DEPARTMENT OF
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CLUSTER I

Course-Unit Reader: A1.10

Health Policy

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HEALTH POLICY

Contents

1 | Community health workers: the evolution of a concept

Before 1975 neither the words 'community health workers' (CHWs) nor 'primary health care' (PHC) were generally used, even among health professionals. Today they are common parlance, although conceptual and definitional differences abound: some people even describe CHW programmes as synonymous with PHC. Indeed, over the last decade CHW programmes have expanded enormously. How did this change occur? Why did thinking about health policy shift in favour of CHWs and PHC? Different types of CHW had existed for years on a small scale. Why the flurry of activity in the 1970s and 1980s?

To understand how the concept of the CHW was promoted internationally and adopted nationally, we need to look at the context within which changing ideas about health, and especially primary health care, took place. In this chapter, therefore, we set the context by distinguishing five areas of influence and changing ideas about health, although any such division is to some extent arbitrary. Policy change occurs as the result of a complex sequence of events and ideas not necessarily distinguishable over time. However, for analytical purposes, it is possible to focus on five areas:

1 Changing ideas about poverty, health and development
2 Concern about population growth
3 Disillusion with the medical care model
4 Community involvement and self-care
5 Activities and policies of the international organizations

We will consider each of these separately before going on in the next chapter to look at the concept of CHWs and at governments' attempts to introduce CHW programmes.

Changing ideas about poverty, health and development

The current emphasis on health as an aspect of development can be seen partly as a reaction against the neglect of health (and other social dimensions of welfare) in the literature on development which was produced in the 1950s and 1960s. This emanated mainly from the developed countries, as a guide to economic and social policy in the newly independent countries of the Third World. Any simple generalization about this literature must be to some extent misleading, neglecting the differences between writers and perhaps exaggerating the effect their theories had on the actual policies of developing countries. But from the point of view of their successors in the 1970s, the earlier writers appear to have some common characteristics which led them to neglect the social aspects of development.

The early post-Second World War development theories stressed the overriding importance of investment in the physical elements of national growth – industry, roads, dams and so on – and saw health and other social services such as education as non-productive consumption sectors. Thus government money expended on such services was a dissipation of national savings.

In order to counter such arguments, and rationalize expenditure on health, some studies attempted to demonstrate that changes in the health of populations would result in increased productivity and therefore rising per capita incomes. Empirical findings were, however, contradictory (Grosse and Harkavy 1980). For example, studies in St Lucia showed no effect on production when workers suffering from schistosomiasis were treated (Weisbrod et al. 1974), although a similar study in Indonesia concluded that workers without hookworm performed better than those with the parasite (Basta and Churchill 1974). There were also numerous methodological problems with the studies (Beenstock 1980).

Other studies pointed to accumulating evidence of the ill-effects on health of many development projects. Hughes and Hunter (1970) suggested a new category of diseases, which they called 'develop-genic', that were analogous to the iatrogenic diseases in medicine but which were caused by the unanticipated consequences of the implementation of development schemes. Such arguments, however, made few dents in the generally held assumptions that developing countries were as yet unformed, infant versions of modern Western societies. By following the same historical path as these societies, and particularly through industrialization, development theorists believed the less-developed countries would become 'developed' in the sense of having high per capita national incomes. Implicit in this theory was the belief that the benefits of growth would 'trickle down' to the poorest sections of society. Although an emphasis on expanding material production was not necessarily inconsistent in practice with the expansion of social services, as Russian experience had shown, most development theorists in the capitalist world believed that the two were incompatible

unless accompanied by draconian (and therefore unacceptable) political measures.

However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s there was growing scepticism as to who was benefiting from development (Myrdal et al. 1968). In many countries with high rates of economic growth, the rapid rise in per capita income was firmly concentrated in the hands of fairly small numbers, and many groups were worse off than they had been:

> If one examines the 32 individual countries for which data are available, it will be found that the number of 'destitute' people increased in 17 countries in 1963–72 and the number of persons suffering from serious poverty increased in 14 (ODC/ILO 1976).

It was agreed that the 'miracle' of the 'green revolution' (increases in agricultural output based on high-yielding varieties of cereals) had actually led to no improvement in the productivity and income of poor farmers, but rather to increasing marginalization of subsistence farmers.

Changing attitudes towards inequalities between social groups were not limited to developing countries. From the early 1960s onwards, the capitalist developed world was 'rediscovering' poverty (Harrington 1962; Abel-Smith and Townsend 1970), and the debate engendered by revelations of grave differences between social classes led to a spate of rethinking about social policies, stimulating new policy initiatives such as positive discrimination (Evetts 1970). Such ideas filtered into the health field through writings such as those of Bryant (1977) and Navarro (1977) on social injustice and health, and in the 1970s the inequalities of health experience between social groups in both developed and less-developed countries gained more attention.

Inequalities between groups formed the basis for some criticisms of the practice of defining development mainly in terms of national income. Seers (1977), for example, argued that it was more pertinent to look at unemployment, inequality and poverty. If they had all worsened, then even if gross national product were rising, this was hardly a successful measure of development. He disagreed with earlier schools of economists who had always argued that in order to have growth, inequality was necessary: that rapid development demanded a high level of investment which could only come from the profits and savings of the rich, and that if these were squandered on better services for the poor, development would not occur. In the early 1970s experiences of poor countries like China and Sri Lanka, as well as middle-income countries such as Cuba and Costa Rica, suggested that it was possible to have high rates of growth *and* to redistribute some of the benefits to the poor, thus improving their relative position (Streeten 1981). Growth and redistribution were not incompatible even within a capitalist system.

Inequalities between groups broadened to a concern with inequalities between countries. Development theories that assumed the context of a capitalist or mixed economy operating in a capitalist internationalist system

led some critics to argue that underdevelopment could not be seen outside the historical context of a world economy dominated by capitalism (Frank 1967; Baran 1973). The reasons for continuing underdevelopment lay not within the underdeveloped countries themselves but in their weak position within a capitalist system dominated by the industrialized powers. Thus developing countries had special problems largely engendered by those nations whose industrialization had taken place at their expense. Many writers, including non-Marxists, accepted Baran's emphasis on the constraints on national development imposed by the international economic system. These writers made up the 'dependency' school.

Dependency was also seen as a technological and intellectual problem. The case in relation to health was argued succinctly by Navarro (1974) and Banerji (1974), who showed the negative effects in Latin America and India, respectively, of using the developed world's concept of health services and medical care. The inappropriateness of Western medical ideology and practice became a central issue in changing ideas about health.

It was perhaps the International Labour Office (ILO) World Employment Conference in 1976 that most clearly rejected past strategies for development and identified a new priority based on the eradication of poverty, the provision of basic needs and productive employment for the whole population. The ILO conference turned from a narrow focus on jobs to *basic needs*, with minimum targets set for food consumption, clothing, housing and the provision of essential services in the areas of water, sanitation education, health and public transport (ODC/ILO 1976).

The shift in thinking expressed at the conference had emerged over several years, at least partly as a result of experience in a number of countries (Jolly 1976). It was not confined to the ILO but mirrored by many other institutions. It became more acceptable to see health as integral to development. The World Bank, for example, which had sometimes financed health components of development projects in various sectors, adopted a formal policy towards health in 1974, although it was only in 1980 that it began direct lending for health programmes (World Bank 1980).

By tracing briefly the changing emphasis in development theories it is possible to see how attitudes to health also changed, and how it began to be seen as part of an integrated package that would help conquer underdevelopment (ODI 1979). The overwhelming concern in the health sector was with unequal access to, and availability of, health services. Rural populations were being grossly neglected in favour of urban populations, and in urban areas the poor were neglected in favour of the better-off. Changing ideas helped to lay the basis for the PHC approach.

Concern about population growth

During the 1960s one of the common explanations for poor countries' slow rates of development was that economic growth was being dissipated because it had to be divided among ever more people. The growth in population was seen by many as a fundamental brake on development. The concern of the developed world, however, was not neutral: it stemmed from the argument that the world's resources were finite, and focused on the one hand on pollution and misuse of existing resources, and on the other on increasing consumption demands. This last was made painfully clear to the rich countries by a shift in power towards the oil producers in the early 1970s. But concern was not only, or even primarily, about limited resources and growing populations; it was also about political security. In his presidential address to the World Bank, Robert McNamara (1979) was quite explicit about the dangers of uncontrolled population growth, suggesting it could lead to high levels of poverty, stress and overcrowding which would threaten social and military stability.

However, the developing world's view of the population 'explosion' did not always coincide with the developed world's view. At the United Nations' World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974 the Chinese Under-Minister of Health said: 'Is it because of overpopulation that unemployment and poverty exist today? No, it is due to the exploitation, aggression and plunder of the Super Powers' (*The Guardian*, 22 August 1974). At the same conference the Brazilian delegates were even more explicit: they argued that they needed an expanded population because all the great powers had large populations (Bunyard 1974).

Population growth has been a subject of considerable controversy since before Malthus, but until the 1960s birth control was considered a private affair, even in the developed world, and certainly not a concern of the state (Jeger 1962). It was no accident that this changed rapidly with the introduction of the oral contraceptive – officially sanctioned in the industrialized world in 1960, having been tested in the Third World (Vaughan 1970). The oral contraceptive seemed at first sight to be a technological breakthrough which would revolutionize control over fertility. In 1966 the World Health Organization (WHO) reversed a 1952 decision to refuse to undertake a population programme by cautiously agreeing to give technical advice on the development of family planning activities, but only on request (Cox and Jacobson 1973). In 1969 the United Nations Fund for Population Activities was established, and by the 1970s well over US $300 million per year was being spent on population activities by international, national and private sources, three-quarters of which went into family planning (Berelson *et al.* 1980).

Enthusiasm for birth control services as a panacea for population growth was tempered by the pressures exercised to make people use the new technologies, especially in India, raising ethical and moral questions (Banerji 1974), and also by unexpected resistance to contraceptive measures (Bicknell and Walsh 1976). This was paralleled by the trend against vertical services, and by the end of the 1970s it was increasingly accepted (although not everywhere) that family planning (or family spacing) should be integrated into maternal and child health (MCH) services.

However, greater understanding of the issues has not diminished the argument in favour of limiting population growth through birth control. Most developing and developed countries accept that fertility must be controlled if poor countries are to develop:

> The real case for an active population policy is simply that, so long as the labour force is growing fast, it is almost impossible to relieve unemployment and poverty since a plentiful supply of labour keeps the wages of the unskilled, apart perhaps from a privileged modern sector, near levels of barest subsistence. Moreover, the growing pressure of population on the budget makes it very difficult to expand educational and other social services (Seers 1977).

Furthermore it has become increasingly clear, although the evidence is scattered, that many Third World women want to control their fertility, and, given methods that are feasible and acceptable to them, are doing so (Population Reports 1984). The emphasis in the 1980s was on integrating family planning into MCH services, not on providing them as a vertical programme, with the focus on family welfare to protect maternal and child morbidity and mortality.

Disillusion with the medical care model

In the mid-1960s Maurice King's (1966) widely disseminated book articulated a different approach to health services, particularly in Africa. The book was the result of a symposium in East Africa, and reflected many people's concern about the inappropriateness of the Western model of medical care being imposed on, or copied by, developing countries. It also reflected a general disillusionment with purely medical solutions. In spite of enormous inputs, many mass disease control programmes were failing for both technical and organizational reasons (Cleaver 1977). There were successes, like the reduction of yaws, the control of malaria in some areas, and later the eradication of smallpox, but the major debilitating or killer diseases – such as tuberculosis, gastro-enteritis and measles – continued to take their toll. Many development projects, such as irrigation schemes or feeding programmes, had had the unintended consequences of actually causing more disease (Taghi Farver and Milton 1973). There were no 'medical' solutions for malnutrition, a major complicating condition in many children's illnesses. The magic bullets capable of reaching and destroying the responsible demons within the body of the patient (Dubos 1959) did not exist. It was clear that other solutions – social, educational, economic and political – had to be sought.

Reaction against mechanistic solutions to illness was one side of the equation. The other was disillusion with hospital-based and hospital-orientated medical services. King (1966) emphasized the importance of looking at the community's needs, arguing that health services and training ld b ural' ed, d acir h und ing cause of most disease

at the level of poverty. In order to increase access to health services the use of medical auxiliaries was strongly advocated and a general attitude, taken up by others later, was that appropriate technologies should be developed. Expensive medical equipment and sophisticated skills did not make sense in countries where foreign exchange was at a premium. It was during the mid-1960s that the idea of *basic health services* (WHO 1973) was developed, advocating the further extension of peripheral health centres and dispensaries – improving access by taking services to where people lived. (It is easy to confuse the basic needs approach as enunciated by the International Labour Office in 1976 (discussed above) and basic health services which emerged as an alternative to centralized hospital services.)

The basic health services policy paved the way for the PHC approach, by recognizing the inappropriateness of hospital care for many of the conditions that were being brought to hospitals, in the absence of alternatives, and by acknowledging that many sick people lived too far away to get to hospital in time for effective treatment. Basic health services, it was argued, had to be not only *available* but also *accessible* and *acceptable* to people. Later a fourth A was added: services had to be *appropriate*.

These ideas from sections of the medical profession were supported by social scientists increasingly 'poaching' on the medical area, and raising doubts about the assumption that disease could be fully accounted for by the medical disease model based on molecular and cellular biology as its basic scientific discipline (Engel 1977). Anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists increasingly showed the importance of other factors.

There were also immense problems of management, side-effects and unintended consequences in the prescription of drugs. Although sulphonamides in the 1930s and antibiotics in the 1940s had greatly increased medical effectiveness in disease treatment, medical intervention with some widely used psychotropic drugs was criticized for their sometimes negative addictive and dependency-creating effects. Illich (1975) argued that medical action or pharmaceutical solutions all too often made illness worse. Criticisms in the developed world were not limited to medical intervention, however. The medical profession's monopoly of knowledge was closely examined; dissatisfaction was being expressed with the private medical systems. Concern about the rising costs of medical treatment added weight to the doubts expressed about health systems in general. All these issues served to raise questions about the medical disease and medical care models, and to shift health care from professional protection. In Britain and the USA the self-care movement grew rapidly in the early 1970s, producing accessible information about health in books such as *Our Bodies Ourselves* (Boston Women's Health Book Collective 1973). It brought the politics of health care into the open.

The issues were, of course, just as relevant to the Third World. The importation of expensive and sophisticated technology and training programmes to deal with 'ative' e cc ons i elo unt

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Changing attitudes towards inequalities between social groups were not limited to developing countries. From the early 1960s onwards, the capitalist developed world was 'rediscovering' poverty (Harrington 1962; Abel-Smith and Townsend 1970), and the debate engendered by revelations of grave differences between social classes led to a spate of rethinking about social policies, stimulating new policy initiatives such as positive discrimination (Evetts 1970). Such ideas filtered into the health field through writings such as those of Bryant (1977) and Navarro (1977) on social injustice and health, and in the 1970s the inequalities of health experience between social groups in both developed and less-developed countries gained more attention.

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represented a disproportionately high part of the national health budget. Further, it was clear that sick people sought help from a variety of sources, not only Western-trained doctors, and recovered (Kleinman and Sung 1979). The 'witchdoctor' slowly became the less pejorative 'traditional' or 'indigenous' practitioner, and traditional midwives were recognized to be doing useful work in their communities. 'Medical' care increasingly became 'health' care.

Much of the debate that followed centred around the diffusion of technology: how, and why, independent countries retained colonial health infrastructures, and aspired to ideals that were inappropriate to the health situations in their own countries. From India, for example, Banerji (1974) suggested that the colonial inheritance had had deleterious effects on health services. The inappropriateness of selection and training, he suggested, had alienated health workers from the people they served. The costly emigration of newly graduated doctors to the Western developed world was indicative of a professional identification reinforced by inappropriate training, as well as the pull and push of market forces.

The focus on the inappropriateness of aspects of Western-type medical training for developing countries spilled over into other areas. For example, pharmaceuticals came under scrutiny, not only because of the often unscrupulous behaviour of multinational drug companies, but also because of poor prescribing habits, and the plethora of brand-named drugs which added to the costs of many countries' health services (Muller 1982).

While the pattern of thinking about health was moving from medical care to health services and from disease care to health care, what was not really being discussed from within was the notion of community involvement in its own health care. That came from another source, during the 1970s, especially from reports of experiences in China.

Community involvement and self-care

The idea of the Chinese barefoot doctor fired the imagination of the international health establishment. CHWs in various guises had worked closely with health professionals for decades: the idea was not entirely new in the 1970s. What *was* new, however, was the large scale on which CHWs were trained, and in some cases the role they were envisaged to play. In many situations CHWs were seen as a way to extend services to otherwise neglected groups (given the financial and time constraints of training nurses and doctors), and to relieve professionals of routine, rudimentary treatment or preventive actions. In a few situations, however, the role of the CHW was seen much more as political. Here the emphasis was less on service delivery and more on the determinants of health, and the way in which CHWs could rally their communities to tackle these: CHWs were seen as agents of change.

What enthused people about the Chinese system was the active

interrelationship between the barefoot doctors and their communities, and the claims of success of mass mobilization against endemic and preventable diseases such as schistosomiasis. Not only were barefoot doctors apparently offering health care to rural populations never before reached by formal health services, but they were accountable to – and controlled by – their own community through the co-operative financial schemes which allowed them to work in the fields part-time, and provide treatment part-time. The first reports by Westerners visiting China were relatively euphoric about the Chinese model, and it was only later that questions about its exportability were raised.

A handful of countries made radical shifts in health policy in the 1950s and 1960s, and by the 1970s were receiving international attention for the resulting improvements in health status. Cuba, which lost one-third of its doctors after the revolution, reconstructed its basic health services, building up a network of polyclinics or health centres, and brought down its infant mortality rate to one substantially lower than that of the rest of Latin America (Huberman and Sweezy 1969). Although using a fairly traditional model for its health service, Cuba instigated a variety of forms of popular community participation, and health workers were expected to spend a relatively large part of their time in community activities (Guttmacher and Danielson 1979). Vietnam (McMichael 1976) and Tanzania (Chagula and Tarimo 1975) also reported imaginative preventive and health care policies utilizing CHWs. In all these countries there was some involvement of the community in health, whether through local organizations or education campaigns (Hall 1978).

The 1970s were fertile years in the exchange of ideas about alternatives in health care, with more emphasis being put on people taking control of their own health and recognizing the positive aspects of self-care. Many of these ideas had grown out of necessity: the Algerians fighting a liberation war found that the people accepted and promoted health measures they had rejected when they had been prescribed by foreign colonialists (Fanon 1965). In the war against the Portuguese colonialist army in Mozambique, Frelimo had almost no medical resources and had to promote ideas of self-sufficiency and self-reliance in health care as in other areas (Walt and Wield 1983).

Aside from these countries fighting for independence, many small-scale voluntary projects run by missionary groups, aid agencies and voluntary organizations had been in existence for a number of years, in a variety of already- or long-independent countries. Many mirrored the principles developed in the community development projects of the 1950s and early 1960s. They all attempted to improve the general living conditions of poor, rural communities with their active participation, by improving skills and encouraging innovation and self-reliance. Multi-purpose workers, who lived in the communities, tried to stimulate community initiative when it was not spontaneous (Holdcroft 1978).

Many non-governmental organizations built on community development

ideas and related them to health. By the mid-1970s there were instances of ordinary village people receiving a short training and returning to their own villages to deliver a rudimentary primary care service (Newell 1975). Although such projects often underlined the difference that could be made to a community's health by community participation and mobilization, they also had the negative effect of emphasizing the powerlessness of the community within the larger society intent on preserving the status quo. They were also usually dependent on the voluntary organizations for limited financial support, which was not always sustained.

By the mid-1970s there was also increasing acknowledgement of community resources: traditional midwives were still delivering most babies, mothers and mothers-in-law giving advice. Anthropological studies added to general knowledge and showed that many health actions people took themselves were reasonable. This changing emphasis was accompanied in the industrialized world by the movement in favour of self-care and support networks, and increasing awareness about lifestyle effects on health.

Activities and policies of the international organizations

Two international organizations in particular promoted the PHC approach, WHO and Unicef, the latter initially playing the supporting role to the health professionals. The 1978 public launching of 'Primary Health Care' at Alma Ata as a vehicle for 'Health for All by the Year 2000' was, however, the result of long discussions about policy in both organizations.

Changes in health policy: the World Health Organization

In the early 1970s many people within WHO, or connected with the organization, felt that basic health services were not keeping pace with changing populations, either in quantity or quality. The basic health services concept (see above), which had emerged as an alternative to centralized hospital services in the 1960s, and to earlier vertical disease control programmes, was critically examined by a special working group set up by WHO. This group (WHO 1973) reported that:

There appears to be widespread dissatisfaction of populations with their health services. ... Such dissatisfaction occurs in the developed as well as in the third world.

The report went on to enumerate the reasons for such dissatisfactions, which included failure of health services to meet people's expectations; inadequate coverage; great differentials in health status within and between countries; rising costs; and

a feeling of helplessness on the part of the consumer who feels (rightly or wrongly) that the health services and the personnel within them are progressing along an uncontrollable path of their own which may be satisfying to the health professions, but which is not what is most wanted by the consumer.

The report had two important effects – one conceptual, the other promotional. Conceptually, it laid the basis for the PHC approach. Although it concentrated almost totally on health services and the health sector, it emphasized the need to involve the consumer, to tap local resources, to 'make medicine "belong" to those it should serve' and called for a 'national will' as well as 'international will' for positive health. Promotionally, the report drew attention to WHO's role as 'world health conscience':

It is possible to use WHO not only as a forum to express ideas or dissatisfactions but also as a mechanism which can point to directions in which Member States should go ... as catalytic mechanisms by which those who agree to follow a new path can be assisted.

As part of the search for new solutions to problems in health services, the WHO–Unicef Joint Committee on Health Policy commissioned a study of successful programmes using alternative strategies for providing health care. A number of countries, and many non-governmental organizations, had been experimenting with new ideas in health service delivery. The expansion of health services – through auxiliaries, health centres and involving communities – had begun in a small way in many countries, often by non-governmental missionary groups, but also by governments. By sifting through a great deal of information provided by organizations such as the Christian Medical Commission, and drawing on the health network, it was possible to identify a number of radical approaches to traditional health services which seemed to offer hopeful alternatives. Nine such schemes were described in a book published by WHO in 1975 (Djukanovic and Mach 1975). The same year Newell (1975) covered some of the same programmes, but with more emphasis on the role of communities in health.

In the meantime WHO began to take a much more active role in persuasion and promotion of a particular health message, firmly orchestrated by Halfdan Mahler, who became director-general in 1973. In 1975 he launched the idea of 'Health for All by the Year 2000' as WHO's contribution to the UN's 'New Economic Order', proposing urgent action now to achieve 'in the twenty-five years of a generation what has not hitherto been achieved at all' (Mahler 1975). By this he meant action to achieve 'an acceptable level of health evenly distributed throughout the world's population'. The message was that health had to be considered in the broader context of its contributions to social development. The duty of health professionals was to consider the benefits of all health actions in terms of their social value rather than of their technical excellence. Health

was to be used as a lever for social development. 'Health for All by the Year 2000' was endorsed by the World Health Assembly in 1977.

It was in this climate of ideas (and preceded by a number of national and regional meetings on PHC) that the International Conference on Primary Health Care was held at Alma Ata in 1978, sponsored by Unicef and WHO, with a substantial financial contribution from the host country, the Soviet Union. A report on primary health care was prepared and circulated beforehand, and from the meeting, attended by representatives of 134 governments and sixty-seven international organizations, came twenty-two recommendations (WHO/Unicef 1978). The Declaration of Alma Ata outlined the role of PHC in Health for All by the Year 2000:

> A main social target of governments, international organizations and the whole world community in the coming decades should be the attainment by all the peoples of the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life. Primary health care is the key to attaining this target as part of development in the spirit of social justice (WHO/Unicef 1978).

Community health worker programmes were seen as one of the strategies for PHC. In the Alma Ata document produced after the conference, the rationale behind CHWs was clear:

> For many developing countries, the most realistic solution for attaining total population coverage with essential health care is to employ community health workers who can be trained in a short time to perform specific tasks. They may be required to carry out a wide range of health care activities, or, alternatively, their functions may be restricted to certain aspects of health care. ... In many societies it is advantageous if these health workers come from the community in which they live and are chosen by it, so that they have its support (WHO/Unicef 1978).

The people from the less-developed world who attended the conference (largely ministers of health and their officials) took home with them some of the evangelizing spirit of Alma Ata. Over the next few years a great deal of enthusiasm was expounded at all levels to promote PHC strategies, and to many ministries of health it seemed that the quickest, most visible way of demonstrating their support for PHC was to introduce a CHW programme on a national scale, or to expand small-scale programmes so that they covered larger areas of the country. Those countries that had already introduced CHW programmes (even if not so named) received a fillip of interest, and sometimes even some resource support for training. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, what was meant by a CHW differed from place to place and there was often a large gap between the concept and what happened in practice. Expectations of what CHWs could achieve turned out to be wildly unrealistic.

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SUMMARISED EXTRACT FROM CHAPTER 3 IN: HM LEICHTER A comparative approach to policy analysis: health care policy in four nations (Cambridge University Press) 1979

The range and number of factors that influence or determine what governments do or, for that matter, what they choose not to do, are virtually infinite. Public policy may be influenced by prior policy commitments, international tension, a nation's climate, economic wealth, degree of ethnic conflict, historical traditions, the personality of its leadership, the level of literacy of its people, the nature of its party system, and whether it is governed by civilian or military leaders. The list could be extended almost indefinitely. Virtually anything can influence or determine what governments do.

To make the comparative study of public policy more manageable we offer an accounting or organizing scheme. The scheme is an inventory of those factors that influence the making of public policy.

The first step in trying to explain the decisions and policies of governments is to order the available evidence. We do this using a few broad categories:

* situational factors : more or less transient, impermanant or idiosyncratic conditions that have an impact on policy

* structural factors: the relatively unchanging elements of the society and polity

* cultural factors: the value commitments of groups within the community or the community as a whole

* environmental factors: events, structures, and values that exist outside the boundaries of a political system but that influence decisions within the system.

A selection of factors is presented in the table to ilustrate and describe the dynamics of a sample of policy-influencing variables, but it must be kept in mind that the policy context actually involves the interplay of many factors, that these policy-related factors vary according to the policy area and from one time to another.

See table below.

Table 3-1. *A scheme for analyzing public policy*

I. Situational factors
    A. Violent events: international and civil wars, communal conflict, terrorism, assassination
    B. Economic cycles: depression, recession, inflation
    C. Natural disasters: epidemics, droughts, floods, oil spills, earthquakes
    D. Political events and conditions
        1. Political status change: achieving independence, joining or leaving an international association, integration with another political unit
        2. Political regime change: revolution, coup d'etat, election of a radical political party
        3. Change of government: electoral shift in power from conservative to liberal party
        4. Political reform: extending suffrage
        5. Political corruption or scandal: Lockheed scandals, Watergate
        6. Change in political leadership: election of a de Gaulle or an F. D. Roosevelt; death of a Stalin or a Franco
    E. Technological change: inventions such as the automobile, airplane, nuclear weapons
    F. The policy agenda: competition among policy issues and their proponents for the time, attention, and resources available to decision makers
II. Structural factors
    A. Political structure
        1. Type of political regime: military or civilian, socialist or nonsocialist, competitive or noncompetitive party system
        2. Type of political organization: federal or unitary system
        3. Form of government: parliamentary, presidential, nondemocratic
        4. Group activity: number, strength, and legitimacy of interest groups
        5. Political process: legislative-executive relations, budgetary process, nature of bureaucracy
        6. Policy constraints: incrementalism, prior policy commitments
    B. Economic structure
        1. Type of economic system: free market, planned, or mixed economy
        2. Economic base: primarily agrarian or industrial, diversified or one-product dependency
        3. National wealth and income: size and growth rate of GNP, distribution of wealth
        4. Complexity of economic organization: modern or traditional economy
    C. Social, demographic, and ecological structure
        1. Population: age structure, birth rate, geographical distribution, communal divisions, rate of in- and out-migration, level of education
        2. Degree of urbanization: proportion of population living in urban and rural areas
        3. Natural resources: land, water, minerals
        4. Geographic location: island or landlocked, tropical or temperate climate, proximity to militarily strong or weak neighbors
III. Cultural factors
    A. Political culture
        1. National heritage
        2. Political norms and values: concerning the role of the individual and the state
        3. Formal political ideology: Marxist, fascist, democratic
    B. General culture
        1. Traditional social values: relating to social institutions and arrangements such as marriage, the family, sex roles
        2. Religion: religious values and role of religious institutions in society
IV. Environmental factors
    A. International political environment: cold war, détente
    B. Policy diffusion: emulation and borrowing of policy ideas and solutions from other nations
    C. International agreements, obligations, and pressures
        1. World public opinion
        2. International affiliations: United Nations, UNESCO, International Olympic Committee, Organization for African Unity
        3. Participation in international conferences and agreements: Stockholm Conference on Man and the Environment
        4. International financial obligations: World Bank loans, Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) assistance
    D. International private corporations: International Telephone & Telegraph, Chase Manhattan Bank

3 The norms of political systems: patterns of government in the contemporary world

The previous chapter was devoted to the anatomy of the political system. Structures constitute the elements which, in combination, form different configurations. As yet it is uncertain how the relative weight of different structures in different political systems may be described precisely, but it is known that these structures exist and that they perform different activities, and therefore have different effects, in the various political systems. It is now necessary to turn to the overall character of political systems, to their overall 'colour', so to speak. Political systems are concerned with the allocation of values: what are these values and how far do they differ from one political system to another? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look at the norms of political systems.

The comparison of political systems by reference to their norms is a very old idea and one in common usage. Everyone talks about democracies and oligarchies, about liberal and authoritarian regimes, about 'progressive' and conservative countries. In doing so, people are indeed referring to the norms of these systems, that is to say to the kinds of proposals they make and to the kinds of aims which regimes achieve (or appear to achieve). Making these judgements involves the type of activity in which political scientists have engaged for centuries – at least since Aristotle, who divided societies into such categories as democracies, oligarchies, and monarchies, and who was later followed by many of the great political theorists, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and others.[1]

The aim of this chapter is to examine more closely the nature of the norms which characterise political systems and, on this basis, to place the various political systems which exist in the world to-day into a number of categories. The next step will be to investigate how far certain structures can be related more specifically to certain types of norms, on the understanding that, as was discussed in the previous chapter, it is still not possible to describe with precision the various configurations of institutions; nevertheless it is possible to give an impression of the type of activities which characterise these structures.

The three dimensions of norms of political systems

The classification of political systems has always been based on the assessment of the norms which these systems were held to embody or to achieve; examples of these norms include, for instance, liberalism and democracy. Yet, while the existence of norms appears to be universally recognised (although there may be controversies in practice as to whether, for example, a given political system is liberal or not), one problem which arises is the number or range of norms which should be taken into account to characterise political systems. Are liberalism and democracy – and their polar opposites, authoritarianism and 'monocracy' – the only two types of norms which need to be taken into account? Many theorists seem to have thought so and, indeed, Western regimes are commonly described as 'liberal democracies' (or 'polyarchies', to use the expression of R.A. Dahl) in order to stress that these are the two types of norms which these regimes embody.[2] However, a classification of this type does not take into account the substantive policies which a given political system might achieve or want to achieve: two political systems may be authoritarian, but may vary according to their actions with respect to property, the social structure or education. A classification of political systems has surely to take these variations into account, since they appear as relevant to the norms of these systems as democracy or liberalism. This is indeed recognised in 'ordinary' language: governments, as well as other bodies within the political system, such as parties or the military, tend to be characterised by the extent to which they are conservative or 'progressive' as well as liberal or democratic.[3]

So far the examples given include only the norms which have been or may be taken into account in order to classify political systems. It is possible to be systematic, however, and, by referring to the definition of the political system, to determine what areas or domains these norms can be expected to cover. The political system is concerned with the authoritative allocation of values: such an allocation can only take place if the following three questions about norms are answered.

