 1992, when Morse-Berger Report was published, it provoked an instant protest in Gujarat. The
denunciation and condemnation of the Report was immediate, swift, widespread and even impulsive. We
were not so sure and declined to fall in line. We studied the bulky, nearly 400 page long Report as
thoroughly as possible for the next six months. We also studied most of the major documents they have
cited in their Report. We were surprised and shocked to learn that the Report suffers from grave deficiencies.
Almost all major conclusions, which dramatically find their place in the Letter to the World Bank President
and in the last chapter * Findings and Recommendations’ of the Report, are not supported by the facts
they have amassed in the text of the other chapters or they don’t follow from the premise. At crucial
places their facts are wrong, although there is ample evidence that they had correct facts at their disposal.
The Report is littered with serious methodological errors. The ambiguities abound. The ultimate casualty
is clarity, objectivity and the truth.
In a short space this article provides, it is not possible to take up all the issues arising from the Report,
nor is it possible to describe in detail the finer aspects of their faulty reasoning, flawed logic and distortions
of the facts. We deal only with those issues which have influenced major international NGOs and the
Executive Directors of the Bank Needless to say that the Report deserves a thorough-going and detailed
public scrutiny of all the issues - major and minor - so that an unbridgeable gap between the expectations
that were generated by the highly reputed, credible and respected team of Mr. Morse and Mr. Berger
and their actual performance can seen by all1.
I ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES:
1. Environmental Clearance and Pari-Passu Approach to Compliance of Conditionalities:
Morse-Berger have made a big issue that environmental clearance given by the Government of India’s
Department of Environment and Forests (DOE&F) providing for the environment impact studies and action
programs to be carried out pari-passu with the construction work was a big mistake and that it has failed.
Even some Executive Directors of the Bank have accepted this major indictment.
The detailed examination of their argument in the relevant chapter dealing with the clearance and
compliance reveals that from February 1983 when the Project went to DOE&F for clearance until June
1987 when the environmental clearance was given, even the DOE&F was struggling to come to grips with
the difficult issues of environmental impact as was evident by the changing guidelines over the period.
Morse-Berger, while referring to the first guideline that was in operation in 1983, fail to give even the exact
date of the guideline, they merely assert that the original application submitted by the Government of
1 a. Issues like pari-passu approach in environment clearance, hydrology, R&R in the three states are discussed in detail in
•Morse-Berger Review: A Search for Truth?’
b. Another important issue of adoption of incremental strategy in R&R by the Bank is thoroughly discussed in another
doccument to be printed soon. (Summarized argument of this issue is given in this article.)
Gujarat failed to meet the guideline requirements. Moreover they do not say in what precise way it failed
to do so. Morse-Berger team was shown by us the series of documents prepared by the DOE&F during
this crucial phase revealing how the DOE&F was itself playing mischief with the clearance. This had a
direct bearing not only on environmental clearance but also on the R&R of the tribal oustees and yet
they chose to ignore the import of these documents in their assessment. In the context of evolving
environmental consciousness in the DOE&F, it was inevitable that the Project could not be held up until
the DOE&F gained full insight and competence in the issues. As such, the Project was held up for four
long years apparently without adequate reason and logic. Morse-Berger failed to objectively assess the
happenings in this phase and to see that-Pa/V-passu approach was inevitable. Characteristically, they have
instead turned round and castigated the government for adopting and the Bank for agreeing to the
Pari-passu approach.
As to their assessment of the compliance with the conditions of the clearance, the deficiencies of their
approach, method and sifting of crucial evidence are even more glaring. They report rivalry between
the Narmada Control Authority (NCA) which is to monitor and oversee the compliance of the Project
Authorities with the provisions of decisions of Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT) and the DOE&F
as to who was to judge and assess the compliance. Then they reproduce a summary of the compliance
report prepared by the DOE&F in December 1991. They also report that the NCA maintained that despite
some slippage the program was on track and would be completed Pari-passu with the Project. Having
juxtaposed two positions, Morse-Berger do not give their own assessment of the conflicting positions and
leave at that, but clearly implying that they accept the DOE&F Summary without again revealing their
assessment as to the degree of failure of compliance and its significance to the Pari-passu clause. From
the overall context, there is no mistaking that for Morse-Berger, this is an evidence of failure of compliance
with Pari-passu position. Then they proceed to describe second major evidence of non-compliance. This
time the source of their evidence is the NCA itself. They quote from the minutes of the 38th NCA meeting
held in early 1991 wherein the Chairman of the NCA is quoted to say that major part of the environmental
safeguard measures were not on going as per schedule. On examination of the relevant part of the
minutes, one learns that the quoted remark of the Chairman is not there! The quotation apart, the Chairman
never said anything even remotely connected to what is purported to be said by him. Not only this, if
something resembling to this was said at all, the speaker was Secretary of DOE&F. What could be the
reason and purpose of Morse-Berger to attribute wrongly to the Chairman of the NCA the remark actually
made by the Secretary of DOE&F?
These two evidences, both in effect derived from one party to the dispute, constitute their only material
evidence to prove non- compliance. They had access to another major source of information, in fact,
more appropriate and in the circumstances the best possible source to assess the compliance pari-passu
with the construction work - the minutes of the Environment Sub Group (ESG), which is the special group
created in the June 1987 clearance letter to monitor the compliance of stipulated conditions. While- they
are not averse to citing the minutes of the ESG meetings elsewhere in their Report, they seem to be shy
of using ESG minutes to assess for themselves the compliance.
■»: I
Their major conclusions, which they rub repeatedly in their ‘Findings and Recommendations’ and ‘Letter
to the President’ that Pari-passu approach to begin with was a mistake and that it failed in practice, are
based on distortions, selectivity, unreasonable and biased selection of the information and significant
omissions of other sources of information. They are seriously marred. Not satisfied with this questionable
exercise, they go on to charge the Bank with gross delinquency with regard to the compliance.
2. Hydrology
Having thus ‘established’ non-compliance with conditions of clearance, they then move on to what they
consider to be an over- arching issue - hydrology. Hydrology is not part of the terms of reference given
to them, they examined it nonetheless, because they felt that there are serious questions raised about
the available quantum of water in Narmada and this is the mother of all the environmental impacts.
From their consideration of the hydrology, they reached a momentous conclusion which has now
become famous throughout the world that 'there is good reason to believe that the Projects will not
perform as planned". Having raised the Issue of available quantum of water one expects that Morse-Berger
will provide a closely- argued critique of the NWDT which has In its decision stated that 75 per cent
dependable quantum of water at the site of SSP is 27 MAF (million acre feet). But they disappoint. At
three places in the text, theyhave beaten a retreat and declared that it Is neither their purpose, nor their
2
responsibility to resolve the issue of 75 per cent dependable water. And then very blandly, without giving
any evidence and arguments, they assert that NWDT's assessment appeared to be unfounded or
questionable and that the assumption of the NWDT award may not hoi-1 in future. A very vague reference
is made to an independent hydrologist they had hired. Even his/her name is not given, nor his/her findings
and assessments are described or discussed vis-a-vis the findings reported by the country’s apex body
- the Central Water Commission. And yet, in the Letter to the President, they argue with assurance that
they had found discrepancies in basic hydrological information and they had done their own analysis and
reached their famous conclusion that the Projects will not perform as planned.
The main issue is not that they strayed into hydrology which was well beyond the TORs. The issue is
they stryaed in; found little substance to refute the NWDT’s well considered decision about quantum of
water in Narmada and yet instead of keeping silence about it went on making assertions without any
evidence that NWDT was wrong about its decision and that the changes in design parameters were
therefore called for In this they followed the tradition laid down by the DOEF and the NBA to make similar
claims without solid evidence. This then became one of the important grounds for them to ask the Bank
“to step back from the Projects and consider them afresh". Little did they realize that this was an unjustified
slight to the competence and integrity of the NWDT. It meant little to them that by such criticism and
demands they were undermining the judicial mechanism evolved in India to resolve the delicate and
difficult interstate disputes wihout which the federal structure would be in serious trouble.
3. Health
In the chapter on ‘Findings and Recommendations', Morse-Berger unambiguously state; "the existing
threat from malaria within the command area is serious"; and by failing to adopt the measures to control
the spread of malaria, assurances offered by the Bank and India have also failed. The situation in various
parts of the Projects is described as ‘death-traps’ in the Letter to the President. Morse-Berger have almost
exclusively relied on January 1992 report of Mr. N.L.Kalra, a consultant to the World Bank, to arrive at
their conclusion that an explosion of malaria is imminent. Mr. Kalra reported that there has been a rising
incidence of malaria in the vicinity of the damsite and that falsifarum malaria - a killer malaria - was also
rising. Morse-Berger have jumped upon these findings with a great alacrity, but, like Mr, Kalra, forgot or
neglected to check the corresponding figures for the areas away from the damsite. As it happens this
methodological lapse has lent them into trouble, because malaria is rising not only at the damsite but all
over Gujarat, as does the falsifarum malaria. For Morse-Berger, trouble does not end here, however,
because Mr. Kalra’s report quite categorically says at least at two places that in the command area of
the SSP there is no risk of malaria because of the appropriate design for the command. How did
Morse-Berger, in the face of such a categorical assertion by Mr. Kalra, reach their conclusion that there
is a serious threat from malaria within the command area?
They also discuss the threat of Schistosomiasis in the Project areas citing the case of Egypt’s Aswan
Dam, where after the dam was completed in 1969, the disease increased by forty fold. They have little
realised or understood the finer aspects of epidemiological considerations. In India, there is one small
focus of the disease near Ratnagiri for more than 30 years and yet the disease has not spread. Biological
characteristics of the worms which cause this disease are diametrically opposite to those of malarial
parasite and determine the different epidemiological characteristics of the two diseases. The load of
malarial parasites in the community, from even a microscopic focus, increases very rapidly in an exponential
manner. As against this, Schistosomiasis worms cannot get foothold in the community easily and cannot
build up themselves from a small focus a la malarial parasites in the community to a huge epidemic.
Morse-Berger ought to have paid more attention to these features before they drew superficially plausible
parallels between post- Aswan Egypt and the Project areas. The reason is simple enough. Even before
the Aswan dam was built, Schistosomiasis in Egypt was wide-spread in the community and therefore
spread of the disease by the vector mollusks along the expanding networks of canals was inevitable.
The Morse-Berger Report characteristically suffers from significant omissions. They have raised the
specter of water-borne diseases in the command area, but have not bothered to survey the latest
epidemiological breakthrough about water- related diseases. It is now well known that bacteriological
quality of the drinking water is less important than the quantity of water in the epidemiology of diarrheas
and dysentries. If the communities are given even 20 liters per capita per day (Ipcd) untreated water, the
incidence of diarrheas and dysentries comes down significantly and crippling diseases like trachoma and
high morbidity load diseases like various skin infections can be nearly wiped out. In the dry water-scarce
3
command and outside areas of the SSP, the drinking water availability in the 8000 villages Is going to be
minimally 70 Ipcd. Morse-Berger had access to the relevant and auth- ntic epidemiological literature. They
have cited this in the footnote of the chapter, but totally ignored the contents in the report and beneficial
effects of domestic water supply. They have pointedly ignored the fact that so many areas in Saurashtra.
North Gujarat etc. have a serious threat of crippier like flourosis. This problem will be completely eliminated.
Having omitted these facts, they conclude the chapter with a sentence, "Omitting the prevention of disease
from the assessment and implementati n of the Projects is a perilous oversight". We wonder, who is
omitting and whose perilous oversight?
II. RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION:
1. The Bank’s incremental Strategy:
•
Morse-Bergers’ attack on the Bank for having adopted the incremental strategy in R&R is total, uncom
promising and full- throttled. The fury of the attack can be gauged by their assertion in the chapter on
‘Findings and Recommendations’ that both human and environmental assessment was absent ab initio,
the considerations of engineering works subordinated the need of the people and environment affected
by the Project and that the Bank’s incremental strategy and its concurrence in India’s Pari- passu policy
has only strengthened this impression and readiness to bear with non-compliance thereafter confirms it.
This point is rubbed again and again in different forms in the chapter and in the Letter to the President.
Such a forceful and dramatic presentation in the crucial parts of the Report has even persuaded some
Executive Directors of the Bank that Bank’s incremental policy on R&R has failed.
This is, no doubt, perhaps the most serious and grave charge on the Bank. The complicated chain of
arguments as set out in the chapter on ‘Project Appraisal’ which leads them to this serious charge begins
with an argument that the borrower country did not gather detailed data on the population to be displaced
and prepare a resettlement plan and none was appraised by the Bank; that only engineering and economic
aspects of the Project were appraised by the Bank in 1982-1983 period; that from the very beginning of
the Projects the Bank failed to implement its own policy.
In September 1983, Prof. Thayer Scudder, an internationally known expert on resettlement from California
Institute of Technology, who-wasengaged-as a consultant to the Bank, came to India as a consultant to
the Bank on R&R mission. Prof. Scudder’s theoretical and practical contributions to the Bank’s R&R policy
of 1980 are well known and acknowledged by the chief architect of the policy - Mr. Michael Cernea, a
senior adviser and sociologist at the Bank.
The Bank’s Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) 1985 of the Projects and its Supplementary document treat
this as an R&R appraisal and incorporate Scudder’s findings. Incredibly enough, Morse-Berger unhesitantly
assert that this was a ‘post-appraisal’ mission and therefore not appraisal. Their insistence that September,
83 mission of Scudder was post-appraisal and not appraisal is beyond a point merely verbal - an exercise
in semantics. Thier formalistic response is surely not enough for the task they faced. The point is whether
or not Scudder studied thotoughly the R&R problems in SSP and whether or not he studied it within the
frame of the Bank’s R&R Policy of February,' 1980. •
Morse-Bergers’ treatment of Scudder Report is a give away. All they do is to give summary findings
of his eighty page report in four points. The most important finding they summarize and repeatedly use
in the text of the Chapter ‘Project Appraisal' is: The information available on the magnitude and implications
of displacement was inadequate and there had been little effort to carry out a full investigation." The rest
of the Scudder Report is simply ignored which in fact is most relevant to the issue of the Bank’s appraisal
of the R&R component in the SSP. Morse- Bergers’ serious charge of ‘lack of appraisal’ rests on the
severe truncation of Scudder Report of November, 1983 and, as we shall see shortly, on total suppression
of other documents and exchanges.
On reading Scudder’s tightly prepared Report of Nov. 1983, one fails to find even a hint that there was
a problem of information, let alone a complaint that the information was inadequate. But by falsely attributing
a 'lact' of inadequate information to the Scudder Report, they very rapidly build up a case that Sardar
Sarovar was appraised without consideration of human costs and the decision to proceed with the Project
in near total ignorance of the people and the impact was, at worst, irresponsible and, at best, in contradiction
to Bank’s existing R&R Policy. ’
4
On these twin pillars of "absence of data" allegedly reported in the Scudder Report and "non-appraisal
of R&R", both factually wrong, they base their case that Bank’s R&R policy of February 1°8O was violated
ab initio. From here they have little difficulty to construct their case along the trajectory of their choice.
They argue that in the face of absence of such basic compliance with the Bank’s February 1980 policy,
the Bank was pushed towards negotiating the loan in the year of 1984, with little choice but to allow
attenuation? of its requirements.
They further report that the Bank’s India Department continued to negotiate the 1985 Credit and Loan
Agreement accepting whatever India offered and in disregard of the requirements dictated by its February
1980 policy and its own expertise. The vacuum left by Bank's own lack of appraisal was filled by the
NWDT Award to fashion R&R policy in the SSP. Thereafter, according to them, everyone in the Bank was
left struggling to make the best of the bad job. Emergency was followed by another one, adhocism ruled.
The genesis and installation of the incremental strategy in R&R is located by Morse-Berger in this situational
logic. This is damning to the Bank, provided it is factually correct.
Morse-Bergers' description of the genesis of incremental strategy and its antecedent chain of argument
depends very much on their factually wrong assertion about absence of data reported by Scudder, and
suppression of vital contents of his Nov. 1983 Report. The Nov. 1983 Report is, in fact, an excellent
concrete elucidation of the abstract framework of Bank's Feb. 1980 policy. It is a slander on both Prof.
Scudder and the Bank to argue that his mission was not an appraisal mission and that R&R policy and
program was not appraised in violation of the Bank's policy. Further on it is also scandalous for Morse-Berger
to selectively highlight the contents of April 1984 document of the NCA and to totally suppress its October
1984 document which contained resettlement plans in accordance with the Bank's policy and as required
by Prof. Scudder. Moreover, Prof. Scudder was an active participant during the negotiations of Loan and
Credit Agreement held in November 1984. When the Credit Agreement was finally signed in May 1985, it
bore a distinct and overwhelming imprint of Scudder's labor. The R&R terms of the Agreement are fully
consonant with the Bank policy. This is clear to anyone who cares to compare the components of the
Agreement with the components of the Bank policy. It is also very clear that the Agreement is totally
based on the NCA documents and Scudder document, which in turn, are based on the Bank policy.
Morse-Berger have really no case. Prof. Scudder and the responsible officers of the Bank Department
and the EDs like Mr. Tim Lancaster of U.K. continued to monitor the developments and actively intervene
in the subsequent years to force Gujarat Government to fashion the R&R policy whose key-stone was to
provide each oustee family, irrespective of his ownership title, an entitlement of minimum 2 hectares of
irrigable land of his choice. This key provision fully coincides with the core part of the Bank policy and
this was achieved in incremental fashion. ARCH-Vahini and Oxfam (U.K.) in close collaboration during
those fatefull months provided the most critical information to key authorities of the Bank - like Mr Tim
Lancaster (ED - UK), Sr. Vice President Mr Hooper and others and to Scudder who was keenly watching
the scene and intervening at critical moments. The GOG relying on the information gap that usually would
exist tried heroicaly to wriggle out of the committment it had made but had to funally accept R&R Policy
acceptable to the oustees and us.
We have on our file the critical exchange of letters, documents and information which gave shape to
new R&R Policy - an eloquent testimony to the success of strategy of incremental changes. It is inconceivable
that Morse-Berger did not see these exchanges and the significance they had for the eventual emergence
of new R&R Policy which even they have praised.
The incremental strategy, thereafter, has continued to secure better and better policy reforms not only
in Gujarat but also in Maharashtra and M.P. Morse-Berger might have succeeded in creating a dramatic
effect and to condemn the incremental strategy adopted by the Bank, but their success is based on
suppression and distortion of facts. Moreover, they have not pondered over the implications of their
approach and conclusion. They have not understood that the best hopes both theoretically and in practice
lie in the adoption of incremental strategy. If this does not succeed, nothing ever will succeed. And finally
this is not true only for India or other Third World countries, it is also true for the affluent countries from
where they came.
2. R&R in Maharashtra and M.P.
Many who are watching SSP with great anxiety were obviously alarmed to know from the Morse-Berger
Letter to the President that none of the oustees of 24 out of 33 villages In Maharashtra qualifies for 2 ha.
5
of agricultural land; that they all will be treated as landless and therefore eligible for 0.4 ha. only; that as
a result as many as 80 per cent of the oustees face dispossession and since both M
and Maharashtra
say that encroachers must be treated as landless with no entitlement to adequate land, in both the states
thousands of tribal families cultivating forest land will not receive adequate land on resettlement.
9
On examining the text of the Chapter on Maharashtra, one finds that Morse-Berger themselves describe
a policy document of Maharashtra Government giving n-.nimum of 2 ha. of-irrigable-agricultural land to
all the encroachers who encroached before 1978. The Report refers to other Maharashtra Government
document from which it is easy to see that at least 70 per cent of the Maharashtra oustees are already
entitled to minimum of 2 ha. of agricultural land. And yet 26 page later in the text, far removed from issue
at hand, they suddenly make a statement that oustees of 24 villages will be treated as landless with a
dr.. .tically reduced land entitlements. There are many other instances of logical non- sequiturs in the
Report, but this perhaps is the most dramatic and crucial of all examples.
In MP also, they know and report that the policy gives 2 ha. of entitlement to pre- 1987 encroachers.
They also know and report that dependence on forest land cultivation is confined to villages of isolated
tribal areas where some 40 out of 193 affected villages of MP are situated. 27 of these 40 villages are
really affected because of submergence (10 per cent or more of the total agricultural land of the village
under submergence). About 2000 of the total 23000 oustee families of MP live in these villages of tribal
areas. Encroachers among these 2000 families of these 27 villages who may fail to be regularized under
the existing MP policy form the hard-core problem of encroachers in MP. At the most, they number a
few hundreds, and not thousands as stated so dramatically by Morse-Berger in their Letter to the President.
In support of their contention and in order to negate the effect of government policy for the encroachers,
they rely on submission made by some in MP to them that in practice the encroachers will not be able
to benefit from the policy because they do not preserve and cannot produce the receipts of the fine they
pay to the forest department for encroachment, which only can substantiate their claim of encroachment.
They did not check with the encroacher oustees themselves to verify the fact, nor did they check with
the records of the forest department.
In the Letter to the President, they say that 23,000 families are to be resettled. They choose to ignore
an important fact of peculiar pattern of displacement in 193 villages of MP, due to which large majority
of the families are affected primarily because only their houses go under submergence and relatively a
small proportion loses both land and houses. So, although 23,000 families will have to be shifted (resettled),
the word resettlement does not carry the same meaning and connotation as it does in Maharashtra and
Gujarat, where resettlement is a complete uprooting far away from their present villages. Morse-Bergers'
reliance on ambiguity of the word resettlement in the Letter to the President is striking and disturbing.
They clearly seek to convey the impression to non suspecting readers of the Letter that all the 23000
families will experience complete uprooting and far away displacement.
Many in authority in India like India’s Finance Minister, reeling under the heavy onslaught of the
Morse-Berger Report, have meekly argued that India’s performance should not be judged by the high
standards of Europe and North America.
Morse-Berger have anticipated this argument and have countered by saying that the environmental and
resettlement standards were determined by the NWDT and agreed to by India and the states in the Credit
and Loan Agreement. These standards are India’s own standards. Their contention is correct.
The point, however, is not that Morse-Berger have introduced the high standards of their own countries.
The point is that their sweeping and dramatic conclusions that standards have been violated are completely
devoid of factual evidence. They have merely asserted that the standards have been violated and thus
themselves have violated the age old standards of rational, objective and fair inquiry.
Date: January 9, 1993.
Prepared by:
ARCH-VAHINI
At&Po. Mangrol.Tal. Rajpipla
Dist. Bharuch (Gujarat) PIN: 393150.
6
MORSE-BERGER REVIEW:
A SEARCH FOR TRUTH?
ARCH-Vahini
PO MANGROL, Via-RAJPIPLA
Dist. BHARUCH (Gujarat) 393 150
INDIA
Draft
MORSE-BERGER REVIEW : A SEARCH FOR TRUTH?
INTRODUCTION
he Sardar Sarovar Project(SSP) controversy has now entered in its fifth year i.e. if we disregard the mild
rumblings that were taking place against the Narmada Valley Projects before 1988. The controversy has
acquired new heights because of the publication of the Bradford Morse - Thomas Berger Report. This Report,
contrary to widely held expectations, has, as we shall see, only added more twists to it. The SSP controversy is
widely perceived as a battle between grass root resource poor activists on the one hand, and mighty government
on the other. Involvement of powerful interests including parts of the Central government, powerful english
language media and heavily tilted involvement of some of the most powerful international NGOs etc. has remained
hidden from the view.
It is a multi-layered controversy wherein the layers frequently and freely intertwine with one another. When
the attack on the SSP began, it was as a classical case study of the way things go wrong in large dams. A
general critique built up against the large dams by Goldsmith and Hildyard in their now classic ‘The Social
and Environmental Effects of Large Dams’ (1984) was applied to the SSP point by point and it was claimed
that it fitted extremely well. It is still subjected to a wide variety of criticism along the lines laid down in the
paradigm. But it is not unusual , in fact quite frequent, to come across an argument when factual criticism
on various grounds of the SSP is seriously challenged : “ but isn’t SSP a large dam ? and aren’t all the large
dams bad dams ? The argument has a telling effect. Its purpose is served but it is forgotten that the SSP
has to provide a detailed empirical corroborative evidence to the general theory of critique of large dams.
The truth of the general theory cannot be assumed and invoked in the specific case of the SSP to prove that
it is a bad large dam. Logical error in the argument is obvious but it is not noticed, the argument is readily
accepted!
The critics of the Project have persistently pointed at the mistakes, lapses and inadeqaeies that were found
at one stage of the evolution of the Project as an evidence to prove their point ignoring or even suppressing
the later corrective developments which they knew. To our great surprise even Morse-Berger have not been
able to avoid such a serious methodological flaw.
We have followed the critique through the time. We are struck by a fact that at certain time point the
Project might have been found wanting on various counts, the damning facts were marshalled to reach the
conclusion that the Project was a ‘planned disaster’. And yet, with the passage of time the original facts
allowing them to reach negative conclusion have been quietly dropped without any explanation or even
acknowledgement, but the conclusion that the Project is a planned disaster remains. New facts are brought
into play to prop up the conclusion. Morse-Berger Report is the last link in the pattern. They have faulted
the Project on issues of Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) and that of environment, their conclusion
is identical to that of national and international critique of the Project; but their facts and reasons in many
instances arc of entirely different order. If there is any overlap, it is quite small. It would be interesting to
inquire as to why they did not accept and incorporate the facts and criticism of the Narmada Bachao Andoaln
(NBA) in their Report. This itself of course, is not an argument to refute Morse-Berger conclusions or for
that matter any conclusions. This must be done by critically examining their facts, by sifting the evidence they
produce and by analysing the logical structure of their analysis. We ha\c found them wanting on these scores.
The point, however, is different. It is that the controversy is kept alive, given strength by various forces without
regard to the sanctity of facts and reason.
Then a very potent argument is invoked to the effect that the corrupt, inefficient government cannot
implement any programme (R&R, Afforestation, Catchment Area Treatment, construction and maintenance
of water delivery system etc.), the good dcsign/policy on paper notwithstanding. .The argument of past
performance is also raised: if the past is so dismal what guarantee is there that it will not repeat itself, that
things will change for better?
It must be recognised again before it is countered that this is not a part of an empirical criticism to
corroborate the paradigmatic critique of large dams. It is a different level of criticism. Never in the past the
NGO like ARCH-Vahini had moved into the Project area before the actual construction began, the oustees
had never got organized and waged sustained struggle for better R&R Policy for as long as seven years,
moved the highest court of the country, lobbied intensely with the World Bank and obtained, almost verbatim,
the Policy they had demanded. If greatly improved Policy had not been given to them, the Project would
have come to a standstill in 1988. This had never happened in the past. The new R&R Policy of December
1987 with many subsequent improvements is a historic breakthrough, in India - unprecedented. As to its
implementation, in essence allotment of minimum 5 acres of irrigable land of choice to each oustee family
is quite satisfactory - nearly 4000 out of 4700 oustee families in Gujarat have been allotcd land and it is in
progress for the others.
T
2
Unprecedented is the fact that the SSP canal system is designed and planned in entirely different way to
remove or minimise those very problems of land degradation in command and inefficient waler use which
the large dam paradigm critique predicts. Anti-SSP critique either ignored the details of planning and design,
by passed them, suppressed them or continued to argue about the problem areas of command in a way as
if these problems were not anticipated or that they will not be studied as planned so that corrective steps
may be taken. Morse-Berger took note of these novel features of design and planning but concluded that
they were at best intentions and no studies were being made to bring them into reality. There is no doubt
that they had access to all these studies but chose to take no note of them and reach unfounded conclusion
that the SSP was no different from other big irrigation Projects and it will face the same problems in command
as predicted.
There is another important consideration against the seemingly potent argument of ‘past determines the
future’ and its implicit pessimism. The tribal ouslecs of Gujarat when told of new R&R Policy in December
1987, did not reach the pessimistic conclusion, their historical experience notwithstanding. They opted, instead,
to brace themselves up for its implementation. So much was at stakes for them that they could not afford
the luxury of pessimism. And as we shall sec presently the same applies to the tribal oustccs of Maharashtra
and Madhya Pradesh (MP).
While we argue against such a pessimism, we retain a strong measure of caution regarding government’s
working style and problems created by bureaucracy. However difficult as these problems are they must be
solved. Otherwise what is the alternative?
The SSP is a target of serious criticism on another ground. According to this argument which was very
prominent in 1989-90, the benefits of irrigation will go to command area, 3/4th of which is already richly
endowed with water resources, only l/4th of it is drought prone. The waters will thus only enrich those who
are already rich. The Project was portrayed to be a conspiracy of rich farmers, industrialists, corrupt bureaucrats
and politicians against poor, illiterate tribals. The activists boldly quoted the Narmada Nigam’s documents
and the Government of Gujarat’s documents to prove their point. This no doubt created a major impact.
The impression was created that to sustain and strengthen the life style of rich farmers, the tribal people,
their culture and their economic base was being destroyed. When we thoroughly examined these documents,
we found out that the documents simply didn’t contain the clinching evidence purported to be there, or they
were misquoted and misinterpreted. Moreover more relevant documents which could have shown the true
extent of drought proneness of the command, were totally ignored.
The issue now is not merely whether R&R in the SSP is possible or not, nor merely whether it is
environmentally and economically sound Project, the issue also is whether deeper issues like alternative life
styles, developmental strategies etc. could be discussed on the foundation of the critique of the SSP built up
by the anti-dam movement in India, Europe and North America and now given further boost by Morse-Berger
team. This needs emphasizing because the debate seems to be moving on the plane of larger issues taking
for granted the validity of the SSP critique. With Morse-Berger landing their prestige and credibility to the
flagging anti-dam movement, the SSP is projected as a paradigm case study of the way things go wrong with
large dams and how the development should not take place. We deny that the critique of the SSP, including
that of Morse-Berger is such a paradigm case study. Il is not right that momentous conclusions about
development issues in countries like India be drawn on such case study when it is so fraught with errors,
misinformations and distortions. In view of such serious doubts about the truthfulness of the critique being
raised, it is not correct to pul it beyond the pale of criticism and to include as a part of global environmental
problem like C02 buildup, Ozone depletion, rain forest crisis etc. as some prestigious publications have tried
to do.
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, A CRITIQUE:
Specific criticism of the environmental aspects of the Sardar Sarovar Project surfaced in the second half
of 1987. On June 24, 1987, the Department of Environment and Forests (DOEF) of Government of India(GOI)
issued a joint clearance letter also known as conditional clearance letter to both the SSP and the NSP(Narmada
Sagar Project) in Madhya Pradesh. This letter, together with other documents emanating from the DOEF
around this period and documents involving the DOEF provide the core arguments of the environmental
critique of the SSP.
A substantial critique has through out drawn its sustenance from this set of documents, but they have just
been referred to in the critique, if at all, and buried in the appendices, annexurcs and foot notes of the
various publications. Since their form, contents and context have never been a subject of close scrutiny,
accuracy of the basic facts and analysis contained therein has remained unchecked.
Without doing this, it is not possible to assess and answer the pointed questions the critics have been
asking. For example, is it true that the Projccl(SSP) was not ready for environmental clearance and yet in
June 1987 it was given clearance because of political considerations? Or that active interaction was going on
3
with the Sardar Sarovar Project authorities for “almost three years” and “ the absence and inadequacy of
data on some important environmental aspects still persisted”? Or that the environmental clearance lapsed
in September 1990 because conditions were violated? Is it true that the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal
(NWDT) has merely assumed the quantum of water available in the Narmada? Or that the economic viability
of the Project is seriously jeopardised because the environmental costs of the submerging forests alone turns
out to be Rupees 80 billion according to the computation done by the DOEF?
The Morse-Berger Team which conducted its inquiry in late 1991 and in early 1992, was not only shown
these documents, but a detailed analysis which follows was shared with them in a number of long sessions.
And yet, to our great surprise they have put it aside without even countering our reasoning and analysis.
They have merely referred to these documents in the footnotes of their report, following the tradition laid
down by the critics of the Project.
The DOEF Clearance:
The 24 June 1987 document (a joint clearance letter for both SSP and NSP) is barely a two page document.1
It is said in this letter that the Projects were examined in detail and on the basis of the discussions with the
central and stale authorities more details were sought from them. There follows a list of eight broad topics:
Catchment Area Treatment (CAT), Command Area Development (CAD), Compensatory Afforestation (CA),
Rehabilitation and Resettlement(R&R), Survey of Flora and Fauna, Carrying capacity of the surrounding
area, Seismicity and Health problems. This is a remarkable document. The SSP authorities had applied for
the environmental clearance in February 1983 followed by that of NSP in October 1984. The SSP application
remained pending for more than four years during which time, as stated in the clearance letter, it was examined
in great detail. NSP went through a similar process for three years. It is obvious that after such a long
deliberation when the clearance letter was given and if the DOEF still had questions about aspects of major
environmental issues listed above and had wanted specific studies related to these to be done by the project
authorities as a condition to the clearance, the letter should have reflected highly differentiated treatment
of the issues they had presumably gone through and aspects related highly specific studies asked for. Moreover,
both the NSP and the SSP would have obviously differed in details so much that separate letters of clearance
or at any rate separate section for each would have been a logical necessity. The clearance letter obviously
lacks this characteristics and specificity. What the DOEF thought it fit to issue instead was a joint clearance
letter containing very general and vague conditions. Such an elementary scrutiny of this vitally important
document with such striking and strange features has not been done so far. The anti-dam movement in its
budding stage based in large cities like Delhi, Bombay etc. seized upon this document, disregarded its vague
conditionalities and its lack of specificity, as a clinching evidence to declare that the SSP was “planned
environmental disaster”. This document has thereafter retained its central place in various critiques published
in India and abroad. It remains a pivotal piece in Morse-Berger Report too.
Our criticism of non-specificity and the implied equivalence of SSP and NSP with regard to Project
preparedness by the DOEF would have remained tangential and circumstantial only, had it not been for
another document prepared by the DOEF in around May, 1987, a close predecessor of June 1987 clearance
letter.
The DOEF’s Note to the Prime Minister(PM) of India:1
2
Around May 1987, just prior to the environmental clearance of the SSP and the NSP, this Note was sent
to the PM. It makes a fairly detailed analysis of the two projects separately. Major environmental concerns
like CAT, CA, survey of flora and fauna, and R & R for each project is discussed separately. In each of
these important areas except CA, the Note has specific and fairly serious criticism to make of the NSP. No
criticism of SSP is made except a moderate criticism of it in the area of R&R. About the crucial issue of
Compensatory Afforestation it states that the proposals submitted for the CA in both the projects are detailed
and satisfactory. This clearly bears out our hunch described above that the environmental assessment of both
the projects was indeed different and differentiated. The SSP had turned out to be better prepared on these
counts. To make these points more clear as it were, in sections viii and ix of the Note it is repeatedly stated
1
Office Memorandum: Government of India - Ministry of Environment and Forests. No. 3-87/80-1A. June 24,1987
2
Environmental Aspects of Narmada Sagar and Sardar Sarovar Multi-purpose Projects. ( Note to Prime Minister from Department of
Environment and Forests.) undated, Published in 'Damning the Narmada’ Appendix.3 P.107-117 ~ by Claude Alvares- Ramesh Billorey.
Third World Network. Penang. Malaysia -1988.
4
that SSP’s state of preparedness is quite good and that it is in fairly advanced stage of preparedness and that
NSP is not ready for clearance. The anti -dam movement dropped the word “the NSP” from the last sentence
and substituted it with the word “the Project” using it in specific context of the SSP to make it appear as
though it applied to the SSP - to read ‘the Project is not ready for clearance.’3 Similarly the statement in the
Note, about the “the absence and inadequacy of data on some important environmental aspects” in its total
context applies to the NSP4 and yet the Morse-Berger Report has quoted this portion of the Note to apply
it to the SSP.(P.224)
Compare these two closely spaced documents from the same department and the great contrast and
inconsistency of the DOEF stand out.
It is not open to anti-dam movement to argue that this preceding document was not known to them at the
time they were highlighting the conditional clearance letter to criticize the SSP. For, the simple fact is that
the activists of the movement had access to this document al that time. Indeed this document was not only
widely quoted by all activists, but it was published by them only.5 Strange but the true part of the story is
that while the Note to the PM was widely circulated among the anti-dam activists here and abroad, the state
governments did not get copies of this! Politics as alleged by the anti-dam activists was indeed at play but
the real question is : Who was playing it? and why?
Morse-Berger’s treatment of these documents in relation to the DOEF’s environmental clearance deserves
comment and analysis. In February 1992, we had a day long meeting with Mr. Thomas Berger, Vice-Chairman
of the Independent Review. We showed him in the presence of his two senior advisers these two documents
and others. Point by point minute analysis was presented to him. On seeing the clearance letter, he lost no
time to grasp its central deficiency to remark," this is only a list of topics without any substance.... this is no
conditional clearance." His inference only could have got strengthened when he saw the relevant parts of the
Note to the PM. If he had any reservation about the meaning of the two documents, he did not reveal it
then, nor is it revealed in the Report. What is described in the Report is very different. It says that the 1983
application for the clearance of the Sardar Sarovar Project was supported by a short term benchmark survey
by the Maharaja Sayajirao(MS) University of Baroda. The information provided was not enough to meet the
environmental guideline requirements. Environmental clearance was, therefore, not granted (P.222). The
guideline it is referring to is mentioned very vaguely in the Report as “first prepared in late 1970s...”(p 216).6
Updated versions came in 1985 and 1989, at least two years after the application for clearance was made by
the SSP authorities.
Apart from the fact that the Report should have described in more details in what way the MS University
study fell short of the guideline requirements of late seventies,7 the Report had also to explain the relevance
of this information, even if correct, to the report in view of the DOEF’s later assessment of the SSP as
contained in its Note to the PM, especially when the Note is discussed and, “a more advanced state of
readiness of the Sardar Sarovar Project(in the Note) was acknowledged”/? 224). Clearly, between the date
of application and the time when the Note to PM was written, quite substantial changes had taken place
even by the DOEF’s reckoning. This must be on record on DOEF files. How can Morse-Berger team not
look for this, not record it in the Report and blandly declare," information provided was not enough and
environmental clearance was not granted"? By more or less following the line of the DOEF and the anti-dam
activists, and by omiting to show inconsistencies in the DOEF’s documents, Morse- Berger have abandoned
the responsibility of throwing light on the tangled issue of conditional clearance and the circumstances
surrounding it. It is also of crucial importance to know what precisely were the contents of these guidelines
of ‘late ’70s’ which were not being met by the SSP in 1983, which according to Morse-Berger compelled the
DOEF to withhold the clearance. Similar criticism should be made regarding the new guidelines of 1985,
3
Medha Patkar in ‘Bhoomiputra’, a renowned Gujarati periodical on Gandhian and Vinoba thoughts, February 1991 issue.
4 The Note to the PM. (op-cit) Section IX - Page. 115.
5 Sec Footnote 2. above
6 It is strange that they do not give the exact date year of the guidelines.
7 One of the senior advisers to Morse-Berger, Mr. Don Gamble during the course of leisurely discussions with us, had argued along the line of
anti-dam activists that the MS university Report is not based on primary data but only on secondary data. We showed him that the Report
was based on the primary data collected from the field in most of the investigations.
5
which became operational while the clearance was pending. It is obvious that from the begining, the DOEF,
the clearing agency, was itself not fully prepared to meet the task. Its own understanding about environmental
impact issues was undergoing evolution as borne out by the succession of guidelines that emerged while the
clearance application was being processed and even after (hat (late ’70s, 1985, 1989.). Morse-Berger should
have paid more attention to such a fluid situation wherein the ground rules for clearance themselves were
in flux than they did. The salient features of ‘late ’70s’ and of 1985 guidelines should have been described,
especially those of the former because they were obviously inadequate; the missing information in the original
application of the SSP authorities before making a final pronouncement that the clearance was not given
because the guideline requirements (of late ’70s) were not met. Their inability or unwillingness to focus on
the evolution in the understanding of the DOEF and on its dubious acts of omissions and commissions did
not allow them to comprehend and report their bearing on the tangled issue of clearance and on the pari-passu
condition in the clearance letter which required that environmental measures were planned and implemented
pari-passu with the Project Works. Ignoring the complexity and fluidity of the ground level reality Morse-Berger
have launched a furious attack on the very idea of pari-passu requirement in their Letter to the Bank President
(P.XXIV) and in their ‘Findings and Recommendations’ (P.335).
They ought to have noticed and recorded that a rapid turn of events was taking place in the early ‘80s.
The NWDT had given its decision in 1978, ending the decade long uncertainty about the use of Narmada
waters. By 1980 the Project preparation started in the earnest when the Bank really got involved to help
modernize India’s Irrigation Sector by helping to plan SSP in new ways. Tata Economic Consultancy Services
did its Cost Benefit analysis in these years. In 1983 when the Project went to the DOEF for clearance
environmental consciousness had just become reality, even with the World Bank. The DOEF itself was struggling
with environmental issues as is evident from the fact that of a rather scatchy guideline (late ‘70s) it possessed
at that time, which got changed in 1985 and then again in 1989. The World Bank guidelines were going
through similar changes. Even the Terms of Reference given to the Morse-Berger Review enjoins upon them
that they had to take the reality of rapidly changing guidelines into account. The logic of the rapidly changing
situation could only dictate that the environmental studies and programme implementation had to bepari-passu
with the Project works. Why this logic should elude Morse-Berger is difficult to comprehend.
They have continued to follow the same strategy of assessment marked by ambivalence and significant
omissions in the section on assessment of compliance of conditional environmental clearance to which we
will turn later.
The anti-dam critique while choosing to suppress major inconsistencies between the Note to PM (May
1987) and the clearance letter (June 1987) continued to make full use of other ‘facts’ given in the Note. The
Note thus became a main source of other major environmental controversies.
Hydrology:
The Note to PM states in section vii that the 75 percent dependable run off in the Narmada has been
estimated to be only 23 Million Acre Feet(MAF) instead of 27.2 MAF assumed by the NWDT. It not only
does not cite any authentic source to back the new estimates, it also tacitly casts aspersions on the competence
of the NWDT. One of the issues the Tribunal had to adjudicate was the quantum of water in Narmada.
Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh were contesting each other with different estimates of the run off basing their
contentions on different lengths of the same series. While the Tribunal’s deliberations were on, the experts
of the three states and that of Central Waler Commission (CWC) of the Government of India met and
agreed to adopt a series that was chosen by MP. This was then incorporated in an agreement of the four
Chief Ministers of the concerned states. The Tribunal accepted all parts of this agreement including the
agreed assessment of the annual run off in Narmada.8 Where is then the assumption of the run off in the
Tribunal’s award? If the two main contenders arrived at an agreement based on objective facts about one of
the issues before the Tribunal and the latter if accepted this agreement and t'he issue‘was thus resolved, why
should run-off estimate thus accepted by the Tribunal be dubbed as ‘assumed’ and be dragged into controversy?
Assumption, if any, was that of DOEF which did not even source the runoff figure it cited. The Note went
further to suggest design changes in the Project. These points including that of water quantity were then
picked up by the anti-dam movement and amplified. While publication after publication claimed that water
available in Narmada was less than assumed by the NWDT, each of these publications quoted different
8
Report of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, Vol.I. P.38-39
6
sources but none of them were authentic. The SSP was widely portrayed as overdesigned creating avoidable
adverse environmental impacts. The viability of the Project was called into question.
Morse-Berger on Hydrology:
When Morse-Berger started their inquiry, the issue of water availability in Narmada had already received
many twists. Morse-Berger also felt very strongly that mother of all environmental impacts was in the hydrology
i.e. water run off and declared at the end of first chapter 10 Environment: Context and Compliance, “ but
first it is necessary to review the overarching issues related to hydrology and water management” (P.234). In
the next chapter on Hydrology and Water Management, which is an overarching determinant of all major
environmental impacts - upstream environment, downstream environment and command area environment,
there are two planks on which the whole critic rests. One plank is constituted by the possibility or impossibility
of NSP (another major Project in MP about 350 kilometres upstream of the SSP) being built and the second
plank of course is the availability of quantum of water. Reading this chapter very carefully, it is quite apparent
that the authors have assumed all along that the NSP is not going to be built. The going argument is that
the NSP being storage reservoir, regulating water discharge downstream, the SSP without the NSP will not
work as planned or hoped. Towards the end of the chapter, however, the authors have been forced to confront
the possibility that the NSP is coming up after all throwing all their arguments related to the NSP component
out of gear. Even here if the authors had taken enough trouble to study the relevant chapters of the Tribunal
award with care,9 they would have realised that the quantum of water allotted to Gujarat and Rajasthan was
not likely to be adversely affected if the NSP was completely dropped.
Coming to more important component of the quantum of water in Narmada, nothing more may be said
than to point out that having raised the issue of overestimation of water quantum in the begining; at three
different points Morse-Berger have declared that it is not their purpose (P.246) that there is little point for
them (P.249) and that it is not their responsibility (P.252) to resolve the 75 percent dependable water quantum
issue. And yet in the end portion of the chapter, the Report blandly declares," many previous assumptions
now appear to be unfounded or are questionable" (P.251), that the assumption of the Tribunal award may
not hold in future (P.250). A very vague reference is made to an independent hydrologist who was asked to
“assess the contentious issues” (P.253), but nowhere his/her critical findings are stated and discussed critically
vis-a-vis the findings reported by the country’s apex body - the Central Water Commission, the report prepared
by an independent hydrologist cited and not even the name of the hydrologist mentioned. Not only this,
nowhere it is explicitly stated that 75 percent dependable run off is less than given by the NWDT which even
Morse-Berger label as assumed following the DOEF and the anti- dam movement (P.251). In the subsequent
chapters on environment many important arguments arc derived from the fact which is not even stated
unambiguously in this chapter. The gaps in the reasoning and methodology followed by Morse-Berger are
glaring. However, in the Letter to the World Bank President Morse-Berger continued to argue that they
had found discrepancies in basic hydrological information, had therefore examined the stream flow data, had
done their own analysis and found that the Project will not perform as planned. They further argued that
the effects of Sardar Sarovar on upstream, downstream and command area will be different than what has
been assumed (P.XXII). One should not expect in such letters the detailed analysis, reasoning and arguments
to arrive at such momentous conclusion but the text of the Report from where such conclusions are brought
into the letter must have all the facts, analysis and reasoning. We have seen that it is not there. We will also
see that the style is repeated by Morse- Berger in the most crucial aspects of the R&R assessment in M.P.
and Maharashtra.
Meanwhile, the anti-dam movement has seized upon this and other parts of the Morse-Berger Report as
the clinching evidence that what they have been arguing all along has now been substantiated by independent
investigators like Morse-Berger. Morse-Berger because of their experience and stature and since they had
rare and unfettered access to all the documents on all the sides, had if come up with strong and hitherto
unknown arguments solidly supported by facts and sound analysis, the boost they gave to the anti-dam movement
would have been justifiable even if not liked by the governments. In the event what one finds in this chapter
and other chapters of their bulky report not good arguments backed by solid facts but just opinions expressed
with a sense of finality.
9 Report of the NWDT. Vol.il Chapter 15.
7
Environmental Costs:
The DOEF’s Note to PM also contained another dubious claim that the environmental cost of the submerging
forest in the SSP5 alone was about Rupees 80 billion ( the total cost the SSP is Rupees 64 billion). The
anti-dam movement did not lose time to adopt this additional cost to attack the SSP on the front of the
economic viability. Between 1988 and end of 1989, this was a clincher argument. It enjoyed mega publicity
in the media articles. The Environment Defense Fund(EDF) of the USA, the NGO leading the crusade in
the North presented this argument to the US Senate in June 1988 to prove that the Project was economically
non-viable?0 The environmental cost of the Project was incredibly based on the rule of thumb devised by
the Forest Research Institute(FRI), Dehradun which was adopted by the DOEF in the form of a guideline
it issued.11 This guideline was issued in January 1986 three years after the SSP application reached DOEF.
The environmental costs computed by the DOEF on the basis of the guidelines found place in the Note to
PM and predictable storm ensued.10
12 An economist connected with the NSP, Dr. S Pant, made inquiry with
11
the FRI and the DOEF to find out the economic rationale of the guideline. He found none. But he also
found out that there was no economist on the staff of either FRI or DOEF.13 The mischievous controversy
initiated by the DOEF continued unabated until Vijay Paranjapyc, a noted activist-economist punctured the
whole argument by stating bluntly in his book that this was a magic figure and no justification or rationale
had been provided by the DOEF.14 Silence fell on this issue of environmental cost and connected economic
non-viability of the Project. Nobody has since even mentioned the economic costs of the environment. No
doubt the Project still remains economically non-viable as before but now on different grounds as propounded
by Vijay Paranjapye.15
Benefit-Cost exercise based on the DOEF guidelines was done by the GOG in 1986. The DOEF was then
still sitting on the environmental clearance. Morse-Berger in the course of their investigation must have come
across this guidelines and the benefit-cost exercise done by the GOG. They ought to have asked the DOEF
whether this was a serious exercise in environmental monitoring? Did such considerations stall the clearance?
Was there nothing more important on the DOEFs mind than such dubious exercises? How was this exercise
which absorbed considerable time and energy of the DOEF, related to environmental Studies and Safeguards
in the SSP? They must have seen this mischief played by the DOEF. But they maintain a discrete silence on
this. And this is not the only silence they observe on the way the DOEF has conducted itself on the issue of
environmental clearance at various stages. We will have more occassions to see how they turn blind eye to
the DOEFs ways on issues of compliance and R&R. The assessment of the environmental clearance by the
DOEF and related issues was also a part of the TOR. Morse-Berger have failed in doing proper justice to
the TOR. What credence can one give to the DOEF and now also to Morse-Berger when they say that
clearance was not given because the studies were not done or programmes not prepared? We will see in the
next section of compliance that Morse-Berger Report is haunted by the same problem of credence if more
seriously.
Compliance:
As we have seen above sizable controversy about the compliance still originates from the conditional
clearance letter, associated documents and the circumstances surrounding it. The letter not only listed eight
broad topics required to be studied, it also set time limit to it, i.e. 1989.
Morse-Berger team has made a major issue of the fact that the studies to be completed before 1989 were
not completed in the time limit and even after that. This particular point is repeated throughout the text on
10 Statement by Bruce Rich of Environment Defense Fund, Washington before the subcommittee on Foreign Operations Committee on
Appropriations, United States Senate - June 14, 1988. P.ll.
11 Refer DOEF, GOI circular No. 11 - 61/85 - FKY (Cons) - Cost Benefit Analysis dated 13/1/86, Annexure II item 5.
12 The GOG had faithfully followed this dubious guidelines to work out costs in the SSP and also benefits. The Note to the PM ignores the
GOG costs, puts its own costs and pointedly does not mention the benefits worked out by the GOG, op-cit. Page 117.
13 Calculation of Benefit-Cost Ratio - Interview with Dr. S.P. Pant - Part 2. Pages 90-100, in ‘Damning the Narmada’- op-cit
14 "High Dams on the Narmada” by Vijay Paranjpye, INTACH, New Delhi 1990. P.225.
15 This argument for all its freshness and newness also suffers from equally grave defects. But it can not be taken up in this paper. The whole
critique of economic viability deserves a thorough treatment in a historical perspective.
i
8
many occasions. The Report would have been more illuminating if it had also described in detail the status
of each of the general studies that were asked for and the time point at which this assessment was done so
that the degree of incompleteness of these studies and their impact could be assessed by all. In fact, another
reason the clearance letter should also be criticized is to be found in very general and vague conditions it
lays down because then there arc no specific and objective criteria to assess the degree of compliance and
their significance in terms of adverse impacts. The assessment then becomes highly subjective, arbitrary and
prone to abuses. Morse- Berger team could have easily seen this gap and could have provided concrete
details in their assessment to overcome the weakness of the letter and its serious mischief potentials. Instead
they themselves made final announcements as it were without doing any detailed assessment themselves which
has become a kind of hallmark of the report throughout. The Report easily lays itself open to serious charge
which in fact, it has levelled at the NCA (P230.), i.e. the Report’s major conclusions are in the form of ipse
dixit.
More specifically, Morse-Berger could have easily judged for themselves the rationality and fairness of
1989 deadline if they had also considered DOEF’s Note to PM sent just before the clearance was given in
June, 1987. The Note is very clearly stating in at least two sections of environmental concerns, the CAT and
flora-fauna survey (both for NSP) that the studies would take at least two to three years which means the
DOEF failed to apply its mind in setting the deadline of 1989 ignoring its own assessment done one month
prior to the issuance of Clearance letter. Only Morse-Berger can answer the question as to why they overlooked
such significant lack of application of mind and arbitrariness of deadline set by the DOEF. More, they have
to explain how did they adopt such deadline to pronounce judgments regarding compliance.
They then turn their attention to more substantive issue of compliance of the conditions (pari-passu with
the Project Works). They begin with the difficulties they faced in assessing compliance because of the dispute
between the NCA and the DOEF about who is to assess the compliance and who is to define progress
(P.229).
According to Morse-Berger ‘‘There are differences between documentation available from the Narmada
Control Authority and that available from the Ministry of Environment and Forests.”(P.229)
Further “The 1987 clearance required ‘complete details’ in eight areas by 1989. The Narmada Control
Authority maintains that despite some slippage, all arc on track and will be completed pari-passu with the
Project. The Ministry of Environment and Forests is less optimistic. A summary of its position as of December
1991 is as follows.” (P.229). A 9 point summary of the DOEF position as of December 1991 follows. They
obviously approve of this summary. They do not consider it necessary, in view of the conflict between the
NCA and the DOEF, to even check with the NCA or to ask for their version, nor do they offer their comment
or analysis of the meaning these findings can have for pari-passu clause of the clearance.
They then refer to the minutes of the NCA meeting in early 199116 and say “The Chairman began with
an enquiry about the scope of pari-passu implementation. He noted that ‘some of the environmental safeguard
measures are on going as per schedule and some others (a major part) arc not’” (P.231). According to the
statement of Morse-Berger quoted here it is quite clear that the Chairman of the NCA said in the meeting
that while some of the environment Safeguard measures were progressing on schedule, the majority of the
measures were not progressing so.
We have checked the Minutes of the 38th meeting of the NCA they have cited.
* No where, the quotation cited by Morse-Berger is to be found.
*
* Chairman of the NCA meeting - always secretary Ministry of Water Resources - did not say, even
remotely, what is being quoted and attributed to him by Morse-Berger.
* Although exact quotation is not found in the document, something similar to what is quoted was said
by the secretary Ministry of Environment and Forests (Even he did not make enquiry about scope of
pari-passu implementation!)
16 Minutes of 38th Meeting of the NCA. March 1991. Item No XXXVI 1-6(417): Activities of the Environment Sub Group.
♦ The minutes records that Mr. D.C.Dcbnath, Executive Member of the NCA informed the Secretary
MOEF that “As such pari-passu action was already underway on most of the major items of work required
to be undertaken in the Environmental context.”
* The minutes similarly did not record as Morse-Berger claim it did (P.231), that “the NCA had not
applied for extension of time for compliance with the conditions of clearance as had been decided at the
meeting with the Chief ministers held on September 18,1990.”
The discrepancies between what Morse-Berger say the document says, and what is actually said in the
document itself are so big and unbridgeable that they can be described only as distortions introduced by
Morse-Berger. By attributing critical comments, which was in fact made, if at all, by the secretary of the
DOEF, about compliance in relation to pari-passu clause to the chairman of the NCA what are they trying
to achieve? They of course know the best but one interpretation claims our attention. They have referred to
the dispute between the NCA and the DOEF about who is to assess compliance? Who is to judge progress?
They have also referred to conflicting documentations from both sides.
Then they quote from the DOEF document of December 1991 to show that compliance is lacking.
Then logically and to be fair they quote the NCA document of March 1991 to show again that compliance
is faltering, with a crucial difference this time - by distorting the contents of the document at critical places.
Thus to a great satisfaction of Morse-Berger both the disputants, not only the DOEF but also the NCA
have reached the same conclusion of non compliance of the conditions.
We have cited the most important ‘factual’ evidence Morse-Berger have gathered and reported about
compliance in the chapter on - Environment: Context and Compliance. They and they only constitute their
material evidence to prove that compliance regarding studies and implementation part of conditional clearance
with its pari-passu clause is lacking.
Morse-Berger made enquiries at least up to March 1992 in India and thereafter they continued to ask for
and to get information from Canada from various sources. They had access to most authentic documents,
like those of Environment Sub Group (ESG) which was specially and specifically set up to monitor compliance
of conditional clearance after June 1987. In this chapter and other chapters they have used information from
this source. Why did they not consult the minutes of latest meeting of ESG to check and report the state of
compliance? Why did they choose to rely on rather dated information of 1991, and that too in effect from
only one source - the DOEF? Their reluctance to refer to ESG meeting reports is remarkable. No where in
their report one can find convincing answers to these searching and relevant questions. Their conclusions are
based on distortions and significant omissions of sources of information. They arc marred.
In the last weeks of 1990 and early part of 1991 anti dam activists in the middle of their heightened struggle
against the Project had made public a part of the Agenda Notes of the ESG meeting (August 1990) to claim
that according to the DOEF the Conditional Clearance had lapsed. The minutes of this meeting held on 7
September 1990, tells a different story. Lapse of Clearance is not even mentioned. The minutes records the
explanation offered by a high official of MP. Mr. N.B.Lohani that due to physical, financial, cost sharing and
other constraints, the CAT works were lagging behind. He was referring to the unresolved problem of the
extent to which the CAT works had to be done by the Project authorities i.e. Either to do works in the directly
draining catchment areas as stipulated in the Planning Commission Guidelines or to do it in the freely draining
catchment areas as insisted upon by the DOEF. (Even Morse-Berger have avoided to take a stand on this
dispute in their Report.) The minutes further record that except for CAT works other studies/ implementation
of Action Plans was going on normally. The anti-dam movement had deftly skirted the minutes of the meeting
which is the authentic document recording what transpired at the meeting and highlighted only the agenda
notes. The EDF leading other 40 NGOs of Europe and North America repeated this claim in the Memorandum
they submitted to the World Bank President on March 20, 1991, obviously disregarding the minutes of the
meeting. The movement still continues to argue that the Conditional Clearance has lapsed on the basis of
the Agenda Notes. The prize, however must go to Morse-Berger. Because in their Report (P.230) they are
referring to both Agenda and minutes of August-September 1990 of ESG meeting, but go on quoting, without
clearly stating so, only from the Agenda Notes prepared by the DOEF itself that the DOEFs conditional
approval “must be deemed to have lapsed” and quoting apparently from the agenda notes only that “the
Project authorities should seek renewal of environmental and Forestry clearance.” Clearly Morse- Berger
have gone a step further from the anti-dam movement or the EDF. They refer to both agenda and minutes,
quote only agenda but create an appearance that these quotations pertain to both the agenda notes and the
minutes. Real truth of what happened in the meeting as recorded in the minutes is held back, to convey that
conditional clearance has lapsed!
10
Careful reading of the environmental part of the Morse-Berger Report further reveals to us the length
they are prepared to go to prove the point that the Project authorities arc not complying with the conditions
of the clearance. In ti.c chapter on Upstream Environment (P.275) Morse-Berger argue “ In India early
considerations about the flora and fauna in the upstream area were based on general concerns of Sardar
Sarovar and the Narmada Sagar Projects taken together. The 1987 briefing Note to the P.M. by the Ministry
of Environment and Forest deals with the flora and fauna for both Projects and slates the need for a ‘Master
Plan’ showing just not the present status but also the likely scenarios after the Project is implemented.” Since
the two Projects are now considered separately, Morse- Berger seem to hint, the flora-fauna survey for both
the projects and common Master Plan for both has fallen by the side and the compliance has suffered. It is
clear to anyone who reads the relevant portion of the Note to the P.M. (section v) which Morse-Berger quote
that the entire section unambiguously refers to the NSP only. The Master Plan naturally refers to the NSP.
Again only Morse-Berger can explain how, what only applies to the NSP is made applicable to the SSP also?
Morse-Berger have done it again. Ala anti-dam activists, they have also opted for the strategy of fixing on
the SSP what was actually said about the NSP.
The sequence of arguments presented here show that Morse-Berger are clearly not after objective evidences
to find out the actual status of compliance of conditions. They are out to prove some how that compliance
is completely out of step and that compliance pari-passu with the Project Works is not possible. This conclusion
is not explicitly stated in the text - it finds its place, as always in the Letter to the World Bank President
(P.XXIV) and in ‘Findings and Recommendations’(P.355). What is stated in the text instead is a serious
charge of gross delinquency with regard to the compliance.
In the last but one paragraph of the Chapter 10 they quote Bank Office Memorandum dated November
19, 1990, “ if one looks at what the Bank legal agreements state with respect to environmental studies and
training, and the MOEF [Ministry of Environment and Forests] clearance requirements, those who are not
fully familiar with the background might conclude that there has been gross delinquency”. And then they
add, “ We did examine the background. We find it difficult to escape that conclusion”. (PP.233/34)
We have also examined very minutely the background of Morse-Berger’s charge of delinquency. We find
that their scathing criticism is based more on unsubstantiated assertions (ipse-dixit) than on hard objective
facts they have been able to unearth. They have time and again overlooked the mischiefs played by the DOEF
which have serious implications. But most importantly they have introduced indefensible selections, suppressing
in the process vital information, in their arguments and finally introduced their own distortions at strategic
places to pursue their strategic goal to prove compliance has failed and that compliance pari-passu Project
Works is impossible. Their assessment regrettably is seriously tainted by distortions and suppressions of facts.
And yet they in their abounding confidence are charging the Project authorities and the Bank staff with
‘gross delinquency’.
And yet in the chapter on ‘Findings and Recommendations’ they argue with great eloquence and fervor
that “we have been at pains in the sections of this chapter summarizing our findings to demonstrate how
these problems of human and environmental impact encompass all aspects of the Projects, including the
uncertainties of hydrology, the upstream questions, the impact downstream, the command area issues, the
health risks, the deficiencies in resettlement policy and implementation in each of the three states as well as
the canal. None of these issues can be ignored” (PP.355-56).
We fully agree with their conclusion that none of these issues can be ignored. But we argue how in the
strategic chapter of Hydrology they fumble and avoid repeatedly to take on the central challenge of proving
the quantum of water in Narmada to be less than what was decided by the NWDT and incredibly enough
yet decree that NWDT assumption was proved to be wrong. We have also seen how on the issues of
environmental clearance and the compliance with conditions they commit blunder after blunder, how they
state their final opinions without substantiating them, how they turn blind eye to the DOEF’s serious mischiefs
on the issue of clearance, suppress relevant information and even distort crucial documents to prove their
point that compliance pari-passu Project works has failed.
We will presently see that their reporting on R&R issues is similarly marred by serious methodological
flaws, suppression and selection of evidence and even distortion of the evidence. We argue with a heavy sense
of responsibility that the same traits hold supreme in other issues of upstream, downstream and command
environment and of health that they assess and report.
11
RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION (R&R)
hue R&R in SSP has a complex historical selling. In 1980, when the foundation work began, the historical
L experience of poor R&R performance of lhe stales had become an issue. In large developmental Projects,
especially \s aler- development Projects, the ouslees had been given a raw deal and lhe prevalent ideology held
that in the process of development and modernizalion, this was inevitable- for the benefits of many a few had to
sacrifice. We found this logic inhuman and unacceptable. The implied rationale derived from inevitable historical
march towards modernization and inevitable human costs was unacceptable to us - then and now'. We also
accepted lhe basic fact that Narmada'Waters will go to predominantly waler scarce command. In early 1986, a
struggle began in Maharashtra and M.P. Ils only focus was a belter R&R policy. The principal demand of
Maharashtra, and M.P. ouslees was also for minimum land entitlements as we have argued before.1 In December
1987, Gujarat was forced to declare lhe new R&R Policy demanded by us. The GOG was facing a first real threat
against the SSP. The R&R issue had become a major issue and il remains so even today. The December. 1987
policy conceded all the demands we had made - a core demand being minimum two hectares of land entitlement
to each oustce family (defined as 18 year old son - married or unmarried) irrespective of the nature of title of the
land held or not held by the family. Moreover, a family had a clear right of choice of land. ARCH-Vahini and the
ouslees of Gujarat accepted the policy package.
Until this time, no grass root organisations active in the three states of the valley had raised any issue of
the viability or desirability of lhe SSP on environmental or economic considerations. The oustees in each
state were explicitly demanding land. They were extremely doubtful that such rights will be conceded. They
were even more doubtful that in fact they will be given land as just compensation. Within a few months of
the major policy breakthrough in Gujarat, lhe grass-root activists in Maharashtra, and MP and the intellectuals
in Bombay, Delhi, Ahmedabad etc. declared their opposition to the Project on the ground that the SSP was
a planned disaster - social, economic and environmental. When in April 1991 #F Ibid we raised lhe question
that the sudden shift in lhe objective from ‘just R&R’ to ‘no dam’ position lacked rational coherence and
plausibility, lhe reply from lhe anti-dam movement was that we did not understand lhe process and experience
which the organisations in Maharashtra and MP had gone through.”
Our argument in April 1991 relied on the published reports, articles, letters of the movement during that
critical transition. The reply did not reveal any error in our analysis of the documents we had relied upon,
nor did it reveal new sources which could give a coherent and plausible explanation in the shift made. Mere
denial or assertion that we did not understand lhe process is not the hard argument our analysis of the
situation around shift demanded.
It is very significant that the most important criticism the anti-dam movement offered in those days was
non availability of land even for the oustees of Gujarat. The R&R was deemed to be in principle impossible
because of the non availability of land. The issues of tribal life style, of destruction of their culture, of their
dependence on lhe river etc, were not lhe most important issues on the forefront. This has happened only
after lhe Morse-Berger report became public. And this makes sense, because lhe memory of lhe activists in
Maharashtra and MP was still fresh that lhe oustees’ overwhelming demand in those days (even now) was
land. Indeed, the activists in MP had candidly conceded in 1988 that while they were oppossed to the Project
“for all the standard reasons that arc too well known to require repetition”, lhe tribals in MP would readily
accept resettlement, if they were given adequate and good quality land and their opposition to lhe dam was
rooted in the fact that they perceived that the land will not be given to them.1
23
After the opposition to the dam was declared in middle of 1988, for three years an idea had gained ground
that the tribals of the valley were opposed to lhe Project, irrespective of lhe quality of R&R package. By lhe
middle of 1991, the ground level reality was irrepressible both in Maharashtra and MP that the tribals’ prime
objective had remained belter R&R policy. Majority of the tribals of Maharashtra villages had broken away
from lhe anti- dam movement. And a group of most interior tribal villages had set up their own independent
organisation to press for the policy reforms which the activist organisations had abandoned half-way. They
1
R&R in SSP: Are the Critics Right? April 1991. - ARC! i-VAI UNI.
2
Response to ARCH-Vahini’s Critique of Narmada Bachao /Xndolan and Anti-dam arguments - Mcdha Patkar and colleagues - NBA.
Undated.
3
Towards People s Power in Jhabua - SWRC - A1THA in People’s Action - May 1988 P. 19. SWRC is the activist organisation in MP opposed
to the SSP.
12
in fact organized a rally in April 1992 and gave a memorandum of demands for better R&R to the Chief
minister of Maharashtra. In MP, amongst tribals, the same type of move is in the offing. The Morse-Berger
report has acknowledged this process in a subdued manner. They have not analysed and examined the
implications of this movement for the R&R with a thoroughness it deserves.
The Morse-Berger Report has also categorically declared that R&R is impossible. The detailed reasoning
offered by them is substantially different from what the anti-dam movement has been offering to reach the
same conclusion. They seem to agree with one another with regard to very high number of affected families
in MP who ought to have land entitlement which is one way or other denied to them. Morse-Berger have
also pointedly refused to acknowledge, let alone analyse, highly negative role played by the DOEF which
gave a boost to the anti-dam movement during the critical years from before 1988 until now.
GUJARAT:
The anti-dam movement had raised a host of questions on the possibility of R&R in Gujarat. To begin
with, they argued that enough land was not available, that the burden was on the oustees to find the land
which was impossible task and that they were loosing hope very fast, that only a handful of the oustees were
going to get land and others were going to be left high and dry, that only a few villages in Gujarat were
benefiting, serving as a show-case; that the Land Purchase Committee (LPC) - a key mechanism to buy
private land for R&R - was recking with corruption and exorbitantly high prices to the big land owners were
being offered, that the oustee villages were splintering into small fragments and the tribal community was
thus breaking apart, that the landless labourers working on the lands being allotted to the oustees were now
being rendered jobless creating what was called ‘Secondary displacement’; that the oustees who were allotted
land were discovering that the land was not good and they had begun to return to their original place of
submergence and that very soon the trickle of return was going to turn into flood of return.
Morse-Berger Team, in Gujarat, naturally went through the whole gamut of issues including those mentioned
above. They accepted (he basic fact that more than 3500 out of 4500 families in Gujarat had been given the
land which they had ciiosen themselves and that it was not confined to a few chosen hand-picked families.
The Report also freely praised the LPC for its energy and thoroughness and quietly ignored the charges of
reeking corruption. They examined the issue of Secondary displacement and found no basis to it and omitted
to even mention it in the Report. They raised no question of quality of land offered to the oustees, and
pointedly ignored the prediction made by the anti-dam movement that the trickle of return will soon turn
into a flood of return. They also accepted the fact that the most vulnerable tribal community of Bhils about
whose welfare there was a legitimate and wide-spread concern was not fragmented because of resettlement,
although they felt that scatter in terms of the number of sites where the- oustees have got their lands is
alarming (P.106). In the chapter on findings, the Report concedes that this is in part a result of choices made
by the oustees and that the scatter effect was observed especially in case of Rock Fill Dyke villages.4
The Report records ARCH-Vahini’s contention that the tribal communities have not been more scattered
than they were in their original place, but fails to record our reasons and arguments for saying so. We had
in fact argued that the number of sites, where the land was allotted was not a good criterion to determine
the scatter effect, but the distances the individuals and their groups had to travel before and after the
resettlement to their fields and to their friends and relatives of the same village is a sensible criterion to
decide the scatter effect. In other words, we are arguing about the degree of closeness and separateness after
the resettlement of the individual families belonging to the same villages. While Morse-Berger recognize the
crucial factor of choice of the land the oustees have exercised, they should have also recognized more explicitly
the effect this choice could have made in the distances amongst groups and individuals, because then they
would have discovered that in village, even in each hamlet of the village, there were families and groups who
were deliberately opting to go to a place away from those with whom they did not want to live as closely as
they had in the original villages. This omission of Morse- Berger is somewhat unfortunate, because they have
failed to capture a realistic picture of social dynamics at work and to probe more deeply the possible effect
in future of this and other dynamics of population in flux. Morse-Berger have, no doubt, found other problems
in Gujarat to which now we turn:
4 These 5 villages were displaced in the early 1980s because of the construction of Rock Fill Dykes and had been resettled in the vicinity of the
dam site according to the old R&R Policy of June, 1979. The new policy of December, 1987 offers them enlarged package of land
entitlements but the additional lands in the surrounding area is not avoilable. Major sons have, therefore, to move further away causing the
split in the extended families. fhis is reprehensible, but inevitable given the recalcitrance of the Government in early 80s.
13
* They argue that of the three tribal communities, Tadvis and Rathwas arc more enterprising, and they
look forward to new opportunity offered by the land of good quality and can cope with the new economic
opportunity/challengc they are presented with. They are really worried about the future of the Bhils who
they feel are the least enterprising and least integrated with the mainstream life. Their problems, they
feel, are going to be immense. And yet, in each of the four detailed case-studies they cite (PP.109-115)
to show that rehabilitation is not going to work out well, none pertains to Bhil community and their one
of the chief worries regarding poor prospects of Bhil rehabilitation remains essentially unsubstantiated.
Even the four case-studies that they cite suffer from their inability to distinguish the short-term,
temporary problems of transition like fodder and fuelwood shortages or inconvinicncies of temporary
and transit tin sheds the oustees were living in, from the long-term problems the oustees were going to
face.
* Morse-Berger seem to draw their most momentous long-term conclusion about the impossible
rehabilitation in contrast to successful immediate resettlement on the highly tenuous and wispy evidence
of some oustees’ reporting to them the promises that the Government had broken. ‘The broken promises’
is a constantlv recurring theme, not only for R&R in Gujarat, but also for the R&R of oustees of MP
and Maharashtra. So much revolves round these promises and yet when one tries to take a hard look at
the broken promises, it is difficult to precisely locate these promises. After very careful and painstaking
scrutiny, three promises stand out - promises ofpucca houses, irrigable land, and electricity in the houses.
They also give no information as to the proportion of PAPs who complain of broken promises. No policy
decision has ever been taken to give pucca houses to the oustees. The team knew about it, and should
have very clearly recorded this. If any officer at the field level was giving wrong promises to some oustees
and if the Team came to know about it, they should have recorded this as such and criticized the
Government for not taking disciplinary actions against erring officials. It 'could not have legitimately
made a point that a promise about pucca house was given and broken. As to the promise of irrigable
land, Morse-Berger should have known that most of the rehabilitation sites they went to see are in the
first phase of the SSP command where the irrigation will begin by 1994-95. This, of course, they knew,
but to deduce that the promise of irrigation is broken or will be broken, they have resorted to a speculation
to conclude that even “the most optimistic schedules will not deliver water for irrigation until 1995 and
possibly not until 1998" (P.114). This is a wild speculation, we are constrained to say, because they have
not given any cogent reasons to indulge in such prediction. Finally, about the promise of electricity. They
knew or should have, of course, known that the oustees were living in transit sheds. The electrification,
when takes place, would be in the permanent houses the oustees will be building this year and the next.
This is the status of the ‘broken promises’ on which hinges, according to Morse-Berger, the bleak
prospects of future rehabilitation. On this rests their case that relocation in Gujarat has taken place, but
rehabilitation is going to be impossible.
* Being investigators of great experience, they have known and recorded that “visitors can easily become
an opportunity for the airing of problems and therefore can cause bias towards negative statements.”
(P.113). But despite being aware of this serious methodological pitfail, they have failed to evolve and to
demonstrate the method they follow to avoid the trap. Even elementary methodological safeguards of
checking and cross- checking the information they got from some oustees, they have not demonstrably
followed. At some many critical points in their Report, they should have clearly relied upon a kind of a
Sample Survey about which also they don’t seem to be aware and have not followed the method and yet
some of the conclusions they reach could be safely based only on use of such methods.
It is this type of elementary methodological problems which led them to untenable conclusions. For example
they report of a large family of 5 brothers from Panchmuli (a Rock Fill Dyke village) which was resettled at
Gadkoi in early 80s. The family reported that in Panchmuli they had 200 buffaloes, 200 goats, 10 pairs of
bullocks and 90 cows and calves, but in Gadkoi they had only 7 or 8 buffaloes, 8 pairs of bullocks, 25 goats
and 22 cows and calves (P.99). If Morse-Berger had bothered to even look up the relevant volume of the
socio-economic baseline survey done by the Centre for Social Studies, Surat just before the village was displaced,
they would have found out that in Panchmuli out of 45 families who owned buffaloes, only 10 had more than
5 buffaloes and cows. Total number of buffaloes in the entire village was no where near 200.
EC Their total
reliance on such exaggerated stories and habit of not cross-checking shows up most dramatically in this
instance. Moreover, Morse-Berger give a long account of the woes of family to apparently demonstrate the
plight that has befallen on the 5 Rock Fill Dykes villages, betraying their lack of awareness of nature of
evidence one needs to arrive at broader conclusions.
* Similarly, to prove that as large as 50 per cent of the oustees (recognized to have land entitlements
following 1987 Policy and a major amendment to it in June 1990) of 5 Rock Fill Dyke villages had not
been allotted agricultural land, they citeFed/uaty 1991 figures released by the Nigam, according to which
466 out of 929 families have had their lands. Interestingly enough Morse-Berger who submitted their
14
Report in June, 1992 had asked for and received the latest figures from the Nigam which showed that till
January, 1992 593 families of these villages had been allotted land. The Report not only ignored this latest
figure which could have altered their percentages but also ignored to give the account of trend in land
allotment which is the most important measure of the assessment. They could have also taken note that
a large number of major sons had become eligible for land only after June, 1990. Thus, Morse- Berger
seem to resort to selective citing of the data to fit into the conclusion, which is yet another kind of serious
methodological error.
* Similarly Morse-Berger have repeatedly expressed their anxiety and lament that socio-cultural factors
were neglected in the resettlement of Gujarat oustees. This, according to them, is another major undoing
of the R&R process in Gujarat. They cite Report No 12 of CSS, Surat in support of this conclusion
(P.106). This Report was published in March 1991. Table 2-20, from which Morse-Berger draw their
conclusion, describes different reasons for selecting the land by different groups of tribals (only Bhils
and Rathwas) in the four most interior villages of Gujarat. It is clear that of the 402 out of 637 total oustee
families who had until then selected their land, only 2 cited social reason as a sole criterion of their choice
of land, 33 did not know their reason and the rest had selected their lands for economic and social
socio-economic reasons. There has been no coercion on oustees to select any particular parcel of land.
