MUDDY WATERS A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BENEFITS OF THE SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
Item
- Title
-
MUDDY WATERS
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
BENEFITS OF THE
SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
- extracted text
-
MUDDY WATERS
02> Ul 7
ABOUT KALPAVRIKSH
Kalpavriksh is an environmental action group based in Delhi, working on aspects of
education, research, campaigning, litigation, and networking with regard to environment
and development issues. It was the first to highlight the potential negative impacts of the
Narmada Valley Development Project, after a extensive field trip through the valley in
1983. Since then, it has remained involved in the issue through awareness work,
research, publications, and participation in the Narmada Bachao Andolan.
The author, Dr. Rahul Ram, is an environmental toxicologist by training, and has been
involved with research, documentation, and campaigning on the Sardar Sarovar Project
since 1990. He is on the editorial team of Narmada: A Campaign Newsletter, brought
out by Kalpavriksh.
towlcdgcment to
110 067
MUDDY WATERS
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
BENEFITS OF THE
SARDAR SAROVAR PROJECT
Rahul N. Ram
KALPAVRIKSH
New Delhi, August 1993
ANALYSIS OF SSP BENEFITS : HIGHLIGHTS
The Narmada river has 17% less water than assumed by project
planners.
DRINKING WATER
No drinking water plan exists even today.
Cost of supplying drinking water is "several thousand crores".
This cost has not been included in project costs.
Urban areas are to receive 80% of the drinking water.
Number of beneficiaries not based on any detailed study.
IRRIGATION
Non-completion of upstream dams reduce SSP irrigation benefits
by 17-30%.
Canal efficiency is much lower than assumed: Water available for
irrigation further reduced by 23.3%.
Total irrigable area likely to be only 44-52% of the area claimed
by project planners.
Over half the area proposed for irrigation is susceptible to
waterlogging and salinization.
Irrigation benefits are likely to be monopolized by rich farmers in
Central Gujarat to grow cash crops such as sugarcane.
POWER
SSP will provide only 439 MW firm power in the initial stages.
Final firm power production is only 50 MW out of an installed
capacity of 1450 MW.
Non-completion of Narmada Sagar Dam upstream will reduce
power benefits by at least 28%.
SSP will consume more power than it will produce for Gujarat.
FINANCIAL
True cost of SSP is likely to be over RS. 20,000 crores and may
rise to over RS. 25,000 crores.
Cost figures quoted by the Government list only the base cost of
the project and ignore contingency costs.
All hopes for foreign bilateral funding for SSP have disappeared.
The SSP consumes 80% of Gujarat’s irrigation budget.
Only about 10% of total project costs have been spent so far.
SSP spending is 53-63% behind schedule.
The Governemnt has no money to finance the SSP.
CONCLUSIONS
Benefits from the SSP have been substantially overestimated.
The SSP will not solve Gujarat’s drought problem.
Kutch and Saurashtra will get minimal irrigation benefits from
SSP. No detailed plan to supply drinking water to Kutch and
Saurashtra.
A comprehensive review of the SSP is needed to determine the
actual scope for benefits and its financial viability.
BENEFITS OF THE SSP: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Introduction
The controversial Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is one of the largest and
most expensive multipurpose river projects ever to be initiated in India. It is
claimed that the project will irrigate 1.8 million ha of land, supply drinking water
to 40 million people, and will have an installed capacity of 1450 MW of power over
the next 30 years (Raj 1992:11). However, the SSP has been opposed by local
people and other groups all over the world who describe it as "the world’s largest
planned ecological disaster". This assertion is based on several findings arising out
of a careful study of the entire project. The major problems are: about 1,000,000
people will be displaced and affected by direct submergence, building of canals,
weirs, dykes and the project colony, by catchment area treatment and compensatory
afforestation, by expansion of the Shoolpaneshwar Sanctuary, and due to secondary
displacement and downstream effects; it is likely that waterlogging and salinisation
will occur all over the command area; several basic errors and flawed assumptions
mar the project plan; the distribution of benefits completely fails to address issues
of social justice and equity; by all indications, the project will not be able to meet
a large fraction of its targets.
Recently the people of Kutch and Saurashtra, who are supposed to be the
main beneficiaries of the SSP, have also started questioning government claims
about the benefits of the project. It has become increasingly clear to them that the
SSP will not solve their problem of drought, and indeed, by spending vast quantities
of money in their name, the government is denying them the resources to develop
alternative methods for dealing with water shortages in their area.
Over the last seven years, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) has
marshalled facts and expertise to critically analyse the SSP. The NBA consists of
the people of the Narmada Valley, and their supporters all over India. After
carefully studying every aspect of the SSP from displacement to rehabilitation to the
planning of the dam structure, the canal system, and its environmental and social
impacts, the NBA has decided to oppose the project in its entirety.
Informed and compelling opposition to the project, the refusal of project
authorities to allow questions or admit shortcomings, and divided opinion within its
own establishment forced the World Bank to initiate an Independent Review of the
SSP. The report of the Independent Review, released in June 1992 (Morse and
Berger 1992) shows clearly that the SSP is flawed, perhaps fatally. Though touted
as one of the most studied projects by its proponents, the report of the Independent
Review demonstrates that the project authorities have failed to collect basic data
for most aspects of the SSP. Thus, the stated benefits of the project should be
thought of as optimistic assertions based on wishful thinking rather than on
scientific appraisal.
As an outcome of the report of the Independent Review, the World Bank
started having serious doubts about continuing its funds; when it became clear that
it was likely to withdraw, the Indian Government in a face-saving gesture, cancelled
the remainder of the World Bank loan. The withdrawal of the World Bank has
served to sharpen the suspicion that the critics of the SSP are right. In light of
these developments, it is imperative that a comprehensive review of the entire
project be carried out.
THE STATED BENEFITS
The SSP is often described as "Gujarat’s lifeline". For forty years, the
project had the stature of a sacred cow as people believed the claim that it would
"drought-proof Gujarat. To this end the project authorities claim that they will
provide drinking water to 40 million people. In addition the project is supposed to
irrigate 1.8 million ha of land spread over 12 districts in Gujarat (see Table 1, Map
1). The SSP is planned to have an installed capacity of 1450 MW of power.
Several other minor benefits are touted for the project, including flood control,
employment generation, "environmental enhancement", tourism, recreational
facilities and improved fisheries. Irrigation is to lead to increased production of
foodgrains and oilseeds, reducing the need for imports.
We will examine each of the main benefits (drinking water, irrigation and
power) separately. However, any discussion about project benefits must begin by
establishing one basic fact: How much water is available for use in the Narmada?
2
MAP 1
Command Area of Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujarat
3
TABLE 1
Area Planned to be Irrigated by Sardar Sarovar Project
District
Agricultural Area
(’000 ha)
Area Under
SSP (’000 ha)
% Agricultural
Area Under SSP
Bharuch
5073
97.95
1928
Baroda
593.0
340.15
5737
Kheda
536.1
116.01
21.63
Gandhinagar
51.9
10.65
2032
Ahmedabad
6762
33127
48.99
Panchmahal
547.8
9.68
1.77
Mehsana
7533
150.19
19.95
Banaskantha
925.6
31339
33.91
Surendranagar
7823
303.73
3831
Bhavnagar
703.1
4827
637
Rqjkot
810.0
34.12
421
Kutch
2363.1
37.85
1.60
9250.4
Total
1793.85
1939
Saurashtra includes Surendranagar, Bhavnagar, Rajkot, Amreli, Junagadh and
Jamnagar districts, with a total cultivated area of 4,176,600 ha. The SSP
command area is planned to cover only 924% of this area.
4
HOW MUCH WATER IS AVAILABLE?
The quantity of water available is the most basic figure for any dam
project. However, the amount of water actually available for the SSP continues to
be debated hotly. Table 2 illustrates the existing controversy over this most basic
figure : the amount of water actually available for use.
There is about 17% less water in the river than planned for. The amount
of water actually available for use at the dam site at 75% dependability is only
22.69 MAF (Million acre feet) and not 2722 MAF as assumed by the dam
builders.