The first question refers to the persons involved in the political process. Who makes the allocation? One answer may be that all the members of the polity take the decisions and that, therefore, in the strict sense of the word, the system is a democracy: no polity of course approximates this situation.[4] The second question refers to the way in which the decisions are taken: are there many restrictions on the examination of alternatives? This question raises the problem of liberalism or authoritarianism. The third question relates to the substantive content of the policies: what does the allocation aim at achieving? Is the goal of the polity to spread goods and services, indeed values in general, evenly and equally, or is it, on the contrary, to create and maintain inequalities in the distribution of these goods, services, and values?

Thus the definition of the political system shows that there are just three types of norms to be examined if one is to characterise a political system. It is immediately apparent, however, that these norms should be viewed as divided, not in a

dichotomous manner, but along continuous dimensions. Political systems are not only democratic or non-democratic: they may be located at many points between a democratic pole (participation of all in an equal manner) and a 'monocratic' pole (one person takes all the decisions), although it is clear that no real-world society is located at either extreme.[5] Similarly, political systems are located between a fully liberal pole and a wholly authoritarian pole.

It may seem difficult to define precisely the third dimension, which relates to substantive policies. Yet experience shows that this dimension is concerned with a variety of models of the 'good society' which can be said to range between fully egalitarian and inegalitarian arrangements.[6] At one extreme is what might be described as the 'communist utopia'; at the other pole is the wholly hierarchical society in which one or very few draw the very large majority of the benefits. The grounds for inequality may be diverse: they may be based for instance on inheritance, race, creed, occupation or class; they may be based on some combination of these characteristics. There will of course be many degrees of equality and inequality; but the overall effect is to place societies on a third dimension, which is distinct from the dimensions of liberalism versus authoritarianism and of democracy versus 'monocracy'.

Four point can be made about this three-dimensional distribution of the norms of political systems. The first is that reference is made here to the norms 'of' the political system as a short-cut to suggest the norms which tend to be expressed by the behaviour of the authorities of that political system and especially by the government and the members of the political elite. Clearly, in any polity, there are dissenters from the prevailing norms of the regime, but the views of the dissenters are either repressed or do not have sufficient force (for instance because they constitute the views of a very small minority); as a result, at any rate at the point at which the observation is made, these views do not translate themselves into norms of the polity. Over time, however, these views may contribute to a change in the behaviour of the authorities and thus in the norms of the regime; the existence of these opposing norms is also likely to contribute significantly to the determination of the position of the political system on the liberal–authoritarian dimension as well as, though perhaps to a lesser extent, to the position of the political system on the other two dimensions.

Second, the current ability of political scientists to operationalise these norms remains relatively limited. Yet it is possible to operationalise them in part – and to a greater extent for some countries than for others. For example, degrees of equality or inequality can be assessed by means of income per head and the distribution of capital across the population, although other indicators should also be used, for example the extent to which minorities have equal access to various positions. Degrees of liberalism are typically assessed by the extent to which various freedoms are achieved in the political system, though the indicators are likely often to be of a qualitative rather than a quantitative nature. The extent of democracy can of course be measured in part by reference to the opportunity given to citizens to participate in the electoral process, but other indicators also need to be taken into account, such

as the extent of participation in political parties and in groups which are involved in national decision-making. Clearly, the measurement is often based on data which are not wholly reliable and the allocation of weighting to various indicators can give rise to argument. However, it is at least possible – and efforts have already been made in this direction – to arrive at some degree of operationalisation.[7]

Third, the measurements which are made refer to a particular point in time: thus the assessment given to a political system concerns only that point in time. If a regime changes and is replaced by one which has different goals (more or less liberal, more or less democratic, or more or less egalitarian), the location of the system in the three-dimensional distribution of norms also changes. Thus the system in the three-dimensional distribution of a given political system does not by itself give a assessment of the location of a given political system does not by itself give a dynamic picture, but a number of observations can provide the dynamics. This also makes it possible to see whether there are trends which apply to many regimes and thus characterise the evolution of political systems in general.

Fourth, the examination of the evolution of norms over a period of time can provide a means of assessing the extent to which moves according to one dimension of norms have an effect on moves on another. The three dimensions are analytically distinct: liberalism is conceptually different from democracy and egalitarianism; but there are apparent empirical links between positions on the three 'axes'. Thus it could be claimed that a move towards liberalism will be followed by moves towards democracy: this has been the evolution of Western European countries in the nineteenth century and it can be argued that, as a state becomes more liberal, more citizens will be able to participate because they will be able to express demands, in the first instance, for greater participation. It is also often assumed that changes towards egalitarianism will have the effect of reducing, at least to a degree, the opportunities for liberalism, as liberty and equality are at times regarded as antithetical; in practice, rapid changes towards greater equality – or indeed greater inequality – often lead to protests and tension; this might result in more authoritarianism on the part of the regime and in a curtailment of participation as well.[8]

Overall, therefore, the determination of the position of countries at various points in time with respect to the three dimensions of norms is both a way of characterising the nature of political systems and a means of understanding the dynamics of these systems on a comparative basis. So far, knowledge of these positions and of the evolution of these positions is still relatively vague: this is despite the fact that it is common to assess many regimes according to two and often all three of these dimensions, as the description of Western European countries as liberal democracies and of Communist states as authoritarian regimes indicates. It should therefore at least be possible to see in broad terms how contemporary polities can be characterised, examine how far they tend to be grouped into a number of categories which can be clearly distinguished from each other, and discover whether some configurations of structures are particularly important in reflecting or even in part determining the characteristics of these regimes.

The five main types of political system in the contemporary world

The three types of norms described above suggest that political systems may be located at an infinity of points in the three-dimensional space determined by these norms. Indeed, no two political systems are likely to be placed at exactly the same point, and even the most stable political system is likely to vary also somewhat in terms of the norms which it embodies. Yet there are also considerable similarities: as was noted earlier, Western European countries are generally regarded as being close to each other in terms of their norms; they are all deemed to be liberal democracies.[9] Communist states are characterised by a high degree of authoritarianism; indeed, some ceased to be Communist when they became less authoritarian, though there have also been moves among the remaining Communist states, and in particular in the Soviet Union, to become more liberal. The situation is so fluid in this respect that it is difficult to know whether states can remain Communist and not be relatively authoritarian.

Indeed, imitation is one of the reasons why the norms of political systems are similar. Western European regimes evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the basis of an adaptation of many of the arrangements of British practices; in the case of European Communist states, norms were openly imposed and maintained by the Soviet Union, to the extent that, for a long period at least, it was relatively difficult to find appreciable differences among the norms of these countries. But the adoption of the norms of one country by another goes beyond Western Europe and the Communist world: the influence of colonial countries over the newly independent states of the Third World, as well as that of the Soviet Union and China, has had the effect of spreading the norms and the institutions of these countries to many parts of the globe.

It is therefore not surprising that there should be clusters in the positions of countries in the three-dimensional distribution of norms. These clusters allow for some differences in the exact position of each country (it is not possible to determine the exact position of each country with respect to the three dimensions and thus to measure the precise difference among the countries in each cluster). Whether because their political systems have originally been set up with norms adapted from other political systems or not, the countries in each cluster display characteristics which are close to those of others, though these positions can be expected to change occasionally, either slowly or in some cases, for instance after a coup or a revolution, rather abruptly.

A survey of the contemporary world suggests that there are five such clusters of positions in the three-dimensional distribution of norms. These clusters can be labelled 'liberal–democratic', 'egalitarian–authoritarian', 'traditional–egalitarian', 'populist', and 'authoritarian–inegalitarian'.

Liberal–democratic regimes

These include the countries of Western Europe and North America, as well as Japan, Israel, some members of the Commonwealth, and in particular India, and some Latin American states, in particular Costa Rica. The list does of course vary over time, indeed vary appreciably: over the post-1945 period, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have entered or re-entered the group, while several Latin American countries (Chile being a good example) ceased to be liberal democratic, at least for a period, in the 1970s and 1980s; on the other hand, a number of Latin American countries adopted liberal–democratic norms in the 1980s. A number of European ex-Communist states have also moved in the direction of these norms in the late 1980s.

These countries also constitute a cluster from the point of view of their substantive policies, which tend to be neither truly egalitarian nor truly inegalitarian. Of course, there are major differences among them from the point of view of the distribution of incomes and of the social services; but the substantive norms which are being embodied and to an extent implemented in these countries tend to correspond to a half-way position between the two extremes. This is probably the consequence of the liberal–democratic formula which these countries adopt: various groups can express themselves at least with a moderate degree of openness and they then compete to obtain support from the population, in particular through elections. The result is a set of policy norms which are in the middle of the dimension, although there are of course movements on either side of this half-way position.

Egalitarian–authoritarian regimes

Communist regimes can be described as egalitarian and authoritarian, though they should also be labelled democratic. The countries of this group have traditionally included, beyond the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, China, North Korea, Mongolia and Vietnam, as well as a number of other states such as Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. In the late 1980s, Eastern European states have moved out of the group or have taken steps towards doing so. A further set of countries, to be found in particular in Africa, has occasionally adopted norms which are close to those of Communist states, but these norms have not been pursued sufficiently systematically to justify their inclusion in the group.

The fact that the regimes of these countries are authoritarian is well-known and does not need to be argued at length, although the evolution of these states in the course of the 1980s suggests that there is a broad tendency to move away from more extreme forms of authoritarianism. This has resulted in a number of states no longer remaining Communist, but there have also been moves away from authoritarianism among those which did, and in the first place in the Soviet Union. The state of flux is such that it is difficult to be sure that these moves can continue without leading to the end of Communism in these countries as well. Meanwhile, authoritianian norms

remain markedly in evidence in a number of Communist states which have refused to be associated with the changes which were initiated in the 1980s in the Soviet Union.

Communist regimes have also traditionally been relatively egalitarian, even if doubts are often expressed about the nature and extent of the egalitarianism of these countries. The fact that there are no substantial concentrations of wealth in the hands of individuals has a considerable egalitarian effect, although the power of managers and politicians does compensate in part, in practical terms, for the limitations upon the economic power of 'capitalists'. Moreover, Communist states are characterised by an extensively developed social security system which provides the whole population with a basic equality of provision with respect to education, health, and pensions.

Finally, Communist states should be regarded as relatively democratic, even when they are or were authoritarian. As was pointed out earlier, liberalism and democracy are two analytically distinct concepts, which tend to be associated in the West because of the evolution of Western Europe in the nineteenth century; however, a political system may be democratic without being liberal if it gives an opportunity for participation without allowing for appreciable competition. Moreover, the democratic character of Communist societies has to be viewed by comparison with the situation which prevails in other countries: in Communist states, the party and the other 'mass' organisations give large numbers of citizens an opportunity to participate.

Traditional–inegalitarian regimes

In the contemporary world, the political systems which are neither liberal–democratic nor Communist are grouped into three clusters. One of these is composed of the systems which have continued to adopt the traditional norms which once prevailed in most of the world and in Western Europe in particular. These countries are absolutist and their head of state, usually a monarch, rules the nation by counting on the loyal support of the large majority of the population; some oligarchical republics have had or still have a similar character. This type of regime is becoming rare in the contemporary world, partly because most Western European monarchs felt the need to abandon their power in order to remain on the throne while others were toppled. Thus only in relatively remote and closed parts of the world (the Arabian peninsula, the Himalayas) have traditional–inegalitarian regimes continued to exist.

The norms of these systems are 'traditional': they preserve inequalities and highly oligarchical structures, like those which characterised pre-revolutionary Europe. Power and wealth are concentrated in few hands and there are few moves towards a political opening up of the society, although in many cases efforts are made by the monarchs to ensure that their popular support is maintained by providing some elements of a constitutional regime and by developing the economy;

regimes such as those of the Arabian peninsula, which have been fortunate enough to be able to disperse substantial resources among the population, have been best able to maintain themselves.

By and large, these regimes are not truly authoritarian, at any rate in the most overt sense. They remain in being on the basis of traditional popular support.[10] Authoritarianism becomes necessary only when a crisis occurs, that is to say when opposition begins to emerge. The regimes may then be toppled or they have to transform themselves into either populist or authoritarian–inegalitarian systems.

Populist regimes

Most of the newly independent states of the 1950s and 1960s , especially in Africa, began as populist regimes,[11] as did some of the South American republics in the early post-independence period. The establishment of a new state requires at least some involvement of the population in opposition to a colonial power, and 'traditional' loyalties are usually insufficient. There has to be some participation by at least a large part of the population; there has also to be a degree of pluralism. Populist regimes are thus typically born in reaction to traditionalism and, consequently, they tend to be half-way between democracy and 'monocracy', between egalitarianism and inegalitarianism and between liberalism and authoritarianism.

These characteristics account in part for the high expectations raised by such regimes at the outset, both within the country and outside; but they account also for their relative instability. Relative pluralism leads to strong divisions among groups and factions: this could result in a liberal–democratic form of government, but only if strong political institutions exist and tensions are not too high, in particular among the minorities which often have a religious, ethnic, or even tribal character: not surprisingly, this is relatively rare in a new country. Not surprisingly, too, a strong leader is not merely a help, but a necessity; if no such 'charismatic' leader exists, the regime is likely to move rapidly to a different form and in particular may become authoritarian–inegalitarian.

Authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes

By and large, authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes occur as a reaction to a liberal–democratic system, as was the case in much of Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe before World War II, with Fascism and Nazism in particular, or as has periodically occurred in Latin America since World War II; they occur also as a reaction to populist regimes, as in Africa and to an extent in Asia since the 1960s: military governments tend then to be the basis on which these regimes are organised. Authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes can also result from the transformation of a traditional system in which the basis of support for the monarch is

decreasing: this has occurred occasionally in Europe in the past; examples can also be found since World War II, for example in the Middle East.

These regimes are first and foremost authoritarian: 'normal' political life is reduced to a minimum and there is even the widespread belief among the authorities that politics can be abolished altogether and be replaced by management and administration. Some authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes have had to accept a degree of 'politicisation' and set up organisations designed to enrol the population in a 'mass' party whose primary purpose is to express support for the leader and the regime; but these regimes are typically hierarchically structured: there is emphasis on the 'chief' and on the need to recognise his superior status while the concept of democracy is rejected outright. Society itself is viewed as hierarchical, with everyone having his or her place in an almost biologically ordered set of positions. The aim is to construct – or reconstruct – a society in which there is a loyal following, an aim which often remains unfulfilled.

These regimes are also socially inegalitarian because they have been set up in order to defend a social elite which feels threatened by the growing influence of the 'popular classes' and/or because they are associated with ideas of social as well as political hierarchy. In many cases, there is longing for a return to what is viewed as the well-organised structure of the past in which everyone had his or her place and positions were not questioned. These attempts often end in failure: the effort to remodel the society cannot be pursued for long. The regime is likely to be toppled and be replaced by a populist or a liberal–democratic system, although this new government may in turn be rather weak and have to give way to another authoritarian–inegalitarian system (or, exceptionally, to a Communist system).

The norms of the political systems of the contemporary world thus fall into quite distinct groups, though the sharpness of the differences sometimes becomes blunted as one country moves from one regime to another or when there is oscillation, as often in Latin America, from one type of norms to another. Whether political systems embody the same norms for long periods or not, however, the patterns which emerge are sufficiently clear to provide a satisfactory picture of the variations among types of government.

Types of norm and types of configuration of institutions

The norms which political systems embody provide an image of the broad direction in which these systems move as well as of the manner in which decisions are taken. But, as we know, decisions are taken with the help of institutions which form different configurations in different political systems. There are, as might be expected, close relationships between the norms of political systems and the structures which prevail in these systems. In part, this is because institutions are set up deliberately in order to embody certain norms: this is the case, for example, with parliaments and parties which are set up to provide a means for democratic

participation. However, structures may also have an effect on norms: when they are well-established, as for instance in the case of tribes or ethnic groups, they affect the role of these institutions in national decision-making. It is therefore useful to describe the relationship between norms and institutions and see how far some regimes are characterised by specific configurations of institutions. It is not realistic to expect to do so here in detail: structures are too complex to be easily circumscribed; but at least a general impression of the relationship can be given.[12]

Configurations of institutions in liberal–democratic regimes

In liberal–democratic regimes, the configuration of institutions is based in large part – though only in part – on constitutional arrangements deliberately designed to implement the norms of the political system. This is particularly the case with parliaments or congresses, but courts, the executive, and the bureaucracy are also shaped to a varying degree by the constitution.

Yet, ever since the nineteenth century when earlier constitutions were drafted, liberal and liberal–democratic systems have included many institutions not even mentioned in constitutions; the most important of these have been the political parties, but other groups have also played a large part in national decision-making. Consequently, even in liberal–democratic polities, constitutional structures have often become less influential or have remained influential only in conjunction with non-constitutional bodies, such as parties: parliaments and executives tend to be dominated by political parties, both because elections occur on party lines and because day-to-day behaviour takes place on topics and in a manner which corresponds to the decisions of the parties (together with the most influential groups). However, of all types of political systems, liberal–democratic regimes are those where constitutional bodies play the largest part.

The structural configuration of liberal–democratic regimes can therefore be said to be based on a number of well-defined arenas (parliaments, executives, but also local and regional parliaments and executives constituting these arenas) in which there are two main levels of actor, parties and groups, while the bureaucracy is influential in the wings. The positions of these two types of actor are different: parties play the main parts and occupy the front of the stage, typically executing the main movements or reciting the main lines; groups are normally less visible, except when they suddenly irrupt by means of major strikes or demonstrations. Groups tend to be organised for definite purposes (though their aims may be relatively broad, as in the case of trade unions or business organisations); they normally exercise pressure on the parties, though they also endeavour to have direct links with the civil service.

The level of participation in groups and parties is ostensibly high but it is in practice often small: the mass of the population tends to take a spectator's position, groups and parties being supported from time to time by vigorous clapping or attacked by strong booing. Ties between population and structures are not

necessarily much stronger at the local or regional levels. By and large the 'grass-roots' activities of the national parties and groups directly concern only a minority, although there may be variations from area to area and from time to time. Overall, the system is relatively well-ordered, largely as a result of the acceptance of the 'rules of the game' – that is to say the characteristics of the constitutional arrangements – by practically all the actors. Where this acceptance is less widespread the probability of the liberal democratic regime being overthrown is high, as apart from this acceptance there are relatively few means whereby the various arenas and actors may be strongly defended.

Configurations of institutions in Communist regimes

In egalitarian–authoritarian regimes such as Communist states, the determination of the arenas is much less clear , as these regimes have traditionally tended to operate on the basis of a deliberate ambiguity. There is in effect a political superstructure and a political infrastructure, with two different configurations of institutions linked primarily by means of personal ties. The political superstructure is constituted by the state level, in which constitutional bodies are outwardly similar to those of liberal–democratic countries, except that a greater emphasis is given to the bureaucratic side of the machinery than in liberal–democratic countries. The civil service is not 'in the wings', but is part of the configuration itself; indeed, at the level of the state structure, there is little, if any, differentiation between the administrative and the non-administrative elements – a distinction which has become sharp in liberal–democratic countries because political parties wish to control the executive but, by general agreement, do not enter to more than a limited extent in the lower echelons of the administrative hierarchy. In Communist states, the structural configuration at the level of state organisation is essentially based on a large number of administrative bodies whose personnel is both political and technical.

The level of the state organisation is effective only because, at the level of political infrastructure, the Communist party and a host of ancillary bodies both suggest directions for action and supervise the implementation. Thus the Communist party does not have clear and circumscribed areas of activity as parties tend to have in liberal–democratic states; it is at least as active as parties are in Western countries in directing the executive, but it also controls many aspects of the administrative machine and supervises the many 'mass' organisations which it has helped to set up, such as trade unions.

There are thus two levels of structural configuration; the linkage between the two is naturally a source of difficulty, and it can be achieved only by means of key individuals at both levels. A further source of difficulty comes from the fact that, below the political infrastructure of party and groups, there also exists a further, wholly unofficial, level consisting of more traditional bodies (ethnic or religious in particular) as well as of more modern (protest) organisations. The party has woven a

closely knit web of groups below itself in order to prevent both traditional bodies and more modern organisations from coming to the surface: it is far from successful in this task and changes which have taken place during the 1980s in particular show that efforts at suppression have been in vain. 'Holes' in the structures have always been large in some countries (such as in Poland, where the Catholic Church has proved particularly resilient), but the problem has erupted in a major way in all Eastern European states except Albania in the late 1980s, to the extent that, as is well known, Communism has ceased to prevail in these countries. Moreover, the grave disorders which erupted in parts of the Soviet Union have raised doubts about the future viability of the Communist system in that country as well.[13]

Configurations of institutions in traditional–inegalitarian regimes

Structural configurations in traditional–inegalitarian regimes are in sharp contrast with those of liberal–democratic and egalitarian–authoritarian regimes as they are in no way the product of deliberate decisions, let alone of imposition on a pre-existing structure. Traditional regimes have the configuration of institutions which corresponds most closely to the social structure: indeed, these are the regimes in which the osmosis between politics and society is the most complete because the only elements which count are the traditional groupings and the hierarchical positions which exist within and between these groupings. Thus there is no political arena as such, whether well- or ill-defined. In particular there are no political parties and there is often no parliament; the bureaucracy itself is relatively limited, at least in the most traditional of these countries. What characterises these regimes are sets of loyalties of a personal or a group character, which start at the level of small units (in villages or among bands, for instance) and move to that of the tribe and of the chiefs.

This situation has two consequences. First, when the system functions well, groupings are very strong and difficult to shake; their domain is by and large geographically circumscribed and they are likely to resist any encroachments. While liberal democratic polities are based on a permanent competition among groups which have specific activities, traditional–inegalitarian systems are based on the principle that there is only one grouping within a particular area, for instance a single tribe.

The second consequence is at the national level. The various groupings may or may not recognise fully the supremacy of the monarch and of the top political personnel. Admittedly, traditional–inegalitarian regimes will be maintained for substantial periods only if some *modus vivendi* is achieved between the geographical groupings composing the nation; otherwise, the polity will break up. This is indeed why ex-colonial countries have rarely given rise to traditional–inegalitarian regimes: oppositions between geographical groups are typically such that, soon after independence, a different regime has to be introduced.

Indeed, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a stable equilibrium

between monarch and tribal or ethnic groups, in part because every society is subjected to outside influences which undermine traditional groupings and in part because of the geographical and social mobility of the population. Thus traditional–inegalitarian regimes begin to change: institutions such as the bureaucracy and the military become stronger; new groups with specific purposes, such as business organisations and even trade unions, start to play a part. As long as these developments occur on a small scale, the regime can still be described as traditional; when the supremacy of tribal groupings becomes seriously challenged, however, the regime typically becomes populist or authoritarian–inegalitarian.

Configurations of institutions in populist regimes

The structural configuration of populist regimes is hybrid. It is often characterised by a profound opposition between declining traditional groupings and new groups, such as business or trade union organisations, between which uneasy compromises have to be ironed out. This means that, in populist regimes, the ties between society and the political system are much less close than in traditional–inegalitarian systems and, specifically, that political structures, and in particular parties, are normally set up with the conscious purpose of fostering change in the society. However, these parties have naturally to confront the problems posed by the opposition which exists between the weight of traditional groupings and the pressure towards 'modernisation' which some of the newer groups, as well as in many cases the bureaucracy and even the army, wish to promote. This suggests that parties are likely to be divided between those which represent primarily traditional groupings and those which at least claim to foster and mobilise the demands of the newer groups (though many parties in these countries are characterised by both elements).

Hence there is a degree of tension, which often resolves itself by the (more or less voluntary) merger of political parties and the move towards a single-party system. Yet the dominance which this type of single-party system (or of a dominant near single-party system) exercises over society is different from that which is exercised by Communist parties in egalitarian–authoritarian regimes: single parties in populist regimes usually cannot hold in check the traditional groupings. In Africa, in parts of the Middle East, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, populist single parties have typically tried to balance the interests of the 'modernising' groups, including the bureaucracy, with those of tribal or ethnic forces. In some cases, the regime has been successful, typically thanks to the presence of a popular (or 'charismatic') leader, who has been able to strengthen the political structures and the party in particular through an appeal to the population as a whole. When there are no (or no longer) such leaders, major difficulties occur which are presented, by and large rightly, as indications of the inadequacy of the structural configuration to solve the problems faced by the country. The result is, often at least, the emergence of an authoritarian–inegalitarian regime.

Configurations of institutions in authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes

Authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes tend to develop when internal divisions at the level of the institutions cannot be overcome by compromises. This takes place, as was noted above, when a populist regime is confronted with traditional groupings, such as strong tribes, which have been alienated by the regime; it also takes place when, in a liberal–democratic polity, oppositions between parties and between groups are so strong that the government becomes ineffective. The emergence of an authoritarian–inegalitarian regime is then often presented as an alternative to an authoritarian–egalitarian system of the Communist variety, though there are in fact very few cases in which Communist takeovers have taken place in this way.[14]

While populist regimes attempt, often unsuccessfully, to build new institutions to counterbalance the influence of traditional groupings, authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes typically try to revive these traditional bodies and to base their strength on the loyalties which they generated in the past. This is of course easier to achieve when the authoritarian–inegalitarian regime replaces a traditional system, and in particular when the monarch himself is the originator of the move. Yet there are difficulties even then, as more modern institutions also emerge, within the bureaucracy as well. This is why authoritarian–inegalitarian systems rely mainly on the military, as this not only provides physical power to control and undermine the opposition, at least for a while, but can also help to foster the principles of hierarchy which the regime wishes to maintain. Where a 'mass' organisation (a party) is set up, and especially in cases when the move is from a liberal–democratic to an authoritarian–inegalitarian regime, this is often done on military lines and indeed based on the army. However, such parties are created only after the military has been in power for some time, and this helps to extend the support for the military beyond the army itself.

Thus, while the configuration of institutions in populist regimes is hybrid and leads to serious internal conflicts, the configuration of institutions in authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes is somewhat artificial. Traditional groupings are expected to be the mainstay of the regime; but they are typically too weak to perform this function and an attempt is made to fill the gap by using the army, while the bureaucracy is expected to be concerned with a very large part of the decision-making process. As a result, the configuration of institutions tends to be divorced from the characteristics of the society: compulsion has to be strong, unless the leader can maintain the regime by his own 'charisma'; but this is rarer than in populist regimes, as there is typically no groundswell of popular feeling supporting the rulers. Not surprisingly, authoritarian–inegalitarian regimes face high levels of internal tension and often collapse as a result.[15]

Conclusion

There is a considerable variety of types of political system in the contemporary world, more variety perhaps than in previous periods of human history. Yet one can find broad patterns among these systems; these patterns can be discovered by reference to both the norms and the institutional arrangements. There are liberal–democratic, egalitarian–authoritarian, traditional–inegalitarian, populist, and authoritarian–inegalitarian systems: each of these types corresponds to particular situations characterising contemporary politics. Some of these systems experience greater tensions than others: the configuration of institutions reflects these tensions more than it overcomes them. As these tensions are in large part the result of the oppositions which exist in the contemporary world between loyalties based on tradition and pressures for social change, the question of the development of political systems is central to the current character and evolution of political systems: this is therefore the question which will be dealt with in Chapter 4.

Notes

1. Aristotle, *The Politics*, Book 3, Chapter 7 Classifications of political systems were common practice among political theorists afterwards. Both Locke and Montesquieu developed a constitutional classification (out of which emerged the current distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems); Rousseau's classification, in the *Social Contract*, was based, as was that of Hobbes in the *Leviathan*, on a behavioural distinction among regimes. For a discussion of these classifications, see D.V. Verney, *The Analysis of Political Systems* (1958), pp. 17–93.
2. R.A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (1971), in particular Chapters 1 and 2.
3. There has been a tendency in political science to classify political systems according to the extent of participation and the extent of freedom only. As a matter of fact, the substantive goals of regimes are important, both for the leaders and the citizens; indeed, the definition of politics – the authoritative allocation of values – suggests that the values themselves are an important part of political life. A comprehensive classification has therefore to take these goals into account. This is what will be done in this and the subsequent chapters of this book.
4. Democracy is taken here in its most extreme and literal sense – government *by* the whole people – a conception which Rousseau, of course, thought impossible for men (*Social Contract*, Book 3, Chapter 4). The point is simply to define a dimension and the poles of this dimension must naturally be the most extreme cases.
5. The term most commonly used to refer to dominance by one person is that of 'autocracy': this was the term used in connection with Tsarist Russia, for instance. Strictly speaking, however, a government by one person is a 'monocracy'.
6. We shall discuss the matter in the next chapter in connection with political development. To discover the wide range of uses of the term by political and social theorists, see A. Arblaster and S. Lukes (eds), *The Good Society* (1971).
7. R.A. Dahl attempts a rigorous operationalisation in *Polyarchy* (1971). Chapter 4 will examine the efforts made to measure political development and to relate it to socio-economic development.

8. The question of the moves along the dimensions of goals is one which has not as yet been given systematic treatment, though it is frequently referred to in general terms in both political science and ordinary political literature: it is typically believed, for instance, that greater freedom of expression will make it difficult at least to maintain legal barriers against participation: the history of nineteenth-century Europe seems to suggest that this view is correct, but it would need to be explored fully, as would need to be explored the relationship between liberalism, participation, and moves on the dimension of substantive goals.
9. There are of course differences in the degree of stability of these systems and indeed in the extent to which liberalism and participation are allowed. One example is voting: it was long restricted to men; only in the 1960s and 1970s has the voting age been lowered to 18; and it is still denied to immigrants, except in some countries and for local elections.
10. This traditional support relates to the type of legitimacy of these regimes. The matter will be discussed in Chapter 5.
11. The expression 'populism' was used in late nineteenth-century America to refer to movements which wished to help the bulk of the people against political and social bosses: it spread particularly in the Midwest. Since World War II, the expression 'populist' has been used primarily in the context of those regimes and leaders who, in the newly independent countries of the Third World, were attempting to 'modernise' their societies, for instance to reduce tribal influence, while avoiding the adoption of a Marxist or communist stance. See for instance S.M. Lipset, *Political Man* (1983), pp. 52–4.
12. Works describing the characteristics of regimes in the various regions of the globe are of course extremely numerous. A selected list of studies on different types of political systems can be found in the bibliography at the end of this volume.
13. Communist states have been in a state of flux since the second half of the 1980s. After the events of late 1989 it could be argued that not just Hungary and Poland, but also East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps Bulgaria and Romania had moved close to being liberal democracies, while the Soviet Union was on the verge of becoming a 'populist' regime and had ceased to be a Communist system in the strict sense, despite the pronouncements of its leaders. There had been appreciably fewer changes of goals in the other Communist states, except perhaps in some of the peripheral ones, such as Laos, Angola, and Mozambique.
14. Mussolini, Hitler and Franco did claim that their authoritarian systems were the best 'bulwarks' against Communist takeovers. The same argument has been used since World War II in many parts of the Third World.
15. This matter will be examined in Chapter 5 in the context of legitimacy.

4

Models of Policy-Making

4.1 Types and uses of models

We are all model builders, in the sense that we need to see some sort of pattern in the world around us and tend to interpret events in terms of that perceived pattern. We *create* 'reality' rather than simply observe it. As Graham Allison (1971) suggests, we carry around 'bundles of related assumptions' or 'basic frames of references' in terms of which we ask and answer such questions as: What happened? Why did it happen? What will happen next? Such descriptive, explanatory and predictive models are, in Allison's phrase, the 'conceptual lenses' through which we view our world and try to make sense of it. In these respects, practical men such as politicians and administrators are as much prisoners of theory as any academic social scientist. Keynes's remark about economics can be generalized to all aspects of public policy:

Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. [1936, ch. 24.]

The academic social scientists should, however, be more self-aware and, one would hope, more capable of making such elusive but essential distinctions as that between, say, descriptive and prescriptive models.