They have exercised full freedom in their choice. This even Morse-Berger have accepted. At the end of
such exercise, if the tribals chose their land predominantly on economic and socio-economic grounds,
Morse-Berger should have recognized this preference as a part of socio-cultural preference of the tribals
and not insist, as they did, that economic consideration the tribals made was divorced from and in
opposition to their socio-cultural life. They have, instead, chosen to lament the fact without producing
any evidence of coercion, that the tribals have given priority to economic consideration over other
considerations. And there is nothing new about this as we have seen above in case of MP, Maharashtra
and Gujarat. This also reflects the theoretical straight-jacket through which the reality is sought to be
interpreted and if there is a misfit between the two, the reality is questioned rather than theory! This is
perhaps the most serious methodological flaw the Report suffers from and which continues to recur
throughout the Report.
* It is this type of conceptual rigidity which has not allowed them to assess the true significance of almost
single-minded demand of the tribals in each of the three states for land entitlements in the memoranda
and charter of demands they had submitted to the authorities.5 In the same way, Morse-Berger Report
throughout describes and discusses the immense economic loss the tribals are going to suffer because of
the loss of river and forest resources. But they fail to measure the true significance of charter of demands
submitted by the activist organisations on behalf of tribals, of Reports published by CSS, Surat and those
by Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Bombay at least upto the end of 1991, or the reports submitted
by World Bank consultants and anthropologists like Prof. Thayer Scudder which attach a very modest
importance to the tribals’ economic dependence on Forest resources and virtually do not mention
resources derived from the river. In the face of this mass of evidence gathered over the years it is not
enough for Morse-Berger to merely assert their contrary position, they.had to effectively refute the
evidence by producing a concrete and credible evidence.
MAHARASHTRA
Availability of the suitable land was also a central problem of R&R in Maharashtra until at least
Morse-Berger began their inquiry. From the beginning of 1986, the oustees of 33 villages of Maharashtra
began organizing themselves under the banner of Narmada Dharangrast Samiti (NDS) which later on became
a central piece of much bigger organisation known as Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA). During the period
of 1986 and 1987, the NDS and the oustees formulated their demands for belter R&R Policy in Maharashtra.
Similar set of demands was being articulated by another organisation Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti
(NGNS) in MP. The main focus of these demands was on the provision of land to oustee families almost
identical to the demands we were making in Gujarat. The main difference between the demands of Gujarat
oustees and those of Maharashtra oustees was related to the fact that Maharashtra oustees were not demanding
private lands like their counter-parts in Gujarat, but were demanding degraded forest land in the vicinity.
One such area they had identified was the Taloda forest land. In a Memorandum submitted to the Government
of Maharashtra (GOM) in April 1986, the NDS specifically demanded that “ as per the principle agreed to
5 See the Memoranda by NDS and NGNS, 1986,1987.
15
in the WB Agreement, forest land available in the nearby Talukas - Akkalkuva, Taloda and Shahada should
be released for the rehabilitation purpose. They should be released, in spite of Forest Conservation Act 1980,
as is agreed to in WB Agreement.” In June 1987, Mcdha Patkar of NDS read a paper at a seminar on
Narmada Valley Projects in Bombay in which she slated that the only alternative was “to release large chunks
of denuded forest land which the Centre is reluctant to do, taking a rigid view of Forest Conservation Act
1980. The tribal-forest linkage, too, is not viewed seriously or not considered in planning alternatives.” As
late as November 1987, just a month before Gujarat’s new R&R Policy was announced, NDS and NGNS had
submitted to Narmada Control Authority (NCA) a list of 38 demands related to R&R, one of the most crucial
of which was the release of denude forest land for the resettlement.
In June 1988, Mr. Bruce Rich of the Environment Defense Fund (EDF), USA which spearheads the
anti-SSP movement in North America and Europe, made a submission to the US Senate that in Maharashtra
even the Government has reached a conclusion that no land for resettlement is available except for denuded
forest land, which the Forest Department has not agreed to release. The fact that the land has not been
released is another violation of WB Loan Agreement."
Soon after the EDF had made this submission, the organisations in Maharashtra and MP declared their
total opposition to the Project and claimed that the oustees were also opposing the Project. The anti-dam
movement had changed its goal radically - from ‘better R&R Policy
*
to the ‘No Dam’ position. With that,
their strategy on R&R took a full U-turn. The R&R was no longer an attainable goal as it was during 1986-87.
The R&R now was declared to be impossible not onl) in practice but also in principle. The principal reason
for impossible R&R in those early days was impossibility678of finding enough land for the oustees in the three
states. In Gujarat, the movement fondly hoped the required private land was not going to be available. In
MP, their main plank was total number of oustee families who w'ould need land. This, they argued, was going
to be 5 to 6 times larger than in Gujarat. There couldn’t be enough land for 22000 plus families. In Maharashtra
the NDS found a good ally in the DOEF, which was refusing to release the degraded forest land of Taloda
despite the provision to release the forest land for R&R if necessary in the legal agreement that GOI and
the three states had made with the WB. The DOEF, which was a target of strong criticism by the NDS and
the EDF until then was now a great help in their pursuit of R&R being impossible.
We have already examined the DOEF’s role on environment issues. The negative role of DOEF with regard
to the R&R is now coming into the focus. In June 1987, it gave a joint conditional clearance to both Lhe NSP
and SSP. In September 1987, in a separate letter, it allowed the diversion of the forest land for the construction
of SSP.6 A similar letter for the NSP followed in October 1987.7 Naturally, a question can arise - why in the
matter of two months the DOEF thought it fit to write separate letters? A whim or a caprice could be one
possible explanation. But a more substantial reason suggests itself, if we read the conditions attached to these
letters more carefully. The SSP letter of September 1987 contains a clause the no forest land will be diverted
for the R&R purpose. The NSP letter of October 87 fails to carry such a clause. The intent of this difference
seems quite clear. The target was R&R in Maharashtra, because only in Maharashtra, the oustees were
clamoring for Taloda foi< t land from the very beginning. The WB was generally aware of the reality that
tribals would demand degraded forest land and had got therefore the clause for release of degraded forest
land inserted in the LA in May 1985. The DOEF, of course, knew of the agreement the GOI had entered
into, and yet without any hesitation or fear of contradiction had inserted this clause in the letter of September
‘87. And since in the NSP there was no WB Agreement, the DOEF calmly decided to exclude the clause in
its letter of October 1987. This reinforces an inference that it was a willful act of the DOEF, specifically
aimed at lhe SSP.
After this, the DOEF continued to ignore the WB Agreement insisting on the condition it stipulated in
September ‘87 letter and with a great energy continued to resist the release of Taloda forest land. Indeed,
it accused the Maharashtra Government that it was creating a crisis situation so as to resolve the issue as a
special case. Il also charged the GOM that it had not categorically told the oustees that forest land will not
be available? It even went so far as to pressurise the GOM that they should actively encourage lhe oustees
to go to Gujarat. The DOEF was completely oblivious of the fact that this w-as a gross violation of lhe
6 No.8 • 372/83 - FC Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests - 8th Sept. 1987.
7 No.8 - 646/84 - FC Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests - 7th Oct. 1987.
8 Minutes - NCA - Rehabilitation Sub Group meeting December 1989, P3-4.
I
16
oustees’ legal right to choose the Stale they wanted to settle as embodied in the NWDT Award and WB
Agreement or they did not care. If there w
*as a case of human right violation, this was the case!
All these documents and their analysis were submitted to Mr. Thomas Berger at Baroda in February 1992.
All Morse-Berger do in their Report about these documents and analysis is just to keep them out of the
Report and suppress their existence. The only tangential and passing reference to this explosive material is
made not in chapters on R&R, but in one of the footnotes of first chapter on Environment (P.225).
Morse-Berger have vexed eloquent on the human right violations done by the GOM and the GOMP - on
often imaginary grounds, but have pointedly covered up the sins of omissions and commissions by the DOEF
in this regard also. This raises a serious question mark on the sincerity of Morse-Berger’s concern for human
rights.
Then, under the WB pressure, the DOEF had to release Taloda land in June 1990. The NDS made a great
somersault. On 31st July 1990, the NDS submitted a memorandum9
1011
to the GOM claiming that this was a
Memorandum on behalf of oustees of 33 Maharashtra villages and that they rejected the Taloda forest land.
It further said, “ It is reprehensible that the Central Government agreed to release forest land in Maharashtra
for rehabilitation in clear contravention of the conditional clearance given to the SSP which clearly stated
that no forest land can be used for resettlement purposes.” and “the clearance is then tantamount to selling
India’s ecological and social future at the behest of a foreign agency’”. The EDF in U.S.A, picking up the
cu# soon followed it up barring the last sentence. In a Memorandum submitted to the WB in March 1991,
the EDF together with 47 NGOs in Europe, Japai. and Australia criticized the Bank severely that.the oustees
of 33 villages of Maharashtra had rejected the Taloda forest land and yet the WB was forcing the oustees
the land they dici not want thus violating the terms of the LA. Massive contradictions of the NDS and the
EDF are there for anyone to sce.The enormity of their manipulations and hollowness of their concern for
the human rights of the tribal oustees came out in open April 1992, w'hen the oustees of the 10 most interior
villages of Maharashtra incensed by the manipulation committed in their name by the NDS and its supporters
overseas, submitted a memorandum to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra exposing their falsehood to state
categorically that they were cheated and had been never asked their opinion, and had not even been informed
of the release of the Taloda forest land which they had always demanded and w'hich they wanted even now.
They, in fact, demanded that the 2700 ha. of released forest land may not be enough for their resettlement
and more should be released. This is so far the best documented case of manipulation of tribals’ wishes and
aspirations. Amita Baviskar, a self-avowed supporter of the anti-dam movement, whose many observations
Morse-Berger report frequently and with great approval, has also wjitten in a forthright manner in one of
her articles1 that the NBr\ makes its own decisions, without consulting the tribals, that they are just the
passive recipients of the decisions made at the top of the pyramid. that (he tribal symbols arc manipulated
by the NBA to further its cause and their resource base is severely depleted contrary to the claims made by
the activists of the NBA.
Faced with these massive manipulations intended to render R&R impossible in Maharashtra. Morse-Berger
simply chose to ignore them and carried on, as it were, the task of showing the R&R to be impossible. Their
line of attack is distinctly different from the one adopted by the anti-dam activists and the DOEF. The Report
carries such dramatic statements as:
• As many as 809c of the Project Affected Persons (PAPs) arc faced with some degree of dispossession
as a result of existing R&R policy. (P.137)
* None of the oustees of 24 villages of Akrani submergence communities (in Maharashtra) identified as
forest villages, qualify for 2 hectares of land.(PP.165, XIX.) Rather as landless, they are eligible to apply
for 1 acre (0.4 ha) only.(P.165)
9 Office Memorandum No.8 - 29/89 - FC dated 15-3-1990
10 Narmada - A Campaign News letter. December 1990, P.6., published by Narmada Bachao Andolan. New Delhi.
11 Amita Baviskar. The Researcher as a Pilgrim' in lx>kayan Bulletin vol 9 3'4 1991 PP 91-97.
17
* “Neither MP nor Maharashtra acknowledge any right of cncroachers to adequate land on resettle
ment.” (P. XVI) and “that cncroachers must be treated as landless ouslees with no entitlement of
adequate land for cultivation on resettlement.”(P XVII.)
Morse-Berger make the first statement categorically on the first page of chapter on Maharashtra. One
naturally expects that a tightly argued case in support of this conclusion will follow immediately. Nothing of
the kind follows. Instead, there follows an analysis of two relevant policy documents of the GOM - Government
Resolutions dated June 29, 1989 and February 26, 1992. The June 1989 GR specifically provided that any
oustcc who had encroached upon the forest land prior to March 1978 as per the survey carried out in 1985
shall be eligible to get 2 ha. of land only.
* The GR excluded major sons of these cncroachers from any land entitlement i.e. they were not to be
treated even as landless with entitlement of one acre of land.
• All post - 1978 encroachcrs were treated as landless with entitlement of 1 acre (0.4 Ha) of land.
* This way the June 1989 GR created various categories of ouslees - 'those with land, regularized
encroachcrs, major sons of land-holders and regularized encroachcrs, landless agricultural laborers,
joint holders etc- with various types of land entitlements.
These categories created a lot of confusion. But more importantly it excluded a large no. of families of
major sons of landed ouslees and of regularized encroachcrs from any land entitlements.
The 26lh February 1992 GR sought to streamline the categories and also to correct deficiencies related
to major sons and others.
* The category of landed now included two categories of June 1989 GR - land owning ouslees and pre
March 1978 encroachcrs.
* A new- an - embracing category of landless was created w'hich now included major sons and major
unmarried daughters of landed ouslees - i.e. land owning ouslees and regularized cncroachers and post
1978 cncroachers.
• This GR gives explicit right of irrigable agricultural land to landless ouslees.
• The GR also removes injustice to the regularized encroachcrs by giving them the status of landed
ouslees, w'hich entitles them to irrigated agricultural land of an area equal to that of land acquired, subject
to the ceiling and minimum 2 ha. of such land. The previous GR gave them only 2 ha of land and did not
specifically sa\ whether it will be irrigated or not.
The net effect of this GR was to give a status of landed ouslees to a majority of ouslees in lhe 24 villages
of Akrani taluka of Maharashtra, who were treated as encroachcrs by the GOM. A historical injustice to
these tribals was finally set right. 855 out of 1485 oustcc families of these 24 villages thus became landed
ouslees. Major sons of these ouslees were now given land entitlement of 1 acre of irrigated land. Similarl),
another GR of February 1990 pertaining to the acquisition of marooned (lapu) land gave entitlements of
landed oustce to 192 families in Akrani, thus making total of 1047 out of 1485 (70.5%) of the 24 villages of
Akrani taluka entitled to minimum 2 ha. of irrigated land. Morse-Berger have strangely not only ignored this
GR and its beneficiaries but they have also raised a false issue of their plight in their Report.(PP.146-47).
All this w-as known or should have been known to Morsc-Bcrgcr. They have analysed June 19S9 and
February. 1992 GRs in great details. (PP 138-39) They should have known a plain fact that 70.5 per cent
oustec families of 24 Akrani villages have the entitlement of minimum 2 ha. of irrigated land, W'hich should
have been staled immediately after the GRs were analysed. But this was not done. For the following 26 pages
of the text, other issues are discussed. Suddenly on P.165, the dramatic statement makes its appearance. “
Since all of the Akrani submergence communities arc identified as ‘forest villages’ none of their ouslees
qualify for two hectares of land at Taloda.”
This statement stands in a stark contrast with the hard fact that 70.5 per cent of the Akrani ouslees are
treated as landed ouslees with lhe commensurate land entitlements. Morse-Berger conclusion is not based
18
on credible facts and hangs as it were in the air. It is a classical case of non-sequitur, which, as we have seen
before, occurs with a great frequency in the Report. This dramatic statement, taken as established, is lifted
from the text to be incorporated in the letter to Mr. Preston which is read by many more readers than the
whole Report, achieving its intended effect that things must be very bad on R&R front. The same strategy
has been adopted about environmental issues and about R&R in MP.
Morse-Berger give a very strange treatment to some issues surrounding Taloda forest land. At three places
in the Report, they bemoan the fact that 2700 ha. of Taloda forest land may not be enough to resettle all
the families and this is the basis of their conclusion that implementation in Maharashtra will be limited by
the availability of irrigable land. (P.351) It is difficult to understand their pessimism, because they could have
easily made a forceful recommendation to release more of the degraded forest land, if necessary. This, they
don’t do. This is very strange also because they have themselves said in the Report (P.263) that the existing
forest on the proposed Taloda resettlement area is degraded with low diversity of vegetation, that although
some areas arc well-wooded, most of the trees are a fast-growing species with a little value except for fuel
wood and even for that purpose the trees are less desirable than most alternative species. NDS had in a
memorandum of 31st July 1990, referred to above, had dubbed the release of this land as ‘selling of India’s
ecological future at the behest of foreign agency.’
Morse-Berger, in the course of their visit to Taloda area, met with the local people who told them that
they were not unduly alarmed by the prospects of resettlement site near to their village. (P.165) The Report
then embarks on extraordinarily strange course of argument. Il says : “These findings appear to contradict
the conclusion arrived at by the Tata Institute research team. However, their work is more extensive and
look them to all 10 of the villages directly al risk as a result of use of Taloda Forest for resettlement sites.”
(P.165) Morse-Berger then go on citing the second TISS Report of February. 1992 on Taloda Forest Land.
They also refer to TISS’s first May 1991 Report on Taloda Forest Land. Quoting the second 1992 TISS
Report, they stale that the 10 villages in Taloda forest area depend upon 800 ha. of forest for grazing and
fire wood. Then they report that a large number of encroachers were already displaced to make way for
resettlement. The February, 1992 Report also says that the host population is completely set against the
proposed rehabilitation.
A number of disturbing questions arise about this argument. TISS had done a first comprehensive study
of the area in May 1991 barely 9 months before the second study of the same area. The May 1991 Report
while discussing all the relevant points does not talk of dependence on 800 ha. of forest of surrounding villages
for grazing and firewood. Il talks about eviction of the encroachers, but does not say large numbers and
actually does not give the numbers of those who have been evicted. And lastly, it says nowhere in the Report.
like the February, 1992 Report says, that the host community is completely opposed to the resettlement. The
May 1991 Report of TISS sharply differs from its February. 1992 Report. Morse-Berger had to contend not
only with w'hal they were told by the people of the host villages during their visit to Taloda sometimes in
February. 1992, but they also had to effectively contend with TISS’s own May 1991 Report. By more or less
ignoring the core contents of 1991 Report and quoting from 1992 Report, they can hardly achieve the end
result they w-ant to. In fact, the only course open to them, when the host villagers told them w'hal they did
and the May 1991 Report being w'hal it w'as to investigate themselves the w-hole area more thoroughly, if they
had any doubts as to the veracity of the statement made by the host villagers and of the findings of the 1991
Report. How could they entertain such serious doubts, and not investigate the situation more thoroughly to
settle the issues that bothered them and strangely wail for the TISS second Report w'hich was clearly not
available to them then? It is also very difficult to understand why two Reports of TISS separated by an interval
of nearly 9 months should contain such different information? And how- did Morse-Berger decide to rely on
1992 Report to get their answers and reject if implicitly, the findings of 1991 Report? Indeed, it is difficult
not to ask a question: what was the necessity for the TISS to undertake the second study on Taloda forest
land so soon? Il is also pertinent to note that the second TISS Report is not available to the public for
scrutiny. To the best of our information it is not even available to the GOM. The Morse-Berger Report
continues to reveal serious methodological flaws in the way enquiry w'as conducted, the evidences were gathered
and sifted and the w-ay they w'crc analysed and processed to reach sweeping and dramatic conclusions that
cannot bear scrutiny.
MADHYA PRADESH
In MP, the impossibility of R&R hinged on the claim that large number of ouslecs would be displaced
and the impossibility of finding agricultural land they w'ould require for resettlement. As we have seen above,
the anti- dam movement has always argued that the submergence is by far greatest in MP. Out of 245 villages
in three stales to be affected by the reservoir, 193 are in MP. This means that by simple law of extrapolation,
80 % of the displacement will lake place in MP. The argument thereafter was quite simple.If GOG had
difficulty in finding land for 10 % of the ouslecs, whal is the hope for finding the land for 23,000 ouslecs of
19
MP ? This argument from extrapolation has stuck. We had argued in 1991 that this argument is incorrect,
because facts don’t tally. The GOMP had carried out its first village-wise survey in 1987. Its salient findings
were reported in the 30th meeting(January 1989) of NCA. Vijay Paranjapye has quoted these findings in his
book.12
1314
This brought out for the first time that out of 193, in each of 65 villages agricultural land submergence
is going to be 20 ha. or more. In the remaining 128 villages, the submergence in each is going to be less than
20 ha. Paranjapye offered no criticism for this startling disclosure. Using the data published by the GOMP,
we analysed and showed that whereas only 13.7 % of the total agricultural land (6,855 ha. out of 49,937 ha.)
was going to be submerged, many more houses - 73 % (15,552 out of 21,231) were going to be submerged.
The really heavy submergence, we showed, was going to be confined to 28 out of 193 villages. This analysis
was criticized by the NBA who raised a fundamental question of reliability of this data. The GOMP then
carried out a 64 column survey in all villages except 28 villages where the opposition was very intense. This
survey brings out the same pattern of submergence as was brought out by the 1987 survey.1 The NBA has
raised the problem of reliability about this data as well. This was the issue on the top of the agenda of our presentation and discussion with the Morse-Berger
team, when they began the inquiry. Various aspects of the quality and reliability of the government data in
general and the data relevant to land submergence, land records, house submergence etc. were discussed
threadbare repeatedly. Similarly, the issue of encroachment regularization in MP also came up for discussion.
In June 1992 when the Morse-Berger report came out, it basically adopted the NBA position on two most
critical issues of R & R in MP. It accepted the basic contention of the NBA that the basic quality of the 64
point survey conducted by the GOMP was unreliable and took the GOMP to task for this lapse. It seemingly
accepted a claim of the NBA about the number of displaced families who will need alternative agricultural
land, i.e. 23,000 families. It also accepted the NBA claim that the cncroachcrs in MP will be reduced to a
status of landless with no land entitlement. In their letter to the World Bank President they wrote, “ ...
Madhya Pradesh, with as many as 23,000 families to be resettled, are prepared to offer 2 ha. of land to landed
oustees, but they arc not willing to provide 2 ha. for major sons. Neither the Madhya Pradesh nor Maharashtra
acknowledges any rights of cncroachcrs to adequate land on resettlement.” (P. XVI)
Further, “
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra say that cncroachcrs must be treated as landless oustees
with no entitlement to adequate land for cultivation on resettlement.The dispute here is whether tribal people
holding their land by customary usage are entitled to be treated as landed oustees. Madhya Pradesh and
Maharashtra say they are not, that they are illegal occupiers.
The result is that, in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, thousands of tribal families who. are classified as
landless but who are, in fact, cultivating land may not receive any or adequate land on resettlement.... We
estimate that under the State’s view at least 60 % of tribal oustees engaged in cultivating land in Madhya
Pradesh and Maharashtra will not receive adequate land on resettlement." (P.XVII)
In fact, the issue of encroachcrs bothers Morse-Berger so much that the same point in different ways is
repeated in the Letter at least six limes. This is bound to leave a deep impact on the minds of the readers,
who often read only such letters and not the whole report, that thousands of tribal families are going to
suffer.
What is the evidence they marshall in the main body of the report in support of these dramatic and startling
conclusions? In the first few pages of the text on MP, they observe that encroachers represent a much smaller
proportion of oustees than in Gujarat and Maharashtra and that in the isolated tribal areas, where some 40
MP submergence villagers arc situated, encroachment is integral to people’s economic life. (P.176) The true
import of this important insight that the encroachcr problem is mainly confined to this area eludes
Morse-Berger. As we shall see presently, out of 40 tribal villages, 27 villages with their 2000 families arc badly
hit by submergence(total land submergence greater than 25 %). Encroachers among these 2000 families who
may fail to be regularized under the existing MP policy form the hardcore problem of encroachers in MP.
The upper limit of the problem could be clearly in hundreds and not in thousands, which Morse- Berger
letter will lead us to believe.
12 op cit
13 Vijay Paranjapye op cit P. 193-94.
14 Action Plan of Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Oustees of Madhya Pradesh (Sardar Sarovar Project) Parts I and II - Jan, 1992. NVDA,
GOMPJ
20
Morsc-Bergcr have recognized both in their Letter (P. XVII) and in the text (P.175) that according to
GOMP policy, encroachers prior to 1987 will receive compensation for the land acquired from them and will
be piloted a minimum of 1 ha. of land and maximum of 2 ha. of land. The puzzle, given such a policy of
the GOMP, is why the Morse-Berger reach such a dramatic conclusion that encroachcr families in thousands
will be treated as landless. A clue lies in an advice they were given and which they accepted in MP that the
proof of encroachment - i.c. receipts of fines paid to the forest guards arc quite unlikely to be preserved by
the illiterate tribals. (P.176) This constitutes a crucial finding for Morsc-Bergcr to conclude definitively that
encroachers face a bleak prospect of landlessness. The conclusion then finds its way in the critical portion
of the Report - Letter to the World Bank President.
Their reasoning is, however, faulty, because before accepting the argument that receipts of the fines arc
quite unlikely to be preserved by the tribals, they ought to have carried out a kind of spot-checking amongst
the oustecs to satisfy themselves that a large number of such encroachers could not indeed produce the
receipts, they obviously did not do this. More importantly, however, they ought to have known that the forest
department also has records of encroachers who pay fines. The objectivity demanded that they should have
checked the relevant records of the forest department. Since they have not even acknowledged the source
of information in the Report, they have obviously not checked this source. Responding to this, the GOMP
recently made a claim that 76 % of the tribal population in affected area is formally recorded as cultivators
in official records, which secures for them the land entitlements that is due to them. Such basic methodological
flaw’s the characteristic of the Morse-Berger Report, severely undermine their findings. Meanwhile, the
uncorroborated finding of encroachers in thousands being reduced to landless got established as proven fact.
Morse-Berger missed a great opportunity like one in Maharashtra to examine GOMP’s claim more carefully
and critically, identify problem areas facing encroachers and make pointed recommendations which could
lead to constructive and creative solutions.
Nature and Size of Displacement:
In the Letter to the World Bank President, Morsc-Bergcr say that 23,
families are to be resettled. This
figure is nowhere directly quoted in the text, but a claim of this type is indirectly and ambiguously
supported.(PP. 174,184) Then they go on to seemingly accept the GOMP’s estimate that about 50 % oustee
families will move to Gujarat requiring 23,000 ha. of land implying that 11,000 families will be completely
uprooted from their villages. The remaining 50 % villages, as claimed by the MP officials, who will not be
losing their agricultural land, will stay back in MP and will require only 2000 ha. of land.(P.186)
Morse-Berger have displayed a staggering degree of confusion here. From the two statements accepted by
them, which we have just cited, it is not clear at all what they really mean? The NBA claims that 23,000
families will need alternative land for resettlement, Morsc-Bergcr Letter accepts this claim. But in the text
they record and seemingly accept the claim of the MP officials that only 50 % of the oustees in MP i.c.
11,
000 families require alternate agricultural land, that they will go to Gujarat and the remaining 50 %, since
they don’t lose agricultural land, will stay back in MP. Morse-Berger are thus caught in a contradiction. Only
ambiguity about the meaning of “to be resettled” can soften a little the edge of the contradiction. ‘To be
resettled’ in MP may mean that some families affected by the reservoir may just loose house, hence have ‘to
*
resettle
by shifting their houses and some may loose their land also, hence they have to be uprooted completely,
and have ‘to be resettled’ at a distant place. Even this ambiguity about “to be resettled” can not be maintained
much longer because they also admit that in each of the 79 out of 193 villages 10 percent or more land will
go under submergence, whereas in each of the remaining 114 villages land submergence will be less than 10
percent.(P. 185) They also admit that the most fertile villages of Nimad are not among these 79 villages since
they are the farthest from the dam site, they suffer inundation of house sites rather than land. (P.185) This
notwithstanding, Morse-Berger make a major issue of landless labourers of Nimad who fear relocation because
their economic security based on long established web of human and geographical links will be destroyed.
Further, “ their sense of security comes from occupying a particular place in an integrated network of
labourer-landowner relationships, which is threatened by resettlement process.” (P.183) The paradox, if not
contradiction, of Morse-Berger is apparent again. If Nimad villages arc not going to experience submergence
and only their houses arc to be shifted to a higher plane in the same village, where is the question of “web
of human and geographical links” being disrupted by relocation? How can there be a rupture of laborer landowner relationships which can threaten the economic security of landless by resettlement process ? And
yet the w'ord relocation, resettlement read in the context leave no doubt that Morsc-Bergcr mean total
uprooting and displacement of these villages. Both the meanings in the ambiguous use of the phrase ‘to be
resettled’ are used by Morsc-Bergcr to convey factually wrong impressions at different places.
This particular, pattern of submergence where majority of the villages do not lose their land but only their
houses (114 out of 193) and 79 villages suffer loss of land and houses arises from the peculiar shape of the
Sardar Sarovar Reservoir and the underlying morphology of the river. The Narmada river runs through a
21
deep gorge with a sleep slope in this pari of ils course. Through ils course in Sardar Sarovar reservoir up
to dam site it drops by at least 100 meters. This results in a shape of lhe Reservoir which is long and narrow
(225 by 1.75 Kms.). The reservoir does not spill out of its banks. Fields lying well beyond the river banks are
spared but a large number of houses along the banks are inundated. The further upstream one goes, lhe
more clearly the pattern of submergence becomes manifest, save some pockets in the upper reaches, the
pattern holds as in Nimad. Thus in MP 114 villages lose 2.77 per cent of their total land but as many as 65
per c nt of their houses. Morse-Berger knew of this pattern. They know of tw'o types of displacement in MP.
While acknowledging these peculiarities at different places in the text they continue to maintain ambiguity
about resettlemcnl/relocalion and create impressions that 23,000 families require land, then 11000 families
require land, then landless in Nimad will be relocated forcibly and lose the economic security they enjoy now
because of lhe physical disruption of the communities etc. Why do they not clarify from lhe begining the
different types of displacement (and resettlement)? There is no clear answer to this in the Report.
The greatest ambiguity of Morse-Berger’s analysis of MP problem lies in their scathing criticism of the
MP’s baseline data. They have accepted the NBA’s basic criticism that lhe 64 point survey carried out by
the GOMP is unreliable because of the opposition to it in MP villages. They have thus raised serious doubts
about MP’s 1992 Action Plan based on 64 point survey. They contend “ such information as is on hand as a
result of government questionnaire appears to be of little value. Findings are not sufficiently solid to ensure
that plans based on them will address problems accurately” (P.194). In so far as MP's Action Plan assumed
that all the ouslccs of 79 villages which lose 10 per cent or more of their agricultural land will go to Gujarat
Morse-Berger’s criticism is accurate. But (hat is not the main outcome of MP’s Action Plan. MP's Action
Plan is based on different pattern of submergence w;e have discussed above. Morse-Berger have to make it
clear w'hcn they totally reject the baseline data gathered by the GOMP w'hether they also reject lhe fact that
only 79 villages face a measure of uprooting and lhe remaining 114 do not gel uprooted w'hich is also a direct
outcome of the 64 point survey. This is clearly set out in Annexure 5 of Part I of Action Plan 1992 (cited by
Morse-Berger on P.186). Here is another contradiction Morse-Berger have set for themselves they have
already accepted lhe basic features - parameters of the 64 point baseline survey as we have seen above.
Option is not open to them to totally reject 64 point survey and still to accept the basic features of submergence
pattern affecting villages, their lands and houses, (they have actually cited Annexure 5 of Part I of 1992 Aclion
Plan.) Their trouble is logical error they have made. They admit certain facts but do not accept logical
consequences of lhe facts.
On the page on which they reject GOMP’s baseline data, they accept in the next para on the same page
that large amount of information can be gathered by ‘desk lop’ procedure w'hich can achieve more or less
adequate completion of questionnaire forms w'hich “may w'cll result in useful approximations, and an initial
basis for assessing the scale of lhe problem. At the individual level - w’hich is w'hat ultimately counts for lhe
oustcc families themselves - ‘desk lop’ data gathering can not be adequate” (PP.184-85). We see here again
how- Morse-Berger gain insight into lhe critical aspects of reality - reliable usefulness of the data al one plane
which may not be useful at another plane and yet the true import of lhe insight eludes them. Il should have
been quite clear to them to ensure justice to individual oustccs for which the Aclion Plan based on 64 point
survey may not have been adequate, to identify and demarcate precisely those villages and communities which
w'ere going to be disrupted because of the inundation of their fields. This is “useful approximation” that MP
data provided to “assess lhe scale of the problem". The irony of Morse-Berger Report is to accept this “useful
approximation” set out in Annexure 5 and yet not to carry analysis through. We had argued this very case
with them. Morse-Berger chose to reject and ignore lhe argument and yet we can not see how they can avoid
it. The source of all lhe contradictions, the paradoxes and the ambiguities lies in the fact that they radically
reject lhe whole data but accept the basic parameters of the data - what they call useful approximations to
assess lhe scale of lhe problem. If they had thoroughly examined the implications of the useful approximations
in lhe text they w'ould have carried results of this analysis in the Letter to the WB President, in the chapter
on Findings and Recommendations and clscw'hcrc in the Report (for example in table on P 62) and not the
ones that were carried. They W'ould not have reached, if unwittingly, (he final conclusion that R&R is impossible
and that it is heading for a disaster.
The analysis based on the basic information provided by MP reveals that of the 23,180 ouslce families in
MP 11,931 belonging lo 114 villages have land submergence of 2.8 per cent, remaining 11,249 (approximalelv
50%) belonging lo 79 villages experience land submergence grcalcr than 10 per cent. GOMP claims and
Morse-Berger seemingly accept that these families will require 23,000 ha. of land (since for each family land
entitlement is minimum 2 ha. in Gujarat). There is a further implication to this claim w'hich is that each of
the land holdings in 79 villages loses at least 25 per cent of land w'hich only can give land entitlements lo ils
holders, cosharers, major sons and landless labourers dependent on these holdings. Morse-Berger never
arrived at this depth of analysis so they did not ask lhe question how- plausible it is to hold such assumption
about each land holding. They did not enquire and therefore did not know that 9148 families of the 58 villages
22
in this group will collectively lose 25 per cent of their agricultural land. (Very heavy inundation - 65 per cent
of agricultural land - occurs in the remaining 21 \illagcs.) Common sense dictates that obviously each of the
land holdings in these villages cannot lose 25 per cent or more of its land. Therefore each of 9148 families
can not have land entitlement of 2 ha. whether they settle in MP or in Gujarat. The main brunt of the land
loss and major uprooting in 58 villages will be borne by only those who lose 25 per cent or more of their
land and those landless who work on those land. The brunt will be also borne by remaining 2000 families
including cncroachers who live in the remaining 21 villages.
The MP data in all probability may not provide accurate enough information about the identity of these
individual families in these villages and their needs. Morse-Berger could have accurately zeroed in on this
group of oustccs and recommended that they be located more accurately and their needs ascertained
authentically. But to do that they had to see these “useful approximations and an initial basis for assessing
the scale of the problem.” Morse-Berger’s failure to analyse Anncxurc 5 of the Action Plan 1991-92 to bring
out the scale of problem in its proper perspective and to display this analysis boldly defies reason.
Their concern for the landless of Nimad should have induced them to do a further analysis. This would
have revealed to them that in 103 villages of Nimad only 2.82 per cent of the total agricultural land goes
under submergence leaving the long established web of human and geographical links within their communities
and network of laborer - land owner relationships integrated and in tact. They could have clearly seen that
the sense of security of landless in these villages is not going to be threatened. As to the other villages of
Nimad, 33 villages lose 18.5 per cent of their agricultural land creating a major uprooting of relatively small
proportion of land owners their major sons and landless laborers depending on these holdings. Only in a
small number of remaining villages land submergence is between 40 to 63 per cent where uprooting is going
to be of a very high order. The irony hits Morse-Berger because in acquiescing with the GOMP officials that
50 per cent of the oustees belonging to 79 villages will be uprooted they have not pondered over the implications
this will have on the landless in these villages because as we argued above many land owners even in these
villages will lose less than 25 per cent of their holdings. They need not be uprooted, will not be uprooted.
The landless working on these lands will have their web of relationships left in tact. They need not fear
economic insecurity. Morse-Berger should have identified these group of landless who are being threatened
by the mindless policy of the GOMP to indiscriminately uproot all and send them off to Gujarat. Instead,
they have acquiesce with the mindless approach of the GOMP in the 79 villages. Morse-Berger should have
scrutinized the problem of landless who need not be uprooted and of those who will be uprooted and should
have made appropriate recommendations. They should have also given a serious thought to those landless
who exclusively depend on fishing for their livelihood to make appropriate recommendations. At this level
of analysis they could have with a telling effect, raised the issue of quality of basic data. Because it is only
at this level individuals who are going to bear the brunt of resettlement could be brought into a sharp focus
and the ways in which MP’s basic data may not be up to the mark. This failure also must be traced to the
original ambiguity vis-a-vis the basic data and their failure to work out full implications of the useful
approximations stated in Annexure 5.
Major Sons:
Morse-Berger have been rightly exercised about the lack of provision of land entitlement for major sons
of land holders in MP and Maharashtra. They have repeatedly discussed this issue in the text. They have
however failed to identify in Nimad a significant development taking place. While the existing R&R policies
in MP and Maharashtra exclude major sons from land entitlement, an existing law in MP and Maharashtra
does allow major sons to be registered in the revenue records as co sharers who have entitlements equal to
that of landed oustees. In some severely affected villages of Nimad many influential and rich land owners
have successfully used this law to get their sons names entered as cosharcrs (monitoring agency has documented
this in its report and the GOMP has also acknowledged this reality in one of its response to the World Bank).
Seen in this light the major son problem assumes radically different perspective. Maharashtra’s and MP’s
stubborn persistence in their unfavorable interpretation of the NWDT’s relevant portion of the award may
cause irritation as it does to Morse- Berger. One may try to remove this irritant but at the same time a
tentative approach to circumvent such a road block must also be explored. Morse-Berger could have easily
stumbled into this reality had they been inclined to solve such hard problems. Their failure to do so has also
resulted in their failure to make specific recommendations for the tribals because they may not be able to
use this instrument of law in their favor as effectively as the rich peasants of Nimad are now doing. The
cumulative effect of Morse-Berger’s attitude of general lamentations and their failure to carry analysis to a
deeper level are most visible for the tribal people and for the landless whose possible plight move them so
much.
23
MORSE-BERGER REPORT AND THEIR CONCLUSIONS
e began (he article with a statement that the SSP cannot be treated as a paradigm case study to corroborate
the grand critique of large dams propounded by Goldsmith-Hildyard. Wc have examined a few critical issues
of environment and R&R in this article and tried to show that anti-SSP critique remains unsubstantial and based
on distortions. Morse-Berger have done their best to shore up the tottering case of anti-SSP movement. It cannot
then become a spring board to discuss more abstract and deeper issues of alternative development strategy or
life style. Morse-Berger intervention remains a pivotal issue in the discussion that follows.
Although we have not laid bare the analysis of all the chapters of the Morse-Berger Report, which wc will
eventually do, we have analysed enough material to bring out two types of characteristics of the Report which
are general and to be found in practically all the important chapters.
One, the Report suffers from grave methodological flaws like conclusions not following from the factual
premises, conclusions based on inadequate data-base or errors in reasoning or failure to carry the logical
analysis far enough, sources of information not properly cited or not citing adequately from the unique
Reports and studies to which only they had access. These could be broadly termed as intellectual errors.
Two, then there arc errors which cannot be legitimately called intellectual errors. In this group, wc found
deliberate selection and omission of information, deliberate distortions of parts of documents, suppression
of vital information which could lead to entirely different conclusions than were reached by them.
Only careful and dogged reading of the text reveals these characteristics and also how they reach staggering
conclusions without matching facts, evidence, analysis or reasoning. Moreover, lack of matching facts or their
distortions arc deeply burried in the tortuous discourse in the text.
Then we realize the frightening implications of their style to carry these conclusions as ‘established facts'
to most critical part of their Report - i.e. the Letter to the President of the World Bank and the ‘Findings
and Recommendations’ chapter, because most readers read these parts only. The conclusions can only leave
a deep impact on the sensitive but unsuspecting readers. They naturally and understandably rely on the high
credibility and objectivity of the persons of stature of Mr. Morse and Mr. Berger. Morse- Berger have unwittingly
and also unintentionally seriously undermined the basis of trust on which major international human rights
campaigns, which should also include the SSP campaign, arc mounted.
Morse-Berger have zealously guarded, and rightly so, their independence from all the sources of Power
including the World Bank. They have missed no opportunity to let it be known that theirs was an independent
mission of enquiry'. They were truly independent of the WB and the concerned governments. But were they
impartial or objective in this enquiry? Serious question marks must be pul on this score. Far from being
impartial they have repeatedly gone out of way to ‘prove’ or ‘establish’ a fact that would show the Projects
in negative light. They have similarly covered up or suppressed several facts which could seriously undermine
the anti-dam case. Their patent partisanship to the DOEF has been repeatedly documented.
So the Morse-Berger enquiry was independent but not impartial and objective. Where does this lead us
to? They have in the process seriously undermined the nascent notion of international enquiry to make the
governments, especially in the third world, more accountable and responsible on the issues which transcend
national boundaries. Experienced as they are, they ought to have known that the notion of national sovereignty
can readily raise barriers against legitimate univcrsalisl concerns expressed internationally. Third world
countries can now legitimately claim that such enquiries arc guises to undermine their sovereignly to decide
their own destiny and to humiliate them. By joining hands with highly vocal NGOs of Europe, Japan and
North America and adopting their dubious methods they have dislocated serious efforts to democratize the
states, to preserve and if possibly further human rights. It is unlikely that they understood or grasped the
implication of their enquiry'.
They fail to recommend deep, precise and thorough-going reforms w'hich could have helped many tribal
ouslees for whom their hearts go out. Some encroachcrs in Maharashtra and MP w'ould have got immense
help from their recommendations and so w'ould have the marooned villagers in Maharashtra. Similarly, major
sons in the tribal areas of MP and Maharashtra would have secured decent means of livelihood, had they
taken cognizance of the legal situation. They would have earned gratitude of agricultural landless laborers of
Nimad area in MP, if they had effectively pulled up the GOMP for planning unnecessarily to uproot them
and if the rights for draw-down cultivation had been secured for them. Similarly, the fishermen families W'ould
have been thankful to them for securing for them the rights of fishing in the reservoir and free access to the
market.
Instead of pressing for such constructive and creative reforms, they decided that “it would be irresponsible
for us to try to patch together a series of recommendations on implementation when the flaws in the Project
are as obvious as they appear to us. As a result, we think that the wisest course would be for the Bank to
step back form the Projects and consider them afresh.” (P.XXV).
W
24
When the Bank decided about the Morse-Berger Review under the pressure of Northern NGOs campaigning
against the SSP we welcomed it, although we disagreed completely with the NGO critique. We relied on
their stature and reputation and hoped that they would straighten out complicated issues, set the record right
deformed by the anti-dam NGOs by their falsehoods and distortions of facts. We had also hoped that some
long-standing problems in MP, Maharashtra and Gujarat would be solved. We cooperated fully and with an
open mind with the members of the Review Team. Even when the anti-dam movement publicly in press
questioned their bonafidcs and raised doubts about their competence, even when we got unmistakable warning
signals from the members of the Team about their strong biases and tills against the Project, we chose to
ignore them and relied instead on the objectivity and sense of fair play of M/s Morse and Berger, who, we
assumed, would take care of these biases and lilts. We trusted them and their objectivity to steer the inquiry
to find the truth. We admit, not without regret, that we were wrong. Their eloquence and fervor notwithstanding,
their reputation for objectivity notwithstanding, they have abandoned the objectivity which only can lead to
truth.
Mr. Morse’s and Mr. Berger’s reputation of being zestful reformers notwithstanding, they pressed on
relentlessly their conclusion that even if R&R Policy in MP is improved, it is too late. R&R is impossible in
MP (P.351). It is the same rush for such staggering conclusions which makes them conclude that “the Bank’s
incremental strategy and India’s pari-passu policy adopted to deal with the resettlement and environmental
problems have failed. A further application of the same strategy, albeit, in a more determined or aggressive
form, would also fail.” (P.355). The same conclusions are repeated in the Letter to the President. This strategic
placement of conclusions has had a desired effect from Morsc-Bcrgers’ point of view. The conclusions like
“proven failure of ‘incremental strategy5 adopted by the Bank and of pari-passu approach adopted by the
Indians to environmental assessment” and like R&R being impossible in MP or tribal cncroachers in thousands
going to suffer heavily etc. were readily picked up by the NGOs in North and even Bank’s Executive Directors.
The final irony of the Morse-Berger Report is best captured in the last para of their Letter to the President
•
“Our job has been to make an assessment. We have done so. We have, in the course of our work, made
many friends in India. We wish to assure them that our sole desire has been to find the truth and report
it. We hope that our assessment may advance the search for constructive and creative solutions.”
(P.XXV)
We hold this to be their ultimate failure.
November 8, 1992.
ARCH-VAHINI
Po. Mangrol
Tai. Rajpipla
Dist. Bharuch
Gujarat
India. PIN 393150.
Prepared for ARCH-VAHINI by:
Anil Patel.
Ambrish Mehta.
Sudarshan Iyengar.
Trupti Parekh.
Rajcsh Mishra.
Date:
Voluntary Shifting of
Manibeli
Village,
ARCH-VAHINI
Sth April, 1992
Maharashtra:
I
1.
:: : ; - • -v
<
•_
R
voluntary ■ and peaceful shifting
of
Manibel i,
the
?e in Maharashtra going under submergence
in
Sardar
eot ’. ££P' began on 26th March 1992.
*
2.
The
operation of shifting was spearheaded by
Mani be1i
F'APs who
snteh to shift but were being prevented by the
Ando lan
workers.
ARCH - V AH I N 1 with an out 400 PAPs of Gujarat,
and
other
N G J s act i •' e i n R & R.
3.
rrcm 26th March to 4th April 1992, 25 fully built,
old
a n.c 7 ** small skeleton structures were dismantled
and
to resettlement
village Parveta in Baroda district,
4.
A . 32 houses, and structures belong to Tadvis. About 13
T a i v •_
ni. s e s and about 19 V a s a v a ( B h i 1 ) houses were not ready
to
shift.
The;/
were not touched. It is clear that
about
half
of
Manibel
shifted willingly during that ror tnight. ( 10 houses
had
sr. ?fted in 1986 aril-j 53 in 1986). This shifting must be viewed
in
thy
*
•■■ntex
or claim- made vehemently and persistently
by
the
Ando.an
at .east during the last one year that nobody from
Han
't b1 i
is willing to shift, the slogan that received a wide
pub
licity hare and alt road read ”We will clash with the rising water,
we v :
c k wn bu t w i 1 ■ no t s h i f t. *’
shifted
and
a
Of
the
19 Vasava houses who have not
section cr whom was extremely voci f erous l.y opposed to the
operan ion ■ a n :i e .
abusive, at least 7 houses are eager to shift,
but
dare n c t a e :. ex p r e s s their desire for the fear of severe repris
al ur tne vociferous section of the Ando lan activists. Similarly,
mere Ta ci v i families are ready to shirt, but could not do so now.
6.
ARCH,
so far, had not involved itself directly in
the
afrairs
of Manibeli, but during the last 3 to 4 months
we
were
receiving
disturbing stories f r o'm those PAPs who were living
in
Parveta tnat they were under severe pressure and threat from
the
Andoian
workers.
Contrary to the wide-spread
belief
that
the
Manibeli
was
solidly behind the' Andoian,
there
were
definite
indications
that the PAPs wanted to shift, but were
being
pre. ■: n t. e d
by
the Andoian. At the; entry point of ’the
village
the
Andoian had set up a post which was constantly screening al 1
the
entries
"
■ •- -1 . lage. Trupti :an.d Sudarshan of our
group
were
o h vs 2 oa 1 1 y
n ■: -• ■. cried from entering the village on
10th
January
1992.
We had. however, very little knowledge of those
PAPs
who
weft
still living in Manibeli. They approached us through
their
relatives
in
Vadgam
and asked for our help. We had
a
meeting
with some of .them in Vadgam. They gave a list of willing PAPs who
wanted to shift. Another list was obtained from PAPs of
Parveta.
They
talked
about their social boycott, (unheard
of
in
these
tribal
villages
but
which we had heard
in
other
Maharashtra
yi'-sges also curing our visit)
of the fact that they were
not
•f
a • ? *.• ed ‘
, i to t • ic- surrounding forest to collect wood , of
the
: a ?t
: a ; : 1. r- .ullage shop would not sell them grocery,
of
the
tart th3- *
~ev
were told to leave ‘.heir homes behind taking
with
.re?
on.:;. cl:thes and nothing else to go to new site
where
the
go e' nme rt
should give them new houses and that their houses
in
Manibeli
will
be occupied
by the Adolan
supporters
of
other
vi : .ages.
’’he essence of the story was repeatedly
confirmed
by
other PAPs cf Manibe I i during and after the shifting operation.
7.
7ri 5 background’ information and other events that
took
pi.io^ including ’he role of Maharashtra Police before and
during
the
oper c- lion
are vital to the understanding
of
ARCH-VAHINI'S
r-ti.e in van;beli oDeration.
8.
Pr.e Press, nas from the very beginning, maintained that
this
was only a massive Police operation pointedly omitting
the
spearheading
role .,z-f Gujarat PAPs and NGOs. After the first
day
reporting which categorically stated that the shifting was volun
tary.
totally peaceful, the reporting on subsequent days
became
.no re
and
more
bi.ased and
started
repeating
wild
fictitious
cnarges
of
the Andolan that the Maharashtra
Police
was
being
‘repressive and using force.
9.
In fact, -the role of Maharashtra Police, from
beginning,
even
before the shifting operation began,
dubious ana even enigamtic.
the
was
very
very
□n 25th March, 1992, when the details of the operation
or.
"5 ch March were being planned at Kevadia Colony by
Mr.
Gill
Mr.
Babbar and Police officers of Gujarat and
Maharashtra,
the
Superintendent of Police (SP) , Dhule District suddenly announced
that
the operation was-cal led off at the instruction of the
DIG
Police.
Incredulous Mr. Gill made, frentic phone calls to
Secre
tary
R S R Mr.Chobe who insisted that the operation was
on. 'He
then
mace calls to the DIG who insisted that the
operation
was
□ff and that he had a direct and unequivocal instruction from the
Director
General
of
Pol ice(J J), Maharashtra
to
this
effect.
Thereupon
Mr.
G i 1 1 talked to the DG himself and had
the
story
confirmed. (Four
days
later
we heard that the DG
had
in
fact
threatened
to resign if the operation was pushed
ahead).
There
was
Maharashtra
Police force of about 350 policemen
and
women
already stationed at R.ajpipla.
This was a strange and most dramatic turn of event.
At
critical
juncture, the whole of the
Maharashtra
Police
was
decisively and effectively paralysed by as high an official as DG
or more plausibly by somebody at h.i'gher level.
Although we were totally unprepared for such a dramatic
turn
of
events
on the eve of Manibeli shifting,
we
had
been
suspecting ’or quite sometime
that there was something amiss
in
Mahaiahstra Administration’s willingness
to effect
a
voluntary
shifting
of.Manibeli, Earlier moves to help PAPs to shift
their
houses
to Parma with the. help of Mahrashtra Police had
failed
to go off the ground for .'some unknown reasons.
Me
I:new
that a signifiacant number of
Manibeli
PAPs
were
willin''
to shift, but were fearful that the
A ndo 1 an
will
.prevent
uem r r am dc.i ng so, .and?.the
Maharashtra
administration
was
lacking the adequate will to help them shift.
We
therefore
argued
that we and the Gujarat PAPs will go ahead and help
them
shift.
We
had also
earlier argued that if
Maharashtra
Police
tried t c. m o v e i n t o h.e ip willing PAPs to shift, the Andolan
will
immediately
cry ’Police repression.’ The Maharashtra Police
had
beaten
a
retreat
last September and had been
the
object
of
severe criticism ever since. With the P r e s s . s o efectively backing
trie
Andc-lan, it was an easy task for the Andolan to turn even
a
legitimate
operation in support of the willing PAPs into
a
vi
cious Pol ■ c~ repression.
•
A str aw i n t-he wind •wa s a v e r y strange and bo 1 d
statem - n t m a c c- b y t h e NBA on 24th M a r c h 1992. ( A Press copy of
25-492 is enclosed) . The Ando ian had- f i 1 ed a petition in Dhu 1 e
Cour t
demanding
,
*
ths
nobody should be shifted from
Man i be I i
village
which was rejected by? the Court on 3rd March, 1992. The Court had
then
.Cloved an appeal period of 7 days during which
the
stay
order
was granted. This expired on 10th March, 1992. The
e 1 abo rati
and reasoned Court Order, in effect,
unambiguously
stated
that the Maharashtra government could shift legally not only
the
willing
PAPs, but also t.h e unwilling PAPs or M a n i b e 1 i , if it
so
desired.
* z
was obvious that the Maharashtra
government
after
hav i n g
obtained
such legal clearance had for some
reasons
not
octed,
and now the MBA in its statement, twisted
the
operative
part
of
the Court Order, making totally false cliams
that
the
Court
had stayed the shifting
operation until 31st March
1992,
and
that the Andolan had requested the Court to vacate the
stay
order, which it had, and threw a .bold challange to the
Ma ha raj’s htra government "to go ahead and evict the residents of
Manibeli"
and now that "the Coupt had vacated the Stay" (at the request
of
the Andolan it claimed) challenged the Maharashtra Government "to
show its true colours,"
d ra ma t 1 c
o f self i nflicted paralysis
by
the
Ma ha r
Pol ice
the
bold if strangely
worded
c ha 1 NBA "to
the the d i f i an t villagers’’ in a statement
of 25th April, 19 9 2 immediate!y convinced us that
with- or
wit h o u t
M a h a r ash t r.a Police helping the PAPs to shift, we had
to
m o v e a h e a ci i n support of Manibeli PAPs on 26th Morning. Mr.
Gill
persuaded
not to precipitate action until half past ten
next
mor n i n£
w hen
the clear picture from Bombay would
emer ge.
With
r e 1 u c- t a noe,
2 agreed to delay, but there was
no
Pol ice
force
:r
i g h t . .11 proceeded to Surpan vi1lage. There
aga i n
ws wa 1
i
o ? Maharashtra Pol-ice to arrive on the scene, so
that
potential ly ugly situation of clash between Andolan and us
cou 1 d
be averted. it did not arrive.
V
4
A
egation of Manibeli and Gujarat PAPs went down the
• •
n:
g a : i e: • ‘to negotiate with the Andolan, which
was
b 1 oc k ■ n g
entry pf the village with the help of
tribals
of
no n - s ubme
i ng
hem lets of village
Tdrkheda (Budni and
Handlanon-submarging tribals of village Mai of Maharash“_ra < t r. i s we discovered later on ) and others. The Andolan put up
unaccep
b . e ' a nd ever, humiliating conditions like :
f.
C
p l - he Manibeli FAP s, whose houses were
etse r r cm outside could enter the village ;
to be? shifted
::
: - i y the Aniclan people would dismantle and carry the
'teria i
cut?
De'.’ganga river o-n labour charge of Rs. 40
an j
‘.’ec . £ c t- i day ;
»
n ? . c ,• wci. . :i not
d a y b u* t a n y a t n e r
Cz
*
tha
shifted
~n• se
start bringing
cay convenient
the house material
to them;
the decision, as to whose house would
>u.d rest with, the Ando I an people.
conditions
were
immidiate1y
rejected
on
by all
housing
a
day
very
that
be allowed
no
to
be
PAPs.
Of Gujarat PAPs and others started at last at
2:15
t r a Police was still not in sight. They arrived
in
a rime, when we were about to cross Devganga
river
e1i . They stepped us, and worked out a hasty undert h e Andolan which averted a c 1 a s h . We were
allowed
iilage. We should stress that they were all Maniber a t. P A P s and N G 0 s . Not a single
hired
worker
en lage that day. Kasniram Mohan Tadvi of Patel
Fa 1 i7a
■
i
c r-.is house, which was dismantled and carried
away
ting trucks on the river bed down the hill.
!
It is very clear from the detailed account given
above
that
the Maharashtra Police was paralysed from the previous
day
by
the top officia 1s(po1iticians ?) in Bombay.
Their
paralysis
and
inaction
continued 'until the last moment
when
they
were
obviously
forced
into action, not because they had
to
perform
their legal duty to help shift those PAPs who wanted to shift
in
the
face of the unreasonableI opposition
of Andolan workers,
but
■
because
they were face to face with the situation
of
potential
clash between groups of PAPs.
10
The Times of India and
Indian Express reports
omitted
tc inquire into thebe strange happenings, into the role of
ARCHJH I N I , a nthat of Gujarat PAPs. They maintained that this was
a
Maharashtra-Gujarat) Pol ice operation - albeit peaceful and volun•.ary.
i
11.
Ms. Medha i Pa tlkar had left for New Delhi on 25th evening
te-’attend a rally on 26th. The strange way in which the Maharash
tra
police
acted
that day and subsequently, it
is
more
than
probable
that
she knew of the Police inaction before
she
left
for New Delhi.
12.
In the subsequent days when the Newspapers carried
.the
stories of Police excesses, bulldozers being used indiscriminate
ly that were fed by.the Andolan to them, ’the reality was that the
Police
was
still more or less inactive. The
Andolan
activists
pe . t e d
stones .it the '.rucks carrying
the house
material.
Many
got
nurt.
The-’Ando I an ; worker s were identified by
the
Manibeli
PAPs.
The
truck movements came to a halt.
Official
complaints
were made to the EP himself and yet the Police took no action a.-.d
sat with folded hands. Our complaints and those of Manibeli
PAPs
have
constantly been that of total Police inaction, and yet
the
Maharashtra
Police was viciously attacked in the
Press.
During
the
Jays ■ of shifting the situation came to such a pass
that
5
4
!
•r
. ..
i *' ziays u 7 months of shifting PAPs had to be taken
t:
. .. . • ,■ • »>. ca-. * he parents shifted their houses because
no
b ve rnignt
shelter w a s ‘ a y a i 1 a b I e.
To remain totally inactive
is
£extremely strange behaviour of the Maharashtra administration.
in the first place it 'disrupted the whole operation last
minute
obviously
t..
help
the
Ando lan, discarding its
duty
to
help
»i i ‘ i iy.... P'APs oi Mani’beji to’shift, and when due to the unexpected
move
f
the
PAPs and Gujarat NGOs to go
ahead
with
shifting
o p e r .-a t i c r.,
it.
had to' intervene reluctantly to
avert
potential
clash. it laic supine cn the floor on the subsequent days in
the
t -re : : grave pro^eation and abuses by the Andolan activists and
•
ii the bearings from the Andosin for the
excesses
it
never commitred.
'"he momentous question is: Who is masterminding such
a
dangerous strategy
*
in Maharashtra •? We ask with a renewed
force:
Who
•> blocking the R & R and rendering it impossible ? This
is
the crux of 'he matter.
13.
Shukia, Union Minis, t'er for
Water
Resources
who is technically in charge of the SSF had his mite to
contrib
ute
to
these strange happenings. On the
night
of
30th
March
■1992. presumably on receipt of complaints of the Andolan
because
he
cfd
not ask for ano get any report from the
Maharashtra
or
Gujarat governments on the so called Police excesses in Manibeli,
jri 1 a tera 1 • y
announced
an inquiry into the Police
excesses
at
Manibeli
to b «. carried out by
TIES, Bombay, CSS,
Surat,
Sagar
Jr. i ve: s i ty
and others. The announcement was made on the
Televi
sor he ws .ae t . Needless to say, we opposed the move as a
par • i= a:.
arbitrary and motivated and decided not to
participate
in
t he i nq u i r y .
i
14.
As
the Press ; o n t i n u e d to cai ry
one sided stories
of
p: ire excesses,
-f repressive use of bulldozers, of burning
and
ajson,
we requested Mr. B.G. Verghese, Ex-Editor-in-Chief Indian
Express
to come over to Manibeli as soon as he could to
inquire
into
the .-u fairs himself. Happily he could make it and
saw
the
ha open ■ n g s in Manibeli on End April 1992. He also visited Manibe
li PAPs at Farveta and addressed a Press Conference in Baroda
on
y.e
evening
on 3rd April, 1992. He made
categorical
statement
"T the shifting
in Manibeli was peaceful and voluntary,
that
>‘.,e
saw r. c misuse or abuse of Police force, that bulldozers
were
used
d make only roads and in fact the Andolan
*
activists
were
clucking the bulldozers to make roads in various
fa 1 ias(hem 1ets)
and
tha; the PAPs and workers had to carry heavy load
on
their
heads
to the trucks. He also referred to the social boycott
and
either
use of force
byi the Andolan and also said that
the
PAPs
wjere
happy .to be in Pajrveta. At least, some parts of his
state
ment were reported in t-he Press. (Later Mr Verghese wrote a
long
Tetter
to Indian Express) Delhi giving details of his
experience
in
Man i be 1 i. Strangely; ehoug h this letter was not
published
in
other
eoit ions of Indian Express, where as
pro-andolan
letters
•w£?e
p- . t- 1 i s h e d i r c-1 r. e jr e d i t o n s is
copy o f h i s letter
end•■
•
Post Scric t
A.; this time, when the peaceful and voluntaryshifting
c:
te Manibeli was going on, the A n d o I a n workers were
blocking
the
roads
to the hamlets and .individual
huts,
preventing
the
c u 1 . de:
to
pave
the way, so that trucks may
not
reach
the
d i s ar t - ' s .
I
The
NBA’sj projection of these events
to
the
outside
wor•d
through
the- Press
is in need of a
detailed
exposition
and a counter r e p i y. |
i
Typically.
the
NBA has taken an ambivalent ,
if
not
contradictory
,
position regarding voluntary shifting.
In
the
very
early days after the shifting h a d begun, Ms.
Med ha
P a t kar
had
asked the press reporters in an ironical vein that:
if
the
PAP = were indeed willingly shifting, why so much of police
force
? Ther the. same newspapers continued to carry the stories fed by
A n d o1 a n
that the a t r i d a v i t s the PAPs had signed
requesting
the
Maharashtra
c o ' i c e' ■ t o a s s i t them shift t h e i r houses in the
face
of
opposition
or the Andolan workers, were
not
genuine,
were
obtained
by
ro-rce or under duress, that the
genuinity
or
the
affidavits would
*
be challenged in the Court. The press
reporters
who
were
regularly meeting the NBA workers
could
have
easily
verified the charges or the A n d o1 a n, but t hi s was never done.
*
If
the Andolan knew that there were PAPs
in
Manibeli
who w a n t e d • t : take away t ri r houses
and that the Ando 1 an had no
interest
a. * ail stopping them, then why did the A n d o 1 a n continue
to
raise unsubstantiated claims about false affidavits
?.
They
could have themselves identified these PAPs and helped them shift
their
houses.
What we came across instead was those
PAPs
were
subjected to social b y c o 11 and other forms of coercion and i n t i m i -J a t i -■ n ■■■;i c• also showed up clearly in the affidavits which they
had signed.
*
. Then
why
did, the Andolan throw
a
blanket
challenge
through
the
press
on -25/3/92, the eve
of
Manibeli
shifting,
daring
tre
Maharashtra government
to try evict
any
PAP
from
Manibeli :
Surely, they could have then known that there were at
least
50 % houses in Manibeli who wanted to shift
their
houses
and other structures. How could they then claim as they did
that
r’ nobody w i1 1’ move- the- dam will not • be built."
•
■
w
*
Then why did the-y not allow the road to be built across
the .sms 1 1 river Devganga' for four years ? At least when they knew
that. certain PAPs wantedi to shift, surely, they could have
under
stood that such heavy structures ,of timber needed trucks to their
door steps, which meant a road across the river upto the huts
of
the willing PAPs. And yet the Andol
took no initiative to
help
these PAPs. Not only this, when the Manibeli PAPs brought in,
or^‘
t he
firs- day, the PAPs of Gujarat to help them shift,
war-cars put up unacceptable and humiliating conditions.
the
NBA
♦
And when the bu1Idozers moved in to pave the way,
they
we.re blocked almost at the entrance point on the second daz«
Why
did they do thi's ? Why was Bachu Da 1 pa threatened and not allowed
to
’ to his house by A nd o' 1 an worker on the first day even
after
the iirst shrfting had started.)
I 6
I
I
‘
,v r •. aid they stoj.
the bulldozer moving
to
many
nuts
c-nc semper i
Gu.'^ra' PAPs,and othec workers to carry
the
lode ■
tr.eir heads up the hills or over the long distance, which
al^c has beer, reported
by Mr. B.G. Verghese ? Similarly why
the
situation
was
allowed to be created when 5 children had
to
be
shifted
by
emergency
arrangements to
parvetta
because
their
houses h a c shifted.
:
With
the press supporting the Andolan to the hilt,
it
can
continue- to weave ano spread such fictions that
those,
who
wanted to move, could mcive away unhindered, and at the same
time
cheating all sorts of difficulties including intimidation,
when
they
were indeed moving willingly. The press turned
its
benign
baci -on such deliberate ambiguities and ineonsistencies. The fact
of
the matter indeed is, that Andolan knew and was scared
stiff
that if tite road making to difficult to reach hemlets was allowed
to go ahead many houses including those of apparently
vociferous
vasavas wou.d have, taking
advan.ta,. : of the road,
shifted their
*
houses
I
•
Whenever the things did not go the way the Andolan
had
wished,
it
mounted
severe criticism
a g j i ns t
the
individuals'
and/or organizations, it jthought to be responsible.
When
Mr.
B. G. ,Verghese,
Ex-editor-in-chief,
Indian
E x p r •= visited Manibeli and Parveta resettlement site and
made
it
c . e a r in. a Press Conflerence 'I at Baroda that Manibeli
shifting•
was
peaceful
and .voluntary, that he saw no evidence
of
police
excessses
and
indeed he saw the Andolan
workers
blocking
the
bulldozer
compelling
the PAPs and other workers
to
carry
the
heavy housing material on their heads, he was immediately branded
by the Ando lan as one who had ’’turned an A RCH-V AH INI Spokesman at
Bareda” an
as one u•o had "posed as a free lance journalist”.
I
k
*
ARCH_VAH!NI
and Gujarat PAPs, who helped the
Manibeli
PAPs
to
shirt
were branded variously’ as
goons,
government
agents, g ever nr. ent dogs and the agents who were paying bribes and
intimidating the Manibeli PAPs.
*
When Mr
V.C. Shukla appointed Commission,
ARCH-VAHIN!
publicly
opposed
the
minister's
move
because
it
knew
of
V.C.Shukla
stand vis-a Vis 'Andolan that it’was
constituted
and
sent
tc
Manibeli to help the Andolan. The commission
made
its
visit
and made a report which
did no t support
Ando1 an's
wild
charges
a rid
rejected all important charges made by the
Andolan
like
police beating-’up the Andolan workers, using bulldozers
to
damage
nouses and fields. A very serious charge was made by
the
Andolan that a hill was set on fire to terrorise the people. Then
the Andolan claimed that a house was set on fire by one Mr.
S.P.
Siqgh, a Nigam employee. ^This apparently inconsistent but serious
charge
also
received
a wide publicity in
the
press.When
the
Commission
probed
deeply . into ithe alleged
incident,
it
was
informed that the fire was started by the bulldozer driver !
The
Commission
dismissed the charge stating " there
were,
however,
conflicting
views
on who.started.the fire. An. examination
re
vealed
that
there was a fire ona very small part.
It
was
of
little consequence." In the face of; such a damaging testimony
of
the
Commission,- the Andolan criticised the Commission by
saying
that it was not surprised that the Committee had said that
there
I
Je ?t
no atrocities
during the Ma n i be1 i operation,
because
the
? 0.11 IT: i t tee
cinsis’ea or Government officials and those
nominated
by the govern..sent did not have the sensitivity or time to
under stand the plight
of the people. It further tried to
turn tables
Ji.
the
Commission by charging
that ” such reports
would
only
ex be ' i e:: the government to get away with such acts and legitimise
carb a i ism
on hapless persons.” It conviniently omitted to
state
t5 at t he Ccm.T. ission a i so included Dr S. Acharya, TISS, Bombay; Dr
S . r . r J na . e k a r ,
CSS, Surat; Dr N.K.Gouraha, H S G Univ,
Sagar
who
ci r*
c*
not government of fi pic
*,
is, but they also signed
the?
r per
*
making it unanimous. Did they also not have
sensitivity ?
&
V i a 3 a ::: i r ■ a
D i s t. 3 h a r u cr.
Gu j a r a t .
I nd i a
39 31 50
VAHINI - ARCH
PO. Mangrol
Via- Rajpipla - 393 150
Dist Bharuch (Gujarat) India
September 19, 1992
To,
Mr. Lewis Preston
President,
The World Bank
1818 H Street N.W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20433
USA
Dear Mr. Preston,
We will be as brief as we can. This letter is about Bradford Morse - Thomas Berger
Committee Report to the Bank. After studying the Report carefully and sifting all the major
evidences they adduce to support the important conclusions, we have reached a
conclusion - backed by well supported facts and analysis, that most of the Morse-Berger
critical findings must be rejected.
1. ARCH-Vahini, a Gujarat based NGO is active in the problem of R & R in Sardar Sarovar
Project(SSP) for last 12 years. From 1983 onwards we have been interacting, alongwith
OXFAM, U.K., with the World Bank on this and related issues with increasing intensity.
At first we worked to obtain a good R & R policy and after having obtained it in December
1987, we have been working to get it implemented in Gujarat with a measure of success.
2. We almost completely disagreed with the critique of the SSP by the NGOs opposed to the
Project which apparently forced the Bank to appoint Morse-Berger Review. We however,
welcomed the Review believing that individuals of stature and reputation of Mr. Bradford
Morse and Mr. Thomas Berger will straighten out complicated issues, set the record right
deformed by the anti-dam NGOs by falsehoods, half-truths and distortion of facts. We
also hoped that some difficult problems in MP and Maharashtra may be solved with their
help. We co-operated fully with an open mind with the members of the Review team even
when the anti-dam movement publicly in Press questioned their bonafides and raised
serious skepticism about their competence throughout the inquiry. Even when we got
unmistakable warning signals from the members of the Morse-Berger Team about their
biases and tilts, we chose to ignore them and relied on the objectivity and a sense of fair
play of M/s Morse and Berger. We assumed that they will take care of biases and tilts of
their associates and they will firmly and objectively steer the inquiry to find the truth. We
now say with great sadness that we have been proven wrong. Morse-Berger, their
eloquence notwithstanding, have abandoned the objectivity which only can lead to truth.
3. Morse-Berger letter to you bristles with dramatic and sweeping conclusions. These create
a powerful impact on the readers of the Report who most often read covering letter only
or at the most read, in addition, the Chapter on ’Findings and Recommendations’. This is
a usual practice and, we would agree, a normal practice because the readers implicitly
rely on the authenticity and authority of the authors which is widely perceived to be highly
credible and competent.
Morse-Berger have obviously been able to convince majority of the readers about the
truth of the conclusions they make in the letter. This is one of the most worrying aspects
of the Morse-Berger style of reporting because majority of the momentous conclusions
in their letter don’t follow from the facts they have assembled or not assembled in the
text of the Chapters. At least some highly significant conclusions they reach in the
Chapters curiously don’t find place in the letter to you. And it is out of the contents of
such letters that protest letters are formulated and sent off.
4. Although our letter concentrates on great issues of R & R in Maharashtra and MP raised
in their letter to you and in the relevant chapters, we say without hesitation and with a
sense of responsibility that the criticism we offer to the main conclusions related to R &R
problems also apply to other conclusions on other issues including those on Environment.
In this letter, we have avoided complicated maze of arguments, the detailed
documentation of non-sequiturs they commit and of faulty reasoning they make. We have
done all these. We will send you soon a copy of our letter to Mr. David Jones, Associate
Director of OXFAM, U.K., which brings out these points in detail, and other critical notes.
5. R & R in Maharashtra : The Morse-Berger Report categorically says that 80 % of the
Project Affected Persons will find their living standard declining (p 137), none of the
oustees of 24 villages of Akrani will be eligible for 2 ha of land, (p xix and 165)
And yet the chapter on Maharashtra almost begins(pages 138-9) with the analysis of two
policy documents of June 1989 and February 1992. The analysis unambiguously
recognizes that oustees who encroached the forest lands before March 1978 have land
entitlements equal to the landed oustees of minimum of 2 ha of irrigable land per family.
Vast majority of the encroachers of Akrani taluka have their land entitlements equivalent
to landed oustees secure (855 out of 1485 of Akrani oustees). This fact was known to the
Morse-Berger Team. In the following 26 pages of the text this material fact is not seriously
questioned and all of a sudden on page 165 the dramatic statement, identical in form and
content to that in the letter to you, suddenly appears. This new conclusion is not
substantiated by credible facts and it hangs as it were in the air. It is a classical case of
non-sequitur. Similarly, the Morse-Berger Team, by failing to acknowledge and cite the
GOM’s policy recognizing a serious problem of marooned lands (February 1990) and
giving them entitlements of landed oustees, falsely raises the issue of their plight and
ignores the fact that 192 such oustees have also been given entitlements of minimum of
2 ha each in Akrani taluka.(Annexure XVIII Maharashtra Master Plan 1991). The plain fact
is that 70.5 per cent (1047 out of 1485) of the oustees in Akrani taluka have entitlements
of landed oustees. The bare facts deriving from the existing R & R policy of Maharashtra
stand in stark contrast to the dramatic conclusion of Morse-Berger that none of the
oustees in Akrani will qualify for minimum of 2 ha of land. It also belies their conclusion
that encroachers in Maharashtra will have their living standard fall because of the policy.
6. R & R in MP: In case of MP also, we are afraid, that the Morse-Berger Team has its
conclusion on encroachers factually wrong. The Morse-Berger Team, while recognizing
that encroachers in MP upto 1987 have land entitlement upto 2 ha of land, have yet rushed
to the dramatic conclusion that the encroachers in MP face ruin because they naively
chose to rely on the advice they received in MP that the tribals do not preserve the receipts
of the fines they pay for encroachments to the forest officials which only can prove their
rights I Incredible as it may appear, but it is a fact that the Team did not bother to check
government records also as a measure of precaution before making up its mind.
Responding to this defective finding, the GOMP officially claimed that 76 % of the
encroachers have their rights confirmed.
Unmindful of non-facts or factual lapses, Morse- Berger are so haunted by the issue of
encroachers in Maharashtra and MP that they repeatedly raise it in a letter to you - at
least six times, prompting others to take up this issue with you.
Furthermore, Morse-Berger mount a severe criticism that apart from a defective R & R
policy, MP have no reliable basic data without which R & R is impossible. Yet in a crucial
admission about the data, they agree that the data they were given provide useful
approximations and a basis for assessing the scale of the problem (p 184-5).
Having made this concession, they accept some more facts derived from data that:
a. MP have to resettle 23,000 families. (But are prepared to offer 2 ha of land to landed oustees
only.)(p xvi)
b. Out of 193 affected villages, only 79 will suffer inundation of 10 % or more of agricultural lands.
(p 185) In the remaining 114 villages inundation is less than 10 % (the figure is 2.8 % of
agricultural lands).
c. In fact, they have apparently gone on accepting the fact that 50 % of the oustee families, who
according to GOMP will move to Gujarat, will require 23,000 ha of land.
In the acceptance of series of these facts lies the major undoing of the Morse-Berger
Report. 12,238 affected families of 114 villages, losing 2.8 % of their land, will not suffer
major uprooting. Only their houses (65.6 % of all houses) will have to be shifted in the
same village at a higher plane. Landless labourers, major sons and encroachers, if any,
are obviously in no need of any land entitlements. That leaves out 11,142 families (about
50 %) belonging to 79 villages who will lose more than 10 % of land. GOMP claims that
they all will go to Gujarat requiring 23,000 ha of land. Morse-Berger seem to agree to this.
Of the 79 villages, 58 villages (9148 oustee families) will have 25 % of their land and 73 %
of the houses flooded. Majority of the major sons, landless labourers and encroachers
will not suffer displacement beyond shifting their houses at a higher plane. The main brunt
of the land loss and major uprooting in these 58 villages will be borne by those who lose
substantially because of submergence of 25 % of land including landless who work on
this land and on those 2000 oustees living in the remaining 21 villages. Morse-Berger
should have clearly assessed the scale of the problem, which in MP includes also the
pattern of submergence ( more houses and less land going under submergence) in all
the 193 villages. This was possible as they themselves have accepted. They did not do
this critical assessment and rushed to the unsubstantiated conclusion that majority of the
landless, major sons and encroachers are lost in MR What is more, in an uncritical
acceptance of GOMP's claim that 50 % of the oustees(79 villages) will go to Gujarat,
3
Morse-Berger have unnecessarily, without application of mind accepted a massive
uprooting of the landless labourers from their economic and cultural setting, which is their
one major concern.
They have also overlooked another significant development taking place in MR It is true
that the existing R & R policy in MP excludes major sons of landed oustees, but the other
existing law in MP - indeed, in all the states of India including Maharashtra - does allow
their major sons to be registered on the government revenue records as co-sharers who
have equal entitlements. In the severely affected villages of MP many land owners have
got the names of their sons entered into the government land records as co-sharers.