Table 2
75% Dependable Yield of the Narmada
Year of Study
Official Yield1
(MAF)
Actual Flow Data2
(MAF)
1966
27
22.28 (15 Yrs of data)
1978
27.22
22.28 (22 Yrs of data)
1983
27.79
23.16 (33 Yrs of data)
1990
27.22
22.69 (42 Yrs of data)
l7TronrPateTI9'91:60---------2. Calculated from CWC 1992.
How did the project authorities fail to accurately measure this most basic
quantity? The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award (NWDTA), on the basis
of which the SSP was designed, used the amount of water available at the SSP dam
site for 3 out of every 4 years (called the 75% dependable yield) to apportion water
between the states. When the award was made, actual flow data were available for
only 22 years (1948-1969). The government estimated flow in the river using
rainfall data from 1891-1947, a procedure known as hindcasting. The resulting
combination of hindcasted and actual flow data led to an estimate of 27.22 MAF
(Million acre-feet) as the 75% dependable yield (henceforth referred to as the
yield).
5
Today we have actual flow data for 42 years (1948-1989), which is sufficient
to calculate yield without hindcasting (CWC, 1992). The yield from 42 years of
actual data is only 22.69 MAF, and not 2722 MAF. It is scientifically much more
appropriate to use actual data rather than hindcasted data. Project authorities
persist in hindcasting even though the exercise is redundant because the lower
yield shown by the actual data would render their project unviable as it stands.
The use of hindcasted data has led to overestimation of yield in several
projects, such as the Gandhi Sagar Project, where the reservoir has completely
filled up only once in 32 years of operation, leading to net irrigated area 35% lower
than that planned. In the case of the SSP, hindcasting has resulted in mistaken
estimates of river flow because it is based on inadequate rainfall data. The Khosla
Commission, which was appointed to go into the Narmada water disputes question
in the early 1960s, stated that the number of rain gauges available from 1891-1930
was too few to allow accurate estimation of data. The World Bank also stated that
the number of rain gauges before 1925 was insufficient to allow hindcasting (WB
1985). Thus, only 18 years of rainfall data (1930-1947) are suitable for hindcasting.
In other words, the Narmada Tribunal was technically wrong when it used
hindcasted data from 1891 onwards.
The decreased water yield changes the entire complexion of the project,
and throws doubt on the scope and possibility of the claimed benefits. The
NWDTA distributed water from the Narmada in the ratio 65:32 to Madhya Pradesh
and Gujarat, with Rajasthan and Maharashtra sharing the remaining 3%. Thus,
while under the original estimate of river yield at 27.22 MAF Gujarat would recieve
9 MAF of water, under the revised actual yield of 22.69 MAF, its share would drop
to 7.26 MAF. This naturally means less water to go around: less water for
irrigation, less water for drinking. The reduced quantum of water is specially
significant for those at the tail-end of the SSP system, i.e. Kutch and Saurashtra,
since they are the most likely to suffer if there is less water.
As the entire planning for the SSP is based on an assumption of using 9
MAF of water, any decrease in this amount will result in decreased benefits.
Indeed, the benefit-cost ratio of the project, which at 1.13 is already at marginal
acceptability according to Government of India and World Bank norms, will
decrease below acceptable limits if the smaller quantum of assured water is taken
into account.
6
DRINKING WATER
The provision of drinking water is one of the main moral and political
justifications for the SSP in Gujarat where acute water scarcity has been a crippling
problem and an emotionally charged issue. The recent droughts in Gujarat,
especially in Kutch and Saurashtra, have highlighted the lack of assured sources of
drinking water and the urgent need for water security in this arid land. Under the
SSP, drinking water is planned to be supplied to 8215 villages and 135 urban
centres in 12 districts, including all villages and cities in Kutch and Saurashtra.
While the moral imperative of supplying drinking water is, in a sense,
beyond considerations of cost-benefit analyses, the sheer magnitude of the project
justifies a close look at its planning and feasibility.
Official Information on Drinking Water from SSP
Very little detailed information is available about drinking water supply
from SSP. Most project literature lists only goals, targets and claims, perhaps in
the belief that frequent repetition of an assertion will make it into a fact. For
example, it is claimed that 32.5 million people will be supplied drinking water
(Raj 1990:11); that the project will permanently solve the water supply problems
of all villages in Kutch and Saurashtra (Raj 1990:56); that the supply of drinking
water from SSP is economically viable (GOG 1991:132). None of this is backed
up by any data.
The SSP authorities appear to be very confused about the number of
towns and villages to be supplied drinking water from the SSP, and the number
of potential beneficiaries (See Table 4). At the time of the NWDTA, no figures
for drinking water beneficiaries were mentioned. Since then, the number has
changed several times, and quite drastically too, from 28 million (GWSSB 1983)
to 32.5 million (Raj 1989) to 40 million (Raj 1992) and again to 25 million
(SSNNL 1993). Similarly, the number of villages that are supposed to benefit
has increased from zero in 1979, to 4719 villages in the early eighties, to 7234
villages in 1990, and finally, to 8215 villages in 1991. There has been no
concomitant increase in the quantum of water earmarked for drinking water.
7
The main sources of detailed information on drinking water are a
"Study on Water Demand for Non-agricukural Use from Narmada Project" by
the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board (GWSSB 1983), and a recent
Narmada Control Authority (NCA) pamphlet on drinking water (NCA 1991).
While the former is now quite dated, it is the only detailed source of
information available. According to these documents (See Table 3), the total
projected water requirement in 2021 for domestic, industrial and thermal power
projects is estimated to be 1.37 MAF (Million Acre Feet). 0.48 MAF are
available from sources outside the SSP coverage, and 0.14 MAF are available
from groundwater sources. The balance requirement of 0.75 MAF is to be
provided by SSP, which works out to a gross demand of 1.06 MAF after adding
losses in the system (GWSSB 1983).
TABLE 3
Non-agricultural Water Demand in the SSP Command (2021)
(All figures in MAF)
Demand
Source
Total
Demand
Urban
1.01
|
Rural
0.2
|-
Industrial
0.16
|
Total
137
SourceiGOG 19113:3
From Local
Sources
0.48
0.48
Recharge
Withdrawal
Balance
Requirements
0.14
0.75
0.14
0.75
The NWDTA allocated 1.06 MAF for non-agricultural uses from
Gujarat’s share of 9 MAF water from the Narmada. Of these 1.06 MAF, 0.853
MAF have been set aside for drinking water purposes and the rest (0.207 MAF)
for industrial use.
Several changes have appeared between the two documents. According
to the detailed study (GWSSB 1983: 18), drinking water requirements are 227
litres/capita/day (LPCD) for cities with population more than 1 million, 140
LPCD for other urban areas, and 70 LPCD for rural areas. However, in the
8
same document, the most needy rural areas of Kutch and Saurashtra are
assigned only 55 LPCD. Again, this document mentions that areas with high
cattle populations (large parts of Kutch and Saurashtra) will be assigned 30L/
cattle /day, but then proceeds to completely ignore that statement when actually
calculating the amount of water required (GWSSB 1983: Appendix IV-C). The
NCA pamphlet fails to mention the higher urban figure of 227 LPCD and
asserts that all villages will be provided 70 LPCD. It makes no mention of
water for cattle, though the images of cattle trekking miles for water are
repeatedly used by the SSP authorities in pressing their claims for the necessity
of the project.
The GWSSB study (GWSSB 1983: p.38, 57) estimated the cost of
supplying drinking water to be 728 crores (in 1981-82 rupees), which is well over
Rs. 1,500 crores in current terms. The NCA document, on the other hand, does
not mention any definite figure, but asserts that the cost of the project "would
run to several thousand crores". It is worth mentioning that the GWSSB study
only considered 4719 villages in its cost estimates, whereas the current number
of villages is claimed to be 8215. The projected cost of supplying water to
villages is 3-4 times that of supplying water to urban areas (GWSSB 1983:57).
Thus, the cost of supplying drinking water may more than double with the
current targets.