The simplest definition of a model is that it is 'A representation of something else, designed for a specific purpose' (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1977). The purpose may be as simple as providing a visual reminder: for example, a former pilot may keep a model aircraft on his desk. A more elaborate model could be used to simulate the aeroplane's performance under varied conditions in a wind-tunnel. Such a model

can assist in hypothesizing and experimentation ('if we give Concorde a droop-snout will lift be increased at slow speeds?'). Models need not be physical, however, and modern aircraft designers work mainly with mathematical models in which variables and their relationships are represented in abstract or symbolic terms. The purposes of such abstract model-building remain those of representation, simulation, explanation, prediction, experimentation, and hypothesis-testing.

These essentially *descriptive* models can be derived from complex social phenomena as well as from material objects. Thus a model of the working of the economy will seek to represent the interactions of such variables as investment, consumption, employment and the movement of prices. The more complex the phenomena to be represented, the greater will be the tendency towards selectivity, simplification and generalization in the making of models. Provided that simplification does not involve gross distortion, such models can assist description, explanation, and understanding.

Clues to another use of the term 'model' are to be found in colloquial languages, as when one hears of a 'model husband' or 'model village'. The reference here is to what is desirable or to be emulated. Such models are normative, or *prescriptive* rather than descriptive. They raise questions about what *ought* to be rather than what *is*.

Finally, there is a much less readily comprehensible use of the term 'model' which involves the exploration of concepts. These include the development of *ideal types* or mental constructs dealing with entities which nowhere exist in real life but which can help us to understand and explain real phenomena and to formulate or refine statements of what is desired. Examples from the natural sciences include the frictionless engine and the perfect vacuum. In social sciences there are such familiar examples as 'charismatic authority' (Weber, in Shils and Finch, 1949), 'perfect competition' in economics, and 'pure rationality' in decision-making (Simon, 1947).

One of the traditional ways of introducing students to policy analysis is to compare the 'rational' approach of Herbert Simon with the 'incremental' approach of Charles Lindblom. However, this simple comparison obscures the different fuctions which models are called upon to perform by these writers. We therefore explore their models (and others) in terms of whether they are ideal types, descriptive or prescriptive. This classification is itself an ideal-type one, and it is not how the models are always presented by the authors themselves, but it is designed to help us understand what functions models can perform.

4.2 Ideal-type models of 'rational' policy-making

4.2.1 THE STATUS OF IDEAL-TYPE MODELS

In a sense, the term 'ideal type' is unfortunate because of the everyday meaning of 'ideal' as 'highest and best conceivable' (*Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary*). The use of the term in social science models carries no such normative connotations. An ideal type is an exploration of an 'idea' rather than a statement of an 'ideal' in the everyday sense.

Examples will perhaps be more helpful. In teaching economics, reference is initially made to the concept of 'perfect competition' and to the manner in which prices would be determined in a totally open, free, and competitive market. This ideal type of perfect competition is not put forward as a realistic account of how prices are determined in the real world; nor is it necessarily advanced as something to be desired and attained. The analyst is concerned with prefect competition as an *idea* rather than as an *ideal*. One reason for building an ideal type of this sort is to improve our understanding of the real world, which can be described in terms of deviations from the ideal type—so that the economics teacher goes on to describe the working of the real economy in terms of imperfect competition, oligopoly, monopoly, etc.

Ideal types can also have prescriptive utility in that, having described the real world, one can then ask how satisfactory that world seems and whether there is a case for attempting to approximate, at least, to certain features of the ideal type. It is worth repeating, however, that an ideal type is not the same thing as a prescriptive model. Some economists might wish to move towards the perfectly competitive market but others would not, prescribing instead some form of regulated or planned economy.

In the context of policy analysis, the 'idea' most frequently discussed is that of 'rationality'. In constructing a 'model of rational policy-making' one is posing the question: 'How *would* policies be made if policy-makers pursued and were capable of complete rationality? Here we look briefly at the two main approaches: (1) considering values simultaneously with considering options; (2) setting out objectives at the beginning and then subsequently considering options designed to fulfil those objectives.

4.2.2 CONSIDERING VALUES AND OPTIONS TOGETHER

The approach of relating the consequences of all options to all values rather than pre-specifying objectives is common to a number of theories,

including utility and social welfare functions in economics, and also provides theoretical underpinning to cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which is considered in chapter 10. In decision-making theory the most prominent writer to use this approach in developing an ideal-type model is Herbert Simon (1957a; also 1957b, 1960, 1983; March and Simon, 1958). As derived from Simon's writings, the main activities which would be involved in rational policy-making are roughly as follows:

(1) *Intelligence gathering*. Intelligence is here used as in the sense of 'military intelligence', namely the gathering of information prior to taking action. In a completely rational world, any policy-making agency would continually and systematically scan its horizon, seeking to identify *all* present and potential problems and opportunities relevant to its mission or interests.

(2) *Identifying all options*. Several policy responses (or 'behaviour alternatives') are usually possible when a problem or opportunity is perceived. The completely rational policy-maker would identify *all* such options and consider them in detail.

(3) *Assessing consequences of options*. In considering each policy option, it would be necessary to know what would happen if it were to be adopted. This perfect knowledge is unattainable in real life but would be essential to complete rationality (in Simon's terms, 'objective' rationality, where the reasoning is not only rational in intention but correct in the event, unlike 'subjective' rationality, where reasoning is intendedly rational but proves, with hindsight, to have been incorrect). Thus the fully rational policy-maker would identify all the costs and benefits ('consequences') of all his policy options.

(4) *Relating consequences to values*. From the preceding gathering of data about problems, options, and consequences, the rational policy-maker would now have a large amount of information, a great many facts. But facts alone are useless if they cannot be related to a set of criteria or some sort of preference-ordering procedure. Thus for Simon (1957a), 'rationality is concerned with the selection of preferred behaviour alternatives in terms of some system of values whereby the consequences of behaviour can be evaluated'.

An example may be useful at this point. Let us take the decision with which any student will soon be familiar if he has not already made

it, namely the choice of a career. What would be involved in making this important choice in a completely rational manner? First, the student would have to consider *all* the career options open to him. Then he would have to explore in great detail the pros and cons of each career possibility, including such considerations ('consequences') as job security, career earnings, social status, opportunities for travel, length of vacations, and so on. But these data would be useless if the student did not know how he valued job security as against high earnings and both against, say, social status and opportunities for travel. Thus he would have to think through his value system with great thoroughness. Given both comprehensive information and a fully worked out preference-ordering set of criteria or values, a rational career choice would be possible.

(5) *Choosing preferred option.* Given full understanding of, and information about, all his problems and opportunities, all the possible policy responses, all the consequences of each and every policy option, and the criteria to be employed in valuing these consequences and thus assessing his policy options—then and only then would the policy-maker be able to arrive at a fully rational policy.

Simon sets out this way of relating values to the consequences of options because he does not find what he calls 'the means-ends' schema useful. The initial specification of objectives may foreclose unduly the courses of action that are considered and the initial focus on objectives may distract attention from the actual situation in which the decision-maker is placed.

4.2.3 SETTING OBJECTIVES FIRST

The alternative ideal type of rational decision-making, however, stresses the importance of specifying objectives before looking for options which might achieve them. This approach is common in much 'managerialist' writing on decision-making and it tends to be this approach which appears in prescriptions for administrative reform in the public sector. This is the approach used by Lindblom (1959) in setting up an ideal-type model of rational decision-making. Lindblom's rational policy-maker would:

(1) define and rank his governing *values*;
(2) specify *objectives* compatible with these values;
(3) identify all relevant *options* or means of achieving these objectives;

(4) calculate all the *consequences* of these options and compare them;
(5) choose the option or combination of options which would *maximize* the values earlier defined as being most important.

As well as stressing the importance of objectives in this 'rational-comprehensive model', Lindblom also places the elements of rational policy-making in a different sequence from that suggested by Simon. Most practitioners find Lindblom's version of rationality more readily comprehensible or 'commonsensical' than Simon's. Businessmen, for example, may claim to see in the Lindblomite synoptic model a rather abstract version of what ought to be involved in corporate planning. Thus a business or corporate plan should begin by identifying the values which the firm regards as of overriding importance: profit maximization, perhaps, but some weight might also be attached to 'social responsibility' or, say, to providing shareholders with a safe investment based upon diversified products and markets. These values having been clarified and ranked, the planners should go on to specify relevant objectives (rates of return to be achieved on resources employed, degrees of diversification, levels of market penetration, etc.). There are usually many different routes to achieving such objectives: not only many product/market strategies but many mixes of such strategies. In planning theory all these options would have to be identified and their consequences calculated and related back to the values earlier defined as being most important. This, after all, would only be 'good business'. It comes as a rude shock, then, to discover that Lindblom is setting up 'comprehensive rationality' not as a descriptive or prescriptive model but rather as a straw man to be pulled down!

4.2.4 CRITICISMS OF RATIONALITY MODELS

The most obvious criticism is that models of rational policy-making are unrealistic or impracticable. In a sense this is an unfair, even irrelevant, criticism since an ideal type is not required either to represent reality or to provide a blueprint for action. Even within its own 'unreal' terms, however, many people find it difficult to accept the assumption of perfect knowledge as an integral part of a rationality model. Surely it is enough, they argue, to require of the decision-maker that he is intendedly rational and follows rational *processes*: he should not also be required to guarantee a rational *outcome*. Another version of the same criticism would attack rationality models for being insufficiently

dynamic. The decision-maker, in other words, might conceivably acquire perfect knowledge of the present (static) situation but should not be expected to have similar knowledge of an essentially unknowable future situation, in which a great many external and unpredictable factors may prevent the anticipated 'consequences' of a strategy occurring in the event.

The main intellectual difficulty with rationality models lies, however, in the part played by *values*. Surely this is the arbitrary element in any decision? Our rational student's choice of a career, for example, required him to specify and rank such values as high earnings as against job security, and so on. How can such 'value judgements' be made on anything other than a personal, intuitive or subjective basis? Ideal-type rational models are about procedures for developing an argument or taking a decision and the model does nothing to guarantee the desirability of the values fed into it or even the validity of the factual assumptions made (see Simon, 1983, 16).

Any prescriptive model derived from the ideal-type rationality model cannot be a complete substitute for political mechanisms for determining values and priorities, since the model cannot determine these but requires them to be fed in from outside. To see 'rationality' and politics as intrinsically incompatible is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of values in rational models. Because the model assumes that at some stage an authoritative person or organization will inject an explicit set of values there is, however, a tendency for prescriptive models derived from the ideal-type rationality model to have centralist, technocratic connotations.

The difficulties do not end there, unfortunately, and the question arises of *whose* values should prevail. Simon does grapple with this problem and distinguishes between personal and organizational rationality, leaving us in little doubt that his concern is with what is rational for the employing organization rather than what the individual employee might see as being in his own selfish interest. There is no problem, of course, when a decision involves and affects only the individual, as in a choice of career. But let us revisit our student twenty years on in his chosen career. He is now a senior manager in a British car-making firm. He is helping to negotiate a merger with a Japanese competitor, a merger which is expected to benefit the British firm but might well threaten his own status and prospects. Here we have two competing rationalities—the manager's personal self-interest and the larger organizational interest of the firm and its shareholders. It is even more compli-

cated, however, because the British Government has reservations about the Japanese merger and asks the firm to consider the national interest. Whose interests should he favour in his contribution to corporate policy-making about the proposed merger: those of the nation, the firm's shareholders, or his own?

The public sector is particularly vulnerable to such questions about the most appropriate scale on which to consider policy issues. A topical example is that of expenditure cutbacks (see Glennerster, 1981). The necessity for, and incidence of, spending cuts might be viewed from the narrow perspective of the self-interested individual officer within a local authority. Or he might take a slightly broader view in terms of what would be best for his particular sub-division of the department. Or he might raise his sights to consider cutbacks in terms of the department as a whole. A more 'corporate' level of reasoning would require him to take into account the scale and balance of spending within the local authority as a whole. A supreme effort might even allow him to take into account national criteria for assessing his authority's expenditure.

A truly rational policy would be based upon the *largest* relevant scale of values and interests. It would avoid the type of sub-optimal policy-making which results from confusing a sub-system (such as one department in a local authority) with a larger system (the local authority itself). This still begs the question, however, of how values at this largest relevant scale would be set and articulated.

4.3 Descriptive models of policy-making

The nature and purpose of a descriptive model seem, at first sight, to be both more obvious and more straightforward than those of an ideal type. Whereas the latter is a 'mental construct' or essentially artificial exercise in reasoning, the development of a descriptive model is a very natural human activity, since we need to see some sort of shape or pattern in the world about us. Unfortunately, however, we do not all see the same 'reality', especially when it comes to describing and explaining something as complex as public policy-making. In his classic study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison (1971) shows how different descriptive perspectives or 'conceptual lenses' lead to different interpretations of events.

In terms of highly general descriptive models, Simon and Lindblom, having set up their largely similar models of rational policy-making,

both go on to describe reality in terms of deviations from perfect rationality.

Simon appears to believe that policy-makers seek to be rational but do not succeed because of bounds or limits to their individual and collective capacities for logical, economic or maximizing behaviour. Real-life 'administrative man' (unlike 'economic man', of the older textbooks) settles instead for 'satisficing' behaviour, that is, for a level of performance which will 'get by' or meet 'reasonable' expectations. ('Satisficing' was coined to accommodate in one word both 'satisfying' and 'sufficing' behaviour.) Simon's original descriptive model is to be found in his account of 'bounded rationality' (Simon 1957a), in which he explains the combination of 'psychological' and 'organizational' deficiencies which limits our capacity for fully rational decision-making and leads us to satisfice.

Lindblom develops his arguments, partly at least, in the same way as Simon, by identifying limits to rationality in real-life policy-making. He emphasizes the 'costliness of analysis' and is particularly strong on the political environment of policy-making and the constraints of the given situation in which policy is made.

If we combine these contributions of Simon and Lindblom, then, we can identify at least five important categories of limitations to rationality in actual decision-making behaviour.

(1) *Psychological limitations*. Some obvious limits to rationality lie in the individual policy-maker's powers of cognition and calculation. Put simply, we lack the knowledge, the skills and the value-consistency which would be needed to achieve complete rationality. To return to an earlier example, why will our student not be able, in practice, to make a fully rational career choice? Because: (a) he lacks full *knowledge* of all his possible career options; (b) he lacks the *skills* to calculate all the consequences (earnings, security, etc.) of even such options as he can identify; and (c) he lacks the degree of self-knowledge, clarity, or consistency about *values* which would allow him to make use of such information as he might acquire.

(2) *Limitations arising from multiple values*. The problem of values is further exacerbated when we move from individual to collective rationality (see Simon, 1983, 84). Arrow (1954) in his 'impossibility theorem' has demonstrated that under quite plausible assumptions about the conditions that a social welfare function

should satisfy—such as that different people are to be allowed to weight their values in different ways—then no such aggregate function can exist. In other words, there is no purely 'rational' way of resolving a conflict of interest.

(3) *Organizational limitations*. Even if the individual could overcome his personal limitations as policy-maker, he would still find great obstacles put in his way because of the fact that he has to work as part of an organization (business firm, government department, local authority etc.). In the name of efficiency, for example, modern organizations tend to involve a high degree of division of labour and *specialization of function*. But this often gets in the way of what might be called the 'whole problem' approach, since different aspects of a problem are handled by organizational sub-units and co-ordination of their problem-solving efforts is usually less than perfect. The treatment of homeless people (especially the elderly homeless) is a good example. Another organizational impediment to rationality is departmentalism of *outlook*. That is, instead of taking the 'whole organization' perspective we often look at problems through narrower departmental 'spectacles'. This failure stems from a refusal to look beyond the sub-system to the larger system's requirements. Finally, organizations tend to have major deficiencies as processors of *information*. Most MIS (management information systems) studies indicate that an organization's information flows do not relate to its information needs. Organizations tend to swamp us with information we do not want but fail to provide us with information we need for policy-making, or the right information comes in an unusable form or too late to be useful (see chapter 5).

(4) *Cost limitations*. These might also be called 'resource' limitations to rationality. In other words, it costs to be rational, in terms of time, energy and money. One would have to be very confident that the benefits accruing from a more rational approach to a problem would outweigh the costs of the rational approach: if not, one would be behaving quite irrationally.

(5) *Situational limitations*. A fifth category of limitations upon rationality is situational. That is, a policy-maker does not write on a clean slate, he does not decide in a vacuum. We are all influenced by the past (e.g. by precedents), by powerful vested interests in the present, and by people's assumptions and

expectations concerning the future. A good example is budgeting. A rational approach would require a strong case to be made anew each year for any and all future expenditure. This is, of course, the theory of what is now called 'zero base budgeting' (see 10.6.6). In practice, however, the constraints of precedents, politics and expectations create a situation in which the main determinant of next year's budget is who got what and how much in last year's budget.

Lindblom goes far beyond identifying limits to rationality, however, and often seems to delight in demonstrating how real-life policy-making stands rationality on its head. If we sum up the main features of Lindblom's descriptive model as developed in his writings in the 1960s, it will be seen that what emerges is a positive theory rather than a regretful account of why fully rational policy-making is impossible (Lindblom, 1959, 1965, 1968; Hirschman and Lindblom, 1962; Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963). The main characteristics of real-life policy-making, as seen by Lindblom, all have an internal logic. They include the following.

(1) Policy-makers often avoid thinking through or at least spelling out their objectives. This may reflect a shrewd awareness that to do so would precipitate conflict rather than agreement. It would also provide standards by which to judge performance, and why give such hostages to fortune?

(2) When it is clear that existing policies are failing to cope, the remedial action taken by legislators and administrators will tend to be 'incremental': That is, they will make relatively small adjustments to policies rather than sweeping changes. In doing so, they are moving cautiously and experimentally from a basis of what is known rather than taking a giant step into an unknown future.

(3) Policy-makers accept that few, if any, problems are ever solved once and for all time. Instead, policy-making is 'serial' (we keep coming back at problems as mistakes are corrected and new lines of attack developed).

(4) Few policies are made by individuals or even single agencies, but are instead made by the interaction of many policy influentials operating in a power network ('polycentricity').

(5) While these actors are self-interested, they are not blindly partisan and are capable of adjusting to one another, through bargaining, negotiation, and compromise ('partisan mutual adjustment').

(6) A value is placed in most pluralist liberal democracies on 'consensus seeking', so that what emerges is not necessarily the one best policy but rather that compromise policy upon which most groups can agree.

Simon's and Lindblom's descriptive models are at a high level of generality, though it could be argued that Lindblom's model reflects special characteristics of the American political system. Each country will have its own 'policy style' with its own special characteristics (Richardson, 1982). For example, Richardson and Jordan (1979) characterize the British system as one in which Parliament plays little direct role in the policy process, with both the formulation and the implementation of policies being determined through consultations within relatively closed 'policy communities' of government departments and interest groups. Clearly it is important to have an understanding of the policy process in a particular country (and of particular policy areas within it) if we are to be able to assess whether prescriptions for change in either procedures or policy substance are likely to 'take'. However, as the debate about whether or not we have 'corporatist' policy-making in Britain illustrates (see Jordan, 1981), there may not be full agreement among political scientists about how to characterize the policy process in practice.

4.4 Prescriptive models of policy-making

4.4.1 TOWARDS GREATER RATIONALITY?

Simon's writings of the 1940s and 1950s had demonstrated the extent to which 'administrative man' fell short of rational decision-making behaviour. But should, and could, administrative man become more rational? Simon's answer to both questions is 'yes'. For his prescriptive model we must look first to his 1960 book on *The New Science of Management Decision* (which has since 1960 been published in various revised editions and with at least one change of title).

Simon distinguishes between 'programmed' and 'non-programmed' decision-making. Decisions are programmed 'to the extent that they are repetitive and routine [and] to the extent that a definite procedure has been worked out for handling them'. Decisions are non-programmed 'to the extent that they are novel [and] unstructured': the problem

may not have arisen before, or its precise nature may be elusive and complex, or it may be so important 'that it deserves custom-tailored treatment'. In non-programmed decision-making, the system has no specific procedures or capacity for dealing with the situation but must instead 'fall back on whatever general capacity it has for intelligent, adaptive, problem-oriented action'. Sinon argues, however, that such general-purpose capacity is expensive to provide and maintain, so that programmed, specific procedures and criteria for decision-making should be used wherever possible.

Thus Simon looks first to improvements in programmed decisions. The new capacity for such decision-making he finds in operations research (operational research in British usage), systems analysis, and mathematical techniques such as linear and dynamic programming, game theory, probability models, etc. Such techniques have only been made 'operational', in many cases, by great advances in computer technology, allowing of much more elaborate analysis, assessment of alternatives, simulation, and modelling.

There remain many administrative problems which are not amenable to programming. But Simon argues that we have learned a good deal about 'heuristic problem solving'—that is, methods which help us to define and solve problems in the absence of scientific, objective or quantitative methods. Such problem-solving proceeds by way of search activity, abstraction, analogy; and by groping attempts to break down problems into sub-problems, and to deal with them on the basis of precedent, observation, and so on. Such decision-making is essentially a learning process but, even here, there is some scope for analysis, including computer-assisted analysis.

Simon then turns to some structural or organizational implications of 'the new science of management decision'. He describes organizations as 'three-layered cakes': (1) bottom layer—'the basic work processes' (manufacture, distribution, etc.); (2) middle layer—'programmed decision-making processes that govern day-to-day operations'; (3) 'non-programmed decision making processes that are required to design and redesign the entire system, to provide it with its basic goals and objectives, and to monitor its performance'. If more decisions could be programmed, 'top layer' management could deal in greater depth with its remaining, unpredictable, and least tractable problems.

What of the basic organizational problem of 'centralization versus decentralization'? Simon rightly says that the issue is not one of small-scale versus large-scale as competing principles of organization, but

rather of defining 'optimal' scales for different types of activities. But he appears to be arguing that modern management methods both demand and facilitate larger-scale fields of operation. In his 1960 text, then, Simon would appear to be pointing us towards a centralized, technocratic, planned form of government.

However, in his 1983 book, *Reason in Human Affairs*, Simon explicitly addresses (among other topics) the role of rationality in public policy-making, and the emphasis which emerges is rather different from that in *The New Science of Management Decision*. There is still considerable stress on the way in which computer-based techniques can aid decision-making. However, Simon also stresses the limitations to expertise and the need to strengthen our understanding of political institutions, based partly on his practical experience of public policy and administration. Thus we find him arguing for adversary proceedings in cases (such as allegations of health dangers from nuclear power stations) where there is a tendency for experts to close ranks and reject the need for an impartial enquiry. He also urges a more sympathetic understanding of the role of politics and political processes:

we must recognize that certain kinds of political phenomena—the attempt to influence legislation or the administration of laws, the advocacy of special interest— are essential to the operation of political institutions in a society where there is, in fact, great diversity of interest. [Simon, 1983, 100.]

He bemoans the decline of political parties and the rise of the 'individual voter' in the United States, claiming that this has lowered the level of 'civic rationality'. Unfortunately, Simon does not develop this concept of 'civic rationality' further, but clearly we have moved a long way from the individualistic rationality of his ideal-type model. Rationality in public affairs is seen as having an important but heavily qualified role.

Reason, taken by itself, is instrumental. It can't select our final goals, nor can it mediate for us in pure conflicts over what final goal to pursue —we have to settle these issues in some other way. All reason can do is help us to reach agreed-on goals more effectively. But in this respect at least, we are getting better [Simon, 1983, 106.]

Simon is probably the most prominent, if misunderstood, name associated with advocacy of a more rational approach to policy-making, but other writers have also attempted to make a distinctive contribution. For example, Dror (1968; 1971) to some extent dissociates himself from Simon, since 'trying to point administrators towards an unachievable

model of total rationality is likely to be counter-productive'. However, it is clear that Dror's approach has much more in common with Simon and the science of management decision than with Lindblom and the 'science of muddling through'.

Dror emphasizes the costliness of analysis in his 'economically rational model', which says that the various phases of pure-rationality policy-making should be developed in practice only in so far as the cost of the input into making policy-making more rational is less than the benefit of the output (in terms of the marginal improvement of the policy's quality). He is unusual in his readiness to include in both his descriptive and prescriptive models the contribution of 'extrarational' (intuitive, judgemental) processes. Finally, he is more specific than the other theorists discussed in this chapter about the necessity for 'meta-policymaking' or 'deciding how to decide'.

Dror thus sees himself as occupying a unique position which avoids the extremes of both incrementalism and rationalism. While there are some grounds for such a claim, we believe that Dror does lean towards the Simonian end of the spectrum. Much of his analysis can be seen in terms of improvments in the factual and value premises of the policy-maker as a means of pushing back the bounds of bounded rationality. His stated purpose could be that of Simon as well, namely: 'What is needed is a model which fits reality while being directed towards its improvement.'

4.4.2 'STILL MUDDLING, NOT YET THROUGH'

If Simon's normative model can be characterized, perhaps too glibly, as an attempt to approximate to at least some features of his rationality (or ideal-type) model, what is Lindblom's position? On the basis of his earlier writings (Lindblom, 1959, 1965; Hirschman and Lindblom, 1962; Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963), it was often said of Lindblom that his descriptive model ('muddling through') was also his prescriptive model: what *is* was also what *ought* to be, and incrementalism and partisan mutual adjustment were not deplored but rather defended by Lindblom as the only way in which policies could and should be made in a pluralist, democratic, and liberal society.

Lindblom's 1959 essay on 'The science of muddling through'—which by 1979 had been reprinted in forty anthologies—became the target of much criticism in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, Dror (1964), while admitting the force of Lindblom's writings as description, viewed their prescriptive element as a 'dangerous over-reaction to the rational-

comprehensive model. Dror focused his attack first on incrementalism. He saw at least three circumstances in which incrementalism would be inadequate, namely:

(1) Present policies may be so manifestly unsatisfactory that merely to tinker with them is pointless.
(2) The problems requiring a governmental response may be changing so fast or so fundamentally that policies based on past experience are inadequate as a guide to future action.
(3) The means available for problem-solving may be expanding, so that major new opportunities exist but are likely to be neglected by incrementalists. (For example, changes in political influence, economic capability, technology, etc. 'In military technology . . . incremental change results in the tendency to be excellently prepared for the last war.')

Dror then shifted his attack to the 'second key element' in Lindblom's thinking, namely 'consensus'. There may be many circumstances where 'agreement as the criterion of good policy' is acceptable, especially when, in times of relative stability, there is informed agreement based on the lessons of a relevant past. But in times of rapid change such lessons may not be relevant. For this and other reasons, 'deceived consensus' may result. Dror also appears less than enthusiastic about the contribution that 'participatory democracy' can make to the solution of highly complex and technical problems.

Lindblom himself has usually been depicted as an arch-conservative defender of the status quo, champion of market systems and dedicated opponent of planning. At the close of the 1970s, however, Lindblom replied to his critics and presented a rather different view of his own position (Lindblom, 1979; see also Lindblom, 1977; Lindblom and Cohen, 1979). While Lindblom is as scathing in 1979 as he was in 1959 about the pretensions of full-blown planning, he goes on to develop a number of distinctions which could be read either as a clarification of his 1959 position or (as we tend to think) the statement of a rather different 1979 position.

First, he distinguishes between 'incremental *politics*' and 'incremental *analysis*'. Incremental politics is a 'political pattern' characterized by 'political change by small steps'. In his earlier writings, Lindblom had seemed more than a little complacent about this type of politics. In 1979, Lindblom makes a significant distinction between the *theory* and *practice* of incremental politics. The theory is still defended, but

Lindblom accepts that in practice incremental politics have been viewed by many Americans as ineffective in coping with 'big problems like environmental decay, energy shortage, inflation, and unemployment'. He makes it clear that he shares such concerns. However, he sees the problem as lying not in incremental politics *per se* but rather in particular 'structural' features of the American political system. He attacks the number of 'veto powers' in the constitution, legislature, judiciary, and business interests. These obstacles to change—even, he points out, to incremental change—also lead Lindblom to reconsider the practice of 'partisan mutual adjustment' in the United States. He admits that some interests are unrepresented or only weakly represented; there are 'disturbing tendencies towards corporatism'; the discussion of 'grand issues' is often stifled by a heavily indoctrinated 'homogeneity of opinion'; and there are too many issues on which 'though none of the participants can on their own initiate a change, many or all can veto it'.

Lindblom is not, then, the conservative he has been branded, but nor do his criticisms of incremental politics lead him to renounce the system, and he continues to deny that a centralized, planned system offers a feasible or acceptable alternative. His response is in terms of *improvements* to incremental politics including the more skilled use of incremental *analysis*.

Turning, then, from incremental politics to incremental analysis, Lindblom insists that 'incomplete' analysis is none the less a form of analysis and as such, it seems, a useful supplement to partisan advocacy and politics. He distinguishes three types of such analysis. The first two are familiar from his earlier writings.

Simple incremental analysis is 'Analysis that is limited to consideration of alternative policies all of which are only incrementally different from the status quo'.

Disjointed incrementalism emphasizes the analytical features of incrementalism as described in section 4.3, namely: analysis limited to a few familiar alternatives; analysis of policy goals intertwined with empirical aspects of the problem; analysis concerned with remedying ills rather than positive goals to be sought; a sequence of trials, errors and revised trials; analysis of only some of the important consequences of those alternatives considered; and analytical work fragmented among many partisan participants in policy-making.

The third type of 'incremental' analysis is less familiar, however, and he calls it *strategic* analysis, or 'Analysis limited to any calculated

or thoughtfully chosen set of stratagems to simplify complex problems, that is, to short-cut the conventionally comprehensive "scientific" analysis'. Such 'strategems' include 'skilfully sequenced trial and error . . . limitations of analysis to only a few alternatives, routinization of decisions and focusing decision making on crises'. Moreover, such analysis can be supplemented by 'broadranging, often highly speculative, and sometimes utopian thinking about directions and possible features, near and far in time' (*sic*: but for 'features' we should read 'futures'?). In other words, Lindblom seems prepared to find a place for 'theory' and for innovative policy analysis?

Surely this 1979 'strategic analysis' plus theoretical insights which 'liberate us from both synoptic and incremental methods of analysis' all add up to a form of modified rationality rather than Lindblom's earlier attempts to stand rationality on its head. What is in 1979 called 'grossly incomplete analysis' (i.e. the 'muddling through' of 1959 in its purest form) is no longer prescribed. Instead Lindblom tells us that 'we can aspire' to a shift along the spectrum towards synoptic analysis, although we shall always fall far short of such 'completeness'. This 1979 position of Lindblom's is still different *in degree* from the 'new science of management decision' of Herbert Simon, since the latter clearly aspires to move much further towards complete rationality, but are the early 1980s positions of Lindblom and Simon as different as appeared to be the case in the early 1960s?

Another writer associated with the 'pluralist' or 'incrementalist' approach to policy-making, Aaron Wildavsky, has also recently stressed that analysis has a role to play, albeit as an input to politics. In his early work (Wildavsky, 1962) he had defended the American political system, which he characterized in terms of 'coalition politics' and 'free bargaining'. The market-like nature of his view of the political process was reflected in his praise of the 'heroic feats of rational calculation performed through the interplay of interests in the American political system'. Wildavsky's reputation is largely based on his debunking of attempts to achieve rationality in government, especially through the introduction of budgeting techniques such as PPBS (see Wildavsky, 1969; 1971; 1973; 1975; Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974).

The best guide to Wildavsky's position at the end of the 1970s is *The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis* (1980). This immensely long book does not lend itself to brief summary, but one is left with the impression that, like Lindblom, the later Wildavsky is prepared to accept a positive, if necessarily limited, role for analysis and planning

in the policy process. He tells us that as he began writing the book 'the necessity of connecting thought to action was uppermost in my mind'. He dwells on the tension between 'social interaction' (markets and politics) and 'intellectual cogitation' (planning) and argues that 'pure planning or pure politics alone are unsatisfactory as modes of making collective choices'. The task of policy analysis is to balance intellectual cogitation against social interaction to supplement but never to supplant the political process. Policy analysis is 'about improvement, about improving citizen preferences for the policies they—the people—ought to prefer'.