(GOMP has referred to this reality in one of the responses to the Bank.) Morse-Berger
should have known this important fact and should have worked out the implications this
has for apparently difficult problem of major sons. They should have also noted that in this
tribal area, the affected people will not be able to use the law in their favour. A precise
recommendation about this situation could save their major sons.
7. Their failure to get the facts right about the encroachers in Maharashtra and MP, their
failure to correctly analyse the scale of problem in MP villages and its consequences for
landless labourers and their failure to know about major sons who can and do get their
names on revenue records as co-sharers has led them to declare in Findings and
Recommendations that even if MP were to bring its R & R policy in line with Gujarat, it is
too late and R & R in MP is impossible !(p 351) They have no other recommendation to
make but to ask the Bank to step back from the Project and take a fresh look. This series
of failure has led them to their ultimate failure: to reach the goal they set for themselves in
the concluding part of their letter to you - to find truth and report it and to search for
constructive and creative solutions.
8. Based on this concrete and irrefutable analysis, we urge you and we urge the Executive
Directors of the Bank through you to disregard the major findings and recommendations
of Morse-Berger.Over the years the Bank has secured good incremental reforms, there
is still an ample scope to secure more to improve the R & R even further, Morse-Berger
findings notwithstanding. We, therefore, urge you not to abandon the method of
incremental reforms as recommended by Morse-Berger. It has served its purpose well.
We also urge you to ensure that the Bank remains involved in SSP because it remains
one of the best guarantees that constructive and creative reforms will be pushed and
positive results achieved. This will also serve as healthy precedent for further
displacements in India.
With regards,
Yours sincerely,
(Dr.Anil Patel.)
for Vahini - ARCH
4
COMMUNITY HEALTH CELL
47/1, (First Floor)St. Marks .load
BANGALORE-560 001
SARDAR SAROVAR OUSTEES WHICH WAY TO GO: ACTIVSTS' DILEMMA
SEPTEMBER-1983
VAHINI
-
ARCH
MANGROL, VIA RAJPIPLA
DIST. BHARUCH, GUJARAT - 393150
SARDAR SAROVAR OUSTEES WHICH WAY TO GO : ACTIVISTS' DILEWU..
M
,
I
— ■■ ■
■ .W. ——
_-------
---------- - -----------
1— _
J
_
L
I.
T_I ~~1-------- ■
-I
-----------
L
- _-------- __
______
_________I—
111
-
-
The issue of rehabilitation of the oustees of Sardar
Sarovar Project ( S.S.P.) in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh
has arrived at a cross-road. They are now offered two very
different choices :
(1)
To press for the comprehensive rehabilitation policy
acceptable to them which is broadly in line with the
new R&R Policy announced by Gujarat Government in
December 1987 and to fight for its fair implementation.
This is the line taken by the oustees of Gujarat and
by Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, Gujarat.
(2)
The second choice, is offered to them by the organi
sations Narmada Dharangrast Samiti (N.D.S.) in
Maharashtra and Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti(N.G.N.S.)
in M.P. Th°se organisations have now
taken a position
that rehabilitation in Maharashtra & M.P< is impossible!
Moreover according to them S.S.P.is fraught with serious
environmental problems. The oustees are therefore asked
to oppose the S.S.P.whoJ.esale. In a statement recently
issued they say, "We would prefer to be drowned by the
rising waters of the dam if the Government insists on
building the dam, rather than give our tacit approval
to these destructive schemes by aggreeing to shift”.
These are brave words and it's a tall order. Speaking
for Gujarat oustees we know that they will not be willing and
able to incur such heavy risks and fight for such "lofty
ideals". Their 8 year long and bitter fight has been to obtain
better rehabilitation for themselves and for the oustees of
other States. We deeply appreciate and understand their positic.
. .2. .
-•s22-
because their’s is the fight for sheer survival. We in-Vahini
also lack the courage and conviction to persuade, cajole and
push these oustees to put their lives at risk and fight for
such ’’lofty ideals’5.
Before we go into the issues raised by these organisa
tions we would like to put on record the revolutionary nature
of new R&R policy of December 1987 won by the Gujarat oustees.
We state its two most outstanding features.
(a)
Each oustees family, defined as eighteen year son
married or unmarried, will be entitled to minimum 5
acres of irrigable land of his choice and preference
it ■
•• r
w■ 1
*
ar
.t:
T« y■
iw
and this is irrespective of the fact whether the oustee
family has titled land or is dependent on- forest/waste
land cultivation or is a landless family. The choice
extends even further. Should they not prefer any other
land but the forest land then under such circumstances
Government of India will have to release forest land
for their rehabilitation.
(b)
These families will not be asked to bear the cost of the
land they choose to have, as that would be borne by the
Project as an exgratia payment.
I
9
Even a noted lawyer knownto be not sympathetic to the
Government was moved to describe this policy as unbelievable.
His reservation with regard to this policy was not related to
its content but was related to whether it will be fairly
implemented or not. We will return to this justifiable fear
about the Governments intention and ability to implement the
policy later on, but first we must deal with the important
arguments raised by these organisations.
• • 3• •
-sj:(I)
Rehabilitation Is Impossible
• • * IV1M
(a)
WMMW# Wl
Rehabilitation is impossible, they have said, because
there is simply not enough land!
In 1985 when we were bitterly fighting for minimum 5
acres of land, one of the favourite arguments advanced by the
Gujarat Government to stall our demand was • "But there isn’t
enough land’'*
In view of the fact that the waste land offered
by the Govt, to the oustees was useless oustees’ choice natu
rally was for private lands. Oustees quickly realised the game
the Government was playing and promptly fought back by using
their intimate knowledge of the surrounding areas and came up
with the list of 6000 acres of land that the land owners in the
area were ready to sell to the oustees. Govt’s move was checked.
The Government machinery could not have identified these lands,
I
but the oustees did I Long after this
had happened not only the
officers of the Government and of the World Bank, but also other
well-wishers were persistently and anxiously asking the question’’But arc you sure that there is enough land available?’belying on
our Oustee friends’
resourcefullness we always answered affir
matively. And our confidence in oustees’ resourcefullness has
ft
been amply justified. The oustees of Gujarat have already identi
fied more than 15Q00 acres of land of their choice and they still
assure us that there are still more lands available for sale.
I
Recently we happened to meet small oustee farmers and
landless oustees in M.P. Not surprisingly they did not know the
types of the benefits Government of Gujarat was offering its
oustees. When we explained to them the policy and asked whether
they can also identify the land a la
Gujarat oustees, the
reply was prompt and clear, ”Yes indeed, if the Government is
ready to pay the cost1’. We have been informed by a friend working.
in Alirajpur that if good land in enough quantity is made avail.a -
ble, all the tribal oustees of Alirajpur area would be ready to
-:4o be resettled even at far off places. Oustees are afterall same
everywhere. We feel from our experience in Gujarat, and a
brief encounter in Rajghat, Badwani that given the right R&R
policy and proper support and encouragement they will and should
be able to bring to the fore their resourcefullness and identify
land of their choice.
At present the argument of "not enough land" in M.P. &
Maharashtra rests on the whatever- the bureaucracy has been able
to identify/not identify. It is not based on the active explo
ration of the situation by activists and oustees encouraged by
them.
(b)
"But this is unfair", they have argued, "Why should
outstees be asked to undertake such hazardous exercise?
In Gujarat they have made this mistake, but this will
not be allowed to-^happen in M.P. and- Maharashtra".
*
'
We wonder why not J. The tribal oustees of Gu jarat have
shown how resourcefull and non vulnerable, atleast with regard
to identifying lands, they are. If they can do itoustees of
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra too can do it with equall faci
lity, provided offcourse that they are given adequate facili
ties by the respective Governments^ Another crucial point
seems
to have been overlooked viz. the question.of land of oustees
choice and preference. The terms and conditions of the World
Bank loan agreement on which the new R&R Poliey of Government of
Gujarat is based, provides explicitly and repeatedly that each
oustee family shall be provided land of his choice and preference.
This crucial condition in conjunction with other conditions
confers right on each oustee to settle in the areas and land of
his choice, so that not only his economic preference is taken
care of but also his social, cultural, religious and other con
siderations are taken care of. So much so that if some oustees
prefer not to have best of the agricultural land but to have
iorest land so that they remain in their prefered environment,
0
• •5• •
-:5:the terms of the loan agreement provide that under such
circumstances the Government of India will release Forest land
for resettlement.
The full significance of this must be grasped. No re
settlement scheme designed by the Government machinery alone at
any level, given the best will and efficiency, will be able to
take into account the complicated and delicate combination of
factors that go into consideration of each such preference and
choice. Of necessity, even the best scheme prepared by the
enlightened bureaucrat cannot match the scheme that can emerge
out of the choices exercised by each oustee. Nodoubt enough care
and precaution must be taken to ensure that the oustees are not
coerced, cajoled or deceived "to make their choices”. Activists
have to play this crucial role. This provision of choice and
preference no doubt assumes the resourcefullness and intelligence
of the oustees. vfe can only repeat our arguments to those who
have genuine doubts on this score that there is no cause to fear
on this count. In our anxiety to protect the vital interests of the
poor tribals, we must not overstep the bounds, the boundary bet
ween concern and patronization is very thin indeed at times!
(c)
"But aren’t we leaving them to the mercy of the
wolves - these land owners ?".
This fear is unfounded because we must remember that
the ousteefe task is finished once he identifies the land of his
choice and brings it to the notice of the rehabilitation office.
The remaining tasks of fixing prices, ensuring clear titles,
making payments and preparing the necessary documents will be
the task of rehabilitation office, as is being done in Gujarat.
(d)
"But why should we do this work. This is Government’s
job"?
This is a familiar refrain. We can only give our answer.
If our bureaucracy
were sensitive,responsible and accountable
COMMUNITY KEAlB-t CEU
gANGAlOa£-660 001
enough, this question, this struggle, this debate and even this
dilemma would not have arisen. We are all in this, deadly
serious business precisely because we all know that there is
not a slightest chance for the oustees to get their due if
every thing is left to the initiative of the bureaucracy. To ask
the bureaucracy to prepare the detailed blue print of rehabili
tation without active involvement of the oustees and activists
I
from the very begining is to under-mine the provisions of
choice and preference guaranteed to them to safeguard their vital
interestSo
(e)
"But the land owners will ask high price. We cannot agree
to this, because this will enrich the already rich land
owners and government, hard pressed as it is,might
agree to this. But how can we accept escalation in the
cost of the project? We are responsible citizens afterall
and should not allow the cost of the project to go high”.
To say the least, this is a strange argument. We must not
overlook some simple facts which seem to have been overlooked.
I
If the land choosen by the oustee is really a good quality land
it will cost more. How can it further enrich the land owner,
unlesjs of course he charges and gets exhorbitantly higher prices?
This can happen. But the role of the activists is precisely to
check this. This argument strangely overlooks the fact that
while land owner gets money the poor tribal oustee gets very
high quality land which means the transfer of productive resources
on a much higher scale, than could be ever imagined, to a poor
farmer. A very important anomaly in the "developmental process”
which we are all challenging is corrected. How can we take ob
jection to this corrective process of transfer of resources to
poor tribals? Further more isn’t it a fact that both the orga
nisations in Gujarat and Maharashtra, where land acquisition
proceedings have been completed and awards made, have legally
challenged the meagre compensation awarded for the lands acqui
red and have asked for much higher award? The real issue is not
..7
the high land price, the real issue is that either through
fraud or through other devious mechanisms the prices must not
get artifically inflated. We again repeat that the safeguard
against such happenings is the vigilance on the part of the
activists. The argument of high project cost is also riddled
with paradox. Right from the begining when the struggle for just
rehabilitation policy started both in Gujarat & Maharashtra we
have argued with passion and vehemence that Government is
spending too little on rehabilitation, giving it a third rate
treatment, throwing out the oustees without providing means of
decent livelihood. We have always lamented, and rightly so,that
poor oustees are rendered destitutes and the people in command
area get richer, - mockery of social justice is made. Now for
the first time in the history when such dangerous process is
seriously challenged and sought to be reversed such arguments
are advanced!
■
Non-availability of the land is a contextual question.
Looking at the reality from the bureaucratic point of view will
only confirm us in our belief that there is no land available.
The activists on the other hand can go deeper into the social
reality, be more flexible and be in a much better position to
encourage the freer exploration of the situation. Only when
this has been done in all sincerity we can say whether enough
land is available or not.
’’Rehabilitation is impossible” is a complex argument
I
and is based on the alleged fact .that enough land is not availa
ble. This argument of non-availability is strengthened by taking
up positions that oustees should not be asked or encouraged to
identify the land they would prefer and that high prices of the
land should also not be given to the land-sellers. Rehabilitation
would indeed be rendered impossible if the assumptions, alleged
facts, and constraints invoked in the vzhole complex of argument
are accepted! Needless to say, that we differ radically from
this assessment and these assumptions.
With this let us return to the point of "justifiable
fear of non implementation of the new R&R policy", raised in
some quarters. This is another real hard question.
There is
no scope here for complacency, even less for naive faith and
trust in the project authorities. We have had enough experience
of betrayal, double-talk and willful distortions and misinter%
pretations of G.Rs, during last 8 years to keep our guards high
and be on the constant vigil for even the tiniest symptom of
back-tracking by the government. We however reject a policy of
9
permanent irreconcilability with
the government. To do so
would be counter productive, irresponsible and immature. Afterall
governments, Narmada Project authorities etc. are not the mono
liths. To reject any policy a prior as impossible is not only a
mark of irresponsibility but also of inadequate grasp of socio
political reality. Afterall we must not forget that our central
responsibility is towards the poor helpless oustees. If they
accept the R&R policy and want to give it a thoroughly fair
trial as they are doing in Gujarat so be it. Besides a radical
stand of permanent irreconcilability with the government appears
in certain political perspective a very attractive proposition,
but it hardly ever serves the interests of the poor people one
is trying to work for. Beyond this the problem of possible/
impossible is a practical question. Government has fought back
hardest before announcing-’ the truly just & fair R&R policy. The
second weapon it always uses is ~o misinterprets the policy to
suit its purpose. Right from the begining there was never any
derth of pious, generous and pro-oustee statements by the politi-
.. 9..
-; 9; cians in power. They however always resisted the formulation
of the policy in consonance with these statements and when
they were forced to do so they always resorted to misinter
pretation and distortions. Conversion of the pious pronounce
ments of the politicians into concrete policies and later on
to get any misinterpretation and distortion removed was not a
benign and voluntary act of the rulers. This has been achieved
through a long, grim and determined struggle by the oustees,
by us and by other individuals and organisations who espoused
the cause of the oustees dodgedly through thick and thin. What
appeared to be an impossible goal only a few years ago, has
become a fact today. The combination of forces which brought
this policy into existence are still there intact, better orga
nised to see that the policy is implemented.We make this state
ment because we know that these forces have a concrete existence.
In order that the instrument of misinterpretation to undermine
the interests of the oustees is not brought into play again we
have been keeping a close watch on the nrocess of translation
e.
i.
the actual implementation of the policy. The process of
implementation of new policy has started in earnest since June
1988 only,
(after we fought back the last and dangerous mischief
of misinterpretation of new policy by convening a convention
of Gujarat oustee’s in May 1988). During the last two months 2
landless families have been given 5 acres each of land of their
choice and many other families belonging to other categories of
oustees have been given minimum 5 acres per family of their
choice. In case of each of this oustee families orders to make
exgratia payments are being made. Any one with even a little
legal background would understand that a concrete interpretation
acceptable to the oustees of a legal document has been made by
the Government. Two most important weapons in the hands of the
Government have been effectively removed. What is this if not a
concrete evidence in favour of possible?
..10..
-slO:In any case the organisations in M.P. and Maharashtra
have dubbed “Rehabilitation impossible" not because of the
games the Government would play. Their case rests on very
different grounds which we have dealt with above to the best
of our ability.
(II)
’’Must Be Stopped"
Irrespective of the fact that the rehabilitation is
possible or not these organisations have now given a call to
the oustees & others to fight against the dam because "we
would prefer to.be drowned by the rising waters of the dam if
the Government insists on building them, rather
than give our
tacit approval to these destructive schemes by agreeing to
shift".
While we arc aware and in know of the huge controversy
*
that rages for and against the S.S.P.5we must admit that we
are not in a position to take any firm and unqualified stand
because the nature and quality of evidence that has surfaced
so far appears to us to be not strong enough. We would like
however to pointout some pertinent facts because they have a
close bearing on the lives of thousands of oustees, in Maha
rashtra 'and M.P.jWho will be displaced if the S.S.P. indeed
goes ahead.
(a)
It is worth remembering that the work amongst oustees
of Gujarat and Maharashtra was started and has been carried
on untill very recently to fight for the fair and just R&R
policy. Oustees in these states were organised with this as
an explicit objective. It was not that during those years and
even earlier the various environmental problems were not raised
COMMUNITY HEALTH CELL
47/1, (First Floor)St. Marks
bangalore.
. .llt.
and discussed with passion. To best of our knowledge very few
concrete facts and arguments have been added to those that were
being made at that time. And yet the focus of work amongst
oustees remained on the R&R policy only.
(b)
It is significant to note in this context that on 5th
December, 1987 a meeting of the activists, environmentalists,
intellectuals, economists and lawyers etc. from all over the
'
country, who were concerned about developments in Narmada Valley,
was convened in New Delhi. This meeting was convened because
there was a wide-spread concern and uneasiness that enough in
formation regarding the environmental and related issues was not
available. In a preliminary meeting with us to discuss the need,
rationale, purpose and modalities of the above meeting, we were
told clearly that S.S.P. now could not be stopped, but its
critique was not properly documented by the activist movement,
so such documentation must be prepared even if for the sake of
documentation. 5th December meeting discussed at length various
issues of concern, various cells were formed and assigned respon-
sibility to prepare detailed critical documents. In a final se
ssion a view was strongly expressed by a few that enough evidence
then was already at hand to straight away start a fight against
these dams. A long discussion ensued and the consensus of the
meeting was that still there wasn’t enough hard evidence at
hand to straight away start a fight to stop the dams. The re
presentatives of all the organisations active in S.S.P.partici
pated in the meeting. In the nine months that have lapsed, we
know
of no new concrete evidence that has been brought out
and properly documented to alter the information basis that
brought about the consensus.
. .12
-: 12:
(c)
It is true that the states of Madhya Pradesh and
Maharashtra have so far failed to satisfy the oustees by not
announcing a new R&R policy which is broadly in line with
G.O.G’s and which is acceptable to the oustees. What intri
gues us however is that in the middle of the struggle to obtain
a better R&R policy a sudden turn has been given. A radical
shift in the objective of the movement has been made. The
struggle is no longer for the comprehensive R&R policy and its
fair implementation. "Rehabilitation is impossible" is a
redundant argument in the light of this radical shift. The
oustees are now asked to shun the rehabilitation altogether
even if it is acceptable to them. They are now asked to lead
the battle against the S.S.P.
Disturbing set of a questions arise in our minds.
(i)
Do the oustee’s of Maharashtra and M.P. fully know the
provisions of Government of Gujarat’s new R&R Policy?
(ii)
Can they or can they not identify lands acceptable
to them if they know that they have a right to have
minimum 5 acres of land of their choice at the place
they want and that the cost of the land shall be borne
by the State?
9
(iii)
Do the oustees know that this entitlement is due to
all categories of oustee families including landless
*
families?
(iv)
Have the landless oustee families and small
farmers
participated in enough numbers to understand the
significance of R&R policy and the new.
shift being
made?.
..13..
- s13 s ~
(v)
It is widely recognised that S.S.P. has near total
social political support in Gujarat, that there are
no obvious technical, legal or political hurdles in the
f
path
of the S.S.P. Even the opponents of the S.S.P.
have conceded in private conversations and even in
writing that the S.S.P. cannot be stopped. In view of
this hard realistic assessment, if the S.S.P.really
goes ahead what will happen to the thousands of oustees
of Maharashtra and M.P.? If the movement to stop the
S.S.P., repeat stop and not postpone, succeeds then
off course the painfull question of human suffering
*
of forced displacement will not arise. All will be well.
But suppose if it fails, which is much more likely
scenario, then what will happen? It is not difficult
to imagine that as the waters
begin to rise, slowly
but surely, a panic will set in Maharashtra and M.P.
villages. First in trickles
then in floods people
will want to move out. The resultant ’rehabilitation’
would be haphazard, panic ridden, unplanned and grossly
injurious to most of the oustees. We all know that even
in the best of the times, given the best intentions and
efforts, rehabilitation is an extremely difficult process.
In case of S.S.P. it is even more so because of the size
of the displacement, of difficult terrain and of
inefficient and unmotivated bureaucracy. If the orga
nisations fail to keep their focus on this difficult
problem, there will be chaotic displacement leading to
great avoidable human suffering. The movement will
perhaps have the
’’you see! How
dubious
caucus
satisfaction of saying,
and rutless is the state, its
highsounding promises not withstanding. Yet another
Disaster!” To us this will be an instance of self
..14..
-sl4: -
fulfiling prophecy.
\
Those of us who have worked amongst the oustees
and who are now making this radical shift must ask,
“will we really ask these oustees to drown themselves
in the rising waters of the dam.... ?”
As we made it clear at the outset we lack that courage
and conviction. If some of us are quite convinced that
S.S.P.is unmitigated evil and that it must be fought,
we believe, that, the issue of rehabilitation must be
delinked from the battle on the wider front. We do not
share the strategic perceptions of those who are witt
ingly or unwittingly using the issue of rehabilitation
of oustees in the cause of fight against the dam. To
us this is not responsible activism.
A
*****
* * *
*
Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Sardar
Sarovar Project: Are the Critics Right?
Anil Patel
Ambrish Mehta
Sudarshan Iyengar
Trupti Parekh
Raiesh Mishra
g|
||
||
||
Si
[The Narmada Project and growing opposition to it have become symbols
both of the destructive measures that displace people and of popular
resistance to them. With many more people-displacing schemes being
planned and the tribals and other marginalised sections of society
becoming their main victims, SOCIAL ACTION has thought it necessary
to encourage an ongoing debate on these questions in order to contribute
to a people-oriented policy. The July 1988 issue was thus on “Develop
ment, Displacement and Rehabilitation." These papers together with
several additional ones were published in book form, with the specific
subtitle “Issues for a National Debate." In July 1989 we published an
article by Gayatri Singh giving arguments against the Sardar Sarovar
scheme. In October 1989 we dealt with the question of natural resource
management in India. Continuing the same debate, we are presenting here
the arguments of those who think that activists should work for a viable
people-oriented R&R policy in Sardar Sarovar and not turn R&R into a
tool in their “No Dam" struggle. We hope that these papers, together with
the rest of this issue which is on the displacement of tribals, will be of
assistance to our readers in their efforts to clarify the issues involved-Editor.]
A storm rages over the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP). Situated in the eye
of the storm is Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R & R). It began almost imper
ceptibly 11 years ago in 1980. VAHINI-ARCH initiated the struggle. The
tribals were unorganised, too stunned and dazed by the sudden and imminent
Dr. Anil Patel and the remaining authors arc members of ARCII-VAIIIN1, an activist group
working among the tribals, and based at Rajpipla, Gujarat.
328
SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
threat of land acquisition, to offer even a token resistance to the bulldozing
tactics of the government. They were highly fearful of the government and
relied almost totally on the mercy of the Sarkar-Maibap. The Government
displayed total indifference and callousness towards the plight and concerns of
the tribal oustccs with its customary arrogance and imperiousness. Little did the
Government then realise that the small trickles of resistance and protest would
swell into a big torrent in course of lime to threaten the Project. Our urgent and
impassioned plea then that if SSP was going to be the “Lifeline” of Gujarat and
was going to be a boon to its dry areas, why ruin the poor, helpless tribals, met
with polite but dishonest nods from the politicians and lop bureaucrats.
The Beginning
In 1978 a highly placed politician had arrogantly blurted out when asked
about the resettlement of lhe oustccs, “we don’t have to move a finger. When
the water rises, these people will be flushed out like rats from their holes.” But
in 1984, another highly placed polilician shaken by the rising tide of resistance
became more cautious. In an apparent show of sympathy but without really
feeling it, he said, “when we arc going to spend billions of rupees, why should
we hurt the tribals? To give to the tribals what is their due (minimum 5 acres of
land per family) is to dispense with one foot of a centipede.”
The drastic change in words notwithstanding, there was little change in
non-commitmcnt to R&R in SSP in 1984. Through the perseverance and
doggedness of VAHINI-ARCH, 19 villages of Gujarat located in the inacces
sible hilly terrain stretching along 60 kms on the bank of river Narmada learnt
to organise themselves, to know about their rights enshrined in the Narmada
Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT) award and the Loan Agreement with the
World Bank (WB), and to fight for their rights within the frame of law. A remote
tribal area, sleepy and docile until now, rose to its feet by the strength of sheer
willpower to walk to Kevadia Colony, the Project headquarters, on 8th March,
1984 in a massive show of defiance and in an act of solidarity which this area
had never witnessed before. The struggle then gathered momentum. A humble
petitioner had got himself transformed into a defiant, if still vulnerable, rebel
who dared to look straight into the eyes of a mighty State and demand his proper
share which the powerful, in an unguarded moment, granted him with no
intention whatsoever to honour it. Ils earlier R&R policy (G.R. of 11-6-1979)
which was a truncated version of the NWDT award, a reflection of pettiness and
short-sightedness of policy makers, lay in tatters and rejected by the oustces of
Gujarat. A demand for a new radical policy was now irresistible—a minimum
of 5 acres of land chosen by each major son, and by each “cncroachcr ”
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT LN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
329
The struggle took various forms including the boycott of the Project
Authority, a Rasta Roko to stop work on the rock fill dyke, a writ petition in the
Gujarat High Court and from there to the Supreme Court of India, a massive
international campaign to lobby with the World Bank (WB) with the active
support and sustained involvement of an international NGO, Oxfam (UK) and
of Survival International (UK) in the initial stages. For three years, the GovernmcntofGujarat(GOG) foughtback hard,knowing full well thatitcouldnotstop
the birth of the new R&R policy which we were fighting for and which the WB
was fully supporting. The GOG could lake no morc.The SSP had met with
threatening resistance on the R & R front in Gujarat for the first time. In
December 1987, a radically new R & R policy was announced by the GOG fully
in line with our demands. We endorsed it publicly.
Meanwhile a movement centered on the R & R issue was spreading to the
Maharashtra villages and slowly taking roots in the last months of 1985,
demanding a belter deal in R & R. In Madhya Pradesh (MP), too there was some
awakening and a little ground level activity, all focusing on R&R. A few articles
examining the environmental aspects of the Narmada Valley Project including
SSP had appeared in some English language journals. This was all. There was
no visible linkage than between the environmental issues and the R&R-ccntcrcd
movement, still less visible was any evidence that the R&R-ccntcrcd movement
was about to adopt an environmental platform and transform itself into a
movement against SSP. Indeed as late as November 1987 in a memorandum
submitted jointly to the Chairman of the Narmada Control Authority (NCA) by
the Maharashtra based Narmada Dharangrast Samiti (NDS) and the MP based
Narmada GhatiNavnirman Samiti (NGNS), who were spearheading the move
ment against the SSP now, had put forward 38 demands almost all related only
to R&R. Al the end of the memorandum they had given a warning that if before
15lh December 1987 a clear and definite decision was not taken on these
demands, then a movement would be launched to get them fulfilled.
In June 1987, the Central Government’s Department of Environment and
Forests, (DOE&F), was forced to issue a clearance to SSP and NSP. A letter of
clearance and DOE’s note to the Prime Minister regarding it, sent before the
clearance, were leaked to a few activists in New Delhi. This provided the first
opportunity to open up an environmental front. Serious environmental rum
blings against SSP in New Delhi and other cities began but the activists in the
field were still largely concentrating on R&R or so it seemed.
The unexpected announcement of the December 1987 Policy with its
radically different contents and structure took everyone by surprise. It exposed
for the first lime the vulnerability of the GOG. The monolithic view of the
330
SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
World Bank, as a front of the international capitalism working at tandem with
the Slate Government pursuing the interests of the ruling classes, had received
a severe jolt. A large hiatus between the WB and the GOG was clearly revealed.
The scene began to be transformed rapidly. Environmental issues rushed to the
forefront. The turning point (new R&R policy) was so sudden that the activists
had hardly any time and opportunity to make a smooth and plausible shift from
their R&R focus to the new focus of No SSP. Thus the transition was clumsy and
weak. The struggle for better R & R in Maharashtra and MP was transformed
into the struggle against SSP. Slopping the SSP at any cost became the
objective. With that, R&R attained a new status—from the end to be achieved it
became a means to fight the SSP.
The history of R&R in India and the State’s usual approach and style in
dealing with such problems has been so dismal and discouraging that any
“worse-ease scenario” is immediately accepted. The government’s credibility
is extremely low. This all pervasive pessimism-realistic as it is-allows the
activists to make such a drastic transition of objectives and transformation of
end to means smoothly and imperceptibly. Hardly a question is asked, hardly an
eyebrow is raised.
This brief historical overview provides an insight into a process in which
at a certain stage a goal came to be fixed, which is integral to the larger goal of
“Stop SSP.” Once this radical transformation of end into means is understood,
it helps one to understand the pattern of ever-changing issues and shifting
arguments regarding R&R while the goal remains fixed: Impossible R&R.
R&R by GOG
Soon after the December 1987 policy was declared and the movement in
Maharashtra and MP shifted to a “No dam-R&R is impossible” position in the
middle of 1988, the criticism of R&R has gone through several quite discernible
phases.
Point-Counterpoint
Once the initial element of surprise and even shock had wom off and the
vulnerability of the GOG had become visible, the anti-dam movement declared
Rehabilitation to be impossible. The immediate arguments offered to substan
tiate this were: there was not enough land not only in MP and Maharashtra, but
also in Gujarat. The new R&R policy was only a piece of paper, GOG had no
will and ability to implement it. The movement then drew heavily upon what
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
331
had happened, not only elsewhere in India, but also in Gujarat and in particular
on what had happened in SSP itself. If past is an important guide to what will
happen in the future this was a weighty argument. Ils impact was immediate and
visible on others who were not directly involved but not on the oustccs of
Gujarat. They could not afford to fall into this quagmire of pessimism. They had
to give a hard and fair trial to the policy for which they had fought so long, so
hard!
We reasoned and argued with the activists of the movement that the
oustccs in Gujarat had in fact succeeded in identifying the private lands of their
choice and that in MP this was a clear possibility. The counter-attack came in
quick: “Poor and helpless oustccs were being forced to roam and wander about
day in and day out with empty stomachs in search of land which was clearly a
responsibility of the government to find!” It was stated that the oustccs were
forced to fix the price with the landowners in the Land Purchase Committee
(LPC). This would only ruin the oustccs as they were no match to the
landowners. It was further argued that land owners were demanding exorbitant
prices. A demand of Rs. 50,000 per acre was and has been repeatedly quoted to
prove the point.
To each of these points and others left out, there is a counter-point.
* Identification of land by the oustccs was primarily our move. This was
initiated in the prc-Dcccmbcr 1987 days when the GOG was trying to stall
our demand that a minimum of five acres of land of choice should also
include private lands, by blandly maintaining that there was not enough
private land available for sale! The list of such private land available for
sale was provided to the WB expert just al the nick of the lime for him to
successfully defeat the GOG’s short-sighted strategy at a crucial meeting
in New Delhi in September 1985. The identification and selection of
private lands by oustccs, we believe, is the real exercise of choice. In the
very early days of the implementation of the new R&R policy, there is a
grain of truth in the claim that oustccs had to spend their resources to
locate these private lands, but it is exaggerated. The stories of exhausted,
depressed, hungry oustccs returning home empty-handed at night bears
little resemblance to reality. Very soon, however, the oustccs were being
provided with vehicles to move about and inspect the land of their choice
and by the end of 1988, six months after the implementation had begun in
right earnest, the spontaneous offers to sell good lands in large chunks
began to pour in with the Sardar SarovarNigam. This has surprised many
people but this is no place to go into the dynamics of the land market in
Gujarat and possibly in MP. Now the situation has changed beyond
332
SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
recognition. Thousands of hectares of private agricultural land were
offered for sale to the Nigam directly and most of these lands were
approved by the oustccs and bought and allotted to them by the Nigam.
However, even today, there arc individual oustccs who arc identifying
their own lands of preference. Their eases arc being brought to the LPC for
fixing the price and once this is done, these arc allotted to them. This must
be viewed as an exercise of free and unfettered choice by the oustccs and
not as an abdication of responsibility by the Government
* The focus of the anti-dam critics has been on difficulties and uncertainties
of these first days of transition to condemn the entire rehabilitation
process, long after the difficulties have been surmounted and new healthy
features.have emerged in the evolving process.
* The Land Purchase Committee has been the focal point of severe
criticism. The oustccs have never been asked to bargain for the price of
land either in LPC or outside. This has always been done by the members
of LPC themselves. The evolution of this institutional arrangement and its
true role has been deliberately misunderstood even by an expert of the
WB, who was chiefly responsible earlier (September 85) for forcing the
GOG to widen die scope of the choice to include private land. In April
1989, when he came again with die WB mission, he subjected us to
torrents of searching questions in a long and intense discussion we had on
the nature, scope and actual functioning of the LPC. He took copious notes
of this discussion. Our hopes that he would provide an authoritative
account of the LPC were dashed when we saw his report, prepared on the
same day but which however we saw after about ten months. He had
totally ignored the intense discussion he had with us and had simply
repeated the uninformed charges of the anti-dam critics.
* It is true that institutional arrangements like LPC arc open to abuses of
middlemen, touts, etc. But the actual working of the LPC should be a test
against which such plausible apprehensions should be checked. The
prices of lands of different qualities in different areas were fixed in an
open and frank manner right before the eyes of at least a hundred
observers, oustccs, members of LPC, officers and others. The LPC went
frequently on day-long tours to view the lands and check the claims made
by the landowners in various areas from where large offers of land had
come. There was little scope for the middlemen and touts to influence all
the members of the LPC including us to steer the process of price fixing
in the direction of their liking. Once the price of selected, sizeable land of
an area, or taluka was fixed that became the price for the whole area and
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROV AR PROJECT
333
all the subsequent sellers of the area got the same price, provided the
ousiees selected their lands.
* The average price of the land fixed by the LPC turned out to be around Rs.
13,000 per acre, far below die much feared price of Rs. 50,000 per acre.
This was the price quoted for Dabhoi land (which is prime quality land)
of about 4,000 acres with assured irrigation. The ultimate price they got
after two and a half years of wrangling and arbitration of the Ex-Chief
Justice of the Gujarat High Court Mr. B J Diwan was Rs. 23,000 per acre,
less than half die price they had demanded.
* The anti-dam activists have persistently argued and the WB expert in 19§9
has uncriticaly supported them that villages arc broken down into frag
ments because private lands arc not available in large contiguous chunks.
According to the WB expert even LPC is responsible for this!
* This WB expert and even a noted supporter of the anti-dam movement
Dr.B.D.Sharma has recorded that tribal villages are not homogeneous
entities and their social units arc hamlets, not villages. Dr.Scuddcr has
gone even further to say that the cluster of their choice should be the unit
of resettlement.
* This cluster approach is what one observes in the dispersion one sees. In
many large sites where thousands of acres of contiguous or nearly
contiguous lands were available for R&R, what one observed is several
clusters from several villages, not even the whole hamlet, have selected
the land. One observes a mosaic of different number of clusters from
different villages whose traditional neighbours may have chosen to go to
different sites although the option to settle at the same site was available
to them. The mechanical approach of counting clusters of a displaced
village is obviously an unfruitful, wrong and misleading exercise. The
real question is whether these clusters made a genuine choice to go where
they did. We believe that in an overwhelming number of eases except
perhaps in the ease of pre-1987 R&R, the answer is in the affirmative.
%
* The issue of non-availability of land in Gujarat and elsewhere has been a
subject of serious distortions. As soon as “No Dam” became the objective
of the movement, “land is not available” became transfixed in the minds
of anti-dam critics.
* Thus in the now famous book, published in July 1989 when it was public
knowledge that more than 1,000 ousiees including major sons, encroach-
334
SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
ers and landless were being allotted 5 acres each of land of their choice,
the author quoted an outdated minutes of the NCA meeting of Junc3,1988
to prove his point that land for relocation of oustces is not available even
in Gujarat (Amte 1989).
* In the April 1989 meeting the WB expert was informed that more than 900
oustces were soon to be given possession of land, chose to ignore this
information as he did regarding LPC and dispersal of oustces. He resorted
to sheer technicality and observed in his report that only 5 persons,
documentation was complete. This report, like the NCA minutes and DOE
notes, was selectively leaked to the anti-dam activists.
* While land has already been allotted to about 3,000 oustcc families and
the remaining arc in the process of allotment, some critics have sought to
belittle this process involving oustces of all the 19 villages of Gujarat as
being a showpiece of rehabilitation of only 2-3 villages by employing
excessive resources.
* In Maharashtra, at the time of writing this, many concerned and interested
citizens’ groups arc still being fed with the false information that virtually
nobody in Gujarat has been allotted land according to the new R&R
Policy! At Ferkuva it soon became obvious that the oustces of Maharash
tra and MP were being deliberately kept in the dark about the new R&R
Policy in Gujarat and its level and extent of implementation.
* As late as in June 1990 Vijay Paranjpyc in his book, High Dams on
Narmadads\vn\{s that 1,718 families inGujarathavcbeen allotted agricul
tural land till February 1990. He proceeds, however, to raise another
problem, “out of 11,850 families, land has been acquired for less than 15
per cent of the oustces” (Paranjpyc 1990). But this is a different problem
which we will deal with later.
T Together with the denial of the fact of availability and allotment of land,
the critics mix the mistakes, blunders and malpractices of the pre-1987
R&R process with those of post-Dcccmbcr 1987 to malign the whole
R&R process in Gujarat. For example, a dated report is quoted to make a
point that in 5 resettlement sites created around 1983 some oustces had
received lands which carried cncumbcranccs of bank debts incurred by the
original landowncrs(Amtc 1989). Now this was a fact and a scandal, but
their cncumbcranccs were removed in August 1988 and the matter was
reported in National Newspapers, a full one year before this book.
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROV AR PROJECT
335
* This denial of facts docs not allow theanti-dam activists to see an assertion
of political will, hitherto conspicuous by its absence, to work for the R&R
in Gujarat. In their over-enthusiasm to condemn the R&R in Gujarat, the
anti-dam activists have also condemned and inadevcrtcntly undermined
the struggle of the oustccs of Gujarat and their judgment and ability to
understand the problems and solve them.
R and R in Maharashtra: impossible?
In Maharashtra, the issue of non-availability of land has taken an even
more curious turn. We have already mentioned above that in November 1987,
justa month before Gujarat’s new R&R policy of December 1987 was declared,
NDS in Maharashtra and NGNS in MP had submitted to NCA a list of 38
demands related to R&R. One of the most crucial demands related to the release
of denuded forest land for resettlement. Within months of the submission of
these demands, these organisations chagcd their objective. No-dam became an
objective and what was a goal until November 87 became one of the means to
achieve the final goal of No-dam.
The demand for release of forest land came in very handy to prove that
R&R was impossible in Maharashtra, because the activists were convinced that
the DOE&F would not release the denuded forest land of Taloda for R&R,
taking shelter behind the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Mr Bruce Rich of the
Environment Defence Fund (EDF), USA, which spearheads the anti-SSP
movement in North America, supported this demand before the Senate Sub
committee of USA in June 1988.
DOE&F, had gone to the extent of putting in a condition (No.vii.) in its
letter of clearance of September 87 (referred to above) “No forest land will be
utilisedfor the rehabilitation ofoustees.” This was all very well in so far as the
conservation of forests was concerned. But in May 1985 the Government of
India (GOI) with three oilier stales concerned had already entered into a Loan
Agreement with the WB in which it accepted that it would take all action
necessary to releaseforest land reserved by the Forest (Conservation) Act 1980
within the boundaries of all three states if required for the purpose of imple
menting the SSP including the resettlement and rehabilitation programme and
plan. Full 2 years after the Agreement was signed by GOI with the WB, the
DOE&F (GOI’s own department) puts such a precondition in its letter which is
directly in conflict with what GOI had committed itself to before!
Due to the peculiarities of the political dispensation then-nature of power
equilibrium between the Centre and the States-the Maharashtra Government
336
SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
did not even forward the demand for the release of denuded forest land of Taloda
to the Central Govcmmcnt-DOE&F for quite some lime. The non-availability
of land could legitimately be claimed by the anti-dam movement. The state of
suspense continued even when the Janata rule was installed al the Centre in
November 1989. The DOE&F headed by Ms. Mancka Gandhi continued to stall
the demand for release of forest land.
The World Bank and R&R
In April-May 1989 had come the WB mission. Prof.Scuddcr, the WB
expert, in his scathing report of April 1989, cited three reasons for the
improbability of satisfactory implementation of the R&R programme in SSP:
1. The Impasse between the GOM and the GOG.
2. The unwillingness of GOI to release forest land for R&R.
3. The unwillingness of NCA to play a strong oversight role.
He had then proceeded to list 9 recommendations to overcome these
problems.
Prof.Scuddcr who had also recommended permanent or temporary sus
pension of the loan, had clearly seen where a part of the important problem was,
for in his final report of May 28,1989, he had this to say:
S incc the passage of the Forest Conservation Act in 1980, the Department
of Environment and Forests has been unwilling to release denuded and
degraded forest land for SSP oustccs, even though tribal people, for
example, could play a major role in the rehabilitation of such lands.
Although it is stipulated in May 10,1985 Agreement with the World Bank
that GOI will release forest land if necessary, as recently as December
19,1988 in the meeting of NCA R&R Subgroup, the Additional Secretary
of Environment and Forests reiterated the Department’s opposition to
releasing forest land for oustcc rehabilitation.
It was obvious them, that the real material block to satisfy Prof. Scudder’s
stringent conditions to achieve satisfactory R&R was his second condition, i.e.
release of Taloda forest land in Maharashtra. In July 1989 the World Bank
officials were gheraoed in New Delhi by the activists for, among other tilings,
asking for the denotification of Taloda forest land. The activists had persistently
demanded this forest land and had argued vehemently that because of the non
availability of land, R&R in Maharashtra was impossible. But now the activists
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
337
went on to argue (hat dcnotification of Taloda Forest land is not a solution
because either it is encroached upon or degraded to the point of being noncultivablc. They went even further: Fifty to sixty thousand hectares for the SSP
and 150,000 hectares for NSP would be required .... Obviously no People’s
movement would agree to such a huge environmental disaster.
*
TheWB had seta limit of June 1990. In June 1990, the Taloda forest land
was released! On 31st July 1990 the same organisation NDS, which had
demanded this land on innumerable ocasions before December 1987, submitted
a memorandum to the District Administration rejecting 2,769 ha of forest land
identified for the rehabilitation of the oustccs because “the land was already
used by 30-40 local tribal villages.” NDS went even further than that in July
1989:
It is reprehensible that the Central government agreed to release forest
land in Maharashtra for rehabilitation in clear violation of the conditional
clearance given to the SSP which clearly slated that no forest land can be
used for resettlement purposes . . . the clearance is then tantamount to
selling of India’s ecological and social future at the behest of a foreign
“agency.”
In a Memorandum submitted to the GOM in April 1986, NDS had
stated:
For die oustccs to be resettled in Maharashtra, if no other land is likely to
be available in large quantity (to be able to settle them as village-units, as
per the principle agreed to in the WB Agreement) forest land available in
the nearby lalukas (near the present settlements) Akkalkuva, Taloda, and
Sahada should be released for the resettlement purpose. This should be in
spite of the Forest Conservation Act 1980, as is agreed to in WB
Agreement.
Earlier, in June 1987 Medha Patkar of NDS had said in a paper she read
at a Seminar on die Narmada Valley Project in Bombay:
The only alternative left is to buy private lands at a very high cost... or
to release large chunks of denuded forest land which the Centre is
reluctant to do, taking a rigid view of Forest Conservation Act 1980. The
tribal-forest linkage too is not viewed seriously or not considered in
planning alternatives, whatever may be the stated policy in the Seventh
Five Year Plan!
* No basis was given for arriving at such outrageously high figures. Only about 3,000 ha. was
demanded.
338
SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
The first and the later two sets of statements, separated by 3-4 years are
juxtaposed here for the readers to see for themselves.
As for encroachment by the local people in Taloda, we have checked from
various sources and have concluded that no encroachment worth the name has
occurred in these lands. In November 1990, four months after the NDS
memorandum, the World Bank mission which visited this area reported that
there is a great deal of misinformation among the oustccs in Maharashtra about
the extent of encroachment in Taloda and the hostility of villages around it.
Essentially there is no encroachment and no hostility of surrounding villages
was evident, reported the WB mission. But in the 1st April 1991 issue of
Gujarati magazine Bhoomi-putra MedhaPatkar, the leader of NDS, argued that
60 tribal families living on this land were forcibly evicted by the police in the
last two months, i.c. in Jan-Feb. 1991.
Madhya Pradesh: A Conundrum of R&R?
Extrapolating from the figures of 19 villages of Gujarat, the critics have
projected for 36 villages of Maharashtra and 193 villages of M.P., that 90 per
cent of the oustccs belonging to three Slates will need agricultural land for
resettlement. M.P. naturally will have a very large porportion of them. The
argument is so intuitively appealing and persuasive that practically everyone
has accepted this projection.
* Based on such a projection, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) has
claimed that not less than 50,000 hectares of land will be required for the
rescttlcmcniofSSPousiccs, which implies that aboul45,000 hectares will
be needed for about 22,000 families of M.P. and Maharashtra. No source
for this information is cited by the NBA.
* Vijay Paranjpye (1990: 192) claims that even high officers of the GOMP
have accepted that about 24,000 hectares of land will be required for the
R&R of M.P. oustccs. He derives his information from Alvares and
Billorcy (1988:77). When we checked this source, to our great surprise we
found out that whereas the figure of 24,000 ha is quoted correctly, this
figure was mentioned by S.C. Verma in the context of the R&R of NSP
and not SSP. GOMP, far from conceding such figures, was busy analy
sing the baseline information it already possessed. The information it
came out with in early 1989 was that in as many as 116 out of 193 villages
of M.P., very little agricultural land will get submerged (less than 20 ha
in each village) and only in 77 villages, more than 20 ha of agricultural
land will be submerged. Thus the argument from extrapolation-90 per
339
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
cent of ousiccs in M.P., Maharashtra-simply collapses. Only about 6 to 7
thousand ha out of about 50,000 ha of agricultural land in these villages
will be submerged.
Only Vijay Paranjpyc amongst all the activists has acknowledged this fact
in his book. But he too merely mentions and continues to maintain later on in
the same book that the total number of oustcc families in SSP, who have to be
allotted alternative land, is 11,850 (ibid: 212).
This has a direct bearing on the question of land requirement for R&R of
SSP oustccs and die availability or non-availability of land and, therefore, of the
highly surcharged slogan of impossible R&R. We have done our own analysis
of the basic villagcwisc data, prepared by GOMP, which amongst other
information gives the basic details regarding land and house submergence for
each of the 193 villages, (see Table below).
Table: Pattern of Agricultural Land and House Submergence in 193 villages of M.P. (SSP)
% of Agr. No. of
land to
Villbe sub
ages
merged
Land to
be sub
merged
(ha)
Total
land
(ha)
%
land
Sub.
Sub.
houses
Total
houses
% of
houses Sub.
0
34
0
5,949
0.0
1,870
2,983
62.6
1-5
52
300
16,200
1.8
4,247
6,377
66.6
5-10
26
663
8,676
7.6
2,134
3,191
66.8
10-25
33
1,770
10,605
16.6
3,883
4,742
81.8
25-35
8
668
2,256
29.6
659
S76
75.2
35-50
12
1,189
2,828
42.0
997
1,097
90.8
50-75
15
1,541
2,582
59.7
1,367
1,456
93.8
75-100
13
724
841
86.0
395
509
77.6
Total
193
6,855
49,937
13.7
15,552
21,231
73.3
1. includes 7 forest villages, for which, die details of total agricultural land were not available,
and it has been assumed here that 100% land will be submerged.
340
SOCIAL ACTION JCtY-SEPT 1991
* Out of a total of 49,937 ha. of agricultural land in these 193 villages, only
6,855 ha. (13.7%) will be submerged. Whereas out of a total of 21,231
houses 15,552 (73.3%) will be submerged. This figure includes houses
that will be affected by the backwater effect, i.c. those situated between
455 and 460 R.L. In 34 villages no land submergence will occur. In 78
villages (1-10% category 963 ha. out of a total of 24,876 (3.8%) will be
submerged.
* In the next category (10-25%) of 33 villages land submergence is 16.6%
but houses as high as 81.8%. The pattern continues in the 20 villages of the
next two categories. Only in 28 villages (the last 2 categories of+50%) do
we find that 2,265 ha out of a total of 3,423 ha (66%) will be submerged
and 1,762 out of 1,965 (89.6%) houses will be submerged.
The most outstanding feature is that a very high proportion of houses is
going to be submerged and land submergence is very modest, if not low. This
somewhat unexpected submergence pattern of houses and agricultural land is
because the river bed is a deep gorge. As a result, the reservoir of SSP is a long,
narrow but deep trough. As we go further upstream, only the houses on the river
bank arc affected. Agricultural lands which arc further away from the bank arc
spared. Therefore, we see this peculiar pattern of more houses and relatively less
land getting affected.
This peculiar submergence pattern has obvious implications for the R&R.
The total number of families affected is indeed very high-about 15,000 or
more. But an overwhelming proportion of them will lose only their houses.
They need to be relocated, no doubt. But all that will have to be done will be to
get their houses shifted to a higher plane in the same village where their lands
are located unsubmerged. Their main problem is to reconstruct so many houses
and not that of non-availability of alternative land. This would mean that most
of the affected families would be living near the edge of the reservoir, after
submergence. This would help in mitigating, to a large extent, the problems of
landless labourers, fishermen, boatmen etc. whose number in M.P., though
unknown, is likely to be significant. A big move is already on to develop
fisheries in the SSP reservoir. The affected fishermen and landless should be
given proper legal fishing rights and linked directly to marketing outlets so that
they are not at the mercy of middlemen or the government machinery for
marketing their catch. Also most of the submerging lands (including those on
the river bank and present dwellings) in these villages will open up for draw
down cultivation as the water level begins to fall in late monsoon, through
winter and summer. The legal rights for draw-down cultivation should also be
given to these landless families who arc affected. If these entitlements arc
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
341
cgally given to these categories of people now, before powerful vested interests
novc in, this will go a long way in improving their standard of living.
The number of families who have to be given alternative land is thus
bound to be much less than the figure of 11,850 quoted by Vijay Paranjpyc as
the number of families affected by land submergence in M.P. will be lower than
expected. GOG, basing its analysis on the GOMP data, gives a figure of 2,100
out of about 15,000 families in these villages who will be substantially affected
by land submergence. This may or may not be an accurate figure. The issue is
not, however, that of exact numbers but of a sense of proportion and of the
peculiar pattern of submergence. Those who arc losing substantially in terms of
land arc already making a silent move towards Gujarat. Of the 28 villages in
which more than 50 per cent of the total land will be submerged, the ouslecs of
7 villages have already viewed and selected lands in Gujarat. As the fact of land
availability is more widely known, more and more people from the affected
villages will take the next step. R&.R efforts in Gujarat thus fall in a proper
perspective.
R&R is Impossible: Shifting of Ground
With the argument of non-availability of land becoming increasingly
untenable in Gujarat and Maharashtra and faced with the fact that the extent of
human displacement in MP had shrunk, the anti-dam movement has now come
up with a new strategy. Who is an oustcc? How is he to be defined? By making
out a case that the definition of the oustcc is very restrictive and inappropriate
and by widening its scope, they have sought to raise the number of ouslecs!
Their list of ouslecs now includes those who arc losing their lands in the canal
network of SSP, the tribals of the proposed Shoolpancshwar Sanctuary and
those who arc going to be affected by compensatory afforestation etc. In the
whole critical literature of Rehabilitation of displaced persons in irrigation
projects beginning with Goldsmith’s famous volumes on Big Dams one docs
not sec these categories of people included as ouslecs ((Goldsmith and Hildyard
1984). And why look into the general literature? Even the overwhelming
proportion of existing literature published by the anti-dam movement docs not,
until this point of lime even mention these categories of people to be included
as ouslecs.
Only after June 1990 or thereabouts when the forest land for the Mahar
ashtra oustccs was released by the Central Government, one secs this new
definition of ouslecs and a new set of ouslecs making their sudden appearance.
Almost all the major publications of the anti-dam movement (Kalpavriksh
1988; Patkar 1988 and 1989; Patel 1988; Arnie 1989; Anon 1989) published
342
SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
before June 1990 do not even mention these categories of oustccs, whereas after
that one suddenly finds them (NBA 1990; DJNDSS 1990; Paranjpyc 1990).
A huge network ofcanals is going tohitan unknown number of small and
marginal farmers very adversely. This human problem must be assessed
properly and a solution to mitigate this problem must be given a proper and
timely consideration. While the Nigam may not react favourably to the demand
put forward by motivated activists to treat them as project oustees and give them
all the benefits of R&R programme, it is equally unacceptable and unbecoming
of the Nigam to take shelter behind the technicalities of Land Acquisition Act
and NWDT Award. It is well known that relatively well-off and organised
farmers losing land in canals arc successfully getting more compensation by
taking recourse to litigation. The Nigam must and will have to come up with a
better deal than that at present.
Regarding the tribals in the Sanctuary area, first of all there is not going
to be any displacement of any person in these villages and secondly VAHINIARCH and die tribals of the affected villages arc actively opposing the very idea
of the Sanctuary as proposed so far. At the same time we do acknowledge that
there is a problem of wildlife and forest preservation in this area. A sensible way
out of this del icatc dilemma has to be found. Fortunately, the Nigam and the WB
have initiated the process, keeping the tribal interest at the centre.
Conclusion
We started the story with the struggle we had to undertake against the
GOG. We have described, if harshly but certainly not unfairly, the bureauc
racy’s style and method in dealing with such sensitive and delicate issues like
R&R of the tribals. The situation in Gujarat in the last three years has witnessed
a sea-change largely because of continuing pressure from developing activism
and growing awareness at the grassroot level, pressure from WB and also
because of the willingness and ability of strategically placed individuals in
politics and bureaucracy to see the situation in a broader perspective and a larger
lime frame than the politicians and senior bureaucrats are credited with.
Between the pre-and post-1987 period, the most outstanding difference is to be
seen in the area of political will. This, we have alluded to above. This, however,
still leaves large gaps in the capabilities and functioning of the administrative
apparatus. Fatiguing delays, petty-minded dilations, petty corruption, sheer
apathy and incompetence, which arc the hallmark of the state apparatus in India
and the ills which afflict the larger system, affect its sub-system loo i.c. Sardar
Sarovar NarmadaNigam Limited (SSNNL). This is an important problem to be
solved as well as one can and not a cause or an excuse to reject the Project,
because then logically speaking practically everything must be rejected, stopped.
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
343
Prof.Scuddcr, the WB consultant, who wrote a scathing report in April
1989 for all his faults, cannot be faulted for pointing out that if the GOG had
taken the promise it had made to the GOMP in 1982-83 seriously and acted on
it, the fund of goodwill it would have created in MP villages would have been
great. The GOG thought of nothing in discarding the promise and losing the
opportunity to build the goodwill. Obviously, the GOG did not act in the best
interests of the SSP. One would have thought that the Government must have
learnt its lessons painfully, but apparently not. In the post-Dcccmbcr 1987
period, a group of Maharashtra oustccs had shown their willingness to resettle
in Gujarat, the lands were shown and approved by the oustccs. The Maharashtra
administration provided the authentic lists and cleared all the administrative
hitches for the allotment of these lands. But for some inexplicable reasons, this
was not done by the Nigam for a long time. Only recently was th is done. One
can quote many more examples to substantiate the contention that old habits die
hard. We believe that there is no room for complacency, let alone smugness and
euphoria, that all is well with the R&R and with the bureaucracy. But then it
must also be recognised that things arc moving-even if haltingly, but in the
right direction.
If the SSP is not indeed a planned disaster, and if R&R is not to be used
as a means to fight the SSP, but to be treated with respect as an end in itself, and
if the ground level reality regarding the State administration being what it is, the
implementation of the R&R programme calls for an objective, fair and
continuous watch-dog. Critical feedback and correctives arc necessary, if
reasonably good quality of R&R is to be achieved. But a much more serious and
perhaps a lethal threat to inherently delicate and fragile R&R programme arises
from the radical critics of R&R or from those strategists who have no qualms
to turn R&R into a wcapon-a means to some “lofty” end.
REFERENCES
Alvares, Claude and Ramcsh Billorcy. 1988. Damming the Narmada: India’s
Greatest Planned Environmental Disaster. Dchra Dun: Natraj.
Amlc, Baba. 1989. Cry the Beloved Narmada. Warora: Anandwan Ashram.
Anon. 1989. “Sardar Sarovar Controversy: Arc the Critics Right?” Business
India, (Oct.30-Nov.12), pp.90-104.
DJNDSS. 1990. Narmada Ki Ghati Mein Ab Ladai Jari I lai. Dhulc: Dhule Jillc
Narmada Dharangrast Samiti.
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SOCIAL ACTION JULY-SEPT 1991
Goldsmith, E. and N.Hildyard. 1984. The Social and Environmental Effects of
Large Dams, Void: Overview. Camclsford: Wadcbridgc Ecological Centre.
Kalpavriksh. 1988. The Narmada Valley Project: A Critique. New Delhi:
Kalpavriksh.
Paranjpye, Vijay. 1989. The Narmada Valley Project: A Wholistic Evaluation
of the Sardar Sarovar and Indira Sagar Dams. New Delhi: Indian
National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (INTACH), mimco.
---- . 1990. Nigh Dams on the Narmada. New Delhi: INTACH.
Patel, Girish. 1988. Narmada Yojna: Kona Mate! Kona Phage? Ahmcdabad:
Lok Adhikar Sangh.
Patkar, Mcdha. 1988. Sardar Sarovar: Vikas Ki Vinash. Pune: Parisar.
---- . 1989. “Sardar Sarovar Narmada: Open Letter to Sanat Mehta.” The
Economic Times, (Mid-Week Review), 28th September.
ISI STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE SERIES
1.
Nulakepetta People’s Struggle for a Safe Environment. Rs.4
2.
Babubigha Scheduled Caste People Show the Way. Rs.4
3.
From Slavery to Freedom: The Tale of Chattisgarh Bonded
Labours. Rs.4
4.
Storm on the Seashore: The Fishermen's Struggle in Kerala. Rs.4
SARDAR SAROVAR OUSTEES WHICH WAY TO GO:
ACTIVSTS’
SEPTEMBER-1988
VAHINI
MANGROL,
DIST.
BHARUCH,
-
ARCH
VIA RAJPIPLA
GUJARAT - 393150
DILEMMA
SARDAR SAROVAR OUSTEES WHICH WAY TO GO : ACTIVISTS' DILEMMA.
The issue of rehabilitation of the oustees of Sardar
Sarovar Project ( S.S.P.) in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh•
has arrived at a cross-road. They ere now offered two very
different choices :
(1)
To press for the comprehensive rehabilitation policy
acceptable to them which is broadly in line with the
new R&R Policy announced by Gujarat Government in
9
December 1987 and to fight for its fair Implementation.
Tliis is the line token by the oustees of Gujarat and
by Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh’Vahini, Gujarat..
(2)
The second choice, is offered to them by the organi
sations Narmada Dharangrast Samiti (N.D.S.) in
Maharashtra and Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti(N.G.N.S.)
in M.P. These organisations have now
taken a position
that rehabilitation in Maharashtra & M.P. is impossible }
Moreover accordingto them S.S.P.is fraught; with serio'ir
environmental problems. The oustees are therefore asked
to oppose the S.S.P.wholesale. In a statement recently
• •
issued they say, "We would prefer to be drowned by the
rising waters of the dam if the Government insists on
building the dam, rather than give our tacit approval
to these destructive schemes by aggreeing to shift".
These are brave words and it’s a tall order. Sneaking
for Gujarat oustees we know that they will not be willing and
able to incur such heavy risks and fight for such "lofty
ideals". Their 8 year long and bitter fight has been to obtain
better .rehabilitation for themselves and for the oustees of
other States. We deeply appreciate and understand their positio
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because their’s is the fight for sheer survival. We in Vahini
also lack the courage and conviction to persuade, cajole and
push these oustees to put their lives at risk and fight for
such "lofty ideals".
Before we go into the issues raised by these organisa
tions we would like to put on record the revolutionary nature
of new R&R policy of December 1987 won by the Gujarat oustees.
We state its two most outstanding features.
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(a)
Each oustees family, defined as eighteen year son
married or unmarried, will be entitled to minimum 5
acres of irrigable land of his choice and preference
and this is irrespective of the fact whether the oustee
family has titled land or is dependent on forest/waste
land cultivation or is a landless family. The choice
extends even further. Should they not prefer any other
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land but the forest land then under such circumstances
Government of India will have to release forest land
for their rehabilitation.
(h)
These families will not be asked to bear the cost of the
land-they choose to have, as that would be borne by the
Project as an exgratia payment.
Even a noted lawyer knownto be not sympathetic to the
Government was moved to describe this oolicy as unbelievable.
His reservation with regard to this policy was not related to
its content but was’related to whether it will be fairly
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inplemented or not. We will return to this Justifiable fear
atout the Governments intention and ability to implement the
policy later on, but first we must deal with the important
arguments raised by these organisations.
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RehabiUtatXon Is Impossible
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(a)
Rehabilitation is_impossih-le , they have said, because
the re-is simply not enough land! .
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In 1985 when we were bit.rerly fighting for minimum 5
acres of land, one of the favourite arguments advanced by. the
Gujarat Government to stall our demand was : "But there isn't
enough land". In view of the fact that the waste land offered
by the Govt, to the oustces was useless oustces
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choice natu
rally was for private lands. Oustees quickly realised the game
the Government was playing and promptly feught back by using '
their intimate knowledge of the surrounding areas.and came up
with the list of 6000 acres of land that the land owners in the
area were ready to sell to the oustees. Govt'.s-move was checked.
The Government machinery could not have identified these lands,
but the oustees did! Long after this
had happened not only the
officers of the Government and of the World Bank, but also other
well-wishers were persistently and anxiously asking the question.:
"But are you sure that there is enough land available?"Relying on
our Oustee friends
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resourcefullness we always answered affir-
natively. And our confidence in oustees
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resourcefullness has
xbeen amply Justified. The oustees of Gujarat have already identi
fied more than 15000 acres of land of their choice and they still
assure u? that there are still more lands available for sale.
Recently we happened to meet small oustee farmers and
landless oustees in M.P. Not surprisingly they did not know the
types of .the benefits Government of Gujarat was offering its
oustees. When we explained to them the policy and asked whether
they can also identify the land a la
Gujarat oustees, the
reply was prompt and clear, "Yes indeed, if the Govemipent is
ready to pay the cost". We have been informed by a friend working
in Alirajpur that if good land in enough quantity is made availa
ble, all the tribal oustees of Alirajpur area would be ready to
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be resettled even at far off places. Oustees are afterall same
everywhere. We feel from our experience in Gujarat, and a
brief encounter in Rajghat, Badwani that given the right R&R
policy and proper support and encouragement they will and should
be able to bring to the fore their resourcefullness and identify
land of their choice.
At present the argument of "not enough land" in M.P. &
Maharashtra rests on the whatever the bureaucracy has been able
to identify/not identify I It is not based on the active explo
ration of the situation by.activists and oustees encouraged by
them«
(b)
"But this is unfair", they have argued, "Why should
outstccs be asked to undertake such hazardous exercise?
In Gujarat they have made this mistake, but this will
not be allowed to happen in M.P. and Maharashtra".
We wonder why not! The tribal oustees of Gujarat have
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shown how
resourcefull
and non vulnerable, atleast with regard
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to identifying lands, they are. If they can do it, oustees of
Madhya Pradesh and .Maharashtra too can do it with equall facility, provided offcourse that they''are given adequate facili-
ties by the -respective- Governments. Another crucial point
seems
to have beeri overlooked viz. the question of -land of oustees
choice and preference. The terms and conditions of the World
Bank loan agreement on which the new R&R Policy of Government of
Gujarat is based, provides explicitly and repeatedly that each
oustee family shall be provided land of his choice and preference
This crucial condition in conjunction with other conditions.
confers right on each.oustee to settle in the areas and land of-
his choice, so that not only his economic preference is taken
care of but also his social, cultural, religious and other con
siderations are taken care of. So much sq that if sonje oustees
prefer noVto have best of the agricultural land but to have
forest land so that they remain in their prefered environment,
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the terms of the loan agreement provide that under such
circumstances the Government of India will release Forest land^-
for resettlement.
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Ihe full significance of this must be grasped. No re
settlement scheme designed by the Government machinery alone at
any level, given the best will and efficiency, will be ablC to
take into account the complicated and delicate combination of
factors that go into consideration of each such preference and
choice. Of necessity, even the best scheme prepared by the
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. enlightened bureaucrat cannot match the scheme that can emerge
out of the choices exercised by each oustee. Nodoubt enough care
and precaution must be taken to ensure that the bustees are not
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coerced, cajoled or deceived "to make their choices". Activists
have to play this crucial role. This provision of choice and
preference no doubt assumes the resourcefullness and intelligence
of the oustees. We can only repeat our arguments to those who
have genuine doubts on this score that there is no cause to fear
on this count. In our anxiety to protect the vital interests of the
poor tribals, we must not overstep the bounds, the boundary bet
ween concern and patronizatiqn is very thin indeed at times!
(c)
"But aren’t we leaving them to the mercy of the
wolves - these land owners ?".
This fear is unfounded because we must remember that
the ousteeb task is finished once he identifies the land of his
choice and brings it to the notice of the rehabilitation office.
The remaining tasks of fixing prices, ensuring clear titles,
making payments and preparing the necessary documents will be
the task of rehabilitation office, as is being done in Gujarat.
(d)
"But why should we do this work. This is Government’s
job"?
This is a familiar refrain. We can only give our answer.
If our bureaucracy
were sensitive .responsible and accountable
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enough, this question, this struggle, this debate and even this
dilemma would not have arisen. We are all in this, deadly
serious business precisely because we all know that there is
not a slightest chance for the oustees to get their due if
every thing is left to th? initiative of the bureaucracy. To ask
the bureaucracy to prepare the detailed blue print of rehabili
tation without active involvement of the oustees and activists
from the very begining is to under-mine the provisions of
choice and preference guaranteed to them to safeguard their vital
interests.
(e)
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"But the land owners will ask high price. We cannot agree
to this, because this will enrich the already rich land
owners and government, hard pressed as it is,might
agree to this. But how can we accept escalation in the
cost of the project? We are responsible citizens afterall
and should not allow the cost of the project to go high".
To say the least, this is a strange argument. We must not
overlook some simple facts which seem to have been overlooked.
If the land choosen by the oustee is really a good quality land
it will cost
more. How can it further enrich• the
land owner,
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unless of course he charges and gets exhorbitantly higher pricc.s?
This can happen. But the role of the activists is precisely to
check this. This argument strangely overlooks the fact that
while land owner gets money the poor tribal oustee gets vry
high quality land which means the transfer of productive resources
on a much higher scale, than could be ever imagined, to a poor
fanner. A very important anomaly in the "developmental process"
which we are all challenging is corrected. How can we take ob•
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jection to this corrective process of transfer of resources to
poor tribals? Further more isn't it a fact that both the orga-
- nlsations 1 • Gujarat and Maha-.shtra, where land acquisition
proceedings have been completed and awards made, have legally
challenged the meagre compensation awarded, for the lands acqui
red and have asked for much higher award? The real issue is not
7
the high land price, the real issue is that either through
fraud or through other devious mechanisms the prices must not
get artifically inflated. We again repeat that the safeguard
against such happenings is the vigilance on the part of the
activists. The argument of high project cost is also riddled
with paradox. Right from the begining when the struggle for Just
rehabilitation policy started both in Gujarat & Maharashtra wo.
have argued with passion and vehemence that Government is
spending too little on rehabilitation, giving it a third rate
treatment, throwing out the oustees without providing means of
decent livelihood. We have always lamented, and rightly so,that
poor oustees are rendered destitutes and the people in command
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area get richer, - mockery of social Justice is made. Now for
the first time in the history when such dangerous process is
seriously
challenged and sought to be reversed such arguments
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are advanced!
Non-availability of the land is a contextual question.
Looking at the reality from the bureaucratic point of view will
only confirm us in our belief that there is no land available.
The" activists, on., the other, hand can go deeper into, the social
reality, be more flexible and be in a much better position to
encourage the freer exploration of the situation. Only .when
this has been done in all sincerity we can say whether enough
land is available or not.
"Rehabilitation is impossible" is a complex argument
and is based on the alleged fact that enough land 1. • not availa
ble. This argument of non-availability is strengthened by taking
up positions that oustees should not be asked or encouraged to •
identify the land they would prefer and that high prices of the ----land should-also not be given to the. land-,•Ilers, RDhabilitatlon■_
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facts, and constraints invoked in the whole complex of argument
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----- this assessment and these assumptions.
With this let us return to the point of "Justifiable
fear of non Implementation of the new R&R policy", raised in
some quarters. This is another real hard question.
There is
no scope here for complacency, even less for naive faith and
trust in the project authorities. We have had enough experience
of betrayal, double-talk and willful distortions and misinter.
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pretations of G.Rs, during last 8 years to keep our guards high
and be on the constant vigil for even the tiniest symptom of
back-tracking by the government. We however reject a policy of
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permanent Irreconcilability with
the government. To do so
would be counter productive, irresponsible and Immature. Afterall
governments, Narmada Project authorities etc. are not the monoliths. To reject any policy a prior as Impossible is not only a
mark of irresponsibility but also of inadequate grasp of socio-
political reality. Afterall we must not forget that our central
responsibility is towards the poor helpless oustees. If they
accept the R&R policy and want to give it a thoroughly fair
trial as they are doing in Gujarat so be it. Besides a radical
stand of permanent irreconcilability with the government aopears
in certain political perspective a very attractive proposition,
but it hardly ever serves the interests of the poor people one
is trying to work for. Beyond this the problem of possible/
impossible is a practical question. Government has fought back
hardest before announcing
the
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truly Just & fair R&R policy. The '
second weapon it always uses is to misinterprets the policy to
suit its purpose. Right from the begining there was never any
derth of pious, generous and pro-oustea statements by the politi•
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cians in power. They however always resisted the formulation
of the policy in consonance with these statements and when
they were forced to do so they always resorted to misinter
pretation and distortions. Conversion of the pious pronounce
ments of the politicians into con crete policies and later on
to get any misinterpretation and distortion removed was not a
benign and voluntary act of the rulers. This has been achieved
through a long, grim and determined struggle by the oustees,
by us and by other individuals and organisations who espoused
the cause of the oustees dodgedly through thick and thin. What
appeared to be an impossible goal only a few years ago, has
become a fact today. The combination of forces which brought
this policy in to. .existence are still there intact, better orga
nised to see that the policy is implemented.We make this state
ment because we know that these forces have a concrete existence.
In order that the instrument of misinterpretation to undermine
the interests of the oustees is not brought into play again we
have been keeping a close watch on the process of translation
i.e. the actual implementation of the policy. The process of
implementation of new policy has started in earnest since June
1988 only, (after we fought' back the last and dangerous mischief
of.misinterpretation of new policy by convening a convention
1s in May 1986), During the-last two months 2
of Gujarat
oustee
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landless families have been given 5 acres each of land of their
choice and many other families belonging to other categories of
oustees have been given minimum 5 acres per family of their
choice. In case of each of this oustee families orders to make
exgratla payments are being made. Any one with even a little
legal background would understand that a concrete interpretation
acceptable to the oustees of a legal document has been made by
the Government. Two most important weapons in the hands of the •
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Government have been effectively removed. What is this if not a
concrete evidence In favour of possible?
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In any case the organisations irr M-P. and Maharashtra
have dubbed "Rehabilitation impossible" not because of the
games the Government would play. Their case rests on very
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different grounds which we have dealt with above to the bestof our ability.
(11)
"Dam Must
Bl
Stopped”
Irrespective of the fact that the rehabilitation is
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possible or not these organisations have now given a call to
th.’ oustees & others to fight against the dam because "we
would prefer to be drowne.d by the rising waters of the dam if
the Government insists on building them, rather
than give our
tacit approval to these destructive schemes by agreeing to
shift".
While we are aware and in know of the huge controversy
that rages for and against the S.S.P.,we must admit that we
are not in a position to take any firm and unqualified stand
because the nature and quality of evidence that has surfaced
so far appears to us to be not strong enough. We would like
however to pointout some pertinent facts because they have a
close bearing on the lives of thousands of oustees, in Maha
rashtra and M.P.,who will be displaced if the S.S.P. indeed
goes ahead.
(a)
It is worth remembering that the work amongst oustees
of Gujarat and Maharashtra was started and has been carried
on untill very recently to fight for the fair and just R&R
policy. Oustees in these states were organised with this as
an explicit objective. It was not that during those years and
even earlier the various environmental problems were not raised
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and discussed with passion. To best of our knowledge very few
concrete facts and arguments have been added to those that were
being made at'that time. And yet the focus of work amongst
oustees remained on the R&R policy only.
(b)
It is significant to note in this context that on 5th
December, 1987 a meeting of the activists, environmentalists,
intellectuals, economists and lawyers etc. from all over the
country, who were concerned about developments in Narmada Valley,
was convened in New Delhi. This meeting was convened because
there was a wide-spread concern and uneasiness that enough in
formation regarding the environmental and related issues was not
available. In a preliminary meeting with us to discuss the need,
rationale, purpose and modalities of the above meeting,
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we were
told clearly that S.S.P. now could not be stopped, but its
critique was not properly documented by the activist movement,
so such documentation must be-prepared even if for the sake of
documentation. 5th December meeting discussed at length various
issues of concern, various cells were formed and assigned respon
sibility to prepare detailed critical documents. In a final se•• *
ssion a view was strongly expressed by a few that enough evidence
then was already at hand to straight away start a fight against
these dams. A long discussion ensued and the consensus of fnc
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meeting was that still there wasn't enough hard evidence at
hand to straight away start a fight to stop the dams. The representatives of all the organisations active in S.S.P.partici -
pa ted in the meeting. In the nine months that have lapsed, we
know
of no new c-ncrete evidence that has been brought out
and properly documented to alter the information basis that
brought about the consensus.
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It is true that the states of Madhya Pradesh and
(c)
Maharashtra have 80 far failed to satisfy the oustees by net
announcing a new R&R policy which is broadly in line with
G.O.G’s and which is acceptable to the oustees. Vhat intri
gues us however is that in the middle of the struggle to obtain
e
a better R&R policy a sudden turn has been given. n radical
shift in the objective of the movement has been made. The
struggle is no longer for the comprehensive R&R policy and its
fair Implementation. "Rehabilitation is impossiblen is a
redundant argument in the light of this radical shift. The
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oustees are now asked to shun the rehabilitation altogether
even if it is acceptable to them. They are now asked- to lead
the Battle against the S.S.P.
Disturbing set of a questions arise in our minds.
Do the oustee’s of Maharashtra and M.P. fully know the
(i)
provisions of Government of Gujarat’s new R&R Policy?
Can they or can they not identify lands acceptable
(ii)
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to them if they know that they have a right to have
minimum 5 acres of land of their choice at the place
they want and that the cost of the land shall be borne
by the State?
(iii)
Do the oustees know that this entitlement is due to
all categories of oustee, families including landless
families?
(iv)
Have the landless oustee families and small
farmers
participated in enough numbers to understand the
significance of R&R policy and the new.
shift being
made?. •
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(v)
It is widely recognised that S.S.P, has near total
social political support in Gujarat, that there are
no obvious'technical, legal or political hurdles in the
path
of the S.S.P. Even the opponents of the S.S.P.
have conceded in private conversations and even in
writing that the S.S.P. cannot be stopped. In view of
this hard realistic assessment, if the S.S.P.really
goes ahead what will happen to the thousands of oustees
.
of Maharashtra and M.P.? If the movement to stop the
S.S.P., repeat stop and not postpone, succeeds then
off course the painfull question of human suffering
of forced displacement will not arise. All will be well.
But suppose if it fails, which is much more likely
scenario, then what will happen? It is not difficult
to imagine that as the waters
begin to rise, slowly
but surely, a panic will set in Maharashtra and M.P.
villages. First in trickles
then in floods people
will want to move out. The resultant 'rehabilitation'
would be haphazard, panic ridden, unplanned and grossly
injurious to most of the oustees. We all know that even ’
in the best of the times} given the best intentions and
efforts’,-rehabilitation is an extremely difficult process.