The cost of supplying drinking water has not been included in any cost
benefit analysis of the SSP to date. The additional cost of drinking water
supply causes will make the financial feasibility of the entire project very
questionable.
As if this was not enough, both the GWSSB (1983) and the NCA (1991)
documents assert that studies so far are only preliminary and a detailed project
report is yet to be prepared. This was supposed to be complete by 1992, but in
January 1993 the GWSSB issued an advertisement in Gujarat newspapers calling
for consultants to do a feasibility study on supplying drinking water from the
Narmada. Thus, even after forty years of planning for the "most studied
project", there is no detailed project report to date, and it is unlikely that a
report will be prepared within the next couple of years!
In essence, the entire scenario for drinking water supply is in a state of
confusion and unpreparedness. Why is a comprehensive plan for supplying
drinking water not yet ready? When will the water reach the people? How
many people are expected to benefit? Where do the beneficiaries live? What
9
is the estimated cost of this part of the SSP? How will it be financed? How
much energy will be required for the project? Has livestock water demand been
considered? How will irrigation and drinking water be prioritized? Have any
alternatives been thoroughly considered? Close analysis seems to show that
none of these questions can be answered at this point in time, almost 10 years
after detailed project plans were drawn up, and a mere 10 years before the
project is supposed to be complete.
Scale of Benefits
The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award (NWDTA) (MAI 1979)
did not mention any numerical targets for providing drinking water.
Subsequently the number of beneficiary villages, urban areas and their
population (in the year 2021) has been changing at almost every mention (Table
4). Even within the same document two different figures for number of
beneficiaries can be found : 29.5 million vs. 32.5 million (Raj 1990). How the
number of beneficiaries can change while the quantum of water allocated for
drinking remains unchanged is a mystery that the SSP authorities are unwilling
to solve.
TABLE 4
Drinking Water Targets for SSP
Source and Date
Villages
Urban Areas
0
0
GWSSB 1983
4719
131
SSNNL 1990
7234
131
SSNNL 1991
8215
135
Narmada Tribunal 1979
According to the latest official information (NCA, 1992), 948 villages in
Kachchh and 4877 villages in Saurashtra will get drinking water. However,
according to the 1981 census, there are only 887 inhabited villages in Kachchh
and 4727 in the 6 Saurashtra districts! The project authorities have simply
listed as a target the total number of villages in all districts of Kachchh and
10
Saurashtra, ignoring, or simply unaware of the fact that 61 villages in Kachchh
and 149 villages in Saurashtra are listed as uninhabited (GOI, 1981, pp.96-99).
The planned number of beneficiary villages was apparently the result of a "study"
by the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board (GWSSB) (NCA, 1991).
Obviously, this "study was cursory and slipshod, to say the least, its quality in
keeping with the level of other planning seen for the drinking water component
of the SSP!
The GWSSB report (GWSSB 1983) displayed a strong urban bias in the
supply of drinking water. In an area where the population is approximately 70%
rural, 63% of project beneficiaries were to be urban dwellers. Cities were
supposed to receive over 80% of the total quantity of drinking water (GWSSB
1983: Appendices IIIA-IVC). Four major cities: AJimedabad, Vadodara, Rajkot
and Jamnagar accounted for over 40% of the total drinking water to be
supplied for the SSP, and Ahmedabad and Vadodara alone accounted for over
25%. While the GWSSB report is now dated, the absence of any further data
leads to the conclusion that the large urban centres in Gujarat are to be the true
beneficiaries of drinking water.
A completely neglected aspect of the plan to ' drought-proof' Kutch and
Saurashtra is the question of livestock. Large parts of the population of
Kachchh and Saurashtra are pastoralist. Families maintain large livestock herds,
and the animals are an important economic and cultural resource. In every
drought, people are forced to migrate with their livestock in search of water.
The government has to set up cattle pounds to supply fodder and water.
No mention of actually supplying water to livestock is made anywhere in
the drinking water plans, or indeed in all the SSP development plans in spite of
the mention that cattle are supposed to be provided 30 LPCD. Cattle consume
large quantities of water, and their needs have to be met if any degree of
"drought-proofing" is sought.
It is difficult to estimate how many people are supposed to benefit from
SSP drinking water in the absence of any plan. However, the bigger question is
whether the numbers tossed out are supposed to represent even an
approximation to project goals or whether it is merely a facade designed to
silence legitimate criticism while diverting water to the politically powerful.
.o r
Jf
>
library
';
AND
rtA
DOCUMENTATION
’
UNIT
S
)
/xj
Costs
The cost of supplying drinking water is estimated variously at 728 crores
(GWSSB 1983) or, very roughly, at "several thousand crores" (NCA 1991). This
cost has not been factored into any overall cost-estimate of the SSP even
though drinking water is a prominently mentioned benefit of the project. The
entire cost-benefit ratio of the project may change if a realistic estimate of this
expense is added. Thus the SSP authorities have been deceiving the people of
Gujarat by claiming drinking water as a benefit, when they have no idea of the
cost, and even less of how they are supposed to find the money. While the
SSNNL washes its hands off the question of drinking water and puts the entire
burden on the GWSSB, the latter professes to be completely in the dark about
where funding is supposed to come from.
The moral imperative of supplying drinking water holds true only if the
beneficiaries are in drought-hit areas with no other sources of water, not in
cities with assured drinking water sources such as Ahmedabad and Vadodara.
Nevertheless, the financial implications of spending an additional "several
thousand crores" are very grave, especially in light of the extremely tight fiscal
situation of the Gujarat and Central Governments. The SSP has already had to
curtail work on the canals because of severe cash constraints, and there is no
sign that the situation is likely to improve in the near future.
If the cost of drinking water supply had been included in the original
proposal, the SSP may not have received clearance from the Central
Government. The late unveiling of this additional cost is an attempt to present
the Central government with a fait accompli; expenditure already incurred is
being cited as a reason for further expenditure. This argument - that "we have
already spent so much money, how can we stop now" - is the standard
justification used for projects which run into problems due to environmental
concerns or even cost/time overruns.
The geographical spread of the beneficiaries (the area of Ku .ch and
Saurashtra alone is 109,630 sq. Km) requires very large pumping capacities,
thousands of kilometres of pipeline construction and maintenance, filtering and
treatment plants, and setting up or augmenting an extensive bureaucratic and
technical infrastructure, all of which are very expensive. The planned 2.5 month
annual dewatering of the canal system (NPG 1989) will require the construction
or, improvement of existing storage facilities, an additional cost (Some recent
12
SSP documents mention that the canal dewatering will only be for a month, but
this is simply a bare assertion unsupported by any data).
Furthermore, the construction schedule of the SSP has been accelerated
so that it is supposed to be completed in 12 years rather than the 17-22
originally envisaged (Patel 1991:76). This requires an expenditure of over Rs.
1200 crores every year for the next 9 years without accounting for drinking water
supply. If the drinking water scheme is to be implemented, from where will the
resources for an even higher yearly expenditure come?
The Gujarat and Central governments have completely different views
on when the drinking water will reach the needy areas. While Gujarat claims
the entire project is to be finished within the next 8 years, the Central Ministry
of Water Resources says that drinking water will reach Kutch by the year 2025!
The World Bank Review Mission Report (September 1992) also said that a
realistic time-frame for drinking water to reach Kutch is the year 2025, and
2020 for Saurashtra. The financial problems faced by the SSP, on the other
hand, seem to indicate that drinking water from SSP may never reach these
areas.
Another aspect of project cost that must be considered is energy.
Supplying drinking water will need large pumping facilities due to the widely
dispersed locations of the proposed beneficiaries, and topographical variation
(especially for Sabarkantha district, the Kathiawar area in Saurashtra, and the
areas west and north-west of Bhuj in Kachchh).
The energy required for such a large pumping capacity will not be
negligible. It is not possible to obtain even an ‘orders-of-magnitude’ estimate of
the energy demand without a detailed project plan, including geometry and
sizing of system, and locations of end-points.