4.4.3 A MIDDLE WAY?

We have made it clear in the previous two subsections that when the later writings of Simon and Lindblom are taken into account it is a distorted caricature to cast one as the centralist technocratic rationalist and the other as the 'politics as a market' incrementalist. However, it cannot be denied that teachers have found it useful to have the 1959 Lindblom available for contrast with the 1960 Simon, since these prescriptions appear to represent opposite ends of the spectrum. Other writers can then be 'located' at various points along the spectrum. One writer, Etzioni (1967), sets out quite specifically to explore and lay claims to the middle ground between Simon and Lindblom—namely, 'Mixed scanning: a third approach to decision making'.

The term 'mixed scanning' is derived from the analogy of cameras employed in such activities as weather observation. If total information about weather patterns and trends were required, cameras would have to incorporate a capacity for scanning the total weather scene plus a capacity for the most detailed observation of each and every part of the scene. This is difficult to achieve and what we settle for is a mixed-scanning approach, in which wide-lens cameras take in a broad sweep to provide at least a rough indication of significant new developments while other cameras are focused much more narrowly on particular areas where developments are confidently expected and detailed observation therefore required.

Translated into policy-making terms, rationalism would seek detailed and comprehensive information about the whole weather scene, thus swamping the observers in largely unusable and enormously costly data. Incrementalism would focus only on those areas in which troublesome patterns had developed in the past and, perhaps, on a few adjacent areas. It would thus ignore significant weather information in unexpected areas. The mixed-scanning strategy combines a detailed examination of some sectors with a more cursory review of the wider weather scene. This feasible and economically defensible operation is seen as adequate for most purposes. Also it is flexible since the 'mix' of broad and detailed scanning can be varied depending on changing circumstances (e.g. in the hurricane season it would be advisable to increase comprehensive scanning because of the consequences of missing early signs of an unexpected hurricane formation).

The mixed-scanning approach also emphasizes the need to differentiate fundamental decisions from incremental ones. Fundamental decisions should be made by exploring as many as possible of the options open to the decision-maker, but with deliberate omission of detailed assessment so that an overview is possible. Before and after such fundamental decision-making (taken in a relatively rational or synoptic manner) there will still be wide scope for incremental decision-making—within the context set by fundamental decisions.

There are several difficulties in applying Etzioni's model to the practical concerns of decision-makers (quite apart from the fact that his original metaphor of weather satellites is inaccurate as a description of how weather satellites operate and how they fit into overall weather forecasting). In the first place, it is not clear whether the analogy between weather satellites and social problems holds up. The surface of the world is of fixed geometrical proportions which can be scanned on a simple pattern and the phenomena to which closer attention has to be paid are fairly well known. It is not clear in the same way what the layout of the social world is or what phenomena should be focused on. In his book on *Social Problems* (1976) Etzioni discussed the application of his model to urban renewal and impact statements. What he has to say about these matters contains a lot of sense (though he neglects the disadvantages of impact statements) and he is right to point to the inappropriateness of fully synoptic or fully incremental approaches; however, the analysis does not derive directly from the original mixed-scanning metaphor.

As the name implies, the 'mixed-scanning' model is of particular potential relevance to decisions about how to allocate analytical resources. However, Etzioni, while providing us with criteria about what kind of weather formations require detailed analysis, does not provide a set of criteria for determining which policy-issues should be analysed in which way (see chapter 5 on 'Issue Search', and chapter 6 on 'Issue Filtration' in this book).

4.5 A contingency approach to policy analysis

The framework for this book, consisting of analysis related to stages in the policy process, does not conform to the stereotyped extremes of either 'rational comprehensive' analysis or 'muddling through'. We regard such polarization as being, in the end, sterile and smacking too much of an either/or choice. Nor do we simply seek a 'middle way'. The crucial stage in our framework is the second, that of 'deciding how to decide' or issue filtration (see chapter 6). In other words, we suggest that different policy issues require different policy-making approaches.

Some issues will always require a highly political, pluralist, bargaining, and incrementalist approach. But some other issues—probably only a small minority—will both require and lend themselves to a much more planned or analytical approach. These are the issues which, having been identified at the second or 'issue-filtration' stage, should then be subjected to all the other stages, with due concern for their logical sequence (plus, of course, opportunities for feedback and interaction). At each stage—forecasting, say, or options analysis—full use should be made of any planning or managerial aids available. Following Dror (1968) our approach is 'economically rational' since we accept that analysis should be conducted only to the extent that it is likely to produce benefits commensurate with the cost of analysis.

Thus we advocate a 'contingency' approach (adjust policy-making methods to the circumstances and to the issue in question). There is no 'one best way' of making decisions, just as there is no universal prescription for 'good organization'. Among the diagnostic skills required is a very high degree of *political* sensitivity and discrimination as well as a grasp of the technical skills of planning and analysis.

4.6 Models in public policy and policy analysis

A policy analyst must be aware of the existence and importance of models in everyday life as well as in the literature of policy studies. He should be explicit and self-critical about the models he himself uses. As Allison (1971) says, 'the fact that alternative frames of reference . . . produce quite different explanations should encourage the analyst's self-consciousness about the nets he employs.' The 'policy frame' he adopts in defining a problem will certainly influence his solution to the problem. In forecasting, too, he will construct a theory or model of how several variables are likely to interact to bring about some future

state of affairs. In moving from policy formulation to policy implementation he will have developed a theory of cause and effect, along the lines that 'if we do x now, y will follow'.

Model-building holds its dangers and traps for the unwary. The analyst, like any social scientist, should understand the distinctions between ideal-type, descriptive, and prescriptive models and, even in the heat of argument, should avoid the temptation to slip unobtrusively from one to another. In developing any model he should realize that a process of abstraction, selection, and simplification is going on. An obvious danger is of over-simplification and distortion. However, as simplifying assumptions are relaxed to make models more realistic, the elaborate model may become too complex to understand or too clumsy to use. A particular disciplinary background (such as economics or psychology) will give a characteristic slant to an analyst's thinking: hence the need for an inter-disciplinary approach (see section 3.1.2). Above all, of course, the analyst should be aware of his own political and ideological biases and the preconceptions, assumptions, and sheer wishful thinking which will influence his view of 'the way things are' and might be. A useful corrective device is occasionally to reconsider a particular problem (or solution) in terms of a diametrically opposed perspective to that so far employed by the analyst.

In seeking to understand the real-world policy process, the analyst must try to identify the particular models or sets of related assumptions which influence different policy actors. Such assumptions may, in the analyst's eyes, be incoherent or internally inconsistent, but they will none the less be models of policy which can influence practical action.

Whether he is operating in the academic arena or the world of policy actors, then, the analyst has an important role to play as an exponent, identifier, and interpreter of relevant policy models. Where different participants in an intellectual or political debate have different frames of reference which are implicit or ambiguous, then there will be particular problems of interpretation (cf. Rose, 1976c). Even though the same words may be used, different 'languages' are often being spoken. The analyst's role as interpreter can extend to identifying which values and perceptions are shared by various models, which are genuinely incompatible, and which, though not completely shared, are not mutually contradictory.

When an analyst is working for a particular client, he will have the often delicate task of clarifying and possibly questioning the assumptions and implicit models underlying the client's view of problems and

acceptable responses. Since securing and then implementing a particular policy usually involves interactions (conflict, competition, accommodation, collaboration, etc.) with other agencies, the analyst can also help his client by similar clarification of those agencies' interests, values, perceptions, and assumptions.

If he wishes his policy advice to be 'consumed', either generally or by a particular client, the analyst must give considerable thought to the language and reference points he employs. To believe that a sufficiently rigorous analysis will lead the analyst to an unarguable 'one best answer' which the consumer will immediately recognize and adopt, is simply to be naïve about the status of policy advice and the activity of policy advising. Where the underlying perceptions, assumptions, and values of analyst and consumer are at odds or, worse, simply do not relate to one another, then very little influence is likely to be exerted.

The approach in this book is, we hope, reasonably aware of most of the problems and traps indicated above. It emphasizes the political nature of the policy process, the subjectivity of much analysis, and the need for the analyst to concern himself with the consumption as well as the production of policy advice.

5 Rationality and Decision-Making

Writers on decision-making may be divided, broadly and roughly, into two schools: those who focus on the relationship between power and decision-making; and those who examine the relationship between rationality and decision-making. The literature on power and decision-making was discussed at some length in the previous chapter. In this chapter we turn our attention to the analysis of rationality and decision-making, concentrating in particular on the debate between writers who analyse decision-making by reference to rational models and writers who portray decision-making as an incremental process. Unlike some recent commentators we do not accept that this is an artificial debate (Smith and May, 1980). While it is correct to observe that rational models usually serve prescriptive purposes, and incremental models are often intended to be descriptive, there is an important continuing search for a prescriptive model which suffers from neither the unrealism of the ideal type rational model nor the incompleteness of incremental approaches. It is this search, and the debate between the writers who have been engaged in it, which is the central concern of this chapter. The chapter proceeds through an examination of the ideal type rational model, to a consideration of incrementalism and an analysis of middle ways between these two approaches. The strengths and weaknesses of each model are assessed, and at the end of the chapter an attempt is made to establish links between the discussion of rationality and decision-making and the analysis of the role of the state and of power contained in earlier chapters.

RATIONAL MODELS

Herbert Simon's *Administrative Behaviour*, first published in 1945, constitutes an important early contribution to thinking about decision-making within organisations. In his book Simon argues that theories of administration must take decision-making as a central focus. In contrast to previous writers, who concentrated on ways of securing effective action within organisations, Simon seeks to examine in some detail the processes leading up to action. In his view, a theory of administration has to be concerned with 'the processes of decision as well as with the processes of action' (Simon, 1945, p. 1), and to this end Simon attempts to specify exactly what is involved in decision-making.

Beginning with a definition of a decision as a choice between alternatives, Simon states that rational choice involves selecting alternatives 'which are conducive to the achievement of . . . previously selected goals' (p.5). In Simon's view, the existence of goals or objectives within organisations is of fundamental importance in giving meaning to administrative behaviour. That is, administrative behaviour is purposive if it is guided by goals. In any organisation there might be a number of ways of reaching goals, and when faced with the need to make a choice between alternatives the rational decision-maker should choose the alternative most likely to achieve the desired outcome. In essence, then, rational decision-making involves the selection of the alternative which will maximise the decision-maker's values, the selection being made following a comprehensive analysis of alternatives and their consequences.

Simon acknowledges that there are several difficulties with this approach. The first is: whose values and objectives are to be used in the decision-making process? Clearly, organisations are not homogeneous entities, and the values of the organisation as a whole may differ from those of individuals within the organisation. Simon's response to this point is to argue that 'a decision is "organisationally" rational if it is oriented to the organisation's goals; it is "personally" rational if it is oriented to the individual's goals' (pp. 76–7).

This leads on to a second difficulty with Simon's approach, namely that it may not make sense to refer to the goals of an organisation. A similar problem arises here as in the discussion of policy (see Chapter 1), namely that general statements of intention within organisations are implemented by individuals and groups who often have discretion in interpreting these statements. If, as we argue in the next chapter, policy is to some extent made, or at least reformulated, as it is implemented, then it may be less useful to refer to an organisation's goals than to the goals of the individuals and groups who make up the organisation.

The third major difficulty with Simon's model of rationality is that in practice decision-making rarely proceeds in such a logical, comprehensive and purposive manner. Among the reasons for this are that it is almost impossible to consider all alternatives during the process of decision; knowledge of the consequences of the various alternatives is necessarily incomplete; and evaluating these consequences involves considerable uncertainties. It is precisely because of these limits to human rationality, maintains Simon, that administrative theory is needed. As he observes in *Administrative Behaviour*,

The need for an administrative theory resides in the fact that there *are* practical limits to human rationality, and that these limits are not static, but depend upon the organisational environment in which the individual's decision takes place. The task of administration is so to design this environment that the individual will approach as close as practicable to rationality (judged in terms of the organisation's goals) in his decisions (p. 241).

What Simon is arguing then is the need to explore ways of enhancing organisational rationality.

There is a fourth difficulty in achieving this, namely how to separate facts and values, and means and ends, in the decision-making process. The ideal rational model postulates the prior specification of ends by the administrator and the identification of means of reaching these ends. Simon notes a number of problems with the means–ends schema, including that of separating facts and values. As he argues, the means of

achieving ends are not devoid of values, and a way of coping with this has to be found in decision-making. Simon's proposed solution is 'A theory of decisions in terms of alternative behaviour possibilities and their consequences' (p. 66) in which 'The task of decision involves three steps: (1) the listing of all the alternative strategies; (2) the determination of all the consequences that follow upon each of these strategies; (3) the comparative evaluation of these sets of consequences' (p. 67). Rationality has a place in this model in that 'The task of rational decision is to select that one of the strategies which is followed by the preferred set of consequences' (ibid.).

It follows that the means–ends rational model is, as Simon always intended, an idealised view of decision-making in organisations. However, it is by no means clear that the theory of alternative behaviour possibilities is any less idealistic. Simon recognises this, and he notes various ways in which actual behaviour departs from the theory. Accordingly, in his later work Simon elaborates the idea of 'bounded rationality' (1957, p. xxiv) to describe decision-making in practice. Bounded rationality involves the decision-maker choosing an alternative intended not to maximise his values but to be satisfactory or good enough. The term 'satisficing' describes this process, and bounded rationality enables the administrator faced with a decision to simplify by not examining all possible alternatives. Rather, rules of thumb are adopted, and as a result important options and consequences may be ignored. In this way the exacting demands of the rational-comprehensive model are avoided and replaced with a more realistic set of criteria. Simon argues that both common sense and computer simulation of human behaviour in decision-making serve to verify bounded rationality as a correct description of decision-making 'in its main features' (1957, p. xxvii).

INCREMENTALISM

Simon's espousal of bounded rationality finds many echoes in the work of Charles Lindblom (1959). Like Simon, Lindblom is critical of the rational-comprehensive method of decision-

making. In its place, Lindblom sets out an approach termed 'successive limited comparisons'. The rational-comprehensive approach is characterised as the root method, starting with basic issues on each occasion and building from the ground up; the successive limited comparisons approach is characterised as the branch method, starting from the existing situation and changing incrementally. The two approaches are compared in Figure 5.1.

In describing decision-making by successive limited comparisons, Lindblom reiterates many of Simon's reservations about the rational model. These reservations are listed most fully in Lindblom's later work where he notes eight failures of adaptation of the rational-comprehensive model, which is also referred to as the synoptic ideal. According to Lindblom, the synoptic ideal is (1) not adapted to man's limited problem-solving capacities; (2) not adapted to inadequacy of information; (3) not adapted to the costliness of analysis; (4) not adapted to failures in constructing a satisfactory evaluative method; (5) not adapted to the closeness of observed relationships between fact and value in policy-making; (6) not adapted to the openness of the system of variables with which it contends; (7) not adapted to the analyst's need for strategic sequences of analytical moves; and (8) not adapted to the diverse forms in which policy problems actually arise (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963).

Consequently, decision-making in practice proceeds by successive limited comparisons. This achieves simplification not only through limiting the number of alternatives considered to those that differ in small degrees from existing policies, but also by ignoring consequences of possible policies. Further, deciding through successive limited comparisons involves simultaneous analysis of facts and values, and means and ends. As Lindblom states, 'one chooses among values and among policies at one and the same time' (1959, p. 82). That is, instead of specifying objectives and then assessing what policies would fulfil these objectives, the decision-maker reaches decisions by comparing specific policies and the extent to which these policies will result in the attainment of objectives. For Lindblom, the test of a good policy is not, as the rational-comprehensive model posits, that

Rational-comprehensive (root)	Successive limited comparisons (branch)
1a Clarification of values or objectives distinct from and usually prerequisite to empirical analysis of alternative policies	1b Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the needed action are not distinct from one another but are closely intertwined
2a Policy-formulation is therefore approached through means–end analysis: first the ends are isolated, then the means to achieve them are sought	2b Since means and ends are not distinct, means–end analysis is often inappropriate or limited
3a The test of a 'good' policy is that it can be shown to be the most apropriate means to desired ends	3b The test of a 'good' policy is typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without their agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective)
4a Analysis is comprehensive; every important relevant factor is taken into account	4b Analysis is drastically limited: i) Important possible outcomes are neglected ii) Important alternative potential policies are neglected iii) Important affected values are neglected
5a Theory is often heavily relied upon	5b A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory

Figure 5.1: Models of decision-making
SOURCE: Lindlom (1959)

the policy maximises the decision-maker's values. Rather it is whether the policy secures agreement of the interests involved.

Lindblom argues that incrementalism is both a good description of how policies are actually made, and a model for how decisions should be made. Prescriptively, one of the claimed advantages of muddling through is that serious mistakes can be avoided if only incremental changes are made. By testing the water the decision-maker can assess the wisdom of the moves he is undertaking and can decide whether to make further progress or to change direction. Lindblom emphasises that successive limited comparisons *is* a method. Despite its acknowledged shortcomings, the method is to be preferred to 'a futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness' (p. 88). Given the rough process which is usually involved in making decisions, Lindblom maintains that the best that can be hoped for is to muddle through more effectively.

These points are developed at some length in Lindblom's later writings. In *A Strategy of Decision,* a book he co-authored with David Braybrooke (1963), Lindblom describes in detail the strategy of disjointed incrementalism, which is a refinement of the successive limited comparisons method. Disjointed incrementalism involves examining policies which differ from each other incrementally, and which differ incrementally from the status quo. Analysis is not comprehensive but is limited to comparisons of marginal differences in expected consequences. Using disjointed incrementalism, the decision-maker keeps on returning to problems, and attempts to ameliorate those problems rather than to achieve some ideal future state. What is more, decision-makers adjust objectives to available means instead of striving for a fixed set of objectives. Braybrooke and Lindblom note that disjointed incrementalism is characteristic of the United States where 'policy-making proceeds through a series of approximations. A policy is directed at a problem; it is tried, altered, tried in its altered form, altered again, and so forth' (p. 73). There are similarities here with the writings of Wildavsky (1979) who argues that problems are not so much solved as succeeded and replaced by other problems, and who is equally critical of the

rational model. Braybrooke and Lindblom describe the strategy as *disjointed* incrementalism because policies and problems are analysed at different points without apparent coordination.

This theme of coordination is taken up in Lindblom's book, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (1965). The problem addressed in that book is of how to achieve coordination between people in the absence of a central coordinator. Partisan mutual adjustment is the concept Lindblom develops to describe how coordination can be achieved in such a situation. Partisan mutual adjustment is the process by which independent decision-makers coordinate their behaviour. It involves adaptive adjustments 'in which a decision-maker simply adapts to decisions around him' and manipulated adjustments 'in which he seeks to enlist a response desired from the other decision-maker' (1965, p. 33). Each of these forms of adjustment is further divided into a variety of more specific behaviour, including negotiation and bargaining. In a later article, Lindblom (1979) notes that although there is no necessary connection between partisan mutual adjustment and political change by small steps, in practice the two are usually closely linked. Taken together, partisan mutual adjustment, disjointed incrementalism and successive limited comparisons form the key concepts in the incrementalist model of decision-making.

There is a large measure of agreement in the literature on decision-making that disjointed incrementalism is a good description of how decisions are actually made in organisations. Yet the rational-comprehensive model remains important because it continues to influence attempts to improve the machinery of government in various countries. In the British context, this can be seen in the development of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) system for planning public expenditure, and the subsequent introduction of programme budgeting, programme analysis and review, and the Central Policy Review Staff (Richardson and Jordan, 1979). Again, the planning system introduced into the National Health Service in 1976 was presented as a process involving taking stock of services, setting objectives, defining strategy, developing a plan and monitoring implementation. These

examples, many of which have their roots in American experience, suggest that the ideal of rational-comprehensiveness is still powerful.

Nevertheless, the experience of a number of these innovations bears out Lindblom's objections to the synoptic approach. A study of PESC, for example, came to the conclusion that far from enhancing rationality, PESC ended up strengthening incrementalism (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981). Similarly, researchers who analysed the operation of the NHS planning system noted the failure of health planners to live up to the synoptic ideal, concluding that 'Health planning is *necessarily* the subject of adaptation, compromise, bargaining and reconciliation of conflicting interests' (Barnard *et al.*, 1980, p. 263). Studies of policy-making in organisations are replete with examples which demonstrate the failure of rational-comprehensiveness and the prevalence of incrementalism. This is not to say that incrementalism is the only way in which decisions are made in practice for there is evidence that other approaches are sometimes adopted (Vickers, 1965; Ham, 1981). The question this raises is what *prescriptive* stance should be adopted in view of the less than satisfactory experience of the rational ideal? Of the many attempts to address this question, two in particular stand out: Dror's (1964) discussion of a normative optimum model, and Etzioni's (1967) work on mixed scanning. We will consider each of the models in turn.

OPTIMAL METHODS AND MIXED SCANNING

While Dror finds much to admire in Lindblom's work, he is critical of the conservative bias he detects in incrementalism. The problem identified by Dror is that Lindblom's favoured strategy of muddling through more skilfully acts 'as an ideological reinforcement of the pro-inertia and anti-innovation forces' (p. 153). According to Dror this strategy is only acceptable if existing policies are in the main satisfactory, there is a high degree of continuity in the nature of problems and there is a high degree of continuity in the means available for dealing with problems. These criteria may be met when there

is a large measure of social stability, and Dror argues that incrementalism may be appropriate in many policy areas in the USA. But where the conditions do not prevail, and where a society is seeking to bring about significant social changes, then incrementalism will not be appropriate.

The alternative to muddling through, suggests Dror, is not the rational-comprehensive model but a normative optimum model which is able to 'combine realism and idealism' (p. 157). In broad outline, such a model involves attempts to increase both the rational and extra-rational elements in decision-making. The extra-rational elements comprise the use of judgements, creative invention, brainstorming and other approaches. The rational elements involve not a comprehensive examination of alternatives and their consequences and the complete clarification of values and objectives but a selective review of options and some explication of goals. What this implies is a decision-making method somewhere between the rational-comprehensive and incremental methods. Thus, while Dror is prepared to accept the validity of incrementalism as a descriptive theory, he argues for an optimal method as a means of strengthening and improving decision-making. One of the features of the method is the stress placed on meta-policy-making, that is 'policy-making on how to make policy' (1968, p. 160). In Dror's analysis, there is a need to invest resources in designing procedures for making policies in order to produce better decisions.

Lindblom's response to Dror is to argue that in a political democracy like the USA and also in relatively stable dictatorships like the Soviet Union the conditions necessary for incrementalism are met (Lindblom, 1964). Further, Lindblom expresses scepticism about the criticism that muddling through has a conservative bias. He maintains that significant changes can be achieved through a succession of small steps as well as through infrequent large steps.

This point is taken up by Etzioni who, like Dror, seeks a middle way between rationality and incrementalism. Etzioni accepts the force of the argument that a series of small steps could produce significant change, but adds that 'there is nothing in this approach to guide the accumulation; the steps may be circular – leading back to where they started, or

dispersed – leading in many directions at once but leading nowhere' (1967, p. 387). In place of incrementalism, Etzioni outlines the mixed scanning model of decision-making, a model he suggests is both a good description of how decisions are made in a number of fields and a strategy which can guide decision-making.

Mixed scanning rests on the distinction between fundamental decisions and incremental or bit decisions. Etzioni suggests that fundamental decisions, such as the declaration of war and the initiation of the space programme, are recognised by the incrementalists but are not given sufficient emphasis. In Etzioni's view, fundamental decisions are important because they 'set basic directions' (p. 388) and provide the context for incremental decisions. Mixed scanning is an appropriate method for arriving at fundamental decisions because it enables a range of alternatives to be explored. Essentially, mixed scanning involves the decision-maker undertaking a broad review of the field of decision without engaging in the detailed exploration of options suggested by the rational model. This broad review enables longer-run alternatives to be examined and leads to fundamental decisions. In turn, incremental decisions lead up to and follow on from fundamental decisions and involve more detailed analysis of specific options. According to Etzioni,

each of the two elements in mixed scanning helps to reduce the effects of the particular shortcomings of the other; incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, and contextuating rationalism helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives (p. 390).

Despite Etzioni's claim that his strategy is an adequate description of decision-making in various fields, the importance of mixed scanning and also of Dror's optimal model is mainly that they are attempts to meet widely held reservations about incrementalism as a prescriptive approach. What then are the strengths and weaknesses of mixed scanning and the optimal model? Taking Dror's work first, it is clear that in many respects he shares the assumptions and the aspirations

of the rational-comprehensive model. Wary of the potential dangers of inertia and conservatism, Dror seeks to provide guidelines for those attempting to improve policy-making. In his book, *Public Policy Making Re-examined,* Dror details eighteen phases of optimal policy-making, ranging from the meta-policy-making stage of designing policy-making systems, through the policy-making stage of examining alternatives and making decisions, and on to the post-policy-making and feedback stages. There is no doubt that Dror offers one of the most considered attempts to devise a prescriptive policy-making model and, in our view, a particular strength of Dror's work is its recognition of the extra-rational elements in the process of decision-making.

As the writings of experienced policy-makers like Vickers (1965) attest, judgement, hunch and intuition do play a part in the mind of the decision-maker. It is paradoxical then that at the same time as incorporating extra-rational aspects, the optimal model emphasises many of the key features of the rational-comprehensive model. As Smith and May (1980) note, Dror recapitulates various stages in the model, but adds caveats in order to avoid the charge of unrealism. What is more, it is not clear what criteria are to be employed when the decision-maker is advised by Dror to undertake 'some clarification of values, objectives, and decision-criteria' and a 'preliminary estimation of expected pay-offs'. For these reasons, it is difficult to see how the optimal model can be successfully operationalised.

Turning to Etzioni, one of the questions which needs to be raised about mixed scanning is whether fundamental decisions are as significant as he suggests. While in some situations fundamental decisions are important in setting broad directions, in other situations decision-making proceeds in a much less structured way. In many organisations and policy areas, action is justified because 'things have always been done this way', rather than through reference to fundamental decisions which serve as a context for action. When this occurs, unplanned drift rather than conscious design characterises the policy process, and unplanned drift may be more common than Etzioni assumes.

A further difficulty with mixed scanning is how to distin-

guish fundamental decisions and incremental decisions. As Smith and May note, 'fundamental decisions in one context are incremental in another and vice versa' (p. 153). It would therefore seem important to specify criteria for distinguishing the two types of decision and Etzioni does not do this. Despite these criticisms, a number of writers have pointed to the virtues of mixed scanning as a prescriptive model (Gershuny, 1978; Wiseman, 1978 and 1979). Particularly in the planning context, it is suggested that decision-makers may find the twin strategies of overall scanning followed by a more detailed exploration of specific problems and alternative ways of tackling these problems to be a useful and realistic way of proceeding. The longer time scale usually associated with planning decisions offers the possibility of overcoming some of the constraints which ordinarily preclude any more than incremental analysis. Often these may be the sorts of fundamental or contextualising decisions discussed by Etzioni. While there will no doubt be continuing disputes over the distinction between fundamental and incremental decisions, in many cases it is not difficult to identify fundamental decisions. As Braybrooke and Lindblom argue, 'in any society there develops a strong tendency towards convergence in estimates of what changes are important and unimportant' (1963, p. 62). Some examples include: whether to undertake a programme of building nuclear reactors to provide energy; whether to undertake a programme of space exploration; whether to develop supersonic passenger aircraft; and whether to rely on nuclear or non-nuclear armed forces. On these kinds of issues it may be possible to use a strategy which combines features of bounded rationality, mixed scanning and Lindblom's later elaboration of incrementalism, which we now consider.

INCREMENTALISM REVISITED

Bounded rationality, it will be recalled, involves the decision-maker in choosing an alternative which is good enough. Satisficing in this way enables the decision-maker to stop his search for alternatives long before all possible alternatives and their

consequences have been examined. This approach, originally outlined by Simon, is seen by a number of writers as having merit. Vickers, for example, argues that satisficing is the way in which most decisions are made in practice. As Vickers comments, 'Only if nothing "good enough" is found . . . are other possibilities seriously considered' (1965, p. 91). Bounded rationality also receives favourable comment from Lindblom. In an article published in 1979 reviewing the debate surrounding incrementalism, Lindblom argues that the limitations on rationality are such that bounded rationality is the best that can be achieved. Lindblom introduces the term strategic analysis to describe a form of incrementalism which appears to be similar to bounded rationality. What is significant in Lindblom's 1979 article is that strategic analysis emerges as only one form of incrementalism. According to Lindblom we need to distinguish simple incremental analysis, disjointed incrementalism and strategic analysis. *Simple incremental analysis* involves analysis limited to consideration of alternatives which are only incrementally different from the status quo. *Disjointed incrementalism* involves limiting analysis to a few familiar alternatives, an intertwining of goals and values with the empirical aspects of the problem, a greater preoccupation with the problem than the goals to be sought, a sequence of trials, errors and revised trials, analysis that explores only some consequences of an alternative, and fragmentation of analytical work to many participants. *Strategic analysis* involves analysis limited to any calculated or thoughtfully chosen set of stratagems to simplify complex policy problems. Simple incremental analysis is one element in disjointed incrementalism, and disjointed incrementalism is one form of strategic analysis. Lindblom argues that strategic analysis is a preferable ideal to synoptic analysis. Figure 5.2 illustrates the range of options discussed by Lindblom.

A further refinement introduced into the discussion is the distinction between the various forms of incremental *analysis*, as outlined above, and incremental *politics*. Incremental politics involves political change by small steps, and may or may not result from incremental analysis. The distinction then is between the process of decision – incremental analysis – and

Ill-considered, often bumbling incompleteness in analysis	seat-of-pants semi-strategies	seat-of-pants plus studied strategies	Strategic analysis: informed and thoughtful choice of methods of problem simplification

Most of us are in this broad range: some here toward the right
(We ought to be in this range)

Figure. 5.2: Incremental and strategic analysis
SOURCE: Lindblom (1979)

the scale of the change brought about by the decision. What characterises incremental politics is that only small changes result from decisions, although Lindblom reminds us there is no reason in principle why large changes cannot result from a succession of small steps.

Commenting on Lindblom's discussion, Gunn and Hogwood argue that the ideal of strategic analysis represents a significant departure from Lindblom's early writings. 'Surely', they argue, 'this . . . all adds up to a form of modified rationality rather than Lindblom's early attempts to stand rationality on its head?' (1982, p. 21). There is sufficient ambiguity in Lindblom's writings to leave room for doubt on this point. Nevertheless it does seem that simple incremental analysis or muddling through is no longer sufficient, even though it is necessary. This does not mean aspiring to synoptic analysis, which Lindblom still considers an impossible ideal. Instead, what is proposed is 'the supplementation of incremental analysis by broad ranging, often highly speculative, and sometimes utopian thinking about possible futures, near and far in time' (Lindblom, 1979, p. 522). It is as a result of statements like this that it seems possible to argue that Lindblom has moved towards the middle ground and indeed comes close to the bounded rationality and mixed scanning models which command considerable support as prescriptive models in the decision-making literature.

Lindblom's reformulation of the incrementalist thesis also links in with Dror's argument for the use of extra-rational approaches in decision-making. Dror maintains that rational-comprehensiveness, bounded rationality, mixed scanning and incrementalism all have their roots in ideas about rationality, the main difference between rational-comprehensiveness and the other models being that the latter 'are presented as realistic second bests to the unachievable ideal, pure rationality' (1964, p. 149). According to Dror the only real alternative to all of these models is an extra-rational approach. It is relevant to note that Lindblom in his later writings also appears to be in sympathy with the need for different kinds of contributions to decision-making processes. This much is indicated by his advocacy of 'methods that liberate us from the synoptic and incremental methods of analysis' (1979, p. 522).

Ultimately, this amounts to an argument for strategic analysis on appropriate issues to be joined with various forms of creative problem-solving. It is in this direction that a new form of rationality may emerge.