In case of S.S.P. it is even more so because of the size
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of the displacement, of’difficult terrain and of
inefficient and unmotivated bureaucracy. If the orga
nisations fa i.l to keep their fc.-uS on this diff icult
problem, there will
chaotic displacement leading to
great avoidable human suffering. The movement will
perhaps have the
lubicus
"you. see I. How caucus
satisfaction of saying,
and rutless is the state, its
highsounding promises not withstanding. Yet another
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Disaster!
To us thia will be an instance of self .
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fulfiling prophecy.
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Those of us who have worked amongst the oustees
and who are now making this radical shift must ask,
"will we really ask these oustees to drown themselves
in the rising waters of the dam.......... ?"
as we made it clear at the outset we lack that courage
and conviction. If some of us are quite convinced that
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S.S.P.is unmitigated evil and that it must be fought,
we believe, that, the issue of rehabilitation must be
delinked from the battle • on the wider front. We do not
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share the strategic perceptions of those who are witt•
ingly or .unwittingly using the issue of' rehabilitation
of oustees'in the cause of fight against the dam. To
us this is not responsible activism.
NARMADA
a.we are about 1000 people in this settlement
a.
..we came here in 1980...now it is 89 so we have been here for some
nine years...officers come, we tell them our problems but they dont
do anything about it...our village was Pachmadhi from where we were
asked to leave because of the dam...we were each to get 5 guntas of
land but we have been given only three..in our resettlemnet I can say
that about 25% wsxhavs succesful, in other areas it is even less than this..
..in the land we left behind, there is about 70 acres that have to still
be bought by the government so we can recieve our full compensation but
now it is 8 years since that land is not sold to any one, nor the Govt
has taken it and nor do we have the money from it..so we have lost it
p
in all practical purposes..
q; where is this land?
a; in our village left behind, pachmadhi, our village land..belonging to
various people sitting here....now they are saying it is not going to
get submurged! But we have been abiexxsxvaEaifce made to vacate it, now
what are we to do? ...the water is going to go arround those 70 acres..
how are we to go there and work on our land, what will we do when the
.excess water is released? there is about 6 or 7 houses with families
living arround there, they are called part of a ’Khsraba
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land, so they
dont want to byy it...what will happen to those families? They say you
6-7 families dont even have a survey number, what compensation can we
give you...they used to live kind of off the village land...now we have
been shifted here, they are in a dilema wether to stay there or to come
here, they cant stay there because from that Kharaba land they cant make
a living, they cant come here because the Govt will not allow anyone but
those rehabilitated...
a. the biggest problem we face on these lands given by the Govt is for fuel
and fodder, our animals used to graze in the firest, our firewood would
come easely from there, those forests are going to be submurged, we have
been put arround barren land, these two, fuel and fodder are our main
problems now...scientists come and tell us take out fuel and fodder from
your given land...what do you get out of three guntas? what are they
talking about?
q; hasent the govt given you grazing land?
a. not one foot, not an inch...they say there is no more land...they should
have seen to this before we were shifted here...the govt now says where
can we get the land from?...look at them!...
2
q. in the newspapers they have announced that you people have been given
all the facilities...
a; yes yes they have given fecilities
gave us bullocks,cattle and pumps
...so
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what have they given? they
far they have given to only
18 families....we are a 1000 people...! have given these myself as I
am the village cheif, from the rest they have taken 25% advance (75%
Govt pays j)... .where is all that money? no one knows 9 no one answers!
What am 1 to tell my people? in this barren land we have 18 pumps,
we are used to the waters of Narmada for god knows how many hundred
years... we dont even know how to deal with barren land..the promise to
give carts, they have taken 25/6 for that too, there are no carts, people
are hassling me...l have no idea now which govt. I should go and tell
our story...who will listen?...I will tell you another thing... one house
was burnt down, 1 made an aplication to Baroda, Bharuch and Ragpipla
all three districts and finally the answer was...its not really your
land and so we’ll think about the compensation...they say if you can
prove that you have put in 10,000 rs. on your land we will concider
giving you a loan for 10 thousand....we just dont understand them, 1st
they say this will be your new land, then they say it is not yours, then
they say you have to spend Rs.10k on it to prove it is yours...
2nd old man-
q.Kaka how much land did you have in Pachmadhi?
a.5 acres and 8 guntas
q; how much did you get here
a; three acres..
q;how many are you in the family?
a;we were ten but now...oh oh we have children of children so we are 15..
there is land here but land lords arround are not selling at the price
the project has to offer and so we are hanging in the middle..how come
we were never asked what the price of our land is...it was just taken.
Chiefa.the collector, mamlatdar,project officers sit on the comittee to acquire
land, when these land lords refuse to give it at their price, they just
pack up their tables and move away.... its just a show, they dont want to
get more land..when we were settled here we were told that a radius of
8 acres arround you we will buy land...now we are a settlement and there
is nothing beyond it...our land was purchased for hs.4500. we have been
given 500 acres...for 1000 people it comes to half an acre per person
while we lost five to seven acres per family in Pachmadhi..instead of
working on our land we are spending time in making petitions, going to
Gandhinagar (
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capital of Gujarat)and spending money on postage...
3
...people like you will take this film and go *
.we
away
11 be still
here
q: you should continue to fight
a; in the middle of my life I am not interested in fighting for what I
had, which was legaly mine,.. I arn a farmer and I just want to be
with my land and not these dirty politicians...look at them, if I
commited a crime, next day I will be in jail... not them...
q; they say lots of people will benefit from this dam....
a; what about our misery for the last 9 years... and when will the
benefit come... and to whom?... we know where the canals are going...
not to us... what will happen if the water doesnt reach our high
lands? who’ll we go to then?...what about right now...one canal
was taken right thru our land here, three acres were taken away..
no compensation for that too... even our given lands are being
treated like this..9this is because the project joined two canals)
on top of this our land is devided by this canal..how are we to cross
it..they say we’ll see., these three acres will be compensated..
we havent recieved comepensation for 9 years and now this new thing..
another old man-
I had 15 acres...three acres of mine went too., i was given 20000 Rs.
for my 15 acres in Pachmadhi...
q: at what rate?
a: rate? they just gave it, pressed my thumb on a piece of paper and
and my family was ent packing here..you are also dumb, asking me the
rate 1 was given!
q; have they given any jobs?
a; yes, on the dam site...lifting stones, making jelly, moving earth...
young men and women are there... by the time this is over they will
be old., they dont have a permenant job tho... say ten to twelve days
a month...the rest they stay in work camps or settlements..from being
landed farmers we will die as labourers...
next interview at a settlement- a peasent in his 40’s.
a; I come from Navagam, where the actual openeing of the dam was done by
Jawaharlal Nehrue..in the euforia of his speach, my father donated,
our land to the cause of the Narmada dam... so for giving away 9 acres
we were compensated by four and so I came here....my father had been
given a Rs.100/- as a token per acre—..Jawaharlalji himself personally
had told my fatheryou
*
will get 4 acres of land, a house and a well
*
our family at that time was the proudest., but look arround me, he died,
• 4
Indira died now there is Rajiv but I dont have a roof over my head..
somehow the six village group we belong to, Kevadia,Navagam,Vaghadia etc
not one family has recieved anything... all this you see is done by us
with our own resources..this four acres we were to get its not there...
from my own money I bougt this few guntas...not the gov. 4 acres., thats
not even a dream for me.. 1 have been y haa here since years..
q; in this sttlement which is your house?
a;
...what saab, 1 dont have a house, that shed, thats all, open from
ail sides, open to the heat, rain and dust storms and hardly anything
to eat.... thats our land., this year there was 8 sacks of corn, 10
sacks of toovar and a few sacks of rice... thats all..
q; when your father had the land what did you grow?
^a: °ajri, rice, toovar and corn., we always had surplus that we sold,
from that we got utensils, farming equipment and our women got jewelry,
q: hoe come this happened?
a: its because of the Govt, the biggest cheats, and we were cheated by
the leader personally-Jawaharlal Nehru's footsteps were crooked, so
were Indira's and now this chchutt Rajiv is even more crookedThats the truth.
Jawaharlal Nehru personally made me a landless peasent- he took 60 acres
and promised 4 - we fell for it and we have never recovered. It is needless
to say my father died knocking his head at the corridoous of these Govt.
liars.....
^q: what about the benefits of the dam?
a; see for your self.... this is the benefit.Its not going to benefit any
of our village people, nor our taluk people, and at our cost..
q: why does the govt, do this?
a: because they want to benefit their own kin-Jawaharlal is a thief, so is
Indira Gandhi, so is Amarsinh Choudhury (CM Gujarat) this is one other
way of getting rid of poverty, take away the water.... yes, take away
the water, simple isnt it?.... my elder kaka fought and once got violent
with the Mamlatdar... poor man, he was fearless but his fate is worse,
he is still in prison since four years...
if India would be blessed by peasants it would be a heaven... now its
hell for all-
5
Int- woman at another rehabilitation site-
a: I have been here for five years now..it was so much better there,
we had plenty of water from the river (Narmada^, our animals used to
graze in the forest, we had no problem of fire wood..we had no well
in our village but the river was so close... then this dam came and
we were moved..no no, I was mistaken, its now been 7 years not 5...
we were told that the river will turn into a big lake and our village
Pachmadhi will submurge.. so we all must move to another place..1
dont know what benefit there is to turn a river into a lake (Catchment)
.. I am an illiterate woman and I dont understand what the Govt, people
say., al 1 can tell you now is that my life has become twice as hard..
if I look for fuel I cant make one meal after searching for one whole
day...there 1 used to send my son out just beofre a meal and he would
bring enough ....
a: man- they had told us if you leave from here whithout making any
trouble we will make all the fecilities for you available at the new
site... give you land, bull you a house, make wells etc..now it has
been more than seven years and there is no water, no pukka house and
no one knows what land belongs to whom. The land owners arround here
tell us..’just because the government shifted you it doesnt mean we will
let them buy our land or let you use the land1..
q; There are some more people from your village who have been given all
fecilities at Sukha Settlement., water, electricity, houses...why not
to this settlement?
a; The Givt is not stupid, Sukha is a model settlement and so that is
shown to tourists and other big May-Baap who come to see .... no one
is ever brought here... no one even knows we exists...when we find a
project worker we ask him the same thing and he says., you all find the
land and we’ll make plots for you... dont think the Govt is an endless
pit of money so we can constantly spend on you all..we are nine families
here... we were late and we were not allowed at Sukha..
q; do your children go to school?
a; only the big ones go as the school is very far...about 3.5 km... the
official says you are all used to walking so let the children walk..
we cant build another school arround here..in Pachmadhi the school was
just outside the village..so all these girls you see here..see..they
all went to school., those boys, see..they went to school too..
woman- our relatives are in other settlements...we dont even meet them,
if we go their house or they come here...what will we feed them? On
festivals we do go...
6
we used to dance a lot., slowly we have stopped this.. I dont have the
spirit to dance anymore., when we meet we only seem to talk about how
great it was there and how awful it is here...
g;you were not given bulloks and carts? The newspapers say so?
a:man-the newspapers say so we know that too.. I havent seen a journalist
here in five years., how do they know., from Govt handouts., they gave
some carts..we insisted on wooden wheels... new scientists came and said
tyres are better..in this rocky land we are blowing tyres everyday..look
look at that cart... looks new..look at those wheels...flatte not only
is new and arid land imposed on us..even arid technology...! would like
to give one of those scientists out atta chakki and take that machine
he has from his wife... let him use my technology and see what happens
to him ..(everyone laughs) (That machine=mixie) a wooden ea^wheel cart
is cheaper..there is hardly any mentainance and ideal for this land..
q;who found this land for you?
a; the project people...the patidars and Patels here ofcourse sold them
land which they didnt want..you see Patels and Patidars are educated..
not like us., now here there is labour to work for..we cant even work
as agriculture labourers..so many have gone back to the Dam site to
work there..
ADIVASIa;all the people you spoke to had land once., we never had land..the forest
was our land., now here too we are left outside the setlement..we are
treated worse than animals..sarkar has stolen our land our roti.. I
think it is on purpose., they do not want adivasees..we have nothing to
claim..that suits them..forty years after indipendance we dont have
water to drink... those chaps they have water to wash their asses after
shit., we dont have water to drink..in our land they have build houses
for adhikaris,..they have tapped water from our streams and lakes., now
our women line up outside their bathrooms to collect water that leaks..
our women sit outside their bathroom till the sethani has a bath and hope
that her tap leaks more than others...and those sethanis scream at us
to go away..all we understand is that the law of the forest was JUST,
the law of the Govt.is UNJUSTsome non govt, leaders are helping us fight- now the fight is no longer
for our land and houses... it is because we want to EAT and Drink water.
Thats all... go away from here, the fight is only to be able to eat and
drink-
(
I
. DECCAN HERALD, Wednesday, July 15, 1992
9
‘Narmada, ecology
won’t suffer’
9
0
SURAT, August 19 (PTI): The
Union minister for environment
and forests, Mr Kamal Nath, has
said that there is “no specific
observation made by the Morse
commission that could stop the
construction of the on-going
multi-purpose narmada project’’.
Speaking at the inaugural func
tion of two industrial effluent
plants at Bulsar in south Gujarat
C yesterday, he said the state gov5 ernment, on its part, is serious
about maintaining the ecological
balancc_at the dam site.
The Gujarat chief minister, Mr
Chimanbhai Patel, said the
scheme of setting up effluent
treatment plants by any big in
i’; diiStry in the state would invite a
j financial share of 20 per cent each
c
S from the Centre and slate while
c 40 per cent would be given as I'
f-c/r loftn .and 20 per cent would be
borne by the industry itself. The
g Rs 15-crore plants have been set
X up jn collaboration with France
and Holland.
An afforestation drive to plant
about 32 crore trees in the stateI .was taken up by the people in• eluding farmers and students,
under the social forestry scheme
i this year, he said. .
G
L
T01NS
reporting
from
i Anmedabad states: The Union
government will support the
,Narmada project which is one of
jhc.ipajor developmental projects
in the country. Giving this as• surance, Mr Kamal Nath, said the
■ Centre would if need be take up
the matter with the World Bank.
Addressing a function at
Hansul on the outskirts of the city
after inaugurating a massive
plantation of 40,000 saplings at
Shahced Smruti yesterday, he as
serted that Narmada is a lifeline
not only for Gujarat but for other
states as well and on completion,
the project would usher in econ
omic prosperity.
,
•
•
• •
•
•
• >»
*.
•
•
— - >
•
••
Environmental WL
tribunal to
be set up
I
,v,r-.NEW DELHI, July 14. (UNI) ■
L— A1 proposal to set up a national
environment tribunal to provide strict
liability for damages arising out of
any accident . involving hazardous *
substances and also to provide for
■-compensation and interim relief to
the affected person is 'under. the
; consideration of government;
' '
This was stated by Environment'
. Minister. Kamal Nath in the Lok
Sabha today.
■The Government has decided to
constitute “Paryavaran Vahinis” to
create environmental awareness and
control pollution and environmental
degradation and preserve forests and
wild life through the involvement of
-'r non-governmental organisations and
individuals, particulany the students '
.■ and the youth, Mr. Kamal Nath said.
—“
TlW XX
Indian Express
7„
DECCAN HERALD, Tuesday, August 4, 1992
Review of Sardar?
Sarovar ruled out
•
»••».»
;?
NEW
i
:
•
.
DELHI,
..
“
Aug.
3.
•
fJ t
(PTI)
The Government does not propose to,.’
review the Sardar Sarovar'Project oh'
‘ the Narmada in view of the findings
of the Morse Commission..Report,:
the Lok Sabha was informed today.
Water Resources Minister, Vidya
’ Charan. Shukla, 'told Mr. Rabi Ray' »•
(that the Narmada Control Authority
is ’ required ‘ to ensure the Tmplementation of environmental safe,
guards parijassu • with the construc
tion of the sardar Sarovar project -a
r1
'the .report, the Morse-review
I team had commented on the issues
, associated with the resettlement and ,
. rehabilitation of persons affected by
• the project and on some of the
inadequacies in the studies associated
'"with the environmental issues in
cluding backwater effects.
In
i
||
Narmada projects
to go ahead
as planned
WASHINGTON - Dr M A Chi
tala, India’s Secretary for Water
Resources and Chairman of the
Narmada Control Authority said
here on Saturday that the Narmada
projects would proceed as planned
and on schedule unaffected by the
US report of the independent re
view headed by Bradford Morse.
He said that Morse’s views on
specific issues would be considered
on merits and in detail by the
control authority but India will con
tinue the “pari passu” approach.
namely keep to the work schedule
while dealing with any problems
simultaneously.
He and India’s Executive Direc
tor J S Baijal pointed out that World
Bank President Lewis Preston had
declared categorically after the release of the Morse review that * con
tinued bank support for the Narma
da projects is justified”. They ex
pected no problems with the bank, j
• PTI
/
•1
AUGUST 3. 1992. THE TIMES OF INDIA, NEW DELHI
3
Activists discuss Morse reoort on SSP
By A Staff Reporter
NEW DELHI, August 2.
EADING environmentalists,
social scientists and activists
discussed the Morse committee’s
independent review of the Sardar
Sarovar Projects (SSP), here yester
day.
The committee, commissioned
by the World Bank (WB) to review
rehabilitation and environmental
aspects of the controversial mega
project, says the WB must stop the
ongoing construction and “take a
step back”, because “issues of the
human and environmental impact
of the project” have so far been
ignored.
The discussions were part of a
two-day national convention on
the rationale behind big dams. It
was organised by the Narmada
Bachao Andolan (NBA), a national
network of opponents of $SP and
other big dams.
Mr. Rajni Kothari, social scien
tist, linked the discussions to the
emerging global search for de
velopment alternatives. He said
the concept of a nation-state was
gone and the age of multinationals
and unipolar world order was here
to stay. This threatens our sov
ereignity, he said.
Ms. Medha Patkar, NBA leader,
echoed this. She said decisions
about India and its people were
being taken by outside agencies in prepared by human rights activists,
lawyers, social scientists and en
foreign countries.
Swami Agnivesh of the vironmentalists, was also released
Bandhua Mukti Morcha said the yesterday.
The Morse report says clearly:
non-Congrcss panics are silent on
the Morse committee's report (re “We think the SSP. as they stand
leased in June) though they have are flawed, that resettlement and
flayed the government for accept rehabilitation of all those displaced
ing the structural adjustment pack by the projects is not possible
age of economic polices from the under prevailing circumstances.
International Monetary Fund and the environmental impacts of
the projects have not been properly
(IMF).
considered or adequately ad
A WASHOUT: Mr. Shivaji dressed. Moreover, we believe that
Rao, president, National Forum the Bank shares responsbilny with
for Environmental Concerns, said the borrower for the situation that
the Morse committee is silent on has developed.”
safety aspects of SSP and their
implications. He said the environ
DAM EFFECTS: The SSP in
ment ministry has been ignoring tend to bring drinking water to
their plea for the preparation of a Kutch and other drought-prone re
disaster management plan “be gions of Gujarat, irrigate its vast
cause the SSP is a washout from areas. Plus irrigate two districts of
Rajasthan. The Sardar Sarovar
the start.”
The convention will finalise a dam. under construction on the
strategy to intensify NBA’s struggle Narmada River, will submerge
in the wake of the Morse report. Il 37,000 hectares of land in Gujarat.
will send a statement to .Mr. Lewis Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.
T. Preston, the World Bank presi says the report. Submergence will
dent. to comply with the Morse affect “at least one lakh persons in
report. And an appeal to the Prime 245 villages....In addition, 1.40
Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha lakh farmers are likely to be af
Rao. to invest in “environment fected by the canal and irrigation
enhancing alternatives” rather system. Finally, there are the
than in large and medium projects. people living downstream, below
A national policy on develop the dam, numbering thousands
ment projects, displacement and more, whose lives will be
developmental resettlement, significantly affected.”
The report advocates more
analytical studies: “Lack of data
meant the Bank was not able, in
the early 1980s. to appraise the
projects properly....Ecological re
alities must be acknowledged and
unless a project can be earned out
in accordance with existing norms
of human rights — norms
espoused and endorsed by the
Bank and many borrower coun
tries — the project ought not to
proceed.''
The report also advocates peo
ples' participation: “There is need
to consider Sardar Sarovar in the
social and environmental context
of the Narmada valley as a whole,
to consult, inform and involve the
people affected by the projects
throughout the Narmanda valley,
those affected in the command
area, and those living downstream.
The opposition, especially in the
submergence area, has ripene'd into
hostility. So long as this hostility
endures, progress will be im
possible except as a result of unac
ceptable means.
“A means must be found to
rebuild confidence, to demonstrate
goodwill arid to send out an unam
biguous message that the Bank
continues to be committed to its
principles and its policies.”!
,,
WB team coming: Narmada
./
WASHINGTON, June 23 (PTI).
HE World Bank vice-president,
Mr Joseph Wood, has re
iterated the bank’s support for the
Narmada Projects and said that its
team would visit India next month
to discuss measures to ensure that
the pace of construction did not
come in the way of appropriate
rehabilitation.
He also said that in the proposed
loans the bank planned to give for
the projects, there would be some '
money for rehabilitation purposes
as well.
Mr Wood reported to the ex
ecutive board today on the inde
pendent review on Narmada by
Bradford Morse and the steps the
bank was taking to ensure that the
rehabilitation aspect and en
vironmental issues were taken care
of.
However, he made it clear that
the alleged human rights issues
against the policy raised by the
review and by Asia Watch were for
the Government of India to deal
with, not for the bank.
Mr Wood said that the resettle- ’
ment of the oustces need not slow
down the projects at all. Hetnoted
that it was the intention of both the
Government of India and the state
governments to sec that the en
vironmental
and
resettlement
aspects were handled properly.
I
Where there were shortcomings,
these would be handled, he added.
A bank statement put the total
cost of the Narmada projects at
about three billion dollars. The
World Bank has lent India 450
million dollars, about 15 per cent
of the total cost.
So far, 230 million dollars have
been disbursed. About 200 million
dollars of the loan for the dam
*
remains to be disbursed but nearly
all of the credit for the canal has
already been drawn down.
Mr Wood said that he expected
two follow-on projects. “One has to
do with the expansion of the irriga
tion canal and, in relation to that
project, we will be addressing some
of the problems which remain to be
dealt with at the first stage of the
canal development.
“The other project will deal with
such things as afforestation, water
shed
protection,
additional
measures relating to environment ’
tai studies 'and some village in
frastructure which will help with
the rehabilitation, not -so much
with resettlement, helping people
get to a higher standard of living.
“Yes, we are prepared to provide
additional support to the govern
ment’s concern to make sure that
the environmental and resettle
ment aspects arc handled satisfac
torily, Mr Wood told the board.
The bank gave correspondents at
a briefing a gist of its approach to i
the independent review report on ;
the Narmada which was .being
conveyed to the executive board. It
said among other things:
The
Morse . Commission
provided a draft of its report to the
bank for management’s comments
several weeks prior to the final
release of the document. About two
weeks before the release, the com- •
mission provided a draft of its
findings and recommendations.
The final version of the report wasthe sole responsibility of its
authors. The report was not cleared
by the World Bank. -•
•
“On resettlement and rehabili
tation (R and R), the bank manage
ment agrees with the description of
the R and R situation in each of the
three states and with, the report’s
conclusions about the short
comings in the preparation and
appraisal of the project’s R and R
aspects.
“We also agree that work should
have been done earlier on the issue
of people affected by the canal in
Gujarat. However, we do not share
the view that resettlement would
be virtually impossible even if
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh
adopted the liberal resettlement
package provided for displaced
people by the state of Gujarat. ✓
STATEMENT ON THE MORSE REPORT.
[1]
Sardar Sarovar Project, under construction at Nawagaom in Gujarat on the
Narmada river has been at the centre of controversy for many years now
whether it is regarding rehabilitation of lakhs of outsees of three states
of Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, the financial' viability and
cost benefit analysis, env ironmental .—destruction or even the benefits of
the project towards solving the
*
prone areas of Gujarat. Very
serious questions have been raised by the critics of the project consiste
ntly. In absence of plausible answers and decisive processes,’ the credibility
of all institutions concerned with the implementation of‘the project had
become doubtful. Unable to withstand the pressure on...its .public accountability and questions on the just and sustainable soi|. and water management
policies, the World Bank had to take an unprecedented step of instituting
an independent review of Resettlement 8 Rehabilitation and environmental
aspects of the projects. After ten months of exhaustive review, in which
all parties whole heartedly participated,, the report- of the independent
.review was made public on June 18, '92.
' ■•... ;•
[2]
\ '■
■ ■
We believe that the team review headed by Mr. Bradford Morse functioned
in an independent manner and did a detailed analysis of all these aspects.
It met and discussed with all the people and parties involved with the
controversy.
■
r
>
.*
*
'
I
[3]
Its findings are unambiguous, and we are greatly concerned witli their
implications. The report has concluded, that the project (SSP) is fundamently
flawed, that RGR is impossible in present circumstances and that environment
issues have not been addressed. We are greatly disturbed by these
findings.
pi]
Of equal concern to us are however, the findings of the team concluding
that the Sardar Sarovar Project will not perform as expected, that there
are no plans for the domestic water supply (drinking water) and that
serious problems are likely to arise in the command areas leading to
large scale water logging and soil salinisation. The facts regarding the
command area and hydrology outlined in the report clearly indicate that
tail ends of the canal-Sausrashtra, Kulch, N.Gujarat will not get water.
These bring into question the very benefits of 'the project.
We feel that the time has come for all the parties involved to rise
above their narrow interests and respond open mindedly to the issues
raised by the Morse Committee and other people who have been questioning
the projects.
. .
[6]
[7]
In particular, we urge the Government of India and, the three states of
M.P., Gujarat and Maharashtra to (a) call an Immediate hault to the
constructions of the dam.
(b) Initiate comprehensive studies for the
alternatives or rather true solutions of water problem of the scarcity
Hit areas of Gujarat esp. Sausrashtra, Kutch, N.Gujarat and others.
(c)
Initiate comprehensive studies for the Narmada basin planning as whole
from the smallest watershed.
• -
From the World Bank, we expect that it shall accept the recommendations
of the report in toto, and step out of the projects, leaving the future in
the hands of the people of India. We also urge that Bank re-examine its
land and water management stratagies that it is promoting and implementing
through its projects all over the world.
I
z
•
GNvi«.oNf<GN'i
.THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA. JANUARY 6,.1991
15
U PDATE
HE Narmada project con
troversy has snowballed into
a . fierce confrontation, with
thousands of protestors on either
side of the Gujarat-Madhya
Pradesh border stirring them
selves up with battle songs and
slogans, and the tension running
high. This latest chapter in the
Narmada saga watQ precipitated
by Baba Amte’s decision to Also while Gujarat, alongwith given Rs 4,500 crores) to stop its eerily, that at a certain stage of a
march from Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and small parts contributions if the project pl^ns country’s development, such pro
where he had been staking out on of Rajasthan and Maharashtra, aren’t modified.
jects are necessary, and that the
the banks of the Narmada since arc exfweted to benefit from the On the other side arc the local West can afford to move away
March last year, to the Sardar scheme, which includes the politicians and most bureaucrats. ’ from them now — since its water
Sarovar (SS) dam site across the Narmada (Indira) Sagar (NS), And those who feel, in all sin- and electricity needs have already
Omkareshwar and Maheshwar
border, in Gujarat.
As is commonly known. SS. 460 dams in MP, the major burden of
feet high, with a projected invest submergence will be bome by
ment of over Rs 11,000 crores, is MP. A good part of the roughly
lhe biggest of lhe almost 3,200 1,45,000 hectares to be
small, medium and large dams submerged by the dams is forest,
planned as part of the project It and. 47 per cent of the estimated
is also the one bn which work is 3.00,000 oustees are tribals, most.
of them from Madhya Pradesh.
progressing the fastest
Upon completion, it is exjjected This explains why they have
to provide drinking water, irriga ranged themselves behind Baba
'k-.
tion and power facilities to large Amte, Mcdha Patkar and the
tracts of drought-prone north Gu- other anti-dam marchers.
jarat,rand at least potable water to International environmental
some arid pockets of Saurashlra agencies are also pressuring the
and Kutch.
World Bank (which has so far
T
zls
ministry of environment and
forests declared that it felt that
the project’s impacts had not
been studied adequately. After
much lobbying, this report was
bypassed, arid tn late 1988, Rajiv
Gandhi cleared SS in a hurried
pre-election move. Work on SS
had started in October 1987.
By this time, the greens had
been met
become a force to reckon with.
The government has dreamt of Many of them felt the size of the
this project since 1947, when project was unwarranted, con
Sardar vallabhbhai Patel first sidering its high costs and the
mooted the idea. Pandit Nehru harm it would cause to forests
Laid the SS foundation stone in and wildlife1961. But a disagreement be
tween the four participating The Gujarat government further
states over storing the water de-’ liberalised its rehabilitation but
layed matters for 10 years — declared all the other charges
unfounded. Some of its reactions
"Xjta’lh’i, Um World Bank ofr™ .™8
the controversy over the Narmada dams reachesflashpoint, HAJRINISWAMY
reviews the troubled history of the project
fered a loan, provided certain threats of dismissal from govern
liberal rehabilitation programmes ment-granted posts, ftirther ex
asperated the activists.
were agreed upon. A cost-benefit
analysis was ordered, and the’ jn the present confrontation,
government was all set to go ’several issues have become
when the Forest Conservation clouded. But what is clear is that
Act, 1980, was passed? requiring the Gujarat government, which
special clearance for diversion of has already spent around Rs 600
forest land. Even that came crores on the dam, is not about to
through, but surprisingly, the stop now.
,
— - •■ Kothari accuses the Gujarat The system encouraged . ex
government of blackmailing the tremism, says Agnivesh. “We
Centre. He believes the Sardar want the dams reviewed — we
Sarovar has eaten into schemes want the government to sit down
of rural development, electrifica and tAlk to people whose lands
later having held several different
tion and education. While the will be submerged."
portfolios, as a minister. He was
anti-dam. lobby is accused’ of B. D. Sharma:.
:hicf minister of Guiarat in
Sanat Mehta:
having the foreign hand behind Sharma, the commissioner for
1*975-76
and again in 1977-78.
A prominent labour leader, As chief minister, he strongly
it, it is the Gujarat government scheduled castes and scheduled
Mehta is a high-profile politician favoured the atomic power sta
that is going with a begging tribes, who has emerged as a new
respected even by his adversaries tion at Kakarapar, but once out
bowl— seeking aid from Japan, leader for the Narmada bachao
Germany and the World. Bank, andolan, was a collector in the
for his administrative acumen. of office, he offered satyagraha
Bastar district of Madhya
As a Praja Socialist Party leader, alongwith environmentalists,
he says.
Pradesh in 1968 where he wifhe offered satyagraha on the against the project He was with
Swami Aghlvesh:
Daman border against the Portu Baba Amte during his Bharafi
Born in Andhra Pradesh, anc| nessed the marginalisation of
guese regime. He rose fast up the jodo yatra, but now he has turned
educated in West Bengal, Swami tribals. When he raised his voice
Anti Narmada activists led by Baba Amte cross into Gujarat
political ladder once he joined the Baba’s foe.
> Agnivesh begin his career work against the injustice done to
the Congress (R), after the split in Chunibhal Valdya:
ing with the.Arya Samaj in them, he was transferred.
hands tied to symbolise non-violence
the Congress. He made his mark Populary known as Chunikaka, jarat Chamber of Commerce and
Haryana. His inspiration was
After a six-year tenure as
as civil supplies minister in the
Gandhiji’s ideology of service
Chunibhai Vaidya is a veteran. Industry, has plunged deep into
joint secretary in the Centre, he
Ghanshyam Oza ministry and Sarvodaya leader of Gujarat en
that would benefit the lowliest
the pro-Narmada movement. He
went back as a secretary of the
finance minister in the
and the poorest The Swami’s
gaged in constructive activities. A is also heading the newly formed Rajni Kothari:
Madhya Pradesh government.
Madhavsinh Solanki ministry.
Kothari, a former member of career of social work began with
close associate of Gandhiji, Narmada Foundation Trust,
and again pot into controversy.
As chairman of the Sardar
Chunikaka was the moving spirit which has the ambitious target of the Planning Commission, has the stone quarry and brick kiln , This time it was over a World
Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd,
behind the stoppage of work on collecting Rs 3 crores by way of been a critic of the country’s . workers.
Bank pine project for the tribal
Mehta fought a prolonged battle
lhe Sipu irrigation scheme to donations, to launch campaigns development model for a long He formed the Bandhwa Mukti areas that he resisted. He has
with environmentalists, and also
protect the riparian rights of at the national and international time. His strong criticism of big Morcha and in the heydays of the determined not to allow a single
got the green signal from the
dams, despite his being a Gu Janata Party, was Haryana’s
farmers in Banaskanlha district levels, in favour of the project
foreign penny to come into the
World Bank for the controversial
jarati, has earned him and his education minister. He has op
Like his colleague in the Lok Harivallabh Parikh:
tribal areas.
project He not only successfully
Swaraj Manch, the Narmada de A known Sarvodaya worker, he sorts—Ashish and Smitu—who posed the plan for a Disneyland1
implemented the Narmada de velopment minister, Babubhai J.
are at the forefront of the agita in Haryana on the grounds drat it While the andolan has moved
posit scheme, but also mooted Patel, Chunikaka is also a bundle has devoted his life to the better tion, the wrath of his state. As a would disrupt the economy of into Gujarat Jo physically stop
ment ofthe adiyasis.
the idea of issuing Narmada
of contradictions. On the one Bhai, as he is known among member of the Planning Com imall farmers of the area and- the construction of the dam.
bonds. He resigned as chairman
Sharma, alongwith several hun
hand, he stopped the work on the adivasis, has been able to solve mission in the previous govern disturb the ecology.
in December 1989
Sipu scheme but on the other thousands of disputes, over issues ment, he fought both the Tehri
The displacement caused by the dred tribals, has been trying to
Babnbhai Juhbbd Patel:
hand, he joined hands with Patel ranging from land tenure to and Narmada dams.
Sardar Sarovar and Narmada open up new .channels of com
At 80, Babubhai Patel, now the and others to oppose Baba Amte marital and social problems of An activist of the People’s Sagar dams, Swami Agnivesh munication with the Centre, over
minister
for
Narmada de and other anti- Narmada project the adivasis through Lok Adalats. Union for Civil Libertics(PUCL), says, will reduce another lakh the last 10 days. He has been
velopment, is remarkably active, environmentalists.
But as the years passed by, he he is also a member of people to bonded labour. If thq interacting with the government
and fighting for a cause dear to Jagdish S. Jhaven:
Host the love and affection of "Lokayan" which is concerned Swami is against the dams, it is but beyond a point, the govern
; adivasis, and he is no more as with human environmental because of the callousness and ment refuses to move, he says.
his heart. A freedom fighter, Patel
has had a long political carter, An iengineer turned-busi- popular among them as he once protection. He was the recipient apathy towards the tribals and
—USHA RAI and
having been a member of lhe nessman, the dashing Jhaveri, was, because he has turned a ofthe Right Livelihood Award or the poor living in the
ASRAF SAYED
bilingual Bombay assembly, arid who is the president of the Gu- politician .
the “alternative Nobel" in 1985. submergence’ areas of the dams.
>®ss
Crossed currents
AGAINSt
«
6
THE HINDU, Sunday, June 21, 1992.
From R. Chakrapani
Mr. Chitale has been meeting the World Bank
officials in the India division. He conferred with
WASHINGTON. June 20.
India's executive director on the bank's execu
India is preparing a paper rebutting the con tive board. Mr. J. S. Baijal. who will also be in
clusions of the independent review commission Paris for the consortium meeting.
on the Narmada projects to apprise members of
Mr. Chitale. in a chat with correspondents.
the Aid-lndia Consortium of the facts and the
measures taken by the Government to resettle used a ,mild language to express India's dis
displaced persons in comfort in their new habi agreement with the conclusions of the World
Bank-funded commission. "They have given their
tats by compensating them adequately.
perceptions with which we do not agree." he
The Secretary of the Union Ministry of Irriga said. The project was proceeding satisfactorily
tion and Power. Mr. M. A Chitale. who is here and there was no question of stepping back or
for discussions with World Bank officials, will halting it. He conceded that the commission had
proceed to Paris to be present during the meet made some valid points which would be taken
ing of the consortium next week. The consortium into account in the further stages of implementa
will discuss the quantum of multilateral and bilat tion.
eral aid to India for the fiscal year 1993. Mem
This was not the first major river valley project
bers are certain to ask questions about some of
the findings of the Bradford Morse Commission India was handling. He pointed to the expertise
report recommending to the World Bank and the gained by his department in handling the NagarGovernment of India that the "step back" from junasagar. Bhakra Nangal and Hirakud projects.
further implementation of the project until more All these had problems similar to those faced by
studies are made about environmental and re the Narmada project and they would be handled
settlement aspects of one of the largest irrigation on the basis of experience.
and hydro-electric projects in the world. (Mr.
Further, in the case of the Sardar Sarovar pro
Morse is the former administrator of the United ject. the Supreme Court had stated the top dam
Nations Development Fund).
on the Narmada would benefit the whole country
THE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA. JANUARY 6.1991
The Narmada uprising which has snowbal led into a fight with Baba Amte's latest decision to
march to the dam site, has spread far beyond the boundaries of the affected states, says
Horini Swamy
9
*
i •
*
:'k'
’
•
•
• «
■
■ y-X'
HE Narmada Project con
be affected by it. activists of
troversy has snowballed
many divergent camps have
into a fierce confronta
approached the human and en
tion. with thousands of protes
vironmental aspects of the issue.
tors on cither side of the
International environmental
Gujarat-Madhya Pradesh bor
agencies have also indicated their
der stirring themselves up with
support, and are pressuring the
battle-songs and slogans, and the
World Bank (which has so far
tension running high.
given Rs 4,500 crore) to stop its
This latest chapter in the Nar contributions if the project plins
mada saga was precipitated by aren’t modified.
Baba Amte’s decision to march
On the other side dre the local
from Madhya Pradesh, where he politicians and most bureaucrats,
had been staying out on the and those who feel, in all sincer
banks of the Narmada since ity, that at a certain stage of a
March last year, to the Sardar country’s development, such
Sarovar (SS) dam site across the projects are necessary, and that
border, in Gujarat.
the West can afford to move
As is commonly known, SS, away from them now — since its
460 feet high, with a projected water and electricity needs have
investment of over Rs 11,000 already been met. Mr B.D. Gup
crore, is the biggest of the almost ta, the commissioner for Sche
3,200 small, medium and large duled Castes and Scheduled
dams planned as part of the pro Tribes, who sympathises with the
ject. It is also the one on which oustees, is.acting as an unofficial
work is progressing fastest.
mediator.
,
.
Upon completion, it. is ex
The government has dreamt of
pected to provide drinking water,
irrigation and power facilities to this project since 1947, when Sar
large tracts of drought-prone dar Vallabbbhai Patel first
north Gujarat, as well as at least mooted the idea. Pandit Nehru
potable water to some arid pock laid the SS foundation stone in
ets of Saurashtra and Kachchh. 1961/
No wonder the Kachchhis and
After that, the World Dank
the rich farmers of the north, who offered a loan, provided certain
consider this project their state’s liberal rehabilitation program
lifeline, are prepared to defend it mes were agreed upon. A cost
with their lives.
benefit analysis was ordered, and
Also, while Gujarat, along the government was all set to go
with Madhya Pradesh (MP) and when the Forest Conservation
small parts of Rajasthan and Act, 19S0, was passed, requiring
Maharashtra are expected to be special clearance for diversion of
nefit from the scheme, which inx forestland.
eludes the Narmada (Indira)
Even that came through, but
Sagar (NS), Omkareshwar and
Maheshwar dams in MP, the ma surprisingly, the ministry of en
jor burden of submergence will vironment and forests declared
be borne by MP. A good part of that it felt that the project’s im
the roughly 1,45.000 hectares to pact had not been studied ade
be submerged by the dams is quately. After much lobbying,
forest, and the dispute has spread this report was bypassed, and in
far beyond the boundaries of the late 1988, Mr Rajiv Gandhi
affected states. Because of the cleared SS in a hurried pre
many areas of human life that will election move.
T
SECOND IMPRESSION
ft *
J
‘a
dogmatic on Narmada
Size of the 8th Plan of Madhya Pradesh
The. Narmada Sagar Reservoir near
ESPITE its apparently tough stand in fa- •' eluding those of Mr. Shukla who was thrice
vour of the controversial Narmada pro Chief Minister, for doing nothing in the past Khandwa (also-known as Indira Sagar), if and '(92-97) — Rs. 15,000 crores.
jects, the Madhya Pradesh Government is decade and half. He wants the initiative to when completed, would be the biggest reser
Annual Plan of Madhya Pradesh (92-93) —
voir
in
India
and
would
change
the
face
of
.
not dogmatic about sticking to the presently come from the Governments of India. Gujarat
Rs. 2,400 crores.
/
backward
Madhya
Pradesh.
and
Maharashtra
which
are
all
under
the
stipulated heights of the Indira Sagar and
Total Plan Budget provision for 92-93
Sardar Sarovar dams. It is not averse to their Congress party. Rajasthan under BJP rule
Mr. Sahai admits that it is a stupendous
reduction provided Gujarat is persuaded by will readily agree as its interests, like those of task, "a big challenge and costly adventure’’ . (whole State) — Rs. 2.991 crores.
the Central Government or any other agency Maharashtra, are only "peripheral" in the with severe financial and administrative con
Allocation for NVDA projects in the 8th
to agree to it, according to the M.P. Minister Narmada schemes. (Mr. Shukla conceded re straints. However once the process takes off. Plan — Rs. 1526 crores.
for Irrigation and Narmada Projects, Mr. cently that not much could be done in the funds for further progress would be found
Shitla Sahai, a senior member of the Patwa past because of difference of opinion on the through sale of electricity generated, he
Budget Allocation for NVDA projects in
Cabinet and the ruling BJP,
/ '
" issue in the Congress party itself but he urg feels. In any case the giant projects would be 92-93 — Rs. 310 crores. .
ed that the process of damage must be halt executed with or without World Bank aid.
In an interview he disclosed that soon after ’
Project costs will be revised every five
ed before it became irreversible).
(According to latest reports, the world bank years. Doubling of project cost assumed ap
coming to power the BJP Government of
The Narmada Minister Mr. Sahai asserts itself is under tremendous pressure from
Madhya Pradesh made an earnest attempt to
that the relief and rehabilitation scheme European parliament and other international pears to be sheer speculation.
get the heights of the dams lowered and re
drawn up by the Madhya Pradesh Govern agencies to "step back" from its aid commit
It is incorrect to say that the progress of
quested the Government of India in April
ment is "the best in the country." It is the ments even while the Narmada Control Auth the Narmada Sagar project has been held up
1990 to hold discussions with the four States
most comprehensive and offers liberal terms ority (NCA) plans to lodge a format protest for want of finance. The clearance of the pro
concerned (Gujarat Maharashtra. Rajasthan
even to "encroachers" on par with others. against the Morse Commission report).
ject was accorded as follows: Environment
besides M.PJ. But Gujarat was not prepared
The Government he says, is determined to
clearance was accorded in April 1987, forest
for any change in the heights of the dams.
Some facts and figures:
implement it fully and firmly. To achieve this
clearance in October 1987. Planning Com
So, according to him. Madhya Pradesh has
goal under the present administrative severe
When and where is the "first" submerge mission clearance in September 1989. Someno choice but to fall in line in order to safe
limitations and shortcomings would be little ence scheduled to begin:
time was required for completing preliminary
guard its interests in terms of the Award of
short of a "miracle." he agrees. "But we are
works and fixing agencies for the dam and
the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal
committed to work out this miracle," he af
Jalsindhi with 45 families in M.P. on Maha the power house. Now the agency for the
(NWDT) which is legally binding and has de
firms. He dismissed the adverse report of rashtra border in 1994 as a result of the dam and power house hasjentered the pro
creed that if 18 MAF waters are not utilised
Morse Commission set up by the World Sardar Sarovar project in Gujarat
ject site.
within 45 years — (now reduced to less than
Bank as biased and unfair.
35 years because of the delay in implementa
Since the World Bank (WB) aid covers
~
The
Narmada,
originating
in
the
(According
to
reports,
the
cost
of
all
the
tion) — Hie M.P. State would lose all control
only 20 per cent of the cost the lion’s share
Amarkantak
range
near
Jabalpur
in
Eastern
projects
has
increased
from
Rs.
11.000
over tlie waters of Narmada, its life line.
of burden has to be borne by the State itself.
Madhya Pradesh, is the fifth largest river of crores to Rs. 22,000 crores since 1989. That
The question before us was whether devel
Even at this stage. Mr. Sahai said. Parlia the country, running 1312 kilometres, drain is doubled in four years).
opment of Narmada water resources should
ment can pass an amendment to the relevant ing a basin of 98,800 square kilometres.
Projects taken in hand under the Narmada be delayed while waiting for the WB assist
Act in favour of a review to get the heights mostly in M.P.. marginally in Gujarat and
of the dems lowered in the light of the sparsely in Maharashtra. The river has more Valley Development Authority (NVDA) in ance or it should be pushed ahead without it.
changed circumstances, despite the rigid waters than those of Beas. Ravi and.Sutlej Madhya Pradesh (with costs). Expected to The circumstances had reached a stage any
stand of the Gujarat Government. But it is for put together. The planning of the Narmada be completed in the 8th, 9th and 10th Plans. further delay would have marred the pros
pects of the State. A decision was therefore
the Central Government to act and persuade valley development began in the fifties but
(i) Narmada Sagar (also known as Indira taken to proceed without waiting for WB aid.
its own party Government now ruling Gujarat got bogged down in water sharing dispute
The WB has (inter alia) put a condition that it
as well. He virtually endorsed the views of between Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. It Sagar) — Rs. 2167.67 crores.
would consider the Narmada Sagar project if
the Congress Opposition Leader and former was referred to a Tribunal for adjudication in t
(ii) Onkareshwar — Rs. 788.03 crores.
the rehabilitation under Sardar Sarovar pro
Chief Minister. Mr. Shyam Charan Shukla, 1969. Its Award came after ten long years —
(iii) Maheshwar — Rs. 465.63 crores-------- ceeds in a satisfactory way. It was felt that
who has repeatedly called for reduction of in 1979 — and became the law With twoCiv) Sardar Sarovar - Rs. 828.80 crores such a 5°™“°" was art*,cial a"d had n°
the height of the Sardar Sarovar dam from thirds of the waters allocated to it under the
455 feet to 410 feet so as to minimise the NWDT Award. Madhya Pradesh has con (M P’s share)
connection with Narmada Sagar. Therefore it
would be incorrect to say that the decision
massive displacement and hardships of the ceived a gradiose scheme which envisages.
(v) Bargi Diversion — Rs. 1.005.65 crores, of the present Government to proceed with
people as also the environmental hazards.
in the course of next few decades, 29 major
(vi) Maan — Rs. 44.10 crores.
the project is a fraud with the people.
Mr. Shukla has offered unstinted support projects. 135 medium scale dams and 3,000
to the BJP Government if it makes a serious minor works. The waters of the Narmada
V.
T.
Joshi
(vii) Jobat — Rs. 30.75 crores.
move in this regard. Mr. Sahai for his part would be re-allocated if not utilised by M.P.
Special Correspondent in Bhopal
Total — Rs. 5,330.62 crores.
chides the previous Congress regimes, in- in 45 years as stipulated in the Award.
THE HINDU, Wednesday, August 19, 1992.
D
•IO
- ' . M MIC TIMES/
BANGALORE' THURSDAY JANUARY 10 1991
Narmada project: From discord to disaster
ERHAPS the mosLobnoxious feature
of the confrontation over the Narmada
in evidence today is the increasingly belli. cose tone adopted by the Gujarat governk- ment in dealing with the activists of the
anti-dam Narmada Bachao Andolan. Not
- satisfied with physically intimidating them,
Mr Oumanbhai Patel has now branded the
activists foreign-funded malcontents.
Coming as it does from a senior politican. this intemperance is distressing
enough — notwithstanding the faults,
shortcomings and tactical mistakes of the
NBA activists. What makes it grotesque is
\that Mr Patel himself desperately wants
foreign funds for the Sardar Sarovar pro
ject. Indeed the project cannot possibly
have any future in the absence of foreign
funding.
* Therein lies a contradiction. But it is not
the only one. As 1 shall try to show below,
• the greatest contradiction is that the very
project—Sardar Sarovar—which the voc
al majority of Gujaratis consider as their
route to a bright, modem, prosperous fu
ture, is liable, if completed, to become the
economic undoing of that state. It is likely
to spell ruin for Gujarat's finances, or
alternatively, make agriculture itself levi
able in the cultivable command area of the
planned reservoir.
P
This is what gives the present confronta
tion its truly tragic character. The pro-dam
agitators have the backing of the stale and
of powerful businctf. and farmers' in
terests. They are. besides, convinced that
Sardar Sarovar is for Gujarat what BhakraNangal was for Punjab-indeed that the
Sarovar represents a redemption of Gu
jarat's violated honour.
The anti-dam activists are equally con
vinced that they arc right. They have a
formidable case in respect of rehabilitation
of those who will be uprooted by the pro
jects. They also command tremendous
moral force as personified by Mr Baba
Amte. Dr B.D. Shanna and by some
others. But they have little support within
Gujarat and cannot daim to represent the
perceived interests of any of its people.
This anomaly may well be an indication
of the shape of the contentions to come on
a series of environmental issues in the
country, especially where there is war-like
hostility and antagonism between the
opposing sides, and where the agitators’
appeal to the local population remains li
mited. This should underscore the need to
create a mechanism for conflict resolution.
To return to the entire Narmada valley
development project — a conglomerate of
’ 30 major, *135 medium and 3,000 minor
*. damson the Narmada and its tributaries, to
be built at an estimated cost of Rs 30.000
crore or more — there are at least four
• incongruities or imbalances which deserve
The Narmada project is not only questionable on ecological grounds, it
is actually a prescription for economic bankruptcy too, holds Praful Bidwai.
special discussion here. First and foremost.
Valley project as a whole then number
fraught with high interest costs or with a
there is a major imbalance between the
heavy burden on the exchequer by way of
could be of the order of 14 lakh or so. What
Gujarat and M.P. sides of the scheme.
is involved here is a qualitative problem
tax exemptions. And only the romantic can
Narmada Sagar, to be located in M.P.’s
too. The oustees tend to be among the
persuade themselves to believe that
Khandwa district, is in some ways the pre * Gujarati-speaking NRIs will, despite their
most vulnerable, poor, culturally oppres
cursor to Sardar Sarovar. It is to cost up
sed and economically exploited segments
numbers and prosperity, contribute to the
wards of Rs 2,000 crore (at 1989 prices,
project unless offered competitive rates of
of Indian society. Where tribaE are in
excluding the environmental costs of forest
interest or other incentives.
volved. displacement means nothing short
submergence) and when completed irri
of separation from life-support systems
’
,
_
*
•
•
•
*
•
•
11
•'
’
•
•
gate 1.23 lakh hectares, install 1.000 mg of
represented by forests and watersheds.
A LL these spell higher financing costs,
power generation capacity (with firm pow
This makes it unrealistic and unfair even to
xxinduding
interest
during
construc
er of 140 to 256mw), and meet some
talk of rchabihution which does not inflict
tion. However, even assuming — favour
domestic and industrial water needs, be
heavy costs upon these people and indeed
ably
for
the
project
—
that
the
interest
is
sides provide water to Sardar Sarovar now
which spells the end of normal life as they
nil,
that
there
is
no
cost
escalation,
and
that
under construction in Gujarat.
know’ it (ethnoodc as Mr Amte calls it).
the
power
generation
capacity
costs
about
There is such a narrow gap between the
The only means of limiting such uncon
the same as that for coal-bunting thermal
area to be submerged —over 91.000 ha —
scionable damage is to minimise submerg
stations,
the
cost
of
irrigating
a
hectare
of
and the irrigation potential —1.23 lakh ha
ence. Or where that is simply impossible.
land
works
out
to
be
Rs
50,000
to
Rs
60.000
—. And so low is the power generation
to relocate people through comprehensive
depending
on
how
the
re
mainin
g,
drinking
target, that the NSP cannot possibly be
watershed reafforestation programmes
water component is costed.
justified except because it would supply
which acknowledge the hnd-for-land pnnThe interest and depreciation on a capit
835 million cubic metres of waler a month
opie. Today, however, the concerned state
al
cost
of
Rs
SO.OOtYha
will,
al
the
very
to the SSP. M.P. therefore has only a mar
governments lack such programmes for
least,
be
Rs
8,000
to
10,000/ha.
This
is
the
ginal stake in the project's benefits but is
most oustees. This is a wholly unaccept
expected to commit massive resources
able. in fact loathsome, situation in which
r
r
* — *
against public opposition and grass-roots
the human costs alone make the w bole pro
resistance to it. This is wholly unrealistic.
ject undesirable.
••
. -•
Secondly, the SSP is nothing if not a
Finally, the true ecological costs of the
huge white elephant. It is estimated at
Narmada project must not be underesti
1987-88 prices to cost about Rs 11,150
mated. Besides submergence of highcrore (excluding the cost of forest sub
quality land, destruction or disruption of
mergence) and irrigate 18.7 lakh hectares,
the watershed, loss of wildlife and precious
as well as generate 1,450 mws of power
irreplaceable flora, and of histoneal and
(installed capacity) while submerging
archaeological stes, and the more noto
39.000 ha of land, including nearly 14.000
rious problems of flooding, waterlogging
ha of forests, and a total of 237 villages.
and salinity, it must be understood that the
Although Gandhinagar claims that the SSP
cost includes the Joss of virgin forest. This
is the only hope for drought-prone
loss can never be fully made up even with
true annualised total social cost. There is
Saurashtra and Kutch, disaggregated data
vigorous compensatory reafforestation: a
show that the project will exclude four- . do reasonable way of meeting even a deforest is infinitely neber than a plantation,
fifths of the talukas of Saurashtra. and pro ‘ cent fraction of this cost given the three to
and a virgin rain forest is nothing less than a
vide only minimal quantities or no water to * ' four tonnes/ha yields on irrigated land to
marvel of nature which cannot be re
about two-thirds of drought-prone pockets
day— themselves worth Rs 10.000 (usually
created. •. |
of the state as a whole.
- \
J . . < much less) or thereabouts in value.
\' An even large question pertains to the
The benefit: Cost ratio of the project has
The conclusion should be self-evident.
wisdom of Upping water from thousands of
been estimated by a consultancy firm The state will simply go bankrupt in the
square kilometres to supply it to a mnscule
process of raising this huge sum of money
appointed by the Sardar Sarovar Nigam
fraction of that area. Ail this creates avoid
and meeting the obligations arising there
itself at 1.12:1. This is well below the norm
able forms of destruction and a senes of
from. Or alternatively, if the farmer is
of 1.5:1. Some others estimate the ratio to
problems relared to imbalances in the
asked to pay even a fraction of the annnalbe even lower.
tmero-and macro-environmeni of the con
ised capital cost of irrigation, agriculture
* There is no way that Gujarat can raise
cerned area.
itself
will
become
unviable.
In
either
the Rs 11,150 crore — a sum larger than the
’ Admittedly, some of these problems are
the consequence is cataclysmic for Gu
state's entire proposed Eighth Plan, almost
amenable to solution. At any rate, their
>
double the size of the last plan; or about 40 jarat's economy.
effects can be erimmised if a serious and
per cent of the Eighth Plan's total outlay on ' .'This staggering fact is not all. A third
timely effort is made. However, leave
irrigation for the whole country. The aspect of the Narmada project is the grav
alone making such efforts, the Gujarat and
World Bank has pledged no more than Rs ity of the problem of oustees, between the
M.P. governments have not even bothered
700 crore (and that too at 10.75 percent). TfSP and the SSP alone. They probably
to furnish adequate data pertaining to the
The proposal to borrow from the market is number over 2,5 lakh and for the Narmada
conditions under which the ministry of en
,:
r The cost of the
project in human terms,
because of the inability
to relocate the oustees,
is not just unacceptable,
it is loathsome.
vironment cleared the project in June
1987.
These conditions included assured plan
ning and implementation by the Narmada
control authority of environmental safe
guard measures, drawing up of detailed
rehabilitation and catchment area treat
ment plans and studies and progress re
ports on compensatory reafforestation, ,
command area development, flora and
fauna, carrying capaary of surrounding
areas, seismicity and health effects. Going
by the minutes of the NCA’s ninth meet-r
ing, the earlier clearance lapsed in Deccm-ber 1989 and the project authorities were^’
asked to seek renewed clearance. *
- There is no evidence that this has been *
done so far. And if the Gujarat govern-”
ment persists with its irrational, hysterical/’
and paranoid approach to the agitation,p
then it is even more unlikely to make sin- /
cere efforts to comply with the conditions/-’
The project is likely to roll on without en
vironmental safeguards. And that would
be an even greater catastrophe —;DOC just
for the Narmada but in respect of other. ,,
future projects as well.
• a'L
*
/
How has such a situation come about?
As with so many economic projects, with
Narmada too. the key lies in politics. What
was at work here was the overzcalous
advocacy of the project by Gujarat, the.;pressure brought to bear upon the:Flan-/-’
rung Commission and the government, andC ; .
the role played by key figures uxh as Mr
Madhavsinh Sclanki, Mr Chimimbbai °
Patel and at another level. Dr Yoginder K. •
Alagh. the commisrion member in clxirga ’
of irrigation — himself a wcll-kxxwa Hsx- - mada enthusiast. ’ * •'
x.; urwrv • •
The pre-National Front PL-umaig Ccm- ”
mission put its seal of cppiovcl —*and c;.o- ’* *
sure — upon the project, evidently without . '
satisfying itself that it was viable..Wben we
came upon the scene, says Prof A. \
Vaidyanathan, the eminent asriadtirel
'
economist who took over as member con^
corned with irrigation, ibo project had'/
already been approved. We rvrrer cc-re
formally ditcusKd iL. ' .
4\- .ePotitiad equations hive changed todry.
The central £^/ernmenlttixrvh?cdsd by 2 .
leader who has been ciosdy sssociatcd • j
with the dependent on Mr
.j !
Patel. Mr Chandra Shrkh^ camot be ex
*
'
peered — whatever Ms Mcrzka Gaodhi .• •
might do and siy in her
mmutry — to
oppose and overrule an importers ally torn •: "
u Mr Patel.
-J
. ■■ q.
i
But is it unreasonable for us to expect'
that he will intervene to the prerent con-- T
frontation, if only to prevent its further
aggravation and to promote fl return to •’
sanity — fl condition euratial to the agenz
da of development without wanton
’ •- ]
miction?
.
.
‘
‘
K
J
... .__ ______ i
10 ’HIE SUNDAY TIMES OF INDIA, JUNE 28, 1992
!»!*?*. 2J T,T^■■ - "/■ nr TA1 ■."■.*•
■
■/■■■»».
Special Report
INDEX MAP OF
n<sr
VEHSANA
SARARKA’HM
□‘ST
O:ST,
GANDhi
KACMCMHOIST
MADHYA PRADE
NAGAR
O’ST
5URFN0RA
NAGAR
/
>OiST
KHEDA
□ ST.
-H
. Worse repor/ shows, the Narmada project authorities are
not iiii'w-ly uprooting tribals, brutalising peasants and offending
human rights Hacked by the World Hank, they are violating
every rule in their own book.
Praful Kidwai on the implications of the independent review
report on Sardar Sarovar.
JAMNAGAR O?ST
' DA
j
UVADODARA
RAJKOT D«$r
□ 1ST
•W DA ,
'AMREtrBnAVNAGAR
D»sr
■JUNAGAOH OlSrl
<
3HARUCH
□isr
DIST
CD
s
SURAT
□1ST
MP
o
tion system — said to be the sacrificed at the altar of the dcGujarat
largest in the world.
-vclopmcnt of large numbers
Rajasthan
Howcv'er, in practice, the
I his represents a huge social
Narmada Basin Boundary
Maharashtra
0
cost which both the Central and Sardar Sarovar authorities, and
Total
Location ol proposed major dams and reservoirs
the governments of the three im the Gujarat. Maharashtra and
'
de\ clop- mediately concerned slates, Gu M P. governments have behaved
mem io the io! of the woild — jarat. Maharashtra and Madhya in contravention of these obliga
th; !,';.'-mal i dity at home — in Pradesh, and the World Bank, arc tions.
the .’.■•!!mud?. •.all<,\
To this day. the Maharashtra
duty-bound to offset through a
I h I.. !’!;, can no longer be comprehensive R & R program and Madhya Pradesh govern
J.i’icJ. Saidar Sarov ar. said to be me.
ments refuse to implement the
the .-.eild < biggest irrigation proThis obligation derives from: Tribunal's 1979 directive to treat
j
cr-nld .•il,.o rum out to be its
* a 1957 covenant (number all major sons as families and to
I
•! hiiin.’n. environmental 107) of the International Labour accept that tribals may not have
and econorni dim disaster.
Organisation, which India rati legal title to the land they actually
I his ir not '.!•? \ iew of the fied in 1958. This commits the cultivate and hence acknowledge
-:'inia.>a B?> hro Andolan and government not to remove in that there is a compelling reason
if. P ry :e !•. i 1. I ni tin implica digenous and tribal people from to treat “cncroachcrs” on a par
tion >il ’Ik fiin’ii rs ol an inde- their liabitual ternlories, except with landholders.
lhe Gujarat government has
|\ndcn' r. . k
v.hi'.h submitted by pros iding them with "lands of
its rej it ten days ago to the quality al least equal to that of failed to draw up plans for those
'A odd Bank
Whatever one's the lands previously occupied by to be affected by the canal and
ic-.v of th'.- commission. ils 363- them, suitable for their present the people living downstream of ex
pag-; report undeniably con needs and future development.” the dam. While Gujarat’s record UJ
* the Narmada Water Dis is a shade belter than the other UJ
stitutes a landmark. (See Jio.x)
It shows that something is putes fribunal (NWDT) award two states' in respect of resettling
seriously. fundamentally wrong of 1979. which provideds for some of the ouslces — it broad
with the way v.c have planned. compensation for property lost, ened its policy in 1987-88 — it T
d: '.i'j’r d and <:' ■:< ’"cd one of the for civic amenities, house plots has violated major norms, not
most ambit''ms. gigantic and and most important, agricultural least by scattering families and
VINDICATING THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS: Medha Patkar by the Narmada
soeci.’; ti'.iih uxj.nsre projv is land of equal size for every dis villages, not buying adequate
failures arc not fundamental. information. It was told it would
tmd.irak n an\ Micie Io dam a placed family losing more than land at resettlement sites, by its to lhe project area.
Scudder found that basic in structural or inherent in the man take two to three years longer.
ri.-.r lor irrig
power and 2 ' per cent of its holdings, with failure to consult the ouslces. in
formalion on human impact was ner in which the project is de meanwhile it was nccessarv to
diin’.iiti' ..Jci. H is so S'.ri
*
us a minimum of two hectares for particular tribals.
Today the government and inadequate, that India's past re signed.
lha’
ii; i, no loor' i be ahi • to each family -- which is defined
begin construction, now that lhe
so that anv son above 18 is the Sardar Sarovar Nigam arc cord on rcscrvoir-rclatcd reloca
The Review's conclusion is Bank loan was in hand. The MEF
t'.’.lrlj the .longs.
engaged in coercing ouslces — as tion violated Bank standards, lhe exact opposite.
Sai J.ii Sru'.ir will in all treated as a separate unit.
noted that "the absence and inthe
violence
al
Manibcli.
and
the
ihal
“bureaucratic apathy”
* the World Bank's policy of
lil.ibh' ■ d i rd
up \ iolaling
Dogmatic defenders of the adequacy of data on some impor
Imman lights on a horrifsing 1980 on involuntary resettle presence of bulldozers and re towards oustccs prevailed and project have also fried to suggest tant environmental aspects still
d-. toying whole com- ment, which is meant to ensure serve police battalions, shows So that the state governments were that the problems highlighted in persists."
i umti. and the ir id monship to that displacement is minimal and much for consultation, "humane not serious about honouring the the Review pertain to rehabili
But a compromise was reac
tation alone. However, the Morse hed. T.N.Seshan (no less), then
a m.d'-' ri-.r. I>r<vts and w.itvi- the displaced "regain at least approaches” and "grievance NWDT award.
This should have sounded report contains a scathing indict environment secretary, granted
‘■Ji-.ds. disrvp'ing balances of their previous standard of liv- procedures."
•
»•
The M.P. government shows alarm bells in Washington. But ment of lhe lack of adequate conditional clearance to lhe pro
na’i.-. ' i» ’•<
'imp correciHe i ng.
* the WOrld Bank's policy of no interest in rehabilitation and the Bank diluted its own R & R environmental and health safe ject in June 1987. It noted that
medium sin ■. in place, indeed in
juring -i ''.nttiri- • "Id river •.n!!« v J°-82 on tril'.-il people which says has failed even to draw up an requirements by accepting a guards and confirms lhe worst "field surveys are not yet com
of Indian
en- plete...” but details are assured by
• il; >
it will not assist development elementary plan. The situation specious slagc-by-stage break suspicions
\nd in th process, it may not projects that knowingly involve there is so bad that “even if M.P. down of rehabilitation plans. vironmentalisis.
1989. Meanwhile, delaying work
■ . •’ . JJ i
• 1 pit portion of encroachment on traditional ter were to adopt a policy with I bis placed “approval of the pro
The chapters on the environ on the project would add to the
•' I •
i’ w m :nl to bring.
ritories being us< d oi occupied by benefits equal to Gujarat's, such ject over compliance with the ment arc a shameful story of cost; hence a Jim accomrli must
tubal people, unless adequate a policy could not be im Bank policy.”
“non-compliance” with stan be accepted. The project was
I Io. Iris ibis come about.’
plemented” In other words, it is
All this was done when the dards and norms. Unbelievable cleared on four conditions. The
’ he Sk
c -mmission s re safeeuards arc provided."
A
earliest experience, with some as that might seem, to this day, most important was that en
port
|‘)r j comprehensive
* (he credit an cement of 1985 too late.
In Maharashtra, the record of 5.0(H) SSP oustccs in 1960-61 al there has been no comprehensive vironmental measures would be
tl.'or! i< .-md-." Sardai on the with lhe World Bank which ex
ba-..i'> ol ofIi; i-Jly ■ talcd policies tends the definition ol "trustees" resettlement remains appalling, Kcvadia. was an extremely un environmental impact assess implemented /hiri passu with the
progress of construction.
and proj-. cli'ms on I he one hand. to include all those affected by despite the highly controversial pleasant one. They are yet to be ment.
Three of the four conditions
project,
not just
by allocation of Taloda forest land. rehabilitated.
and the reti-.il performance, on the
The most outrageous feature
The World Bank has sought.to of the SSP is that it has proceeded are still to be fulfilled.
the othci Ils method emphasises submergence, and which says
Subsequently, in 1Q8S the
int-.rua’ <■ m.’Mcncy. or com- that rehabilitation plan must
HE World Bank has foist upon the SSP oustccs a apace without an unambiguous
pfi.-’iv.<■ with nouns and stan ensure that the ouslces "improve
Commission
too
been no less guilty. In patchwork of measures based on and
specific environmental Planning
dards il.iivv 1 from the govern or at least regain the standard of
the first place, it failed data marked by discrepancies clearance. Its proponents have cleared the project, subject to
ments own stated policies and liv ing they were enjoying prior to
to carry out adequate and inconsistencies. It has failed managed time and again to de seven conditions. These have not
co. en >nls o' 'pccilic conun it- then displacement."
assessments of the to take into account the ex ceive both the public and re been fulfilled in their entirety.
1'1'11!-. mad>- io lhe World Bank
A the W'orld Bank operational
human impact of SSP. perience with other irrigation gulatory agencies
The project But the SSP juggernaut has rolled
> nit ol <i<dii agreements
directive of June 1990 which It failed to consult lhe projcel- projects in India and proved un failed in 1983 to receive clearance on and on. As the Morse report
there
appears
I he principal conclusion that emphasises minimisation and alTcctcd people. It refused to lake able “to turn a recognition of from the Ministry of Environ notes, "
fundamental
dif ment and Forests (MEF) because
emerges from the review is that avoidance ol displacement to the account in the 1985 credit agree persistent
to be an
institutional
Sardar Saros ar. as it stands point, eg. of reducing dam height. ment of its 1982 policy on tribal ficulties (with resettlement plans) it had not complied with even the numbness at the Bank and in
*
todas. is seriously flawed both in It also calls for "special treat people." It failed to insist on the into an effective demand Ibi most elementary of the infor India to environmental matters'
with
agreed mation requirements.
The net result is that man
respect nl ip. resettlement and ment" lor tribals and “grievance overarching criterion that ouslces compliance”
and
recommended
r-.liabihia'i-n -'R
Rj pI(). proc edmes "
Subsequently. in I9S5. the datory
must improve on or at least re measures. It has wilfulh accepted
have
been
im
* lhe Bank's operational direc gain their standard of living — vague assurances and promises as World Bank finalised credit for measures
gianimcs and
its plans to
2ii-t.dio' uc nd-.< r«.- environmen- tive on tribals of September 1991 although it had adequate powers adequate and as recently as this the project but ils principal docu plemented in a token, piecemeal
•r ’ ell.- IS.
which encodes "full respect to to do so.
year made attempts “to soften ... ments suppressed the fact that and irrational fashion; the pan
I Ir. I) ■ . •> in P & R policit-, their dignity, human rights and
I his is not all. The Bank criticism” and refrain
from SSP was refused clearance. I he passu condition has been cy nical
and pi'gramm -s have a din it cultural uniqueness”,
repeatedly failed to consider the threatening "suspension of the Bank has been complicit frorii the ly exploited for its ambiguity; and
burring on the lives of some of
All these obligations represent cfl'ccts on the people downstream loan." which, savs lhe Morse re early stages. Il demanded a de the whole purpose of providing
tailed workplan by the end of safeguards has been successfully
the poorest and most vulnerable a growing worldwide awareness of the dam and to ensure that port, was under consideration.
people living in the Narmada of lhe very
All this amounts to a scaring 1985 from the three governments dcfeaied.
special, indeed those affected by the canal would
"It is now too late to develop
valley, the project will displace unique, nature ol tribals and the be entitled
to resettlement indictment
of the
porjecl but relaxed the deadline time and
no f. .er th.") lOO.t’OO of them, vulnerability of other dam-af- benefits. Even worse, its India authorities, the concerned gov again. The workplan is still not in and implement many of the
mitigativc measures.” .Most of
living in 215 v ilkrp.es which are to fected people. They reject as un country department did ils ut ernments and the World Bank. place.
be submerged
In addition, acceptable and abhorrent the idea most in 1983 to scuttle a mission The government of India and
In 1985-86. under public the Bank's 1985 legal require
another 1-10,090 people will be that the interests and rights of a by Professor Thayer Scudder, a irrigation engineers have sought pressure, the MEF asked the pro ments for the environmental
?n '' <’ 1 ■ •'
emvd and irriga minoritv. however small, can be well- known resettlement expert. to pretend that these flaws and ject aulhories for lhe requisite clearances have not been md.
A
/%
/ A
/
A
/
A
I I TR
the elevated
at Rio —
vl’-te
no
Indian
* l"1 'osl ,*lt c,)'
j-.ufunily to preach
VALSAD
C:ST
Maharashtra gets 27% o<
cr
cr
T
r~
Benefits from Lower Narmada Projects
Annual Irrigation
(m ha.)
2 90
1.80
0 075
0.04
4.5/5
• POW ER
InstaUed Capacity
. Annual
*
Production,
’
‘
*
(10
KWh)
i.92r3,880
1.450
3,500 ■
*
.••
“
•
•-/
.
. I
«..«)•
M
/'•
••
••
•
..
ail !•
/.U.i
Drlnkinfl
Water
Yes
J. Yes ..’
. .. Yes
• * • ft •
3,370
•ii
.
/•
•
«
»•
\
________ ;_____________ _____________________ '* • "
' .....
45OMW<X irtiuiWdcapacryoCSSP.
,
.
.
•
~ >
^ •• • tl/U/lk c'al.
It HJ.'< •»«.»• /it. •
t t'| • M |
There is clearly a lesson for all
Most of the conditions attached
to the 1987 environmental of us here. A,predilection to look
clearances by the Government of for magic remedies and
technological fixes in the form of
India have not been met
mega-projects has dangerous im
HE Morse report plications which justify a
finds significant dis malevolent; negative, miscrepancies (of the anthropic.ikind of utilitarianism
order of 30 per cent) and. sanction cruelty to .the en
in the hydrological- vironment ’-and to ordinary
data and estimates of people,. particularly the . under
likely water flows on which the privileged, the weak, and those
benefits of the project were innocent of the corrupt ways of
calculated. It concludes that the official and commercial
project "will not perform as predators.
Adopting such an approach in
planned with or without the up
stream Narmada Sagar projects.” the name of “realism", “pro
What this means is that the gress", development" and rapid
promised quantity of water or “change" is not only immoral; it
power is unlikely to materialise. makes nonsense of the rationale
.These uncertainties are not of the project itself. That brings
theoretical. A technical analysis us to cost-benefit, analysis. If
estimates that, a 28 per cent error even, say, a quarter of the con
in annual run-off of water would servative estimates of. the-Morse
reduce the economic returns to report on water flows, irrigability,
zero. Similarly, since Narmada' power generation, submergence,
Sagar is not being built concur sedimentation, salinity, destruc
rently with SSP, there will be a 25 tion of forests and fisheries, are
per cent decrease in power and 30 correct, then the cost-benefit ratio
per cent fall in irrigated area as calculated by MEF guidelines
would tum wholly unattractive.
under the project.
The project would lose its
.This is not all. The authorities
have not only not bothered to economic rationale and viability
study the cumulative impact of altogether. We still do not have
*
or the
SSP with that of other associated the final figures of costs
projects, but have begun to oper precise breakdown of benefits.
But it would be
ate ill-designed schemes. Thus
the afforestation and catchment. only reasonable to suppose that
area programmes, already inade so far as irrigation is concerned,
quate, are unlikely to have even the SSP costs would be at least as
limited results because of lack of high as those of the average
major irrigation project in recent
consultation with oustces.
Equally startling, the Morse years.
To irrigate a hectare it costs
commission concludes that the
compensatory afforestation being roughly Rs 1.5 to 2 lakhs. This is
undertaken by Gujarat is such as mind-boggling. What it means is
“would lead to a steady decline in that the annualised cost in
the quality of forests." The gov interest and depreciation alone
ernment is destroying high or (of the order of Rs 20,000 to
medium value foftsts but re-.
•XL per hectare) would make
planting marginal, arid land in a agriculture completely unviable.
desert ecology.
The Narmada projects could
The Morse report concludes then be outrageously expensive
that the backwater effect of too — besides being violative of
sedimentation in the upper reac human rights and menacing to
hes of the reservoir has not been the environment. Such an evaVuaconsidered. it will be significant fion is no longer in the realm ol
ttius the follow-up to the early speculation.
T
\
work on upstream environment
has been "disappointing."
It is not an independent In
■
Destruction caused by the dian agency or commission but a
canal and water delivery system World Bank-appointed body that
is likely to be no less severe. has pduced the report But that
As if this were not bad only reinforces the case for an
enough, the probject will ag independent review by a com
gravate health problems, especial mission of Indian environmen
ly the existing threat from talists, scientists, biologists,
malaria. A report to the World anthropologists,
energy
Bank forecasts “an explosioh of economists, sociologists, and re
malaria", the creation of "death habilitation specialists and
traps" in the form of waste-filled human rights activists.
And secondly, it clinches the
dykes and "taking malaria to the
argument for immediately
doorsteps of villagers."
Gross as it is. the Bank's suspending work on the project
failure is partly explained by the Allowing anything to proceed
willingness oi its officials to pari passu is to encourage cheat
sabotage their own policies. ing and destruction.
~
7.
S ft P T? tv) /Lif«. 7
R 1X
More funds for Narmada project likely ..
The Times of India News Service
BARODA, September 6.
HE World Bank reappraisal
mission on the Sardar Sarovar
project on the Narmada river has
come to the conclusion that there
was no severe environmental con
sequences due to the delay in
completing the environment and
health-related studies. It has how
ever expressed certain reservations
about the successful implementa
tion of the rehabilitation and reset
tlement policies of the projectaffected people in the’current con
ditions.
The 14-mcmbcr mission, headed
by Mrs Pamela, was sent to India
in July this year after the indepen
dent review mission headed by Mr
Bradford Morse had severely criti
cised the project implementation
and recommended to'the World
Bank to hold up financial as
sistance till an overall review of all
its rehabilitation and environmen
tal aspects had been completed.