13
Drinking Water: Conclusions
It becomes clear that the supply of drinking water from SSP is beset
with problems and uncertainties. It is unclear how much water will actually be
available. It is unclear how many people are expected to benefit from the
supply of drinking water. It is unclear how much the project will cost, who will
pay for it, and where the money is going to come from. It is unclear when the
water is going to reach the people. It would be very useful to compare these
uncertainties with the actual plan for the supply of drinking water, but there is
no plan!
There is no reasonable explanation for the lack of a comprehensive plan
for drinking water. The rhetorical value of "parched throats" and "water for 40
million people" seems to far outweigh actual planning effort put into evolving a
workplan. The detailed project report was supposed to be available by the end
of 1992 (NCA 1991), but has not put in an appearance so far. There is no way
to determine how detailed or feasible the plan will be, if indeed it is ever
prepared. The SSP authorities have abdicated responsibility for the plan, its
execution and its financing to the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board, a
body whose "study" wants to supply water to uninhabited villages!
Everything seems to indicate that the Ahmedabad-Baroda corridor will
get as much water as it needs from the SSP. The GWSSB recently allocated
a sizable quantity of SSP water to Baroda in direct contravention of their own
directives, using "recalculated figures" to show that more water was available due
to high efficiency in transportation (in a hypothetical system which does not even
exist on paper!). This was done shortly after the Baroda Municipal Corporation
voted to bring SSP waters to the city. Powerful urban centres all over Gujarat
are likely to react similarly, and their political clout will ensure that their
demands will be met. But for the people of Kutch and Saurashtra the assurance
of drinking water appears to be a cruel hoax.
14
IRRIGATION
The SSP plans to irrigate 1.8 million ha of land spead over 12 districts
in Gujarat (See Table 1) and an additional 75,000 ha in Rajasthan. The
command area of the SSP has been divided into thirteen agroclimatic zones
(ORG 1982) which form the basis for irrigation planning (Map 2). This
irrigation is to occur through a network of 75,000 Km of canals, including a
main canal 460 Km in length and 35 branch canals of various lengths. It is
planned to supply water to the canals on a volumetric, rotational basis. In
addition, it is planned to dewater the canal system beyond the Mahi river for 2.5
months from March 1 to May 15 (SSNNL 1989), though recently the SSNNL
has asserted that dewatering will only occur "for a month or so" (NCA 1991).
A close look shows that the irrigation plans of the SSP are fraught with
problems, based on flawed assumptions that make the plans socially, politically,
technically and economically unworkable. Our analysis is based on several
factors, including quantum of water, water efficiency of the canal system,
waterlogging and salinity problems in the command, lacunae in the planned
administrative system for the canals, the effect of the Narmada Sagar Project not
being built, siltation, dependence on ground water, financial reasons, and
political factors at work in Gujarat.
Quantum of Water
As stated earlier, the 75% dependable flow of the river is likely to be
17% less than estimated by the project planners in designing the canal system.
In addition, the use of water by Gujarat for irrigation depends critically on the
graduated release of water from upstream projects in Madhya Pradesh
(Narmada Sagar, Maheshwar and Omkareshwar). None of these projects is
going to be ready by the time the SSP is ready. Indeed, their very existence at
any stage is becoming increasingly improbable. The Narmada Water Disputes
Tribunal Award had ruled that 85% of the water allocated for use in Gujarat
and Rajasthan was to be provided in the form of regulated release from
reservoirs upstream in Madhya Pradesh. The NWDTA determined that, without
the Narmada Sagar Project, the irrigation and power benefits of the SSP would
15
MAP 2
The Agroclimatic Zones of the SSP Command
16
drop by 17% (MAI 1979: VolII:pl02). A January 2, 1992 World Bank
memorandum stated that irrigated area in the SSP would drop by 30% without
the NSP (Morse and Berger 1992: 250).
A 17% lower flow in the Narmada combined with a 17-30% drop in the
SSP irrigated area due to the absence of the Narmada Sagar Project could
decrease the area irrigable by the SSP to as much as 58-69% of the original
estimate, if the two factors are cumulative. But the story doesn’t end here.
Canal Efficiency
The area irrigable by the SSP becomes even more uncertain when we
examine the efficiency of the canal system. In any canal irrigation system, water
is lost due to seepage and evaporation from the main canal, its branches, and
from the distribution system and field channels. Water is also lost during field
application and in the overall operation of the system. The overall water use
efficiency is estimated after accounting for all the losses. The SSP authorities
have "deemed feasible" an overall water use efficiency of 60% (NPG 1983:12,
SSNNL 1989:360) for irrigation and of 75% for drinking water supply (NPG
1983:4). (Water use efficiency is determined as the ratio of water reaching the
target to that released at the source: Thus, if 600ml reach the field for every
litre released at the dam, efficiency is deemed to be 60%.) The figure of 60%
canal efficiency is based on several very questionable and overly optimistic
assumptions (SSNNL 1989: 356).
The project planners have completely neglected evaporative losses in
the canal system! Given that large parts of the canal system are to run through
the arid parts of Kutch, Saurashtra and North Gujarat where substantial losses
through evaporation can be expected, such an assumption seems foolhardy at
best and wilful deception at worst.
Other dubious assumptions made by the SSP authorities relate to
estimates of seepage rates, field application losses and operational losses.
Values assumed by the project planners arc shown in Table 5 along with values
observed in different systems in India and values used by the World Bank for
irrigation projects in India.
17
TABLE 5
Water Losses: SSP Assumptions and Realistic Values
Source of Water Loss
SSP Assumptions
Observed and Literature
Values
Lined Canal Seepage
2 cfs/msft1
3 cfs/msft (WB2)
2.22-5.93 cfs/msft3
Unlined Canal Seepage
5 cfs/msft
8 cfs/msft4
5% / 100m canal (WB)
Field Application Loss
20% NIR5
20-40% NIR (SSNNL
1989:368)
Operational Losses
5% Total Water
Demand
20% NIR (WB)
1. Cubic fect/second/million square feet canal surface area.
2. World Bank report on Irrigation Development in India.
3. Observations on Mahi and Dantiwada Canal Systems (SSNNL 1989:357).
4. Observations on Bhakra system (SSNNL 1989:357).
5. Net Irrigation Requirement at the field.
The SSP authorities have given no concrete reasons for their
assumptions. For example, seepage losses in lined canals have been
assumed at 2/3 of the value considered appropriate by the World Bank in its
report "Irrigation Development in India" (WB 1987). Average losses observed
on lined canals in the Mahi and Dantiwada systems (in Gujarat, in similar agroclimatic regions) are double the value assumed for the SSP. Similarly, seepage
loss rates in unlined canals are assumed to be 60% of observed loss rates in
existing systems. It is completely unclear why this figure is used. While the SSP
authorities had claimed that the distribution system would be concrete-lined
while carrying out efficiency calculations, a recent Narmada Control Authority
publication says that the distribution system will be bricklined (NCA 1991b).
Field application and operational losses have also been assumed to be much
lower than reasonable, without providing any concrete explanation.
The irrigation efficiency for the SSP was calculated using more realistic
and observed estimates (As shown in the second column of Table 5). The
results are shown in Table 6, along with the SSP calculations for comparison.
The irrigation efficiency of the SSP is likely to be only 46% (ignoring
evaporative losses) and not 60% as claimed. The water available for irrigation
18
would be 23.3% less than what is assumed. Our figure for irrigation efficiency is
almost identical to a World Bank estimate (WB 1985b: 143) made for the SSP
using a somewhat different method. The World Bank estimated that only 46%
of the water released from the SSP reservoir would reach the fields. It is
interesting to note that the Bank did not see fit to mention the implication of
this reduced irrigation efficiency anywhere in its documents.
It seems that the World Bank Irrigation Sector Review (1991) must
have had the SSP in mind when it made the uncannily apposite observation that:
"Most design problems stem from inadequate data and unrealistic assumptions
about water availability and irrigation efficiency...More realism concerning the
availability of water and feasible efficiency of water usage is in order. Irrigation
efficiency in India has often been assumed to be 60% ...Most irrigation
commands in India probably have an irrigation efficiency of 20 to 35%. If
assumed efficiency is 60% and actual efficiency is 30%, actual water availability
will be half the assumption at design."