CONCLUSION: RATIONALITY AND POWER

One of the issues underlying the debate about models of decision-making is the relationship between the way decisions are made and the distribution of power in contemporary society. Lindblom's early work provides an important link between incrementalism and pluralism. He argues that, in a society like the USA, groups are able to defend the interests of different sections of society and in this way no interests are entirely ignored. Through a process of mutual adjustment issues are resolved and a system of dispersed power centres enables more values to be protected than a system of centralised coordination. It was this that led Etzioni to argue that disjointed incrementalism 'is presented as the typical decision-making process of pluralistic societies, as contrasted with the master planning of totalitarian societies' (1967, p. 387). In Etzioni's view this interpretation needs to be challenged, for two reasons: first, because mutual adjustment will favour the well-organised partisans and work against the underprivileged; and second, because incrementalism will neglect basic innovations and fundamental questions. A third reason why the association of incrementalism with pluralistic societies and comprehensive planning with totalitarian societies needs to be questioned is that empirical studies suggest that incrementalism may be prevalent even in totalitarian societies (see for example Crouch, 1981).

Lindblom recognises the strength of Etzioni's points. As far as the first is concerned, in *Politics and Markets* (1977), Lindblom accepts that pluralism is biased in favour of certain groups, particularly businesses and corporations. Yet he resists the argument that centralised planning would be a preferable means of making decisions. Rather, Lindblom argues that the veto powers so prevalent in the US political

system, and which prevent even incremental change occurring in some policy areas, need to be challenged through a restructuring of mutual adjustment. Specifically, he proposes that planners should be brought into policy-making to give absentees a voice. The overall aim should be 'greatly improved strategic policy-making, both analytical and interactive' (1977, p. 346).

On the second point, Lindblom accepts that partisan mutual adjustment is only active on ordinary questions of policy. Certain grand issues such as the existence of private enterprise and private property and the distribution of income and wealth are not resolved through adjustment. Rather, because of 'a high degree of homogeneity of opinion' (1979, p. 523) grand issues are not included on the agenda. Lindblom adds that this homogeneity of opinion is heavily indoctrinated, and in *Politics and Markets* he explores the operation of what, in the previous chapter, we have referred to as ideology. Lindblom's argument is that in any stable society there is a unifying set of beliefs which are communicated to the population through the church, the media, the schools and other mechanisms (1977, Ch. 15). These beliefs appear to be spontaneous because they are so much taken for granted, but in Lindblom's analysis they are seen as favouring and to some extent emanating from dominant social groups.

Is there an inconsistency here between Lindblom's early and later work? Lindblom argues not, reiterating that the pluralism which results from partisan mutual adjustment is heavily lopsided, at the same time arguing that the key task is to muddle through more skilfully and to strengthen strategic analysis. Nevertheless, it does seem that the optimistic tone of the original incrementalist thesis has by the late 1970s been replaced by a more critical and pessimistic analysis. It may not be going too far to suggest that in his early writings Lindblom was content to endorse incrementalism because of his interpretation of the US power structure in pluralistic terms. In contrast, in his later writings, Lindblom, reflecting the changing political conditions of the USA, and the accompanying challenge to pluralism within political science, explicitly acknowledges the limitations of pluralism, and is less sanguine

about incrementalism. In short, it would seem that his call for improved strategic analysis follows on from a recognition that the distribution of power is less equal than he once assumed.

5

Issue Search

5.1 The importance of issue search

The potential contribution which analysis can make at later stages of the policy process depends on when and how a potential public policy problem or opportunity is initially identified. The introduction of expensive policy analysis techniques for options appraisal may be wasted if the failure to identify a potential problem at an early enough stage means that many options are foreclosed because of time constraints, or that they can only be adopted at a much greater cost. All organizations in the public sector currently employ both formal and informal methods of identifying possible problems, opportunities, or threats to the organization. The questions to be explored are whether these existing channels, many of them 'political', are fully adequate for establishing the 'agenda' of public policy issues, or whether the use of more active issue search approaches might improve the overall issue-processing capacity of public organizations

5.2 Agenda setting in practice

How and why do some issues get on the policy agenda for discussion and perhaps action, while others do not or, if they do, receive only cursory or belated attention? There are, of course, different types and levels of agendas (see Cobb and Elder, 1972, on 'systemic' and 'institutional' agendas) and agenda items can also be categorized in various ways, such as annually recurring (for example, budget-related) items, less regular but cyclically recurring items such as demands for an incomes policy, and apparently 'new' items which, in turn, either become recurring items or quietly disappear.

To the extent that it is possible to generalize, however, an issue—especially a new issue—seems most likely to reach the agenda if one or more of the following circumstances apply. First, the issue has reached *crisis* proportions and can no longer be ignored (see Kimber *et al.*, 1974, on the origins of the Deposit of Poisonous Wastes Act, 1972), or is perceived as threatening a future crisis (for example, nuclear waste in the 1980s). Second, the issue has achieved *particularity* (Solesbury, 1976): for example, 'acid rain' has recently served to exemplify and dramatize the larger issue of atmospheric pollution from sulphur dioxide and other industrial emissions. Third, the issue has an *emotive* aspect or the 'human interest angle' which attracts media attention, such as the tragedy of the 'Thalidomide children' which aroused concern about the side-effects of modern drugs and the plight of the severely handicapped. Fourth, the issue seems likely to have *wide impact*: most 'pocketbook' issues (such as higher rate demands by local authorities) come into this category, as do health 'scares' such as the possible link between the contraceptive pill and certain types of cancer in women. Fifth, the issue raises questions about *power* and *legitimacy* in society, as in recent disputes about the 'closed shop' principle and the use of 'secondary picketing' by trade unions. Sixth, the issue is *fashionable* in some way which is difficult to explain but easy to recognize: for example, problems of the 'inner city' or concern about mugging and other forms of 'street crime'.

Such predisposing circumstances do not guarantee politicization and access to the public policy agenda. For a fuller understanding of why issues do or do not achieve political salience we need further study of the activities and influence of various *agenda setters*, such as organized interests, protest groups, party leaders and influentials, senior officials and advisers, 'informed opinion', and the gatekeepers of the mass media such as newspaper editors and television producers. Fortunately there has been growing interest among political scientists (for example, Anderson, 1975; Richardson and Jordan, 1979) in the politics of agenda setting. Certain policy areas, such as ecology and the environment, have been particularly well served (Brookes *et al.*, 1976; Downs, 1972; Kimber *et al.*, 1974; Sandbach, 1980; Solesbury, 1976; Stringer and Richardson, 1980) but agenda setting in other areas, especially the more 'closed' fields such as defence or science policy, requires further research and discussion.

5.3 The case for (and against) more active issue search

5.3.1 THE NEED TO ANTICIPATE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Governments often become aware of problems or their ramifications too late to act upon them in the optimal way. The best time to start treating (or averting) a problem might well be before a crisis forced the issue onto the political agenda. Relatedly, it often takes a considerable amount of 'lead' time to set up the organizational structure to deal with a problem. Thirdly, if a decision has to be made very quickly once crisis has arisen, it may be based on inadequate or misleading information. There may be inadequate time for definition of just what the problem is and for exploration of the implications of alternative options. Many of the techniques available to policy analysts can only be brought to bear if there is adequate time for analysis; hence anticipation of occasions when decisions may be required is a precondition for effective policy analysis at other stages.

There are, of course, formidable technical and intellectual problems in devising methods of ensuring advance warning. However, it is political factors which help to explain the relatively passive role of governments in problem search. There is a temptation for governments to concentrate on current problems requiring action now rather than hypothetical problems where any adverse political effects of not taking action now will not occur until the future, and perhaps affect a different political party. In Britain, because of the frequent reshuffling of ministerial posts, an individual minister also faces the temptation to concentrate on issues with an immediate impact, since 'He knows that he will probably not be in the same post long and therefore not be held responsible for the consequences of his policies' (Headey, 1974, 99). Similarly, civil servants are likely to have moved on before any hypothetical crisis actually materializes. On the other side of the coin, the rewards for foresight for both politicians and civil servants are negligible, and are just as likely to be reaped by others as by those actually responsible for the anticipatory action.

Thus, there may be a mismatch between what is 'rational' in terms of bringing analysis and programmes to bear on problems at the optimal time, and what is 'rational' from the perspective of the career rewards of policy-makers. Thus, more active issue search would entail not only the introduction of new techniques, but alterations to the political reward structure so that foresight is rewarded (and perhaps lack of it penalized).

5.3.2 THE NEED TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS WHERE THERE ARE ONLY 'WEAK SIGNALS'

The type of information required for issue search may differ from that required for strategic planning or forecasting approaches, which tend to assume massive information input (see Ansoff, 1975, 22). If we are to be able to anticipate potential problems rather than merely identify problems which already exist we need to be able to respond to 'weak signals', particularly when there may be discontinuity from the present pattern. There is a paradox that a comprehensive planning approach is easiest (and arguably only possible) when it is least necessary, that is, when there is plenty of information and high continuity or certainty. On the other hand, incremental approaches are singularly ill-equipped to deal with large discontinuities, particularly those requiring long decision or lead times.

The purpose in seeking to identify potential threats or opportunities which are highly uncertain or may have only a low probability of occurring is to enable these to be taken into account when designing organizations and other policies so that a capacity to deal with potential problems is built in, or at least not precluded. In addition, it might be decided to establish a contingency or crisis team designed to carry out or co-ordinate contingency plans should the crisis actually occur. Such preparations may be politically sensitive, as indicated by the resistance of some local and health authorities to making appointments to posts concerned with civil defence preparations for nuclear war.

The identification of a potential problem on the basis of only limited information does not preclude fuller analysis later when more (or more certain) information becomes available, but at that stage it may be too late to start effective contingency preparations.

5.3.3 THE NEED TO RECTIFY UNEQUAL ACCESS TO THE POLICY AGENDA

We have already noted the political nature of any prescription for more active problem search, but the most explicitly political is the argument that access to the policy agenda is currently unequal, and therefore there is variation in the extent to which problems affecting particular groups get on the policy agenda. Policy analysts should therefore, it could be argued, take on the role of ensuring that the problems of all groups in society receive equal attention.

This issue is an academic minefield in terms of both descriptive and prescriptive models. In terms of descriptive models, there is a long-standing disagreement about the distribution of power in Western societies, both in terms of how issues get on the policy agenda in the first place and how this affects the final outcome (see Castles, Murray and Potter, 1971, part three; Jenkins, 1978, 105–16; Lukes, 1974; Polsby, 1980). 'Pluralist' writers tend to emphasize the widespread distribution of power among a variety of often competing groups and the existence of a multiplicity of channels for raising grievances, whereas 'class' or 'élite' writers emphasize the concentration of power in a particular elite group or economic class by virtue of office-holding, political power, or the way the State is structured to favour the interests of the dominant class. However, all but the most naïve pluralist theorists would accept that the ability of citizens to get issues on the agendas of decision-makers is not distributed evenly. A particularly relevant development in the literature is the concept of 'non-decisions', by which potential issues are kept off the agenda either by action or even by inaction on the part of those holding political power (see e.g. Lukes, 1974); pluralist writers, such as Polsby (1980) have attempted to cast doubts on the validity of the findings of those who claim to have empirical evidence of 'non-decisions'.

When we turn to the normative aspects of the models we can see the ideological problems which face a 'rational policy analyst' trying to 'improve' various stages of the policy process. If there is a tendency in the relatively closed British 'policy communities' of government departments and associated interest groups to raise issues which reflect only mutually shared values, how can a policy analyst, perhaps employed by the department, ensure that other issues are raised, and, indeed, is this a proper role for him rather than for elected politicians? Marxist models would indicate that the only way to remove the problem of unequal access—and indeed solve the substantive problems of society—is to overthrow the capitalist system. The pluralist writers would recognize the existence of inequalities in access to the political agenda, but would argue that this is inevitable in any political system and that pluralist societies represent the best, if unsatisfactory, form.

Thus to ask whether it should be the role of the policy analyst to seek to place on the policy agenda issues which are not currently receiving attention may also imply arguments for changing political institutions or for changing the distribution of political power, and the nature of the political system. For example, Stringer and Richardson (1980, 36–7) call for more open government in Britain on the grounds that more attention would be paid by government to the identification

and definition of problems if these were subject to critical review from outside the government apparatus.

5.3.4 THE PROBLEM OF ANALYTICAL OVERLOAD

More active issue search would involve further problems receiving serious attention from government in addition to those it already considers. Even given a substantial increase in the analytical capacity of government, it would not be possible to bring costly analytical techniques to bear on all existing issues, let alone new ones thrown up by a deliberate search for more problems which might require analysis. However, this is an argument for explicit priorities in deciding which issues should be subject to analysis of the planning kind, and which should be decided by conventional routes. Such priorities should not be determined by default, through the failure to give consideration to some issues at all. We present procedures for drawing up priorities for the allocation of analytical resources in chapter 6 on issue filtration.

5.3.5 THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OVERLOAD

It could be argued that policy analysts should not actively engage in seeking out new problems for consideration by government, since this would entail increasing the demands made on the political system without necessarily increasing resources to meet those demands, 'supports' for the political system, or the capacity of the political system to resolve issues. Since many of the 'new' problems may be intractable (and this may be one of the reasons why these issues were not on the political agenda before), the effect of creating new demands without necessarily providing the resources for corresponding solutions may be to create additional strains on the political system.

Set against this are the counter-arguments that better recognition of the problems and opportunities that exist in a society would increase general support for the political system and would improve the capacity of the political system to cope with problems. If improved issue search was part of a wider improvement of decision-making, then fewer resources might be wasted on bad decisions (some of which arise from inadequate warning of problems).

However, it has to be recognized that the idea still has to be sold to the decision-makers who have to cope with more information and increased problems. Their reaction may be that they have enough problems already, thank you. Advocates of issue search have to convince decision-makers that there are political or other benefits to them as well as to 'society as a whole'.

5.4 Distinctive characteristics of public sector issue search

We should be cautious of simply transposing prescriptions from the management literature to policy analysis, since the nature of the problems, environment, and organizational structure all differ; arguably, these are normally much more complex and ambiguous in the public sector. However, some insights from the management literature are potentially relevant (see e.g. Aguilar, 1967). One of the themes of the management 'scanning' literature is the need to scan for problems and opportunities in a range of different contexts. For example, Hellriegel and Slocum (1974) draw attention to the different *modes* of scanning ranging from highly structured to quite unstructured:

(1) *Undirected viewing*. This is exposure to information without any specific purpose in mind. Thus firms 'keep their eyes open' for information about political, economic, and social developments, but without quite knowing what they hope to derive from this information.
(2) *Conditioned viewing*. This involves a degree of purposefulness in terms of the information sources to which the organization exposes itself and of the purposes to which that information may be applied. A manager travelling abroad may notice particular types of opportunity or methods of delivery which are potentially applicable to his own organization.
(3) *Informal search*. Here the organization is in a less passive or reactive stance. Branch managers or regional representatives might be requested to look out for certain types of information for specified purposes. For example, Inland Revenue tax inspectors might be asked to look out for signs of growth in the 'black economy'.
(4) *Formal search*. This involves quite deliberate scanning: the aim is to acquire specific information for specific purposes. This could include market analyses and forecasts; technological state-of-the-art surveys and forecasts; political analysis, etc. Sometimes a specific unit is set up within a firm for such purposes. More often it is a matter of policy information acquired by various departments within a firm: R. & D., marketing, finance, etc.

The last category, formal search, has an aura of being more sophisticated and more rational than other modes of scanning. However, it is these other modes which are likely to lead to the identification of problems and opportunities which had not previously been anticipated

or which would not be thrown up by the appraisal of routine data. The problem is to ensure that all this information is passed on to the parts of the organization where it will be utilized.

Similarly, there is the problem of co-ordination of information from a variety of sources, both personal and impersonal, and of varying degrees of reliability. The problem arises from the fact that effective information flows do not necessarily correspond to either functions or formal hierarchies within and between organizations. The 'official' flows of information will tend to be impersonal: trade publications, trade shows, technical conferences, regular reports, scheduled meetings, etc. However, personal information is often potentially more important: business contacts, customers, bankers' advice, recruits transferring to the firm, even (or especially) gossip. Such personal, and often oral, information may not necessarily reach the relevant sections of the organization (especially if there is internal distrust) or may be discounted relative to supposedly harder, formal printed information.

Any organization will seek, or simply receive, different types of information. For a firm, these will include market information, technical information, information about broad issues such as general economic conditions, government policies, social trends, leads about potential mergers and acquisitions, and information about suppliers and resources. For most public sector organizations, information about the clientele served or target group regulated would be most important for the identification of future problems and opportunities.

Despite some similarities between scanning for industry and issue search for public policy, there are important differences, some of which reflect the less well-defined nature of public policy concerns, but others of which derive from the Government's special authority to collect data which it requires.

Arguably it is easier for industry to conduct scanning because there will be greater agreement about what to scan for, how to measure it, and how to interpret the findings in terms of their implications for the firm. Within government one can distinguish between economic and social data, with social data being more fragmented because of the lack of any central social theory (Moser, 1980, 9). However, even with macroeconomic data there is now less certainty about the policy implications, even within the known margins of uncertainty. The potential range of data that government has to scan is much wider than for firms, though some firms are now becoming sensitive to wider social and political implications of their activities.

Government has certain advantages in the different sources of information on which it can call. We can distinguish between *by-product statistics*, which are produced incidentally to the carrying on of the administrative process, and *survey statistics*, where the main purpose of collecting the statistics is to produce information (Thomas, 1980). Because of the scale of its activities, government generates a wide range of statistics on everything from crimes reported to the number of vehicles licensed to the volume of imports checked by customs and excise. In addition there are a number of statistics which could be said to be a main product rather than simply a by-product of a government activity: this is true of statistics of the numbers eligible to vote, which can be obtained from the electoral roll, and vital statistics collected as part of the process of registration of births, deaths, and marriages. While many by-product statistics are a valuable potential basis for scanning activity, care should be exercised that figures do not simply reflect administrative procedures rather than the phenomenon with which one is concerned. For example, figures for crimes reported or those registered as unemployed are not accurate measures of crime or unemployment, and changes in the statistics may not reflect corresponding changes in the phenomena (and vice versa) or may even be perverse in their measurement effects: a vigorous anti-crime campaign by the police may lead to a greater success in arrests, but because of that very success people may report crimes which previously they would have failed to report.

Government also has particular advantages when it seeks to collect information it needs. First of all, its sheer size means that it has the resources to carry out surveys of a type which might not be justifiable by smaller organizations. Secondly, government has the power to compel people to provide the information, such as business statistics from firms or personal details from individuals in the decennial census. However, much of the data that government does collect is through voluntary responses, as in the General Household Survey.

Government might, in principle, seem to have fewer difficulties in the transfer of information between public organizations than is the case in the transfer of information between firms which may be in competition with each other. However, this ease of transfer is not always apparent in practice. Central government is profoundly ignorant of the pattern of policy delivery at local level on many indicators. Even within central government there are problems of the transfer of data. As is so often the case in policy analysis, apparently technical questions turn out to have political ramifications.

Governments also have a wide variety of other sources of more informal information and demands, such as public inquiries, select committees (though much of the information they collect comes *from* government), consultative and advisory committees, interest-group representations, and information from MPs, as well as internal information-generating mechanisms such as reports from regional offices, embassy reports, intelligence and espionage activities, etc. The defects of these channels as mechanisms for agenda-setting have already been discussed in section 5.2.

6.3.1 ISSUE'S CONTEXT

6.3.1.1 Is there time for analysis?

An obvious first question to ask (though one ignored by those who assume that systematic analysis is always desirable) is whether or not there is sufficient time available to carry out an analysis. Political or other constraints may require that a decision has to be taken in the near future (for example, because the minister has committed himself to make a statement by a specified date). If the need is for a 'decision' rather than a fully documented 'conclusion' there is likely to be little enthusiasm for formal analysis.

Shortage of time need not mean, however, that there is no role for analysis at all. The analytical input may take the form of a 'quick and dirty' exercise. If so, it should try to limit decisions to those which have to be taken in the short term and retain flexibility to allow subsequent alteration (Wiseman, 1978, 78). Clearly this will be easiest in cases where the minimum outlay of resources is low (cf. 6.3.4.2). In any case, time is rarely an absolute constraint (for example, ministers can sometimes be persuaded to make a holding statement) and if an issue scores high on other criteria indicating the need for further analysis, any time constraint may have to be reassessed. Also the time by which an issue has to be decided is only one aspect of whether or not there will be time for analysis; the other aspect is the length of time the proposed analysis will take, which will in turn reflect the complexity and significance of the issue (see 6.3.2.3 and 6.3.3.1). Where appropriate, the starting time of an analysis can be advanced (i.e. it can be given preference in the queue of problems awaiting analysis) and the minimum time involved can be reduced by concentrating analytical resources upon it.

6.3.1.2 To what extent does the issue have political overtones?

'Political' here is not confined to party political issues, though these are obviously important. There are many other types of politics: interdepartmental and intradepartmental politics, interprofessional and interregional politics, and many others. What often happens is that a disagreement about a particular issue falls along the same fissure-lines as those which already tend to divide parties, or departments, or professions on many other issues. This means that the particular issue in question will more readily become 'politicized'. It will thereby also become potentially more significant in the eyes of the organization,

which might suggest the need for analysis. But the very fact that it is a 'sensitive' issue may serve to exclude analysis, especially where the organisation's leaders fear that an open, frank, and allegedly 'objective' analysis may expose them to criticism or exacerbate relations between contending groups. This sort of political sensitivity was one reason for the rejection by Whitehall departments of some subjects as potential candidates for PARs (programme analysis and review) in the early 1970s (Gray and Jenkins, 1983).

Thus the 'political' criterion is double-edged. A political issue may seem to require analysis, especially when it relates to fundamental questions of purposes and priorities within the organization; but a high degree of political sensitivity may mean that the issue does not lend itself to analysis.

6.3.1.3 Have fixed positions been adopted on the issue?

When an issue is 'political' in one of the senses indicated above, there is a tendency for party politicians or powerful figures within the bureaucracy to have preconceived ideas and to adopt fixed positions from which analysis is unlikely to move them. Indeed even the suggestion that an analysis should be carried out may receive very short shrift indeed. Thus, in Mrs Thatcher's Whitehall, it would be a brave analyst who proposed a study of alternatives to monetarism. Nor have recent Labour governments seemed likely to welcome a possibly critical review of comprehensive education.

6.3.1.4 How central to the concerns of the organization is the issue?

A final criterion related to the 'context' in which an issue presents itself (also to 'repercussions', see 6.3.3 below) is the extent to which it is perceived as having 'centrality'. This test is difficult to define but easy to recognize in practice. That is, some issues are seen as relating to the key values or purposes of an organization, or as bringing together many strands of policy, or as having long-term implications or widespread ramifications, or as creating precedents or guidelines for future decisions. For these or other reasons, such issues are seen as central rather than peripheral. Provided they are not too sensitive politically, they appear eminently suited to analysis.

6.3.2 ISSUE'S INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS

6.3.2.1 Is there scope for choice?

It is important to establish what range of options is open in tackling

the issue. The really difficult policy issues are those which require choices to be made, particularly where the choices involve large numbers of diverse factors. Where there are no real choices, or all options seem likely to produce much the same outcomes, or a policy line is heavily indicated by political or circumstantial factors (e.g. financial constraints), then there might seem little point in conducting in-depth analysis. Conversely where there appear to be genuine policy choices the case for reference to analysis would seem stronger.

6.3.2.2 How much consensus is there about the issue and the solution?

Related to the criterion of choice is the question of how much consensus there is about both the nature of the issue and the best policy for tackling it. If there is virtual consensus then analysts may have little to contribute, unless they can see value in acting as devil's advocate on occasion (e.g. when it seems that other options are being neglected or that the consensus is based upon an unquestioning 'conventional wisdom'). Where there is not only a range of choice but also disagreement, there might seem to be a particularly useful role for analysis.

6.3.2.3 How complex is the issue?

Systematic analysis would seem to have a major contribution to make where there is disagreement about the definition and scope of an issue or where there are many considerations and criteria to be weighed against each other in selecting a solution. Issues which involve a number of different factors have particular appeal for the analyst.

6.3.2.4 How much uncertainty is there about the issue and possible outcomes?

The complexity of an issue—and its appeal for analysts—will be increased if there is a high degree of uncertainty about the nature of an issue, the causal factors at work, the likely outcomes, and the feasibility of various solutions. Deciding between alternative solutions often involves choices between small, but fairly certain, gains and much larger, but also quite uncertain, gains. Analysis should have a good deal to contribute to issues involving the identification and consideration of probabilities. An issue might be expected to be of particular interest to an analyst if its outcome was both potentially significant (see 6.3.1.4 and 6.3.3) and highly uncertain.

6.3.2.5 How value-laden is the issue?

This may overlap with the question of political overtones (6.3.1.2)

but the more general point is that the contribution of analysis is likely to be more obvious and acceptable when dealing with issues which lend themselves to fact-finding, quantification, the comparison of commensurables, and relatively 'objective' analysis. There are other issues which can only be considered in 'subjective' or value-laden terms. Abortion is perhaps an extreme example of an issue where the grounds of dispute are located in strongly held and widely differing value-judgements, related to ethical and even religious beliefs. Capital punishment is another example of a value-laden issue. This is not to say that analysis has no contribution to make to such issues, but the contribution will be limited to, say, appraising the validity of the 'facts' advanced by contending groups or clarifying the value differences underlying the debate. Given the limited resources available for analysis, it might seem wise to attach only low priority to value-laden issues.

6.3.3 ISSUE'S REPERCUSSIONS

6.3.3.1 What scale of consequences is involved?

The resolution of a particular issue may involve bringing the organization (perhaps even the State) into a completely new area of activity, or terminating existing activities, or replacing an entire programme rather than altering it incrementally. An example might be deciding whether or not to omit the next generation of development of fission technology in civil nuclear policy and go directly in pursuit of fusion technology (the 'controlled hydrogen bomb'). As Americans say, the latter would be 'a whole new ball-game' with not only technological and industrial but also social, political, and military implications. Such a policy issue would clearly demand a larger input of analysis than other issues with less far-reaching consequences.

6.3.3.2 Will many people be affected?

Different issues impact upon different sizes of 'constituencies' or affected groups. Some issues involve very large numbers of people. For example, legislation to make wearing of seat-belts in cars compulsory affects all drivers and front-seat passengers. Simple political reasoning suggests that issues which affect large groups of people appear more likely to justify the expense of large analytical inputs.

6.3.3.3 How significant are the affected groups?

More advanced political reasoning will remind us that the size of an affected group is not the only determinant of its significance. In the

health services, for example, a small 'client group' can be politically significant if its members are well-organized and vocal (such as the drivers of invalid cars) or evocative of popular and media concern (such as the thalidomide children). Such groups may be able to secure the attention of both analysts and politicians. Conversely, much larger but less organized client groups, such as sufferers from bronchial diseases, may receive little consideration.

6.3.3.4 How significantly is the group affected?

As Wiseman (1978, 78) suggests, 'A small client group which could be provided with life-saving conditions might therefore be as important as a much larger group where disease condition(s) can only be reduced in severity and not cured'. More generally, an issue which involves significant consequences for a significant group is likely to be given high priority on the agenda of both politicians and analysts.

6.3.3.5 Is the issue likely to ramify and affect other issues?

Many issues are relatively insulated, so that decisions on them will have little or no impact upon other issues, policies, or agencies. The need for analysis would seem to be limited accordingly. However, some issues tend to ramify, to have 'knock-on' or side effects, and to have far-reaching consequences for the parent organization and for other agencies. These may qualify for analysis on the grounds of centrality (6.3.1.4) and complexity (6.3.2.3); but analysts have a more direct contribution to make to such issues in terms of tracing and assessing their ramifications and repercussions throughout the larger system. This type of analytical activity may be particularly suitable for a central unit such as a corporate planning group in a local authority or the former Central Policy Review Staff in the Cabinet Office. The influential work of CPRS on population trends and their implications for public services is a good example of this sort of analysis (CPRS, 1977).

6.3.3.6 Will acting upon the issue restrict the agency's future flexibility of action?

Former US Defense Secretary McNamara used to warn his colleagues against adopting policy options which would 'foreclose' other options. British civil servants are taught to recognize decisions which may be quoted as precedents or 'decision rules' (Keeling, 1972) and thus commit their department. Any economist knows that the true cost of 'project A' is not simply the cash outlay ('accountant's cost') but rather

the denial of the same funds to project B and C with the loss of opportunities for possibly higher returns ('opportunity cost'). These are all examples of the same insight, namely that certain issues (or certain ways of handling those issues) are important because they have the effect of seriously restricting the alternatives open to the agency and/or limiting the agency's future freedom of action. Such issues and their resolution both require and lend themselves to analysis. As Wiseman (1978, 77) puts it:

Because there is usually considerable uncertainty about the future situation, decisions about the future should wherever possible be made in the future. When commitments have to be made, the level of flexibility of action they allow to be retained into the future is important in adapting to the inevitably changing circumstances. If any options are such that they will commit significant resources far into the future in a virtually irreversible way then very detailed and careful study of them will be required before any implementation should be contemplated.

6.3.4 COSTS OF ACTION AND ANALYSIS

6.3.4.1 How large are the costs of acting on the issue?

Almost every policy issue will have a cost dimension. Issues which involve major costs (not simply in terms of money but also real resources of manpower, materials, land, etc.) might seem to be self-evidently those deserving high priority in terms of analytical inputs. However, there are other aspects of the cost question. For example, an agency head might insist that any 'spending option' involving an outlay of more than £100,000 should be referred for analysis. However, £100,000 is a significant sum for a small agency and almost insignificant for a much larger agency. Thus, if any rule of thumb about costs were to be applied, it would be more realistic to refer a spending option for analysis if it committed, say 2% or more of the budgeted revenue expenditure. In other words, relative cost is more relevant than absolute cost in determining any threshold for analysis.

6.3.4.2 Cost increment or quantum jump?

The argument for incrementalism (see chapter 4) is that an agency can move from a known present into an unknown future by a series of small steps based upon trial and error and experiential learning, with little or no need for costly analysis. For example, it would be possible to introduce a small-scale traffic-management scheme in Bradford and, if it worked, to expand it gradually in other towns, even nation-wide

eventually, without any prior or formal analysis being involved. Contrast this with the case, quoted earlier, of pursuing the 'fusion' option in nuclear civil policy. A fusion reactor cannot be developed incrementally (or, for that matter, terminated decrementally): both literally and metaphorically, it has a 'critical size' below which nothing will happen and the minimum commitment of resources involved in embarking upon such a policy initiative is enormous and irreducible (Schulman, 1980). Many programmes based upon advanced technology (Concorde, space travel, etc.) have extremely high 'entry fees' and the funding agency's budget will rapidly move on to a new plateau rather than increase gradually over the years. This used to be called 'lumpy expenditure' but has now attracted the more impressive label of a 'quantum jump' in expenditure.

Where tackling a policy issue will commit an agency to a very large minimum outlay, especially one which is virtually irreversible (e.g. Concorde), there is the clearest of cases for prior and extensive datagathering, forecasting, research and analysis.

6.3.4.3 For how long a period will resources be committed?

J. K. Galbraith (1969) argues that one of the 'planning imperatives' in modern industry arises from the fact that the average 'lead time' of investment is increasing (i.e. the period elapsing between the decision to invest and any return on that investment). When large volumes of resources (see 6.3.4.2) are likely to be tied up for long periods of time, there would seem to be a strong case for planning to precede commitments, in the public sector as in industry. Among other considerations, the opportunity costs (6.3.3.6) of such decisions will be high.

Time considerations also add to the complexity (6.3.2.3) of a decision, since a pound spent (or received) today has a different value from a pound to be spent (or received) several years ahead. Modern methods of investment appraisal include provision for 'discounting for time' ('discounted cash flow' methods): although the calculations are fairly simple, some of the assumptions involved are controversial and such project appraisal is best put in the hands of professional analysts.

6.3.4.4 What will be the cost of analysis?

Perhaps surprisingly, given its emphasis on the rational use of resources, much of the policy analysis literature ignores the cost of the analysis itself. The resources of money and manpower available for analysis are usually severely limited. The resources committed to one analysis may

be denied to another, potentially fruitful, analysis so that there are considerations of opportunity cost involved here as well. Other things being equal, analyses which would tie up many resources should be approached with great caution.