While the Morse Commission
had fell that proper rehabilitation
of the affected would be imposs
ible, some measure of rehabili
tation and resettlement was poss
ible.
With the board of directors of
the World Bank scheduled to take
a final decision on continuing as
sistance to the project on Septem
ber 10, the partly favourable report
of the mission could help to til t the
balance in favour of the Gujarat
and other concerned governments
in securing further World Bank aid
for the project.
The mission has so far submitted
only an interim report and oral
briefings to the World Bank and
said it was still awaiting a response
and information from some con
cerned governments before finalis
ing its report.
The mission praised the con
struction schedule and rehabili
tation and environmental protec
tion measures being taken by the
Gujarat government but was criti
cal of the rehabilitation efforts of
T
the Madhya Pradesh and Maha 22 studies before the Central gov
rashtra governments. The Morse ernment had given environmental
Commission had criticised the Ma clearance. Eleven more studies had
harashtra and M.P. governments been completed while 15 more
for not adequately implementing studies were in hand. But there
the rehabilitation and resettlement have been no severe environmental problems to- date because of
policies.
The mission said the construe-. study delays, it concluded.
The corporation had accepted
tion of the dam and power house
was proceeding on schedule and the mission’s recommendations to
the construction standards were take up as soon as possible a
high and among the best in India. detailed environmental manage
Construction, work had to be ment plan, including a synopsis of
slowed down from January, this all studies completed, planned and
year, to keep in step with the underway, and details of further;
submergence schedules till June, work needed in the estuary and on
1994, but in the worst floods since health issues.
The Gujarat government, it said,100 years many houses were af
had also accepted the findings of
fected.
’ The mission was however happy the World Bank mission of Janu
that the project authorities were. ary, 1992, on malaria ’ in and
taking necessary measures through around the construction site and
flood-warning systems and tem the risk of cerebral malaria, and
porary shelters for the flood-af was working in accordance with its
fected to mitigate the sufferings of recommendations to set up a
health planning and monitoring
the affected persons.
The mission placed on record cell in the corporation, preparing
that the slowing down process environmental health management
might cause the Sardar Sarovar plan, and Atting up of an anti
Narmada Development Corpor malaria unit at the Kevadia colony,
ation to pay financial penalties to and other areas in the command
area.
the contractors.
The mission said it was seriously
According to the mission, some
structural problems had appeared concerned about the question of
in the rock walls of the machine rehabilitation and resettlement
hall cavern of the canal head power both in the area of policy and
house, which had halted the pro implementation. Under current
gress in construction. The mission conditions and policies, successful
had advised the corporation to seek and timely rehabilitation and reset
international expertise to take re tlement is unlikely. However, with
medial measures. Except for that improvement in policies and im
snag, construction work was pro plementation capacity, the mission
gressing smoothly and the power believes that successful rehabili
house might be completed ahead of tation and resettlement was poss
schedule. In fact, the first unit may ible.
be commissioned in August, 1995.
The Cox mission pointed out
It pointed out that the disputes that issues and performances on
between Gujarat and M.P. over the rehabilitation and resettlement dif
construction of the irrigation fered among the three concerned
bypass tunnel to enable Gujarat to states but in implementation, all
use water storage capacity of the share the same common problems,
dam in case of drought however- which in its opinions were bureau
crats, too inflexible to handle the
still remained unresolved.
On the environmental andt myriads of small problems and
health issues, the mission said the expenditure demanded, insuffi
project authorities had completed cient staff, lack of basic resources,
particularly in Madhya Pradesh,
lack of procedures.to handle griev
ances, lack of reliable and easily
accessible data on families to be
affected, for proper planning and
monitoring and limited and sometimes ineffective • consultations
with the Project-Affected People i
(PAPS) and Canal-Affected Famil
ies (CAFs).
Complimenting the Gujarat gov
ernment, it commended the state
for its performance to date having
resettled about 3,700 out of the
total of about 4,700 people, besides
resettling another 1,100 PAPsfrom
Maharashtra and M.P. But it had
doubts whether the state would be
able to handle 3,000
«3S to 4,000 PAPs
each year in the next four years as
it was committed to resettle 11,500PAPs from M.P. though all these
families might not agree to be
resettled in Gujarat. It also com
plimented the voluntary organisa
tions in Gujarat for the role they
had played in co-operating with the
government in rehabilitating the
PAPs.
The M.P. performance was the
biggest drawback in the rehabili
tation policy. Significantly, it
would have 23,500 PA_Ps on its
hands. So far it had done little by
way of rehabilitation and resettle
ment. Its policy of not granting
land as compensation to the af
fected had been a sore point. A
decision had to be taken about the
compensation to be paid to those
losing less than 25 per cent of their
land holdings.
The mission informed the World
Bank that the Narmada Corpor
ation by accepting its recommen
dations on the canal had agreed to
carry out a review of its data on
land records and acquisitions, a
socio-economic study and rapid
rural appraisals to determine the
situation and needs of the CAFs in
the next few months, it would
develop its rehabilitation and com
pensation packages on the basis of
its fresh reviews.
' ^^-.THE TIMK OF INDIA, BOMBAY, SATURDAY, JULY^jj
1
Sarovar project;
TherTimes of India News/ Service .
' NEW DELHI, • /July 3: ■ The1
Sardar ; Sarovar.1 Projectn (SSP)1
should not be carried on “unless it
is in accordance with the existing
norms of human rights’’: said Mr
B/D. Sharma, chairperson of-the.
BHarat • Jan Andolan, at ;a‘ news1'
conference here on TuesdayZ;MfSharma is the former chief oft the
commission on scheduled castes’
and scheduled tribes (SC/STs) and j
an activist with the Narmada
Bachao Andolan.
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“The violations of human rights i
I
has many dimensions,’’ said Mr]
Sharma. “But the most distressing |
features are the omission of tribals i
from the 1985 World Bank (WB)?|
agreement (on SSP) and he implicit.
reasons for that studied omission.", j
The WB agreement was entered, i
“without adequate data, studies;;•
and understanding of the human; i
situation", said Mr Sharma, qout-z i
ing the recently-released indepen-j<
• dent review report of the WB. / kji
I ‘ Mr Sharma also demanded that
/
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1‘the government come out “with.;
*
Lfull facts” about rehabilitation anal;
| .resettlement (R and R) plans and/- I
I provisions for other •;-projects £•;
I undertaken in tribal areas. /V” -'
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I ’The “unequivocal conclusion" •• i
I of the review, said Mr Sharma, is/. i
I “as things stand rehabilitation fori. ]
I the bulk of the oustee families (by/J
I the SSP) is impossible’"-India lis>/,j ..
I bound by the International Laboun/j
I Organisation1'’ (1LO) convention^' I
I 107 not to “impair these (R and R)r 1
I rights on grounds of national ,sov£ ',
I ereignty or national interest"^5
I ‘ Human rights also means taking
I the permission bf the oustees to go
I ahead with a project, said . Mr,
I Sharma. He quoted the ILO conI vention 107 again: “The popuI lation concerned shall not be reI moved without free consent’,’. .The,
I 1982 manual of the WB says, “The
I bank will assist the project only, .
I when it is satisfied that the bor
rower or the relevant government
agency will effectively safeguard
the integrity and well being of tribal
people." Mr Sharma said ’ these
provisions should have stopped the'
furthefc * •
I WB from proceeding
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Mr Sharma said the “original
sin” lay the Narmada water dis| putes tribunal award. - .
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DECCAN HERALD. Tuesday, July 28. 1992
WB in a fix over
Narmada project
ccmed states.
DH News Senice
The bank has already disbursed
BHOPAL, July 27. — The World
Bank, which has landed itself in a $230 million to SSP and remaining
dilemma by conducting an inquiry 5120 million arc yet to be disbursed.
by an independent commission led However, the SSP authorities are
by Mr. Bradford Morse into Nar hopeful that the recent visit of bank
mada and Sardar Sarovar projects, • team would help them in pleading
has suggested various ways to the for further disbursement The ch
Madhya Pradesh Government to ances of Madhya Pradesh getting
improve environmental and rehabili WB assistance also depends on the
tation conditions of the dam oustces. clearance of Gujarat case. The bank
The WB is not only trying to bail will take up the MP case in March
out itself from the messy situation next year.
Meanwhile, the antidam agitabut also the two governments of
tionists have chalked out a plan to
Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat.
The WB team comprising Mr. launch stir in Vadgam and Manibcli
Oktay Yenal and Ridley Nelson .villages in Gujarat and Maharashtra
which recently visited submergence respectively. These two villages arc to
areas in MP hits reportedly told the be submerged first after the water
* at least
officials of Narmada Valley Deve level rises in the SSP. In MP
lopment Authority (NVDA) that the 80 villages apart from two towns —
oustces, whom they met, were willing Harsud and Kukshi — are to be
to settle in new places in Gujarat but submerged with the construction of
the activists of the Narmada Bachao Narmada and Sardar Sarovar Pro
Afidolan had been trying to obstruct jects.
their movement.
VESTED INTERESTS: The
team has pointed ,out that the rich [;
farmers in Narmada basin in.
Khandwa, Khargonc and Banvani1
were behind the ami-dam movement
as they did not want ouster of land
less labourers from the area The
team which has flatly refused the
demand of Environmental Defence
Fund (EDF), Asia Watch and Nar
mada Activists to stop funding Rs.
133 crore Sardar Sarovar Project
in Gujarat, has told the state gov
ernment that in an attempt to harass
the landless labourers, the rich
farmers had lowered their wages.
The team has also come to the
conclusion that the activists led by
Baba Amtc and Ms.’ Med ha Patkar
had no base in the submergence
areas. The NVDA has also geared up
its publicity machinery to counter
the anti-dam agilationists. While the
WB team which not allowed entry'
into Kukshi town, which will be
totally submerged after the con
struction of the dam, NVDA Chair
man S.C. Jain has refuted this and
siu'd there was a warm welcome to
the team in entire area The people of
Kukshi opposed to the visit of the
team on the ground that the Morse
team had already done exhaustive
survey and there was no need for the
WB to conduct another investigation.
CRITICISM: Il may be mention
ed that after the presentation of the
Morse report, there was sharp cri
ticism of the WB about the funding
of these mega projects. The bank
hurriedly announced to send another
team to verify the findings of Morse
Commission. According to anti-dam
activists, the team had been virtually
trying to whitewash the earlier find
ings and give a clean chit to con-
WbECCANHERALK’^ul,^^
aomwi ^demerit I
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orituar
NARMADA PROJECT
Centre holds talks with WB team
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(officials, who supervise all aid_ that
lhe visiting World Bank team, -the independent review commission 2
NEW DELHI,. July 2. — The. flows to India from the World Bank,» while recognising that it would be was assisted by two Canadians and;
Indian Government, worried over the said the World Bank has insistent difficult for it to actually monitor, one from' the. United ; Kingdom.'1
implications of the Morse Commis that the rehabilitation programmes •ground-level relief measures under- While one Canadian was-a lawyer
sion report indicting the Narmada would have to be “transparent” and taken by Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh specialising in relief issues, the other’
River Valley Project, has held ex information on its progress1 would and Maharashtra, has suggested me- was an engineer and the. UK.expert^
tensive consultations with a visiting have to be easily accessible to those thods by. which it would be possible ,an^thropologist.':tX7>.
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for it to. maintain Overall supervision 'f- The Morse team was given uhre-/
World Bank team.
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interested,.
; - r
Vergin also indicated that if on this front. It. was in this context ’ stricted
i all files both at.the^
_1_2_ __2access
___ j to
The team, headed by the Director theMr;
relief plans were • not - to the that the Bank has asked for' more World Bank and in India.
of the India Country Department at
of the Bank, .aid to the transparency and openness in • the • •• The Bank has completely
the Bank, Mr. Heinz Vergil?, arrived satisfaction
project ^ould definitely be, reconsi implementation- of the relief mea- with the Morse Commission’s de-«
in New Delhi last week enroute to dered.
sures. .
, .
' /.scription of the shortcomings' in thd<
New York from the Aid India Con
While the total cost of the project
The World Bank team pointed out relief measures undertaken in all the
sortium meeting at Paris.
is estimated at three billion dollars, •the reasons for the setting up of the' three States and with the' team’s
Though.official sources said there the
Bank has so far lent India Morse Commission in the first place, conclusions'about 'the shortcomings’^
were olner items on the agenda of 450 World
about 15 per cent of the and said the former Bank President in the preparation and appraisal of
the visiting team, it appears that the total million,
cost.
. ’ ’ Barber Conable had commissioned it the project’s relief aspects. ••' c'
Morse Commission report came in
Of the’ 450 million, 250 million in June 1991 following growing
crowing pu
du- ./. The Bank also agreed that-thoj.
for extensive discussion.
been disbursed. A sum of 200 blic controversy over the project. •' work should have been done earlier^
The Morse Commission set up by has
In fact, the setting up of. an, on the issue of people affected by. the7
tbiuWorld Bank last year to review million dollars remains to be dis
t{jB Sardar Sarovar Project has bursed, but nearly all of the credit independent commission of this sort canal in Gujarat' "
identified a number of deficiencies in for the canal has already been drawn was unprecedented in the history of ; DISAGREES:' But, where/.the 1
\ ’
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• the Bank, and the reason for it . World Bank’ disagrees with? the
the Bank’s appraisal of the project, in down.
the Bank has announced according to the' Bank, was its '*
~
‘ report is on the/
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Morse Commission
India’s implementation and in the thatThougn
the Morse report would not • “commitment
‘.to
public latter’s stand that even if Maharash^j
Bank’s supervision work. The team’s
come in the way of the aid to the accountability.”
’
tra and Madhya Pradesh adopted-a ■»
report was made public last week.
the report is far from being
'IMPARTIAL: Through the Mor liberal resettlement package .for those
While making it clear that the project,
Commission, the World- Bank displaced by the project, it would c
World Bank would not curb its aid to dismissed. According to Mr. Vcrgin, se
the facts brought out in the report wanted to obtain an impartial asses virtually be impossible, for a satisfac
the Narmada Project, Mr. Vergin are
acceptable to the Bank.
sment of the implementation of the tory resettlement
»
told Indian officials that further aid
PESSIMISTIC: But, the conclu1 resettlement, rehabilitation and envi
According to tyfr- Vergin, . the J
would accrue to India only after a sions
drawn from the facts have not ronmental aspects of the Narmada Bank is optimistic that before the^
thorough review of the resettlement been accepted
the World Bank as Project..'
project ends in 1996-97, there is timev? A
and relief programmes for those who in its view they by
Headed >'by Bradford Morse, enough to modify and improve the
are “pessimistic,” and
would be displaced.
do not give scope for improvement, former administrator of the United relief packages in consultation, wi *
TRANSPARENT: The senior .especially jn the rehabilitation sector. Nations Development Programme, the affected, people.
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THE ECONOMIC TIMES
BANGALORE MONDAY 6 JULY 1992
POINT: The failure to consult the
people has resulted in opposition to
the Sardar Sarovar projects on the
part of potentially affected people,
supported by activists. This opposi
tion has created great obstacles to
successful implementation.
Counterpoint: This is not correct
The activists are mainly those who
do not belong to the area and are not
affected by submergence due to the
project.
*
T was bound to stir a hornet's
nesL When an independent re. view mission delved into the
status of the Sardar Sarovar pro
jects in the Narmada Valley and se
verely indicted both the Indian gov
ernment and the World Bank for
fundamental failures in its imple
mentation, it only vindicated what
environmentalists had been saying
for long: that both the government
and the Bank (which is funding the
project to the tune of around S 400
million out of the total anticipated
cost of $ 11-odd billion) have been
negligent in carrying out an ade
quate study on the human impact of
the projects. At least one lakh peo
ple live in the area which could be
submerged by the damming of the
Narmada.
The Morse Commission headed
by-a former UNDP administrator,
Bradford Morse, has thus put the
ball fairly and squarely in the gov
ernment's court. The World Bank
says it will not stop funding the pro
ject but is unlikely to increase the
degree of its financial participation.
It also says that it is up to the Indian
government now to decide how to
proceed.
The government of Madhya Pra
desh has prepared a point-by-point
rebuttal of the Morse Commission's
report. While the comments are of
the Madhya Pradesh government,
which pertain to the resettlement
and rehabilitation (R&R) measures
it has taken, in parts it mentions the
efforts of the government of Guja
rat as well. Here's a sample of the
Commission's comment:
Accusation: "Bank policy has not
oeen respected. The projects were
not appraised in accordance with
Bank requirements. Basic informa
tion had not been gathered and ade
quate plans for resettlement and re
habilitation were not in place.”
Defence: "It is incorrect. We are
accepting the Bank’s policy as
agreemented."
The Bank, it appears, is most
vexed over the issue of oustees.
Rightfully so. The project will disnlace no fewer than c lakh of peo
ple, living in 245 villages which
will be submerged. Moreover, an-
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a
in
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The river and the damned
I
The independent review report says the project is highly flawed. Now the MP government counters charges.
other 1.4 lakh people will be affect
ed by the canal and irrigation sys
tems, among the largest in the
world.
Says the Commission on page 19
of its 363 page report: “.—.it is im
portant, we think, not to leave the
matter there. The fact is that in Ma
dhya Pradesh virtually no steps
have been taken towards resettle
ment and rehabilitation (R&R).
“Even if Madhya Pradesh were
to alter its policies, would it be rea
sonable to expect that Madhya Pra
desh could implement a policy con
ily losing more than 25 per cent of
its holdings, with a minimum of
two hectares for each family. This
is defined so that any son above 18
is treated separately.
But to this indictment by the
Commission on the issue of ous
tees, the MP government takes a
rather belligerent stand. Says the
government in its counter to this
charge: "We are very clear in our
policy. Our policy is based upon the
Tribunal award and Bank agree
ment so there is no question of
changing the policy except by a con
the targets fully or they are margin
ally less. In some activities we are
ahead. This we have done by con
stant persuasion despite obstruc
tion by the activists."
That is just one face of the argu
ment as it pertains to landed ous
tees. What of the encroachers, of
whom there must be several thou
sand?
According to the Commission,
the states of Madhya Pradesh and
Maharashtra say that encroachers
must be treated as landless oustees
with no entitlement to adequate
But the significant points that
the Commission raises relates to
encroachers and how they should
be resettled. Sample this:
Point “....in Gujarat and Maha
rashtra almost all are tribals. A
great many of them are en
croachers, that is, they have no for
mal title to their land. There are
thousands of tribal people in the
submergence area of Madhya Pra
desh as well, many of whom are
encroachers...”
Counter: The number of encroacher families is estimated to be
not more than 306 out of a total of
23,250. Final figures can be given
by July-end. According to our defi
nition, encroachers are those in un
authorised occupation of govem-
Bank policy has
not been
respected. The
projects were not
appraised in
accordance with
Bank
ii
requirements.
forming to the Tribunal award and
Bank agreements, if it were pre
pared to adopt one, within the time
remaining
before
inundation?
Could the implementation of R&R
be done in time? We have reluc
tantly concluded that the answer
must be ‘no’."
The Tribunal award the report
refers to is the Narmada Water Dis
putes Tribunal (NWDT) award of
1979, which provides for compen
sation for property lost, for civic
amenities, house plots and most im
portantly, agricultural land of
equal size for every displaced fam-
scious decision by the government
of Madhya Pradesh. We have al
ready prepared an action plan of
R&R and submitted it to the World
Bank.
"The World Bank recently in its
report dated February 22, '92 ex
pressed its satisfaction with it and
implementation of the plan in gen
eral. A copy of this plan was also
given to the Commission pertaining
to the resettlement programme for
1991-92, with the targets and
achievements shown.
"This shows that in most of the
activities we have either achieved
land for cultivation on resettle
ment. The dispute here is whether
tribal people, holding their land by
customary usage, are entitled to be
treated as landed oustees. MP and
Maharashtra say they are not. that
they are illegal occupiers.
But MP has a different story’ to,
tell. In its counter, though it reiter
ates that encroachers and legal
land owners are different, it is giv
ing land to encroachers also from
one to two hectares as per the size
of the encroachment and treating
them as land owners for the pur
poses of resettleihent only.
ment land before April 13, 1987.
The Commission seems to have tak
en the number as of date.
Point: India and the three states,
Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh, take the position that un
der the Tribunal award, land for
land was only intended for the ben
efit of land owners holding a formal
title, i.e. having what is known in
India as revenue land. They say
that the Tribunal did not intend
tribal
people
cultivating
en
croached land in the forest, to
which they have no formal title,
should receive any land on reset
tlement.
Counter In forests also there are
two types of agriculturists: (a) Patta
holders and (b) encroachers. For
(a) we are treating them as landed
and giving all benefits which
available in revenue lands. For (b)
we are giving lands from one to
three hectares depending on the
size of the encroachment.
The other issue which the Com
mission has dwelt on at length is
that of resettlement. It says that
Maharashtra, which may have as
many as 3,000 families and Ma
dhya Pradesh with as many as
23,000 families to be resettled, are
prepared to offer two hectares of
land to landed oustees. But they are
not willing to provide two hectares
for major sons, says the report. Nei
ther Madhya Pradesh nor Maha
rashtra acknowledge the rights of
encroachers to adequate land on re
settlement.
O that the the MP government's
counter is that in the case of en
croachers there is no provision to
provide land to them but for the
"maintenance of their standard of
living in MP, we are providing land
of one to two hectares depending
on the size of their encroachment".
In another section of the Com,
mission's report, it has come out
more strongly when it refers to the
resettlement of tribals in Madhya
Pradesh and Maharashtra.
The Commission states that in
its view that the two states "in fail
ing to provide adequate land on re
settlement for rehabilitation of en
croachers, have not complied with
the Bank credit and loan agree
ments”.
But the MP government refutes__
this, saying that in MP, 74 per cent
of tribals are land owning, while
encroachers form a minuscule fig|
ure of 4 per cent while the landless
in MP are only 22 per cent.
An issue that the Commission
has referred to is related to major
sons (above 18 years). It says that
the policies of the riparian states
have failed to anticipate the needs
of major sons and adopted “what
we regard as an unduly restrictive
interpretation...."
. But the MP government is quite
clear on that point. In reply to this
charge it says, “Any major son of
landed oustees will be treated as a
separate family and be given agri
cultural land only if has a legal re
corded title over land. If he is a co
sharer he will also get the benefit."
The Commission has recom
mended the government immedi
ately suspend work on the dam till
issues related to resettlement are
sorted out. But the MP government
'
has fired the first salvo against the
Commission’s findings. This could
only be the beginning for further
tussles.
/
T
■ Vinav Kamath
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8 - 'THE TIMES OF INDIA, BOMBAYpTUESDAY, AUGUST 4,1992. ,
A
Ji\oreviewor
IN armada proj ect
',W rS
NEW DELHI, August 3 (PTI).'
HE government does not
propose to review the Sardar
Sarovar Project on the Narmada in
view of the findings of the Morse
commission report, the Lok Sabha
was informed today.
The water resources minister,
Mr Vidya Charan Shukla, told Mr
Rabi Ray and seven others in a
written reply that the Narmada
control authority is required to
ensure implementation of en
vironmental safeguards pari passu
with the construction of the Sardar
Sarovar Project
In the report, the Morse review
team has commented bn the issues.
associated. with the - resettlement
and rehabilitation of the persons L
affected by the project and on some .
of thejnadequacies in the studies
associated with the environmental ■'
issues, including backwater effectsJ*
T
, AUGUST 26, 1992, THE TIMES OF INDIA, BOMBAY
Narmada oustees
can appeal
BHOPAL, August 25 (PTI): The
Madhya Pradesh government has
further liberalised its rehabilitation
policy to benefit families affected
by submergence due to the
Narmada projects.
As per the new provisions in
corporated under this policy, an
oustee can go in appeal against the
decision of the rehabilitation of
ficer, according to the state minis
ter for water resources, Mr Sheetla
Sahay.
The oustee can appeal to the
district collector, who will take a
final decision within three months,
an official release said.
The appehl can be filed by’the
affected family in respect of de
marcation of the area, identifi
cation of displaced persons, publi
cation of their lists, facilities in new
places and all other decisions taken
by the rehabilitation officer in re
spect of other procedures, the re>,
lease said.
//
7
E2- 5<S
AUGUST 8, 1992. THE TIMES OF INDIA. BOMBAY
9
Morse report on
dam assailed
I
The Times of India News Service
BHOPAL, August 7.
HE Morse report on the Sardar
Sarovar Project (SSP) is full of
factual errors, according to the
Madhya Pradesh minister for water
resources, Mr Shcclala Sahay.
He told the TOINS here on
Wednesday that the independent
review commission’s (IRC) ap
prehension that at least 60 per cent
of the tribal oustccs engaged in
cultivation in Madhya Pradesh
would not receive adequate land
for resettlement was unfounded.
“In fact. 76 per cent of the tribal
population in the affected areas is
recorded as cultivators in land
records and all of them will get
compensation, including land due
to a landed oustce,” he added.
Mr Sahay said all 306 tribal
encroachcrs (prior to April 13,
1987) were entitled to resettlement
benefits. There was no basis for the
commission’s claim that there were
no records of encroachments as
land records were updated every
year.
He said the commission had
come out with sweeping state
ments. such as observing that vir
tually no steps had been taken in
Madhya Pradesh for resettlement
and rehabilitation. He pointed out
that submergence of villages would
only begin in 1994. Plans had been
prepared and it did not make sense
to uproot people years in advance,
he added.
Mr Sahay described as totally
incorrect the commission’s com
ment that the people had not been
consulted, resulting in opposition
to the projects. All members
elected to the assembly from the
affected areas had supported the
project. On the other hand, ac
tivists opposing the dam were
mainly those who did not belong to
these areas, he observed.
He said another point of criti
cism raised by the commission
related to the rights of adult sons in
the rehabilitation policy adopted
by the Madhya Pradesh govern
ment. “The IRC wants us to follow
the Gujarat pattern wherein all
major sons are entitled to two
hectares of irrigated land. But in
our policy, a major son will be
treated as a landless labourer if he
is not recorded as a co-sharer in the
records. This is a rational decision
because it makes room for the fact
that a major son may not be
dependent on agriculture. Besides,
there is no bar on anyone being
recorded as co-sharer in the land
even now,’’ he added.
Mr Sahay said the state could
not follow Gujarat’s policy in tolo
because there were several other
projects in the state where rehabili
tation issues had to be settled.
Referring to the environmental
concerns voiced by the com
mission, |Mr Sahay said these had
come up recently and were not
discussed when the project was
formulated in the sixties. Studies
on the environmental impact re
lated to flora, fauna, monuments of
archaeological importance and
other aspects were underway and
would be completed by June 1993,
he added.
o'
As the Morse report shows, the Narmada project authorities are not merely uprooting tribals, brutalising
peasants and offending human rights. Backed by the World Bank, they are breaking every rule in their own
book, playing havoc with the environment, creating a situation whereby the dam becomes an example of
unsustainable, undesirable development.
After the elevated rhetoric at Rio - where no
Indian leader lost the opportunity to preach sus
tainable development to the rest of the world the abysmal reality at home - at Kevadia and
Gadkoi in Gujarat, Parveta and Manibeli in
Maharashtra, Harsud and Morkhala in Madhya
Pradesh. The reality can no longer be denied.
Sardar Sarovar, said to be the world’s biggest
irrigation project, could also turn out to be its
biggest human, environmental and economic
dam disaster.
Going by the experience of villages where peo
ple have been uprooted like weeds, by the pathe
tic state of hydrological and watershed planning,
by repeated breaches of norms set by the project
authorities themselves, by numerous flaws in
‘ their environmental assumptions, and by the
World Bank’s complicity in their actions, that
conclusion seems difficult to resist
This is not the view of the Narmada Bachao
Andolan and its fiery activists but the implica
tion of the findings of an independent review
which submitted its report ten days ago to the
World Bank. Whatever one’s view of the com
mission, its 363-page report undeniably consti
tutes a landmark, (see box)
It shows that something is seriously, fun
damentally wrong with the way we have plan
ned, designed and executed one of the most
ambitious, gigantic and spectacularly expensive
projects undertaken anywhere to dam a river for
irrigation, pow’er and drinking water. It is so se
rious that we may no longer be able to rectify the
wrongs.
Sardar Sarovar will in all likelihood end up
violating human rights on a horrifying scale, des
troying w’hole communities and their rela
tionship to a majorriver, forestsand watersheds,
disrupting balances of nature without setting
corrective mechanisms in place, indeed injuring
a centuries-old river valley civilisation.
And in the process, it may not even yield a
good proportion of the benefits it is meant to
bring to Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan. There is every reason to
believe that each one of the basic premises about
costs and benefits on which Sardar Sarovar has
been planned, funded and sold to the public is
unduly optimistic or simply wrong.
How has this come about?
The Morse Commission’s report is the first
comprehensive effort to analyse Sardar on the
basis of officially stated policies and projections,
on the one hand, and the actual performance, on
the other. Its method emphasises internal con
sistency, or compliance with norms and stan
dards derived from the government’s own stated
policies and covenants or specific commitments
made to the World Bank as part of credit agree
ments.
.
The principal conclusions that emerge from
the review is that Sardar Sarovar, as it stands
today, is seriously flawed both in respect of its
Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R andR) prog
rammes and its plans to ameliorate adverse en
vironmental effects.
The flaws in R and R policies and programmes
have a direct bearing on the lives of some of the
poorest and most vulnerable people living in the
Narmada valley. The project will displace no
fewer than 100,000 of them, living in 245 vil
lages which are to be submerged. In addition,
another 140,000 people will be affected by the
canal and irrigation system - said to be the
largest in the world. This excludes thousands
more living downstream of the dam whose lives
are also liable to be significantly affected.
This represents a huge social cost which both
the central and the governments of the three im
mediately concerned states, Gujarat, Maharash
tra and Madhya Pradesh, and the World Bank,
are duty-bound to offset through a comprehen
sive R and R programme.
This obligation derives from a 1957 Covenant
Praful Bidwai on the
implications of the review of the
Sardar Sarovar Project
SUMMARY OF PROGRESS
REHABILITATION & RESETTLEMENT (UP TO JAN. '92)
Item
Unit
1. Total No. of PAPs
DETAILS OF SUBMERGENCE OF SSP
State
Land area submerged
Villages (nos.)
8
(in Hectares)
submerged
|
fully
5
Aqriw
culture
Forest
River
Total
land
bed/
land
land
partly
3. Allotment of
waste
Residential plots
Achievement
Guj.
Mah.
M.P.
Total
4500
2462
23180
30142
2306
228
232
2766
No. of
PAPs
land
*.-.••■A .•.••••-•.•.•. . ..-.• .‘. v. • •. .V. ••.•.
*.■•••. ..Gujarat
Madhya Pradesh
Total
illil
•J • ‘1877
_ •«••• * - •
•
•••
• • • • • • • • • • • •• •
7883
2737
10208
•• ••••••••■
• • • 1519
. • • • • •• •• •« •• •
3459
If# 6570
11279
10719
12869
20828
34867
......
193
36
3
245
k.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
What’s so special about tribals, anyway?
Of the 199,500 people esti
mated by the Morse commission
to be affected by the Sardar Saro
var projects, 56 per cent or
117,000 are tribals or adivasis.
These are mostly Bhils, a four
million-strong community w’hich
lives in all three, riparian states of
the Narmada and extends into Ra
jasthan as well. The Bhils are di
vided into linguistic and ethnic
sub-groups such as the Tadvi,
Vasava, Ratthwa, Paura, Bhilala,
and Nayak and have a distinct cul
ture of their own.
A characteristic of tribal
societies is their connection with
land and forests in their religion,
economy and day-to-day activity.
.Anthropologists are now virtually
unanimous that Indian tribals are
not backward Hindus but ethni
cally different people.
Indeed, the tribals themselves
argue that they are the original in
habitants of India. As Indian civi
lisation advanced, the tribal
homelands shrank. This ancient
process of deprivation is one of the
subterranean mainstreams of In
dian history. This long history of
exploitation forms the backdrop
to the constitutional provision on
reservations. There is a strong
case in terms of human rights and
democratic pluralism for preserv
ing the specific identity of tribals
and retaining for them the option
to choose how’ to live. Tribals
usually live in geographically
relatively-isolated areas, are unacculturated into the norms of the
dominant society, and operate
fairly
stable,
low-energy,
sustained-yield economic sys
tems.
These systems are often
poorly monetised but based on
production largely for subsist
ence. Most tribals have loose te
nure over traditional lands, which
is rarely recognised by formal legal
systems.
. •
From the point of view of cultu
ral pluralism, the unique charac
teristics of tribals are intrinsically
worth preserving and defending.
Independent India has tended to
do just the opposite. Mainstream
society has encroached into and
colonised tribal spaces and in the
name of development, under
mined their integrity.
Tribals are particularly vulner
able where irrigation and mining
projects are concerned. Those
watersheds and mountain ranges
are precisely where the bulk of
them live.
-P.B.
... ..... . .
t •• wwi
bilitated.
The World Bank has sought to foist upon the
SSP oustees a patchwork of measures based on
data marked by discrepancies and inconsisten
cies. It has failed to take into account the experi
ence with other irrigation projects in India and
proved unable to turn a recognition of persistent
fundamental difficulties (with resettlement
plans) into an effective demand for compliance
with agreed methods. It has wilfully accepted
vague assurances and promises as adequate and
as recently as this year made attempts to soften...
criticism and refrain from threatening suspen
sion of the loan, which, says the Morse report,
was under consideration.
All this amounts to a searing indictment of the
project authorities, the concerned governments
and the World Bank. The government of India
and irrigation engineers have sought to pretend
that these flaws and failures are not fun
damental , structural or inherent in the manner in
which the project is designed.
This is not all.
..
The authorities have not only not bothered to
study the cumulative impact of SSP with that ot
other associated projects, but have begun to
operate ill-designed schemes. Thus the
afforestation and catchment area programmes,
already inadequate, are unlikely to have even li
mited results because of lack ofconsultation with
oustees.
Equally startling, the Morse Commission con
cludes that the compensatory afforestation being
undertaken by Gujarat is such as would lead to a
steady decline in tne quality of forests. The gov
ernment is destroying high or medium value
forests but replanting marginal, arid land in a
desert ecology. This is at best irrational, at worst,
a prescription for disaster.
Anyway, the achievements in afforestation
have been of the order of 20 per cent in M.P. and
35 per cent in Gujarat. Maharashtra is worse:
there is no target And the Taloda forest remains
mired in serious problems.
Catchment area treatment remains a joke.
It has been interpreted to mean less and less,
the latest figures being only 6 per cent of the high
priority direct draining portion to be treated be
fore reservoir filling starts. There are disputes
about definitions and Maharashtra still has to
submit maps and drawings.
The Morse report concludes that the backwa
The review^s conclusion is the exact opposite.
Dogmatic defenders of the project have also ter effect ofsedimentation in the upper reaches of
tried to suggest that the problems highlighted in the reservoir has not been considered. It will be
the review pertain to rehabilitation alone. significant Thus the follow-up to the early work
However, the Morse report contains a scathing on upstream environment has been disappoint
indictment of the lack of adequate environmen ing.
The downstream story is even more worri
tal and health safeguards and confirms the worst
suspicions of Indian environmentalists.
some. These ecological implications have not
The chapters on the environment are a shame been considered, but will be significant - greater
ful story of non-compliance with standards and siltation, salinity, decreased water quality grea
norms. Unbelievable as that might seem, to this ter pollution and severe damage to, if not the eli
day, there has been no comprehensive environ mination of, the last important hilsa fishery in
mental impact assessment Even the nature of western India.
Destruction caused by the canal and water de
the environmental problems involved remains
obscure and basic information is lacking. The livery’ system is likely to be no less severe. Plans
typical solutions are irrational, inadequate and for its amelioration arebased on suspect assump
tions. Serious problems with waterlogging and
piecemeal - in one word, counterproductive.
The most outrageous feature of the SSP is that salinity in most of the 13 zones of the concerned
it has proceeded apace without an unambiguous area are unlikely to be effectively tackled
and specific environmental clearance. Its propo
As if this were not bad enough the nrni pet win
nents have managed time and again to deceive aggravate health problems,
both the public and regulatory agencies. The ■sting threat from malana. A report to the World
project failed in 1983 to receive clearance from Bank forecasts an explosion of malaria, the crea
the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF) Uon of death traps in the form of waste-filled
because it had not complied with even the most dykes and takmg malana to the doorstep of
elementary' of the information requirements.
villagers. This is m direct contraventinn /r
■ e
Subsequently, in 1985, the World Bank final commitment to minimise the ri^kAf
arla’
ised credit for the project but its principal docu filaria and other water-borne disease a
leases as per who
ments suppressed the fact that SSP was refused guidelines.
Remedial measures havp nnt
>
clearance. The bank has been complicit from the
early stages. It demanded a detailed workplan by althoughpeoplehavedied.(Yettheb^ssS
the end of 1985 from the three governments but reportssimp vsavtat the preventive measures
relaxed the deadline time and again. The work required by the formal agreement sevenv^S
ago are not yet due.)
plan is still not in place.
Faced with the growing awareness of their
In 1985-86, under public pressure, the MEF
asked the project authorities tor the requisite in comprehensive failure, the Narmada Control
formation. It was told it would take tw’o to three Authority and the government have now floated
years longer. Meanwhile it was necessary' to be yet another project, the Narmada Basic Develop
gin construction, now that the bank loan was in ment Project, which is meant - so to speak - to
hand. The MEF noted that the absence and in clean up after SSP. The Morse report finds that it
adequacy of data on some important environ too fails to address key issue ... adopts a
mental aspects still persists.
piecemeal approach, falling far short of the work
But a compromise was reached. T.N. Seshan that the bank’s missions have said is needed
(no less), then environment secretary’, granted the bank is considering it sympathetically.
Gross as it is, the bank’s failure is partly ex
conditional clearance to the project in June
1987. It noted that field surveys are not yet com plained by the willingness of its officials to sabot
plete ... but details are assured by 1989. Mean age their own policies. There developed an eager
while, delaying work on the project would add to ness on the part of the bank and India to get on
the cost hence a fait accompli must be accepted. with the job. Both, it seems, were prepared to
The project was cleared on four conditions. The ease, or even disregard, bank policy and India’s
most important was that environmental mea regulations and procedures.
There is clearly a lesson for all of us here. A
sures would be implemented pari passu with the
l predilection to look for magic remedies and techprogress of construction.
: Three of the four conditions are still to be fill-. J nological fixes in the form of mega-projects has
U°nshir» ♦ ’
COmT
3
—> ---
disrupt?n° a n'^ior Unities and their relaCorWi^8 ba^ic5Ver- forests and watersheds,
a centJri
mof nature
s?lt?lg
Wies'0|d
in
indeed mjunng
good . 1,1 »he p^ vaUey civilisation.
benefit ?ne°^ the basic premises about
Planned S?1 which Sardar Sarovar has
^duly optimkr ded
501(1 016 pubhc 1S
How has this r Or simPly wron^The Morse c2°me about?
^niprehensivp
report 151116 5181
basis of official! v ^orl t° analyse
on 1116
on the one hand Stated P°Ucies
P™^0115’
the other Its and dle aclual Performance, on
sistencv om meUJod emphasises internal condards derived Trance with norms and stanPolicies and from the government’s own stated
made to the
or specific com™tments
mentis
World Bank as part of credit agree-
l^n
thpT^^Pril^cipal conclusions that emerge from
tod ?ev!ew that Sardar Sarovar, as it stands
Rp«phi1S seriously flawed both in respect of its
ram ^ernent and Rehabilitation (R and R) prog,^Z7rnes and its plans to ameliorate adverse en
vironmental effects.
h The flaws in R and R policies and programmes
nave a direct bearing on the lives of some of the
poorest and most vulnerable people living in the
Narmada valley. The project will displace no
fewer than 100,000 of them, living in 245 vil
lages which are to be submerged. In addition,
another 140,000 people will be affected by the
canal and irrigation system - said to be the
largest in the world. This excludes thousands
more living downstream of the dam whose lives
are also liable to be significantly affected.
This represents a huge social cost which both
the central and the governments of the three im
mediately concerned states, Gujarat, Maharash
tra and Madhya Pradesh, and the World Bank,
are duty-bound to offset through a comprehen
sive R and R progranune.
This obligation derives from a 1957 Covenant
(Number 1G7) ofthe International Labour Orga
nisation, which India ratified in 1958. Thiscom
mits the government not to remove indigenous
and tribal people from their habitual territories,
exceptby providing them with lands ofquality at
least equal to that of the lands previously
*occu
piedby them, suitable fortheir presentneeds and
future development. The Narmada Water Dis
putes Tribunal (NWDT) award of 1979, which
provided for compensation for property lost, for
civic amenities, house plots and most important,
agricultural land ofequal size for every displaced
family losing more than 25 per cent of its hold
ings,with a minimum of2 hectares for each fami
ly -.which is defined so that any son above 18 is
treated as a separate unit.
TheWorld Bank’s policy of 1980 on involun
tary resettlement, which is meant to ensure that
displacement is minimal and the displaced re
gain at least their previous standard of living. It
also stipulates that compensation must go
beyond fair marketvalues because the true worth
of assets may exceed those.
i
I
The World Bank’s policy of 1982 on tribal
people which says it will not assist development
projects that knowingly involve encroachment
on traditional territories being used or occupied
by tribal people, unless adequate safeguards are
provided. The statement also emphasises tribal
Pupation in decisions affecting tiiem and detaned, contemporary knowledge of the peoples
to ^ affected. The credit agreement of 1985 with
the World Bank which extends the definition of
oustee to indude aB those affected by the prorot just by submergence, and which says
^^iHtationXnmustensurethatfteoustew improve or at fest regain the standard of
±8
to their displace-
theaffected states and be'
IWO whichr ^imisation and avoiof reducjng dam hewhUui 101?
cnecial treatment
do not suffer a£-^tbatina^
these
“Present a growing
worldwide a
unique, natu
What’s so special about tribals, anyway
suspicions of Indian environmentalists.--------- "SOTTO, uiese lW16acal irilpu'-fi ant-1 E1"1
"r‘Xality,
The chapters on the environment are a shame been considered, but uiU be
ful story of non-compliance with standards and sdtation, salinity, decreased wat^^notthe elinorms. Unbelievable as that might seem, to this ter pollution and severe damage w. fishery m
ing the specific identity of tribals
day, there has been no comprehensive environ mmation of, the last important
ral pluralism, the unique charac
Of the 199,500 people esti economy and day-to-day activity.
.Anthropologists are now virtually and retaining for them the option
oiandwaterdemental impact assessment Even the nature of western India.
teristics of tribals are intrinsically
mated by the Morse commission
to choose how to live. Tribals
Destniction caused by the canal ai
p]ans
unanimous
that
Indian
tribals
are
the
environmental
problems
involved
remains
worth
preserving
and
defending.
to be affected by the Sardar Saro
not backward Hindus but ethni usually live in geographically
obscure and basic information is lacking. The livery system is likely to be no ‘^.^tassumP:
Independent India has tended to
var projects, 56 per cent or
relatively-isolated areas, are uncally different people.
typical solutions are irrational, inadequate and for its amelioration arebased on suspj^.g and
do just the opposite. Mainstream
117,000 are tribals or adivasis.
acculturated
into
the
norms
of
the
tions. Serious problems with wa/^e^£lrned
piecemeal - in one word, counterproductive.
society has encroached into and
Indeed, the tribals themselves
These are mostly Bhils, a four
The most outrageous feature ofthe SSP is that salinity m mostof the 13 zones ot tnew
colonised tribal spaces and in the
argue that they are the original in dominant society, and operate
million-strong community which
fairly
stable,
low-energy,
it has proceeded apace without an unambiguous area are unlikely to be effectively “f~oiect will
name of development, under
habitants
of
India
As
Indian
civi
lives in all three riparian states of
sustained-yield economic sys
and specific environmental clearance. Its propo
mined their integrity.
the Narmada and extends into Ra lisation advanced, the tribal
nents have managed time and again to deceive
jasthan as well. The Bhils are di homelands shrank. This ancient tems.
Tribals are particularly vulner
These systems are often
both the public and regulatory agencies. The
process of deprivation is one of the
vided into linguistic and ethnic
able where irrigation and mining
project failed in 1983 to receive clearance from
sub-groups such as the Tadvi,
subterranean mainstreams of In poorly monetised but based on
projects are concerned. Those
the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF)
Vasava, Ratthwa, Paura, Bhilala.
dian history. This long history of production largely for subsist
watersheds and mountain ranges
because it had not complied with even the most
and Nayak and have a distinct cul exploitation forms the backdrop ence. Most tribals have loose te
villagers. This is in direct cont^entjo , are precisely where the bulk of
elementary of the information requirements.
to the constitutional provision on nure over traditional lands, which
ture of their own.
’
them live.
Subsequently, in 1985, the World Bank final commitment to minimise the risk of
A characteristic of tribal
reservations. There is a strong is rarely recognised by formal legal
ised credit for the project but its principal docu filaria and other water-borne diseases as 4
• '
societies is their connection with
case in terms of human rights and systems.
.
ments suppressed the fact that SSP was refused guidelines.
From the point of view of cultu-P.B.
land and forests in their religion.
democratic pluralism for preservRemedial measures have not been take
clearance. The bank has been complicit from the
early stages. It demanded a detailed workplan by althoughpeoplehavedied. (Vetthebank sstaui
the end of 1985 from the three governments but reports simply say that the preventive measur^
relaxed the deadline time and again. The work required by the formal agreement seven years
ago are not yet due.)
r
.
plan is still not in place.
Faced with the growing awareness of their
In 1985-86, under public pressure, the MEF
asked the project authorities for the requisite in comprehensive failure, the Narmada Control
formation. It was told it would take two to three Authority and the government have now floated
yet anotherproject, the Nannada Basic Developyears
longer.
Meanwhile
it
was
necessary
to
be
*‘$2’$^*
gin construction, now that the bank loan was in ment Project, which is meant - so to speak - to
hand. The MEF noted that the absence and in clean up after SSP. The Morse report finds that it
adequacy of data on some important environ too fails to address key issue ... adopts a
piecemeal approach, falling far short of the work
mental aspects still persists.
But a compromise was reached. T.N. Seshan that the bank’s missions have said is needed ...
(no less), then environment secretary; granted the bank is considering it sympathetically.
Gross as it is, the bank’s failure is partly ex
conditional clearance to the project in June
plained by the willingness of its officials to sabot
1987.
It
noted
that
field
surveys
are
not
yet
com
*3?*
plete ... but details are assured by 1989. Mean age their own policies. There d eveloped an eager
while, delaying work on the project would add to ness on the part of the bank and India to get on
the cost hence a fait accompli must be accepted. with the job. Both, it seems, were prepared to
The project was cleared on four conditions. The ease, or even disregard, bank policy and India’s
most important was that environmental mea regulations and procedures.
There is clearly a lesson for all of us here. A
sures would be implemented paripassu with the
a'-S’***predilection to look for magic remedies and tech
progress of construction.
/ Three of the four conditions are still to be ful nological fixes in the form of mega-projects has
dangerous implications which justify a malevo
filled.
HOW INDEPENDENT IS THE MORSE COMMISSION?
Subsequently, in 1988 the planning commis lent, negative, misanthropic kmd of utilitarian
sion too cleared the project, subject to seven con ism and sanction cruelty to the environment and
Is the Morse Commission really resettlement and rehabilitation and executors, however, the tion that it steps back from Sardar
ditions. These have notbeen fulfilled in their en i to ordinary people, particularly the underpriindependent? Could it be so when issues.
Morse Commission is biased, pro Sarovar till thorough-going cor
tirety. But the SSP juggernaut has rolled on and \ vileged, the weak, and those innocent ot the corit was appointed by the World
According to the commission, environmentalist and unsym rective measures are taken.
I nipt ways of official and commercial predators.
on.
Bank?
.“We made it quite clear wherever pathetic to the project. ChimanAs the Morse report notes, the SSP’s fun ' Adopting such an approach in the name of
The commission says that it we went that we would conduct a bhai Patel has condemned the re
The Nannada Bachao Andolan
damental compliance problems ...go beyond a realism^ progress, development and rapid
was wholly free to work as it chose truly independent review, that port. Yogendra Alagh, an eco has not commented on the inde
failure to address a check-list of environmental change is npt only immoral, it makes nonsense of
within its terms ofreference, them though our terms of reference are nomist and staunch ideologue of pendence or otherwise of the re
requirements. There appears to be an institu I the rationale of the project itself.
selves broad, and a budget, itself quite properly set by the president the project, has accused the com port but stresses that it vindicates
tional numbness at the bank and in India to en
Thatbrings us to cost-benefit analysis. Ifeven,
vironmental matters. The tendency seems to say, a quarter ofthe conservative estimates ofthe
liberal.
of the Bank, none of us work for mission of reaching totally its own stand on the issue.
One thing is plain though. The
have been to justify rather than analyse to react j Morse report on water flows, irrigability, power
It consisted of four men - all the bank nor have any of us ever erroneous conclusions.
rather than anticipate. Thenetresultisthatman- generation, submergence, sedimentation, salin
westerners but each one of them worked for the bank. We made it
And M.A. Chitale, the central Morse Commission is quite unpre
datoiy and recommended measures have been ity, destruction of forests and fisheries, are cor
*
distinguished in his field: Brad plain that we intended to travel
irrigation secretary, has politely cedented. Never before has an in
implemented in a token, piecemeal and irration rect, then the cost-benefit ratio as calculated by
ford Morse, a former head of wherever we thought it important said he disagrees with the report. ternational agency gone so far as
al fashion the pari passu condition has been MEF guidelines would turn wholly unattracti ve.
UNDP and under-secretary to go, and to talk with whomever Gujarat political leaders and Sar to constitute an external review
cynically exploited for its ambiguity and the
The project would lose its economic rationale
general of the UN, with experience we thought it appropriate to speak dar Sarovar Nigam supporters committee of competent profes
whole purpose of providing safeguards has been and viability altogether. We still do not have the
of famine relief; Thomas Berger, a ... the bank has provided all the can be expected to use strong lan sionals to sit in judgment over the
successfully defeated.
final figures of costs (which keep rising and
Canadian lawyer known for his necessary financial support, but guage acainst the independent re execution of a major project in
It is now too late to develop and implement changing) or the precise breakdown of benefits,
work on Aboriginal and human we have designed and adminis view, wnich they do not employ which it has itself a large stake.
Evidently, the World Bank has
many of the mitigative measures. Most of the such as power, drinking water and irrigatioiL
rights; Donald Gamble, an en tered our own budget, having re against the World Bank.
bank’s 1985 legal requirements for the environ But it would be only reasonable to suppose that
But the report has not spared had to bow to growing public
vironmental engineer, with ex tained editorial control of this re
mental clearances have not been met iMost of the so far as irrigation is concerned, the SSP costs
perience in water development port, we are fully and solely re the World Bank from criticism. pressure and green opinion.
conditions attached to the 1987 environmental would be at least as high as those of the average
Not surprisingly, the bank has reissues and Hugh Brody, an sponsible for its content”
clearances by the government of India hatfe not major irrigation project in recent years. (Indeed,
For the project’s proponents e ised to accept its recommenda— P.B.
anthropologist and specialist in
been met By any reasonable standard of the they would probably be higher thanks to longer
bank or the government of India, this ought to be delays, top- heavier management,
•ruikMi new technofo
the overarching criterion that oustees must im unacceptable. A bank office memorandum of gy, and other transactional costs, as well as high
other dam-affected people. They reject as un var Nicam are engaged in coercing oustees - as
acceptable and abhorrent the idea that the in the violence atManibeli, andthepresenceofbullprove on or at least regain their standard of living November 19,1990 states: “If one looks at what er R and R costs).
the bank legal agreements state with respect to
terests and rights of a minority, however small,
dozers and reserve police battalions, shows. So
- although it had adequate powers to do so.
To irrigate a hectare, it costs roughly Rs 1.5 to
environmental studies and training, and the 2 lakh. This is mind-boggling. What it means is
much for consultation, humane approaches and
can be sacrificed at the altar of the development
. This is not all. The bank repeatedly failed to MOEF (ministry of environment and forests)
grievance procedures.
of large numbers.
that the annualised costmkiterestand depreda
consider
the
effects
on
the
people
downstream
of
clearance
requirements,
those
who
are
not
fully
However, in practice, the Sardar Sarovar au
tion alone (of the order of Rs 20,000 to 30,000
The M.P. government shows no interest in re
the
dam
and
to
ensure
that
those
affected
by
the
familiar with the background might conclude per hectare) would make agriculture completely
thorities, and the Gujarat, Maharashtra and habilitation and has failed even to draw up an
M.P. governments have behaved in contraven elementary plan. The situation there is so bad' canal would be entitled to resettlement benefits. that there has been gross delinquency.
unviable. The average foodgrains yield from irri
Even
worse,
its
India
country
department
did
its
The Morse report finds significant discrepan gated land cannot generate aprofit: to meet even a
tion of these obligations.
that even if M.P. were to adopt a policy with be
utmost in 1983 to scuttle a mission by Professor cies (ofthe order of30 per cent) in the hydrologic fourth of this.
To this day, the Maharashtra and Madhya nefits equal to Gujarat’s, such a policy could not
Thayer Scudder, a well-known resettlement ex al data and estimates of likely water flows on
Pradesh governments refuse to implement the be implemented.
The Nannada projects could then be out
pert,
to
the
project
area.
which the benefits of the project were calculated. rageously expensive too - besides being viola
tribunal’s 1979 directive to treat all major sons
In other words, it is too late.
Scudder found that basic information on hu It concludes that tlje project will not perform as tive of human rights and menacing to the en
as families and to accept that tribals may not
In Maharashtra, the record of resettlement re
have legal title to the land they actually cultivate
man impact was inadequate, that India’s past re planned with or without the upstream Nannada vironment Such an evaluation is no longer in the
cord on reservoir-related relocation violated Sagar projects. What this means is that the realm of speculation After the Morse report,
and hence acknowledge that there is a compell mains appalling, despite thehighly controversial
ing reason to treat encroachers on a par with allocation of Taloda forest land. The govern
bank standards, that bureaucratic apathy to promised quantity of water or power is unlikely there is a strong basis more than prima facie
ment has shown no commitment to rehabilitate
wards oustees prevailed and that the state gov to materialise. The canal will probably flow at foundation, for it^’
landholders.
The Gujarat government has failed to draw up anyone and is only too glad to be able to get rid of
ernments were not serious about honouring the less than half its capacity two-thirds ofthe time
It is not an independent
°T “.ml
and the desired flow rate would be achieved less mission but a World Ht-appointed body that
plans for those going to be affected by the canal oustees, and drive them into Gujarat M.P. and
NWDT award.
and the people living downstream of the dam. Maharashtra together will ensure that 60 per
This should have sounded alarm bells in than 6 per cent of the time.
^Pnxiucedtherer>ort ButtolonlJ,reL4orces
While Gujarat’s record is a shade better than the cent of the oustees will suffer a lowering of their
These uncertainties are not theoretical.
Washington. But the bank diluted its own R and
the case for an indentIda
*
b-v a Mllllll
other two states’ in respect of resettling some of standard of living.
•IwIM
A technical analysis estimates that a 28 per s>on of Indian Sadists, scientists,
R requirements by accepting a specious
stageThe World Bank has been no less guilty. In the
the oustees - it broadened its policy in 1987-88
by-stage breakdown of rehabilitation plans. cent error in annual run-off of water would re biologists, anthrop^^fflergyeconomists
- it has violated major norms, not least by scat first place, it failed to cany out adequate assess iThis placed approval of the project over com duce the economic returns to zero. Similarly, sociologists, and n^Stion specialists and
tering families and villages, not buying adequate ments of the human impact of SSP. It failed to
pliance with the bank policy. All this was done since Nannada Sagar is not being built concur human nghts acti^b^^ndly.itchnchffii
land at resettlement sites, by its failure to consult consult the project-affected people. It refused to
when the earliest experience, with some 5,000 rently with SSP, there will be a 25 per cent de the argument for im^Jftelysuspendmg wrk
take account in the 1985 credit agreement of its
the oustees, in particular tribals.
SSP oustees in 1960-61 at Kevadia, was an ex crease in power and 30 per cent fall in irrigated ontheproject. allo^^&loproceed pan
Today the government and the Sardar Saro.
1982 policy on tribal people. It failed to insist on
tremely unpleasant one. They are yet to be reha- area under the project
«to enco^^^and destraction.
BfliB-
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9521 Koramangala
Bangalore
The Narmada Dam
Indians vs. Aryans
‘
Dt: 26.8.95
•Dear Sir,
Much has been spoken and written of the damaging
effects of the Iarmada dam: destruction of forest wealth,
damage to ecology-flora-fauna, submergence of fertile land
with permanent loss of underground wealth, large scale displ
acement of population -mainly tribal, destruction oftheir
homes, Livestock and fields as well as means of livelihood, etc.
Added to that is the adverse green house effect of large
expanses of water behind high dams, as experienced in Canada etc.
But the collossal human tragedy and trauma of those whose
ancestral homes will be destroyed has not been fully appreciated.
7hy this inhumanity when other less damaging alternatives are
available ? The answer is rapacious greed of well-todo
politicians, bureaucrats and rich business, compounded with
racial-cum-religious intolerance. Did not Manu say that the
scheduled tribes and scheduled castes were not fit to exist
other than to serve the interests of the brahmins and their
eight and left hand props - the thakurs and the banias ! So,
wherever the former come in the way of the well-being of dthex
Latter kill them, burn them and their homes, failing that/Hiem '
This has been going on right from the time the savage Aryan
marauding tribes invaded India some 5500 years ago.
Bur still it is not too late. Let the voice of reason and
humanity overcome the overweaning lust for wealth of the Money
baggers', which seems to have become the order of the day. Lven
Larger benefits than from the Narmada dam would accrue through
the alternative of low and meium level dams ot barrages, without
the harmful effects of high dams. It is not the exercise of
the cold, self-centered and calculating religion imported
with the Aryans through the Vedas, but the humane and truly
Indian philosophy of the Buddha that is needed.
A SHORT GO IDF TO THE SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
Its promoters say it is the only solution to the
drought in Gujarat. Its critics say it is a social and
environmental disaster.
In October 2000, following six years of litigation, the
Supreme Court of India conditionally cleared the
construction of the dam. In 2003, while rehabilitation
and environmental conditions continue to be flouted
by the Government, construction continues.
Some answers to
frequently asked questions
A SHORT GU IDE TO THE SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
The SSP is one of five mega dams proposed in the
Narmada Valley Development Project. Lo
Gujarat, its reservoir also submerges villag
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Altogether, it
affects about 500,000 people, only half of whom
are officially considered ‘project-affected'
Its promoters say it is the only solution to the
drought in Gujarat. Its critics say it is a social and
environmental disaster.
In October 2000r following six years of litigation, the
Supreme Court of India conditionally cleared the
construction of the dam. In 2003, while rehabilitation
and environmental conditions continue to be flouted
by the Government, construction continues.
R A j
Isn’t it true that the SSP is the only way to
take drinking waterto millions of people in
the thirsty villages of Kachchh and Saurashtra?
No, better options do exist. The SSP is simply not a
sustainable choice. The tacts are as follows:
• The SSP was never designed to provide drinking water to
the villages of this region. This “benefit” was added as a
political ploy when the project ran into trouble. Feasibility
studies for drinking water supply were initiated only in 1998.
• While the Government of Gujarat spends 85% of its annual
irrigation budget on the SSP, allocation for drinking water
continues to be meager. Issues of public i inance and
accountability remain unanswered: drinking water is
claimed as a “benefit” of the SSP. but expenditure on it is
nor reflected in its financial statements.
Isn't the SSP the only way to irrigate the
drought-prone regions of Kachchh,
Saurashtra and North Gujarat?
This is a falsehood perpetuated by the Government to
convince people that the SSP will be rhe “lifeline” of Gujarat.
Irs canal system, according to their own plans, is designed to
irrigate less than 2% of the cultivable land in Kachchh, less
than 9% in Saurashtra, and only 20% in North Gujarat.
By diverting money from the maintenance of existing
structures, as well as from more realistic, local solutions for the
region, the SSP actually makes the problem of drought in
Gujarat much worse. One instance: instead of strengthening
irrigation infrastructure damaged by the earthquake in
Kachchh, the Government recently diverted the Asian
Development Banks’ Post Earthquake Reconstruction assis
tance towards funding rhe Narmada based pipeline project.
Sowhen will the Narmada water reach the
projected areas of Kachchh and Saurashtra?
Water from the Sardar Sarovar dam may never reach the tail
end of the canal system because
• There is 15-17% less water in the Narmada today than was
assumed when the SSP was designed.
• The SSP depends on regulated releases of water from rhe
proposed Narmada Sagar dam upstream in Madhya Pradesh.
Till that dam is complete, the irrigated area and die power
generation of SSP will be reduced by 17-30%.
• The SSP assumes an irrigation efficiency of 60%, when the
highest efficiency achieved in India is around 40%. So about
half of the projected area will never be irrigated.
zf
A $
comprehensive rehabilitation plan, even though the Narmada
Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) requires that
Banaskantha
rehabilitation arrangements for all project affected families be
Rann of Kachchh
complete before water is impounded in the reservoir.
esana
Little Rann
• Over 80% of the 200,000 people ‘officially’ considered
Gandhinagar
Project-affected live in MP. In the Supreme Court the MP
Surendranagar
Ahmedabad:
Wankaner
Jamnagar
Government has declared on oath that it has no land to
Kheda~=^~ Panchmahal
EVadodara,...
provided a single hectare of cultivable and irrigated
Rajkot
S A
U
R
A
S
>Porbandar
_
Junagadn
re-settle the project affected people, and the State has not
HPT R A
Bhavnag.
Amreli , 1
Bharufrh
Sardar Sarovar
Dam
Surat
agricultural land for its oustees.
• The MP Government has no land to rehabilitate 75,000
people displaced by the Bargi dam in 1990; more than
50,000 people to be displaced by the Mahesh war dam; it has
Narmada main canal
Branch canals
Drought prone 6 desert areas
Command Area of SSP
MAP BASED ON SEVENTH FIVE YEAR PLAN 1985-90 GOVT OF GUJARAT
not resettled even one of the 252 villages that will be
submerged by the proposed Narmada Sagar dam, or by the
Omkaresh war dam.
• In Maharashtra alone, Adivasi families who collectively
lived on 20,000 hectares of land have been provided only
4200 hectares of denotified forestland. Half of this land was
“A glance at the map of the command area clearly indicates that large
found to be unavailable or uncultivable, and rehabilitation
areas of water deficit regions would not get any water. As many as 35
is incomplete.
out of 5 3 talukas having dark or over exploited status ofgroundwater
development, are outside the command area. ”
GUJARAT ECOLOGY COMMISSION REPORT / MARCH 2001
A Jr" There must be some benefits from the project?
Who profits?
Cities, rich farmers, industry, politically powerful lobbies - not the
people from drought prone areas. Before the water can reach
Kachchh and Saurashtra, it will have to negotiate the water
intensive, cash-crop growing, politically powerful regions (and
Municipal Corporations) of Vadodara, Kheda, Ahmedabad,
Gandhinagar and Mehsana. Against their own directives, the
authorities have allotted industrial and commercial users in
Vadodara and Ahmedabad city a sizeable quantity of water.
Sugar-mills, water-parks, golf courses, and five-star hotels are
already positioning themselves ar the head of the canal.
. I?;-f
Now that the Supreme Court says that the Dam
must be built, why doesn't the Narmada Bachao
Andolan (NBA) work constructively towards the
rehabilitation of displaced people?
It is simply not possible to rehabilitate such a vast number of
people, except on paper. That’s what the NBA has learnt in the
18 years that it has worked in the Narmada Valley. Since
construction began, the authorities have not come up with a
But isn't it true that the Government of
Gujarat offers one of the best rehabilitation
packages in the world?
Only on paper. It has not been able to settle a single village
according to the directions of the Narmada Water Disputes
Tribunal. For example, the Tribunal stresses the importance of
preserving the social fabric of Adivasi villages through
‘community’ rehabilitation. Instead 19 Adivasi villages
displaced in Gujarat have been scattered in 175 different
‘sites’. Communities, even families, have been split.
Amongst those not counted as “project affected” are:
• 950 Adivasi families displaced in 1961 in order to construct
the Project colony at Kevadia
• 8,000 Adivasi families (from 104 villages), to be displaced
from the Shoolpaneshwar Sanctuary, created to “mitigate”
the submergence of 13,000 hectares of forest land
• 10,000 fisher families who live downstream and whose
livelihoods will be destroyed when rhe project is completed
• 23,500 families who will lose a major portion of their lands !
to the Narmada canal
.
v
• Fami 1 ies who are being evic ted by ‘compensatory
afforestation’and ‘catchment area treatment' schemes, as
well as those of artisan^, traders, and other non-agriculturisr<
have noteven been officially estimated.
Surely the Supreme Court took all these
issues into account before allowing the
construction of the Dam to continue?
No, it JiJ not. In his dissenting, minority judgment Justice
Bharucha lays out the evidence produced before the court.
He dearly says that when the Project was given conditional
clearance in 1987, no environmental impact studies, or
assessment of rehabilitation had been done. Today, 16 years
later, none of the conditions of clearance have been fulfilled:
no comprehensive assessment of the various impacts have
been completed. There isn’t even a rehabilitation master
plan. So Just ice Bharucha categorically said that
construction ought to be stopped immediately, and the
project subjected to a comprehensive review.
The majority judgment however dismissed the issue of a
comprehensive assessment as an “administrative detail” and
permitted the construction to continue in accordance with
the guidelines laid out by the Tribunal.
'
I
This despite rhe fact that:
° the Tribunal Award has been violated for 24 years
• not a single village has been resettled according to its
directives .
The Government says that it has already spe.^
Rs 12,000 crores of public money. Can we afford
to waste this money?
The current expenditure is almost a quarter of the final project
cost, said to be Rs 44,000 crores. To continue with the project
would mean throwing good money after bad. If the project were
reviewed and restructured even today, it would not be a waste:
• Expert studies show chat the SSP can be restructured, with the
bypass tunnel constructed as a lower level channel, using rhe
current dam height to carry water to Kachchh and Saurashrra.
• Instead of one large reservoir at the Dam, Gujarat can receive its
full share of Narmada waters at the present height by building
de-centralized storage systems in the Command area.
By continuing without review and restructuring, rhe
Government will spend another Rs 32,000 crores, and still fail to
deliver its promise. The money will instead only go towards
servicing debt liability on indiscriminate market borrowings.
And restructuring the project would save money that is more than
adequate to fund water harvesting schemes in every one of the
9,000 drought-prone villages of Gujarat, as well as for other
decentralized solutions and alternatives.
the M.P. Government has said it has no land to resettle
Restructuring the project now would save prime forests and
‘oustees’, nor has the Maharashtra or Gujarat Government
been able to offer adequate, cultivable land
agricultural lands from submergence, and save hundreds of
thousands of oustees from displacement.
even families displaced by the dam at its current height of
103 mts have not been rehabilitated.
1
Produced in the public interest by
Free the Narmada Campaign January 2004
The Tribunal Award clearly states that under no circumstances
will anyone's land be submerged before rehabilitation.
While permitting further construction beyond 90 mts,
the Supreme Court too directed complete
For more information
www.narmada.org
rehabilitation before proceeding. No one has
cared to comply with this condition.
F •
In effect, this is contempt of court.
|?bl
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Page 1 of 3
Main identity
From:
To:
Sent
Attach:
Subject:
"Pervin Jehangir” <pjehangir@rediffmail.com>
“smruti koppikar” <smruti@koppikar.net>
Monday, December 08, 2003 3:23 PM
ATT00263.txt
Fw: victims
Narmada Bachao Andolan
B-13 Shivam Flats
Ellora Park, Baroda, 390007
Press Release, 7/12/03:
Attempted Suicide of 15 Narmada Oustees
Dire Situation in Gujarat Resettlement Sites
ii
(BARODA. Gujarat) On December
5. the attempted suicide of 15 Project Affected People
(PAPs) at the Sardar Sarovar dam site brought to public attention the grave injustice and
ii
destitution faced by dam-affected
people in Gujarat. The PAPs are adivasis displaced from
villages in Nandod and Naswadi talukas (District Narmada and Baroda respectively) by the
Sardar Sarovar Project reservoir and other project-related works and shifted to resettlement sites
as early as the 1980s. but not yet adequately rehabilitated. The government promised, among
other things, that at least one member of each family would receive jobs from the government
ii
upon displacement.
After this and other promises of rehabilitation failed to materialize and
numerous appeals went unanswered, the desperate PAPs fell they had no options left.
While the NBA in no way condones the attempted suicide, the issues raised by the PAPs arc
genuine. As the Gujarat government repeatedly claims that it has rehabilitated all 4,600 PAFs
from Gujarat and seeks approval to increase the dam height to 110m,
•i the ground reality of the
resettlement shows that people displaced at the dam heights of 80, 90, and 100 meters haven't
ii
even been adequately rehabilitated. Both the NWDTA as well as the Supreme
Court Order
(2000) made it mandatory to provide dam-affected oustees with a minimum 2 hectares of
irrigable and cultivable land, house-plots, and resettlement sites with ameneties, before
submergence and displacement.
ii
However, surveys conducted by the NBA and petitions of oustees from R&R sites indicate the
complete violation of these provisions. Many declared PAFs have not actually received lhe
promised minimum of 2 hectares of cultivable land. Among those who actually received 2
hectares of land, many report that their lands arc partially of frilly uncultivablc and of lower
quality than the fields in their original villages. Some PAFs who received land are yet to get thentitle deeds, and others have not been provided with irrigation as required by subsequent court
rulings. Moreover, many sons above the age of 18 and thus entitled to land compensation are yet
Ul
to be recognized.
Many sites also still lack approach roads, clean drinking water, grazing lands.
and civic amenities. Consequently, many families have gone from a situation in their original
villages where they could support themselves fr om the forest, river, and fields, to one where they
no longer have resources upon which to subsist in a secure and dignified manner.
ii
Page 2 of 3
There arc also scores of people affected by the dam who arc still living in the villages of
Mukhedi, Gadher, Hateshwar, 1 urkheda, and Antras who are facing submergence but have not
been declared as projected-affected. Other people have gone back to the original villages because
survival has proven so difficult in the R&R sites.
Il is thus evident that the rehabilitation of PAFs in Gujarat is incomplete, contrary to the claims
II Court
mi
made by the Government
of Gujarat, and in gross violation of the NWDTA, the Supreme
Decision of 2000, and fundamental human rights. The unfortunate incident this week should
Ml
compel the governments to take cognizance
of the gravity of the situation, stop submitting
erroneous reports, and lialt construction on the dam until all Project Affected People are
Mil
resettled. The NBA expects the Courts, including the Apex Court, to take cognizance
and legal
action to insure that this happens.
M.K. Sukumar
Sanjay Sangvai
Narmada Bachao Andolan
Sanjay Sangvai,
7, Chintamani Aptts,
19, Shikshaknagar, Paud Rd.,
Kothrud, Pune, India -411038
(ph.020-5450870)
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12/9/03
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12/9/03
| M (1A
Narmada Bachao Andolan
20 Years of Resistance & Reconstruction
Narmada Bachao Andolan Invites You to Join
The Commemoration of 20 years of Resistence & Reconstruction
It's 20 years since we began organising, mobilising, and questioning the big dam,
'Sardar Sarovar' and the destruction in the Narmada Valley. The two decades of
struggle, with mass actions, challenged and exposed the designs of the governments
and the World Bank. The struggle also witnessed state repression, illegality and
inhumanity of forceful eviction of living communities, severe environmental
destruction and the falsehood in the overestimated benefits. We have tried to bring to
the attention of the civil society as well as the planners, the unjustifiability of large
dams and the need for decentralised, non-destructive management of land, water, and
forest.
Today, even when the construction of the Sardar Sarovar has stopped (and so are the
big dams in the Valley, Narmada Sagar, Maheshwar, Goi, Veda) the sword is still
hanging... other large dams and the interlinking of rivers is pushed ahead...the World
Bank and other players are privatising and looting our water resources. The water
policy and the national rehabilitation policy is still to be radically transformed as per
our vision of equity, justice, sustainability, and self-reliance. The challenge is on and
so is the struggle.
The reconstruction — through Jeevanshalas (the life-schools), the micro-hydel
project, the training and action related to health, water projects, PDS, EGS and
Panchayat Raj — too is on! We continue to be active in alliance building of peoples'
movements challenging globalisation and liberalisation, Enron and Coca Cola, and
contribute to policy making — national and international, like the World Commission
on Dams, to the extent possible. The supporters, activists from all over have been
with us through thick and thin.
Deep woods and long roads call upon us to cry halt to the destruction in the valley of
the oldest human civilisation, the nature and living human communities, to
strengthen our steps and commitment, to broaden and deepen our vision and to keep
walking to the horizon! This is time to not just rejoice over and celebrate our humble
attainment but also to reflect and to review.
We invite you to the Narmada Valley for a series of programs to commemorate the
past two decades. These programs would bring together the people who valiantly
fought the might of the State for past two decades, as well as a host of supporters
from all walks of life, who walked with the movement for different distances at
different phases of the struggle and who have contributed in very many ways. The
planned programs are:
November 23-24, 2005: Visit to Gujarat Rehabilitation sites and tribal areas of
Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh (One team to start from Baroda and
another to start from Dhule on 23rd morning)
November 25: Visit to Nimad area (plains in Madhya Pradesh)
November 26: Narmada Convention in Badwani
November 27: Mass rally and public meeting in Badwani
What To Bring: Please carry with you good walking shoes, socks, torch, dry snacks,
water bottles, sheets (chadar)/ sleeping bag, whatever medicines and personal items
you need. Please note that for the first two days you will be in an interior area and
will not be able to buy anything you need. Travel light since there may be some
walking involved.
Travel Plan: To those who come by train, Baroda, Indore and Dhule are the nearest
railheads. Baroda office would assist those who reach there. From Indore, regular
buses are available for Badwani (5 hours). From Dhule, Dhadgaon is 5 hours by bus.
(Kindly see below the addresses). Baroda and Indore are connected by air. Overnight
buses are available from Mumbai to Badwani (via Julwania). Kindly contact any of the
centers below to get more information.
Volunteers / Appeal for Funds: Before and during the programs we would require
large amount of human power. If any of you can come to the Valley earlier and help us
with planning and preparing for the event, we would welcome your help. The program
would require significant funds. We would appreciate donations to help us for this
event. For donations, contact Ms. Pervin Jehangir in Mumbai - (022) 22184779,
9820636335.
Contact Information:
For any information about the program, please write to nba20yearprogram@gmail.com
or to Pervin Jehangir pjehangir@gmail.com / Maju-Joe initiative@riseup.net
NBA offices contact information:
BARODA office - contact Dipti, Jiju, Biniwale
c/o B-13 Shivam Flats, Ellora Park, Bhagwan Mahaveer Marg, Baroda, Gujarat 390023
Email: baroda@narmada.org; Phone: 0265-2282232, 09879536407
BADWANI office - contact Ashish, Asit, Rakesh, Devarambhai, Kailash
62, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Badwani, Madhya Pradesh 45155. Phone: 07290-222464
DHADGAON office - contact Gita, Yogini, Rohan, Chetan
Maitri Niwas, Tembewadi, Behind Kakawadi, Dhadgaon, district Nandurbar, Maharashtra.
Phone: 02595-220620
Dule contact: Shyam Patil, 16 Ashok Nagar, Phansi Pool, Dhule. Ph: 02562 246419
We would welcome your confirmations, suggestions and comments.
In solidarity,
Devaram Kanera
Baba Maharia
Kamala Yadav
Ashish
Gita
Narmada Bachao Andolan
20 Years of Resistance & Reconstruction
Narmada Bachao Andolan
c/o B-13 Shivam Flats, Ellora
Park, Bhagwan Mahaveer Marg,
Baroda, Gujarat 390023
Noorji Padvi
Dipti
Prabhubhai Tadvi
Medha Patkar
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What is the Maheshwar Project and why has it been a subject of controversy ?
The Maheshwar Project is one of the 30 large dams in the Narmada valley. It will be
built on the river Narmada upstream to the Sardar Sarovar Project at the village of
Jalud near Mandleshwar in District Khargone in Madhya Pradesh. Since 1997, the
affected peasants, fisherpeople, boatspeople and agricultural workers of the area
have waged an intense struggle to challenge and stop this controversial Project.
Thousands of local people have barricaded roads leading to the dam for months,
peacefully captured the dam site at least 11 times, taken over the jails and refused to
leave, and demonstrated, fasted and protested in every way possible. Why have they
done so ?
Social issues
If this dam is ever built, the 42 km. long Maheshwar reservoir will submerge both a
rich land economy - black cotton soils irrigated by pumps from the river on which grow
wheat, cotton, spices, etc, as well as a rich river economy - scores of sand quarries.
fishing, draw down agriculture, ferrying, etc which supports upwards of 5000 Kewai.