Adding evaporative losses would further reduce the efficiency of the
canal system. A lower efficiency implies that less water would reach the fields
or that the area to be irrigated would have to be reduced. However, the project
authorities have already minimized the amount of water they would deliver per
unit area (in order to raise the total area irrigable). Thus, the area to be
irrigated will drop by an additional 23.3%.
Combining a 17% lower How in the Narmada, a drop in irrigation
benefits by 17-30% in the absence of the Narmada Sagar Dam, and a realistic
irrigation efficiency, the irrigation benefits of the SSP are likely to be only 4453% of what is claimed.
How will the SSP deal with this lowered quantum of irrigation water
and irrigable area? The most probable answer, both politically and logistically,
is that the tail end of the canal system will be deprived of water. In Gujarat,
Saurashtra, Kutch, and North Gujarat (Banaskantha and Sabarkantha) are at the
end reaches of the canal system. 43% of the area to be irrigated by the SSP lies
in these drought-prone districts and will, in all probability, be deprived of
irrigation. Thus, it is clear that the claim of irrigating the most needy and
drought-hit areas of Kutch, Saurashtra and North Gujarat is a mirage in the
desert. So too, of course, is the claim of irrigating a part of Southern Rajasthan.
19
Waterlogging and Salinisation
About half the proposed command area of the SSP is prone to
waterlogging and salinisation. A preliminary study called "Regionalisation of
Narmada Command" (ORG 1982) divided the command area of the SSP into 13
agroclimatic zones, and classified them into irrigability classes as shown in Map
3. The Soil Survey Manual of the Indian Agricultural Research Institute
recognizes six irrigability classes:
I: Few limitations for sustained use under irrigation
II: Moderate limitations
Ill: Severe limitations
IV: Marginal for sustained use under irrigation
V: Temporarily classified as not suitable pending further investigations
VI: Not suitable for sustained use
However, the ORG (1982) report used somewhat different nomenclature. Class
II areas are called "suitable for rice", Class IV areas are called Class IVA
("partly suitable for rice"), Class VI areas are called Class IVB ("partly
unsuitable for rice"), and Class V areas are called "unclassified". The
inventiveness of calling an area that is marginal for irrigation as "partly suitable
for rice” is impressive!
It is clear that areas classified as Class III are moderately prone to
waterlogging, whereas Class IV-VI have severe waterlogging problems under
sustained irrigation. It is possible to calculate the areas under different
irrigability classifications from Map 3. The results are shown in Table 7 and 8.
Less than half the command area can be called "suitable" for irrigation.
25.61% of the command area has severe limitations for sustained irrigation
(Class III), and 26.5% of the command area is not suitable for sustained
irrigation at all. In other words, 52% of the command area faces high to very
high probability of waterlogging and salinisation if the SSP is completed. (It
should be reemphasized here that the preliminary land classification done by
ORG (1982) is for the gross command area, and not the culturablc command
area.)
20
TABLE 6
Comparison of Water losses and Efficiencies
(All figures for 1000 ha CCA)
SSP
Volume
(ham)
Realistic
% loss to
Main
Canal
Releases
(ham)
NIR
(ham)
Field
Application
Unlincd
Canal
Distribution
System
Branches
Main
Canal
Operational
Total
Water
Demand
5042.08
1008.72
668.2
522.02
267.15
260.91
544.28
3135.9
8177.98
12.33
8.17
6.38
3.27
3.19
6.65
40
1512.6
965
1062.3
543.65
530.95
1260.5
5875
13.85
8.84
9.73
4.98
4.86
1154
53.81
Efficiency
60
SSP%
loss to
Main
Canal
Releases
Realistic
Volume
Losses
5042.08
10917.8
46.19
All SSP figures are from SSNNL 1989:371
MAP 3
Land Irrigability Classification of the SSP Command
FMOM
0Rw<_IM2)
22
MAP 4
Groundwater Suitability and Availability in the SSP Command
From one
23
TABLE 7
Land Irrigability of Narmada Command
Land Irrigability Class
Percentage of SSP Command
Area
I (Eminently suitable for irrigation)
8.75
II (Moderately suitable for irrigation)
39
III (Severe limitations for irrigation)
25.61
IV+VI (Marginal and unsuitable)
19.31
V (Not suitable - unclassified)
Source: Calculated from Map 3 (ORG 1982)
7.29
All of the command area in Kutch and Saurashtra is classified as
Class III and below. 41% of the command area in Kutch and Saurashtra is not
suitable for irrigation at all, whereas the remaining 59% has severe limitations
for irrigation. In Banaskantha district of North Gujarat (Zone 12), only onethird of the command area is suitable for irrigation. If the SSP plans to
"eliminate" drought in Kutch, Saurashtra and North Gujarat, it seems highly
unlikely that it will do so through irrigation. As it stands, the SSP plans to
irrigate only 1.6% and 9.3% of the gaMMBd areas of Kutch and Saurashtra,
respectively (Table 1).
Areas classified as "suitable for rice" (Class III) will tend to get
waterlogged, so that only those crops that can grow under waterlogged
conditions (i.e. rice) will survive. Interestingly, the existing cropping patterns in
the zones labelled as "suitable for rice" (Zg.,, Z13) show that almost no rice is
grown there at present. Rice is 0% of cropped area in Z, and Z13 and only
0.06% of cropped area in Z 8 (SSNNL 1989: 192). Further, the proposed
cropping patterns for these zones under SSP irrigation do not describe rice as
the predominant crop, with only 3.9, 5.4, and 0% paddy proposed for Zj, Z, and
Z13 respectively (GOG 1983). This somewhat contradictory position remains
unexplained.
24
TABLE 8
Zonewise Land Irrigability
Zone
Area (’000 ha)
LIC (% Area)
I + II
III
1
253
100
2
273.05
100
3
153
65
4
111.3
5
295.7
100
6
181.7
55
7
476
8
294
100
9
268.4
100
10
344.6
79
11
191.7
100
12
462.8
33
13
122.9
100
47.75
Total
3422.9
Source: Ca culated from Map 3 (ORG 1982)
25.61
IV + V + VI
35
100
17
28
100
14
7
1
13
54
26.6
Further problems exist. The SSP plans to augment Narmada waters
with groundwater, since the surface waters will not be sufficient to irrigate the
command to the level decided. Unfortunately, as shown by Map 4, groundwater
is highly saline in Z4, 2^ and substantial parts of Z2.3, Z6 and Z,.13> and is
unsuitable for use in irrigation. Aquifers suitable for use in irrigation in parts of
Z6, Z8 and Z1(M2 are very deep (> 150m) and it would require very high energy
inputs to tap them. From Map 4 (ORG 1982) it can be seen that about 35% of
25
the command area has groundwater that is completely unfit for irrigation, while
an additional 25% of the command area only has very deep aquifers (>100-150
m depth), from which would be very costly to pump water.
An additional factor is that the main soils in Z,., are medium deep
black soils, while Z2J have substantial areas of black soils (ORG 1982:15).
Black soils are known to be unsuitable for canal irrigation in a sustained fashion
due to their propensity to get waterlogged. The experience with the Ukai dam,
just south of the proposed SSP system, is illustrative: The Ukai command had
substantial areas of black cotton soils. Before canal irrigation, less than 0.5% of
the command reported waterlogging, but after 15 years, 17-35% of the command
area reports waterlogging (Mukhopadhyay and D’Souza 1992). Similarly, Tawa
Dam in a similar soil zone in Madhya Pradesh has had 20% of the command
area taken out of production partially or completely due to waterlogging, just 10
years after irrigation was started.