6.3.4.5 Will the analysis have pay-off?

Other things are rarely equal, however, and the cost of any analysis must be set against the anticipated benefit in terms of better policy, especially when the issue involved is central, complex, likely to ramify, and significant in terms of the various dimensions identified above.

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Understanding
the political
world

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Chapter 7

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When we think about the political world, the names of certain governmental institutions come to mind. These institutions have such names as the *Senate*, the *Chamber of Deputies*, the *prime minister*, the *Ministry of Defense*, the *KGB*, the *Treasury*, and the *Supreme Court*. Each of these labels represents a particular component of one of the four major structures of governance, which are generally termed the *legislature*, the *executive*, the *administration*, and the *judiciary*. This chapter provides some broad descriptive generalizations about the nature and roles of these four common governmental structures that operate within most nation-states.

In Chapter 5, an analytic distinction was made between certain *functions* of governance, such as rule making and rule adjudication, and the institutional *structures* that might be involved in the performance of those functions. This distinction between functions and structures can be confusing, because there is a tendency to identify a certain function with a certain structure. For example, one might assume that the national legislature is the structure that dominates the rule-making function. But the distinction between function and structure is useful because, minimally, there might be other structures besides the legislature that are significantly involved in the rule-making function. In the United States, for example, there are major rule-making activities not only in the Congress, but also from the chief executive (the president), the upper levels of the administration (the cabinet departments), and the judiciary (particularly the Supreme Court). And in China, the national legislature has almost no real power over the rule-making function, which is carried out by the Communist party and the political executive.

This chapter emphasizes the general nature of each major institutional structure, the basic building blocks of most contemporary political systems. It also indicates the primary functions that are typically performed by each institutional structure. As you read this chapter, remember that each of the four major structures can perform a variety of functions in a particular political system and can be composed of many different substructures. For these reasons, the discussions emphasize broad patterns and generalizations, although there are always exceptions and variations across the many nation-states.

THE LEGISLATURE

Most states (about 80 percent) have a legislature as a part of their basic structures of governance. Among the names of legislatures (which can have one or two "houses") are the Senate and the House of Representatives (United States), the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, among others), the Legislative Assembly (Costa Rica), the National People's Congress (China), the People's Chamber (East Germany), the National Assembly (Egypt and Tanzania, among others), the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha (India), the Knesset (Israel), the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors (Japan), and the House of Commons and House of Lords (United Kingdom).

Roles of the Legislature

Legislatures have always been structures where policy issues are discussed and assessed. Indeed, the roots of the name of the first modern legislature, the British Parliament, suggests this crucial function—the French word *parler*, "to talk". Most early legislatures were initially created to provide advice to the political executive, typically a monarch, and to represent politically relevant groups. Many legislatures have also been responsible for a second major function—enacting public policies. The roots of the word *legislature* itself are the Latin words *legis*, meaning "law," and *latio*, "bringing or proposing." Some of the earliest legislatures, such as the Roman Senate (from about 500 B.C. to 100 A.D.), had great power to discuss and enact laws.

Although a particular legislature might not exercise these powers, most legislatures are supposed to have three broad roles: (1) enacting legislation, (2) representing the citizenry, and (3) overseeing the executive. In the discussion of these roles that follows, be aware that it is difficult to generalize about the actual functions of the legislatures in all contemporary political systems. First, these actual functions are often quite different from those specified in the state's normative rules, such as those in constitutions. Second, the actual functions of legislatures vary considerably from state to state. Third, they vary through time within a state. Fourth, even in one time period, the role of the legislature within a state can vary because of the particular issue or set of personalities who are active.

Enactment of Legislation. It might seem obvious that legislatures draft, modify, and then ratify public policy in the form of legislation. But in fact, most contemporary legislatures do not have the dominant role in the rule-making function. As I suggest below, dominance in rule making has passed to the executive in most political systems.

Nonetheless, many legislatures continue to have an active and significant role in the rule-making function. The essence of the legislature's power in rule making is, in most political systems, a constitutional provision that a majority vote of the members of the legislature is required to authorize the passage of any law ("legislative enactment"). The power to enact laws that raise revenue and to authorize its expenditure on public policies ("the power of the purse") has been a central responsibility of the legislative majority. In some systems, legislatures have a system of special committees that thoroughly assess and can amend all proposed legislation that is under the committees' jurisdiction. And in some political systems, many laws are also initiated and drafted by members of the legislature.

Representation of the Citizenry. A second major role of the legislature is to represent, within the governing process, the opinions and interests of the citizenry. Most legislators are elected by some set of the eligible voters, and it is assumed that a key responsibility of a legislator is to reflect and to serve the best interests of those voters.

However, the concept of representation is not straightforward, because there

are at least four different conceptions of the "interests" that a legislator might attempt to represent: (1) the group that is most dominant in the legislator's constituency, possibly a social class or an occupational class or an ethnic group; (2) the political party to which the legislator owes loyalty; (3) the nation-state as a whole, whose broad interests might transcend those of any group or party; or (4) the legislator's own conscience, which provides a moral/intellectual judgment about appropriate political behavior (a position made famous in a brilliant justification in 1774 by British parliamentarian Edmund Burke in his "Address to the Electors of Bristol" [1855/1967:219–222]).

Is it possible for a legislator to represent all four voices simultaneously? In reality, the legislators in most contemporary legislatures do not experience deep conflict in dealing with the problem of representation.

> For some legislators there is no choice, because they hold office in undemocratic systems where their actions are dictated by the political leadership, and thus they act as little more than "rubber stamps." This would characterize the behavior of a legislator in Cuba or Iran, for example.
> Some legislators, in both nondemocratic and relatively democratic political systems, are deeply committed to adhere to their political party's line or must obey the party to survive politically. This is usually the situation for most members of the British House of Commons, for example.
> Some legislators feel such deep loyalty to particular group or societal norms that they seldom experience seriously conflicting pressures.

There are only a few political systems where most national legislators are *not* significantly constrained by these forces. The U.S. Congress is an example. Legislators can experience underlying tensions, as they attempt to balance legitimate but competing interests that would lead them to support different decisions or actions. Even in such systems, there is predictability in most legislators' choices (on the basis of some dimension such as conservative-radical ideology or party-political loyalty). But there can be considerable variation, as the legislator attempts to balance competing interests, and also as she attempts to do some vote trading, compromising on some issues to insure greater support for the issues about which she cares most deeply.

Oversight of the Executive.   The third major role of legislators concerns their interactions with the executive. In general, the legislature is responsible to oversee the actions of the political executive, and legislators in some systems have substantial capacity to influence what the executive does. The legislature might have the constitutional right to select the executive, to authorize major policy decisions by the executive, and to approve the chief executive's selection of key appointments. In some systems, such as India and West Germany, the president is actually chosen by the legislature (although it is the prime minister, not the president, who is the most powerful executive officer in these systems).

Many legislatures have the right to approve the executive's selection of major appointments. The Israeli legislature must approve the cabinet as a whole. And

the U.S. Senate has the right to "advise and consent" on such presidential appointments as cabinet members or Supreme Court justices. The Senate's 1987 rejection of Judge Robert Bork, President Reagan's nominee for the Supreme Court, is an example of a legislature asserting its power over appointments. Also, in cabinet systems, the cabinet and prime minister hold office only if they have the confidence of the majority of the members of the legislature. Also, the cabinet's policies are only enacted if they are approved by the legislative majority.

A second area of legislative oversight involves the right of the legislature to scrutinize executive performance. In many political systems, there are regular procedures by which the legislature can question and even investigate whether the executive has acted properly in the implementation of public policies. At minimum, the legislature serves as a discussion and debating chamber. In subjecting the plans and actions of the political executive to public debate, a modest check on executive power is established. Many legislatures have a more direct right, during legislative sessions, to question the specific plans and actions of particular members of the executive. In Britain, Italy, and West Germany, for example, each minister in the executive cabinet must appear before the legislature and justify any actions taken by her department that are questioned by a legislator.

Most legislatures also have formal investigatory powers on a continuing or a case-by-case basis. Investigations by the U.S. Congress of the Watergate burglary (1972) and of the Iran/Nicaragua arms-for-hostages-for-*contra*-aid deal (1987) are dramatic American examples of such oversight. In addition, some legislatures have followed the innovative idea of Sweden, setting up an *ombudsman*—an independent agency that investigates complaints regarding the actions of the executive branch and its bureaucracies. If legislative questioning, committees, or the ombudsman discover inappropriate behavior by the executive, there is significant political pressure on the executive to correct it. Of course, if the executive resists such pressure, the ultimate resolution of the dispute entails either legal adjudication or, in most cases, a power struggle between the executive and the legislature.

The most fundamental power of oversight held by some legislatures is their capacity to overturn the government. In a cabinet system, the legislature can oblige or pressure the executive to resign from office by a vote of censure or of no confidence or by defeating a major bill put forth by the executive. Even in presidential systems, the legislature has the power to overturn the executive, by means of the extraordinary process of impeachment. Impeachment is quite rare in presidential systems. In the United States, no president has left office due to impeachment, although Andrew Johnson was acquitted on the House's impeachment charge by only one vote in the Senate (in 1868), and Richard Nixon avoided an impeachment trial only by resignation (in 1974).

Structural Arrangements

Number of Houses.   There is one very visible difference in the structural arrangements of different legislatures—the number of houses (often called *chambers*). About three-fifths of the nation-states with legislatures have *unicameral* or one-chamber legislatures. The presumed advantages of a unicameral system are that

political responsibility is clearly located in one body and that risks of duplication or stalemate between parallel legislative bodies are eliminated. These arguments sound similar to those put forth in favor of a unitary state. And, in fact, most unitary states have unicameral legislatures. Among the many states with unicameral legislatures are Algeria, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Kenya, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, and Tanzania.

In contrast, many of the states that have two legislative chambers—*bicameral* legislatures—are federations. These federal states include Australia, Canada, India, Mexico, the Soviet Union, the United States, Venezuela, and West Germany. There are bicameral systems in some unitary states such as Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Given the apparent advantages of a unicameral system, what is the justification for a second chamber?

One argument is that two legislative houses insure more careful and thorough deliberation on issues and laws. Secondly, the two houses can be based on two different and desirable principles of representation. Thus in the United States, the Soviet Union, and West Germany, one house represents the regional governments in the federal system and the other house more directly represents the numerical and geographic distribution of citizens. Some upper houses also represent functional groups in the society, as in the Republic of Ireland, where most members are appointed as representatives of such groups as agriculture, labor, industry, culture, and public services. Thirdly, in a few bicameral systems some members are selected on more individualistic criteria, as in the Canadian Senate (where all members are appointed for life) and the British House of Lords (where many lords are members because of their families' aristocratic status and the rest are "life" peers appointed for merit).

Over time, some bicameral systems have evolved toward unicameral systems. This has occurred where the need for extensive checks and balances within the legislative branch has not seemed compelling, representation in the "people's" chamber has seemed adequate, and the problems of overlap and stalemate between the two chambers have increased. Some political systems, such as Sweden and Costa Rica, have constitutionally abolished one chamber. And in other systems, such as Norway and Britain, the powers of one chamber have been so reduced that it can delay, but cannot veto, the decisions of the more powerful chamber. In fact, the United States is now one of the few bicameral political systems in which the upper chamber (the Senate) is both directly elected and politically powerful (more powerful than the House of Representatives).

Box 7.1
_____
A Peripheral Puzzle: Nebraska
_____
Nebraska is the only American state government with a unicameral legislature. Can you suggest reasons why Nebraska's decision was a good one or a bad one?
_____

Size of Legislatures. There is enormous variation in the numbers of members within a legislature. In his comparative study of 108 national legislatures in the early 1970s, Jean Blondel (1973:148–153) reported considerable variation. Lower chambers ranged from 24 to 888 members and second ("upper") chambers ranged from 6 to more than 800 members. The range is even larger now, with the expansion of some legislatures. Currently, the British House of Lords has 1,174 members, the Congress of People's Deputies implemented in the Soviet Union in 1989 has 2,250 members, and the National People's Congress in China has 2,978 members. The U.S. Senate, by contrast, has only 100 members. In the U.S. House, 435 members are elected, proportionate to population. Japan, with half the U.S. population, has 511 members, and the United Kingdom, with less than one-third the U.S. population, has 650 members elected proportionately in their lower chambers. Can you think of an appropriate decision rule for deciding how many members there should be? Are there persuasive reasons for the U.S. Senate having two rather than three—or four or N—representatives for each state?

The Decline of Legislatures

Many observers claim that in the twentieth century there has been a general decline in the power of legislatures, relative to executives and bureaucracies. Has the power of the legislature declined, and if so, why? Actually, it is very difficult to provide a definitive answer to these questions about relative power, using the techniques of cross-national empirical analysis. In large part, this is because the precise measurement of power continues to be a puzzle for which political science has no clear solution (see Box 7.2).

Given the difficulty of assessing political power with precision, can *any* answer be provided to the question of measuring the decline of legislative power? An empirical test of the relative decline of legislative power is especially difficult. It requires measurement and comparison of the power not only of the legislature, but also of the executive and the bureaucracy, at several points in time and across several (many?) different countries. Since no studies have provided a rigorous analysis of this issue, we might begin with a more modest question: Is there evidence that contemporary legislatures display significant political weaknesses? Despite the absence of precise measures, there are a few types of circumstantial evidence that suggest legislative weakness.

To begin with, the weakness of the legislature seems undeniable in about one in five contemporary political systems, which have no working legislatures whose power we might assess.

Moreover, in nearly all those states that are classified as totalitarian and many that are authoritarian, the legislature is essentially a "rubber stamp" for the actions of the political executive. This lack of significant power applies to 20–40 percent of the remaining states. Thus in as many as 60 percent of the contemporary political systems, the legislature need not even be considered a major power structure.

Among the 40–50 percent of political systems where there do seem to be

"real" legislatures, there are indirect indicators of the relative weakness of most national legislatures. First, most legislatures do not provide a coherent structure within which power can be concentrated and exercised effectively. Many legislatures have relatively slow and cumbersome procedures for the lawmaking function, especially where there are institutionalized legislative committees that amend legislation. This complexity in the legislative process is even more evident in bicameral systems, since there is often disagreement between the two chambers.

Second, legislatures almost never have the level of support services available to the executive. Their budgets, facilities, staff sizes, and even the legislators' own salaries are significantly lower than those of top members of the executive and administrative structures. Similarly, the technical expertise and knowledge resources within legislatures are far less than those of the executive and administrative structures, a major liability when legislators attempt to deal with the complex subjects facing governments in modern societies.

Third, such factors put most legislatures at a decided disadvantage, relative to the executive, as a source of major policy. In most national political systems, the executives clearly dominate the legislatures as the source of crucial legislation. Most legislatures react to policy initiatives from the executive more than they create policy. This is particularly true in cabinet systems, where the constitutional power center for lawmaking as well as law application is the executive (the prime minister and the cabinet) rather than the legislature. And in most presidential systems, policy initiatives by the executive are far more extensive than one might expect from examining the constitutional division of power and authority (Blondel 1973; Loewenberg 1971).

Some analysts have argued for a fourth, more social-psychological weakness of legislatures, although there is little empirical data on this point. The claim is that most citizens desire clear, dynamic, and singular political leadership; but legislatures are typically composed of many people who, for most citizens, are either indistinguishable or offer too many different identities. In the United States, for example, it is usually possible to answer the question, What does the president think about issue *Y*? But how does one answer the corresponding question, What does the legislature think? In this case, there are not only two chambers and two parties, but there is also a great diversity of different opinions among the individuals and factions within the legislature. In a sense, even though legislatures usually have spokespersons and leaders, no one can truly speak for the legislature. One might even conclude that the legislature in a domestic society tends to fulfill one of its roles too well—its members too accurately represent the diversity among the society's population, and thus speak with many voices.

Studies of major political institutions often mention the relative decline of many legislatures in the twentieth century. While the empirical evidence on this point is sketchy rather than systematic, the reasons cited in the discussion above suggest why the power of legislatures might not have kept pace with that of other institutions, especially the executive and the administration.

Clearly, not all legislatures are impotent or dying institutions. Certain national legislatures remain extremely powerful political structures, such as those in the United States, Japan, Sweden, and Italy. In most other relatively democratic political systems, legislatures have significant impacts on the authoritative allocation of values through their roles in enacting legislation, in representation, and in oversight. And in virtually all societies that have a legislature, its members can exercise political power in many subtle ways. At least, its members have dramatically more political power than most other citizens.

EXECUTIVES

The historical evidence indicates that as long as there have been political systems, there have been individuals or small groups who assume top leadership roles. Such a leader or leaders, who are responsible for formulating and especially for implementing public policy, can be broadly called the *executive structure*. The word *executive* comes from the Latin *ex sequi*, meaning "to follow out" or "to carry out." Thus the particular role of the executive is to carry out the political system's policies, laws, or directives.

One might be tempted to generalize that a few individuals emerge as the leadership cadre in *every* political order. But there are some historical counterexamples, especially from Africa and Asia, of societies that are *acephalous*, which means that they are "without a head." In such systems, many people in the community share power relatively equally, as a collective leadership. Nonetheless, in most sociopolitical systems a few people do assume the positions of executive power.

At the apex of the executive structure, there is usually a chief executive. This might be a single individual with a title like president, prime minister, chief, premier, supreme leader, or queen. Or there might be a small number of people exercising collective executive leadership, as in a ruling council or a junta.

A broader definition of the executive includes not only this top leadership, but also the entire administrative system. Such a definition derives from the notion that the rule-application function (the "execution" of policy) is shared by the top executive group and the administration. The top executive group cannot survive without the continuing support of an extensive system of people who interpret, administer, and enforce the policy directives of the executive. But in order to differentiate analytically between the major political structures, we shall examine the top executive and the administration in separate sections of this chapter.

Chapter 6 has already provided some analytic information about the executive structure. The executive was central to the description of different patterns linking the rule-making and the rule-application functions. Typically, the executive structure is partially or primarily responsible for rule making, as well as for rule application. While the executive is clearly differentiated from the legislature in the presidential system, the two structures are more integrated in cabinet, council, and assembly systems.

Also, the discussions of democratic and nondemocratic political systems in Chapter 6 emphasized the mechanisms by which top executive leaders attain

power and the conditions under which executives are replaced. Democratic executives are empowered by a limited mandate from the citizens and can be removed by regularized procedures that do not require the use of power. In contrast, non-democratic executives maintain their position in the absence of a limited mandate. The basis of their position might be heredity or the threat/use of power. Despite the considerable variations across states, this section will attempt to describe the components of the executive structure and certain common roles that most political executives undertake.

Structural Arrangments

The Chief Executive versus the Executive.   The term *chief executive* refers to the one individual or small group (such as a president, prime minister, or ruling junta) at the apex of the executive structure of the political system. The *executive* is a much broader term, including all the people and organizational machinery that are below the chief executive in the executive structure. Thus it encompasses upper- and middle-level decision makers in all the departments, agencies, or other administrative units that are in the chief executive's chain of command. As noted above, a definition of the executive far broader than the one is this book might also include the entire administrative system.

In theory, and usually in practice, this is a hierarchical system of political control, in the sense that the actors in the executive structure are supposed to follow the directives of the chief executive. But the chief executive's power over the rest of the executive is rarely absolute. Among the reasons why the chief executive's directives might not be carried out are these:

1.   Units within the executive might be too disorganized to act effectively.
2.   The executive might lack the resources to carry out policies in the manner desired by the chief executive.
3.   Units might be more involved in competing against other units than in coordinating their actions to meet the chief executive's policies.
4.   Units might misunderstand or resist or defy the chief executive.

Can you think of other reasons?

Fused versus Dual Executives.   Many political systems have a *dual executive*, in which one actor performs the more ceremonial aspects of top leadership and another is responsible for the more political aspects of the executive role. The essential virtue of the dual executive is that a citizen can be angry or hostile toward the political executive while still remaining loyal to the nation and to the political system through one's affection and support for the ceremonial part of the top executive.

Constitutional monarchies are obvious examples of political systems with a dual executive. In these systems, there is a ruling king or queen (such as Queen Elizabeth in Britain, Queen Margrethe II in Denmark, or Emperor Akihito in Japan) and there is also a prime minister or other political executive. The monarch

has little or no power to make authoritative value allocations; rather she serves mainly symbolic or ceremonial functions, as an embodiment of the nation and the people. Chapter 6 noted some "hybrid" forms of government that have attempted to create a dual executive in the absence of a monarch. They have created a second executive office (such as the presidency in India) that is typically insulated from the daily struggles of politics and thus can be a symbol of national unity.

A different form of dual executive exists in some political systems where the monarch is the strong element of the executive, but there is also a governmental executive that exercises modest political power. For example, in the Kingdom of Morocco, King Hassan II dominates the political process. In 1965, he suspended the constitution and dissolved Parliament, ruling by decree until 1977, when he allowed a new legislature to be elected, with a prime minister as chief executive. Kuwait and the kingdoms of Bhutan and of Swaziland are other examples where the monarch has greater power than the prime minister.

Most political systems have a *fused executive*, in which the ceremonial and political functions of the top executive both reside in a single actor. In such cases, it can be difficult or impossible to distinguish loyalty to a partisan political leader from loyalty to the nation. This is often used to advantage by political executives, who criticize or even punish their opponents by claiming that such opponents are traitors to the political order (although they are usually only critics of the current top leadership).

Roles of Executives

Leadership Roles.   In modern political systems, the crucial role of the chief executive is to lead. The leadership role entails taking the initiative in formulating, articulating, and implementing goals for the political system. In the contemporary political world, political leadership is virtually always identified with chief executives. The effective chief executive becomes the spokesperson for the aspirations of the people, can galvanize the people's support for these goals, and develops strategies that facilitate their accomplishment. The crucial skill of the "great" chief executive is this capacity to lead—to mobilize people and objects in the accomplishment of desirable goals.

To a large extent, initiative in policy formation is centered in the chief executive. Executive policy leadership is especially crucial during times of crisis, because the executive structure has the potential for coherence and unanimity of action that are often lacking in the legislature. Moreover, in most political systems, the chief executive has the capacity to veto, either directly or indirectly, the legislation that is initiated by the legislature. Increasingly, even the drafting of legislation is a function dominated by the executive, since many major bills require the expertise and policy direction of the chief executive and its staff.

Symbolic and Ceremonial Roles.   Whether a modern nation-state has a dual executive or a fused executive, the actors in the executive role usually function as the unifying symbol for the entire society, becoming the ultimate mother/father fig-

ures for the people. This is especially true if the chief executive has a strong image, as with such leaders as Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, or former U.S. president Ronald Reagan. The executive's presence becomes central to many rituals and ceremonies in the society, whether it is the appearance of the Soviet president on the reviewing stand at the May Day parade in Moscow's Red Square, the Kenyan president's official send-off of the national team to the Olympic games, or the British queen's Christmas Day message on television.

Supervision of the Administration.   In virtually all contemporary political systems, the executive has primary responsibility for the rule-application function—the implementation of the policies and laws of the political order. At the apex of this administrative hierarchy, which might include millions of public employees in the state's departments, bureaus, and agencies, is the top group of the executive structure. Most systems have an executive cabinet, each of whose members is directly and personally responsible for some major area of administration. Given the scale and complexity of the activities that are being supervised, these top executive actors can neither know nor control all of the actions that occur in their domain. But they are supposed to set the broad guidelines of rule application and in many political systems they are accountable for any major failures that occur. In cabinet systems, for example, the minister of a department will usually resign if there is a serious shortcoming or blunder in the area under her responsibility.

Supervision of the Military and Foreign Affairs.   Given the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force, the military, including internal security forces, is an area over which the top political executive usually has direct control. In such cases, the top executive is the commander in chief of the entire military system of the state, including personnel and other resources (aircraft, nuclear weapons, military intelligence, etc.). The chief executive must set policy and supervise the organization and utilization of the state's military capabilities, a task that can carry the most serious consequences for the security and well-being of the society.

Associated with control of the military is the executive's responsibility for foreign affairs—the state's relations with other nation-states. As Chapter 13 will describe more fully, the relations between states involve complex patterns of cooperation and conflict, as each state attempts to accomplish its own goals in the international environment. The chief executive, or her delegates, represents the state in its dealings with other countries. Particular significance is often attached to situations where the chief executives of different states meet directly, as in a state visit or a "summit conference." In fact, such meetings among heads of state typically are symbolic gestures of cooperation or ratify agreements that have been reached by the chief executives' representatives. But the concentration of the state's political power in the chief executives is so great that such meetings can provide opportunities for major breakthroughs in the relations between the states.

The Age of the Executive?

Although chief executives have nearly always been evident, and usually ascendent, in political systems, some analysts call the twentieth century the "age of the executive." This label reflects the apparent concentration of power in executives and the relative decline of legislatures' powers. Why do analysts claim that this has occurred? To some extent, this is a chicken-and-egg issue: The reduced capacity of the legislature for coherent and decisive state action is linked to the emergence of coherent and decisive executives.

In comparison to legislatures, the executive structure tends to be more streamlined and less prone to stalemate and inaction. And the executive, centered in a single individual or small group, can offer a unified focus for a mass public that desires simplicity and clarity in an age of great complexity. If a contemporary mass public wants some form of heroic leadership, it is most likely to be sought from the chief executive. The chief executive typically speaks with one voice and, when effective, can assure the people that political power will be exercised with certainty and efficiency to respond to the pressures and demands in the society and in the international environment.

Even if a chief executive cannot deliver, she can at least promise decisive leadership in a manner that no other political structure can. Since most political systems have always had a significant or even a dominant executive structure, the twentieth century might merely be more executive-dominated than many other historical periods. Can you specify conditions under which a state would be likely to be dominated by a structure *other* than the political executive?

THE ADMINISTRATION

While the chief executive can be understood as the managers of the rule-application function, the broader executive of a political system—the *administration*—consists of the thousands or even millions of public employees who do the ongoing business of interpreting and implementing the policies enacted by the state. These employees are divided into organizational units called by such names as *departments, ministries, agencies,* or *bureaus.* The state's military and police forces are often a particularly crucial component of the administration.

The administration is the machinery of government without which the political system could barely function. The units perform such important activities as the maintenance of order, the collection of revenues, the keeping of records, the provision of public goods and services (e.g., roads, education, solid waste disposal, health care, monetary aid for the needy), and the regulation or actual control of the factors of production (e.g., production of steel, provision of transportation, growth and distribution of food).

Bureaucracy as One Form of Administration

In most discussions, administration and bureaucracy are synonymous concepts. In the attempt to clarify our language of political analysis, it might be helpful to distinguish them. In this view, *administration* is the general term for the machin-

"Government Bureau" by George Tooker (Metropolitan Museum of Art)

ery and also the processes through which rules and policies are applied and implemented. *Bureaucracy* is a particular structure and style through which the administration can operate. Bureaucratic structure and style have received their definitive description from the great German sociologist, Max Weber, whom we first encountered in Chapter 1. Structurally, bureaucracy is characterized by hierarchical organization and specialization by means of an elaborate division of labor. Weber also defined the "ideal-type" bureaucracy by several key characteristics of its style of operation: (1) Its members apply specific rules of action to each case, (2) so that the resulting treatment of each case is rational (3) and nondiscretionary, (4) and predictable, (5) and impersonal (Weber 1958a:196–244).

Some readers might always have experienced treatment by public administrators that is consistent with these distinguishing features. This is quite possible, since some nation-states have deeply incorporated this bureaucratic style. But there are also many contemporary political systems, and even more examples historically, where there are frequent instances of unpredictable and personal treatment. In these systems, the treatment that you receive can depend on the attitudes of the administrator with whom you interact, as well as who you are, and whom you know. Or it can depend on what favors or benefits you offer to the administrative actor who deals with your case (see Box 7.3).

Among contemporary political systems, situations like that in the imaginary system of Delta are widespread. Personal contacts and bribes (in various societies, these are referred to as *grease, chai, baksheesh,* or *dash*) are often an essen-

BOX 7.3

"Dealing" with the Administration in Gamma and Delta

An imaginary example might help illustrate the contrast between a classic bureaucracy and one that does not fulfill Weber's criteria. Two citizens, A and B, each intend to undertake an identical activity: to open and operate a small shop selling tea and pastries in the market district.

In the country of Gamma, both A and B apply to the Ministry of Business, where an employee requires each to complete a standard form and to pay a fixed application fee. An inspector from the Ministry of Health examines the premises to insure that all health and sanitation regulations are met. When rat droppings are found in both premises, both A and B are obliged to hire an extermination service. Each receives the health certificate only after pest eradication and a second inspection. Both A and B open their shops.

In the country of Delta, A and B make the same application. However, A is a member of the dominant ethnic group and B is not. When A applies to the Ministry of Business, she is given a form to complete by the clerk, also a member of her ethnic group, and the form is approved. When B applies, she is told that the maximum number of permits for the market district has already been issued. After lengthy discussion, B telephones her cousin, who is an important politician in the local government. The cousin contacts the undersecretary in the Ministry, on behalf of B's request, and the application form is now provided and permission is granted. When the inspector from the Ministry of Health examines A's shop, she finds rat droppings. She threatens to refuse the certificate, and so A offers her a substantial amount of money. The inspector completes a report in which the shop passes the inspection. When the same inspector goes to B's shop, she claims to find evidence of rats. When she can show B no evidence, B demands her certificate. The inspector shrugs, provides the name of the only extermination service she "guarantees," refuses the certificate to open the shop, and leaves.

The contrast between the two imaginary cases is clear. The administrators in Gamma behave in accordance with the bureaucratic ideal. Both A and B receive fair and identical treatment and all rules of procedure are scrupulously followed. In Delta, however, the treatment of A and B is very different. A manages to succeed because she is a member of the favored ethnic group and because she is willing to bribe an inspector. B overcomes the hurdle of her unfavored ethnicity because she has an influential contact; but she fails to open her shop because she is not willing to accede to the extortion attempt by the inspector.

tial element of success in dealing with the administration. Indeed, in some societies, a style like that in Delta is viewed as normal and even appropriate, because it is assumed that individual treatment and personal favors are preferable to rigid application of the rules.

Is there a reasonable argument against a Weberian-style bureaucracy? In complex societies, terming an organization "bureaucratic" is not usually intended to be a compliment. Some criticisms of bureaucracy are really directed at all large administrative structures that exercise increasing control over people's lives and

that expand their organizational domain (i.e., their turf) to a level where they are seen as too large and powerful. But at its heart, the negative use of the bureaucracy label has come to connote a system that is too inflexible and impersonal. The application of rules is so rigid that extenuating circumstances tend to be overlooked, and every individual is merely treated as a number. Bureaucrats themselves are seen to be relatively free of political accountability, because they are protected by professional norms and hiring/firing rules, which give them quasi-permanent tenure and insulate them from political pressure.

Despite criticisms of its occasional excesses in practice, the Weberian bureaucracy is celebrated as an ideal form in most contemporary political systems. In the abstract, most people would prefer an administrative system that is overly rigid and impersonal to one that is based on corruption and personal favoritism. Rather like the ideal of democracy, many countries claim to be operating in terms of the ideals of Weberian bureaucracy. But there are enormous differences in the extent to which such ideals are consistently applied, especially in environments where the ideals are inconsistent with traditional practice.

Administrative Functions and Power

The scale of activity of the state's administrative structure depends upon that political system's definition of *res publica*. As the political system penetrates a larger sphere of the society and economy, there is a corresponding need for a more extensive administrative structure, since the administration serves as the basic apparatus through which the state interprets, implements, and monitors its value allocation decisions. Thus the administrative system tends to be larger, in relation to the society, as the political system becomes more totalitarian.

Given the very substantial variations in the definition of *res publica*, there are at least five broad functions that are performed, more or less extensively, by the administrative structures in contemporary political systems.