Kahar and Dalit families.
As per the MoEF clearance given to the Project promoters in 2001, the dam will
submerge over 8000 families in 61 villages in the area either fully or partially, ie. lands,
homes or both. This excludes those thousands of landless Kewat, Kahar and Dalit
families who will lose their entire livelihoods of sand quarrying, fishing, etc,although
their homes may escape being submerged in the project and who should be identified
as Project affected as per Madhya Pradesh govt rehabilitation policy for oustees of
Narmada Projects. Similarly, it excludes the large number of people who may be
additionally affected because of the under estimation of the extent of submergence
and the large numbers who may be additionally affected by large scale expected
waterlogging in the adjoining area as per an environmental study commissioned by
the S.Kumars and submitted by them
The Rehabilitation policy of the Madhya Pradesh govt, for oustees of Narmada
Projects as well as the conditions of the environmental clearance of the MoEF require
that the affected people be settled with agricultural land in the lieu of agricultural
land that they are losing, and that it was only in very exceptional cases that a oustee
could receive cash compensation. Yet, till today, not a single affected family has
been given agricultural land. But the S.Kumars have forced several people to
accept cash compensation by dumping truck fulls of stones on their land. This
complete absence of land and the failure of the rehabilitation process has been
documented again and again in the Report of the Task Force Committee set up by the
State govt, that came out in 1998, the Tour Report of the Ministry of Environment and
Forests of 1999, the Report of the German Development Ministry in June 2000 The
situation continues and the Monitoring Committee of the MoEF have reported in their
recent most report of 2002 that not a single condition of the environmental clearance
including land based rehabilitation has been complied with.
Technical issues
Maheshwar Project: Myth of power production
The Maheshwar Project site is at a point in the river where there is no river gorge and
where river flows through the plains. Because it is situated in the plains of the
Narmada valley with a low rim, there is a technical and design bar to higher production
of power.
In fact, as per the 28-year river flow data from 1951 to 1977 used in the Updated
Project report of the Maheshwar Hydro-Electric Project (1993), the average
electricity generation in the 8 non-monsoon months from November to June
each year, when peaking power is in demand because of Rabi is only 193.86 MU.
This data shows that the large part of Maheshwar power (nearly 79%) will be
produced during the 4 monsoon months. In fact, for the 8 non- monsoon months of the
year the Project will produce an average of only 1.5 hours a day. Yet, the high tariff of
the power to be produced by this Project is sought to be justified by claiming that this
is a peaking Project.
Thus, although the Maheshwar Project has an installed capacity of 400MW, it will
have a firm power production of only 92 MW initially and 49 MW finally since the
actual extent of firm power in a Hydel Project is based on the available water flows
and may actually be only a fraction of the proposed installed capacity. If there is a
drought and they do need power, hydel power will not suffice because of inadequate
flows, illustrated by the abysmal record of Hydel Projects in Madhya Pradesh in the
last five years.
Expensive power, PPA rip off
Since 1994, when the Project was only Rs. 465 crores, the estimated Project outlay
has been increased upwards by a factor of five to around Rs.2233 crores today. That
this huge increase in outlay, combined with the "deemed generation" clause, that
means compulsory payments at deemed generation levels, irrespective of actual
production, guaranteed rates of return on equity ranging from 16 % to 32 % and a
PPA that is valid for 35 years, has increased the cost of power from this project to
make it prohibitively expensive. As a result, the power tariff, as a proportion of project
costs, has gone up enormously. Based on the tariff formula in the Power Purchase
Agreement, it may be conservatively estimated that the average cost of power from
the Maheshwar Project will be around Rs. 4- 5 per kWh at bus bar, and the cost of
peaking power will be much higher.
Comparing this with the cost of the power produced at bus bar by the State Electricity
Board today (Rs. 1.25 per kWh for thermal and Rs. 0.25 per kWh for hydel) and the
cost of the NTPC produced power (Rs. 1.67 per kWh), it is clear enough that the cost
of Maheshwar power will be prohibitively expensive.
After including the cost of T&D (49% losses in Madhya Pradesh today - so the cost of
power will be exactly doubled when it reaches the consumer and reach a level
between Rs. 10 per kWh), the cost of this power at the point of consumption will be so
high as to be completely beyond the reach of power consumers in the state agriculture, domestic, commercial or industry. This is the fundamental flaw in the
Project - that the power it will generate is so expensive that the cost of power
production cannot be recovered through sale of power either by the MPEB (Madhya
Pradesh State Electricity Board) or by the Project promoters. This makes the project
extremely vulnerable to and crucially dependent on the overall financial position and
other sources of revenue of the MPEB, which is deeply in the red. It is also a concern
that the PPA , the escrow account and the state guarantee to the debenture issue that
that the GOMP is planning to grant is likely to destroy the State Electricity Board, if the
Project is ever built.
Meeting of 4th march 2003 organized to arrange financing for S.Kumar promoted
Maheshwar project:
On the 4th of March, 2003 a meeting was organized by the Ministry of Power, which
was attended by Union Power Minister Shri Geete, Chief Minister Madhya Pradesh
Shri Digvijay Singh, Minister of State for Finance, Govt, of India, Chairman, IFCI, MD.
LIC , MD, SBI, MD, IDBI and several others. The major agenda in the meeting was
how the privatized Maheshwar Hydro-Electric Project in the Narmada valley in
Madhya Pradesh promoted by the S.Kumars group was to be financed with public
money.
The apex politicians were meeting with the heads of financial institutions in order to tie
up the finances of the Maheshwar Project to the extent of Rs. 2233 crores through
loans and debentures to be financed by the Indian financial institutions. This included
subscriptions for the debentures to be issued by the Shree Maheshwar Hydel Power
Corporation Limited - the S.Kumars company implementing the Project for the
purpose of picking up equity - an amount between Rs. 330 to Rs. 400 crores.
It is rather ironical that except for a small amount, the rest of the finances of this
privatized Project are being sought to be mobilized from public money, making
nonsense of the original argument for the privatisation of the power sector as the need
for ' additionality of resources". The Project that had to be privatized for the want of
public financial resources when it was costed at Rs. 465 crores is now being sought to
be financed with over Rs. 2000 crores of public money after the total cost of the
Project has been increased five fold to Rs. 2233 crores in a decade after privatization
What transpired during the meeting :
Some of the crucial highlights of the meeting was that the SBI said that they had
formally cancelled a foreign currency loan of Rs. 110 crores that it had committed to
earlier (which to be given by SBI Frankfurt), but were prepared to renew it. The IFCI
was directed to firm up subscription agreement for equity from others as well as LIC.
and to tie up or reconfirm balance debt/equity from the Fl's. Thus very clearly, except
for a small amount from the S.Kumars, the entire project was to be financed by public
money.
The Power Finance Corporation CMD Shri Khan stated that PFC is the largest lender
to the Project beyond its normal exposure limits but will still be " providing the credit
enhancement guarantee to facilitate the raising of funds through OFCDs" provided the
SMHPCL defaults on the PFC are paid.
It may be recalled that till very recently, the SMHPCL were the PFC's third largest
defaulter. Obviously, since the S.Kumars had defaulted on the money already
borrowed by them from the PFC on a very large scale, it would be completely illegal
for the Power Finance Corporation to give the S.Kumars a credit enhancement
guarantee, any sort of default guarantee or any more public monies.
Pressure on LIC :
The Managing Director of LIC stated that the LIC had agreed to contribute to the
subscription of Rs. 100 crores to the debentures proposed to be issued by the
SMHPCL on the condition that a) the OFCDs are rated by the CRISIL at AAA(SO), b)
provided the RFC provides credit enhancement guarantee to the Project, and c) if the
lenders confirm their support to the Project.
Unfortunately, instead of insisting that the S.Kumars must pay back these defaults on
public money of the SMHPCL on the PFC at once, especially, if they were seeking to
receive a credit enhancement guarantee from the PFC, the Minister of State for
Finance, GOI said that he " he " desired " that the LIC should "reconsider” its decision
and should hand over Rs. 100 crores of public money to the S.Kumars so that the
company can pay off it’s huge outstanding default in repayments to the Power Finance
Corporation. It is only after this repayment that the PFC would offer the S.Kumars
company - the SMHPCL the further facility of a credit enhancement guarantee. The
Rs. 100 crores to be given by the LIC will be in the shape of "advance" subscription to
an Optionally Fully Convertible Debentures to be issued by the SMHPCL The LIC
Board had earlier refused to make any such advance payment.
The Secretary Power also states in the Minutes that " Considering the fact that PFC
cannot issue the credit enhancement guarantee without the clearance of default dues,
LIC to reconsider payment of Rs. 100 crores in advance for clearing the dues and to
mobilize site for resumption of work.”
Thus, although the a priori condition of the LIC contribution to the S.Kumars
debentures was the PFC credit enhancement guarantee must be in place, the LIC is
being forced to pay the entire sum in advance at the "desire" of the Honorable Minister
so that it becomes possible for the PFC to issue such a credit enhancement
guarantee.
It may be recalled that the Tarapore Committee that had been set up to investigate the
UTI imbroglio that had cost millions of small investors very dearly and had resulted in
the imminent collapse of the Indian economy, had identified and censured the
"evergreening" practices of various financial institutions in which they extend loans to
corporates who have defaulted on previous loans in order to wipe off their defaults, as
one of the major reasons for the UTI crisis. These evergreening practices are also
responsible for the huge accumulation of Non-performing assets in this country.
However, now a Minister of the Central government responsible for public finance has
virtually ordered another public financial institution - the LIC to pay out crores of
rupees of public money to wipe out the existing huge defaults of the private company
- the S.Kumars on the Power Finance Corporation, rather than asking the defaulting
company to pay up. Clearly this is not only highhanded and dictatorial, it also blatantly
illegal.
Debt - Equity ratio below norms
The Fl's also expressed concern that the equity for this Project is being sought to be
raised by debentures, which could be converted into equity at a later stage, at the
option of the equity holder. The required debt equity ratio for private power projects is
4:1, that is at least Rs. 440 crores of the financial outlay must come from equity. In this
4
context, Mr. Batra, MD, SBI cautioned the meeting against taking any steps that could
reduce the debt - equity ratio below the established banking norms.
Promoter's equity in due course ?
The meeting minutes also record that the Managing Director of SBI also insisted that it
was imperative that in addition to attempts to tie up funds for equity through
debentures, the Promoter must infuse its own share of balance equity of around
Rs. 82 crores. The Policy on Private Participation in the Power sector issued by the
Ministry of Power through gazette notification of 22nd October 1991 stipulated that" at
least 11% of the total outlay must come through promoter's contribution." That is a
project outlay of Rs. 2233 crores necessitates a minimum promoter's contribution of
Rs. 245 crores. The SEBI also requires that for any public issue, at least 25% must be
the promoter's share - ie. at least Rs. 100 crores out of Rs. 400 crores for this issue.
Must come from the promoters. However the S.Kumars seem to have a completely
different view of how much contribution they need to make. The meeting minutes
record that " with respect to equity being brought in by the promoter, Shri Kasliwal
informed that only an amount of Rs. 41 crores remained for which also
arrangements had been made and that the amounts would be infused in due course.
II
Political pressures privilege corporate interest over public interest:
There seems to be no discussion in the meeting about the order of magnitude
difference in the estimate of promoter's contribution between the Promoter and that of
the financial institutions. In fact, the Secretary (Power), GOI merely concludes that the
Promoter will infuse balance equity in a time bound manner. Thus, the promoter will
pay his contribution " in due course" and " in a time bound manner", but the LIC is
to be milked for an advance subscription to the debentures, without fulfillment of any
of its stipulated conditions, so that the S.Kumars defaults can be paid off and the
guarantee provided. Clearly, the promoter is let off the hook both in respect of bringing
in the adequate amount of promoter's contribution as well as taking responsibility for
and paying up its defaults because of strong political patronage it seems to enjoy. It is
also not clear as to why the Power Finance Corporation has overexposed itself to this
Project but it seems that it is for the same reasons of political pressure.
Why is any decision to provide the S.Kumars corporate group with further
i njections of public money for loans and equity (not just from the LIC) il Ileg aj?
A. SMHPCL 's Maheshwar Project properties are attached
There are ongoing legal proceedings against the S.Kumars group companies Induj
Enertech Limited and Shree Maheshwar Hydel Power Corporation Limited and that
the movable and immovable properties of the Maheshwar Project have been
under attachment since the 20th of December of 2002.
In 1999-2000, the holding company of the SMHPCL - the Induj Enertech Limited had
taken a short term loan of Rs. 44.75 crores for the financing of the Maheshwar Project.
As a result of this default by the S.Kumars,in September 2001, the MPSIDC ordered
that the recovery of the outstanding sums should be made from the attachment and
sale of the movable and immovable properties of the Maheshwar Project under the
Madhya Pradesh Public Money (Recovery of Dues) Act 1987 and the Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The MPSIDC is the state industrial development
corporation of Madhya Pradesh.
4
The attachment of the movable properties was done by the District administration in
February 2002 and of the immovable properties, including Project lands on the 20th of
December 2002. The S.Kumars have now moved the High Court to stop further
proceedings, and the case is pending. In the meantime, on the 14th of February, a two
member bench of the Indore High Court has restrained the S.Kumars from "creating
any further charge on the property under attachment" pending final decision. Thus
clearly the attachment of the properties continues.
In the circumstances that the promoter company- the SMHPCL that is to issue the
above mentioned debentures and mobilizing the loans from the Indian public financial
institutions does not even have possession of the movable and immovable
properties of the Project, including the dam site lands, since the last number of
months, because the said properties are attached, and that any possible rating can
only be D- for default, it would be illegal and absurd to jeopardize any further public
money - in the shape of loans or equity into the Project or the promoter company ?
The NBA has issued a legal notice to all the banks and financial institutions who have
put money in this project to cancel all existing agreements, recall the public monies
that have been defaulted on. In the circumstance that the movable and immovable
properties of the Project including Project lands are no longer with the S.Kumars, and
that this constitutes the securities for the said loans, the NBA has asked that the
personal guarantees of the Promoter Directors and the corporate guarantees of their
Associate companies with which their loans had been additionally secured be invoked.
However, instead of this, the S.Kumars are attempting to mobilize further public funds
with the help of political patronage and support.
B. Pre - disbursement condition of IFCI of the return of Rs. 106.4 crores with
interest yet to be fulfilled
That the Project promoters of the S.Kumars promoted Maheshwar Project is being
envisaged to be largely funded with public money from the Indian public financial
institutions and banks, and that the IFCI or the Industrial Finance Corporation of India
is the lead agency responsible for the continuing appraisal and monitoring of the
Project on behalf of all the other public financial institutions and banks, involved in
financing the Maheshwar Project. As per the IFCI Reappraisal Report of March 2000,
by the end of 1999, the SMHPCL had borrowed around Rs. 122 crores of public
money from various banks and institutions including the IFCI, IDBI, SBI, LIC, GIC,
Bank of India, Dena Bank, etc. It had also put in around Rs. 136.4 crores of its own
money as promoter's contribution that was a requirement for the public financing.
Together this money constituted the project funds, the expenditure from which has to
be with the prior approvals from the financial institutions. The IFCI March 2000
Reappraisal Report clearly states that out of this money, Rs. 106.4 crores was given
to agencies that neither did any of the assignments on the Project nor had any
approved contracts for the Project. Clearly, therefore these public monies were not
used for the purposes of the loan, ie. the construction of the Project.
6
The I FC I Report also notes that Rs. 19.3 crores of this money was given to SMHPCL's
holding company - Induj, although the said company had no contracts, or any
experience to work in the Project. As a result, the IFCI Report stipulates in its special
pre-disbursement condition for all public banks and financial institutions financing this
Project that" SMHPCL shall bring back the capital advances of Rs. 106.4 crores ,
with interest, given to various agencies who have not been awarded with any
project contracts ",
The SMHPCL has recently admitted in a case in the Mumbai City Civil Court that out
of this sum of Rs. 106.4 crores plus interest that they were to bring back, they have
been able to bring back only Rs. 68 crores. By their own admission, therefore over Rs.
36 crores with interest is yet to be brought back. Clearly, then there can be no further
question of any more public funds going into the project as loans, as debentures or as
advance subscriptions.
SMHPCL guilty of diversion and siphoning ?
The 30lh May circular of the RBI defines "diversion" under Section 4.1 Among other
things, it defines diversion as " deploying borrowed funds for purposes/activities or
creation of assets other than those for which the loan was sanctioned" (Section 4.1 (b)
or as " transferring funds to the subsidiaries/ group companies or other corporates by
whatever modalities".(Section 4.1 ( c))
The IFCI Report makes it clear that the entities who were given the Rs. 106.4 crores
did no assignments regarding the Project. Thus since the Project funds including the
Rs. 122 crores of borrowed funds were not deployed for purposes that the loan was
sanctioned for - i.e the construction of the Project, they were deployed for purposes
other than the stipulated purposes, and by RBI definition given under Section 4.1(a)
this constitutes "diversion".
It is also clear that these monies amounting to Rs. 106 4 crores were transferred to
group companies and other corporates, without there being any contracts or approvals
for the same, thus attracting the definition of" diversion" under Section 4.1(b) of the
30lh May 2002 RBI notification.
The 30th May 2002 RBI notification also defines " siphoning" of public funds to be "
construed to occur if any funds borrowed from banks/ FIs are utilized for purposes un
related to the operations of the borrower to the detriment of the financial health of the
entity of the lender". It has been established on the basis of the IFCI Report that the
Project funds that included borrowed public financial institution/bank funds were
utilized for purposes unrelated to the Project. The press cuttings shown at page 241242 of the Compilation on Finance state that the telephone and electricity connections
of SMHPCL has been severed due to non-payment. Thus the financial health of the
entity has suffered even as Rs. 106.4 crores of Project funds including public funds
were diverted to entities without contracts and who did no work on the Project. This
can only be regarded as the "siphoning" of funds.
The SMHPCL has sought to argue that these diverted monies of Rs. 106.4 crores
were not from public funds as according to them, by October 1998, when the said
amount of 106.4 Crores was disbursed, only Rs. 19 crores had come in from the Dena
Bank by the way of public funds. Therefore by implication they have sought to suggest
that these monies had been disbursed from their promoter’s contribution and therefore
it was not public funds that the SMHPCL was distributing to agencies unconnected to
the Project either by work or by contracts. This contention is not acceptable because
firstly, by 31st December 1998, as per the Balance Sheet of the SMHPCL, only Rs. 65
crores had come in as shareholder's funds. Obviously, Rs. 106.4 crores cannot be
conjured from Rs. 65 crores, and therefore it is a mixture of shareholders funds and
loan funds that was diverted. Secondly, because the SMHPCL is a 100 % held
subsidiary of a listed company ie. a public company, it is under the Section 43 A of the
Companies Act, a deemed public company , implying that its shareholder's as well as
loan funds are public funds.
Thirdly, the Policy of the Ministry of Power on private participation in the power sector.
Gazette notification 22.10.1991 states that "at least 11 % of the total outlay must come
through promoter's contribution" in any private power Project, especially one that is
seeking public financing such as the Maheshwar Project. At the level of outlay cleared
by the techno-economic clearance of 1996 of Rs. 1569 crores, the promoter's
contribution at 11% needs to be at least Rs. 172 crores.
Thus, this minimum level of promoter's contribution as a proportion of the public funds
is legally required (Please note that the infused Rs. 136.4 crores is lower than the
required Rs. 172 crores) as the basis of any further public financing, and once public
financing comes in, the promoters equity is inextricably mixed up with the public funds
that have come in, and the entire amount becomes a domain for the scrutiny by the
public financial institutions participating in the Project and approval about the use of
these monies need to be taken from them. The SMHPCL cannot then claim that if it
has given away Rs. 106.4 crores without adequate justification it has done so out of its
own money. This is the reason why the IFCI Report states that "the company has also
not taken any approval from the Institutions in this respect before appointing them"
and stipulates the return of the entire sum of Rs. 106.4 crores along with interest as an
important pre-disbursement condition for any more public funds to be infused into the
Project. Thus for the SMHPCL to claim that the Rs. 106.4 crores was given out of its
promoter's contribution cannot be justified by any means. It may be regarded that the
Rs. 106.4 crores was given out of Project funds, a very substantial part of which was
public borrowings.
Thus, if the S.Kumars have defaulted to the Power Finance Corporation on one hand.
on the other they have diverted crores of rupees out of the project which has not yet
been fully recovered. Had this money been available, they would not have needed io
default on their payments.
The Section 7 of the RBI notification of May 2002 stipulates that no additional facilities
should be granted by any bank/ Fl to the listed willful defaulters. In case of siphoning
and diversion of funds, the entrepreneurs and promoters of companies ...should
be debarred from institutional finance, and the lenders may initiate criminal
proceedings against willful defaulters, wherever necessary. However, instead of
stopping all institutional finance to the S.Kumars for the abuse of public money and
initiating criminal proceedings against them, they are being given further amounts of
public money, at the insistence of the state and Central governments.
Track record of wilful default
Il must be noted that the S.Kumars group have a track record of willful default. In
addition to the Rs. 18.97 crores outstanding on a Rs. 44.75 crore loan taken in 19992000 from the MPSIDC that is the cause of the attachment of the Maheshwar Project
properties , the S.Kumars Power Corporation Limited now known as the Induj
Enertech Limited was declared "willful defaulter" by the MPSIDC through a public
notice in the Economic Times on the 13th of September 2002 for defaulting on a loan
of Rs. 8.02 crores plus interest taken from the MPSIDC in 1997-98. That by the public
notice of the 13th September, 2002 another S.Kumars company - M/s Modak Rubber
and Textile Industry Private Limited was also declared a willful defaulter. The notice
reveals the utter contempt that the S.Kumars have for public money. It says " Despite
several intimation, lots of opportunities and demand notices given by them, the
aforementioned Companies have not bothered to pay or respond."
That yet another IFCI Report of 10th June 2002 notes that another S.Kumars company
- the S.Kumars Nationwide Limited - their flagship company has willfully defaulted on
its loans despite being able to pay when it states " Even after restructuring, it (SKNL)
is defaulting to IFCI as well as to other institutions despite having cash accruals of Rs.
63 crores for the year ending September 2001". The SKNL has defaulted in the
repayment of the principal and interest to IFCI even after the restructuring of the loan.
The institution has stated that the company has diverted substantial funds without
permission from lending institutions from the SKNL to their Ready to Wear business
division.
(See Annexure : IFCI Note of 10th June 2002)
That, as per media reports, in April 2002, the SBI Caps has filed a winding up petition
under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 against the SMHPCL for non- payment
of dues worth Rs. 3.7 crores plus interest in the Indore High Court. That the SBI Caps
has filed a winding up petition under Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 against
S.Kumars Nationwide Ltd. in the Mumbai High Court. In May 2002, the SBI Caps also
started separate legal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act against the diversified textile firm for issuing post date cheques that have
bounced.
That since the S.Kumars have been guilty of diversion of funds both in SMHPCL
(106.4 crores and 19.3 crores) and in SKNL, and willful defaults in the case of SKNL.
Induj Enertech Limited and Modak Rubber and Textile Company Limited as well as
defaults by the SMHPCL, it is not a single instance of financial irregularities , rather
there seems to be a clear track record. That since the rating that can be given under
these circumstances to the Project can only be a D - (for default) and since the IFCI is
a public financial institution there can be no question of it giving public money or
supporting a bonds issue for the S.Kumars.
Project properties never paid for:
In addition to a record of multiple willful defaults and actions that can only be
interpreted as diversion and the siphoning of public funds, the S.Kumars have not
even paid for the Project properties that they took over at the time of privatization in
1992 and have enjoyed for more than a decade since then. The Reports of the CAG
of India of 1998 and 2000 note that the Promoters are yet to pay crores of rupees to
the state government for these properties.
o
It may be recalled that when the NBA brought all these issues in to the public domain,
the S.Kumars responded by trying to gag public criticism by bringing a Court injunction
against the NBA since October 2002. However on the 29th of March, 2003, the City
Civil Court disposed off the injunctions and the contempt cases brought in by the
S.Kumars.
Enron, all over again
Tragically, these very same public financial institutions had reposed a similar
confidence as lenders in the Enron's high cost Dabhol Project. The results are there
for all to see. Today more than Rs. 6250 crores of public money from the financial
institutions lie locked in this Project. The Fl's have now proposed that they write off
Rs. 1500 crores of loans given to the Dabhol Project out of public money in order to
make the Project viable.
The Godbole Report that had investigated the Dabhol Report said " The Committee is
surprised at the breadth of governance failure which has occurred time, across
governments and across agencies. Organs of both the Centre and the State level
appear to have been remiss in their functions. .. every one of the assumptions relating
to the benefits of the project have proved to be false, and indeed were false at the
time of the assertions.." The Report also states that" the Committee also finds that the
financial institutions showed poor judgment and lack of due diligence ... the decision
of the financial institutions to fund this Project seems to have been based primarily on
escrow account given by MSEB , guarantee by the state government and the counter
guarantee by the Central government rather than an independent and meticulous
appraisal of the project..." The story of Maheshwar is eerily similar. The same story of
the collusion state and Central governments at the highest level and pressure on all
institutions including the financial institutions in order to favor an undeserving
corporate is being repeated in the case of the Maheshwar Project
The Narmada valley demands
The Narmada Bachao Andolan and the people of the Narmada valley condemn these
attempts of the state and Central governments to squander public money and force
Indian public financial institutions such as the LIC to take decisions to invest in a
Project whose promoters are guilty of willful default, diversion and siphoning of funds,
and whose properties are under attachment. The NBA calls on the LIC and the otherpublic Financial institutions to refuse to comply with the illegal and illegitimate
demands of the apex political leadership and not to put another paisa into this flawed
and controversial project. The NBA asks them to immediately recall public money
already invested in the Project and initiate criminal proceedings against the Promoters
in consonance with the RBI rules. It also asserts that they will launch a mass
movement through out the country exposing and condemning the blatant malpractices
of the state and Central governments and their unholy alliance, and reiterates its
resolve and determination not to allow another Enron be built - in the shape of the
Maheshwar Project.
IO
-
THE'SSP
WITHDRAWN from
THE WORLD BASK
'-AREH-VAHLVTS
VIEWS
■
nnca
Action Research in
Community Health & development
On 30th March, 1993 Dr.Bimal Jalan the Indian Executive
Director of the World Bank informed his colleagues in the Board
that GOI was withdrawing the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP)
from the World Bank.
First reports including that of PTI coming from Washington
failed to inform the readers of the English Newspapers the
reasons Dr. Jalan gave for GOI's withdrawal. The English media,
by and large critical of the SSP, had little difficulty in jumping
tfl^he conclusion that for the GOI there was no other choice left
because the governments had failed to satisfy the benchmark
conditions set by the Bank in October 1992. In the lengthy
editorials and detailed analysis that followed one failed to find
the nature, contents and the background of the conditions which
were the focal points of critical comments.
The Prime Minister Mr. Narasimha Rao speaking to the
Press in Ahmedabad on 3rd April'93, said that this was a
question of self-respect; the GOI could not accept the Bank loan
at the expense of self-respect. The Chief Minister of Gujarat
echoed the feeling. However, it is interesting to know that the
analysts, commentators and editors of the Newspapers made
little first hand inquiry to find out the actual benchmark
conditions and the extent of failure to fulfill these conditions.
Tij|re was little evidence of deeper probing of the event or even
a recognition of a need for it. Their source of information seemed
to be the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA).
There are strong reasons to believe that the GOI's final
withdrawal is a logical culmination of a process that began
when Mr. Bradford Morse, the ex UNDP chief was appointed
to head the Inquiry Commission on the SSP. In early 1991 the
Inquiry was instituted at the behest of the Executive Directors
i
(EDs) of Northern Europe and America. Majority of them were
undei; political pressure from some MPs, Congressmen and
Senators of their respective countries who in turn were all too
ready to accept whatever adverse criticism about the SSP that
was fed to them by the Northern Environmental NGOs-NBA
combine. There was little attempt by them to cross check from
other sources the facts and analysis they were being fed. The
submissions made to the Senate Sub-Committees, to the
Ministries and to the EDs of the World Bank by thase
environmental NGOs since 1988 were full of fallacies, half truWE,
distortions, misinformation and misinterpretations about the SSP.
Neither the GOI nor the GOG did anything to effectively counter
the propaganda blasts against the SSP. There lie the roots of
institution of Morse-Berger Inquiry Commission.
the counter arguments carefully and arrive at objectively
balanced conclusions. We did not take very long to discover
that we were completely wrong.
We and many others in Gujarat had anxieties about the
reasons for which the Morse-Berger Inquiry was set up and the
way it was set up. This was also conveyed to the Bank. But once
the Inquiry began, many like us, accepted it. We were told that
both Mr. Morse and Mr. Berger were well-known for their
experience, knowledge and robustness, and that they were
highly reputed individuals. We were assured that because of
their robustness they will be able to conduct the Inquiry in an
objective and fair manner. Once the Inquiry was under way^.e
discovered on several occasions that other team members showd
marked tilts towards the anti-dam cause. We however relied on
the objectivity and fairness of Mr. Morse and Mr. Berger and
ignored the manifest tilts. Given their solid background of law
and their reputation, we felt assured that the concrete evidence
of documents and reports we were giving them and the unique
access they had to the information from all the sides concerned,
they were bound to sift the evidence fairly and skillfully, weigh
In June 1992, their bulky Report was made public. A quick
reading through some important chapters including the 'Letter
to the President' and 'Findings and Recommendations', warned
us about the sweeping and dramatic conclusions they had
reached and serious problems these contained. An in depth
Jfcdy of each chapter along with all the documents they had
cited and which we could lay our hands on, confirmed our
worst fears. The whole of the Morse Report is riddled with
serious factual errors, logical fallacies, innumerable nonsequiturs, serious methodological flaws, distortions of documents
and facts, suppression of important facts and mischievous
ambiguities to prove only one point that the project authorities
and the officers of the Bank working in collusion have ignored
the human and environmental factors and that the SSP is nonviable. In a clear transgression of their TORs they raised the
issue of hydrology unconvincingly and in the process cast serious
aspersions on the integrity and competence of the judicial body
like the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT) without
really giving any cogent reasons for doing so, to make a dramatic
i^pmmendation in the 'Letter to the President', "we think that
the wisest course would be for the Bank to step back from the
Projects and consider them afresh." Through their massive
Report, they have thrown their heavy weight behind the
Northern environmentalists-NBA combine with complete
abandon . Their conclusions about the impossibility of R&R,
about the heavy environmental cost of the Project and it being
nonviable are completely those of environmentalists-NBA
combine. The interesting aspect of such identical conclusions is
2
3
I
i
that both give vastly different sets of reasons for almost same
conclusions! Morse-Berger have doubtlessly taken a calculated
gamble that in the West, save the supporters of the
environmentalists, there will be very little attention to the Report
and the interested environmentalists will simply endorse them
and their Report; in India it will pass the muster very easily
and it will be subjected to very little scrutiny by the antagonistic
Indian Press. Their gamble has paid off. In their own countries
they could not have taken such a gamble.
A
The Northern EDs who had originally forced the
appointment of Morse-Berger Review were inclined to accept
the Report fully. Those in the Bank management who were in
live and direct contact with the SSP however had a very different
assessment of it. The serious errors in the Report were quickly
detected by them. It was clear that the conclusions were flawed.
A way out was probably sought to be found. On Sept 11, 1992,
the Bank President sent to the EDs a document known as Next
Steps, which avoided head on collision with the Morse-Berger
Report and concentrated on much needed hard headed vital
reforms. Morse-Berger were intensely unhappy with the Next
Steps. They took an unusual step. On October 13 1992, they sent
a fax letter to the Bank President with-copies to all the EDs. The
fax letter in its first part stated "We believe this Next s^h
document, along with its Annexes is misleading. It ignores or
misrepresents the main findings of our Review ... Given the
many projects before the Bank, we cannot expect you or the
Executive Directors to have the familiarity with the Sardar Sarovar
Projects issues that we gained during the course of our work. But
we do want to ensure that the senior decision makers at the
Bank are not left with an account of our findings that is* at
variance with what we wrote" (emphasis added).
4
The letter then went on to recapitulate what they considered
to be the crux of their findings in the Report which they alleged
the Next steps had 'ignored' and 'misrepresented'. They were:
□ failure of Bank's incremental strategy to achieve
successful resettlement and rehabilitation.
□ problem of canal affected persons in Gujarat.
□ problems of plans to deal with landless in MP.
□ violation of standards of environmental requirements
by
the project.
□ problems of Pari-passu approach for environmental
measures.
□ Hydrology issue.
□ Sedimentation.
They admitted at the end of the letter that their Review had
'no longer any formal existence', and yet asked for a meeting
with the EDs to discuss their Report. Interestingly enough, the
recap quietly dropped their Report's most damaging findings
and conclusions related to R&R of tribals of Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh. The Letter to the President in the Report
repeated at least six times that the encroacher oustees in both
the states constituting thousands of families will be seriously
harmed by the existing R&R policy. This finding alone had
provoked strong response from some Northern NGOs. This
major contention incidently was vigorously refuted with reasons
by us in our letter to Mr. Preston on 19th September, 1992.
5
The World Bank President Mr. Preston did not think he
needed any help from Morse-Berger to adequately assess their
Report. Reacting to their serious allegations he wrote to Mr.
Morse on October 16, 1992 that "The common theme... that the
findings and conclusions of the Report you submitted last June
have been misrepresented or ignored in the document which I
circulated to the Executive Directors on September 11 is highly
disconcerting assertion." (Emphasis ours). He went on to argue
forcefully "that the notion that senior decision makers in t^
Bank may be in danger of acting without a full appreciation or
what is said in the Report is simply wrong."
We do not know whether or how the EDs reacted to this
obviously patronizing help to offer them summary of the
Report's main findings so that they were not misguided by
misrepresentations. Surely they could easily find out for
themselves whether the Bank management was really
misguiding them about the main findings of the Report. After
all they had forced the Inquiry in the first place. They were
bound to read the momentous Report with the thoroughness it
deserved.
In the event however the Morse team met only the EDs of
Northern nations (GIO nations) on 22nd Oct, 1992, a day pricer
to the Board meeting and all the EDs on the day of meeti^.
Not surprisingly the Northern EDs almost unanimously accepted
what Morse-Berger considered to be their major findings,
brushing aside the explicit and implicit critical analysis contained
in the Next Steps and other antecedent documents, briefings
and discussions.
Ms.Herfkins of Holland forcefully asserted that Morse
was commissioned because the Board couldn't trust the
Bank staff.
Mr.Rill of Austria castigated the management for
excessive lobbying of EDs and claimed that management
had not proven trustworthy.
Mr.Peretz of U.K. expressed concern that all was not
well with the Project, that the Morse Report had
confirmed that there have been serious failings in the
design and implementation of the Project from the outset,
that the Report is a serious indictment of the Indian
authorities and of the Bank management, that it presented
clear evidence that the Bank's own guidelines for the
resettlement have been repeatedly ignored and there
has been consistent failure to meet time table of work on
environmental impact assessment. He seemed to accept
what Morse told Eds of the GIO Nations on the previous
day that Bank's incremental policy on resettlement and
Pari-Passn approach adopted for environmental
assessment have failed.
Mr. Patrick Coady of US spoke with greatest eloquence
in support of Morse-Berger Report. He obviously did
not need quick and ready help Morse-Berger gave to the
EDs. He said "We have all read the Morse Commission
Report, which focuses on a specific Project.......... I think
it is fair to say that their concerns and their recommendations
are substantive, detailed, clear and have withstood scrutiny".
Then he said:
In the crucial Board meeting on 23rd October 1992, these
EDs spoke.
"After all of these, we have come to this position:
6
7
O
The Independent Review has prepared a serious objective and
intellectually honest analysis and has recommended an approach
that is appropriate and offers a best chance to turn this project
around. We accept the findings of the Independent Review.
We recommend that the Bank step Back and reappraise the
Project.
Q We strongly reject the approach Bank management has
asked us to endorse. It is an explicit repudiation of the
central finding of the Morse Commission: that the increment}
approach employed for the past seven years has failed, and that
a continuation of this approach cannot resolve, and may even
compound, the project's fundamental problems. We want to
be recorded as opposing voting against option three/'
(Emphasis ours)
Mr Codey's bold and unambiguous assertions of having
read the Report and having found it objective, well scrutinised
and intellectually honest not-withstanding, it is quite striking to
note a fact that alongwith Morse-Berger he also dropped the
issue of thousands of encroacher PAPs in Maharashtra and MP
being left, without resources after resettlement. Morse-Berger,
by repeatedly raising this issue in "Letter to the President"
section of the report, had in fact raised it to a level of one of
central issues of R&R.
w
How did Mr Codey miss this central issue? Of the seven
major issues discussed in the faxed letter he chose only one
issue - failure of incremental strategy in R&R - to extend his
whole hearted support to the Report. All others including those
on the environment were omitted.
What M/s. Morse-Berger consider to be their central finding
i.e. failure of incremental strategy in R&R is based on a string
of arguments / findings; each of its links is either unrelated to
the factual reality or is based on suppression of facts.
O
Did Mr. Codey really agree with them:
☆ that from the outset there’ was no Bank appraisal of
Resettlement Component in SSP in violation of the
Bank's own R&R Policy of 1980?
☆ that the Scudder mission was not really an appraisal?
O
'
What did he think of the fact that the Staff Appraisal
Report (1985) of the SSP specifically mentions Scudder
mission as appraisal and did he find suppression and
distortions of contents of Scudder's 1983 report and other
vital documents on which "the central finding" of the
Report is based?
If he didn't, this can be readily shown. If he did- then what
can be said about his bold assertions?
In the concluding part of his speech he said " what is at
stake is the credibility of the Bank and the various governmental
^horities in India. I believe it is fair to ask that they earn back
the trust of this Board. If this Board accepts the Bank's option (as
contained in the 'Next Steps') I believe the consequences will
be as follows:
O
It will be rejection of the Independent Review, which
will bring into question the integrity of this process
and the Board's willingness to exercise its responsi
bilities.
9
O
It will signal that no matter how egregious the situa
tion, no matter how flawed the project, no matter how
many policies have been violated and no matter how
clear the remedies prescribed, the Bank will go forward
on its own terms."
Then he urged the Directors "to accept Independent Review,
its recommendations and not continue down the path of
incremental actions. "In fact" he said, "I do not see how any
other approach than that identified by the Morse Commiss^ i
can, in good conscience, be adopted."
Then followed a close vote at the end of which a statement
was released by the Board favoring continuing support for the
Projects because they wished to give the "benefit of the doubt
to the Government of India." Key benchmarks based on the
Next Steps for assessing the performance in the resettlement
and environment areas had been worked out. A special Bank
Review mission would visit India during April 1993 to assess
the progress. If there was a recommendation to continue to
support the Projects, it was to be submitted to the EDs for
approval.
But the message Codey gave was loud and clear. A clear
signal had gone out of the Board room that the Northern jj^'S
had extended a full support to Morse-Berger who had fully
supported environmentalists-NBA combine. Their approval
received wide publicity in Europe and America. They provided
not only a huge credibility to the Morse-Berger Report but also
provided yet another potent tool in the hands of the
environmentalists to beat down the Project and the Bank
management in total disregard of the facts. Morse-Berger had
poured ridicule and heaped unjustified humiliations on the SSP.
10
Now the Northern EDs played their role.
In the last quarter of 1992, a massive campaign was
unleashed in India and abroad that the Next Steps was a big
fraud; that it was a sham to deceive the EDs; that it was a
desperate coverup exercise of the Bank management to
marginalize Morse-Berger Report. Parts of Mr. codey's speech
unreservedly supporting Morse-Berger Report and stinging
criticism of the Project and the Bank management were freely
(^bted with approval. Powerful campaign was unleashed that
the Bank management will continue to fund the Project no matter
how badly India performed. The Northern EDs had given crucial
clues, although Mr Peretz (U.K.) had noted in his speech that
Government of India had strongly indicated its willingness to
go ahead with or without Bank support. He expressed his worry,
"Whether our social, environmental and technical concerns are
likely to be better met if the Bank remains engaged with the
Project or whether there is a good chance of meeting them if the
Project continues without Bank support."
However, Mr. Codey representing the dominant thinking
amongst Northern EDs had given strong signals about their
intention in the future, no matter what were the findings of the
A^ril 1993 Bank mission.
A stage was set for the smarting government to turn away
from the Bank. During the course of subsequent 5 months the
central government was probably forced to conclude that Codey
line rather than Peretz line would prevail and that the benchmark
performance was only a temporary tactical retreat. Another
unwarranted and worse humiliation was probably in the offing.
The withdrawal from the Bank was almost inevitable from the
day when Mr. Codey - supported by the EDs of GIO nations -
11
O
It will signal that no matter how egregious the situa
tion, no matter how flawed the project, no matter how
many policies have been violated and no matter how
clear the remedies prescribed, the Bank will go forward
on its own terms."
Then he urged the Directors "to accept Independent Review,
its recommendations and not continue down the path of
incremental actions. "In fact" he said, "I do not see how any
other approach than that identified by the Morse Commis^ i
can, in good conscience, be adopted."
Then followed a close vote at the end of which a statement
was released by the Board favoring continuing support for the
Projects because they wished to give the "benefit of the doubt
to the Government of India." Key benchmarks based on the
Next Steps for assessing the performance in the resettlement
and environment areas had been worked out. A special Bank
Review mission would visit India during April 1993 to assess
the progress. If there was a recommendation to continue to
support the Projects, it was to be submitted to the EDs for
approval.
But the message Codey gave was loud and clear. A clear
signal had gone out of the Board room that the Northern ^ps
had extended a full support to Morse-Berger who had fully
supported environmentalists-NBA combine. Their approval
received wide publicity in Europe and America. They provided
not only a huge credibility to the Morse-Berger Report but also
provided yet another potent tool in the hands of the
environmentalists to beat down the Project and the Bank
management in total disregard of the facts. Morse-Berger had
poured ridicule and heaped unjustified humiliations on the SSP.
10
Now the Northern EDs played their role.
In the last quarter of 1992, a massive campaign was
unleashed in India and abroad that the Next Steps was a big
fraud; that it was a sham to deceive the EDs; that it was a
desperate coverup exercise of the Bank management to
marginalize Morse-Berger Report. Parts of Mr. codey's speech
unreservedly supporting Morse-Berger Report and stinging
criticism of the Project and the Bank management were freely
(^bted with approval. Powerful campaign was unleashed that
the Bank management will continue to fund the Project no matter
how badly India performed. The Northern EDs had given crucial
clues, although Mr Peretz (U.K.) had noted in his speech that
Government of India had strongly indicated its willingness to
go ahead with or without Bank support. He expressed his worry,
"Whether our social, environmental and technical concerns are
likely to be better met if the Bank remains engaged with the
Project or whether there is a good chance of meeting them if the
Project continues without Bank support."
9
However, Mr. Codey representing the dominant thinking
amongst Northern EDs had given strong signals about their
intention in the future, no matter what were the findings of the
7^?ril 1993 Bank mission.
A stage was set for the smarting government to turn away
from the Bank. During the course of subsequent 5 months the
central government was probably forced to conclude that Codey
line rather than Peretz line would prevail and that the benchmark
performance was only a temporary tactical retreat. Another
unwarranted and worse humiliation was probably in the offing.
The withdrawal from the Bank was almost inevitable from the
day when Mr. Codey - supported by the EDs of GIO nations -
11
declared that he had read the Report and had found it
intellectually honest and well scrutinised. The mystery is not
that the GOI pulled out, the mystery is why did they take so
long?
The EDs have failed to see the central points of R&R. Though
they have praised and endorsed the Morse-Berger Report for its
objectivity, truthfulness and intellectual honesty and have taken
Bank management to the task for adopting the incremental
strategy for R&R, they have obviously not read the Moi^>
Berger Report critically enough.
Had they done so, and had they also referred to the other
important documents Morse-Berger truncate or suppress, they
would have understood and appreciated that it is the Bank's
continuous involvement and interaction with the pro R&R NGOs
like Oxfam (U.K.), ARCH-Vahini and individuals like prof.
Scudder and ironically enough the then Executive Director Tim
Lancaster (U.K.), which has shaped the R&R policy in
incremental fashion firstly in Gujarat, the best so far, and then
in Maharashtra and MP better than any other in India. Not only
this, they would have known that the Bank's close monitoring
of the R&R with critical feed backs from the same NGOs has
resulted in the good implementation of the policy in Gujarat
and that this would ensure a strong possibility of this happe
in Maharashtra and MP. They failed to see that this has
strengthened the hands of pro R&R NGOs and oustees and
those in the administration who wanted a fair R&R for the
tribals.
By uncritically rejecting the success of incremental strategy
in the SSP, by wrongly condemning the World bank's
involvement in the SSP and by humiliating the SSP, the Northern
EDs supported Morse-Berger-Environmentalists-NBA tirade
against the Projects and created conditions which forced the
GOI to withdraw. In lending their uncritical support to the
Morse-Berger Report and through that to the motivated
environmentalists of the North, they have unwittingly and
^necessarily created clouds of uncertainty for the tribal oustees
of Maharashtra and M.P. and brought down the nascent process
of building much needed reforms of policy changes at macro
level and of implementation at micro level. The EDs have
probably overlooked the grave implications for other Bank
financed Projects in the World with the cluster of Northern
Environmentalists bent upon opposing the Bank supported
Projects every where in the World irrespective of the facts.
This has created a piquant situation for groups like ours.
We largely share the assessment of the governments with regards
to Morse-Berger Report, its gross -unfairness,ineptness and
interference. We know how the Northern EDs acted, and forced
the situation. We do not know what precisely happened around
the final crucial decision of the GOI. However in the background
have, described above it has little significance. We are,
however, not all together very comfortable with the situation
the EDs have inadvertently created in which unmonitored
resettlement will be done by the state government of Maharashtra
and more particularly of MP.
The NBA and its Northern allies have long ago abandoned
the cause of R&R in the SSP. The vast majority of tribals in
Maharashtra and in MP who were kept in dark about the true
goals and methods of the NBA supported them for sometime
12
13
but eventually found out that their first concern - a proper R&R
- was not really the concern of the NBA. In fact as in Maharashtra
their basic demands were being manipulated by the NBA while
keeping the tribals in dark. Anybody who is familiar with the
grass-root situation in Maharashtra and tribal villages of MP
know that ground is fast slipping away from under its feet. The
tribals want proper R&R. They have little use for victories
implicit in suspensions and withdrawals. Yesterdays high profile
resistance symbols of Manibelli and Bamani are no more
The environmentalists - NBA having abandoned the goal of
R&R will do nothing else but clamor that R&R is impossible
and work for the fulfillment of their prophecy. So that they
might be able to claim with a sense of triumph "we told you
so, yet another R&R disaster".
Until the first quarter of 1988, for the parent activist
organizations of NBA in Maharashtra and M.P., the R&R policy
affecting tribals was the object of serious criticism and concern.
The SSP itself was not under attack. Then after December 1987
the scene suddenly got transformed. The SSP became the target
and R & R the weapon against the SSP. One of the first public
attacks on the SSP was mounted before the U.S. Senate by the
U.S. environmentalist group EDF in June 1988. T]j&
environmental cost of the SSP was shown to be in fact higlW
than the total Project cost, rendering it economically crippled.
This attack derived its charge from sketchy and mischievous
information provided by some in the Department of
Environment and Forest of India. This environmental-cumeconomic argument which reigned supreme for about 3 years
was decisively shown to be fictitious by many economists, Vijay
Paranjapye being one of them. The standard of arguments
against the SSP, including that of Morse-Berger, has shown no
14
improvement. Yet the SSP remains a maligned Project and R&R
remains a weapon to fight it.
The SSP at the most can be delayed. It cannot be stopped,
postulated resource crunch not withstanding. Morse-Berger were
the Environmentalists-NBA's best bet to mount a credible attack
on the SSP. Morse-Berger have failed and so has the violent
irrational intellectual attack on the SSP.
A In September 1988, when we knew little of this extensive
iWwork of motivated alliance, national and international, we
had asked NBA's predecessor activist organizations :
"Those of us who have worked amongst the oustees and
who are now making this radical shift must ask, "will we really
ask these oustees to drown themselves in the rising waters of
the dam'?"
I
We had further argued,
"we do not share the strategic perceptions of those who are
wittingly or unwittingly using the issue of rehabilitation of
oustees in the cause of fight against dam. To us this is not
responsible activism."
Our appeal was rejected. From the very beginning, before
(flqarat declared its liberal December 1987 policy, and after that
we have always taken view and publicly stated that given the
nature of administrative apparatus in India their ability to
implement a policy with care and fineness is lacking. An
objective and fair monitoring and goading of section of
administration is required. In our opinion the World Bank staff
together with pro-R&R NGOs and other forces were doing this
difficult job well inspite of the unfair and relentless attack on
them by environmentalists.
15
Thanks to the strategic perceptions of the key Northern EDs
and Morse-Berger we are face to face with a vital question: now
that the Bank is out and the tribal oustees in Maharashtra and
MP in increasing numbers are demanding a fair R&R, if the
GOI fails to keep its promise and to force the states to implement
R&R policies in fair manner, what will happen then ?
ARCH-VAHINI
At & Po. Mangrol,
Tai. Rajpipla,
Dist. Bharuch,
Gujarat.
INDIA - 393150.
April 13, 1993
WHY DOES ARCH-VAHINI
NOT PARTICIPATE
IN THE SSP REVIEW
DISCUSSIONS?
urcu
Action Research in Community
Health & Development
Published by.
ARCH - VAHINI
Post. Mangrol.
Ta. Rajpipla, Bharuch.
Printed at
Shreeji Offset.
8, Laxmi Estate,
Karelibaug,
VADODARA.
Contribution Rs. 5.00
Why does ARCH-VAHINI not
Participate in the SSP - Review
Discussions ?
An Exchange of letters beween the
Group on the SSP and ARCH - VAHINI.
October 2, 1993
ARCH - VAHINI
At & Po. Mangrol
Tai. Rajpipla, Dist Bharuch
Gujarat, India - 390 150.
Preface
The Sardar Sarovar Project (India) on the river Narmada
continues to be surrounded by controversy. However, as the
time goes by, it becomes clearer and clearer that very potent
and powerful interests within the Central Government of India
and outside are fuelling the controversy for their own ends. It
is also becoming clearer that issues like human rights,
environmental conservation etc. are being used more as fronts
than the real issues of concern.
Mr. V.C.Shukla, Minister of Water Resources, Government of
India has finally chosen to reveal his hand behind the
controversy and the powerful impetus he has been giving to
the controversy. Earlier this year he had stalled the further
release of 1500 hectares of degraded forests lands for the
rehabilitation of tribal oustees in Maharashtra by not putting
up a note to the Cabinet as a minister he was required io do.
He went further to declare that no more degraded forest land
shall be released for rehabilitation. This was not for him to say,
this being the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment and
Forests (MOEF).
As a Minister, he hasn’t hesitated to use
vital institutional mechanisms, which should be employed to
resolve deep-seated, conflicts in a democratic frame, to further
his own political calculations. In the long chain of demands
for the Review of the Project initiated first by the "six
intellectuals” at the clear instance of the MOEF in December
1986, Morse Report added its own inpetus by relying on
dubious assessment of hydrology of the river, which apparently
relied on the MOEF’s shaky arguments. Now Mr. V.C. Shukla
at tandem with the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) has
Joined their game of "Review”, his catedgrical Statement to
the Contrary in the Parliament notwithstanding, by appointing
the Group headed by Dr Jayant Patil, member Planning
Commissioon. There are strong parallels between the Group
he has constituted and the appointment of Bradford Morse
Commission at the behest of powerful Excecutive Directors of
the World Bank.
Much more important issues like further improvement in the
R&R policy of Madhya Pradesh and functioning of the
administration of the Government of Madhya Pradesh which is
effectively now being controlled by Mr. V.C.Shukla himself,
other issues and the critical monitoring these areas require
have gone into the background.
ARCH-VAHINI continues to send out its analyses and
perceptions as the events unfold. We were invited by the
Group headed by Dr. Jayant Patil, member Planning
Commission, to present our views. We have politely refused to
participate in the proceedings, realizing it as yet another move
in the deep game of politics against the SSP. In this
publication, we reproduce the exchange that took place
between ARCH-VAHINI and Dr. Jayant Patil, Chairman of the
Group. We remain deeply concerned about the way the basic
issues are being handled, the institutional mechanisms to
resolve
such
issues
are
being
manipulated
and
strategically-placed individuals are using such mechanismsl
and such issues to further their own ends nationally and
internationally
October 2, 1993.
ARCH-VAHINI
Mangrol.
Dr. Jayant Patil
MEMBER
Convenor, Group on
PLANNING COMMISSION
Sardar Savovar Project YOJNA BHAVAN, NEW DELHI-110 001
NO. PC/M(JP)/SSP/93
DATED AUGUST 19, 1993
To,
The Director,
Action Research in Community
Health & Development,
At & Post Mangrol,
Taluak Rajpipla, Distt. Bharuch,
Gujarat - 393 150
Sub: Meeting of the Group on Sardar Sarovar ProjectSeptember 8, 1993
Sir
As you must be aware that the Ministry of Water
Resources has set up on 5th August, 1993 (copy of the Office
Memorandum is enclosed) a Group comprising of five
members including myself as Convenor, on Sardar Sarovar
Project. Accordingly, the Group will meet on Wednesday, the
8th September, 1993 at 10.00 A.M. in my chamber (Room No.
115) in the Planning Commission, Yojana Bhavan, New Delhi.
I request you to kindly make it convenient to come over here
to present your views in this meeting on Sardar Sarovar
Project. You may also bring the necessary written
material/documents in support of your presentation.
A line in reply confirming your participation will be
appreciated.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
'* 3
Sd. (Jayant Patil)
3
VAHINI-ARCH
P.O. Mangrol
via Rajpipla - 393150
Distt. Bharuch
Gujarat
September 1 , 1993
To
Dr. Jayant Patil
Convener, Group on Sardar Sarovar Project
Member,
Planning Commission
Yojna Bhavan
New Delhi 110 001
Sub:
Meeting of the Group on SSP -September
8, 1993.
Dear Dr. Patil,
Thank you for your letter dated 19th August inviting us
to present our views on the Sardar Sarovar Project. An
opportunity to share our views and analyses on this important
developmental issue with such eminent persons like you and
other members of your group would have been a matter of
immense pleasure and privilege. But we are sorry to say that
the manner in which the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR)
has formed this Group and various aspects surrounding its
formation make it impossible for a group like ours to participate
in its proceedings.
Firstly, we think that your Group is concerned with the
discussions between the MOWR and the Narmada Bachao
Andolan (NBA) only and as such there is hardly any scope for
other independent groups like ours to participate in its
functioning. The Office Memorandum dated 5th August 1993
makes it clear when it states that this Group has been set up
by the MOWR to "continue the review discussions initiated
during the end of June, 1993...". You and other members of
your Group have also emphasised this point in your appeal to
the NBA of 5th August by explicitly stating that your group has
4
been set up by the MOWR to "continue the discussions with
the Narmada Bachao Andolan". All along the MOWR had
thought it fit to involve only the NBA in the process of formation
of this group and to exclude all other groups. Not only did it
hold lengthy discussions with the NBA in the end of June 1993
to work out the modalities and scope of this group, it went out
of its way to accommodate all the conditions put forward by
the NBA to participate in this process. We have all witnessed
the fact that the wordings of the Office Memorandum dated
3rd August 1993 were changed within two days at the instance
of the NBA and the all important word ‘Review’ was added. On
the other hand, not even preliminary discussions were held
with the other groups who^are as-involved in this controversy
as the NBA. And this, despite'thedact that the various groups
of Gujarat had submitted ar memorandum to the Hon’ble
Minister of Water Resources1 and had specifically asked for a
meeting with his ministry. Thus, it is clear that all along this
has been an affair between the MOWR and the NBA only.
Secondly, the all important question of the scope of
functioning of this Group has become highly ambiguous. The
Office Memorandum of 5th August states that this Group has
been formed “to continue the review discussions... of all issues
related with the Sardar Sarovar Project". This gives virtually
an unlimited scope to.the functioning of this Group and has
been interpreted by the NBA as the actual beginning of the
process of 'Review' of all aspects of the Sardar Sarovar Project,
implying that the MOWR has already accepted that there is a
prima-facie case for such a ‘Review’. On the other hand,
subsequent to the formation of this.group, the Hon’ble Minister
of Water Resources has made repeated statements in the
parliament that there is no question of Review of the Project
as it is not permitted by the Award of the Narmada Water
Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) and that the group will only discuss
the ecological and rehabilitation aspects of
*the
Project. Similar,
*,.
statement has been categorically made by the Hon’ble Prime ../
Minister. It is clear that these two interpretations of the scope
of functioning of this, group are poles apart and both of them
cannot be true at the same time. And: yet as far as we are
5
aware the MOWR has to date not taken any action to clear
this confusion. Even the joint statement that was to be released
at the end of June discussions has yet been not released and
as a result we do not even know as to what was discussed
and agreed upon in that meeting!
That the final Award of the NWDT which is binding on
all the concerned Governments has categorically ruled out the
review of the basic parameters of the Project prior to
completion of 45 years from the date of the Award has been
acknowledged by the Hon’ble Minister of Water Resources
himself. And yet his Ministry has unilaterally, arbitrarily and
without any legal authority initiated a process, which has the
dangerous potentials of reopening all the issues of an
inter-state water dispute which were fairly and squarely settled
by the Hon’ble Tribunal after thoroughly examining all the
aspects of the Project. What Is more, this has been done
without even examining whether the NBA has produced a well
documented factually correct critique of the Project or not and
at a time when our country is faced with the crisis of such
inter-state disputes threatening to divide the various states and
their people. The whole process smacks of petty politics and
malafide motives. This is a very serious and grave matter and
we are very sorry to say, Dr. Patil, that we can not be a party
to this.
While struggling first to obtain a good Rehabilitation
Policy for the tribal oustees of the SSP and then for its proper
implementation over the years, we have also studied and
minutely examined the other aspects of this Project. We have
examined in detail the critique of the Project produced by the
NBA and other anti-dam groups and have found that in all
important aspects the critique is completely devoid of factual
basis and most of their crucial contentions - whether it is the
question of 'rehabilitation of the oustees’ or the 'economic
viability of the Project’ or 'environmental costs of the Project’are simply not true. And yet the myth persists, largely due to
effective propaganda and media support, that the NBA and
other groups
have
produced
a well
documented
comprehensive critique of this Project!
6
We had hoped that the Morse-Berger Review, which
was appointed by the World Bank in circumstances not
dissimilar from the ones in which your group has been formed,
would examine the intricate web of issues in an objective and
fair manner and thus set the record straight in this long and
involved controversy. They had a unique opportunity to do so
as their review was accepted by all the concerned parties and
had received co-operation from all sides. We also cooperated
fully with them, even when the anti-dam movement had publicly
in the Press questioned their bonafides and raised serious
doubts about their competence. We had submitted massive
evidence and arguments which clearly refuted the anti-SSP
case of ‘Rehabilitation being impossible’ and ‘Environmental
costs far outweighing the benefits of the Project’. They had all
the evidences before them to arrive at an objective and true
assessment of the Project. However, they belied this
expectation when, their eloquence notwithstanding, they chose
to abandon the standards of the objectivity and fairness and
produced a report which is full of sweeping conclusions not
based on the facts or based on distortions and half truths. Our
well-argued and well-substantiated critique of their Report has
till date received no refutation.
Despite such negative experiences, we would have liked
to take this opportunity of presenting our case to a group of
distinguished persons, but as we have already stated above,
the various aspects of the formation of your Group compel us
to protest and abstain ourselves from participating in this
process. We simply cannot recognise this review group and
present our views before it.
With best regards,
Your’s Sincerely,
Sd (Ambrish Mehta)
7
MEMBER
PLANNING COMMISSION
YOJNA BHAVAN
NEW DELHI-110 001
D.O. NO. PC/M(JP)/SSP/93
September 8, 1993
Dear Shri Mehta,
I am in receipt of your letter dated September 1, 1993.
We take note of the reservations expressed by you. While
appreciating the strength of your sentiments, may we only
mention two points for your consideration? The first is that we
understand that a representative of ARCH-VAHINI had, in fact,
been included in the group of eminent persons invited as
observers to attend the meetings on June 29-30, 1993 and
that for some reasons ARCH-VAHINI did not participate in
those meetings.
Secondly,
the Office Memorandum
constituting this Group says specifically that "the Group will
hold discussions with different Opinion Groups". This Group
will greatly value your views on the important matters before
us. Your participation will be of great assistance to the Group
in completing its task. May we, therefore, request you to
reconsider your decision and come and talk to us ?
We would appreciate an early response to this letter.
With regards,
Yours sincerely,
(Jayant Patil)
Shri Ambrish Mehta,
VAHINI-ARCH
P.O. Mangrol,
via Rajpipla - 393150
Distt. Bharuch
Gujarat.
8
VAHINI-ARCH
P.O. Mangrol
via Rajpipla - 393150
Distt. Bharuch
Gujarat
September 20, 1993
To,
Dr. Jayant Patil
Convener, Group on Sardar Sarovar Project
Yojna Bhavan
New Delhi 110 001
Dear Dr. Patil,
. We very much appreciate your reply to our letter dated
September 1, 1993. We also appreciate the fact that you
recognize the strength of our feelings. Following is our
response to the points you have asked us to consider.
It is true that Minister (Water Resources) Mr. V.C.Shukla
did invite Dr. Anil. Patel of ARCH-Vahini to attend the meeting
on June 29-30, 1993 as one of the eminent persons from the
government side. I am surprised that you have not been told
that the meeting was basically held with the NBA and its
sympathisers and supporters. At no stage of preparation of
this meeting ARCH-Vahini or any other responsible NGOs in
support of the SSP was taken into confidence and was
involved in the formulation of Agenda. If you had an opportunity
to see the invitation letter and other relevant documents on
the file of the Minister, it would become as obvious to you as
it was to us that invitation to us and other eminent persons
from the government side was an after-thought and at best a
window dressing. This was directly communicated to Minister
himself by Dr. Anil Patel as one of the members of the
delegation which met him just before the start of the meeting
and day after at his residence. The same delegation also
requested him to hold separate discussions with the NGOs
who are in support of the SSP. But he did not think it necessary
to grant this request.
As to your point regarding the statement of the Office
Memorandum which talks about holding discussions with
9
different Opinion groups, I have already discussed at length in
my letter dated September 1 the remaining aspects of the
Memorandum and the events which clearly show that your
Group has been formed by the MOWR primarily to continue
the discussions with the NBA only. All along during the
formation of this Group the Hon’ble Minister has been
concerned only about the participation of the NBA in this
process. His lack of concern about the participation of the
other NGOs is so glaring that one can hardly assign any
significance to the statement of the Office Memorandum which
talks about holding discussions with different Opinion Groups.
All the events leading to the culminating act of
appointment of your Group clearly show the unfair and
injurious politics being played against the Project. This is
wholly unbecoming of the Hon’ble Minister who heads the
Central Ministry of Water Resources. The Group such as yours
should not be dragged into such controversies unilaterally and
with palpably ulterior motives. Politicians are now with much
greater facility and much less inhibitions using and abusing
vital institutional structures for. their petty ends. Mr. Morse’s
Report underscores the abuse of these institutional
mechanisms at an international level. Little do they realize that
they are rendering such instruments ineffective and thereby
making the fair and just resolution of deep, genuine conflicts
plaguing the federal structure of our republic nearly impossible.
In the circumstances, I cannot but humbly reiterate our
position to you. We are sorry to say that the Hon’ble Minister’s
culminating act of appointment of your Group, in the context
of unhealthy process he has initiated, has cast serious
shadows on the proper and balanced functioning of your
Group itself. Let me hasten to repeat that ARCH-Vahini holds
you in the highest esteem and in other circumstances we
would do everything in our capacity to fully appraise individuals
in public life like you of our views. But in presenting our views
to this Group, clouded as it is in the unfair politics, we feel that
we would have endorsed the unhealthy process initiated by
the forces unmindful of the well-being of the democratic
processes and institutions of this unfortunate country.
With best regards.
Yours Sincerely
Sd (Ambrish Mehta)
ARCH - VAHINI Publications on
the Sardar Sarovar Controversy
—........
--■ ■
■ ■
7. Displacement in the Sardar Sarovar Project:
a Gujarat Experience -
<
— April 7988
2.
Sardar Sarovar Oustees: Which way to go?
An Activist’s Dilemma.
— September 7988
3.
Resettlement & Rehabilitation of the Oustees in
the Sardar Sarovar Project:
Are the critics right ?
— Arpil 30, 7997
4. Voluntary Shifting in Manibelli (Maharashtra)
— May 8, 7992
5.
A letter to the World Bank President on
Morse-Berger Report
— September, 7992
6. Morse - Berger Review of SSPA Search for Truth ? (DRAFT)
— November 8, 1992
7. Morse - Berger Review of SSP A Counterview.
— January, 1993
8. The SSP Withdrawn from the world Bank :
ARCH - VAHINI's Viewpoint.
— April 13, 1993
9 . The Sardar Sarovar Project:
An Intellectual Fashion.
I
— July 5, 1993
DISPLACEMENT
SARDAR
SAROVAR
A
IN
(NARMADA)
GUJARAT
EXPERIENCE
Vail ini - Arch
Mangrol Via - Rajpipla
INDIA
9
rZi'J
April
PROJECT
-
1988
393150
Displacement m 33^ :
**
w
A Gujarat Experience:
VAHItJI - ARCH,
Post: Mangrol,
"'al: Raj pip la
Dist: Bharuch,
Pin:
In December 1987,
393150
India.
rhe Government of Gujarat(GOG)
declared a
new Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R and R) policy,embodies in 3
crucial Government Resolutions (GR3'.
The first phase of the struggle
for the just and right <-R and R policy for the Gujarat ousteeo of the
Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)
has borne fruits.
Project
(33P)
Outside Gujarat,
that was launched in July 1980
relatively little is known of this •
even less is the understanding ebout the nature of this policy
«
and its true import.
Through this note, we try ^o disseminate infor
struggle,
mation about this policy, highlights of the struggle to achieve this
policy and some important implications of this policy for the future
struggle of the displaced people in the country.
(I)
■
■
*
.X Short History of the Straggle for
.
the New R
i.
R
Policy : .
The story begins with the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal
(N’.’DT)
Award.
In the Award mare public in 1978,
ground for the rehabilitation of
the N’.JDT broke a fresh
the oustees affected by the avowedly
public purpose projects like the SSP.
Never before in the history of
independent India was so radical a treatment given to the problem of
rehabilitation of the displaced persons.
features of the NWDT Aw=rd,
Sefore we go into the salient
it is necessary to record that this revolu
tionary break-through was not made because the disputing states were
concerned about the well-being and welfare of the people going to be
affected by the SSP.
It was more an outcome of rivalry amongst the
contending states and expediency of politics, at that time.
Maharashtra
and Madhya Pradesh (M.=.) were trying to put in as many obstacles in the
way as possible.
hands.
Rehabilitation issue, was quite a potent tool in their
Gujarat state,
equally determined and cynical if not more, wanted
2
to remove -these obstacles singlemincedly and at any cost.
In a bid to
remove this seemingly formidable hurdle of rehabilitation,
the GOG
took a bold gamble.
It accepted the total responsibility of settling
all the oustee families of Maharashtra and MP in the command area of
the ESP.
Each oustee family as defined clearly ?nd unambiguously in
the Award as a major son- married or unmarried - was to be given minimum
of 5 acres of irrigable land in the dommancl of the ESP,
the size of his individual land-holding.
irrespective of
It further provided that the
oustees had a choice to resettle in their own respective states with
the same benefits and that the total cost of their rehabilitation was
to be borne by uhe Gujarat State.
The GOG very smugly and cynically
assured that rehabilitation of the poor and ignorant oustees v.ould pose
no serious problem,
the revolutionary provisions of the Award notwith
The GOG relied very heavily on the past experiences where
standing.
masses of the poor people were displaced callously and ruthlessly,
•
•
without provoking resistance of any kind.
The Governments of Maharashtra
in the
and MP could be relied upon to create a few disconforting manents
air-conditioned chambers of the Sachivalayas or the palacial Circuit
houses, but nothing of real substance and stuff that would seriously
worry the Gujarat State.
However, unfortunately for the Gujarat State,
there was not going to be such a smooth sailing as was assumed so
smugly.
• •
The NWDT Award,
although a product of such cynical calculations,
...
. -
....
-•—»
,
•
•
has some salient features which provided an important foothold for the
future st niggle.
The Award has a force of Statutory Law.
(1)
It can be enforced through
the Court of Law.’-
It defined an oustee family clearly and unambiguously.
(2)
This is
deci si
.
*
ly going to work for tr.e benefit of t-he oustees,-especia lly
tribals,
who almost always happen to have joint land-holdings.
•
•
Each oustee family was made eligible to obtain minimum of'5 acres
(3)
of irrigable land. "“This, in conjunction with.the above two, ia a •
•
truly revolutionary step forward.
'
A significant and negative aspect of this AworJ is that It
aa^hothing
about the oustees wh.O_live off exclusively on the Govern
,
j
cn-ralled encroacher oustees.
ment waste land and forest land-ie. the so
It also-unfortunately does not recognise the existence and right of
the truly Landless oustees
.
*
entitlement to either minimum cert
amount of land or a.permanent source of liveli-.?od.
.hese omi ..,ions
can only corroborate a conjecture that, the whole exercise Oi i.e..abi
litation was an exercise in cynicism, where poor people s liveo didn
simply matter *
The
.
GR
.of
June
1979
A further evidence of GOG’s bad faith came to light,when
the GOG Issued a GR of June 1979
(11-6-1979)
for the rehabilitation of
the oustees of SSP and other major and medium irrigation schemes in
Gujarat.
This GR didnot even refer to the NWDT Award.
A natural ex
pectation fro-' the GOG was that it will, at least extend the benefits
of the Award to
the Gujarat oustees' also.
But this was not to be sol
With an attitude befitting a profit-minded,petty trader,
it slyly
introduced a tin~ but crucial change that effectively destroyed the
right of the-minimum of 5 acres of land to each oustee family.
The
entitlement of minimum of 5 acres of land Gras now Given
to each land•
holding =nd not to each oustee f~zmily.
This was a lethal change.
In the tribal areas in Gujarat and elsewhere,
almost always joint land-holdings.
two,
the land-holdings ere
Each such land-holding contains C.
three or even more families as defined in
This fact
the Award.
is th’ result of unpleasant past history, administrative ineptitude
and corruption.
of this fact.
The GOG, knowingly, decided to
This was mean.
take undue advantage
All our representations
abolish this GR was rejected out of hand.
to the GOG to
Our argument, tha t this GR
was a gross discrimination between the oustees of Gujarat on the one
hand and the oustees of Maharashtra and MP on
with derision.
the other,
was treated
Even such water-down policy as’the GR of June 1979
was not Implemented in true spirit.
The displaced oustee land-holders
of the first five villages who lost their lands because of
the Rock
fill Dykes were offered minimum of 5 acres of worthless Government
waste lands more than 100 Kms away - away from th«ir society and cul
ture.
This was, of course,
immediately rejected bv the oustees.
The
4
Government’s response was swift and even cruel: "If you don’t accept
v'.is land,
you forfeit your right to minimum-of 5 acres of larriFV
(Please remember 5 acres per land-holding and not per family), The
real choice,
therefore,
for the oustees was to buy private laniE in
whatever measure they could from the compeirsation money paid t© them.
The GOG refused to even consider the case of rehabilitation of the
So-called encroacher and landless oustees.
All that was offered to
this Unfortunate group was measly two guntha plot for house-site. The
GOG could not be bothered about the source of livelihood of these
people.
Such a narrow and inhuman outlook in the name of deve3opmentl
While such a mean and petty cost-cutting exercise in R & R was ;oing
on/ the NDD was building one after another luxurious guest houses at
Kevadia
Colony,where rapidly a township of concrete blocks was emerging.
In the project proposals,
had allotted Rs.49 Crores to build
the GOG
and maintain the township of Kevadia Colony to be used for 10 to 15
years by the staff of at the most a few hundreds.
-As against this,
the total cost of rehabilitation of all the oustees of 3 states was
estimated to be Rs. 19 crores only !
for the
project staff ‘
Money flowed like water -only
Nothing was farther from the minds of top
brass of the Irrigation Department than the R and R .
the oustees seemed bleak.
This was the year 1981.
power pretended that they were concerned.
utterances in public.
The future of
Politicians in
They made several sympathetic
Hopes were raised for a while to -be dashed in a
•
•
short time.
Then in the last quarter of 1983,
for some reason,
the World Bank (W2) was taking keen interest in the
R and R of the SSP oustees.
th^plights of the oustees.
from the WB,
we first came to know that
We wrote a long letter to the ’.JB detailing
This elicited.a short and a cautious reply
stating categorically that the proper R and R was indeed
one of the most important concerns of the WBr
In those days of nearly
total hopelessness, with all the doors firmly closed upon us,
this
was an opening we needed so badly; .
At about the same time,
another process of organised resiso
tance amongst the oustees was gathering momentum.
We could discern that
slowly but. steadily the oustees in all the villages of Gujarat were
beginning to see
the dirty game the Government was playing.
The oustees,
who had so far meekly surrendered to the arbitrary dictates and the
soulless policy of the Government,
decided to take these crumbs no
more.
They rose with one voice to fight out.
rally
marched to Kevadia Colony from the dam site village,
On Match 8,
1984,aabig
The
Vadgam.
oustees from all the villages of Gujarat and those of first 9 villages
of Maharashtra joined the rally.
In a Memo submitted to the GOG,
the
oustees demanded a right to have land according to the NWDT- not only
for the landed
• oustees, but also for those who depended on the culti
vation of waste land and forest land.
such a
Never before this,
demand was ever raised in Gujarat by the affected oustees themselves.
This was a shattering experience for the complacent GOG.
The rattled
•Irrigation Minister rushed to the affected village to publically offer
them promises which the oustees had never heard conceded before.
Here,
it is impossible to 3c
into the history of all the
major events that followed one after another in the following 3 years.
They were the years packed with events, some dramatic,
dramatic.
some not so
Lavish promises from the tdien Irrigation Minister in public,
-Government's back-tracking from these promises. Government ’ s illegal
occupation of the private lands of the oustees of Vadgam Village,
•Rasta Roko' Andolan.
a
by the oustees to stop carrying of black top soil
from the private lands to build a Rock Fill Dyke,
litigation in the High Court and later
*
a public interest
cn in the Supreme Court,
a
willful violation of the interim..-stay order of the Supreme Court
by the Government followed by an appointment of an enquiry commission
cf.Srilata Swaminathan and Mahendra Chowdhari by the enraged Supreme
Court, the loud an • clear report o'f the Commission indicting the
Government for its misdeeds and illegal occupations constitute one
sequence of events.
Parallel to these and intertwining with this sequence runs
another chain of .event's.
This relates to a truly massive international
campaign that was unleashed abroad on the R and R issue of SSP mainly
by Oxfam, U.K. and Survival International. U.K.
Washington became the fbcel poiht of
the massive lobbying.
'-■ords of one of the staff members of the
SSP oustees became a 'Cause Celebre' !
The WB headquarter in
In the
the R and Rproblem of
Xt became almost Impossible
'
•
b
for the Bank to ignore the plight of the oustees of the SSP.
back m<1
*984,
Way
the WB had obtained a good idea about the specific
and concrete demands for R and R through a meeting we had with the
Bank Constult~nt,
an
anthropologist from California, Dr.T.Ceudder,
who has spent the best part of his life studying the problems of
displaced population all over the world. He felt strongly about the
displacement issue and was very much worried that the Bank might
not take the R and R issue seriously.
His commitment to the oustees
was ungues tionable. He came to know about Vahini’s activities amongst
the oustees of Gujarat in 1983.
He insisted and got the GCG to agree to have a meeting
forward to.
with us.
This was an opportunity he was looking
His long experience of issues of rehabilitation coupled
with cur specific and concrete feedback was more or less incorporated
in the Loan ncjreernsnt ()
the Bank entered into with the GOG,Govern
ment of Maharashtra (COM), Government of MP (GOMP)
India
(GOI)
formally signed in May 1985.
and Government of
The LA constitutes a distinct
improvement on the NWDT Award in so far as it includes many new pro
visions which reflect the reality at the ground level much better and
thus it -safeguards the vital interests of the
'encroacher' oustees and
landless oustees concretely and in a much better form than the NWDT
Award ever did.
The XB .Missions that were coming to Gujarat ever/ six
months were making sharper and sharper inquiry on the basis of the
specific information they had been receiving from us.