Taking irrigability classifications and areas of black soils and saline
aquifers into account, about 55% of the command area appears to be in danger
of waterlogging and salinisation, an environmental disaster of epic proportions in
the making. •
Detailed studies appear to indicate that the actual potential for
waterlogging and salinisation is even worse than what was indicated by the
preliminary study. A study of Zones 1-4 of the SSP command (Table 9)
conducted by Core Consultants (1982) concluded that 54% of Zj, 64% of Z, and
100% of Z4 is liable to be affected by waterlogging and salinity. The report said
"..increased recharge will cause water tables to rise by 1-2 m/year. Over much
of the study area the water table will rise and within a few years encroach on
the crop root zone causing waterlogging and salinisation, resulting in the
decrease or complete loss of soil production”. Comparison of Tables 9 and 10
shows that while the preliminary study indicates 20.9% of Zones 1-4 as prone to
waterlogging and salinisation, the detailed report puts that figure at 45.5%,
almost double the original. Even if we exclude the problematic Zone 4, the
relative area prone to waterlogging and salinisation increases from 8% to 36.5%!
26
TABLE 9
Detailed Study of Zones 1-4
Percentage Area in Land Irrigability Classes
Irrigability Class
Zone
I + II
III
IV-VI
1
74
19
7
2
70
27
3
3
15
70
3
4
2
39
59
33.26
52.65
Total
All data from Core Consultants (1982).
12.22
A study done on Zone 7 reports that 74% of the area is severely
problematic for irrigation (ORG 1981). The study concludes that since the area
suitable for irrigation in zone 7 is such a small fraction of the total area of the
zone, it is questionable whether this should be brought into the SSP command.
The report suggests that a change in cropping patterns under the existing regime
may be more fruitful.
Incredibly, detailed studies have so far been completed for only 5 out of
13 agroclimatic zones! Studies are supposed to be under way for the rest of the
command area, and it is quite likely that they will bear out the gloomy prognosi;
of the preliminary study undertaken by ORG earlier (ORG 1982).
The project authorities claim to have a "foolproof system" to deal with
any problems. They assert that not a single hectare will get waterlogged or
salinised. Let’s look at this foolproof system.
The SSP authorities plan to have groundwater sensors placed along
every 100 Km2 of the 18,000 Km2 command area. These will be linked to a
central computer, which will analyse the data and send out commands to the
canal heads to stop the flow of water into areas showing signs of waterlogging.
In addition, a mix of irrigation-only, drainage-only and irrigation-cum-drainage
27
tubcwells shall be sunk, and operated on the command of this central computer.
It would truly be a technological miracle if such a system could be installed and
operated. Unfortunately, there is not even a pilot project using this system
anywhere in the country. We have no idea how such a highly centralised and
complex information and engineering system will work under field conditions.
Given the track record of irrigation systems in India, it is unwarranted optimism
to hope that such a system will work in a "foolproof fashion.
Canal Operation Policy
If the SSP were to be built, the first areas to receive irrigation would be
Bharuch, Khera and Baroda districts. Already economically strong and
politically powerful, their regional clout would increase tremendously with
irrigation. According to the World Bank Staff Appraisal Report (WB 1985), the
earlier reaches will initially be given more water since the canal system will not
be ready to carry the water beyond the Mahi (This is a common practice in all
irrigation systems). Is it politically feasible to reduce this quantity later on?
Once farmers get water in large quantities, they tend to switch to water intensive
cash crops like sugarcane as has happened over the entire Ukai command.
When water begins to be diverted to those at the further reaches of the canal
system, those close to the canal head "apply for canal water to ‘save’ the
standing crop and sanctions are given ‘on humanitarian grounds’ and ‘in order to
prevent wastage of national wealth’" (Dhamdhere 1986: 167). The economic and
political clout that comes from growing sugarcane makes it very difficult for the
government to then give less water to these farmers.
It is indeed no coincidence that seven large sugar factories are coming
up in the initial reaches of the SSP command area. That they are doing so
despite the fact that almost no sugarcane is grown there at present (0.05-0.67%
of gross cropped area in 1981-82: SSNNL 1989:194), is a clear indication that
those in positions of power in Gujarat are confident of a large source of
sugarcane in the locality in the near future. In the Ukai project in Gujarat,
sugarcane now accounts for over 75% of the command area, though the
planners had originally decreed that only 30% of the command area shall grow
sugarcane. History, rather predictably, appears to be repeating itself.
The official canal operation policy of the SSP needs to be examined in
the light of this political reality. The policy specifies that a limited quantity of
28
water will be provided to farmers. An induced scarcity will be maintained by
supplying water volumetrically on a rotational basis, so that extensive use of
irrigation is made and profligacy minimized. The authorities fondly hope that
farmers will be persuaded to grow "...crops...which consume less water, but are
comparatively more remunerative." (Patel 1991:76) What is much more likely is
that farmers will grow cash crops that require a lot of water, and resist efforts to
enforce cropping patterns by centralized regulation of canal flow. This could
upset the estimates of water demand which are based on projected cropping
patterns, and lead to decreased availability in the tail-end reaches of the system.
In addition, the SSP plans to supply water to farmers’ irrigation
cooperatives instead of individuals, on a volumetric basis, for which farmers will
pay per litre. These irrigation cooperatives will arrange for rate payment, will
line canals beyond the minors, will carry out groundwater pumping when
required, will maintain the drainage systems at the micro level. However, the
decision to supply water to them will still be taken by a central authority. This
"revolutionary” system is exactly what irrigation experts have been
recommending. Unfortunately, no such irrigation control system is in place in
India, even on a pilot scale: How is it supposed to work over 1.8 million ha?
And, regrettably, the entire success of the project is dependent on these blithe
assumptions that defy ground realities.
Work on Indian irrigation by Chambers, Wade and others has shown
that decentralised systems arc much more efficient. While the SSP
commendably seeks to decentralize the irrigation system, there has been
absolutely no degree of participation of the beneficiaries in plan formulation.
The government has not bothered to ask the potential users of irrigation to
ascertain whether this cooperative structure is at all feasible. Besides, there has
been no thought given to the administrative, logistical and financial costs of
setting up and running thousands of irrigation cooperatives, ensuring that
elections are held regularly and conducted fairly, proper accounts are
maintained, that the rich and powerful do not grab all the water: a nightmare
for any person who has ever worked as an irrigation specialist at the micro level.
Besides, cooperatives cannot be formed ‘on demand’. While the government
can force cooperatives to be formed, it cannot force people to cooperate.
Under such conditions, how politically feasible would it be to supply
water on a rotational basis and on the basis of land holding, without giving in to
popular demands? Once the farmers of central Gujarat receive the surplus
29
water that would be available before the further reaches of the canal were built,
how will it be taken away from them?
Irrigation: Conclusions
It is clear that the irrigation benefits of the SSP have been vastly
exaggerated. The project will not only be unable to irrigate 1.8 million ha, it
may have water to reach only 44-52% of that area. Large parts of the command
are unsuitable for irrigation, and waterlogging and salinisation are bound to
occur. Prospects of failure loom large, magnified by the absence of the
Narmada Sagar Project. Rich and powerful central Gujarat will definitely
benefit in the short run, before waterlogging and salinisation lays waste its fields
forever, but the drought-hit will be left high and dry.
30
POWER
The SSP has a planned installed capacity of 1450 MW, of which 1200
MW will be generated by turbines installed in the river bed power house
(RBPH) and 250 MW from the canal head power house (CHPH). However,
installed capacity is not equal to actually produced power. Power will never be
actually produced at 1450 MW. As the SSP planning documents show (Table
10), the amount of power that will be generated on a reliable basis (i.e. firm
power), drops from 415 MW to 0 MW for the RBPH, and increases from 24
MW to 50 MW in the CHPH! Thus, the final firm power from the entire SSP
is only 50 MW, while at its highest, the firm power from SSP is 439 MW.
TABLE 10
Firm Power Generation From the SSP
Installed
Capacity
Firm
Power (MW)
(MW)
Initial Phase
Final Phase
River Bed Power House
1200
415
0
Canal Head Power House
250
24
50
Total
1250
439
50
Source
The reason for this is very clear. As the dam impounds water in the
beginning, water can be sent to the large turbines in the RBPH to generate
power. However, this can be done only when there is enough water in the river.