1. *Information management*. Administrators are responsible for the collection, storage, and analysis of huge amounts of data and information about the individuals and processes in the society. This information provides a crucial data base—recording activities and conditions in the society, measuring the nature and impact of public policies, and informing many ongoing decisions and actions related to the allocation of public values.
2. *Provision of knowledge*. Many administrators develop great expertise within their specialized areas. This knowledge can be of enormous utility for virtually every decision and action undertaken by the political system.
3. *Provision of public goods and services*. The essential work of the administrative structure is the rule-application function. Administrators must constantly interpret and apply public policies that provide public goods and services to individuals and groups.
4. *Regulation and enforcement of public policies*. The administrators are also responsible to interpret and apply many public policies that set

guidelines for the behavior of individuals or groups. These can vary greatly, from monitoring collusion among corporations to enforcing traffic laws to protecting the civil rights of ethnic minorities.
5. *Extraction of resources*. In roles such as collector of revenues from citizens and businesses or operator of state-owned companies producing goods and services, the administrative structure is in charge of many tasks that generate resources for the political system.

This brief and general list of functions suggests the enormous breadth and depth of the administrative structure and its activities. Some observers argue that in the complex, extensive, and knowledge-based political systems of the late twentieth century, the power of the bureaucracy is supreme. Although the administrators are, in theory, "servants" of their political masters and clients, it might be that in reality these roles are reversed. Bureaucrats have such unmatched knowledge and experience in their specialized domains that generalist politicians rarely have sufficient expertise to question the bureaucrats' information, recommendations, or actions. And their power to grant or withhold benefits provides them with considerable leverage over clients. Career administrators have quasi-permanent tenure while politicians and clients come and go. The modern bureaucracy has such wide-ranging power and competence that it is typically credited with maintaining political systems when executives and legislatures are ineffective, as in the Third and Fourth Republics in France and in many modernizing states in Africa and Asia. Max Weber himself might have had the last word when he observed that, "in the modern state, the actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy . . ." (1958a:211).

THE JUDICIARY

In a Hobbesian state of nature, disputes among individuals would normally be resolved by force or the threat of force. In such a setting, "might makes right." Thus a primary reason for the social contract is to authorize the state to intervene in the potential and actual disputes among individuals and groups, by creating and enforcing rules regarding proper forms of interaction.

Every society holds that those who violate its rules and laws must be sanctioned. But the rules in each society are deeply influenced by its unique culture, history, and politics, and there are usually ambiguities regarding the rules:

What does the rule mean?
Has a rule been violated?
Who are the "guilty" actors?
How serious is the offense?
What sanctions are appropriate?

These kinds of ambiguities are resolved through the rule-adjudication function in

BOX 7.4

Packing the Supreme Court:
F.D.R. versus the Judicial Branch

There is a constant interplay of power between the judiciary and other structures. A classic example of this interplay occurred in the United States during President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal (1933–1940). Roosevelt drafted and pushed through Congress a series of sweeping laws meant to use national government policies to pull the country out of the Depression. However, the U.S. Supreme Court consistently ruled these laws unconstitutional, since the New Deal legislation gave the central government a role far exceeding its constitutional powers, as the Court interpreted them. After considerable grumbling and frustration, Roosevelt devised a different strategy for influencing the court. Since there was nothing in the Constitution that limited the Court to nine justices, Roosevelt implied that he would increase the size of the Court.

Congress blocked President Roosevelt's initiative to expand the Court. But his appointment of two new justices and his threat to "pack" the Court was followed shortly by a change of heart on the Court regarding the constitutionality of New Deal legislation. By 1937, the Court majority no longer objected to the central government's expanded activities. While it cannot be proven empirically that Roosevelt's threat changed the judicial reasoning of the justices, it was punned at the time that "a switch in time saved nine."

independence, it still might respond to political pressure. In most systems, the individuals in top judicial positions are likely to share the values of the ruling groups, since they are appointed by chief executive leaders. And when judicial officials displease the dominant power group, they can be ignored, replaced, or even eliminated. In Argentina during the 1970s, more than 150 high-level judges disappeared and are presumed dead, and it is speculated that the Argentinian government ordered the executions.

Actually, the most common pattern among contemporary states is for the judiciary to be little more than a loyal administrative arm of executive power. While the rituals of the judicial structures offer the appearance of protecting "justice," the reality is that the judicial structures serve the political elite. In short, while most judiciaries exercise some discretion in rule adjudication, the existence of a truly independent judiciary is a rarity.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Traditional political science emphasized a description of political structures as the best means to explain how politics worked. But further empirical research has revealed considerable diversity in the roles of particular political structures. There is no straightforward and necessary correspondence between a political structure and the political functions that seem logically associated with the struc-

ture. Thus precise behaviorally oriented and process-based analyses of politics now treat political structures more richly.

For a while, political structures seemed so fluid that they were treated as secondary elements, merely forming a context with which various political, economic, and social groups must deal as the groups' actions result in the allocation of values for the society. But in the past decade, many scholars have reemphasized the importance of institutional arrangements. For the "new institutionalists," the particular configuration of political structures can powerfully shape political actions and outcomes (March and Olson 1984). For the "neostatists," the structures of the state—its institutional arrangements, the actors who have major roles in its institutions, and its policy activities—are autonomous and have fundamental impacts on political, economic, and social life (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Nordlinger 1987).

A full understanding of the political world requires a clear grasp of the essential features of executive, legislative, administrative, and judicial structures. Institutional structures are the skeleton and organs of the body politic. As one could explain certain biological functions and processes of the body without explicit reference to skeleton and organs, so one could explain certain functions and processes of the political system without reference to structures. But such an abstract description of a biological organism would be incomplete without indicating the way in which the structures constrain and shape the functions. Similarly, attempts to describe or explain politics, especially in actual settings, are much richer and more complete if they include a characterization of how political institutions constrain and shape the political process.

every political system. Many political systems have constituted judicial structures whose primary role is, or at least appears to be, rule adjudication.

Aspects of Rule Adjudication

The rule-adjudication function attempts to interpret and apply the relevant rules or laws to a given situation. When the issue involves civil law—the rules regarding the relations between private actors (individuals or groups)—the main objective of rule adjudication is to *settle the dispute*. Examples of such rules include divorce, contracts, or personal liability litigation.

When an individual or group behaves in a manner interpreted as an offense against the social order, rule adjudication can be an important mechanism of *social control*. Much of this is the area of criminal law, and the offenses are ones like murder, substance abuse, theft, bribery, extortion, or environmental pollution. The state represents the public interest and protects the social contract, insuring that the relations among actors are within the boundaries of "acceptable social behavior." In the same manner that the definition and scope of *res publica* differs greatly across political systems, the definition of acceptable social behavior varies dramatically. In some political systems, such social control entails little more than regulation of the conditions under which people can do physical and economic violence to one another. In contrast, there are other political systems where mere public criticism of the political order or its leaders is viewed as a violation of acceptable social behavior, punishable by imprisonment or death.

In some instances, rule adjudication can center in *arbitration regarding the behavior of the political system* itself. This is especially evident in cases involving constitutional, administrative, or statutory law—the rules concerning the rights and actions of the political system. The main issues for adjudication involve questions about the legitimate domain of action by a governmental actor, in its relations with other governmental units or private actors. Such a dispute might concern a quite technical disagreement over the implementation of a specific policy (e.g., is a person with vision correctable to 20/400 qualified to receive state-subsidized services for the "visually impaired"?) or it might raise fundamental constitutional questions about the distribution of political power (e.g., does the central government have the right, in a federal system, to force the state government to force a locally elected school board to implement full racial integration against the board's wishes?).

Judicial Structures

Most, but not all, political systems have specialized judicial structures—the system of courts and personnel that determine whether the rules of the society have been transgressed and, if so, whether sanctions ought to be imposed on the transgressor. (Some broad definitions of judicial structures even include agencies of law enforcement, such as police and security forces, and agencies that apply sanctions against rule breakers, such as jails and prisons, although I have included these among the administrative structures.)

In the United States we tend to link the rule-adjudication function closely with explicit judicial structures. The United States has one of the world's most complex systems of judicial structures, with a Supreme Court and an extensive system of federal, state, and local courts, including judges, prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys for the indigent, court clerks, and so on.

While there are significant cross-national variations, most political systems do have a hierarchical system of judicial structures, with appeal processes possible from lower- to higher-level courts. Most judicial systems also have subsystems that are responsible for different aspects of adjudication. For example, the French judicial structure separates the criminal and civil law system from a second system that handles administrative law. In the Soviet Union, one system handles criminal and civil law, but the second major system is composed of special prosecutors who monitor actions in all types of cases and who can challenge, retry, or even withdraw cases from the regular courts. In Great Britain, one major judicial system is responsible for criminal law and a second handles civil law.

The conception of an "independent" judiciary is a particularly interesting one. The legal system and the set of judicial structures in *every* political system are political. By its very nature, rule adjudication entails crucial decisions about the allocation of values and meanings for a society. Thus the only sense in which it is reasonable to speak of an independent judiciary is to assess the extent to which the judicial structures make decisions and take actions that are at variance with other powerful political structures in the society, particularly the executive, legislative, and administrative structures. While there is no systematic research to clarify this question, the judicial structures in most states consistently support and rarely challenge the power and authority of the top leadership groups in their society. In general, the judicial structures are *dependent* on political power for their own power and survival.

However, there are some political systems where the judiciary is relatively independent. By exercising the power of *judicial review*, such judicial structure can reinterpret or even revoke the policy decisions of the other political structures. About one in ten nation-states has a significant level of judicial review. Such states include Canada, Colombia, India, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, the United States, and West Germany. Even in states where the judiciary is relatively independent, it is ultimately dependent upon other political structures, especially the executive and the administration, to enforce its decisions.

The conflict between Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court (see Box 7.4) is a rather visible example of a process that occurs continually in a more subtle manner—the impacts of external political power on judicial processes and decisions. More recent examples in the United States are the refusal of California voters to reconfirm Rose Bird as chief justice of the State Supreme Court in November 1986 and the refusal of the Senate to confirm Robert Bork, President Reagan's nominee for the U.S. Supreme Court in October 1987. In each case these jurists were rejected on political grounds (Bird too liberal, Bork too conservative).

And even when the judicial structure does strive to maintain some politic

PRESSURE GROUPS

The theory which underpins our government is that of representative democracy. At least once every five years voters elect their representatives to the House of Commons. The majority party forms the government and proceeds to carry out its programme with the help of the civil service and the regular parliamentary endorsement which its majority provides. At the next election voters can decide whether or not the ruling party deserves another term of office. The diagram below illustrates the theory.

From: British Politics Today

B Jones & P Kavanagh

Manchester University Press, 1991.

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This is a very simplified view, of course. In reality voters never express a genuine collective wish, and even those who have voted for the party in power will disagree with aspects of government policy. Many will use their membership of pressure groups – over half the population belong to one kind of pressure group or another – to influence, counteract or reverse government policy in certain cases. Similarly, governments do not faithfully carry out their programmes in a vacuum. At every stage they consult and negotiate with these organised groups, amending, transforming or even abandoning their policies where necessary.

What happens at elections sets the general context for policy decisions – by selecting the party which forms the government. Remember, too, that policies are usually formed in opposition only in outline. The determination of specific policies in government emerges from a complex process involving, at its heart, consultation between Ministers, civil servants and representatives of those interests likely to be affected. The latter are often pressure-group

Government decisions

Pressure Group influence

leaders, who seek to strengthen their hand in dealing with Ministers and civil servants by influencing Parliament, other pressure groups, the media and public opinion. A classic study of pressure groups concludes that 'Their day-to-day activities pervade every sphere of domestic policy, every day, every way, in every nook and cranny of government' (Finer, p. 17). The second diagram shows how the theory is affected in practice by the permeation of pressure-group influence.

Representative democracy, which under the present voting system is based upon geographical areas, is therefore supplemented in practice by what can be seen as *functional* or *group* representation.

Some scholars, S. E. Finer and S. H. Beer included, have argued that such 'informal' representation is now more important than the 'formal' parliamentary system. Certainly people are more prepared to join and be active in groups which defend or advance their various interests than political parties which organise electoral representation. Some see the two systems as complementary, but others fear that pressure groups 'short-circuit' the democratic chain of representation and accountability. This question is returned to in the final section.

Development of pressure groups

Government has always had to deal with groups in society, but in the last two centuries they have organised themselves more effectively as society has become more complex and government intervenes in more areas of life. The anti-slavery movement and the Anti-Corn Law League were two early examples. Many philanthropic societies grew up in the nineteenth century, and government came to support, subsidise or even take over their roles altogether.

The nineteenth century also saw the formation of the major economic groups concerned with industrial production. Trade unions increased in membership and coalesced to form bigger units, while business groups too formed federations in order to negotiate more effectively with the unions and the government, itself an increasingly important economic interest. This process was catalysed by two world wars and Labour's 1945–50 nationalisation measures.

Types of pressure group

Pressure groups can be described as organised groups which seek to influence government policies. This definition is a useful catch-all for all the extra-governmental influences upon policy, but it puts a youth club that writes to its local MP on the same level as the TUC seeking to influence economic policy. When over half the population belong to groups which at some time or other try to influence government policy is hardly surprising that most definitions are unsatisfactory.

Useful distinctions can be made between:

1. Economic (or interest) groups

(a) *Trade unions*, representing workers, seek to improve their members' pay and conditions of employment, and to influence public and government thinking on a whole range of social and economic issues. Their central or 'peak' organisation is the Trades Union Congress (TUC).

(b) *Business organisations* are interested in maintaining the social and political conditions that favour their activites. Their peak organisation is the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). Increasingly important are the multinational companies. These are large international businesses with varied interests which use enormous investment power and the ability to switch operations to other countries (where conditions might be more favourable) to influence government decisions.

(c) *Professional associations* that represent and defend the interests of people with advanced training and qualifications, e.g. the British Medical Association, the National Union of Teachers. Increasingly these organisations are affiliating to the TUC.

2. Cause groups

(a) *Sectional groups* defend and promote the interests of specific social groups, e.g. Age Concern (old people), Shelter (the homeless or badly housed), the Child Poverty Action Group, the Automobile Association (motorists), and the typically British local voluntary associations which exist in great numbers.

(b) *Attitude groups* share common beliefs and objectives on a particular issue and seek change in the interests of society as a whole, e.g. the Howard League for Penal Reform, the

Electoral Reform Society, the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL).

Such classifications can be misleading in that some pressure groups have more than one of the above characteristics: for example, inasmuch as they represent the interests of working-class people, trade unions are also sectional groups; and the Politics Association — closely connected with this book — is both a *professional* organisation representing the interests of politics teachers and an *attitude* group seeking to alert government and society to the need for political education.

3. Values and pressure groups

3. Values and pressure groups are closely related and provide an interesting alternative form of classification. The more acceptable its objectives the more likely a pressure group is to achieve them. Richard Rose (*Politics in England*, 1980, pp. 234–5) identifies six possible relationships between group aims and cultural norms briefly summarised and adapted as: (a) *harmony*, e.g. the RSPCA; (b) *increasingly acceptable values*, e.g. the women's rights movement; (c) *fluctuating acceptability*, e.g. trade unions; (d) *indifference*, e.g. the anti-smoking movement before it was backed by medical evidence; (e) *fading support*, e.g. the Lord's Day Observance Society, and (f) *conflict with cultural values*.

Having no need to win acceptability, a group in harmony with cultural norms may seek to identify its aims with the interests of the country as a whole or, more typically, to concentrate upon influencing administrative decisions; other groups will need to spend time and resources fighting for acceptability.

Insider and outsider groups

Wyn Grant (1989 and 1990) uses a somewhat similar typology based upon the degree of intimacy pressure groups have with the policy-making process. He identifies three kinds of insider groups, all of which are constrained to some extent by the 'rules of the game': *prisoner groups* dependent upon government support (e.g. those Third World charities financed mainly by government); *low-profile* or *high-profile* groups (e.g. the CBI used to be a discreet, behind-the-scenes group, but then chose to court the media and acquire a higher profile). *Outsider groups* are less constrained; once again there are three. *Potential insider* groups will strive to establish

credibility through media campaigns, meetings with ministers and civil servants. *Outsider groups* by necessity lack the political skills to become insiders; for example, they will tend to couch their demands in extravagant or strident language, instead of the sophisticated, esoteric codes of the Whitehall bureaucracy. *Ideological outsider groups* deliberately place themselves beyond the pale of Whitehall because they wish to challenge its values and authority. Grant illustrates his typology with the example of animal welfare groups, which range from the respectable, 'insider' RSPCA, to the outsider, Animal Liberation groups, using threats and violence to pursue their ends.

Pressure-group personnel

Cause groups usually have only a small permanent staff and rely upon voluntary help which is often middle or upper-class in origin. Government sometimes channels funds into cause groups which it regards as particularly important – e.g. MIND receives one-fifth of its income from central government – or helps establish them where they are thought to be necessary, e.g. in the field of race relations. Trade unions and professional and business associations have large staffs, and the TUC and CBI employ several hundred people who shadow the work of government departments. Over the years the large pressure groups and government bureaucracies have become increasingly similar in recruitment and mode of operation, and pressure-group personnel are often drawn into government employ. Nowadays they are often career professionals rather than activists, but this is not so true of pressure-group leaders, who tend to be committed people who often move over into mainstream politics, e.g. in the 1970s John Davies from CBI to Conservative Cabinet, David Ennals from MIND to Labour Cabinet, and Frank Field from CPAG to Labour MP.

Relations with government

These are usually cordial and co-operative: each can give what the other wants.

Pressure groups want to protect and advance the interests of their members through: access to the decision-making process;

the recognised right to be consulted; contacts with Ministers and civil servants; real influence on policy formulation.

Governments rely heavily upon pressure groups for information and advice; civil servants, after all, are not experts in all the matters they must advise Ministers upon. They also hope that, in exchange for a say in policy-making (i.e. becoming 'insider' groups), pressure groups will: support measures passed; co-operate in their implementation; accept the authority of government; respect the confidentiality of discussions and behave in a 'responsible' fashion.

Hidden from public view, these transactions take place all the time. Indeed, without them government would be impossible. With government controlling nearly half of all economic activity it is inevitable that it should work closely with the economic pressure groups: they are virtually interdependent. Occasionally, however, they cannot agree and conflict ensues. It may be because government policy has changed radically, as in 1945 when the British Medical Association challenged Labour's plans to nationalise the health service or as in 1971, when Mr Heath tried to bring trade unions within the framework of his Industrial Relations Act. On such occasions both government and pressure groups are forced back upon the power they can command.

Government naturally has the greater power. It controls the vast economic resources of the State and the decision-making process, can freeze out a group from the process if it chooses, has the authority of law and in the last resort commands the forces of law and order.

Pressure groups do not have such monolithic power but they can bargain, threaten or retaliate in a variety of ways, as follows.

Methods

1. Violence and illegality. Hijackers and terrorists have shown how effective these techniques can be, albeit at high risk to themselves. Few groups would consider such extreme measures, but some do occasionally break the law to draw attention to their cases. Particularly active from the mid-1980s onwards have been various Animal Liberation groups, which have frequently broken the law to direct attention to the use of live animals in scientific experiments, the killing of animals for furs, and so forth. In June

1990 a bomb under the car of a scientific researcher exploded, badly injuring a one-year-old in Bristol.

2. *Denial of function*. As most cause groups seek to publicise ideas or serve the interests of social groups, this is not a technique they can use: it is the preserve of economic groups. Business concerns can lock out their workers, or direct investment elsewhere; multinationals can, and often do, threaten to move their activities to other, more agreeable countries. Trade unions, of course, can withdraw their labour through strike action.

3. *Publicity-seeking techniques* are used by all pressure groups and include demonstrations, marches, advertising, articles, books, specialist reports, broadcasts and so forth: a glance at the papers any day will reveal how successful their efforts have been. The more unusual the technique the more likely the media are to be interested; women camping outside the cruise missile site at Greenham Common in the 80s attracted considerable media coverage.

4. *Political parties*. Most cause groups try to pitch their message above the party political debate, but some seek to influence one party in particular. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), for example, has been able to command substantial support in the Labour Party and this was a key factor in the party's adoption of a non-nuclear defence policy for a time in the 80s.

5. *Parliament*. Many MPs automatically represent economic interests by virtue of being businessmen, trade unionists, doctors, lawyers or whatever, and can be relied upon to articulate and defend the interests of such groups. Additionally, certain pressure groups persuade MPs, and often pay them a retainer, to represent and defend their interests in Parliament. The practice is regarded as acceptable as long as MPs do not prejudice their voting freedom in the Commons — though some do have contractual agreements. Some MPs strongly criticise this practice as a form of 'buying' support. Also criticised is the increasing activity of professional lobbyists who seek to influence MPs on behalf of powerful economic interests.

6. *Ministers and civil servants*, substantially control the taking of executive decisions and the initiation of major legislation. Consultations with pressure groups take place mostly away from public view, most typically in the hundreds of joint advisory committees. This is the inner sanctum of influence to which most groups seek access.

Governability

As the economy has become more complex since the war its elements have become more interdependent. Small groups of key workers are consequently able to wield great power by threatening to disrupt the working of the economy. To be successful, government economic policy has to win general acceptance, but this is not easy. In the 1970s many urged the TUC and CBI to reach annual agreements on such subjects as wage levels — as in Sweden or West Germany — but these bodies are only loose coalitions: they cannot enter into agreements and be sure their members will keep to them.

Some commentators, like Professor Anthony King, have argued that the difficulties of reaching consensus between such wide ranges of antithetical, autonomous groups has made Britain harder to govern. Mrs Thatcher's answer was to disavow the consensus approach and assert the executive power of government. Her style, and to an extent the style of her government, has been to squeeze pressure groups towards the periphery of decision-making, to be less interested in listening and more concerned to act in accordance with what has already been decided as necessary.

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(ves on to argue that pressure groups complement the process of government by providing :—

1. Detailed information on specific areas of economic and social activity without which good government would be impossible.

2. Continuity of communication and consultation between government and public between elections.

3. Defence for minority interests, particularly those connected with parties not in government.

4. Increased participation in the political process by people not necessarily active in political parties.

5. A counter to the monopoly of the political process in Parliament by political parties. Cause groups raise items for discussion which fall outside party manifestos, and economic groups by-pass much potential party conflict by dealing direct with Ministers and civil servants.

6. Dispersal of power downwards from the centralised legislative and executive institutions and in the process providing checks upon their power.

Against this it can be argued:

1. Pressure groups are often unrepresentative and only rarely reflect the broad mass of their membership. Union leaders are often elected by small activist minorities, though we should note that business organisations and other pressure groups often have appointed officers. Neither is accountable to the public as a whole, despite the fact that their influence on policy is considerable.

2. A corporate state? Pressure groups have reduced the power of Parliament by working so closely with Ministers and civil servants. By the time Parliament sees legislation it is all but decided, and only a small minority of Bills are substantially amended on the way to the Queen's signature. Some commentators have discerned the rise of a 'corporate state' in which decisions are shaped and even made by Ministers and officials who are not elected by the public (see Moran, pp. 144–9).

3. Pressure groups do not represent society equally. For example, they favour the strong groups in society – key industrial workers, educated professionals, the business elite – and they favour producer groups rather than consumer interests. Weaker groups like immigrants, old-age pensioners, children or the unemployed have low bargaining strength, and are often poorly organised.

4. They often work in secret. Their consultations with top decision-makers take place behind closed doors, hidden from public scrutiny. S. E. Finer rather dramatically ends his classic study of pressure groups with a plea for 'More light!'

Concluding comment

The nature of pressure-group politics has demonstrated considerable change over the last twenty years: business interests are concentrated into fewer and fewer hands; the traditionally powerful pressure groups – especially the unions – have found their access to decision-making less easy and less effective. On the other hand, there has been a startling increase in nation-wide popular movements, many of them using opinion-influencing techniques to good effect.

This has been particularly true of environmental groups. Between 1971 and 1988, membership grew from 1,000 to 65,000 in Friends of the Earth: 278,000 to 1,634,000 in the National Trust and 98,000 to 540,000 in the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Band Aid, Live Aid and, in 1990, the Mandela Concert, have shown the power of the media and popular music to change people's minds and win their support. The anti-apartheid movement, moreover, has chalked up many successes in the last decade, notably the withdrawal of Barclays Bank from South Africa in 1986.

The professional campaigner Des Wilson has been a potent influence in the development of citizen power. Despite Mrs Thatcher's assertion of executive initiative and the decline of trade-union power, pressure-group politics at the national and local level seem to be as vigorous as ever.

Pressure Groups in the Global System

The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organizations

Edited by
Peter Willetts

Includes ch. w

Anti-Apartheid

PLO

Amnesty Int.

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Friends of the Earth

UN Women's Conference

Gov't Response to pressure groups - Sweden

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1982

1 Pressure Groups as Transnational Actors

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A variety of terms have been used to describe organized groups of people who seek to influence political decisions. Some like to call them pressure groups, while many others prefer to speak of interest groups and Professor Finer puts them all under the heading of 'the lobby'.[1] Diplomats nearly always talk of Non-Governmental Organizations and 'NGOs' has now become a standard piece of jargon in the world of diplomacy. It seems inappropriate to use the term 'interest groups' because it carries a strong bias towards considering sectional economic interests as being more important and more influential. Indeed some sectional interests may have never become involved in the wider politics of society. Most of them have interests to pursue *within* the group that take up far more of their time and resources. For the study of politics, it is preferable to refer to pressure groups, because this emphasizes our concern with the way such groups seek to exercise influence. They may try to bring about social change by the direct effect of their actions on other individuals, by their impact upon other groups or by affecting government policy. It is the act of applying pressure that brings them into politics. But this is not to say that all pressure groups are active in politics all the time.

Pressure groups have conventionally been considered relevant to the study of the domestic politics of each country. If international relations in the traditional view concerns the interactions between 'states', which seek to mobilize 'power' to promote their respective 'national interests', then pressure groups are not relevant to international relations. It used to be assumed by Realists that there were few non-governmental interactions between different countries; certainly they were not discussed. Now when faced with the large literature on transnationalism (that is, relations between different societies across country boundaries, which bypass governments),[2] the interactions may be dismissed as being of secondary importance, because they are not seen as affecting substantially the power relationships between different countries. Pressure groups cannot themselves be considered by Realists to utilize power. In addition, it is argued that governments have the authority to control transnational activities and tolerate them as long as they are compatible with the 'national interest', but stop them when the 'national interest' is threatened.[3] All of these theoretical assumptions will be challenged, but first of all it is worth considering the great diversity among the pressure groups.

Types of Pressure Groups

In the literature on British politics, a distinction has been made between sectional groups which 'seek to protect the interests of a particular section of society' and promotional groups which 'seek to promote causes arising from a given set of attitudes'.[4] It is argued that this distinction is related to the difference between aiming for a specialized small membership or a general mass movement; it affects a strategy of aiming to influence government directly or gaining support in public opinion; and it largely explains whether there will be success or failure in applying pressure.[5] For our purposes, it is worth making further sub-divisions among both sectional and promotional groups and it will be seen that the above relationships do not hold uniformly.

Sectional groups

The first of our eight categories of pressure groups covers *sectional economic groups*. These include companies, commerce, financial institutions, trade unions and agriculture. They are specialized groups, with restricted membership, are generally believed to have direct access to government and to be highly successful in achieving their goals, particularly on matters of economic policy. They are usually involved in a complex hierarchical structure of organization. For example, in Britain we have the companies, such as Imperial Tobacco Ltd, or Gallaher Ltd., both of which manufacture cigarettes, and the trade unions, such as the Tobacco Workers Union, the Transport and General Workers Union and the General and Municipal Workers Union, all of which represent tobacco workers. The individual companies co-operate in their employers' association and the Tobacco Advisory Council, while the unions have joint negotiating committees. Further up the hierarchy representing much more general economic interests, we have the Confederation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress. However, the structure does not stop at the boundaries of Britain. Both the CBI and the TUC are members of world bodies, the International Organization of Employers and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, respectively. The CBI and the TUC each send delegates to the International Labour Organization, are members of European confederations, serve on OECD advisory committees and have been involved with the UN. The IOE and the ICFTU also have a formal consultative status themselves with the ILO and several other intergovernmental organizations, including the UN. The complexity of these arrangements shows that country boundaries do not necessarily provide major discontinuities for pressure groups

Professional associations form a second category. Doctors, nurses, lawyers, teachers, social workers, the various scientific and technical disciplines, journalists and so on, all have their own professional bodies. In some respects these act like trade unions in defending the sectional economic interests of their members, but in many cases they restrict membership to those who have attained certain qualifications and exercise some of the employers' functions in monitoring work standards. Their really distinctive feature is the promotion of a strong moral code, which can place loyalty to the profession and to the clients above loyalty to employers or to the government. If the organizational links for one of the professions was outlined in the same way as it was for the companies and the unions, the result would be very similar, with there being extensive links to regional and global professional associations and to intergovernmental bodies, particularly the UN specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization or UNESCO. But in addition, the professions are fundamentally transnational in two further ways. Generally speaking, the professional ethics of each profession are very similar in each country of the world, even though the political cultures may differ substantially. All doctors feel bound to observe the Hippocratic oath, wherever they practise medicine. Secondly, much of the work of the professional depends upon the free flow of information and the accumulation of knowledge within a single, global, professional community.

Recreational clubs are a third category of sectional groups. Even though recreation is a highly personal form of activity, these clubs also have transnational links and, with the great increase in the volume of tourism which has occurred since the Second World War, they promote exchanges between different countries and offer reciprocal facilities to their members. Some of these also form full-blown International Non-Governmental Organizations, (INGOs). There is a Boy Scouts World Bureau and a World Association of Girl Guides, both of which have a recognized status with several intergovernmental organizations. Among the most widespread and popular forms of recreation are the various sports. These too, in the competitive element to find the best performer, are intrinsically transnational. Here the groups are involved in a very special relationship with world politics. The individual sportspeople and their clubs usually have a strong commitment to sport for its own sake and the desire 'to keep politics out of sport', while governments try energetically to associate themselves with the prestige of staging and winning sporting competitions. Anyone who is tempted to think that sport is irrelevant to international politics should reflect upon the history of the Olympic Games.

Promotional groups

Next, we may turn to the five categories of promotional groups, starting with the *welfare agencies*, which run operational programmes and/or raise funds to provide education, health or social services or to relieve poverty. Very many of the charities, trusts and foundations are very specialized in their concerns and highly parochial in their area of work. Even with some of the larger agencies one would not presume that they would ever be involved in direct contacts outside their home country. However, among the top twenty British charities in terms of their annual income, two, Oxfam and Christian Aid, collect money almost entirely to benefit people overseas, another two have large overseas

programmes, four more are members of INGOs and sixteen of the twenty are
members of the National Council for Voluntary Organizations, which has an
International Committee and 'attempts to represent the views of UK voluntary
organizations internationally to bodies such as the UN agencies, Common-
wealth Secretariat and the EEC',[6] and is itself a member of an INGO, the Inter-
national Council on Social Welfare. Under British law, charities are not allowed
to be active in politics, but such a concept is only tenable with a very narrow,
'common sense' definition of politics as covering the relationships between the
political parties. If politics is taken to cover all the activities of governments,
whether or not they are contentious, then there can be few charities of any
size which do not at some point in every year co-operate with central or local
government. Under the broadest definition of politics as the process by which
society assigns the moral values which are to be supported and decides the
distribution of resources to accord with those assignments, all the charities
are fundamentally political. Thus, charities which choose to transfer resources
or engage in other activities across international boundaries are taking part
in world politics.

Religious organizations are concerned with the general promotion of values.
In some countries there is a frequently held belief that religion should not be
involved in politics, while in other countries few would find such a belief to
be comprehensible. Even within the same country, religious organizations
vary substantially in the amount they affect the political process: from helping
to set a climate of opinion to being a major challenge to government, when
issues central to their religious concerns are raised. What the religions have in
common is that none of the organizations which have a significant number of
adherents within one country is confined solely to that country. Most of them
have a formal transnational structure, such as the Anglican Communion or the
Baptist World Alliance, with the Protestant churches being further grouped in
the World Council of Churches. The Catholics and Islam each have arrangements,
which result in unique hybrids in a world where NGOs and governments are
seen as being separate. The Vatican as the headquarters of a major INGO is
for historical reasons treated as a state by the governments of the world and
the rise in Islamic consciousness has contributed to the formation of the Islamic
Conference, an intergovernmental organization. Nevertheless, despite its co-
option by governments, Islam also remains a potent transnational political
influence.