Reeling under the impact of the determined -nd organised
resistance of the remaining oustees,
the massive campaign of the
lobbying with the WB and the Supreme. Court case,
the GC3 began to make
one after another grudging and halting concessions.
Gone were the
days when the GOG had averred with the customary arrogance in cne after
another affidavits filed before the Gujarat High Court and the Supreme
Court that the encroachers were
no compensation whatever.
breakthrough.
thieves.
Law-breakers etc. and deserved
The GR of 30th May 1985 was the first major
This was slyly Inserted as one of the annexures of
one-of the affidavits.
T.’.e encroachers now -ere entitled to minimum
of’ 3 acres and maximum of 5 acres of land..
It did not, however, specify
which land and how they were to be allotted this land.
the available
.non-occupied
Obviously,
waste land of thw GOG was not going to be
7
acceptable
to these oustees.
The struggle had scored a major victory
*
but it had to go on. .
•
•
The GR Of
1st
November,
in the similar fashion,
•■
' "
■■ ■ ■
1985
:
the GOG made other concessions to
the landed /••istees
in the G’ • of 1st ■ November, 1965.
Reflecting in
•
part the provisions of the LA, this GR conceded the principle of
application of the NaTT Award to the lanced oustees of Gujarat.
It
alro included in principle a major concession to the landed oustees to
have minimum 5 acres of irrigable land of their choice.
This right cf
choice of- land was even not availble t;o the landed oustees in the Award.
The GR made each oustee family as against each land-holding entitled tc^"->
minimum -f 5 acres of irrigable land of his choice.Here again,
the GOG
trying to prove as it were that public
«
announcements of the then Irrigation Minister notwithstanding, the GOG
came up with the same old tricks,
was bent upon denying the vital benefits to the tribal oustees.
This
was in stark contrast to the extravagant expenses being incurred by the
Narmada Development Department (NDD)
and the -way in which the cost esti-
rites of the project were being revised upwards.
In the begining of
1980 the to tai cost estimate of the Project was Rs. 3300 Crores,which
was raised to R.S.600C/- Crores in 1983-84 and which now has shotup to
If the GOG was showing any cost-consciousness at
Rs.
12000/-Cjrores.
all,
it was confined only to the rehabilitation cost.
November 1985,
The GP of
while conce/ding the principle of minimur.of 5 acres of
irrigable land to each oustee family and that of his choice, was worded
a bit too cleverly.
The mischief was that the Government was contininc
choices only to one of . the 3 types of lands available or would-be-avai
lable with the Government.
This was a fraud,
but to many others including the ’.VB then,
to us a transparent fraud,
this was not seen as such.
V
The oustees were sure not to choose and indeed did not choose the
Government lands of various kind that were offered to them.
GR then offered a crueloption to the oustees:
one of the three kinds of Government lands,
The same
should they fail to choose
thev forfeited their rioht
of choice of their land and with that their right of minimum 5 acres
of land.
Thereafter,
they could buy private land to the extent of their
existing land-holdings.
The Government would help them buy the land.
Any discerning person could see that this was in effect a resurrection
of that notorious anti-poor June 1979 GR.
dead GR back into life through a back-door,
The GOG was bringing the old,
except 5cr « small mitigatory
8
change.
Unlike in the June
79
*
GR,
the oustees were not being asked
to buy whatever amount of land they could with their compensation money
only. They were now offered ex-gratia money to cover the difference
between market prices of private land to the extent of their land-holding
and the compensation amount they were paid.
after another was piling up on each other.
The meanness of one kind
Meanwhile,
in the Supreme
Court case, the GOG was maintaining its self-righteous moralistic stand
that they were doing the best possible they could and that Vahini was
a trouble-maker and obstructing the process of development which would
immensely help the poor of Gujarat.
This twist in the GR was clearly
Remember,
a foul trick and a flagrant violation of the LA.
< X
the end of 1985.
this was
For the next two years we argued and fourht hard
Court and through letters and
through the affidavits in the Supreme:
memoranda to the WB.
Cutting this long story short,we jump to April 1987. This
is the time when the sanction for the SSP withheld, by. .the Department
of Environment .for a long time, was granted by the Central Government,
no doubt,
for the political reasons.
GOG was removed.
Then the W9 Mission arrived,
tnd information regarding the foul
oustees.
The
An important road-block for the
fully armed with facts
tricks the GOG was playing with the
Mission, --ho visited the deep, interior villages which
• •
were not even visited so far by the Government higher officials,
corroborated the information and the complaints we had communicated to
the Bank through our support group in the U.K.
size ensued between the GOG and the WB.
GOG was so taken off the guard
An argument of mega
We have information that the
;nd so incensed with the unpleasant
exposure at the stage of this heated argument, that it asked the Bank
to pack off and to pack off with their money I
The Mission, on the
other hand, was so annoyed *-ha t it wanted to cancel the loan as well.
A t-'nse silence punctuated uy brave public utterances by the Chief
Minister of Gujarat followed the next six months.
so demanded",
of money".
said the Minister,
The oustees,
more and more restive.
"If the situation
" Gujarat will raise the entire amount
waiting with anxiety for so long, were getting ■
Everyday that passed by increased their
struggle and lowered their morale to go on fighting in the same
measure.
The pr-ric was almost palpable.
Unfortunately for the oustee
9'
struggle, our petition in the Supreme- Court that was listed for the
_
final hearing before the bench of the then_ Chief Justice Mr.P.N.
..d_’
Bha.gawati in the closing months of 1986 was not taken up for the final
hearing-the hearing on which the oustees and we have pinned so much
We missed the hearing by hair-breath—a cruel play of
of our hopes.
o not know and
chance or a well-time scheming of human beings ?-
perhaps shall never knew.
then on 21st December,
An
Chief Justice Mr. P.N. Hhagwati retired.
1986,
the then
A new Chief Justice took over.
The •.'.hole pile of pending cases was obviously reshuffled by the new
incumbent.
We never thereafter heard of our case 2
The Bank stopped ‘the disbursement of the loan.
This gave
us.-a-little comfort, .but the gnawing question.was • if the GCG indeed
did decide to revoke the LA, what would happens to the oustees ?
doors of the Supremen Court were now closed.
breath,
The
We waited with a baited
bearing the tension of uncertain future for the oustees and
so did the oustees and started preparing ourselves for the long drawn-
out, grim bottle that laid .a ahead. '" In November,
the new chief of the Sank come to visit India.
him.
This meeting, however,
1987, Mr. 3.Conable,
We were invited to meet
for all intent and purposes,
be a-public relation exercise.
However,
turned out to
we had a reliable information
that the Bank had adopted a very tough posture in private regarding the
R and R policy.
And the GOG had developed cold feet.
brave talks of revoking the LA.
There- were now no
The TOG1 s options •••ere closed.
Our anxiety and tension finally ended on 23rd December,1987,
when theGOG officers hanceo us a set of new GRs which transformed the
whole policy,of R and R beyond recognition.
askec ±.or .
It gave more than we had
The Chief Minister mace a claim-perhaps justifiable - that
this was a revolutionary policy of R & R not only in India,
in the world.
He seemed to make it sound as though this was a spontaneous
and generous act of GOG for the benefit of the oustees.
long history of struggle for this policy, however,
claim.
but perhaps
The 7 year
belies this hollow
The only saving grace of this proclamation is,however,
that it
is not blighted with the customary meanness which had been the hall-markof. the GOG
s
*
policies so far 1
vi
10
~
------------------
C11)
‘ ——
•—The New Rehabilitation Policy ;•
The G. Rs. of December, 1987
(l) The G. R. of 4th December, 1987:
This is a very brief G. R. But its significance lies
in the fact that it removes all the mischief, the Government of
Gujarat (GOG) had played in the November, 1935 GR. Tt accepted the
fact that the landed oustees were eligible to get •minimum 5 acre?
•
of land of their choice. More importantly and interestingly, it
also granted that the difference, between the compensation paid to
an individual oustee for his private land-holding and the market
price of minimum 5 acres of his choice will be borne by the Govern
ment by way of ex-qratia payment. It must be stressed that this
we had never asked, because even the legally binding NWDT Award
contemplates of interest-free loan only to be paid in 20 yearly’
instalments. The oustees were prepared to bear the burden of loan.
We were, nonetheless, worried about the burden of debt they would
incur. This is a great relief. We have reasons to believe that
although’ the LA does not carry this provision so clearly and
explicitly, the jointly agreed interpretation of the LA had incor
porated this understanding. Once again, it turned out that the
Government of Gujarat (GOG) had no real choice.
Another important component of this GR is that it
extends'all the benefits of this GR to the oustees who were up
rooted before the LA was signed in May, 1985.
(2) The GR of 14th December,1987;
This important GR replaces the non-starter 30th May,
1985 GR. It provides that the so called unauthorised cultivators
of Government waste land / forest land (the "encroachers;) will
• •
<>
I'
11
be provided 5 acres of land of their choice and that they will
also get the same kind of benefit of ex-gyatia payment.
(3) The GR of 17th December,1987:
This'GR covers the landless oustees and extends the
benefits of 5 acres of land of their choice with ex-qratia payment
to such oustees. This is a far-reaching GR, far-reaching not so
much for the oustees of Gujarat, but for the oustees of MP where
the exact number of landless oustees is not known so far, but is
believed to be very high. According to the exhaustive list of all
the oustee families we have prepared in Gujarat, about 65 families
out of 3000 and odd are truly landless families. The fact, that
the GOG had to issue this GR in all probability, signifies that
the MP Government will have to follow the suit. This i s so both
because of the provisions of the‘LA and also because the financial
cost of this policy for both MP and Maharashtra will be borne by
the GOG and not by the GOMP and GOM. It stands to reason that the
GOMP and GOM cannot have any valid reason not to accept this GR as
their own.
(4)
'
' In addition to these GRs, the GOG issued two more
GRs which make the travails of the rehabilitation more bearable
and lessen the pains of uprooting. We will not go into the detail’s
of these GRs here, as they are essentially peripheral to the
Central issue of rehabilitation i. e. viable and permanent means of
1i velihood i.e. in the context of SSP - land.
(HI)
>
Displacement Problems and the Implications
of the new R and R Policy
• •
•
By any reckoning, this i s a massive step forward’in
the otherwise bleak area’of displacement in India. The CM of
Gujarat was not far off the mark, when he said that this was
truly a revolutionary R and R policy. And yet the critical feed
12
backs we started receiving *soon after the announcement of .the —
policy did not acknowledge the scope of the truly massive vic
tory and-pointed to oth6r issues we had allegedly ignored i We
intend to discuss these issues in this third and the final part
of the note.
.
•
(A) Put what about implementation ?
As soon as the policy was announced, the friendly
critics said that this was only a piece of paper I This policy
will not be implemented. The oustees’ condition after resettle
ment- following the new policy will be no better than that of the
oustees already resettled.There are simply no private lands of
this size available on sale; the Government will not move a
finger to locate and acquire such lands; it is unfair and un
realistic to expect tribal oustees to identify and locate the
lands which they will be able to purchase without being cheated;
the Government is shunning its responsibility and so we should
force the Government to identify new lands and it should not be
the oustees' responsibility. There was even uninformed criticism
that the oustees will incur heavy debt, making the whole process
of rehabilitation a mockery. There were others who were critical
because they simply could not believe that the Government/under
the heavy pressure of the Bank,had actually done it and felt
vaguely uneasy about it.
A long experience of cheating and deceiving by the
Governments has contributed quite a lot to such caution and
scepticism. Nobody and least of all, the groups like ours who
have had such an intense, long and close experience of Govern
ment's double-talk, cheating and deception would discount these
fears and cautions as totally imaginary. There is a lot to say
for such scepticism. We, however, believe that there is a failure
of distinguishing different issues, which results in the massive
confusion.
13
In the early period of our struggle, when we
were fighting for the proper implementation of the then exis
ting R and R policy (June, 1979 GR), the same critics and
others had said that we ought to be fighting for the change in
the policy and not just help implement the policy; and that
useful though this was in a limited scale this was like fighting a fire and not preventing a fire. Thereafter,^the change
in R and R policy in the right earnest, the critics said that
we were confused and naive to believe that we could win through
the instrumentality of law. When we started focussing on the WB
policy-making process through ouV friends and supporters in the
U.K.., we were told that^the WB which is only the instrument of
domination could come to assistance of the poor tribals and
when the crunch comes, it will look the other way, when the
Government destroys the oustees, and it cannot but do such
things. The policy instrument we were after was a mirage and
it only showed our immaturity and poor political understanding.
,ie were incurable romantics who refused to see the writings on
the wall. In short, the R and R policy that is now in existance
was an impossibility before the event. And after the event ? All
this is forgotten and new sets of questions are posed. What was
once, considered impossible almost unanimously has become possible.
w *
4
{jolU i nj -for
• •
The point is not that since the R and R policy has
come into existance, a satisfactory implementation will follow
automatically. This would be smugness. The rehabilitation policy
became possible and even inevitable in retrospect, because a
combination of powerful forces was working towards that end. The
SSP would have become an impossible proposition. The GOG's hands
were forced. This is not solely a victory of one organisation
nowever organised , or of a person however strategically placed,
or of an institution however exalted. If anything, this is a
combined victory of all forces, small and big, scattered in time
and space, who. sincerely believed in the cause of the oustees.
These forces are still in place, better informed, better organised
and reinforced since the announcement of the new R and R policy —
*
—nrr-
14
in their conviction and determination that the oustees shall
get what is justly due to them. The Government's back of
resistance has been effectively broken. The Government is keen
that the SSP work goes ahead in full speed without any hind
rance. The GOG knows that the R and R issue, if remains un
resolved, will stop the Project in track. This, it cannot
afford.The oustees know fully their rights and they will
demand their rights,which are now embodied in the legally
enforcable GRs. The WB for its own strategic reasons will not
want to appear back-tracking’from or side-lining the R and R
issue. Even for the WB, the stakes are too high. There are
friends in the Bank, who called the Narmada issue a 'cause
celebre' will fight and will fight tooth and nail. Interna
tional groups are even more watchful.
Coming now to more pragmatic and down-to-theearth situation, the issue of availability of land in all
probability is not going to be a significant issue in Gujarat
because the oustees-repeat-the oustees themselves have upto
now located more than 10,000 acres of land. Our role, in this
exercise, has been secondary, and that of assistance only. We
are emphasising this point, because one criticism has been
that the tribal oustees cannot even identify and locate the
land, available for sale. All the four communi ties of the
tribals in-Gujarat have taken initiative in locating the pri
vate lands. Given a minimal support system, encouragement and
assistance, we do not see how these tribals cannot find land.
The question of cheating is real, but again given the above- *
mentioned .support and watchfu], eyes on the rehabilitation
machinery, this problem must be and can be minimised. Those
critics, who have been raising these doubts, we believe, have
never been part of such exercise as we have been. Their
is
an exercise in speculation,, to say the least. The question of
debt simply does not arise because of provision of the ex*
gratia payment.
a
15
At the risk of repeating ourselves, we say again
that this does not guarantee a proper rehabilitation in as
fluid a situation as India’s, where anything can happen, any
thing can go wrong, and so could the rehabilitation. Our effort
is to help dispel in some measure this wide—spread pessimism .
and raise- the prospects of possible by degree higher than that
was thought possible a few months ago. It is difficult to resist
a temptation to say that the situation today would not have been
so hopeless, if thio tendency of viewing all efforts to fight
the domination of all kinds of power, especially that of State,
with so thorough-going scepticism as to deny them even a fighting
*
chance of success, was kept in check
*
•
(B) What about the R and R of Maharashtra and MP Oustees ?
*
There were dark hints that now that the R and R
policy for the Gujarat oustees were announced, we were no more
interested in the fate of the oustees of other two affected
States. This is a mean charge. Our record throughout the struggle
.clearly Shows that we have always thought about the displaced
people of not only Gujarat, but of all the three States and also
of the displaced persons in similar other Projects in Gujarat
and in India. In 1984, when the struggle took a higher turn, we
realised that this was a fight for much bigger issue. One of the
constantly recurring themes while interacting with the oustees
of Gujarat has always been that we are fighting not only for
Gujarat oustees only, that we are fighting for the oustees of
*
all the three States and also possibly for the similarly dis
placed people in India. True, the goal seemed so distant and
even perhaps unreal!sable then, but this goal was never lost
sight of. In the beginning of the intensified phase of the
struggle, we tried to establish contacts with activist groups
and interested individuals in both Maharashtra and MP. There was
some success, but because of the lack of resources and differing
priorities and perspectives, this process did not gather momen
tum. Given these limitatio.ns, strategically also it was necessary
16
to focus on the ,GOG, because the GOG is
the main —party.
If
..
T
the GOG was forced to adopt appropriate R .and R policy, other
States will have to simply follow the suit. The GR of 17th
December, 1987 for the landless oustees lends a strong, if
indirect, support to this argument, because as we have argued
above, the problem of landless oustees of Gujarat is insigni
ficantly small. The GOG could have easily accomodated these
oustees without announcing such specific GR. This GR, we
believe, is a powerful cue to MP to come out with-similar
policy for the landless oustees of MP where this problem is
very big. The LA also clearly provides for the similar policies
for all categories of oustees in all the 3 States. It seems
inconceivable at this stage atleast that the Bank should force
the GOG only and allow the other two States to get away. If the
GOG is going to pay for the total cost of rehabilitation, it
would be very hard and
absurd for MP and Maharashtra not to
••
adopt a better new policy. No doubt, a sustained pressure would
be required to force the slumbering bureaucracy of Maharashtra
and MP to adopt this policy with suitable modifications to meet
specific needs of- the oustees of these States.
A
(C) But where is the land ? And are you not facilitating the
construction of the dam which ought to be opposed 7
There are some who have criticised us on the prac
tical ground that we have fought for and achieved a policy which
cannot be implemented because there is simply no private land
on such a big scale available in MP and Maharashtra. We will
postpone the discussion of this question for a little while, but
before that we must turn to a second question/linked to the
first one and in a sense a deeper question. Some of those who
have posed
*
the first question have done so in the context of the
second question. To them, we suspect, the primary objective is
to stop the dam or atleast to delay the dam^ The non-availability
of private land (which is possibly going to be the land of choice
for most oustees in MP) can become a powerful instrument to stop
17
the dam. At this stage, we would categorically like to say that
if it is really going to be so, then the further work on dam
must stop. There cannot be the SSP at the cost of inadequate
rehabilitation. We are also somewhat familiar with the range of
problems connected with SSP. However, we would sharply like to
distinguish a difference between the two objectives, i.e. objec
tive of proper R and R of the oustees and that of stopping or
delaying of the SSP because of its supposed disadvantages. Those
groups who have worked for the * R and R policy in Gujarat and
Maharashtra have so far done this with an avowed objective of
achieving just R and R. It so happens at this stage that the R
and R issue has become huge and a powerful instrument in its
own right, which can be used to delay the dam, if not stop it
altogether. It would be morally wrong and also illegitimate to
use this instrument to delay or to stall the Project. This is
so because the oustees in Gujarat, Maharashtra and MP, in so
far as we_could ascertain, want to be rapidly resettled at the
alternative sites. Their will and ability to fight the dam as
such is either non-existant or extremely limited. It is wrong to
ignore their limitations and their desires. Even if the dam
construction is stopped or delayed, the oustees will be left in
a state of 'suspension, wait and anxiety as to their future. Their
hot
desire is for just and proper R and R and^for the stoppage of the
dam as such. It bears repetition in this context that no activist
group in any of the 3 States has organised oustees and fought
against the dam as such so far. Their aim has always been just
and proper R and R of the oustees. If the dam needs to be stopped,
we must build up a strong case against it on other grounds, mount
a campaign against it, build a strong movement against^and stall
i t.
A crucial question now-is : are the lands,which would
be accepted by the oustees of MP and Maharashtra,available in
enough measure ? In Maharashtra, we have been informed that private land is not available for sale In the vicinity
*
But according
to our information, the oustees have? shown their preference for the
18
denuded forest land which is available in a sufficient
measure.
■
The rub there, however, is that because of.the Forest Conserva
tion Act, 1980, these lands cannot be released-for the purpose
of R and R of the oustees without permission of the Central
Government. It is clear to all concerned by now that the GOM
or GOI has really no choice in-this regard, because the GO1
has agreed with the WB that if all else fails, it will release
the forest land for the oustees of Maharashtra, As to the
problem of land in Mr- is concerned, there might well be a
problem of release of forest land in some areas and in others
the question of identifying adequate private land for s'ale. We
have ho first hand experience of the situation in MP, nor do we
believe that any activists there have a fair assessment of the
situation. It is not irrelevant here to recall our experience
in Gujarat. In the year of 1985, when we were fighting tooth and
nail for minimum 5 acres of land of the oustees’ choice as stipu
lated in the LA, the GOG had taken a very convenient stand, that
private land for sale on such a scale was simply not available.
It is from then on the tribal oustees of Gujarat had begun to go
out in the surrounding areas to look for private land and even
in those days we could submit a list of 6,000 acres of private
land for sale. But we go beyond speculation in the case of MP.
Mr. S. C. Verma, the Ex-Chairman of the Narmada Valley Development
Authority (NVDA) has gone on record to say that the Government
land for resettlement is not available, but the NVDA has already
got the offer of 30,000 acres of private land for sale. There is
a strong case, therefore, for the need of taking much stronger
initiative by the oustees' organisations to identify more private
land for sale.
This leads to a final question.
(D) But do you not oppose the present style of development ?
Our short answer to this is : 'Yes, we do.’ A little
longer answer is : the activists^and public-oriented intellectuals
and professionals must not only criticise and denounce the present
mode of development from the Conference rooms and Seminars. The
point i s to oppose it actively by forging and activating the demo
cratic alliances, organisations and institutions-national and inter
national. The development projects, harmful to the poor people, must
be opposed in their entirely or in part, depending on our strengths
and weaknesses, We believe that if all the 3 States are forced to
formulate R and R policy acceptable to the oustees and are made to
be implemented in more or less full measure, it will set a powerful
precedent. Hopefully, when the Supreme Court takes up the case for
final hearing, it will put a seal of approval which will do immense
good to the cause of displaced people. It will make much more diffi
cult, if not altogether impossible, for the State Governments to
ignore and violate this precedent. It will become mandatory for all
the Projects financed by the WB, which are not inconsiderable in
number, to implement the cpre of this policy. This will make for
a major advance. The R and R issue then will be raised to a much
higher place in the list of priorities by the planners. They will
not be able to give a cursory and a third-rate treatment to the R
and R, as they have been doing uptill now. This will• immensely
•
• J•
complicate the Project Schedule and may well make Project not
worthwhile, if prospects of adequate R and R are not bright
enough. The dynamics of such or similar R and R policy have the
potential of posing a big challenge to reckless planning of huge
>
••
projects that pass as development. It does not necessarily have
to became a show-piece for the WB to show off or for the three
Governments to boast about.
>
But the crucial component of this process is that
activists everywhere must check their scepticism, avoid meticu
lously the confusion of objectives and work for the net-working
of the democratic forces within and outside the establishment,
within and outside the national boundarie s, without any ideologi
cal hang-ups. The R and R policy of Gujarat carries the seeds of
all India policy for displaced people and possibly provides an
ai. iitional tool in the hands of the movement which is rightly
worried about the -purpose, direction and impact of the currently
fashionable development.
■ THE ■
SARDAR
SAROVAR
PROJECT
Experiences with
Resettlement and
Rehabilitation
1987-93
•
u------ -----------— —---------- —------------- — -- *-------------------------------------- ■ — — —
— — —----- ——- ------- —--------------—-
-------- -—
---- ---- - — —-
1
J
Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Bombay
The Sardar Sarovar
Project
Experiences with Resettlement
and
Rehabilitation
A Summary Prepared
by
The Monitoring and Evaluation Team
for Maharashtra
1987-93
Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Dconar
Bombay - 400 088
INTRODUCTION
This report summarises the findings of six years of work completed
by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, in its capacity as the
Monitoring and Evaluation (M and E) Agency, for the Maharashtra
submergence villages of the Sardar Sarovar Project. Tata Institute of
^□cial Sciences was appointed for this task by the Government of
Maharashtra as required by the terms of the contract with the World
Bank. The report presents the team’s perspectives on the
rehabilitation of the displaced, based on the analysis of their own data
(not influenced by the opinions of the Narmada Bachao Andolan or
the Government). These experiences have been documented in 19
reports, that have been circulated among the officials of the
G ove m m e n t o f M a h a ras h t ra, t h e Wo rl d B a n k a n cl o th e r o rga n i sa ti o n s
related to the project. Reference is also made, for comparisons, to
some findings of the Centre for Social Studies, Gujarat, the official M
and E Agency for the project affected villages in Gujarat. These have
been incorporated for illustrative purposes so as to indicate the
commonalities in the displaced persons’ experiences across the two
Slates. No claim is, however, made to summarise the Gujarat situation.
The plan of the report is as follows:
1. The size of the problem is first examined, followed by an
elaboration on the policy package for Resettlement and Rehabilitation
and R).
2. An assessment of the socio-economic condition of the people
prior to their displacement is then made. This reflects the tribals’
perspective of their own situation.
3. Finally, details on the various aspects of R and R, including the
implementation, the Government procedures, the situation in the
resettlement colonies, and the R and R as it stands today, are
presented.
1
4.
The policy implications which emerge, from the above, are
presented.
Throughout our association with the Project, we have urged the
Government to place the findings within the broader perspective of
the entire scope of the rehabilitation of the Project Affected Persons
(PAPs). This initial micro-level feedback was regularly provided so as
to give useful pointers to issues likely to affect the policy at the
macro-level.
the project
1 - Direct Displacement
reservoir
level
of 455Dam
feet isItexnertpd
will
i
lm
The Sardar
Sarovar
• P°und water to the full
acres) of land in threesm eCT 37’°°° hectares <92,500
Pradesh. The canal and irrieatioST1’ Maharashtra and Madhya
submerging 85,000 hectares^ 19 Mn™ a^SreSate 10 75.000 kmM)
the water catchment of the dam J i .
°f lancL The leagth of
be 123 kms' Conserve
estimates place the number o?i
Persons (about 27,000 families a™ r aPProximately 152,000
lesidmg m 245 villages of ihmJ c
Goveinment estimates),
submergence. The break „ h ScateS’ t0 be affected by the
-13.500, andMadfyXdX'm^'’’1 '
«•
Dlsp,„cme„(
canal
and irrigation
*™
615 ar? ^ely lo be affected by the
In
addition,
about 140svstem
onn r«
marginally. The latter, however
"L a maJOr Way and others
1 hm U becomes available The 1 ta?d to Sain fr°m the irrigation
andlords in Gujarat to relocate the pap ■ Purcllascd from absentee
equal number of tenant farm,.
r? V S1S *kely to displace an almost
dl0Usandsmore mid .h
Pe°P,C ,ivil downstream,
71 be affected. Compulsoiv nrr
°Se ocated in the backwaterzone,
sanctuary, will displace hmKlrcd^0’1’and the development of a
^heleSthese
^cd°n
of
envir±?L
fam.iHeS
’since
mea
ns.theOne
es^imnT^
sou
Sht tothe
beconsequences.
compensated
ected persons at 42 000 fonn
These figures reveal 1
' ■ ° P aces this category of project
(appiOXlmately 7,000 families).
No one really knotvs^he^f”1,1*
^ of dircct and indirect dislocation.
Tlw
dirnensions, and the snin^rf11^6
dle 1‘kely displacement
. e eysl'ng figures on the amoi ° £.ePPecls are yet to be measured.
states for compensating even *
e d' °f ®urPlus Iand available in these
g
" the dlrecdy displaced are far lower than
9
•■R
the required amount. Therefore, whether in fact, sufficient land will
be found, is not known.
THE PACKAGE
The Sardar Sarovar Project has undergone many financial and
economic cost-benefit exercises. As per the Government records, the
cost-benefit ratio is positive. However, most of these exercises have
been conducted without fully accounting for the social and
environmental costs. The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal
(NWDT) Award of 1978 gave its report on R and R based on the
critical minimum requirements of resettlement for the displaced. It
is not clear whether a detailed costing of the R and R had been
undertaken.
The Award was hailed as a breakthrough in rehabilitation as it made
^provisions far beyond those of earlier projects where only cash
compensation (often undervalued) had been provided. It stated that
the Project Affected Persons (PAPs) must:
(a) improve or at least regain the standard of living they were enjoying
prior to displacement;
(b) be relocated as village units, padas (hamlets) or families, in
accordance with their preference, as far as possible;
(c) become fully integrated within the community in which they are
resettled; and,
(d) be provided with appropriate compensation and adequate social
and physical rehabilitation infrastructure.
The general compensation package, designed for this purpose, is
characterised by state-specific variations with regard to certain
aspects. It comprises the following:
1. A minimum of two hectares (5 acres) of irrigable land has to be
provided to each land holder. In Maharashtra, one hectare of
irrigable land has to be provided to all the landless families, post-1978
encroachers (i.e., those not in possession of title deeds for their
lands), major sons, and major unmarried daughters of PAPs. Al
persons are defined as ‘major’ if they have attained the age of 18 on
1 January, 1987. In Gujarat, the provision of two hectares of irrigable
land has been made to all persons of the above categories except the
major unmarried daughters. In Madhya Pradesh too, the landed are
to receive a minimum of two hectares of land. Those who encroached
land before April 4, 1987, are eligible for a minimum of one hectare
and a maximum of two hectares of land. Landless major sons from all
3
the families and those with land encroached after April 4, 1987, do
not qualify to receive the land. The Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh
PAPs can opt to resetde in Gujarat according to NWDT Award. In
reality, however, this disparity in policy reduces the choices available
to the PAPs who wish to move to areas where cultural affinity exists,
but the rehabilitation package is less attractive.
2. There is non-uniformity in the policy across Maharashtra and
Gujarat regarding the compensation for land. The PAPs of
Maharashtra are entitled to Rs. 3,750 to Rs. 4,500 per hectare as
opposed to the Gujarat figure which is placed at Rs. 10,000 (1990-91
reporting).
3. In Maharashtra, the PAPs are provided with food ration for a three
month period after shifting. In contrast, in Gujarat (for Maharashtra
PAPs) a subsistence allowance of Rs. 4,500 is to be paid to all PAP
families by the first year after resettlement. In both Gujarat and^
Maharashtra a resettlement grant of Rs. 750, with January 1980 as a
base and a rise of 8 per cent for every year; and a grant-in-aid of up to
Rs. 500 for each family. All this is in addition to compensation for the
land.
4. In Maharashtra, PAPs are entitled to house plots measuring
approximately 60 sq. mts., while those in Gujarat are entitled to about
68 sq. mts. House building loan and subsidy, and free transportation
of all salvaged and household material, are also to be provided.
5. Within agriculture, during the initial period, land is to be
developed by the Government. There is also to be diversification
towards horticulture and cash cropping. Secondary and tertian’
activities are to be initiated, including daily, supported by training and
marketing.
6.
Areas have to be demarcated for fuel wood and fodder cultivation.
7. In the resettlement colony, physical infrastructure is to be
provided through the construction of approach and internal roads,
transport facilities, drinking water, domestic and street lighting, and Q
residential and day schools.
Several policies were not included in the original package. F°l
instance, financial compensation is now provided to (he PAPs foi a
year after they move to the new location site. This was introduced
when it was realised that it takes some time to clear rocks and
roots/ground level growth, so as to permit cultivation. Anothei
pi oblem was ol tapu" lands, i.e., lands becoming surrounded by Hood
waters, thus becoming islands rendered inaccessible io the owneu
4
The landless and major sons were not eligible for R and R provisions.
Policy changes to incorporate this group came in 1987. The cut-off
date to determine major sons was moved in 1988 from January7 1,
1980 to January 1, 1987. Some of these policy changes have resulted
from the R and R monitoring feedback and several others from the
organisation of people by NGOs demanding change.
It is evident from the above package that the Governments of
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh do not have policies equivalent to
that of the Government of Gujarat. Therefore, non-parity between
packages across States has created complications for the PAPs in terms
of the real choices available. Even then, the provisions currently
available to the Sardar Sarovar PAPs in these states are relatively better
compared to the benefits available to similar categories of people
affected by other such projects.
^Moreover, prior to completion of negotiations on the issue of the
loan, the World Bank had not appraised the R and R component. It,
therefore, asked Prof. Scudder, an expert on resettlement issues, to
analyse the situation related to the extent of displacement, and the R
and R measures adopted by the State Governments. After his review
in 1984, he concluded that the resettlement of the displaced was likely
to occur in a very unfavourable environment. India’s past record of
reservoir related relocation did not meet the World Bank standards.
The provisions of the Award represented a major advance in India,
yet they did not meet the requirements of the World Bank policy
guidelines on involuntary resettlement.
Six years later, in 1991-92, the World Bank deputed the Morse
Commission (The Independent Review) to conduct a further
appraisal of the progress of the project with specific regard to the R
and R and the amelioration of the environmental impact of all the
aspects of the project. The Commission concluded that
environmental and social trade-offs have been made without a full
understanding of the consequences. The social and environmental
Losts were understated; as a result, the financial benefits of the dam
tended to be overstated. Further, it was maintained that the
rehabilitation of all the displaced would be impossible under the
present circumstances. The World Bank agreed to continue fundingthe project on the condition that the Indian Government met six
benchmarks related to the R and R component by April 1993. These
were:
1. Satisfactory improvement of the data describing the number of
PAPs in the reservoir area, including an analysis of the affected tribal
3
people. The Governments of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh were
expected to agree on the interpretation of eligibility criteria applying
to various PAPs, including the landless agricultural labourers and
major sons.
2. Preparation of satisfactory resetdement and rehabilitation plans
in all the three States.
3. Adaptation of strengthened institutional arrangements for the
implementation of R and R, including an appropriate role for local
n on-gove mm e n tai o rganisa ti o ns.
4.
Satisfactory7 demonstration of improved consultation practices.
5. Satisfactory demonstration of the feasibility of getting land in
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.
6. Development of a satisfactory policy7 package for canal affected^
families.
All these tasks should have been completed before the Government
of India gave clearance to commence work in 1987. The tasks were
not completed even by March 1993. creating conditions under which
World Bank funding became impossible.
This summary' seeks to examine the extent to which it has been
possible for the Governments to meet the terms and conditions
elaborated in the Award and as per R and R related World Bank
benchmarks.
THE TRIBAL SITUATION
No attempt is macle here to glorify the tribal situation, as life in these
areas is both arduous and rigorous. Instead, their well-being is define
as seen from the point of view of the tribals themselves. Thus, socia
values and lifestyles preferred in non-tribal locales need not akvavv
coincide with those subscribed to by the tribals of the Narmada X allev -Z-Since the Award envisages the assurance of continuity of life for the
displaced, rehabilitation has to be examined in terms of the social.
cultural and technological matrix of the communitv and the extent
to which the tribals can continue to utilise known practices and skill
*
while coping with a new environment.
A few universal factors can be observed across all tribal sub-groups
Akkalkuwa and Akrarii Talukas (the two affected talukas m
Maharashtra) as well as those in Gujarat. These are:
6
1. The existence of an integrated, self-sufficient and essentially
non-monetised economy. Agriculture, cattle rearing, forest and the
river provide the main sources of sustenance.
(a) Table 1, which' pertains to select Maharashtra villages,
indicates that land ownership and entitlement in these ullages arc
quite different from those put forth by conventional definitions.
People have access to land through a range of methods (owned,
shared, and encroached land) which vary across villages. Thus,
landlessness in the real sense of the term is virtually non-existent.
In Maharashtra, as well as Gujarat, this is as little as two to four per
cent. In Maharashtra, the average land owned per family ranges
from 2.82 to 5.25 hectares while in Gujarat, it ranges from 1.6 to 10
hectares. More than half the land under cultivation in Gujarat is of
the n on-revenue category' (so called encroached). In Maharashtra,
large quantum of land was not treated as revenue land because
^the 1975 land survey remained incomplete and till 1980, no land
survey had been undertaken in these villages. The second reason
for land not beingf registered in a family’s name is related to nontransference of title deeds. Though the number of families has
increased and the lineage expanded, no effort was made to transfer
the divided land to the name of the inheritor. This was unimportant
in the prevailing tribal context. In actuality, the notion of
encroachment is alien here, as the output from encroached land
does not differ from owned land.
(b) The average yield per hectare meets the food requirements of
the people. The major items cultivated are indicated in the section
on consumption. The fertility of this (semi-grade) soil has not
deteriorated due to minimal application of chemical fertilisers;
instead manure is utilised, especially since the people own large
livestock.
%
(c) Table 2 indicates that an average family in Maharashtra owns up
to nine to ten animals. In Gujarat, as well, on an average, families
possess 11 animals. Poultry too are owned in abundance. The output
from agriculture is thus substantially supplemented by livestock (milk.
meat, eggs etc.)
(d) Proximity to the river and forest has provided additional
supplements. Most households catch fish at least four times a week.
The forest provides a range of food items and adequate fuel and
firewood. Every household in Gujarat and Maharashtra consumes a
minimum of five to eight kgs. of fuel wood per day, with an increase
in the winter and monsoon months.
(e) Bamboo and wood are also gathered for house construction.
In Gujarat, 27.31 per cent of the people are engaged in cattle
□ razing, 30 per cent in firewood collection, and one fifth in
collection of minor forest produce. Existence of these
complementary production sources has prevented the emergence
of unemployment.
Table 1
Percentage Distribution of Households by Land Holding Status
(Only of families present at the time of survey)
Dhankhedi
Chimalkhcdi
No. having
only own land
5.0
2S.6
No. having only
encroached land
36.7
No. having only
shared land
3.3
No. hating own land
-r encroached land
Particulars
Village Names
Mu- ManiSin- Bamni Danel
khadi
bcli
duri
40.3
5.6
9.5
3.7
24.2
24.1
20.3
16.7
30.2
9.7
■
9.5
10.0
20.6
28.5
99
No. hating shared
land r encroached
land
25.0
17.5
No. having no land
3.3
3.1
No. having satbara
3.3
--
No. hating satbara
4- encroached land
11.7
—■ —
No. hating sharing
+ Satbara
+ encroached land
1.7
—' ■
—
Unspecified
—»
■■ —
9
•w
—■ ■ ~
99
9
Gaman
All
30.8
14.8
91.9
17.9
29.2
—
■—
9.7
»M■ M
9
21.6
25.9
■
51.3
20.5
w/
44.4
39.2
29.6
■
1
—
21.6
□
3.7
■
1.9
8.1
——
3.6
—
■
■ »
■
—
— --
——
■-
—— ■
—-
■ ■-
■-—
— —
——
— -
0.2
■
■
— —
.All households
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0 100.0
100.0
100.0
10(10
Average land owned
per family
5.25
3.35
2.82
3.12
4.22
3.86
3.12
3.81
3.28
cons^clu^nce
such an economy is a fairly high
fluctume'w” eVe ’ The consumption patterns art: varied and
actuate acioss seasons. The principal source of consumption is
8
1 an d, wh i le c attl e, rive r an d fo res t producc p 1 ay a significan l ro 1 c. For
example, in one village up to 16 per cent of the total consumption
comes from the forest in the monsoon months. It needs to be
mentioned that wage labour is not an important source of income in
these villages. This is significant as it implies adequacy and
self-sufficiency of the economy.
Table 2
Cattle Population Per Family In Eight Villages (in Akkalkuwa Taluka)
Mukhadi
Manibeli
Gaman
ci
Animals
Village Names
Bamni
Dancl
2.8
2.8
2.8
1.3
1.8
1.0
1.2
3.5
1.9
3.8
6.4
3.3
0.8
0.2
0.6
1■
0.7
Dhan- Chimkhedi alkhedi
Sinduri
2.4
2.1
2.6
2.8
•''"’7'Sows
iOy
1.7
1.3
1.5
1.7
Goals
4.8
2.0
7.4
Buffaloes
0.3
0.3
0.3
Bullocks
Table 3 indicates that the per capita calorie intake is about 2527 in
Maharashtra while in Gujarat it is 2418 calories. Considerable
diversity too, is noted in the items of consumption: maize,jowar, bajri,
a range of local millets (badal, band, mor) til, mahua seeds and pulses
(udid and tur), milk and its products, fruits, fish and meat. There is
virtually no hunger, even in the summer, as the river-bed is used for
cultivating vegetables and for catching fish in shallow waters. Leaves,
tubers, stems, fruits and vegetables from the forest, also make up the
tribal diet.
3. This community is minimally dependent on the market as most
items produced are largely consumed locally. A major portion of
til and a small quantity of udid and tur, harvested by the
.-“households, is sold in order to purchase essential items such as
- clothes, utensils, tobacco, sugar, salt and jewellery. Ambadi seeds
are exchanged for salt and spices. The people also visit the market
to sell their surplus livestock. The house is constructed of
material obtained from the forest; Liles are prepared by each
family; and basket making and pottery are skills every family
possesses for its utensils and storage requirements. All of these
indicate a high degree of self-sufficiency in the submergence
villages. Even if there is no saving, there is no indebtedness, since
this is a largely non-monetised economy.
9
4. People reside in spacious and comfortable houses made out of
teak wood, thatch, mud and bamboo. These arc not the stereotyped
concept of the village hut. The size of the houses range from 50 to
100 sq.mts.
Tabic 3
Per Capita Calorie Intake in the Eight Villages
(in Akkalkuwa Taluka)
Village Names
Average Consumption (Calories)
1. Dhankhedi
2942
2. Chimalkhedi
2618
3. Sinduri
2359
4.
Bamni
2375
5.
Mukhadi
2583
6. Danel
2178
7. Manibeli
2482
8. Gaman
2682
___
2527
Total (average)
5. These villages are characterised by close family ties and strong
intra- and inter-village networks. Relationships of patronage and
exploitation are absent. Instead, reciprocity permeates all
interactions, evident during the agricultural season, at the time of
house construction, or on ritual occasions (including marriage).This
is evident from the fact that the component of wage labour, referred
to earlier, never exceeds three to five per cent of anybody’s major
activity. Sendees are not hired but exchanged and only food and
tobacco are provided for the days when such help is used. Strong
inter-village networks also result from the establishment of affinal tie
across village boundaries. Leadership is customary (i.e., the headship
usually is located within a single family), but the head is chosen based
on his capability. Decision-making is not entirelv his prerogative;
every single adult has the right to express his her view.
6. The women occupy a special position in these villages. This is
evident from the roles performed by them, their contribution to the
economy, decision-making powers vested in them, and the nature of
interaction with men and with the wider society. An open admission
10
_
of the high premium placed on women, is the payment of bride price
at the time of marriage. The women perform a multiplicity of roles as
they shoulder a large burden of the agricultural work, look after the
livestock, do all the housework, make utensils, fetch water, gather
minor forest produce, etc. Rather than being exploited, they are
valued for their capability. They are seen taking important decisions
within the household and outside. These decisions are wide ranging,
pertaining to agriculture, selection of spouses, opting for
resettlement, etc. High fertility rates and a good health status have
prevailed. No incidents of wife battering have been recorded, despite
regular alcohol consumption. The women consume alcohol and
smoke bidis, against which there is no social sanction. Unequal power
equations between genders are not evident.
7. There is poor access to the formal health care, child welfare and
^educational facilities, due to isolation. Such facilities have not been
'' adequately extended to them. This is a definite lacuna, yet people’s
health status is not very poor. They avail of an array of medicinal plants
from the forest and only in the case of serious illness, they go many
kilometres to seek medical help. Their current lifestyle precludes the
need for formal education. This, however, restricts their
opportunities while attempting to move beyond their isolated
surroundings.
The above description indicates the nature of the community being
dealt with and the rehabilitation programme required.
REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT IN TERMS OF THE
AWARD AND WORLD BANK TERMS
1.
Survey of the PAPs
The project work was to be preceded by a comprehensive appraisal
regarding displacement and plans for rehabilitation; but the
‘ government of India granted permission for the commencement of
work on the condition that such studies will be commissioned and
comprehensive plans will be submitted by 1989. This did not occur.
Even subsequent to the World Bank conditions (1992), no
comprehensive studies were commissioned between October 1992 to
April 1993. As mentioned earlier, according to Prof. Scudder’s report,
the extent of displacement was not known and, hence, no clear plans
for resettlement could be envisaged. The Award and certain World
Bank benchmarks assume relevance only if these aspects are clearly
explicated.
11
As the Slate Governments are still not aware of the exact extent of
displacement, assurance cannot be provided that all PAPs would be
appropriately rehabilitated. A simple calculation, based on the
Maharashtra and Gujarat baseline village studies, shows that each
family, on an average, owns or has access to two to five hectares of
land. Hence, even at the minimum norm, for the Maharashtra PAPs
alone, about 7,000 to 8,000 hectares of cultivable land is required.
This is evident from some sample data in Table 4.
The Government of Maharashtra obtained 2700 hectares of forest
land, to be cleared for purposes of resettlement. Since additional land
was required for persons newly designated as PAPs, due to policy
changes, another 1500 hectares is being considered for this purpose.
However, it should be noted that the PAPs also subsisted on cattle
rearing, forest and river produce. In the past, as their families grew
and older sons established nuclear families, they could cleai
additional forestland. In the new settlement colonies, there is no river
and access to forest is restricted. Also, expandability of land is not a
feasible proposition. Thus, even if a total of 4,000 hectares of land is
released by the Government, it will prove to be inadequate as families
grow and have to seek an alternate livelihood for which there is no
provision in the resettlement colonies. It is anticipated that they will
be reduced to landless and, possibly, even migrant wage labourers.
Table 4
Quantity of Agricultural Land Required for Compensation
Particulars
Dhankhedi
Chimal
khedi
Village Names
SinBamni
Danel
duri
Mukhadi
All six
villages
total
1. Number of landed and
landless adults and
major sons as on 1981
cut-off point
63
69
98
62
93
75
460
—• • Agricultural land
required as per 1.
(in hectares)
126
138
196
124
186
150
920
3. Number of landed and
landless and major sons
as on 1988 cut-off point 75
96
131
83
116
106
607
4. Agricultural land
required as per 3.
(hectares)
192
262
166
232
202
1204
9
150
12
It is also doubtful whether Gujarat would be able to make available
the required land for all those from the other two states, who indicate
their preference for relocation in Gujarat, in view of the fact that
Gujarat Zmysland at a rate of Rs. 35,000 to Rs. 75,000 per hectare, and
the land prices are expected to continue to escalate since Government
is acquiring so much land. The per family financial allocation for
rehabilitation is in the range Rs. 1 to 1.25 lakh only. This is clearly not
adequate to meet procedural and incidental costs and other expenses,
in addition to land costs.
2.
Maintaining the integration of the village community
An important element of the Award was the relocation of PAPs in
units of their preference. However, due to the non-availability of
large land plots, they are unable to express their preferences. In most
resettlement colonies, there is no possibility of relocating an entire
- Village. (The Taloda forest in Maharashtra provides such an option
but due to n on-parity of packages between Gujarat and Maharashtra,
those opting for this site stand to lose in economic terms.) In fact,
even pada members (group of inter-dependent families), and major
sons and daughters have not been resettled together with their
families. This poses new problems in an inter-dependent society and
economy. For the Maharashtra PAPs, the most striking example, in
this regard, is in the first resettlement colony of Parveta (Gujarat),
which is inhabited by families from Manibeli (a submerging village
in Maharashtra), but the major sons had to go elsewhere — Lunadra
and Sihandra (Gujarat).
Maintaining village also community integration has been
problematic as there are factors beyond economic imperatives
influencing the PAPs’ decision-making: (a) proximity to forest, and
(b) retaining in ter-group ties by resettlement at the same sites. For
example, the Vasavas and Tadvis (sub-tribes) have expressed the
desire to be relocated together. The Tadvis have been more
^inclined to avail of the Gujarat option while the Vasavas are
■ interested in residing near the forest. Thus, people have been
compelled to opt for one choice or the other, while both aspects
are equally important. The outcome of this is that the villages have
been split; in some cases members of the same pada have been
resettled in different colonies, inter sub-group ties have been
broken and families have been divided. Gujarat is resettling its 19
villages in 175 different locations
*.
From a single village, Khalvani,
<
* The Gujarat data, in this report, pertains only to the 22 resettlement colonics surveyed by die
centre for Social Studies.
13
a group of46oustec families were resettled in three differentsites: 26
in Chhindiapura; 17 in Khadagada; and 3 in Thapavi. Similar
prob 1 ems are occurring in Maharash tra vi 11 ages.
3.
The non-submerging hamlets
There exist problems at yet another level as except a few villages in
Gujarat and Manibeli village in Maharashtra, all other villages will not
be entirely submerged. A few hamlets are to be left out in each village.
People residing in these non-submerging parts are not being resettled
but will be left behind in inaccessible mountain areas around the rim
of the reservoir. For the non-submerging hamlets in Maharashtra,
access to Gujarat will be completely cut-off. Villages along the
Narmada river are dependent on Gujarat for its market and for a
range of social reasons. Markets on the Maharashtra side are located
at a great distance from these hamlets. People living in these
truncated villages are also likely to be affected by water borne diseases
generated by the reservoir. They will have no access to health care,
because the nearest PHC or sub-centre will be over six hours walk
across the Satpura ranges, and even those would become inaccessible
during monsoon. These isolated hamlets will not constitute viable
units wherein survival itself cannot be assured.
4.
Procedures
The R and R procedures require that the PAPs be served eviction
notices, detailed asset surveys conducted, compensation notices
issued and amounts fixed, and submergence notices issued. As people
of this region are illiterate, they are to be explained the meaning of
these processes.
In Akkalkuwa taluka (first phase submergence villages), various
problems have occurred in the process of application of the minimum
requirements. Resistance to eviction is still evident and consultation
with PAPs has not been possible in most villages. This is possible onb
when there is mutual trust and confidence between the affected
people and the Government. Even persons who have agreed to move,
have not opted for it as a desired shift. They are virtually compelled
to undertake this step through lack of choice: they see the walls of the
dam rising before their eyes and fear that moving will become
inevitable. They were never consulted in the first instance when the
plans were being prepared for the sharing of the Narmada waters.
Now, the Government has to exert considerable pressure on the PAPs
to relocate in view of the imminent submergence.
14
In Akkalkuwa again, it has been noted that not all persons whose lands
are to be submerged have received the required notices. The level of
awareness is also not very high as a number of people who are to be
affected by submergence do not know this. There are others who
believe that their lands will be submerged but do not feature in the
submergence list of the Government. There are 97 persons who
maintain that they arc to be exposed to submergence but have not
received notices. At least 31 PAPs from these villages have also not
received compensation notices. Even among those who have received
them, some are yet to receive compensation. A total of 107 persons,
out of 391, did not receive any form of compensation, till early 1993.
In Akrani taluka, an entire village did not receive compensation
notices (Sikka); in Paula village, the eviction notices were left at the
headman’s house, and were consumed by white ants.
•nln Gujarat, the PAPs who moved to Ten tai av and Ambavadi
- ''settlements maintain that they received an equal amount or more
agricultural land than owned by them in their original villages.
However, in Parveta about 18 per cent claimed that they received less
land. In Chhindiapura and Khadaga all the PAPs received smaller
plots as compared to their original holdings. In 1991, 27 per cent of
persons resettled in KJiadagada and 9 per cent of the Parveta
inhabitants were yet to receive land, while 65 per cent of the Gujarat
oustees resettled in Parveta stated that they were dissatisfied with the
land quality. Moreover, most of the major sons in 11 of the new sites
have not received agricultural land and house plots. Forty-eight
oustees in Sandhia, Chhindiapura and Vaghavali have been given less
than the requisite 68 sq.mts. for housing purposes.
With regard to the process of land selection in Akkalkuwa, 126
persons are still in the process of selecting land; 40 have selected land
but are yet to receive title deeds; and 63 have received title deeds but
are yet not cultivating their new lands as they have not been
co m pl e tely re habi 1 i la to d.
series of discrepancies have been noted in the land selection and
identification process in Gujarat. Persons have been shown a specific
piece of land but allotted an alternative one, of poorer quality. In
some cases, the land allotment has been cancelled after being
sanctioned. There have also been instances, wherein more than one
person has been allotted the same piece of land. In general, the
choices offered to PAPs have been minimal, if at all. The PAPs are
compelled to wait for long periods outside the rehabilitation office
for submitting applications and collecting documents to which they
are entitled.
15
In Parveta, the first batch of 81 Maharashtra PAPs received the first
instalment of subsistence allowance as late as 1988, although they had
shifted in 1985. The shifting allowances in most cases were paid only
alter a lapse of at least two years. This led to an unwarranted financial
burden on (he PAPs, because they had to finance the land clearance
as well. Each PAP in Parveta incurred an average expenditure of
-Rs. 18,000 in the process of resettlement, which was not reimbursed
as it exceeded the amount earmarked for this purpose.
A series of problems have also been related to the payment of
compensation. The people who have received the amount are
dissatisfied as they maintain that the 1985 land survey for regularising
encroached land was not complete; hence, all their lands were not
recorded and it was difficult to prove that they had been cultivating
the land prior to 1978.
f
Due to non-uniformity of policy across slates, the PAPs of Maharashtra
received only Rs. 3,750 to Rs. 4,500 per hectare of land as opposed to
Rs. 10,000 received by the Gujarat PAPs. This created a feeling of
deprivation among the former. A number of cases (at least nine) have
been recorded, wherein, people feel that they have not been given
adequate choice in land selection. Bureaucratic delays in attending
to complaints have further aggravated the problem.
5.
Strategy7 for Shifting
People from Manibeli were motivated to shift to Parveta,
unfortunately by adopting the policy- of ‘first come best served’. The
first set of families received good quality of land while those who
moved in later were allotted poorer quality of land, sometimes too
rocky for cultivation. Thirty-four per cent of the Parveta households
(from Maharashtra) applied for alternative lands because of poor
quality. Land clearance too was slow; in some cases it took up to three
years. Up to 15 per cent of the families were affected by this slowness
of piocedures, while 18 households have returned their lands to the
Government as they were not willing to shift out of Manibeli. In
Januaiy 1992, 52 eligible persons were still waiting to receive land.
Factional lends have also been recorded, and there is a polarisation,
as a few have become richer while the majority have not reaped the
same benefits.
In some cases, persons have found plots allotted to them to be
unsuitable, but their applications for alternative plots are vet to be
considered. The applications of the major sons of a number of PAPs
have also io be attended to. In Gujarat too, it has been noted that
16
though the major sons have been declared "oustees", yet many of
them have not received land or house plots (a point mentioned
earlier). As birth certificates cannot be produced and, therefore,
disputes have arisen as to whether a person is 18 years or below. In a
tribal society, birth certificates, or any other method of marking births
or deaths, does not exist.
Such problems have created disenchantment among some who have
opted for resettlement, and is compelling others to move back to their
original villages after shifting. Tension occurred in March 1992, when
efforts were made to forcibly evict people from Manibeli by deploying
a large battalion of policemen. The people did not move, and the
force had to be withdrawn under public pressure. Prolonged
confrontation has injected bitterness between the parties.
The process of resettlement is itself traumatic, and adjustment to a
fa / new environment requires a congenial and supportive atmosphere.
This needs sensitive handling by trained and committed personnel.
In its absence, it is no coincidence that families that have shifted to
new locations for over a year continue to maintain two abodes: one
in the new resettlement colony and the other in the submerging
village. They need to buttress the loss of agriculture in the initial stages
through cultivation in their original village. This has been noted
among the Gujarat PAPs as well. They cultivated land in both old
submerging villages and new sites for a period of almost five years.
Some families are fractured for several years between the new and the
old villages. Often, women and older persons are left behind. Family
life is disturbed and it is difficult on the women for whom
responsibilities increase with divided household and parallel activities
in both locations.
6.
'
Changes in the Economy
The dislocation from the valley has eliminated access to river and
forest produce. This has resulted in a change in the consumption
pattern in the new colonies. Fish and meat have vanished, and while
cereals are available and some good crops have been halves ted, a
general shortage of pulses and vegetables has been noted in some
resettlement colonies. In Parveta, about 23 per cent of the
Maharashtra PAPs were recorded to be below the poverty line in 1989.
In the resettlement colonies inhabited by the Gujarat PAPs, the
average calorie intake per adult is 2629. Though this is above the
required minimum, it is not uniform across the resettlement sites. In
Dhefa, Ambavadi, Bhilvashi, Jemalgadh, Kukarda, Parveta and
Vaghrali, the average intake per capita is less than 2400 calories and
17
16 to 28 per cent of the population in these colonies consume even
less than 2000 calorics. This has been attributed to low yields and poor
employment opportunities outside agriculture.
In 1992, in Parveta (the Maharashtra PAPs resettlement site) with a
poor monsoon, wage labour became the only alternative, if and where
it could be found. On the aggregate, up to 46 per cent of the
households engaged in agricultural wage labour in this Milage in
contrast to only 5 per cent earlier. Contract labour too has begun to
surface. In the pre-resetllement situation, the option of expanding
land under the plough and availing of forest produce existed to ude
over such periods. Wage labour may continue to rise in the future
since there are few alternatives/cushions available.
The Gujarat situation is also similar, wherein, 87 per cent of the PAPs
maintain that there are less work opportunities in the new si Les, except
for those resettled in Khadaga. It has been noted that 17 per cent of
the population is engaged in casual wage labour for a period of 220
days per year as their main occupation, while 65 per cent of the people
are self-employed agriculturists. In addition, 46 per cent are engaged
in casual labour as a subsidiary occupation. Approximately, 150 days
of employment are generated per year. This is less than the
pre-resettlement situation owing to narrowing of the occupational
base. Dependency upon agriculture has thus risen, but its ability to
absorb people has narrowed.
Regarding the agricultural occupation itself, a few changes are
evident. Eighty per cent of the Gross Cropped Area is under food
grains. On the one hand, there has been the introduction of two new
high value crops: wheat and paddy, while, on the other, there has been
the loss of local millets such as nagli, bhanti and bhadi which added
variation to their diets. There has been use of HYV cotton seeds, and
fertilisers such as di-ammonium phosphate, and plant protection
chemicals. Despite this, higher yields have been recorded only in 10
per cent of the irrigated cropped area. Yields in the dry lands of
Ambavadi, Bhilvashi, Dhamadra, Dhefa, Gora, Parveta and Vaviyala
(all in Gujarat) have been extremely low. The value of the average
yield per acre is Rs. 1,032 which is lower than the district yield value
of Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 1,800 per acre. The farm economy is, thus, weak in
the sites which do not have irrigated agricultural land. Out of the 21
colonies monitored in Gujarat, in four there are no irrigation
facilities; in nine, less than 10 per cent of the area is irrigated while
in the remaining seven, less than 20 per cent is irrigated?
18
In Defa, it is feared that farming households will transform to casual
labouring ones. A decline in reciprocal labour has also been noted,
bringing a new dimension into the agricultural system. People in
these resettlement colonies have not eone
in for serious investment
o
in land as there is some confusion regarding the interpretation of
land allotment rules, shortchanging of land, and canal or road
expected to pass through the allotted plot.
The maintenance of large herds of cattle and goats by both the
Maharashtra and the Gujarat PAPs has become problematic due to
inadequate pasture lands. This is particularly acute for the latter, as
in many colonies no grazing has been reported. The grazing land that
exists in the resettlement sites, has to be shared with the people of the
host village. A large number of persons have also sold their cattle due
to this problem. They have reduced the numbers in their livestock
and feed them on the stubble after harvesting the crops. A number
° / of PAPs have left considerable livestock in their original villages where
adequate pasture is available. Among the Gujarat PAPs, a decline in
milk consumption has been recorded. In fact, sheep-herding as an
occupation has become insignificant in most Gujarat settlement
colonies.
Excessive dependency on land and integration into the market
economy, has reduced the earlier self-sufficiency and, thereby,
created indebtedness in a market economy where only cash can
obtain their requirements. People now have to purchase certain items
(both food and non-food) which were earlier obtained gra/Afrom the
local environment; e.g., grain, oil, vegetables, pulses and seeds.
Expenditure on new items has also been recorded: e.g., fertilisers and
pesticides. In Parveta, 80 per cent of the Maharashtra PAP households
have taken loans in the range of Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 3,000, partly for
meeting their agricultural needs and partly for shortfalls in
consumption. In the other four Gujarat resettlement sites where
families from Maharashtra have settled, six out of the eight
(families) studied, have become indebted. Loans ranging from
‘ Rs.1,000 to Rs. 26,000 were taken from relatives and money lenders.
Hence, while increased availability of cash is cited as an improvement
over their earlier living, in fact, their standards have fallen because it
is insufficient to meet their needs.
7. Problems of Encroachers
Families in the submergence villages have cultivated these lands since
generations without(title deeds). Whenever a family expanded,
the members took up additional land, cleared and began to cultivate
19
it. No Government official ever visited these areas till the beginning
of the project. However, now the non-patla holders are termed
‘landless’ for purposes of rehabilitation. They are called the
encroachers. Since such persons would get only one hectare, their
standard of living would be severely affected in a cash economy. This
would be against the basic principle of the Award: that all displaced
should regain at the least, if not improve, their standard of living. This
is in contrast to the Gujarat package, wherein, two hectares of land
are available for the same category.
8.
Housing
Some PAPs have been residing in tin sheds for up to 18 months in a
Maharashtra resettlement site (Somaval). These sheds were meant for
a transitional period not exceeding six months. They are small, hot
in summer and cold in winter and cannot house cattle. The size of
the plot, to be given to PAPs, is about 60 sq.mts. which compares with,'
perhaps, the smallest of the house plots in the submergence villages
(where the houses could be as large as 100 sq.mts.) They can
dismantle and bring their old houses from the original village only
after they get the titles to their house plots, agricultural land and the
necessary compensation. Until then, they are compelled to leave their
houses and some members of the family in the original village. These
processes are lengthy; as a result, people are compelled to stay in tin
sheds for extended periods.
An expense of about Rs. 1,500 has been incurred on house construction
by the Maharashtra PAPs (in Parveta) which was not compensated. It
would be much more if they did not use the original (indigenous)
materials. Besides, for the major sons, new houses need to be built on
the land allotted to them. There are schemes under the tribal sub-plan
which have yet not been implemented in a co-ordinated manner for the
allocation of homesteads and construction of houses.
In Gujarat, several PAPs in 11 new sites complained that they had not
been allotted houseplots. In Dhefa, the plinth construction work is
still not complete. In Jemalgadh, the people are dissatisfied with the
plinth construction and wish to undertake the task themselves. The
early settlers in the Gujarat sites are disgruntled because they had
constructed the plith at their own expense and have not been
compensated for it.
Though the policies provide for housing loans, no such benefit has
been extended so far in Maharashtra and Gujarat. People who lived
in hill areas, had specific structured houses. Such structures in the
20
resettlement (which are located in the plains) areas are not protective.
People have been waiting ever since they shifted for the subsistence
from government to make concrete houses. In fact the tribals are also
eligible for house construction assistance due to their scheduled
status.
9.
Status of Women
A series of changes have been observed in the life and status of women
in the resettlement colonies. Earlier, the women were agriculturists
and did not have to leave their villages for wage labour. After moving
to rehabilitation sites, they have had to engage in wage labour,
especially as activities related to tending cattle have reduced and
collection of forest produce disappeared. In 36 per cent of the
Maharashtra PAP households in Parveta, women's contribution to the
. to tai household income through wage labour (mainlv in sugarcane
tutting) was significant. However, they receive a lower wage as
compared to men (only Rs. 7 to Rs. 10 per day). This is the first
expression of gender inequality in the relocation sites. The need for
wage labour has resulted due to the growing requirements of cash to
meet consumption needs, in addition to being exposed to drought
without a cushion; a dramatic change from the earlier situation.
The women are now expending less energy and time on certain types
of housework such as collection of water, which is available close by,
and the flour mill has reduced the drudgery of grinding grain. Thev
are unfortunately no longer using the skills of pottery, basket-making,
etc. The Maharashtra PAP women who are availing
of gobar
gas
o
o
o
facility (in Parveta) maintain that the time gained from firewood
(non) collection is diverted to the collection of cow-dung for the
gobar-gas plant. The availability of firewood is a major problem, for
households which cannot install gobar gas plants. The consumption
of firewood has decreased to one kg. per day. This extends to the
Gujarat PAPs as well.
Efforts have been made to provide alternative opportunities for
income generation for women in the Gujarat resettlement colonies
through introduction of training in non-traditional skills e.g., soap
making and weaving. Most women in the older age category have
resisted this. Some of the younger ones have come forward but the
effort has not yielded additional income or improved their status as
the programmes have not been efficiently adapted. There have been
no links between subsidised purchase of raw materials and efficient
output marketing.
21
7 rr
The status of women in the host villages is not high. This will
undoubtedly influence the position of women who are relocating,
over a period of lime, as cooption occurs. The type of economy
reducing them to wage labour and non-parity of values in the two
situations, will affect their status adversely.
10.
The Host Population
In Maharashtra (Somaval settlement), a forest is being cleared for
R and R purposes. This forest contains unrecorded settlements
wherein the original residents depend upon the forest for their
subsistence. The PAPs are required to adjust to both, the host villages
and the unrecorded settlements, as members of the latter now have
to share their minimal sources with an additional set of people.
Clearing the forest has already reduced their access. Hence, incidents
of tension have been noted in these areas. In Somaval, the crop of
one of the PAPs was stolen in 1992. Some PAPs have also been
physically threatened by the earlier inhabitants. In one incident (in
1992), the tension culminated in a firing incident, in which the life
of a tribal woman was lost.
The PAPs are receiving benefits in the form of agricultural
implements, fertilisers and other infrastructural support, as specified
in the compensation package. Even though these are under-used, it
has created feelings of jealousy and hostility among the original
inhabitants. Non-advancemerit of these benefits to host populations,
has generated tension.
In most resettlement colonies inhabited by the Gujarat PAPs,
integration with the host villages is yet to be attained. Except the site
of Khadaga, problems have been identified in the other sites. These
relate to a variety of factors. A large number in the host population,
employed as labourers on the sites purchased by the R and R
Department, suddenly lost all employment. The PAPs, unlike the
absentee landowners (their previous employers), do not require their
services as they cultivate their fields with the help of family labour. Ir
addition, the arrival of so many persons has created a situation ol
surplus labour, reducingjob opportunities for them. Further, people
associated with the land in a share-cropping capacity have been
reduced to landless labourers. In 1991, this problem was the most
acute in Chhindiapura, Ambavadi and Parveta. Moreover, fodder and
fuel shortages were exacerbated by the arrival of the new entrants.
The host population was also not involved in the process of R and R.
They got to know of impending changes only through hearsay. The
99
interaction in most sites is minimal. There is virtually no exchange or
interaction on a daily basis. Some amount of interaction on
ceremonial occassions (births, deaths, marriages and festivals),
though, has been noted.
I
‘
|
I
11. Preparation of site before resettlement and availability of infra
structure
It was envisaged, under the terms of the Award, that when villages or
sections of villages relocate, infrastructure of school, primary health
centre and transport would be provided.
In the case of the Maharashtra PAPs who moved to Parveta, due to
batch-wise shifting at the initial stage, infrastructural facilities were
inadequate. The tin sheds were leaking, only one hand pump was
functional, there was no electricity, roads, health facility, toilets or
^grazing ground. The first batch of persons experienced serious health
problems due to nutritional deficiency and lackof proper health care.
In 1988, 17 deaths (a number of them children below 5 years), were
recorded out of a total of 350 persons in this settlement. With
improvement in the sites, the number of such deaths recorded has
decreased. Initially, the most serious problem was water, which was
solved after the people were organised by the Narmada Bachao
Andolan. Ironically, the Award requires that two hectares of irrigated
land should be given. Till irrigation facilities commence, hand pumps
and wells are required.
Approach roads have now been constructed to some colonics, but the
bus transport is inadequate, creating a problem of accessibility.
Somaval (in Maharashtra) has one dirt road on which only one bus
plies per day. Among the colonics inhabited by the Gujarat PAPs, only
12 have pukka approach roads.
I
I
As per geological reports, Somaval is located on the hill slope at the
foothills of the Satpuras, wherein, due to the topography of the land,
{Surface run-off could prevent adequate recharge of ground water at
the site. It is in the future that water shortages are anticipated unless
watershed development is commenced early. At present, all the
colonies are provided with adequate drinking water, but in some,
water is released only at particular hours, unlike the perennial
Narmada. Moreover, in the future, a cost will be attached, as electricity
bills will have to be paid for lifting and pumping water. Further,
pumps are prone to break down. In Gujarat, PAPs are encountering
a water problem in some sites. In Ambavadi, Parveta, Dhefa, Khadaga
and Thapavi one of the two sources of drinking water has become
23
dysfunctional. In Bhilvasi and Chhindiapura, due'to only one source
being available, and that too non-functional, the PAPs have to cany
water from the adjoining villages located three to four kms. away.
Regarding educational and medical facilities, there appears to be
improved accessibility in both Maharashtra and Gujarat. In Somaval
and Parveta, schools exist. The PAPs are availing of these facilities
and sending their children to school if not required for domestic
work and minding cattle. In the newer resettlement colonies in
Gujarat, however, the total number of PAPs from Maharashtra is
too small to qualify for the infrastructural facilities, according to
the laid down norms. Therefore, the children of the Maharashtra
PAPs are expected to avail of the schools of the host villages, where
they have to traverse a distance of at least four kms. eveiyday. This
affects small children.
The Gujarat PAPs have access to a health sub-centre in only three
colonies. In 13 new sites, seivices are available at a distance of one to
live kms. In the remaining four, the closest sub-centre is 15 kms. away.
The PHCs and the sub-centres of nearby villages are poorly equipped
and the people no longer have access to medicinal herbs earlier
procured from the Satpura forests.
CONCLUSION
1. The above discussion highlights that, given the baseline situation,
the resources available, and the approach adopted, the
implementation of the Award is far from satisfactory, across both the
States reviewed in this paper. It is also doubtful whether the
Governments can take on the full dimensions of the task, given the
problems highlighted at the micro-level with the rehabilitation ofjust
a few families. The tense situation in the Narmada valley region is the
outcome of the serious problems relating to rehabilitation of this
tribal community. A project symbolising development has caused
deprivation to a group of people who lived beyond ‘development’
strategies for centuries. Bringing people into the main-stream should
not adversely affect their life situation. The claim is now being put
forward that they, have access to Government services in the
i (•settlement sites. This is unjustified since they were supposed to be
entitled to these services even in their original villages as these areas
have been demarcated for ('overage under the tribal sub-plan. They
had a basic right to services such as health or education. Moreover,
liny arc now being moved to sites which will not be similarly covered
midci the tribal sub plan provision. Earlier neglect cannot be sought
to be m tdc up hv this claim. It is accepted that some of the sendees
J
are now more accessible such as the PHC, school, roads, and
transport, yet observed that their overall position has actually
deteriorated in both economic and social dimensions as documented
by this report.
2. Problems have emerged due to a variety of reasons. At the
macro-level there was clearly the need to : (a) gauge the exact
dimension of the total impact of the project (on the people, flora and
fauna) at the stage of project formulation; (b) determine the exact
number of PAPs at the very outset; and (c) determine the nature and
the extent of resources and finance required for resettling the
displaced. None of these were fully undertaken before commencing
the construction of the dam. At the very outset, it needs mention that
there is need for a systematic review wherein an effective cost-benefit
exercise needs to be undertaken with a major emphasis on accounting
zTpr the social costs and not only the cusecs of water likely to reach a
pertain number of beneficiaries.
3. With specific regard to R and R, there are problems with the policy
package as well, which have been documented in this summary. The
basic problem pertains to non-parity of the package across the three
States. Though people in all the three States are exposed to the same
situation, there are vast differences in the R and R provisions which
have not been modified by the Governments of Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh to bring them on par with the Government of
Gujarat. The R and R provisions of these States do not provide
adequate support for people to regain their previous standard of
living. It is anticipated that the displaced from Madhya Pradesh
(especially) will have no alternative except to move to Gujarat.
4. If the people from these two States do opt to resettle in Gujarat,
non-availability of land in sufficient quantities is going to pose
difficulties due to the magnitude of displacement in Madhya Pradesh.
The experience of all the three States clearly reveals that land for
cultivation and resettlement cannot be acquired easily. Claims being
(X>it forward regarding the availability of land lack authenticity, as
much of this land has been proved to be non-arable.
The Governments have not acquired land for resettlement using
legislative measures such as the Land Acquisition Act, Land Reform
Act and Land Ceiling Act. The 1984 amendment to the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, provides for land acquisition to resettle people.
Instead, in Gujarat, land is now bought in the open market in small
bits and pieces. Thus, it may be difficult to obtain land of adequate
size to resettle even 30 to 40 families in one location. This prevents
25
effective relocation of groups which represented cohesive social units.
The resettlement experience of Gujarat villages is already available as
evidence: families from 19 villages are resettled in over 175 locations.
The Government of Maharashtra has chosen to resettle people in the
clear felled forest area. Private purchase of land cannot permit
large-scale resettlement due to limited availability. Forest land cannot
be a source of agricultural land for the resettled, given the magnitude
of displacement caused and depleted forest reserves. The options of
the Governments of Maharashtra and Gujarat, thus, have limitations
as also repercussions and, in conditions of large scale R and R they
cannot be justified or sustained.
5. In order to effectively operationalise the R and R policies of
Gujarat, the Government must account for the unwillingness of
people from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds (from
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh) to settle in Gujarat. For most of >
the displaced people, caste, religion, language and kinship, contim>
to play a dominant role in determining their economic and social
security. Education and the formal sector employment do provide
people with the capacity to break away from the ties related to social
attributes, to a certain extent, but only a small minority come under
this category. Hence, the non-availability of suitable and adequate
land in their own State, and the unwillingness of people to move to
unknown areas, easily gives rise to the use of external pressures or
force, besides leaving no options for the concerned person to choose
between alternatives. The choice is, then, between being wiped out
or accepting whatever is offered without protest.
6. The adoption of the policy of ‘divide and shift’ in the villages has
devastating effects on the welfare and community life of the originally
cohesive groups. In the process, the original villages are divided into
non-viable social units and relocated. Further, the Government is
attempting to resettle people by marginalising the advocacy groups
spearheading the anti-dam movement. In the absence of advocacy
groups, it is possible that the people will not be able to put the
necessary pressure for resettling them with the full provisions of tl
Award and its subsequent modifications in the light of experience in
implementation.
7. The Sardar Sarovar Project has highlighted one point very clearly:
large scale displacement of people from land cannot be sustained. It
may be easy to design an appropriate R and R policy framework,
similar to the policies the State and Central Governments have
evolved for the social and economic development of tribals, harijans
and other weaker sections. The M and E experience for a period of
26
six years has revealed the magnitude of procedural problems
associated with R and R.
8. The time has come to look for alternatives to large dams, in order
to minimise submergence of land and displacement of people. High
population density on land implies large displacement. When the
area of submergence is large, the problem of displacement assumes
serious dimensions. Moreover, when the people displaced are
dependent on land for livelihood, and if they happen to be tribals,
then the alternative provision has to be land. At least for the first
generation of resettlers, provision of land can be the only method of
compensation. All other methods have their shortcomings. As
discussed earlier, land is not available or the State is unable to acquire
land for the displaced.
9. Divisive policies will trigger serious social and political
consequences in society. As displacement progresses and
dissatisfaction increases, the affected people will regroup to challenge
the State. This process is gaining momentum. The Narmada Bachao
Andolan has sown the seeds of assertiveness and it has taken firm root
in the minds of the affected people. The activists view their work
basically as facilitation to enable the people to awaken them to their
dormant capacities to decide and act for themselves.
10. Given these observations from M and E work, it is incumbent on
the State Governments, and the Centre, to review not only R and R
but the entire issue of creating development with deprivation as these
data show. This is particularly crucial at this stage as, ultimately, there
are a very large number of PAPs from Madhya Pradesh who are yet to
be resettled. Hence, decisions taken now will be crucial for thousands
who will be displaced by this project.
27
Monsoon Satvagraha 2001
Narmada Bachao Andolan
July 2001
President of India concerned over Large River Valley Projects
President K R Narayanan on Wednesday voiced serious
concern over large river valley projects uprooting tribals and caus
ing them untold miseries.
In an apparent reference to the Narmada Valley project, he
said in his address to the nation on the Republic Day eve that
only through enlightened development policies the country could
resolve dilemmas of development.
"But the development path that we have adopted is hurting
them (the tribals) and threatening their very existence," he said.
"Let it not be said by future generations that the Indian
Republic has been built on the destruction of the green earth and
the innocent tribals who have been living there for centuries."