As the canals for the SSP are completed, water abstraction for irrigation will
decrease water diverted to the RBPH turbines. The riverbed powerhouse will
then stay idle except for periods of high "excess" flow and for periods of
pumpback/generation from the Garudeshwar weir to meet peak demands for
electricity. The final firm power generated by the RBPH is zero. The CHPH,
on the other hand, will increase its generation to 50 MW as more water flows
through the canals.
31
£ ISO
Even (he highest firm power production of 439 MW by the SSP is open
to question. It must be kept in mind that production of electricity by SSP in the
early stages of the project contributes substantially to the net present benefits of
the project, as evident from the cost-benefit calculations (TEC 1982). However,
the graduated release of water from the Narmada Sagar Project upstream is
essential for this power generation to occur to the extent planned. This is
because most of the flow would occur in monsoon months, and the SSP, its
reservoir and turbine intake tunnels quickly filled to capacity, would let the
water spill over to go to the sea. During the rest of the year the flow is much
lower, and the amount of power generated would not be able to reach 439 MW.
In the absence of the NSP, the power generated at SSP in the highest stage will
drop by 28% (SSNNL 1989:226). The World Bank estimated power releases
would be reduced by 50% if the Narmada Sagar project was delayed.
Furthermore, losses of firm power in the "no NSP” scenario would be
substantially higher than loss of total power (WB 1985B: 117).
Does the SSP Provide Any Net Energy For Gujarat?
It is becoming increasingly clear that the SSP will actually consume
more energy in Gujarat than will ever be produced for Gujarat by the dam.
Power from the SSP is to be divided amongst Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra
and Gujarat in the ratio 51:33:16. Gujarat’s share of the highest firm power
production is 70.4 MW (16% of 439 MW), which will only be obtained in the
few years the canals are not supposed to be in operation. Once the canals start
functioning, however, the SSP will require vast quantities of energy.
The Gujarat State Narmada Minister, Shri Babubhai Patel recently
admitted that more than 60 MW will be required for lifting water in the canals
in Saurashtra and Kutch (Patel 1992). Thus, the canal system itself will
consume most of Gujarat’s share of firm power. Furthermore, the SSP plans
require 3 MAF of groundwater to be annually pumped into the canals to
augment the Narmada waters in the command. SSP plans call for installing
thousands of irrigation-only, drainage-only and irrigation and drainage tubewells
all over the command. The power required for operating all these tubewells has
not been calculated in any project document, but the amount is likely to be quite
large.
32
Supplying drinking water to 8215 villages and 135 towns, as claimed by
the authorities, is going to require large expenditure of energy for pumping and
maintaining flows in very long pipelines. Again, there is no estimate of the
energy likely to be required for this component.
These power costs have not been included in any cost-benefit analysis of
the SSP. Power benefits in the initial years contribute vvry significantly to the
overall benefits of the SSP - including the power costs would probably push the
cost-benefit ratio for the SSP below the level of acceptability.
Power: Conclusions
Thus, the highest power produced by the SSP is 439 MW, which will
drop to only 50 MW at full development of the canal system. Thus capacity
utilization will be very low. The power generation is likely to be reduced by as
much as 28% since the NSP will not be constructed in time to provide
graduated releases for power generation. The SSP will consume more power
than it generates for Gujarat, and may even consume more power than will be
generated by the project as a whole. The power consumed by the SSP has not
been factored into any cost-benefit analysis.
33
FINANCIAL VIABILITY
The critical analysis of the benefits proposed for the SSP is rounded off
by a brief look at the financial viability of the SSP. The total cost of the project
is still a much debated figure. The cost of the project was estimated to be Rs.
crores in 1981 (TECS 1981). This rose to Rs. 6,500 crores in 1985. In
1991, Shri Babubhai Patel, the Narmada Minister of Gujarat, stated that the cost
of the project was Rs. 9,000 crores. The Gujarat State budget for 1992-93 states
that the cost of the project is Rs. 9,400 crores. All these cost estimates refer
only to base cost and not the total project cost. The total cost of any project is
the sum of the base cost and physical and price contingencies. The latter may
be very roughly described as the effect of inflation over the implementation
period of the project. In 1985 the World Bank estimated the cost of the project
to be Rs. 13,640 crores in 1985 (WB 1985). This included a base cost of Rs.
6,264 crores, price contingencies of Rs. 6,574 crores and physical contingencies
of Rs. 803 crores. In other words, the total cost of the project is more than
double the base cost. Thus, if we accept that the base cost of the SSP was Rs.
9,400 crores in 1992, the total cost in 1992 terms should be around Rs. 20,470
crores.
It is shocking that the government and project planners have
consistently chosen to ignore contingency costs when informing the public about
the cost of the SSP. As recently as 1993, the Deputy Finance Minister at the
Centre informed Parliament that the cost of the SSP was Rs. 6,400 crores. Such
blatant disregard for facts is all of a piece with the overall attitude of secrecy
and misinformation that seems to obscure the SSP like a miasma.
The true cost of the SSP may be even more than estimated above. The
total cost of the power component of the SSP was estimated to be Rs. 1,700
crores by the World Bank (WB 1985). However, the Government of Gujarat
announced in April 1993 (after the World Bank withdrawal) that the "Rs. 2,700
crore power component of the SSP will be privatised." In other words, the
power component costs 58.8% greater than was assumed. If the total project
cost has been similarly affected, the total cost of the SSP would rise to Rs.
21,700 crores. It should be kept in mind that the drinking water costs of the
SSP are not included in any of these cost estimates. The "several thousand
crores" required for this component of the project may raise the total cost well
34
beyond Rs. 25,000 crores. (As an interesting comparison, the total cost of all the
major and medium irrigation projects built in India from Independence till 1985
is only Rs. 15,000 crores.)
According to a press release issued by the Chairman of the Sardar
Sarovar Narmada Nigam, the Government had spent about Rs. 2,300 crores on
the project till June 1993. This is just about 10% of total costs, and thus the
argument that most of the expenditure on the project has already been incurred
is hollow and untenable. What needs to be examined is how much more money
needs to be spent on the project, and whether it is at all feasible to obtain such
finances. The tendency to throw good money after bad must be resisted.
Where docs the Government hope to obtain funds for the project?
After the withdrawal of the World Bank from the SSP, all hopes of funding
from international donor agencies and foreign governments have disappeared.
This is specially significant in view of the fact that approximately 50% of the
amount already spent on the project came from the World Bank. By the
withdrawal of the World Bank, the project has lost Rs. 530 crore from the
cancelled loan, Rs. 310 crore from the Japanese, and an additional Rs. 1,400
crore in the form of additional funding proposals already submitted to the
World Bank, a total of Rs. 2235 crores.
In the wake of the World Bank withdrawal, attention was focussed on
the financial aspects of the project. The Government announced plans to obtain
funds from NRIs, by floating Narmada Bonds and by obtaining Rs. 1000 per
acre from every farmer who is supposed to benefit from the project. The
government also wants to privatize the Rs.2,700 crore power component of the
project.
The proposal for funding by NRIs is still to get off the ground. An
m »lii ■ F11F
111
|,|.| tL ufft.r-11% iLtui IIJ tn ITlIu fui IIITTUT........ in l pi ujn.1 nj|h in iiffitiW
Hint) in liniipiiiiiiliiiii, Ilin tiiij...... Cl.... 11.1 jI^llt"ItmtLluiI....... Mtn...... ... fl..... in nn
iiiwWiwiMmwiln^in.inji^ The
ludicrous proposal to raise contributions from farmers who are supposed to be
beneficiaries is not even worthy of comment except to point out that such an
exercise is politically impossible. The attempt to privatize the power component
of the project will depend on the success of ongoing privatization of power
CfliajiaMatn* ■ iwwiwiiiii^if Illi ...........
35
generation in other parts of the country, and its feasibility cannot be assessed at
this juncture.