PTI
Source: RediffNews, January 26, 2001
Contacts
Narmada Bachao Andolan
B—13, Shivam Flats, Ellora Park, Baroda, Gujarat—390 007
Telefax: 0265-382232
Email: <baroda@narmada.org> <medha@narmada.org>
Narmada Bachao Andolan
62, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Badwani, Madhya Pradesh—451 551
Tel: 07290-22464
Email: <badwani@narmada.org>
Narmada Bachao Andolan
Jail Road, Mandaleshwar, Dist.Khargone, Madhya Pradesh
Telefax: 07283-33162
Email: <nobigdam@vsnl.com>
Web site: www.narmada.org
For Private Circulation only
Contribution: R_r. 8
I. Narmada Valley Development Project At a Glance
o
<=>
o
o
30 Large Dams, 135 Medium Dams and 3000 small dams
on the river and its tributaries
2 dams out of these are the gigantic ones - Sardar Sarovar
and Narmada Sagar (Indira Sagar)
All of these, except Sardar Sarovar arc in Madhya Pradesh
Sardar Sarovar Project is in Gujarat, with impacts and bene
fits in four states namely Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Ma
harashtra and Rajasthan
Four of the large dams are already completed - Bargi, Tawa,
Barna, Sukta. Ongoing ones include Sardar Sarovar Project,
Indira Sagar, Maheshwar, Maan, Jobat, Kolar
Maheshwar is the first privatised Hydropower project in the
country
Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award of 1979 decided
allocation of Narmada waters between various states, fixed
height of Sardar Sarovar Project, Indira Sagar, gave orders
for R&R
Water Yield of River Fixed at 28 Million Acre Feet (NL-X.F)
Allocation of Water (From all dams)
Madhya Pradesh
18.25 MAF
Gujarat
9.00 MAF
Maharashtra 0.25 MAF
Rajasthan
0.50 MAF
Sharing of Power Pc/ie/ds (from Sa/dar Sa/vrar Project)
Madhya Pradesh
57 %
Gujarat
27 %
Maharashtra 16%
II. Sardar Sarovar Project: Salient Features
(As per Official Documents)
Length of Main Concrete Gravity Dam -1210 m
Maximum Height above deepest foundation - 163 m
Catchment Area of the river above the dam site - 88,000 sq.km
Live Storage Capacity - 4.7 Million Acre Feet
Length of Reservoir - 214 km
Maximum Width Reservoir - 16.1 km
Average Width -1.77 km
Full Reservoir Level -138 m (455 Feet) MSL
Riverbed Level -18 m MSL
Spillway Gates - 23 Nos. 65’ x 60’
7 Nos. 60’ x 55’
Full Supply Level (FSL) of Main Canal - 91.44m (300 feet)
Length of Lined Canal - 460 km
• Base width of Main Canal - 73.1 m
Full supply Depth in Head reach - 7.6m
Design discharge capacity - 40,000 cusecs
Number of Branches - 42
Length of Distribution Network - 75,000 km
Annual Irrigation - 17.92 lakh Ha in Gujarat
73,000 ha in Rajasthan
Power Generation (Instailed capacity):
Riverbed Power House -1200 MW
Canal Head Power House - 250 MW
Drinking water
8215 Villages, 135 Urban Centers
30,000 ha, 210 Villages including Bharuch city.
Benefits to
Dhumkhal Sloth Bear Sanctuary Wild Ass Sanctuary,
Kutch Black Buck Sanctuary, Velavader Great Indian Bus
tard Sanctuary, Nal Sarovar Sanctuary.
III. The Complex Case of Sardar Sarovar Project
The CQSt:
DISPLACEMENT: Between 250,000 (an official figure- only
including, and almost certainly underestimating, those displaced
by submergence) and 1 million (NBA figure, including those
displaced by all aspects of die project - colony, canal, sanctuary,
down-stream, catchment area treatment, compensatory' affore
station etc.) will lose their homes and livelihoods to Sardar
Sarovar.
OFFICIAL FIGURES are a shambles and resettlement plans
have as a result been based on mistaken estimates of the num
ber of people to be displaced. In many villages some people
have received submergence notices, whilst others in houses be
low theirs have not!
RESETTLEMENT has been totally inadequate so far, with
many oustees not receiving the ‘land for land’, which they arc
entitled to under the NWDT award. Some tribal people are re
ceiving nothing because they do not have legal ownership of the
lands which they have cultivated for centuries. Many more have
received stony, uncultivable land and as a result have been
forced to work as wage labourers (Rs 15-20 per day), or migrate
to the slums of cities. Despite official claims, there is barely any
decent land available for future oustees, and the land which the
state governments propose to give to them is rocky and uncultivable. (One official was heard saying: Te can put them here- if
we do they’ll manage somehow, people always do manage
somehow!’). No Master Plan for rehabilitation till date.
CONSULTATION with those affected by the dam, concerning
resettlement plans, has been almost entirely absent.
COMMUNITIES have been split up and dispersed to many
different resettlement sites, in contravention of the NWDT
award.
TRIBAL LIFE depends heavily on die forests and the river.
Their daily life, nutrition, religion and whole culture are closely
interwoven with these resources. They are almost entirely selfsufficient, and are not used to the ways of the market economy.
Resetdement sites have neither forest nor river, and will lead to
the destruction of their culture.
NO RESETTLEMENT was given to the 950 families whose
land (much of it remains unused)'was taken for the construction
of Kevedia Colony, or those whose land was taken for the main
irrigation canal (23,000 families will be seriously affected if this is
completed). They now live as impoverished squatters on their
own land, and could be evicted at any time.
SHOOLPANESHWAR SANCTUARY- The presence of
38,000 villagers in 104 villages in the area designated for the
enlarged Shoolpaneshwar Wildlife Sanctuary (where all the ani
mals who will be drowned by the reservoir are supposed to flee
to!) is regarded as a “Limiting Factor and Threat”. Their activi
ties will therefore be severely restricted (eg. No goats, almost no
use of forest, etc..), such that they will be ‘persuaded’ to leave,
without resettlement. Tourists will be encouraged to visit the
sanctuary!
VILLAGES slated for submergence have had no government
funded development. The only schools that have appeared are
NBA funded.
FOREST SUBMERGENCE- Around 14,000 ha of prime for
est land, along with all the complex and delicate ecosystems
which it contains, will be submerged. This is being compensated
for by planting a few saplings (often on land belonging to farm
ers and tribals, as in Shoolpaneshwar!). Over 4000 ha. of forest
is already chopped down to rehabilitate the oustees.
ENVIRONMENT - SSP never received clearance from the
Ministry of Environment and Forests, as it was supposed to, yet
it went ahead.
DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS- The dam will have severe im
pacts on the downstream ecology of the river (although Gujarat
State has not bothered to conduct a survey to find out what
they might be). One effect will be a severe depletion in the
population of Hilsa fish, on which 10,000 fisher families depend
for a living.
HEALTH- Water borne diseases incidence will continue to in
crease near the reservoir. Malaria has increased six fold already.
ANCIENT AND HISTORIC SITES have been, and will con
tinue to be, submerged (eg. Shoolpaneshwar Temple; Maheshwar Ghats). The site of the oldest found civilisation on earth over 40,000 years old will be submerged at Navatoli.
SEISMIC RISKS- There is good evidence from independent
experts that the presence of the Sardar Sarovar reservoir will
increase seismic activity in an already seismically unstable area.
The Claimed 'Benefits
:
*
THE RIVER has 17% less water than was originally estimated
by project planners which, along with other considerations such
as the likely non-existence of the Narmada Sagar dam upstream,
will lead to a serious reduction in any benefits of the project.
DRINKING WATER- The government of Gujarat claims that
Sardar Sarovar is the “lifeline of Western India”, and that it will
permanently solve drought problems in die drought prone re
gions of Kutch and Saurashtra. This is complete and utter non-
sense. Even the people of Kutch have now filed a court case
againsi (he project authorities lor making (his lalsc claim. The
truth is that Kutch and Saurashtra arc not, as the government
itself says, supposed to get water until 2025, and that even then
only a tiny percentage of the villages there will get water. Ac
cording to the dam authorities: 9% of Saurashtra and 1.97% of
Kutch. But even this won’t happen because: (A) The Narmada
has less water than they thought; (B) They have ignored basic
considerations like evaporation from die canal; (C) They will
run out of money a long time before rhe water gets anywhere
near Kutch and Saurashtra; (D) In contravention of original
plans and the NWDT award, water is now going to be diverted
to major cities (esp. Baroda and Ahmedabad), to water guzzling
sugarcane estates, and to tourist developments like 5-star hotels,
golf courses, industries and even water parks! (Did somebody
say something about ‘development’?!). Kutch and Saurashtra arc
at die far end of the canal system, beyond this immense obsta
cle course; (E) There will be no water in the canal beyond Mahi
from March - May: leaving the people who are to rely on this
‘solution’ to their drought problem to find some other means to
quench their thirst during the driest part of the year before the
monsoon!
IRRIGATION- It seems very unlikely diat die money will be
found to complete the irrigation plans of the Sardar Sarovar
project, which in any case will be monopolized by rich farmers.
Even if the money is found much of die land will become use
less as a result of waterlogging and salinisation within the space
of a few years. Furthermore, irrigation efficiency (amount of
water reaching its destination divided by the amount released
from the reservoir) is only 40%, not 60% as assumed. This
means diat a third of die command area won’t get any water.
ALTERNATIVES which really could solve the drought prob
lem in Gujarat do exist (eg. Local water harvesting, groundwater
developments programs and water management-locally based
initiatives). But the Gujarat government is busily pouring 80%
of the state’s entire irrigation budget into Sardar Sarovar. As a
result these alternatives are being ignored, and the people of
Kutch and Saurashtra arc left with their thirst.
ELECTRICITY HYDROGENERATION- I( is often claimed
that Sardar Sarovar will produce 1450 NEV of electricity, but in
fact this is only the total installed capacity. It will actually pro
duce only 439 MW of firm power in the early stages, dropping
to 50 MW once all upstream development is completed. On
balance Sardar Sarovar will consume more power dian it will
produce for Gujarat!
FLOOD CONTROL- In Bihar state the flood prone area in
creased from 2.8 million ha (in 1952) to 6.82 million ha (in
1998), after its dam building program. What more can be said?
LIFE EXPECTANCY of Sardar Sarovar is only 70 years. After
that the reservoir will become silted up and the generating
equipment etc. will start to deteriorate.
THE WORLD BANK withdrew funding from Sardar Sarovar,
after rhe Independent Review which is commissioned (The
Morse Report, 1992) heavily criticized all aspects of the project
after conducting extensive research in the valley. This was the
first time the World Bank had ever been persuaded to pull out
of a project.
FINANCIAL - The total cost of the Project is expected to be
more than Rs.44,000 crores .
IN THE WEST big dams are becoming increasingly unpopularmany are being decommissioned and no new ones built. Truly
sustainable alternatives such as Wind and Solar power; Local
water harvesting; and ‘Demand Side Adjustments’, hold out
much greater promise for the future of Gujarat, India and the
World.
It's not too late to stop die dam rising any furdier and destroy
ing thousands more Eves. Detailed plans have been prepared by
experts for how the water can be used even at the current
height of 88m. The dam must be stopped.
IV. Overall Displacement
In Gujarat:
8 ]
Colony affected 950 PAFs in 6 villages
Submergence affected 4600 PAFs in 19 villages
Canal affected
1,69,493 PAFs owning land tides out of
these 24,000 will lose cither whole or major chunk of their land
holding and become landless or marginal farmers.
Shoolpaneshwar Sanctuary affected
38,000 PAPs in 104 vil
lages
Downstream affected
10,000 PAFs making their EveEhood
fishing in die 150 kms stretch of river downstream of die Sardar
Sarovar dam
Drainage affected Large areas will be required for drainage.
Just for die main drains in Zones 4-13 it is estimated thr.t
18,000 hectares of land will have to be acquired and those los
ing land will have to be compensated. (Estimates for odier areas
not available)
Compensatory afforestation / Catchment area treatment
There is no estimate for the number of famiEes being
affected by these environmental protective measures.
(approximately 3000-5000 tribal famiEes)
Secondary displacement due to loss of lands to resettle
ment sites There is no estimate for the number of famiEes
being affected due to this.
(Note: PAF: Project Affected Family. PAP: Project Affected Person.)
In Madhya Pradesh:
Submergence affected 33014 PAFs in 193 villages (Balance
as on today - 30,000 +)
Compensatory afforestation / Catchment area treatment
There is no estimate for the number of families being
affected by these environmental protective measures.
(approximately 3000-5000 tribal families)
Secondary displacement due to loss of lands to resettle
ment sites There is no estimate for the number of families
being affected due to this. In a number of cases it has been seen
that land is being acquired from adivasi / dalit families..
In Maharashtra
Submergence affected 3300+ PAFs in 33 villages (balance
as on today approximately 2000)
Compensatory afforestation / Catchment area treatment
There is no estimate for the number of families being
affected by these environmental protective measures. It is being
carried out in atleast 49 adivasi villages in Akxani tehsil and tens
of villages in Akkalkua tehsil of Nandurbar district over adivasi
lands, (approximately 3000-5000 tribal families)
Secondary displacement due to loss of lands to resettle
ment sites This is a serious issue here. The PAFs are being
relocated in adivasi lands where the rights of the original adivasis who have been living there have not been recognized. This
has led to serious conflict and even the death of two original
inhabitants at one of the R&R sites.
V. Rehabilitation at 93 mts: The Ground Reality
The number of families falling in the 90 m affected zone are far
from rehabilitated, for whom the master plan for rehabilitation
too is not ready as yet, surveyed by us, is 1912 in Madhya
Pradesh, 1061 in Maharashtra and 195 in Gujarat. These include
(hose to be nHeeled al 90 m. ns per our ground level assessment
and comparison with the flood level in 1994.
The purpose o‘" 'he surveys conducted by the NBA is to review
10 ]
the situation persisting in the villages affected at 90m, as also
the situation of die project affected families residing in the
original villages. Contrary to official reports, such as the Action
Plan prepared in November 2000, the clear picture diat has
emerged from the surveys, as one wall see, is diac dierc arc atleast 3084 families, who face an uncertain future in die long run,
and likely submergence at 90 mts in die coming two months at
1:100 year rainfall. The surveys have forced us to raise several
vibrant questions again, which w’c raised before, regarding die
rehabilitation process and most importandy, die very purpose
of rehabilitation. We fear, as is proven now quite evidendy,
now that the rehabilitation of families has been reduced to an
exercise on paper, the main aim being, reaching zero in the balmice column. 'Phis farce, being paraded as complete rehabilita
tion has reached further ludicrous extent with one sided, ‘exparte allotment’ being resorted to, with the sanction of the
NCA. The people in die valley have firmly rejected this ad hoc
and violative way of allotting land that has not been seen, let
alone selected by the project affected person. NBA believes,
now', that a point has been reached where the three states and
every' concerned audiorities, especially the NCA, need to review'
the entire rehabilitation process and the feasibility' of providing
fair and complete rehabilitation as per NWDTA, state govern
ment policies and die Apex Court judgment to the PAFs. This
is something that emerges from the findings of the survey,
which may seem startling revelations inspite of the fact that
NBA has repeatedly pointed out this ground reality to every sin
gle authority', die State and even to the Supreme Court. This
survey proves beyond doubt without such a comprehensive re
view exercise one can’t presume that die governments con
cerned would ensure the rights and entidements to the affected
families, on die brink of illegal and inhuman displacement.
The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award has explicitly
stated, among other detailed provisions for the resettlement that
under no circumstances can submergence precede rehabilita
tion. The NWDTA also enshrines the essence of community
rehabilitation to safeguard -he social fabric and prevent the frag
mentation of these close knit communities. Sadly the states have
made a mockery of these stringent provisions that serve to safe
guard the present assets and properties of the affected people
until the time when the state, fulfilling its legally bound respon
sibility, provides total rehabilitation including alternate land,
civic amenities, community resetdement, etc. The surveys con
ducted by the NBA clearly prove the numerous blatant viola
tions of the rights of the project affected families and non com
pliance with the NWDTA.
Some Special features of the survey-data collected are given be
low.
i. Gujarat:
It may be noted at this point of time, diat there are hundreds of
families at die sites who too are 80 or 90 meters affected, who
are relocated but no rehabilitated. This is clear from die thou
sands of complaints received by the Grievance Redressal Au
thority (GRA), majority of which were related to land allotted
for resetdement. GRA has not been able to take care of serious
land problems, unlike the problems with civic amenides, in
most of the cases, till date.
Mokhdi, the site of construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam, the
Erst affected village in Gujarat on the Southern bank of Nar
mada is a glaring example of the failure of the state. Faced with
submergence year after year 42 declared families (alongwith 35
non-declared eligible project affected persons) are still residing
in this village. These families have either returned from or never
gone to Ambavadi, Chikda, Chikda2 and Piparvati resettlement
sites. These families have been supposedly rehabilitated in
these R&R sites. However, a visit to Mukhdi will bring one face
to face with these families totally unwilling to return to these
sites. Similarly in Gadher there are 7 families that have returned
from R&R site within Gujarat. Similarly there are also families
in Vadgam, Antras and other villages in Gujarat, all of which we
haven’t surveyed as yet. The government of Gujarat has main
tained that they have rehabilitated every single family upto 110
meters. This is a blatant lie and they should be forced to ac
knowledge the fact that there still remain families affected at 90
meters who are yet to be rehabilitated. This is important be
cause the government also ignores various other falias of vil
lages that may come under submergence of this monsoon, like
the Budni falia of Turkheda.
12 )
One can't but mention here the inhuman treatment to the thousands of families affected by project - related works such as ca
nal and project colony as even sanctuary. We have written to
NCA and concerned authorities earlier on this and need not say
that the families from whom land is acquired for the purpose of
the dam (although not reservoir) but with no other rehabilita
tion provision but cash-compensation, are the victims of unjust
policy. With or without the readiness of the authorities and in
tervention of the Court, the Minister of Social Justice can't ig
nore them, mostly the tribal and other backward castes and
classes, but ensure justice through a well defined just policy and
plan for rehabilitation to be finalised with them, as they too are
organised under the banner of NBA. A few hundred of rockfill-dykes affected families displaced since 1979-80, for whom
alternative land allotment is officially provided for since 1985,
arc also not yet fully rehabilitated.
ii. Maharashtra:
In Maharashtra too repeated violations of the NWDTA and
now the Supreme Court order are seen from the fact that lands
have been repeatedly submerged widiout any rehabilitation of
the affected families. Lands of Manibeli, the first affected village
in Maharashtra, has been repeatedly submerged year after year
from 1993 onwards. Thirteen houses in Manibeli had flown
away with all the belongings, with floods in 1993 itself. Even
today the families affected at 69 meters remain to be resetded.
There remain 41 declared families besides 39 undeclared ones in
Manibeli who will be affected by the submergence this year.
Their rehabilitation, obviously docs not seem likely even in the
near future. This is the case with all the villages in Akkalkua
and few of the villages in Akrani. Today there arc adcast 1016
families in Maharashtra that will be affected by the 90 meters
submergence. The government continues to show a less num
ber of families affected in Maharashtra. This is grossly untrue as
shown by the surveys, and can be further proven by an inde
pendent un-biased assessment of this grim situation. Included
in these affected families are those aged between 18-31 years,
most of whom are married and have their own houses. Since
their houses are to be affected they too are, obviously, affected
and will lose property in submergence hence entitling diem to
be declared as project affected. Further the cut-off date that is
being adopted, that is 1987 is, to put it very lightly, un-rcalistic
and needs to be changed to the actual date of displacement.
This issue and many others including, the serious legal violation
in non-granting of land rights, to the tribals have been repeat
edly pointed out by the NBA. Without settling all those, there
can be no just rehabilitation possible. It is in tliis situation that
major tribal villages in Maharashtra will face floods this mon
soon.
The serving of nonces to 90m affected families is such that
PAFs at a higher level get served notices and not houses at
lower levels. In fact this ad hoc nature of serving notices is clear
evidence of the fault)’ level surveys of the government. T his
has been in every single village. In fact, the villages of Maal and
Savaria where the lower lands have submerged every y :ar have
not been served a single notice indicating 90 meters affect! ’1'his
is further seen in the village Bhadal where families whe se lands
were submerged in 1994 are not being served notices.
As in Gujarat, there are a few hundred families at Maharashtra
resettlement sites too, who are relocated but can't be called re
habilitated as they have not yet received all die enddements es
pecially agricultural land and houses-plots.
iii. Madhya Pradesh:
\
14 )
This state has the largest submergence to face while the tribals
PAFs to face submergence this monsoon and thousands of
families (above 30000 as per official figure) yet to displaced at
the higher dam-heights have no place to go. As the Chief Minis ter himself has openly declared 'No land' situation on resetdement in the state while almost all the remaining families have
decided not to shift to Gujarat but to stay in their own state,
and are cn tided to, under the NWDTA. A small amount of land
identified by GoMP, out of grazing land and government waste
land over years, is proved through joint panchanamas (with of
ficial's signatures on die reports) to be uncultivable.
It is amazing that the Government of Madhya Pradesh has die
audacity to actually claim total resetdement of families affected
at 90 meters. This is so since even today diere still is not a single
square foot of land available and die fact is that the government
of Madhya Pradesh has not rehabilitated a single family to date.
The government has forced the PAFs to choose from the
choices of either accepting land in Gujarat or cash compensa
tion in lieu of land for land. The adivasi families are being
forced to accept cash when diey are unwilling to go to Gujarat
since die option of receiving land in Madhya Pradesh does not
realistically exist. Several PAFs complained to the Grievance
Redressal Authority about diis. The government has now
served notices to several such PAFs demanding them to deposit
50% of the cash compensation received and rhfrcaf’’,,r
•’
th? land option.
It is important to note that when this issue was brought before
them the direction order issued by Retd Justice Shri. G G. Sr.hani, chairperson GRA (Madhya Pradesh) implicidy states that
cash compensation is in violation of the NWDTA. Referring to
the grievance of Shri. Kuwarsingh Bhangda of village ICikarwas
that he was given cash compensation in lieu of land for land he
directed:
"During the pendency of this case, a copy of the letter
dated 19.1.2001 sent by the Rehabilitation Officer to
the complainant has been filed. That letter does not
indicate that any parcel of land as provided by the
Award has been allotted to the complainant. He has
been directed by that letter to deposit 50% of the
amount of compensation paid to him for acquisition of
his holding, within a week from the date of receipt of
that letter, so that further action as regards allotment of
land could be taken. The manner in which the State has
proceeded to discharge its obligation under the provi
sion of the Award is not that which is contemplated by
the Award. Sub clause (iv)(7) of Clause XI of the
Award lays down that an oustce family entided to land
according to that clause shall be allotted irrigable land
as provided by that clause and the same shall be trans
ferred to the oustce family if it agrees to take it."
Further, the GRA directs the State to allot land to the PAF im
mediately. The GRA very unambiguously states that the present
policy of the State is not in compliance of the NWDTA. The
obvious inference that can be drawn, then, is that this is in vio
lation of the NWDTA. For this, die State should be striedy pro
hibited from continuing with this violative policy. This should
be done by die NCA.
There are 1912 PAFs affected at 90 mts iself who still remain to
be resetded in Madhya Pradesh. They include 108 PAFs who
have returned from / or have not been shifted to the Gujarat
R&R sites. At 90m, there are about 290 families in all who have
been forced into receiving cash compensation as a compromise.
Their resetdement is still due widi no land having been allotted
to even one PAF.
16 ]
In Alirajpur tehsil, District Jhabua, adeast 913 families will be
affected by submergence if there is a good monsoon. However,
only 370 of these families are officially declared as project af
fected families. The remaining non declared families are so due
to irregular baseline surveys. These families have submitted
their claims to the Narmada Valley Development Authority
(NVDA) in March 2000 by way of a process that was mutually
agreed upon. Due to the absence of any documented data indi
cating their age, the NVDA agreed to accept resolutions passed
by the respective Panchayats verifying and certifying the ages of
each of these claimants. The NVDA it seems has not indicated
any further movement in this process of granting declared
status eligible families. Therefore, these families having their
own houses and agricultural lands will be forced to comprehend
with impending unpredictable submergence. Still the out
standing issues such as updating the land records which is pend
ing for years as remains to be done further becoming a cause
alienating the rights of these affected adivasi families.
It is still difficult to assess the complete situation and statistics
related to 90mts affected and to compare our surveys with die
official surveys.
The difficulties are as follows:
a)
There is no complete and correct survey of the hamlets and
-
b)
c)
d)
villages to become tapu (island) at 90 mts or higher level,
who too are entitled for rehabilitation benefits as per the
R&R policies. NBA surveys too haven’t covered all tapu
lands/villages.
NBA’s checking of the government survey marking of sub
mergence levels through engineers has concluded that there
is 3 mts difference in the benchmarks now used in Madhya
Pradesh amount to wrong calculation / estimation of PAFs
at any level.
Madhya Pradesh govt has over last few years, acquired
PAFs’ lands and properties upto 436 feet only and the same
are being cancelled and fresh notices under section 4 of
Land Acquisition Act are being issued 455 feet. The official
picture of each PAF’s (including the 90 mts affected) total
property to be affected by the project is thus not yet final.
There are enormous obvious mistakes found in the official
lists and surveys of PAFs. Eg. In certain villages, the mark
ing stones in the midst of thickly populated village, have
houses on both side, at the same level and yet one side
houses are shown as ‘affected’ and not the other.
To conclude, the grim situation, to say the least, of the PAFs at
80 and 90 meters SSP-affected area with no rehabilitation of
balance families now possible to attain before the coming mon
soon, is obvious. JJheillegality _a nd violation of the NWDTA
involved in the dam construction pushed to "this stage and dis
placement witnout rehabilitation having been made mevitable, is
obvious. The atrocity that would occur through inhuman flood
ing would again amount to nothing less than atrocity^ against
scheduled tnbes, which is a cognizable act. Not only the people
but die governments concerned and the NCA will also have to
face the disaster this year itself.
It- is imperative diat the R&R sub-group and the NCA as a
whole to take truthful cognizance of the whole situation and
fulfil its duty under NWDTA and the Apex Court judgment.
The precondition for permission to be granted, after such a
clear history of violation and injustice, must be :
(i) Preparation of a master plan with the total amount of land suitable and cultivable, required for resettling all the PA Fs at the
full dam-height level, to be approved by all concerned state and
interstate authorities and the organisations of people to be af
fected, i.e. Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) and Punarvasan
Sangharsh Samiti (PSS) before finalisation.
(ii) Completion of R&R of all PAFs affected or to be affected at
93 mts.
VI. Satyagraha 2001:
A Challenge To The People And The Government Both.
Ban NBA - Move of Unholy Alliance Against Democracy
A fiery fight with the rising waters is what thousands of tribal
families in the Vindhya-Satpudas and farming communities in
the West Nimad are prepared for, this monsoon. The impend
ing submergence being absolutely illegal and immoral, against
even- human right and constitutional guarantee of life and liveli
hood. the struggle is not only inevitable but totally justiliablc as
a people's movement against the destruction and destitution of
farmer communities let lose by the State and allied forces. Six
teen years long batde by the people in the Sardar Sarovar af
fected region, now spread to other big dams — Man, Maheshwar
Bargi, Veda, Goi, supporting those affected by Narmada Sagar
in the Narmada - and all over the country allied with similar
thinking people's movements across the world feels proud to
announce 'Satyagraha to Nyayagraha' at Jalsindhi Qhabua),
Domkhedi (Nandurbar-Maharashtra) beginning from July 5th
and Chhoti Kasaravad (Baba Amte's residence) to be inaugu
rated on July 9th with thousands of people participating. Baba
himself has taken a pledge 'not xo move' and be the first Satyagrahi.
Amidst Stale repression, taking away not just the market space
for local agricultural produce or land and other resources or
livelihoods, but even life, as witnessed in Kashipur (Orissa),
Koel-Karo Qharkhand) and Dewas (M.P.), the perseverant
struggle challenges the concerned state and the central govern
ment to dare flood the homes and farms of 5000 + families.
The same is being imposed without even land for rehabilitation,
with skewed distribution of benefits to the Ahmedabad-Baroda
at the cost of the drought affected in Kutch, Saurashtra or even
the Narmada Valley and with an unjustifiable social, environ
mental costs as also economic extravaganza.
A-Colossal waste with a human cost: the game of power1
The politico-economic vested interests, in India least bothered
about a permanent solution to drought and deprivation of the
large majority of natural resource-based communities, continue
to neglect 162 major dams and 74 extension schemes left in
complete since 2nd five year plan onwards requiring a colossal
sum of 79,000 4- crores. They are bent upon stating New gigan
tic projects with old vices which arc sources of huge corrup
tion - much more serious than tehelka — and misappropriation
of water and power by the elite population as evidence in En
ron. Sardar Sarovar, that will cost not less than 2.5 lakh rupees
per hectare of irrigation and 3 to 4 crores per MW of power is
'another Enron', to be exposed and admitted sooner or later.
Madhya Pradesh state is not fulfilling its duty, neither towards
the citizens in the bountiful Valley of Narmada nor die popula
tion at large. The costliest electricity (much of which SSP will
produce for less than 10 to 15 years and much less than esti
mated) 56% of which is the only benefit for MP to be obtained
at the cost of life of the Valley.
No land, Nq dam
On the displacement front, while it's more than proved that
there is no agricultural land and no adequate & appropriate sites
tor resettlement of 32 to 35000 families residing in the affected
zone of SSP, as there is no land even for the 3000 + tribal fami
lies to be affected by Man (another of 30 big dams in Narmada),
the SSP dam construction has had to be stopped again, in spite
of the Supreme Court's verdict at 90 metres. As Jayanarayan
Vyas, Sanat Mehta, Urmilaben Patel and other ex-ministers of
Gujarat has now admitted, the Supreme Court Judgement has
not been the final word as they expected. NBA never expected
it to be one since the judgement has exhibited ignorance of the
ground reality’ and deliberately concealed the facts well pre
sented before it.
NBA, the people in the Valley, inspite of the politicians — bu
reaucrat's tactics to vacate the villages have stayed put and
fought the untruth, proving that the submergence at 90 mts + 3
mts level (full height 138.68 mts not reached) yet will come and
come with a fatal impact on the thickly populated to vast
stretched communities both, which will be faced as a movement
does, with the onslaught on life of the living populations. Large
rainfall this year would certainly prove the truth, even if through
a likely sacrifice for the same. No land, no dam is die only just
and reasonable position. We demand an immediate announce
ment towards indefinite suspension of a dam-work and a deci
sive dialogue and master plan for rehabilitation of diosc already
affected.
Ban NBA - move of an unholy alliance against democracy
The exposure of the misdeeds and falsehood in the big dam
propaganda and strength of die people's struggle has, however,
disturbed the peace of die political and economic interests who
appear to be at their worst, leading to a malafide and vicious
campaign against not the vision and values, facts and issues
posed by NBA but NBA itself. The commercial means of ad
vertisement, used by one Mr.V.KSaxena, sponsored apparendy
by some industrialists, is only such move. Who is behind tliis
waste of lakhs of rupees on ads. All the allegations in those are
either fake, distorting the facts or deliberate concoction of link
ages between NBA and its supporters. NBA can't be proved to
be violent, based on a long list of false cases clamped upon it by
the State during its agitational programs. Our alliance with inter
national people's organizations and NGOs and submissions to
the multinational companies, lenders or export credit guarantee
agencies is perfectly justifiable in the present context of global
power's encroachment on people's life and resources, hand in
gloves with the State, misusing our laws and indigenous agen
cies. We are unregistered people's movement, as was die first
freedom movement of India. Our actions to accounts are not
only legal but constitutional. We have therefore filed a criminal
complaint against V.K.Saxena and Indian Express in the Delhi
Magistrate's Court. We are issuing notices to other dailies too.
Jamunadevi’s public campaign trying to incite people against
NBA is non-sensical and motivated with petty political gains.
She seems to have given a commitment to Gujarat to sacrifice
the interests of the people of MP and especially Nimad which
she will have to pay a heavy political cost for, if not today, to
morrow.
The latest move by ex-chief ministers of Gujarat and Jamunadevi with her stooges in MP is nothing else but a nexus sym
bolic of the unholy alliance politics dominant in the country. It's
also an expression of the State's attempt, in the privatization era
to take away the space for people's protest and be intolerant to
any democratic dissent. The special area Securities Act of Ml5
and moves by some-other states as also the easy resort to re
pression indicates this. NBA will expose the attempt to do away
with non-violent but strong people's organizations while the
corrupt communal and criminal political outfits arc let lose.
Digvijay Singh must make his arms and die party's position on
this clear or will be proved to be a party to this!
At one level, such politics and its accusations such as NBA is
responsible for human rights violation is to be ignored as imma
ture and a game they always play, it's also simultaneously a
warning and an appeal to all democratic forces, especially work
ing with the downtrodden, to come together and fight to pro
tect the space for protest against valueless politics. We can't
even be trapped under the Unlawful Activities Act, except
through lawlessness by die rulers. What is more dangerous and
to be challenged, however, is valuelessness. While the Summit
comes closer, when it’s a great statesmanship and openness,
love for peace with the neighbourhood and no.i-violence is
what die Prime Minister is posed with, NBA would like the
people to also judge this government from their attitudes and
actions towards the inside protesters, its own people.
Maan Project — A Valley Rises
The Man Project is one of die 30 large dams being constructed
in the Narmada valley. This dam will inundate the homes and
lands of over 5000 adivasis in 17 villages in District Dhar in
Western Madhya Pradesh. It is being constructed on the river
Man (that drains into the Narmada River) as an irrigation pro
ject in the Dhar district of Madhya Pradesh This yea’- these
thousands of adivasis and die lands diey live on are slated for
submergence without any arrangements for the restoration of
livelihoods or provision of alternative agricultural land..
The Man Project received the legally binding environmental
clearance from the Central Environment Ministr}7 in 1984. The
condition of the clearance was that the affected tribals must be
resettled widi non-forest agricultural land. The state govern
ment policy for die oustees of the Narmada Projects that was
made in 1987 and firmed in 1992 also required that the affected
people must be resetded with land for land. Despite this from
1991 to 1994, the state government completely violated the
conditions of the environmental clearance and the provisions of
its
own policy and finished the rights of the people with paltry
amounts of cash compensation.
As a result, in 1994, the Appraisal Committee of die Central
Environment Ministry blacklisted the Man Project for complete
violation of the conditions of the environmental clearance. In
1997, when die oustees were given eviction notices, they organ
ized themselves under the aegis of the Narmada Bachao AndoIan and raised their voices. After a long struggle, in April-May
1999, the Madhya Pradesh government agreed to constitute a
committee for the rehabilitation of the affected people. This
committee which was constituted under the chairmanship of
the Narmada Minister of Madhya Pradesh comprised of the af
fected people, elected representatives, government officials and
two members of the Narmada Bachao Andolan. The govern
ment order of 2nd May, 1999 that constituted this committee
clearly stated that no construction work on the dam would be
allowed to be carried out that would endanger any affected per
son whose rehabilitation had not been completed. But despite
this clear order, from October 2000 onwards, the state govern
ment began work on the spillway section of the dam, thus creat
ing a situation of imminent submergence of hundreds of tribal
families who are yet to be rehabilitated.
On the 24th of January7 this year, the Man-affected tribals then
took out a protest rally in Dhar demanding immediate stoppage
of work and rehabilitation of the affected people. Subsequendy
after representations to the NVDA, a government order of 30th
January stopped the work on the spillway section of the dam.
The actual physical work had to be stopped by demonstrating
people at the dam site demanding that die order be carried out.
The Madhya Pradesh government did not rehabilitate any adi-
vasi family by providing it with agricultural land. On (he con
trary, the Madhya Pradesh government began rapid work on die
spillway section of the Man dam since November, 2000, thus
increasing the dam wall. Since the past six months, we, the hun
dreds of Bhils and Bhilalas affected by this dam have moved in
to a new and intense phase of struggle where we have been on
the streets incessantly trying to stop the destruction that threat
ens to engulf us this monsoon. We have demonstrated in Dhar,
Indore and Bhopal, captured the Man dam site and met officials
at all levels. In fact in February this year, more than 200 adivasis
had to stay in jail for around 15 days, because we had dared to
ask for rehabilitation and our legal entitlements. This is a sad
commentary on the state of our troubled democracy.
24 j
In the monsoon that is almost upon us, 5000 adivasis affected
by the Man Project will have to face the rising waters of the
Man reservoir which will inundate hundreds of houses and
most of the lands of these 17 villages. We have decided that we
wall face this unjust and illegal submergence with courage and
determination. Wejwill fight the attempts__of the government to
flood us out like rats and wall struggle for our right to resources
for life as well as the right to live a life of dignity. The Satyagraha'm the first village to be affected by the Man dam - IClaediBalwadi, District Dhar has started from the 2nd of July, 2001.
xxxx
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Extracts from the Address to the 29th Annual Meeting of the
Centra! Board of Irrigation and Power on 17th November
1958 by India's first Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru
"For some time past, however, I have been beginning to
think that we are suffering from what we may call "disease
of gi
gantism". We want to show that we can build big dams and do big
things. This is a dangerous outlook developing in India. I want our
of
having big undertakings and doing big tasks for the sake of
showing that we can do big things is not a good outlook at
all.
engineers to undertake big schemes in the country, but the idea
"I think that while, inevitably, we shall have to undertake big
schemes or tasks in this country, we should always remember that it
is the ten thousand small tasks that count ultimately much more
than a few big ones. It is, as you also referred to it, Mr.President,
the small irrigation projects, the small industires and the
small plants for electric power, which will change the face of
the country far more than half a dozen big projects in half a
dozen places.
"You have said just now in your address that the cost of pro
duction of power in a small project is great. I am not at all sure if
that is so, because the cost of small
project has to be judged
after taking into account all the social upsets connected
with the enormous concentration of national energy, all the
national upsets, upsets of the people moving out and their
rehabilitation and many other things, associated with a big
project. The small projects however, does not bring about these
upsets nor does it involve such a large endeavor....
"Thus the social value of a vast number of small projects is
much greater than that of one, two, three, four or five big pro
jects....
balance in our
thinking, which has shifted too much towards gigantic
schemes. State Governments are constantly pressing our Govern
"I merely wish, if I can, to replace the
ment, our Planning Commission, for various schemes - ail huge
schemes -
But this is all the relic of gigantism to which we have
fallen a prey. We have to realise that we can also meet our prob
lems much more rapidly and efficiently by taking up a large number
of small schemes, especially when the time involved in a small
scheme is much less and the results obtained are rapid."
Sordair Sarwar
:
cm DntcSIectoaS Fashion
ARCH-VAIS IN I
Action Research in
Community Health & Development
At & PO. Mangrol,
Tai. Rajpipla, Dist. Bharuch,
Gujarat, India-393 150
ARCH-VAHINI
Ontroduction.
A terminal dam in Gujarat on peninsular India’s largest
rainfed river Narmada has been half built; civil work on its large
underground hydroelectric power station is nearing completion;
a main canal - largest in India - upto 144 kms and its intricate
network of canal system is proceeding apace so that by 1995
irrigation begins in the first segment of irrigation command of
nearly half a million hectares.
Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) of tribal oustee
families spread over three involved states of Gujarat, Maharashtra
and Madhya Pradesh is going ahead with the same pace. Gujarat
has resettled, with the active help of NGOs like ARCH-Vahini and
others, 4200 out of 4500 oustee families. Similarly out of about
3000 families of Maharashtra, all tribals, 1200 have been allotted
agricultural plots and other legal entitlements, 50 % of them in
Gujarat. About 1200 families of Madhya Pradesh (MP) have been
resettled in Gujarat. Although MP has the largest number of
villages affected by the reservoir • 193 out of 245 total villages,
submergence of agricultural land is disproportionately low
because of the peculiarities of the geomorphology and shape of
the river basin. As a result, a peculiar and unusual submergence
pattern is emerging in MP. Whereas only 13% of the agricultural
land of the affected villages is going under submergence, 65%
of the houses, standing right on the river bank, will be inundated
by the reservoir. Our critical analysis of the MP data accepted
even by Morse Review reveals that at the most 7500 families,
most probably lower than that number, lose substantial amount
of their land and therefore suffer total uprooting requiring R&R
away from their original place. Seen in this perspective, nearly
about 20 % of the MP oustee families have been resettled in
Gujarat, whereas most sizable submergence in MP does not
1
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
begin before 1997.
Environmental safeguard measures like Compensatory
Afforestation (CA), Catchment Area Treatment (CAT) of directly
draining areas in to Narmada and Command Area Development
of second phase of command beyond the currently planned
command area are also proceeding apace.
And yet, the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is in the eye
of the storm of controversy. It has been maligned and vilified
unfairly by Morse-Berger Commission and by influential Executive
Directors (EDs) like Mr. Patrick Codey of USA. Egged on by
some influential environmental groups in Europe and North
America, they have heaped unjustified and unsubstantiated
serious charges on the SSP which is going to provide immense
benefits to the long suffering, water-starved command of two
million hectares and provide drinking water to about 15 million
people, mainly outside the command, of saurashtra, Kutch and
North Gujarat where availability of drinking water in long months
of summer reduces to a few litres per person per day and in large
number of these villages, crippling disease of fluorosis is rapidly
emerging.
The criticism of the SSP without factual basis to it has thus
become an intellectual fashion of the day. It is a critique which
has lost its head. The US Congress has been warned of
disastrous consequences of the Project, if it goes ahead. The
critical supporters of the Project like us have been branded as
stooges of the Government and accused of being numb about
sensitive issues like-human and environmental costs. It is not our
case that there are no human problems or environmental
problems that need close scrutiny and monitoring. We argue that
the massive attack on the Project is without any basis and that
the critique has lost a sense of proportion. ARCH-Vahini also
argues that the critics have failed to prove their case that the SSP
as a large dam is a good specific case study to prove a generic
case of how things go wrong in large dams. The task facing us
is to identify crucial problem areas in the project implementation
and to get effective and quick remedial actions.
The ongoing onslaught on the SSP still necessitates a
detailed, well-substantiated factual point by point reply to some
crucial criticism which is doing rounds.
2
ARCH-VAHINI
’Resettlement and ^Rehabilitation.
1.
How many persons will have to be resettled?
Point.
The anti-dam movement spearheaded by the Narmada
Bachao Andolan (NBA) has argued that 1,50,000 tribals will be
affected in the 245 villages of submergence zone; that in MP
alone 30,000 families (1,50,000 people) will be affected; that
1,70,000 farmers will be affected because of the canal network
of the Project; that Shoolpaneshwar Sanctuary will displace
about 40,000 tribals in Gujarat; that thousands of families will lose
their lands due to land acquisition for Catchment Area Treatment
(CAT) and Compensatory Afforestation (CA); that there would be
secondary displacement of thousands of landless laborers from
the private lands which are allotted to the oustees. Thus, in all,
according to the NBA “million people will require resettlement in
the SSP alone."
Counterpoint.
*
According to MP’s Action Plan of R&R (1992), 23,000
families are going to be affected by the reservoir. MorseBerger Report of June 1992 quotes the same figure. As
argued in the beginning, further analysis of MP data clearly
shows that a large majority (about 67%) of these families
are not being uprooted from their original place. They do
not require alternative agricultural land and therefore they
are not to be resettled in the usual and traditional sense
of the term. The ambiguous use of the word ‘affected’ used
by all, including Morse-Berger, connotes much bigger
uprooting than is the case.
*
Virtually all the 40,000 persons (7500 families) affected
and to be uprooted in Gujarat and Maharashtra are tribals.
In MP, at the most 15,000 tribal people (2000-3000
families) from the 37 tribal villages are going to be
uprooted. The Morse-Berger Report also supports this. So,
it is difficult to comprehend the NBA figure of 1,50,000
tribal peasants being affected.
*
The NBA literature does not quote the source from which
they derive their figure of 1,70,000 farmers being affected
3
SSP
An Intellectual Fashion
by the canal network. This figure is nearest to Indian
Institute of Management (IIM), Ahmedabad study of canal
affected people (October 1991). The study reported that
2,22,000 farmers will be affected by the canal network. The
NBA had accepted this crucial finding with alacrity, without
realizing that this finding was based on grave methodological
mistake. The Morse-Berger team was shown this fatal flaw
and wisely avoided the trap. They have given their own
figures, according to which 1100 families will become
landless, about 6000 are left with 1 ha. or less and 7500
with less than 2 hectares. They do not give the full details
of their calculations. But then they also give three different
estimates at different places in their Report, which is
intriguing. However, by their estimate at the most 14,000
farmers are losing their land to a sizable extent. Since
these farmers are scattered over a vast irrigation command
area, and since they are not going to be uprooted enmasse
as submergence communities, their standard of living can
be restored to that which was previous to the canal
construction by a package which offers them replacement
land. The Gujarat Government was finally persuaded to
accept the principle. The details of the package, however,
are not satisfactory and are being revised.
*
In Shoolpaneshwar Sanctuary, no tribal is going to be
displaced. This fact is well-known. In fact, in the Sanctuary
villages, the procedure to regularize the encroachment of
the vacant cultivated forest land upto 1980 is on. But the
NBA finds it convenient to ignore this fact.
*
As to the land acquisition of thousands of families because
of CA and CAT, all one can say is that no lands are being
acquired for these purposes from the farmers and not only
that the vacnt forest lands encroached upon and occupied
by tribals are in the process of being regularised as per
the recent Government Resoulution. Moreover, in case of
CAT, on the lands used for agriculture, tree planting is not
called for; shaping of the land and other soil conservation
measures are the mainstay of it. In the SSP, CAT by far
involves much larger area than the CA. (1,00,000 hectares
against about 25,000 hectares.) The scary figures of
thousands of families losing their livelihood are obviously
4
ARCH-VAHINI
not rooted in reality.
As to the secondary displacement of thousands of landless
laborers because of the private land allotment to the
oustees, we can argue that number of studies carried out
by us in major resettlement sites revealed that no such
displacement is taking place. We had discussed these
studies and the dynamics of the labour market at length
with the Morse team and as a result this problem is not
even discussed in the Morse-Berger Report.
Similar scar of displacement in Taloda resettlement site in
Maharashtra has been raised by the NBA which has
received a surprising support from the Morse-Berger
Report. A close scrutiny of the Morse-Berger Report
revealed that their assessment is critically dependent on
an arbitrary selection of an unofficial document not open
to public scrutiny and equally arbitrary exclusion of another
public document from the same source. The two documents
produced by the same institution are mutually inconsistent
in crucial matters.
*
With all these facts in mind, when the number is totalled
up, it cannot even reach 1,00,000, let alone 1 million. It
is also noteworthy that from 1988 upto 1991 the NBA was
quoting figure of 1,00,000. Their main reliance on R&R
being impossible then was on the non-availability of the
agricultural land in all the states and on the alleged fact
that 80% of the oustees requiring agricultural land were in
MP where nothing was happening. The issue of other
categories was hardly raised, let alone their number,
although the facts of canal network, CAT, CA, Sanctuary
etc. were well-known.
2.
Resettlement Experience in Gujarat.
Point.
In Gujarat, the critics argue that, oustees have been
scattered widely; they have not been given land or given
uncultivable, waterlogged lands; a steady stream of oustees has
returned to their original villages; and natural resource based
social, economic and cultural life of the tribal communities is
being destroyed.
5
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
Counterpoint.
*
The critics have consistently refused to acknowledge that
oustees of all the submergence villages have freely
exercised their right to choose the group, the place and
the land they wanted for resettlement. The leading NBA
activists in the early years, when they were also struggling
for just R&R, had forcefully argued that tribal villages are
not the proper units of resettlement, that tribal communities
are far from homogeneous, monolithic communities. Prof.
Scudder, a World Bank Consultant on R&R who played a
pivotal role in formulating the R&R part of the World Bank
Loan Agreement (LA) had also clearly grasped this social
reality. The Loan Agreement, therefore, provided that the
tribal communities should be resettled as a village, hamlet
or a group of their choosing. The tribals in Gujarat have
freely formed their own groups and settled at different
sites. Even the Morse-Berger Report acknowledges, even
if grudgingly, the exercise of unfettered choice by all the
tribals. Moreover, the scatter effect is apparent only if the
number of sites is taken as a criterion of scatter. If it is
measured in terms of distances the tribals have to travel
for their social and economic activities, the scatter effect
is no different than before, if anything less, because
distances traversed are on the plain land and not in the
mountainous terrain as was the case in their original
villages.
*
The NBA has overlooked an overwhelming fact that so far
93% of oustees in Gujarat have been allotted land of their
choice. They ought to give actual figure of those who have
been allotted uncuttivable land. This will put the whole
picture of resettlement in a proper perspective and will
impart a much needed sense of proportion. The NBA also
overlooks the fact that the Project Authorities had
acknowledged the mistakes made in land allotment in
some cases and had already instituted remedial measures
following our presentations, long before the NBA even
knew of the problem. Thus about 200 oustees out of 4200
who have been alloted lands (less than 5%) have had
various types of problems with their land which were
changed. The sense of proportion is constantly missing
6
ARCH-VAHINI
even from the very serious observers who have been
uncritically supporting the NBA campaign in the press
nationally and internationally. The Committee of officers
and involved NGOs formed to look into the complaints of
the land is receiving complaints and examining each case
individually and recommending appropriate remedies.
Such institutional mechanisms must also be recognized,
appreciated and consulted before adverse criticisms are
made publicly.
In August 1991, 24 families of village Vadgam at the
instance of the NBA after having taken 3 years’ crops on
their allotted lands went back to their original village. The
crop statistics of each of the 3 years collected by us
revealed that they had the same yield as the other oustees
of the same site who have continued to cultivate their
lands. The NBA then had predicted a flood of return.
Nothing of the sort has happened thereafter. About 60 Bhil
families returned to Mankadkhada. They have repeatedly
stressed that the quality of the land is quite good. They
feel threatened by the thieves who visited them at the site.
They will resettle once the perception of threat goes or they
are given land at different site.
Of late, following the Morse-Berger Report, the issue of
dependence of the tribals to the tune of 60 to 80% of their
house-hold requirement on the natural resources like
forest, like fish in the river and their cultural life being a
major factor in their economic well-being has been raised
to a new height. In the plethora of the NBA publications A
before Morse-Berger arrived on the scene, the agricultural
land was the main issue. Dependence on minor forest
produce, to an extent, was often mentioned, but their
heavy dependence on fish was not to be found in any of
the publications. In fact, there was clear recognition that
these tribals were settled farmers and their main demands
were also about the land. Paradoxically enough, even the
Morse-Berger Report acknowledges explicitly that in case
of the Sardar Sarovar submergence area, forest is already
degraded with lower biodiversity and productivity. They
were also constrained to record that the loss of these
forests has no ecological impact. So much for the natural
7
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
resource base of the tribals living in the submergence
zone.
*
The fact of the matter is that the tribals in each of the three
states are clamoring for good quality agricultural land.
There is a clamor in Gujarat, Maharashtra and possibly in
MP among tribals of non-submergence area to be included
as oustees, so that they may also get minimum 2 hectares
of land which constitutes the core part of the R&R policy.
This, more than anything else, speaks volumes of harsh
geographical, biological and economic reality of the tribals
of the valley, arguments about rich biodiversity and cultural
life integrated to the forests and aesthetically pleasing and
bountiful environment notwithstanding.
*
We do not wish to enter into the speculation about the fate
of these tribals, but we can safely foresee, seeing their
strong burst of initiative, eagerness to get on with their land
and their strong reservoir of entrepreneurship, that they
are not going to end up in the urban shanty towns as
predicted by the NBA.
3.
Resettlement in Maharashtra.
Point.
Morse-Berger, in their Report, categorically stated that all
the encroachers in 24 out of 33 villages of Maharashtra will be
treated as landless with paltry entitlements and will face ruin after
resettlement.
Until very recently, the NBA argued and their supporters
endorsed that the oustees in Maharashtra are well-organised and
are challenging displacement.
Counterpoint.
*
There is no doubt that Morse-Berger made such a dramatic
statement not once, but six times in their ‘Letter to the
President’ and achieved a desired result. But a finer
combing of their text revealed gaping holes between their
conclusion and the factual evidence they were able to
marshal. We documented this in our letter to the World
Bank President as the best case of non-sequitur committed
by them. As a matter of fact majority of the encroachers
8
ARCH-VAHINI
(pre 1978 encroachers) were., entitled to minimum 2
hectares of land each. With the further improvement in the
policy, post 1978 encroachers also have entitlement for 1
hectare of land.
In the submergence villages of Maharashtra, the oustees
were originally organised for better R&R policy. Their
demands were almost identical to those of the oustees of
Gujarat and ARCH-Vahini prior to December 1987. After
Gujarat Government yielded to the intense and sustained
agitation, the activists in Maharashtra and MP inexplicably fk
and suddenly turned anti-dam. Environmentalist groups
like Environment Defense Fund (EDF) and others who
were supporting us and the precursors of the NBA in our
struggle for just R&R did not lose much time to turn against
the Project itself. The oustees in Maharashtra were kept
in total dark about the radical shift in the objective of the
activists who were leading them. The oustees and
activists, from the very beginning, had demanded degraded
forest land in Taloda for resettlement. This land was not
released by the Government of India’s Ministry of
Environment and Forests (MOEF), despite the fact that the
World Bank Loan Agreement had clearly stipulated this at
the instance of Prof. Scudder in May 1985. The activists
including EDF, in their pro-R&R frame, had criticized
MOEF for violating the World Bank Agreement. The same
combine, in the post December 1987 anti-R&R frame,
turned against the World Bank for forcing the MOEF to
release the degraded forest land and to undermine the
ecology. This combine even went further. They started W
making statements to the U.S. Congress, to the World
Bank and to the Maharashtra Government that the oustees
of Maharashtra had themselves rejected the Taloda forest
lands. The oustees of Maharashtra, of course, were in total
dark about this double-cross. They discovered this after
about 3 years in 1991. Their right to know and to
participate meaningfully in the movement was denied to
them for as long as 3 years when the NBA was complaining
to the world that oustees were denied these rights.
The oustees of Maharashtra have grasped the real nature
of the NBA and their goals. There is little support to the
9
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
NBA in Maharashtra villages. Large majority of the oustees
want proper resettlement. They are not resisting
displacement.
4.
Resettlement in MP.
Point.
In MP also, Morse-Berger claimed that thousands of tribal
oustees will face ruin and that intricate network of inter
dependent relationship between land owners and landless
laborers in the rich and fertile region of Western Nimad will be
completely destroyed because of the submergence. Taking a cue
from Morse-Berger, the NBA has also claimed that the large
chunk of prime agricultural land in Nimad and a variety of crops
it produces will be destroyed and it will disintegrate well-knit
communities, most of them socially disadvantaged.
Counterpoint.
*
Morse-Bergers’ concern for landless of Nimad is touching,
but they forgot to take account of a vital fact they have
recorded in their Report that a large number of the Nimad
villages, farthest from the dam site, will have mainly house
sites going under submergence rather than land. We have
asked them : “How under such condition the fertile lands
of Nimad will be inundated, undermining the integrated
web of laborer-land owner relationship and disrupting
socially disadvantaged communities in Nimad?”
We also ask : “How production of Nimad region will be
disrupted and supply to large cities of Indore and Delhi
will be affected as claimed by the NBA when only about
6000 out of 50000 hectares of agricultural land of the
affected villages go under submergence?”
5.
Incremental Changes in RAR.
Point.
One of the most prominent criticisms of Morse-Berger
Review is that the strategy of incremental changes in R&R
adopted by the World Bank has failed and that it must be
abandoned. In fact, from all the important criticisms on
environmental issues and R&R issues made by the Report, Mr.
Patrick Codey, ED, U.S. picked up only the criticism on the
10
ARCH-VAHINI
Bank’s strategy of incremental changes to severely criticize the
Bank staff and the Project authorities in the crucial Board meeting
of 23rd October 1992, which eventually forced the Government
of India to withdraw the SSP from the World Bank.
Counterpoint.
*
Morse-Bergers’ criticism on this score is false. They seem
to have accepted without proper checks the NBA activists’
claim that R&R component of the Project was not
appraised by the Bank before the Loan Agreement in May
1985 was signed in gross violation of Bank’s own
guidelines of February 1980. They misquoted and
misconstrued the Scudder Report of April 1983 which was
in fact an R&R Appraisal. Their failure is glaring, because
the staff Appraisal Report (1985) of the World Bank
explicitly refers to the Scudder Mission's Report as R&R
Appraisal and quotes extensively from the Report. Their
failure to assess a final emergence of the R&R component
of Loan Agreement is even more glaring. They failed to
examine and study extensive exchange of information and
communication between Scudder, John Clark of Oxfam,
U.K., ARCH-Vahini, Gujarat, Tim Lancaster, ED of U.K.
and many others in the Bank staff which finally shaped the
contents of the LA and R&R policy of Gujarat at first and
those of Maharashtra and MP later on. Their ignorance of
the process is incredible and frightening. Their stinging
criticism that the Bank had violated its own R&R guidelines
of February 1980 and had indulged in panicky adhocism
lacks substance. Their appraisal of the Bank’s R&R
appraisal is a big blunder. Mr. Patrick Codey’s brave words
in the Board meeting of 23rd October that he had read the
Morse Report and had found it objective and intellectually
honest notwithstanding. The R&R policies in Gujarat,
Maharashtra and MP are examples of success of strategy
of incremental changes in R&R.
6.
Human Rights violations in Maharashtra - 1992.
Point.
The NBA has claimed that in March 1992, 500 armed
policemen and women attacked a tiny village of Manibeli in
Maharashtra with bulldozers and trucks and let loose the reign
11
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
of terror in the village razing everything in sight with bulldozers,
arsoning and molesting women activists - on the pretext of
removing the houses of some residents who had left Manibeli
during 1983-86.
Counterpoint.
*
At least, 33 tribal families of Manibeli who were cultivating
lands both at the resettlement site and at Manibeli had
wanted to shift their houses for at least 2 years. But the
NBA had used intimidating tactics including social boycotts
to prevent their shifting on their own. They had effectively
prevented Maharashtra police to intervene to help remove
their belongings and houses (large wooden frames) by
crying police repression which was immediately picked up
by the English press and environmentalists abroad. Hordes
of video cameramen from abroad descended on Manibeli
to portray the ‘police repression' and to show how defiantly
Manibeli as one was fighting dam and ‘police repression’.
*
The oustee families finally approached us to help them
shift. About 500 oustees from Gujarat, ARCH-Vahini and
other NGOs with the willing oustees of Manibeli entered
Manibeli on 26th March 1992. Maharashtra police, for
some mysterious and inexplicable reasons, was totally
paralysed from the previous night by none other than the
highest ranking police officer of the state - IG. The state
of paralysis of Maharashtra police lingered on even during
the voluntary and peaceful shifting of 33 families, when the
trucks carrying the household material were attacked by
the NBA supporters. The wild charges of forcible demolition
of houses by bulldozers, of arson and police repression
had no basis whatever. A commission, appointed by Mr.
V.C.Shukla, Central Minister of Water Resources at the
behest of the NBA, and consisting of independent
academicians of reputed social institutions like Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay and Centre for Social
Studies, Surat investigated these charges and found them
to be without substance. The NBA’s own publications
published at 3 different time points showed glaring
inconsistencies and contradictions.
As to the molestation, even if we ignore different and
12
ARCH-VAHINI
mutually inconsistent reports in the friendly newspapers
published at the time, the published documents of the NBA
describing the events in those days show similar
inconsistencies.
7.
Human Rights violations in Gujarat and Maharashtra
- 1993.
Point.
English language newspapers like Times of India, Indian
Express and news magazine like ‘Mainstream’ have recently in •
their editorials argued that police repression has been let loose
in Gujarat and oustees were forcibly evicted. Similarly, they
argued that in Manibeli, people were forcibly evicted in violation
of the stay order of Gujarat High Court.
Counterpoint.
*
In Gujarat, no oustee was forced to shift. Police force was
not even deployed, let alone used to force eviction. The
English newspapers helped to create the news of forced
eviction in their local editions two weeks before the
damning editorials appeared. They were promptly refuted
by the Project Authorities to no avail. The editorials used
the 1acts’ none the less, to prove their point of human
rights violation in Gujarat.
*
In Manibeli, obviously stay order given by the Gujarat High
Court cannot apply. There, the ruling of the Dhule District
Court given in March 1992 applied. The three editors chose
to ignore these facts and declared that human rights have t A
been violated in Manibeli because one family was removed
from the place which is coming under permanent
submergence this year. The family has been given
agricultural land at Parveta in Gujarat since 1986 which he
has been giving to a sharecropper. Moreover, he was
shown lands at 3 different places, if he did not want to go
to Parveta. If, after all this, he was evicted, this was a
perfectly legal eviction as per the ruling of the Dhule Court.
(His house has been rebuilt at a higher point in the village.)
*
R&R related provisions of the Narmada Water Disputes
Tribunal (NWDT) were misquoted. The NWDT award says
13
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
that at least 6 months before the submergence, the oustee
should be given legal notice to evict the area. The editorials
said that the NWDT stipulated that oustees should be
informed at least 18 months before their land is submerged.
It is quite disturbing to note that these editors of national
press chose to raise the chorus of human rights violation
in Gujarat and Maharashtra disregarding reality on the
ground and facts of law.
em/tronment
8.
Environmental Clearance.
Point.
The Morse Report said that the MOEF did not give
environmental clearance to the SSP in February 1983 because
the proposals did not meet the MOEF's guidelines; that when the
clearance was finally given in June 1987, a condition was
attached requiring the environmental measures to be planned
and implemented pari-passu with the Project works. This
pari-passu clause has been severely criticized by Morse-Berger.
According to their assessment, this condition has been violated
and that conditional clearance had lapsed in August 1990. The
NBA has repeated these arguments claiming that the Bank was
clearly wrong in entering the Agreement with the Governments
in 1985, when the Project was still not cleared by the MOEF; that
the clearance was wrongly given and that the MOEF was forced
to give clearance under political pressure which renders the
whole basis of the Project fragile.
Counterpoint.
*
The Project was sent for clearance in February 1983 and
was given clearance in June 1987. Morse-Bergers’ claim
that this happened because the Project failed to meet the
existing guidelines is itself fragile. They vaguely refer to the
guidelines of ‘late 70s’ without giving any specific details
like even its title and precise date of publication. The
Report does not even describe the salient features of the
guidelines which were not met by the proposals.
*
It is obvious from the Morse-Berger Report itself that
there were no guidelines worth the name in 1983. The first
14
ARCH-VAHINI
concrete guidelines came into existence in 1985 only when
the Loan Agreement was made by the Bank. The MorseBerger Report failed to bring out any concrete considerations
related to environment which were holding up the Project
in 1985. It is clear that the MOEF was sitting on the Project
only for political considerations in 1985 and for two more
years thereafter.
Morse-Bergers’ attack on pari-passu clause is also
contrived, because they themselves failed to give any
concrete details as to why the Project was held up for four <
years and also because they describe how the guidelines
were themselves emerging during those years. It is
inconceivable that they thought it correct for the MOEF to
continue to learn about the environmental monitoring of
irrigation projects, while the Project remained pending with
it. Pari-passu clause was inevitable only on this
consideration.
Their contention that compliance with the pari-passu
condition is lacking is based on severe selection of the
source of information and documents on the one hand and
suppression of others on the other. More seriously, it is
based on mutilation of a vital document.
The NBA had maintained in 1991 and still maintain, quoting
the Agenda Notes of Environmental Sub Group (ESG) of
the Narmada Control Authority (NCA) meeting of August
1990, that according to the MOEF, the conditional
clearance had lapsed. The minutes of this meeting held on
7th September 1990 does not even mention the lapse of
clearance.
Morse-Berger went much further than even NBA. In their
Report, they refer to both Agenda and Minutes of the ESG
meeting, but go on quoting, without clearly stating so, only
from the Agenda Notes prepared by the MOEF, creating
an appearance that these quotations pertain to both
Agenda Notes and Minutes. The true content of the
minutes regarding the lapse of clearance is held back to
convey that conditional clearance had lapsed.
15
•
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
9.
Hydrology.
Point.
The NBA has argued that annual run-off in Narmada at
75% dependability is 23 million acre feet (MAF) only. They have
attacked the NWDT to have assumed under political pressure the
75% run-off to be 27 MAF. The Morse-Berger, following the
footsteps of the NBA and the MOEF, have also charged the
NWDT to have assumed under political pressure the annual run
off and have made their chief recommendation that the design
parameters of the Project be reviewed.
Counterpoint.
*
The NBA first raised this issue in 1988, citing as a source
the MOEF Note of May 1987 to the Prime Minister of India
just before the clearance to the SSP was given. The
MOEF, of course, did not cite the source. Thereafter, the
NBA has cited several other authors without giving any
detailed information about the estimates. The NWDT had
not assumed the water yield as alleged by the MOEF, NBA
and Morse-Berger. Its Award contains complete details
including the water series tables they relied upon to reach
the figure of 27 MAF.
*
Morse-Berger undertook a strange maneuver. They raised
the issue of water yield in their Report, although it was
outside their TOR. They, however, refused to go into the
consideration of run-off and stated at 3 different places that
it was not their task or their purpose to find out the
run-off, and yet they managed to ridicule the NWDT’s
assessment, to raise doubts about its competence and to
level a serious charge that it had assumed the run-off
because of the political pressure. They did not consider for
one moment that the NWDT was a statutory body to
adjudicate upon delicate and politically explosive issue of
inter-state water distribution. For a body of this stature to
intervene in India’s affair in such a cavalier manner is
unbecoming. They further asserted without giving substantial
reasons that the annual run-off was less than ‘assumed’
by the NWDT and echoing MOEF’s recommendation
contained in the Note to the PM went on to their chief
16
ARCH-VAHINI
recommendation that the design parameters of the Project
like height of the dam, level and size of the main canal be
reviewed. Morse-Berger had access to the latest estimates
of Central Water Commission (CWC) which is very much
in tune with the NWDT estimate. They obviously rejected
the Report of the CWC without giving their reasons and
went on to reach their dramatic conclusion and
recommendation.
10.
Environmental Costs of the Submerging Forests.
Point.
The NBA, at one stage of their campaign against the SSP,
had made a huge hue and cry about colossal environmental cost
of lost forest. The cost of Rs. 80 billion was sought to be imposed
on the SSP in addition to its original cost of Rs. 64 billion. This,
they vehemently argued, rendered the Project economically nonviable. Strangely enough, Morse-Berger have quietly skirted this
explosive issue.
Counterpoint.
*
As with other environmental issues, the MOEF provided
ammunition to the NBA on this issue also. In the May 1987
Note to the PM, the MOEF, for the first time in the
controversy, introduced an argument that environmental
cost of the forest in case of the SSP was Rs. 80 billion.
As usual, it failed to give further details of the computation
of this staggering cost.
Further inquiry made by a concerned economist led to no
further illumination. The rationale of this cost remained
secret. The Project was maligned and severely castigated
by the NBA activists and supporters including EDF for 3
years on this count as economically non-viable. Then, the
explosive issue was quietly dropped, because the NBA
was sternly advised by an economist, a supporter of the
NBA that the argument was untenable. The mischief
initiated by the MOEF was given a burial here and abroad
and with that was buried the argument. The Morse-Berger
team was shown by us all the relevant documents, but they
chose to keep totally silent about it. In fact, the Report
categorically states that the forests in the submergence
17
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
zone are severely degraded and there is no ecological cost
to it, although incredibly enough the NBA as late as in
October 1992 continues to argue that the ‘SSP would
cause incalculable destruction of the precious forests in the
Narmada valley, with loss and in some cases extinction of
flora and fauna...”. This is a staggering assertion but where
is the evidence to corroborate it?
11.
Drinking Water.
Point.
The NBA has contested the claim of the Government of
Gujarat that about 8,000 villages and 135 towns - mostly outside
the command of the SSP - in Saurashtra, Kutch and North
Gujarat will be provided drinking water. They have argued that
the number of villages to be provided with water has been
increasing mysteriously from nil when the NWDT was deliberating
to 4700 in 1983 to now about 8,000. There is no rationale to this
while water allotted remains fixed at 1.06 MAF. The NBA doubts
that there is sufficient water to provide 140 litres per person per
day for towns and 70 litres per person per day for villages. They
contend that distribution losses amounting to 40% have not been
taken into consideration. They have angrily argued in the recent
past that the Project, while claiming the economic benefits of
drinking water, does not include the costs of the pipelines to the
villages and towns.
Counterpoint.
*
The NBA having taken a cue from the MOEF had ignored
for years even to mention the benefits of drinking water
to thousands of villages in Saurashtra, Kutch and North
Gujarat. They have at last taken note of these benefits.
The rationale of water balance and water distribution has
not surprisingly eluded the NBA. In the earliest
acknowledgement of the water benefits, they had accused
the Gujarat Government of fraud and deception, because
according to their calculation, the cities were to be given
1.5 liters per person per day, and the villages nearly 0.6
liters per person per day. The clue lied in the simple
arithmetical mistake they had made. It was a mistake of
placement of decimal points.
18
ARCH-VAHINI
In 1983, Gujarat Water and Sewage Board had included
Projected water demands of big cities and towns in
command like Baroda, Gandhinagar etc. The per capita
norm adopted for cities was 230 litres per day. whereas
that for villages was 55 liters per day. Judicious mixing of
the ground water to the fresh waters of Narmada was not
contemplated. In 1990 the whole thing was reviewed. Big
cities of the command area like Baroda, Gandhinagar were
excluded The per capita norm in the cities was rightly
lowered to 140 litres per capita per day. Mixing of the
ground water with the tresh water was taken into
consideration and most importantly, norm for the rural area
was revised upwards to 70 litres per capita per day. It is
not correct as NBA claims that the transmission losses
have not been considered. Twenty percent of such losses
have been taken into account which is more reasonable
than the 40% quoted by the NBA because all the canals
upto and beyond off-take points are going to be lined,
reducing drastically the seepage from canal system.
There is thus no mystery about more numbers of villages
being included as beneficiaries and there is no reason to
doubt on this score that the norms of the water will be
maintained.
In the first burst of reaction after the NBA could no longer
suppress the fact of drinking water benefits to millions of
people in Saurashtra and Kutch, they reacted angrily to say
that economic benefits were being claimed but the cost of
the pipe lines from off-take points to the villages was
wrongly excluded. They did not understand the rationale
of the cost-benefit analyses undertaken by both Tata
Economic Services in 1983 and that carried out by the
World Bank in 1985. They both had in their different ways
taken costs into account, they were right in taking net
benefits in their analysis. The NBA apparently received
some wise advice, after that they have quietly dropped this
criticism. Both the economic analyses have explicitly
ignored the tremendous health benefits the drinking water
will impart to millions of people: the drastic reduction in all
pervasive skin infections like scabies, boils, sores, ring
worms, in the crippling diseases like trachoma which
19
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
blinds, fluorosis which cripples large number of people and
reduction in other water-washed diseases like
gastroenteritis. The NBA has always suppressed these
large benefits. Well-done epidemiological studies have
shown that even 15 to 20 litres per capita per day of the
untreated, but assured water supply brings sizable health
benefits to the community. The norm of 70 litres per capita
per day for the rural area is by any standard quite
generous. The requirements of the cattle can be met within
the limits of the improved norm. The NBA has hardly any
case.
72.
Irrigation Benefits.
Point.
The NBA's first position with regard to irrigation benefits
in the command was that only 1/3rd command was drought prone
while the remaining was well endowed with water and that it
mainly would benefit the rich farmers of Central Gujarat,
industrialists and contractors.
They have apparently dropped the issue of extent of
drought - proneness in the command. They now argue that the
most industrialized and commercialized districts of Bharuch,
Baroda, Kheda, Ahmedabad and Mehsana are taking away the
largest share of the water.
Counterpoint.
*
Relying on the inappropriate documents, sidelining the
crucial documents and by making simple mistakes of
counting, miscounting and misquoting, they had reached
a dramatic conclusion to counter the GOG’s case that
3/4 th of the command was drought-prone. Similarly, when
it was shown conclusively that the command was
dominated by small and medium farmers, the argument of
rich, big farmers of the water-rich central districts of
Gujarat cornering all the benefits was dropped. The
argument that industrialists cornering sizable benefits has
also lost its force because hardly 2% of the water is to be
allotted to the industry.
*
A large proportion of command in Kheda, Bharuch,
Ahmedabad and Mehsana suffer from grave shortages of
20
ARCH-VAHINI
water. It is not correct and fair to argue that because small
areas adjacent to the main Railway line in these districts
are experiencing industrialization, the whole districts are
also industrialized and commercialized. By and large they
remain underdeveloped and backward.
Power Benefits.
13.
Point.
Like drinking water benefits, for first few years there was
hardly any critique of power benefits. At first, the NBA argued V'A
that from the installed capacity of 1250 MW at River Bed Power
House (RBPH) the firm power generation would be only 415
MW. From the installed capacity of 250 MW at Canal Head Power
House (CHPH), they argued that, the firm power generation for
the first 30 years would be 91 MW. This would go on decreasing
as the whole canal network is built.
Forty seven European and North American NGOs who
submitted a Memorandum to the World Bank President, Mr.
Conable in March 1991 argued that the SSP would initially
provide firm power of 415 MW and as the water would be
increasingly diverted for irrigation purposes, the firm power
generation would decrease to 91 MW.
The latest NBA position with regard to power generation
is same with regard to RBPH, but with regard to CHPH the firm
power is now shown to be 24 MW. It is also argued that if
C.C. Patel recommended shortened schedule of the construction
of the Project is accepted, then the RBPH would stop generation
power earlier than envisaged.
Counterpoint.
Firm power is always less than installed capacity.
Therefore, it is no criticism to say that out of 1250 MW
installed capacity, only 415 MW firm power is to be
generated.
It is strange to hear their argument that CHPH is going to
generate 91 MW of firm power for the first 30 years and
thereafter it will suffer decline as the canal network is
developed. This betrays lack of understanding of how
CHPH is going to work, because with full development of
21
SSP : An Intellectual Fashion
canal network, Gujarat will in effect be using all the water
allotted to it. This water of necessity will go through the
CH PH and will produce the same amount of firm power.
So it is beyond comprehension how the firm power
generation at CHPH will decline.
The Northern NGOs, who wrote the Memorandum in close
consultation with the NBA, have simply forgotten that firm
power will be generated both at RBPH and CHPH. They
apparently were given to understand that in the first thirty
years only RBPH will generate power and inexplicably
CHPH will remain idle and will become active only after 30
years!
The NBA, after revising their earlier position, continue to
make similar mistakes about CHPH. Their critique regarding
the C.C.Patel construction schedule also reveals critical
lack of understanding. Even if Gujarat constructs the dam
and the canal system and begins to utilize 9 MAP water
for irrigation purpose, how would RBPH stop generating
power? RBPH is not to generate power from the water
allotted to Gujarat in any case. It is through the water which
MP cannot utilize that the RBPH will generate power. So
it all depends on MP. The C.C.Patel recommended
schedule and its implementation has no bearing on the
RBPH power generation.
14. Utilization.
Point.
Utilization in the irrigation Projects in Gujarat is said to be
45% of the established capacity, according to the NBA. To
support this, they quote Suresh Mehta Committee Report.
Counterpoint.:
*
Suresh Mehta Committee reported that excluding irrigation
potentials of Narmada waters, ultimate irrigation potential
in Gujarat was 1.8 million hectares. Out of this, by June
1987 in 1.12 million hectares of irrigation potential was
created. Out of this, utilization was achieved in 0.8 million
hectares; thus utilization achieved was 69% (0.8 M.Ha./
1.12 M.Ha.)
22
ARCH-VAHINI
The NBA achieved its damaging figure of 45% again by
false calculation. They divided utilization achieved by ultimate
irrigation potential (0.8 MHa/1.8 MHa.) This is yet another
instance of misleading calculations. It is significant that this
mistake was pointed out by us in 1991. The NBA still persist with
their error, which is mischievous.
Budget Allocation: SSP v/s Other Irrigation Schemes.
15.
Point.
The NBA and other critics have been arguing, which on •yTh
the face of it is quite convincing, that over 80% of the irrigation
budget in 8th plan is being spent on the SSP which will benefit
only 14% of the total cultivable land in Gujarat, while 86% of the
land is allocated 20% of the irrigation budget.
Counterpoint.
*
It is important to remember that whereas total cultivated
land in Gujarat is about 9.7 million hectares (MHa) the
ultimate surface irrigation potential in Gujarat is only about
4 MHa, which is 40% of the total cultivated land. The SSP
with its 1.8 MHa of cultivable command constitutes nearly
half of the irrigation potential. Of the remaining half of the
irrigation potential of 1.8 MHa, in 1.22 MHa (June 1991)
i.e. 2/3rd area irrigation potential has already been created.
This simply means that apart from the Narmada command
only 17% of the area remains to be surface irrigated, for
which 20% of the irrigation budget of the 8th plan has been
allocated which is fair. Narmada command constituting
75% of the remaining ultimate potential rightly gets 80% .
of the budget. For the NBA, to focus on the total cultivated
land in Gujarat while discussing budget allocation for
irrigation is not only incorrect but highly misleading.
ARCH-VAHINI
July 5, 1993.
At & PO. Mangrol,
Tai. Rajpipla, Dist. Bharuch,
Gujarat, India-393 150.
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