On top of all this , the Gujarat Government has announced that it plans
to complete the entire project by 2000. Such an optimistic plan would require
Rs. 1000 crore to be spent every year for the next seven years, just to meet base
costs. The SSP cannot even meet current spending requirements. Only Rs. 530
crores were spent in 1992-93, out of a requirement of Rs. 820 crores. The SSP
is about 53-63% behind schedule in terms of money spent on the project
compared to financial schedules drawn up by the Gujarat Government and the
World Bank. The Gujarat Government is devoting 80% of its Eighth Plan
irrigation budget to the SSP (Gujarat State Budget 1993-94), bypassing the needs
of scores of smaller projects in the drought-prone areas of the state. Thus it is
not possible for the state to allocate more money for the SSP.
The SSP appears to be totally unviable from the financial standpoint.
Currently, the Gujarat Government is unable to show financing for even 25% of
the project. Prospects of raising money seem very bleak. A comprehensive
review of the costs and financing of the SSP needs to be conducted immediately.
A fresh decision on the financial viability of the project must be taken. In light
of the reduced benefits of the SSP such an exercise becomes imperative.
36
CONCLUSIONS
The benefits claimed for the SSP do not stand up to scrutiny. The
benefits claimed for the project have been consistently, systematically and
deliberately overstated by the project authorities. It is highly unlikely that the
project will perform as planned, a view supported by the World Bank
Independent Review (Morse and Berger 1992).
At the very outset, the amount of water available in the river has been
overestimated by 17%. In addition, it is highly unlikely that the Narmada Sagar
Project upstream in Madhya Pradesh will be built, further reducing the amount
of water available for use by the SSP to about 58-69% of what was originally
assumed and planned for. This reduction distorts the entire project, and will
substantially reduce drinking water, irrigation and power benefits. However, the
SSP authorities are wilfully ignoring this most basic fact.
The drinking water benefits claimed for the SSP are completely
unsubstantiated. There is no detailed plan available to date. The current
limited planning effort is careless, incompetent and riddled with inconsistencies.
While project authorities claim that the project will be completed by 2000 A.D.,
the World Bank fells that a realistic schedule is for Saurashtra to get drinking
water by 2020 and Kutch by 2025. Rhetorical flourishes are substituted for plans
and the lack of careful and realistic studies.
All realistic appraisals indicate that the system will provide much less
water than promised, and at a very large cost, which has not been included in
the project. So far, the government has not given any firm estimate of this cost
(beyond stating that it will cost "several thousand crores"), nor has it allocated
any funds for it. There is a strong possibility that drinking water from the SSP
will be used for the large cities of central Gujarat, and that the drought-hit
people of Kachchh and Saurashtra will be left high and dry.
The SSP is likely to irrigate only 44-52% of the 1.8 million ha. claimed
by the project authorities as the amount of water available for irrigation is
substantially less than planned for. Furthermore, the authorities have made
completely unrealistic assumptions about the efficiency of the canal system. The
efficiency is likely to be closer to 45% rather than the 60% claimed. This will
further reduce water available for irrigation.
37
Over 55% of the SSP command is prone to waterlogging and
salinisation. The plans to prevent this from occurring are based on completely
untried methodologies and a very high level of technological sophistication that
has not been tested, even on a pilot scale, anywhere in India under realistic field
conditions.
The canal operation policy of the SSP is also based on several desirable
but completely untried options. The large quantities of water that will be
supplied to Baroda, Bharuch and Khera districts in the initial stages of the
project will lead to large-scale cultivation of water-intensive crops. As the
experience of the Ukai command shows, it will be politically impossible to
subsequently reduce the amount of water allocated and expect farmers to switch
back to less remunerative crops.
The power benefits of the SSP are vastly exaggerated. Even though the
installed capacity is 1250 MW, the highest firm power generation is only 439
MW, dropping to 50 MW once the canals start operating. In the absence of the
NSP in the initial stages power benefits will drop by at least 28%. The SSP will
consume more power than it produces for Gujarat.
The needy regions of Gujarat - Saurashtra, Kutch and North Gujarat,
are unlikely to get any of the overall benefits of this project. The already rich
and politically powerful "mainline corridor" of Central Gujarat will certainly
benefit, further cementing its dominance in the state. Kutch and Saurashtra will
doubly suffer: the SSP already eats up 80% of the 8th 5-year plan allocation for
Gujarat, leaving no money for provision of alternative water supply schemes to
these needy areas. Several alternate supply schemes available with the state
district irrigation boards are languishing for lack of funds.
The SSP appears to be completely unviable from a financial standpoint.
Only about 10% of total project costs have been spent to date. Further foreign
funding is unlikely to be obtained, and the probability of domestic funding is
remote.
The SSP needs to be comprehensively reviewed by an unbiased body to
ascertain whether the vast costs of the projects will translate into benefits at
the scale claimed by the project authorities. The Government of India owes at
least this much to the people of Gujarat and the country.
38
References
CWC. 1992. Monthly Observed Flows of the Narmada at Garudeshwar. Hydrology
Studies Organisation. Central Waler Commission. New Delhi.
Dhamdhere, H. V. 1986. Irrigation Water Management - Western Region. In J. S.
Kanwar (cd.) National Seminar on Water Management - The Key To Developing
Agriculture. Indian National Science Academy. Delhi.
GOG. 1983. Water Use Plan and Sizing of System. Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)
Development Plan. Volume 1. Chapter 8. Narmada Planning Group. Irrigation
Department. Government of Gujarat. Gandhinagar.
GOG. 1991. All About Narmada. Directorate of Information. Government of Gujarat.
Gandhinagar.
GOI. 1981. Census Of India. Table A-I, Gujarat State. Series I, General Population
Tables. Government of India. New Delhi, pp.96-99.
GWSSB. 1982. Study on Water Demand for Non-agricultural Use From Narmada
Project. Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board. Gandhinagar.
MAI. 1979. The Report of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal with its Decision. Vol.
I-IV. Department of Irrigation. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. New Delhi.
Morse, B., and T. R. Berger. 1992. Sardar Sarovar. The Report of the Independent
Review. Resource Futures International Inc., Ottawa.
Mukhopadhyay, P. and R. D’Souza. 1992. Post Construction Analysis of Large Dams In
India : A Case Study. Kalpavriksh, New Delhi.
NCA. 1991. Drinking Water from Sardar Sarovar Project. Narmada Control Agency.
Indore.
NCA. 1991b. Anti-waterlogging and Anti-salinity Measures in the Command Area of
Sardar Sarovar Project. Narmada Control Authority. Indore.
NCA. 1992. Benefits to Saurashtra and Kachchh Areas in Gujarat. Narmada Control
Authority. Indore.
ORG. 1981. Critical Zones in Narmada Command - Problems and Prospects. Report 1
Zone 7. Operations Research Group. Baroda.
39
ORG. 1982. Regionalisation of Narmada Command. Operations Research Group.
Gandhinagar.
Patel, B. J. 1992. SSP. Progressing Amidst Challenges. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigain
Limited. Gandhinagar.
Patel, C. C. 1991. Sardar Sarovar Project. What It Is and What It Is Not. Sardar
Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited Gujarat.
Raj, P. A. 1989, 1990, 1991. Facts. Sardar Sarovar Project. Sardar Sarovar Narmada
Nigam Limited. Gandhinagar. [This publication is released yearly. As the figures given
change every year, we have quoted different editions.]
SSNNL. 1989. Planning for Prosperity. Sardar Sarovar Development Plan. Narmada
Planning Group. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited. Gandhinagar.
TEC. 1981. Economic Analysis of Sardar Sarovar Project. Tata Engineering Consultants.
WB. 1985. Staff Appraisal Report. India. Narmada River Development - Gujarat. Water
Delivery and Drainage Project. South Asia Projects Department. Irrigation II Division.
The World Bank, Washington. Report No. 5108-IN.
WB. 1985b. Staff Appraisal Report. India. Narmada River Development - Gujarat.
Water Delivery and Drainage Project. Supplementary Data Volume. South Asia Projects
Department. Irrigation II Division. The World Bank, Washington. Report No. 5108-IN.
WB. 1991. India. Irrigation Sector Review. Agriculture Operations Division. India
Department. Asia Region. The World Bank, Washington. Report No. 9518-IN.
40
- Media
2847.pdf
Position: 3733 (2 views)