Communal groups arise when distinct segments of society, such as people of
common ethnic origin or resident within a particular area, come together in
order to promote their group identity and group status. They can have highly
specialized concerns, such as the Welsh Language Society nominally concentrat-
ing on promotion of the use of Welsh, but frequently they beome active on
a wide range of political questions: the Welsh Language Society has been in-
volved in seeking to change policy on court procedures, road signs, education,

television broadcasting and home ownership in rural areas. In many colonial
societies, communal groups were the source from which nationalist political
parties grew. Very few communal groups have established formal links in INGOs,
such as the Celtic League or the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, but many
obtain support from governments which are hostile to the government in their
own country or have strong informal bilateral transnational communications
with their ethnic kin. All communal groups can, in theory at least, have access
to the United Nations via the Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Some communal
groups move beyond specific cultural concerns to make economic or political
demands, including claiming the right to form their own government. A few
groups which have done this have become important global actors. African
liberation movements have been accorded observer status by many intergovern-
mental organizations and at times have been given full membership. Even more
successful has been the PLO, with membership of the Arab League, the Group
of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, the right to attend all UN organs and
conferences and recognition from a majority of the world's governments. To
some people it may seem inappropriate to regard liberation movements as a type
of communal promotional group, but really all that occurs is an attempt to
move from domestic politics to an involvement in world politics. It is the claim
for international recognition of the 'national right to self-determination' which
converts a domestic communal group into a liberation movement.

Women's groups are another distinct sub-category among the communal
groups. They do not have a narrow numerical base, which can often be a dis-
advantage for minority groups, but they are dealing with the same issues of
group identity and group status. In many societies there is a large number and
a great diversity to the women's groups. They have often been established
since the early years of the twentieth century or the late nineteenth century
and a dozen of the corresponding transnational associations date back this far.
The majority of formal organizations have restricted memberships such as the
Medical Women's International Association, or specialized concerns, such as
the International Contraception, Abortion and Sterilization Campaign, but
a few are more broadly based aiming for a general membership and covering
a wide range of women's questions. An anomalous feature of the contemporary
scene is that modern feminist groups do not co-ordinate well either by linking
different issues or by moving beyond the local community, particularly to the
transnational level. This may be due to a strong ideological predisposition
towards seeing 'organization' as a male concept for promoting structures of
hierarchy and domination. It is not unreasonable to assume that this pattern
will change, in response to the desire to achieve political results, and that new
feminist INGOs will in increasing numbers join the forty-seven relatively tradi-
tional women's INGOs already active in world politics by 1970.[7] The formation
of ICASC in 1978 is evidence that the change is already starting to take place.

Political parties are normally considered to be analytically distinct from pressure groups, on the basis that they seek to take over office rather than to influence a limited range of policy outcomes. In practice this distinction does not accurately reflect how groups behave. Pressure groups, when they have widespread support, always have the option of converting themselves into political parties. Both agrarian parties and ecology parties have occurred in a variety of European countries. Anti-Common Market and unofficial Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament candidates have been markedly unsuccessful in Britain, but the Progress Party in Denmark achieved a spectacular growth mainly on the single issue of abolishing income tax. On the other hand, groups which have always claimed to be broadly based political parties, such as the National Front in Britain or refugee parties in West Germany, may appear to the government and to the electorate to represent minorities concerned with a very limited range of questions and only able to influence politics through their indirect impact on the other parties.[8] Even major parties, when they are in opposition and no election is in the offing, may have few strategies for applying political pressure on the government, which are not equally available to pressure groups. (In fact, in most countries the potential for taking office lies not so much with opposition parties as with particular economic–professional groups: the military and/or the police.) When they are in government, a certain distance still remains between government as an operational institution and party as a repository of ideology, so that the party is akin to a pressure group with privileged access to government. From the point of view of world politics, the distinction between party and pressure group is not at all appropriate. Legal doctrines assert that governments are the representatives of states and that relationships with *any* other body constitute interference in its domestic jurisdiction. From the Realist, theoretical perspective parties are like pressure groups in being unable to mobilize international 'power'.

In a manner similar to professional associations, political parties in the modern world are intrinsically drawn into a transnational exchange of ideas. Party ideologies provide a structure through which people may interpret the political world around them, but there is no logic by which our need for understanding is restricted to what is occurring within the boundaries of our own country. Baffling events in far-off places demand explanation; foreign people and institutions, which have a clear image, can be used as reference points for the advocacy of domestic policy; support from prestigious external sources is beneficial, while one's opponent may be discredited by being identified with hostile elements in the environment. From a perspective that sees political parties as being involved in global politics, it is not so surprising to find that major foreign policy failures can lead a party to topple its leader from office. There are some remarkable examples, from Lyndon Johnson in the United States, to Anthony Eden in Britain and Nikita Khrushchev in the Soviet Union.

However, not all political parties are formally organized on a transational

basis. The socialists have the longest history, because international solidarity has been part of the ideology of most socialists. Two formal organizations were established successively in the nineteenth century. The Second International was seriously weakened by the failure of socialist parties to unite against the outbreak of war in 1914, but co-operation between social democrats did continue in the inter-war years. The current Socialist International, which is a successor to the Second International, was founded in 1951 and now has forty-eight member parties from forty-two countries. In 1919 the Third International of communist parties, Comintern, was formed, but it came under Stalin's domination and was disbanded in May 1943 as a gesture of goodwill towards the Western allies. A comparable organization, the Communist Information Bureau, Cominform, was established in September 1947, to assist in the strengthening of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and the development of ideological uniformity. This was used as the instrument of Stalin's ideological war against Tito from 1948 onwards and was disbanded in April 1956 as part of Khrushchev's *rapprochement* with Tito. Since then no formal communist international has existed, but there has been an intermittent series of world conferences of communist parties. In addition, the party congresses of each of the ruling parties are usually attended by the First Secretaries or at least a Politburo member from the other ruling parties, with the result that they provide an informal basis for discussion and co-ordination.

In the Third World during the colonial period nationalist parties often had a close association with socialist or communist parties in Europe and met each other in lobbying at the UN and other international meetings. Since independence, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) founded in December 1957 and based in Cairo, along with the Organization of Afro-Asian, Latin American Peoples' Solidarity (OSPAAL) founded in January 1966 and based in Havana, have tended to attract only the minor and/or the more radical nationalist parties. In some regions where close party ties have at times developed, such as the 'Mulungushi Club' in East Africa around 1970, the party ties have been difficult to distinguish from intergovernmental relations.

Moving to other areas of the political map, we find that there has been a Liberal International since April 1947, but the right wing has been much slower to organize transnationally. A European Christian Democrat Union was founded in 1947, but it was not until 1961 that a Christian Democrat World Union appeared. In the Assembly of the European Community the Christian Democrats have remained separate from the European Democratic Group of conservatives, which only includes parties from the United Kingdom and Demark. Outside the Community, a totally different body, the European Democrat Union brings together twelve member parties (half from within the EC and half from the other European countries) with associate members from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan. The EDU was formed as recently as April 1978. While it might eventually recruit world-wide, there is no sign yet of a global organization

of conservative parties. Other types of parties, anarchist, agrarian, Islamic, fascist or ethnic parties, for example, and the Republicans and the Democrats in the USA, have not established substantial transnational links. Clearly, of all the groups which we have considered, political parties are the only ones to be completely absent from some countries and they are also among the least likely to have strong, institutionalized transnational links.

Lastly, in contrast to the three types of general promotional groups, there are *specific-issue, promotional groups*. These consist of groups of people who have come together solely for the purpose of promoting social change on a particular issue, usually by seeking change in government policy. They are the groups which most readily spring to mind when the term 'pressure group' is used. By the nature of their work, specific-issue groups are likely to be challenging orthodoxy. Often they are either raising new issues, which have not before appeared on the political agenda, or are trying to change the way existing issues are handled. Thus, they usually concentrate on influencing public opinion and the media and so they become household names. Frequently, new issues will not lead to specific-issue groups being formed because existing groups such as sectional economic groups or political parties can readily take them up. In many countries there has developed a consensus on questions of foreign policy which established groups become reluctant to challenge for fear of being regarded disloyal. As a result specific-issue groups do arise quite often on foreign policy. In Britain the development of nuclear weapons led to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament being formed; increasing public awareness of the contrast between decolonization in the Commonwealth and trends in the opposite direction within South Africa led to the Anti-Apartheid Movement; and the steady decline in the priority given to Official Development Assistance led to the World Development Movement. Each of the groups quoted is based in Britain and is known for its attempts to influence British foreign policy. However, it should occasion no surprise that such concerns frequently lead them into transnational activities in order to obtain information or to gain external allies. Furthermore, the events to which the groups were responding were also relevant in similar ways to those in other countries and so similar groups were formed elsewhere. In each case an INGO has resulted to provide a channel of communication between the groups in each country.[9]

New issues of the last two decades have also produced transnational activities through a totally different process. It has frequently been noted that problems arising from pollution and environmental issues cannot be solved by governments acting on their own. The technical need for co-operation is one of the factors producing interdependence. What is rarely, if ever, noted as well is that this has produced an international political process, in which pressure groups must engage in transnational lobbying in order to have any chance of affecting the outcomes. Friends of the Earth Ltd. in Britain is a member of Friends of the Earth International and is in frequent contact with the FOE groups in many other countries.

The Connections Between Different Pressure Groups

To some extent the eight categories of pressure groups given above are ideal types and very few groups belong unambiguously in just one category. The International Committee of Catholic Nurses is both professional and religious, while the International Council of Social Democratic Women involves both transnational links between parties and the group identity of women. Alternatively, some activities may have only one significant aspect to them for each of the participants, but belong in quite different categories according to which participants we are considering. The foreign tour of an orchestra may be an economic interest of the company, a professional opportunity for the players, recreation for the audience and a prestige promotion for the government which has subsidized the trip.

The first major point to note is the very great diversity among the pressure groups. The eight categories of groups are very different from each other in the motivation and goals which bring them together, yet there is both overlap between the categories and an enormous number and range of groups within each category. Secondly, although pressure groups are widely seen as a feature of Western democratic political systems, they do in fact exist in every country in the world, including both the least developed and the most totalitarian. There can be few, if any, countries which do not have groups from at least five of the eight categories. Thirdly, all types of groups can be significantly affected (from their own perspectives) by international politics and directly or indirectly engage in a wide variety of international and transnational interactions.

Any description of non-governmental groups being primarily concerned with promoting co-operation among their members and then moving from this base, with greater or lesser frequency depending upon the type of group, to seek influence in decision making by government, is too simple a picture. In most complex societies (and the term complex should not be equated with developed; India or even Uganda are considerably more complex than Iceland) several pressure groups arise within a single area of concern. Frequently these co-operate with each other by evolving distinctive specialization in membership, objectives or tactics; by exchanging information; and by co-ordinating activities, when they apply political pressure or engage in operational programmes. Sometimes by working together groups can obtain services and undertake activities which would be beyond the resources of any of the individual groups. The result can be not only a great deal of communication and co-operation but also a complex network of country-wide and transnational organizations.

If we take Oxfam as an example, it is part of an extensive network of research, fund-raising, educational and promotional groups concerned with development. The 'Development Guide', published by the Overseas Development Institute, lists 198 groups based in Britain.[10] In two major specialized areas

of work Oxfam is in national bodies: the Standing Conference on Refugees includes Oxfam and thirty-one other agencies, to exchange information and make joint representations to government, and the Disasters Emergency Committee links Oxfam to four of the major relief agencies, primarily to enable joint fund-raising appeals to be made. To deal with its general concerns as a charity, Oxfam is a member along with 236 other non-governmental organizations of the National Council of Voluntary Organizations. For the purposes of sharing their experiences and skills in producing information, the Centre for World Development Education organizes a Public Information Group. In October 1980 this brought together forty-seven representatives from twenty-four agencies, four members of the UK government's Overseas Development Administration and forty-four press and broadcasting journalists, and the conference was funded in part by the EEC Development Commission and the UN NGO Liaison Office. Thus, in addition to its own activities, Oxfam has at least four other routes, SCOR, DEC, NCVO and CWDE, through which it can communicate with the public and with government at the national level.

The situation becomes more, not less, complex at the global level, as a pressure group can relate to the United Nations and the specialized agencies (1) directly, on its own initiative, (2) via national co-ordinating bodies, and (3) via transnational co-ordinating bodies (INGOs). Oxfam is a member of Euro Action ACORD (Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development), a consortium for the promotion of joint relief and development programmes. In Geneva, it works with the American based Catholic Relief Services and three INGOs, the League of Red Cross Societies, the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches, in a Steering Committee for Disasters. Oxfam is also a direct member of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies and an indirect member both via the national body, SCOR, and also via the INGO, Euro Action ACORD. For a while Oxfam's Director held the Chair of the International Council. Several other formal organizational connections of less direct concern to Oxfam exist, along with a whole multitude of *ad hoc* and non-formal links.

Not all groups work in as complex a network of domestic and transnational organizations as does Oxfam. Indeed, Amnesty International, as an explicit matter of policy, does not allow its National Sections to affiliate to any other organization, while for the Anti-Apartheid Movement it is not a matter of policy but there are few formal channels to other groups. On the other hand, both of them have extensive non-formal links. For example, Amnesty is strongly promoted by the churches and Anti-Apartheid maintains a close working relationship with the ANC and SWAPO offices in London.

It is not just co-operation between the bureaucracies which brings groups together. The structure of political beliefs also serves to integrate issues. Ordinary people do not necessarily relate environmental, development and disarmament issues to each other, but for political activists they are often seen

as being inseparable. Thus, Oxfam run a Wastesaver Project to recycle aluminium and rags, partly in order to raise funds but also to reduce profligate consumption in a world of want. Oxfam's Youth Department runs work-camps in conjunction with Friends of the Earth, while Oxfam and the Conservation Society have a joint imprint on sticky labels for re-using envelopes. The Brandt Commission Report argued that expenditure on armaments represents 'a huge waste of resources which should be deployed for peaceful development',[11] a link which was also made in the Final Document of the UN Special Session on Disarmament.[12] In April 1980 the World Disarmament Campaign was launched in Britain with the objective being the implementation of the proposals in the UN Final Document. Three months later, 'Oxfam had donated £10,000 towards that part of [the Campaign's] work which emphasises the relationship of disarmament to development'.[13] Six months later, three local Friends of the Earth groups and four other ecology groups, along with some eighty United Nations Associations and more than 200 other varied groups were listed as 'Support Groups' of the World Disarmament Campaign.[14] These examples illustrate not just issue linkages but also how global political processes can have a major input to political interactions within a country.

Pressure Groups and the Intergovernmental Organizations

Reference has been made at several points to connections between pressure groups and the United Nations. This is not a new phenomenon and it dates back to the formation of the UN, yet it is not mentioned in standard works by as diverse a range of scholars as Alker and Russett, Bailey, Claude, Gregg and Barkun, Luard and Nicholas.[15] One thousand two hundred non-governmental organizations attended the San Francisco conference which finalized the UN Charter.[16] Although the original proposals drawn up at Dumbarton Oaks by the 'Big Four' made no mention of NGOs, they were successful in applying pressure, mainly via the United States delegation, so that NGOs were granted an official status.[17] The result was Article 71 of the Charter:

> The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organisations and, where appropriate, with national organisations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

The NGOs wanted to widen the UN's responsibilities as much as possible beyond security questions. They 'strove for the inclusion . . . of some provision for dealing with questions related to educational and cultural co-operation, human rights . . . and to the economic and social area in general'.[18] Some authors claim that the NGOs were directly responsible for the existence of the Charter's provisions on human rights.[19]

In implementing Article 71, ECOSOC has drawn up and regularly reviews a list of NGOs which have been granted 'consultative status'. The work is done through the Committee on NGOs, which has to apply several criteria before accepting any NGO on the list. The activities of the organization should fall within the Council's competence. It should have an established headquarters, an administration, authorized representatives and a policy-making body. Although one government urged that an organization should only be considered international if it had branches in ten or more countries, it has been accepted that two countries are sufficient.[20] It soon became plain that there was resistance to granting consultative status to 'national organizations'. But the possibility had to remain, because of the Charter provision, and in 1949 there were five national bodies along with eighty-five INGOs on the list.[21] When the arrangements were reviewed in 1968, provision was made for suspension or withdrawal from consultative status, if an organization was shown to be improperly under the influence of a government.[22]

The list of organizations originally was divided into Category A, those which have 'a basic interest in most of the activities of the Council, and are closely linked with the economic or social life of the areas which they represent;' Category B, those with a special competence but in limited fields; and Category C, those 'primarily concerned with the development of public opinion and with the dissemination of information.'[23] These categories might appear to match the ones we discussed earlier in this paper, with Category A covering the sectional economic groups, Category B the more specialized professional associations, recreational clubs and welfare agencies and leaving the other promotional groups in Category C. In practice by 1949, when the system had settled down, the major trade unions' and producers' INGOs were in Category A; the vast majority, seventy-seven out of ninety organizations, including ten religious and sixteen women's organizations, were in Category B; and the four in Category C did not have any obvious distinguishing feature to them. The two exceptions in Category A are not so surprising, when one remembers they were chosen by United Nations delegates rather than by impartial adjudicators. They were a professional association, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a group with which diplomats must maintain good relations, and a specific-issue promotional group, the World Federation of United Nations Associations, a group promoting the organization in which they spend their working lives.

The classifications were modified in 1950 and again in 1968, when they became Category I, Category II and the Roster. The three categories are still supposed to correspond to differences in the breadth of the organization's activities and its relevance to ECOSOC's mandate, but 'in practice the Committee has tended to treat the consultative status categories as a hierarchy.'[24] Since 1968 the number of NGOs with Category I status has been increased from sixteen to thirty-one and in all except two cases the fifteen new groups have been promoted from Category II. Promotion from the Roster to Category II

has also occurred regularly, but far more of the new groups admitted to Category II have not previously been on the Roster. When one scans the list it is clear that the Category I NGOs are the more broadly based, non-specialist groups, but it is impossible to see any operational criteria which distinguish those on Category II from those on the Roster. Thus, the three categories do appear as a status ranking.

Evolution of the system has produced other changes which are of general political significance. In an early report it was said: 'In order to avoid duplication, an organisation whose work is mainly or wholly within the field of activity of a specialised agency is generally not admitted to consultation under Article 71.'[25] Now, as part of the trend towards a decline in the independence of the agencies and the extension of the authority of the United Nations over their work, the situation has been totally reversed. Acquisition of consultative status with one of the specialized agencies, since 1968, has led automatically to listing in the Roster. Secondly, among the many small increases in the powers of the UN Secretary-General is the authority he was given in 1968 to place NGOs on the Roster on his own initiative. Thirdly, 'national organizations' which only operate in, or have personnel from, a single country have begun to gain consultative status in slightly larger numbers in the 1970s.

Apart from being a status ranking, the main significance of the different categories of consultative status has been in the differences in the procedural rights which are obtained. From the beginning Category A organizations had the same rights as governments to receive documents and to circulate their own written communications to all delegations as official ECOSOC documents. They could propose items for the agenda and be heard on the question of the inclusion of the item. If the item was accepted, they could open the debate and might be invited to reply to the discussion. Organizations in the other two categories could only have their written statements circulated, if it was requested by a government, and could only speak before the NGO Committee rather than the full Council. The Committee could also approve a request by a Category A organization to speak before the Council on any of the other items on the agenda. With the review of the arrangements, approved in new regulations in 1968, the procedures remain basically the same, except for a slight liberalization. Now Category II NGOs can also have their written statements circulated as an automatic right, but they are limited to 500 words whereas Category I are allowed 2000 words. Category II organizations have also gained the right, upon approval by the NGO Committee, to speak before the full Council when there is no relevant subsidiary body for the subject. The origin of the 1968 revision had been the disclosure that several non-governmental organizations had received funds, sometimes indirectly and without their knowledge, from the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The result was the addition of a requirement that the INGOs should in principle be funded by their 'national affiliates' and/or by individual members (i.e. individual people)

and that any other sources of funds should be declared. This was backed up by a new requirement that those with consultative status should submit a report on their work every four years and a new provision that the NGO Committee could recommend suspension or expulsion from consultative status. Although several governments may be hostile to particular NGOs, notably those active on human rights questions, it seems unlikely that the provisions for suspension or exclusion will ever be utilized, except to delete groups which become moribund.[26]

In practice the system has not always worked smoothly from the NGOs' point of view. In 1974, as part of the general attempt to rationalize the Council's work, the NGO Committee was required after 1975, like many other subsidiary bodies, to meet every two years instead of annually. The result was that the ECOSOC session opened in early 1976 without there being any provision for participation by NGOs. Considerable pressure had to be exercised by the NGOs as a whole before those in Category I were allowed to speak. However, in 1977 the NGO Committee was authorized to meet outside the normal biennial cycle, so that the problem did not arise again in 1978 and thereafter.

ECOSOC started life as a relatively small group of eighteen members. With the Charter amendments which came into effect in 1965 and 1973, the Council increased to twenty-seven and then to fifty-four members. The volume of business has also increased substantially. In such a situation governments have tended to ignore rather than encourage the NGOs. When the contribution of a NGO has been unwelcome to particular governments, then the tendency has been to deny the legitimacy of the NGO and to deny its right to take part in the intergovernmental forums. As with most of the UN's activities, the legal authority provided by the Charter, by resolutions and by rules of procedure, is little guide to the regular political behaviour. Peacekeeping operations lie in an unspecified and ambiguous manner somewhere within the authority provided by Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. The independent role of the Secretary-General lies in Article 99. This legal authority has rarely been invoked, but the political legitimacy which it conveys has been used with great frequency. Similarly, Article 71 and the ECOSOC provisions have only been used by a small minority of the NGOs, but the legal authority they provide conveys political legitimacy to a variety of other links.

Firstly, consultative arrangements work much better in the Commissions and Committees of ECOSOC. The rules are applied more flexibly, giving NGOs more freedom to take part, and the Committee on NGOs does not have to be used as an intermediary. Here much depends on both the nature of the specific issue under consideration and which country is in the chair. In the case of the discussion of Chile during 1975–76 in the Commission on Human Rights, it would seem to be no exaggeration to say that the written report and oral statements of the NGOs dominated the debates and the decision-making.[27] On other occasions, Argentina and the Soviet Union have tried to stop Commissions from receiving any NGO communications and have used the control of the chair for this purpose.

Secondly, the existence of the consultative status with the Council has legitimized communication between the Secretariat and the NGOs. Without Article 71, it would have been possible to argue that, in dealing with anybody other than government representatives, the Secretariat was violating Article 2(7), which prohibits intervention 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'. Here the practice of giving overriding preference to INGOs has helped, as contact with the citizens of any country is not direct, but via the world headquarters of each organization. The Secretariat has found it useful, as it has been given more and more tasks, to tap the resources provided by NGOs. The General Assembly at its first session encouraged this contact in one specific way. The Office of Public Information within the Secretariat was asked to disseminate information about the United Nations through the NGOs. The OPI has established its own list of organizations with which it has contact in New York. Weekly briefings are given by top personnel, periodic conferences are held and documents on UN activities are supplied. Different United Nations organs and programmes now are developing their own constituencies, by using the OPI. Some go direct to the NGOs and the public, as with the monthly newspaper *Development Forum* or the journals, *United Nations Chronicle, Objective Justice*, concentrating on action against apartheid, and *Disarmament*. Others, such as the *Special Unit on Palestinian Rights Bulletin*, are aimed at the press.

It has now become standard practice, when specialized conferences are called, to set up a small unit to act as a secretariat for the conference and it is authorized to make contact with the NGOs. They are thus involved in the earliest stages of the preparations and provide an input before some governments have even begun to formulate policy. The intergovernmental preparatory committees for global conferences also work closely with NGOs. When the conferences actually take place, the diplomats become dominant and often do not allow formal NGO participation. At the 1980 UN Conference on Women, all the NGOs were given a total of 15 minutes between them to address the delegates. But the agenda for the conferences and the basic documentation have been prepared long before the delegates arrive and the NGOs have helped to set the frame of reference within which the debates take place. Since 1970 all the major global intergovernmental conferences have had 'unofficial' conferences take place alongside them, involving thousands of participants, from hundreds of INGOs and domestic NGOs, from all over the world.

The term 'unofficial' is rather inaccurately applied to these NGO Forums, as the basic administrative work to enable them to take place and the political briefing on the work of the intergovernmental conference is provided not by the NGOs themselves, but by the government of the host country and by the UN Secretariat. Among the more interesting features of the NGO work is the

school. The literature on the domestic sources of foreign policy, bureaucratic politics, transnationalism and interdependence has been referred to as the 'pluralist perspective'[44] or more simply 'the international relations paradigm'.[45] Because the current author would wish to include greater emphasis on the way in which global communications are producing linkages between issues and the development of intergovernmental organizations, as separate loci of decision-making, the term 'Global Politics' school is preferred. The main writers in this school have been Rosenau, Keohane and Nye, and Mansbach.[46] They all accept that both governments and non-governmental actors are important and that both security issues and economic and technical issues are important. The argument about whether the state is dominant or subordinate is not resolved by simple assertion of an axiom, as it is with the Realists, the Marxists and the Functionalists, but is a matter for empirical investigation and dependent upon the particular issue process under consideration.

Keohane and Nye's book, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, is the most relevant work for the study of pressure groups. Their approach was ambitious and they said 'the conclusion to this volume attempts . . . to introduce our alternative "world politics paradigm" as a substitute for the state-centric analytical framework'.[47]

> The difference . . . can be clarified most easily by focusing on the nature of the actors. The world politics paradigm attempts to transcend the 'level of analysis problem' both by broadening the conception of actors to include transnational actors and by conceptually breaking down the 'hard shell' of nation-state.[48]

The empirical material covered by Keohane and Nye is predominantly economic. The six chapters on 'issue areas' are all on economic and technological questions. Only in 'Part II. Transnational Organisations', where there are chapters on the Roman Catholic Church and on revolutionary organizations, does the emphasis change. This is not due to problems they had as editors in search of contributors. It is quite explicitly built into their theoretical perspective.

> In the modernized Western world and its ancillary areas the acceptability of multiple loyalties is taken for granted. Yet, this toleration seems to be extended more readily when the transnational actor is explicitly economic in purpose than when it is explicitly political. Thus, it seems less incompatible to be loyal to both IBM and France . . . than . . . for Americans to identify with Israel. In the West, therefore, nationalism probably hinders overt political organization across boundaries more than it hinders transnational economic activity.[49]

At three places they go further and speak of 'the decline of transnational political organizations', but no evidence is offered that such a trend exists.[50]

In a more recent book, *Power and Interdependence*, Keohane and Nye

backtrack in their attack. They offer 'complex interdependence' as an ideal type, an explanatory model in which transnational actors are important and the distinction between high and low politics is irrelevant. However, they also say 'sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrait of reality.'[51] They are not far from saying that there are two distinct types of systems of interaction: security relationships and economic relationships.

The overwhelming impact of all the academic literature is that transnationalism operates in a distinct realm and that the actors come mainly from our first two categories of pressure groups: sectional economic interests and professional associations. The Global Politics paradigm ought to make a sharper break with Realism, Marxism and Functionalism, because in each of the six other categories there are major transnational actors and significant transnational processes. In the area of recreation and culture, there is the International Olympic Committee, foreign broadcasting and cultural exchange. In the field of welfare, there is a myriad of development and relief agencies, such as Oxfam. The religions are high organized through the Vatican, the World Council of Churches, Jewish and Islamic bodies. Communal groups, such as the PLO, African liberation movements and women's groups, have an impact throughout the world. The Socialist International and communism bring political parties into international relations. Specific-issue promotional groups, such as Anti-Apartheid, Amnesty and Friends of the Earth, cannot be understood in terms of the politics of any one country, or even within the context of interactions between just two or three countries. From all the six categories, there comes a world of transnational politics which has its own impact upon both security and economic issues.

At this point it is necessary for us to clear up a confusion which occurs in the use of the word 'politics'. This has two components. Politics is the process by which groups take decisions, which will be regarded as binding upon the group. For the country as a whole, the government is considered to be the appropriate sub-group to take decisions which are binding on society, including all the pressure groups operating within it. A decision taken by the due process has legal authority. A second meaning to politics covers the process by which groups allocate moral values and hence derive preferences for different patterns of social relationships. Communication and debate produce each person's ideas of political legitimacy. Government generally is obeyed not just because it has authority but also because among a sufficient number of people it has legitimacy. The particular strength of government is that in most countries of the world nationalism and/or democracy (in whatever way it is defined and practised) promote the idea that government should be obeyed even when the individual disapproves of the decision that has been taken. The distinction between the two meanings of the word 'politics' is necessary because governments may have high authority and low legitimacy. Alternatively, pressure

groups may have low authority and high legitimacy. Realists, Marxists and Functionalists tend to concentrate on the authority aspects of government, at the expense of its role for the mobilization of legitimacy.

The distinction between authority and legitimacy helps us to have a clearer conceptualization of the relationship between politics, economics and security. In the sense of politics being decision-making by governments, then it may well be true that some governments spend more time taking decisions about security and diplomacy relations with the rest of the world than they do about international economic relations. This is one aspect of maintaining their authority to continue making decisions. But there is nothing intrinsic in the nature of the exercise of authority to produce an automatic concern with security and diplomacy. William Wallace in writing about *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain* says 'High policy issues are those which are seen by policy-makers as affecting Britain's fundamental standing in the world: as involving national security or national prestige, as linked to values and symbols important to society as a whole.'[52] Where Wallace differs from other writers is in the assertion of the subjective nature of these questions: 'What is or is not a matter of high policy is above all a matter of perception, of definition.'[53] In other words, it is not the geographical situation of a country, its power in relation to its neighbours and questions of military strategy that determine security to be a matter of high politics. (On such a basis, the prevention of a military alliance between France and America would be the top item on Britain's political agenda.) The determination of 'high policy' is a matter of choice. As Wallace points out, the question of Britain's relations with the EEC was at first seen as mainly a matter of foreign trade policy and as such not 'high policy',

> to be redefined, rather painfully, as a matter of high policy when the Treasury, the Foreign Office, the Cabinet and the leaders of British industry realized that wider questions were involved and that a reassessment of the assumptions underlying British foreign policy might be necessary.[54]

For many governments of the Third World, such as Jamaica, Ghana or Sri Lanka, there may be no significant problems of 'national security' affecting their international relations. The security problems may be severe, but they arise from the domestic system. For them the high politics of international relations lies in trade and aid issues. The logic of Wallace's approach leads us to abandon the concept of high and low politics and replace it with the more precise and more widely applicable concept of *issue salience*. If priorities are a matter of choice, if they can change over time and can vary at the same time between one government and another, then to study any issue we need to know how much salience governments attach to the issue and how much they are attempting to exercise their authority on the issue.

The advantage of the concept is that we can generalize it to other actors,

both intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. Pressure groups attempt to influence outcomes on issues which are salient to them. If certain outcomes, which they desire, require the exercise of its authority by a government, any government in any country, then pressure groups will seek to put their case to that government. They enter politics in the traditional sense of the word. The system of interest for the study of an issue consists of all those actors for whom the issue is salient. They are the ones that chose to engage in interactions to effect outcomes. The part of the global political system which we wish to study may or may not consist predominantly of governments. It may or may not contain large numbers of transnational political actors, from any of the eight categories of pressure groups. The situation will depend upon the issue under consideration and the time period under consideration.

The extent to which any actor will be the target of pressure will depend, significantly but not solely, upon the extent to which the actor has the ability to take and enforce decisions. Generally, this is perceived to coincide with the legal authority of the actor. As most governments have extremely wide authority, but never unlimited authority, they become major focal points for interactions. But it must be remembered that all other organizations possess some authority, either in a recognized legal sense or in some analogous rule-making capacity. Thus, virtually all organizations can determine eligibility and conditions of membership of their own organization. Usually they can freely dispose of their own resources. As a result any organization may become the target of pressure.

The issue of apartheid raises such a diversity of questions, which are of high salience to such a diverse range of actors and affects the exercise of their authority for so many of the actors, that virtually any organization with either wide global links or engaged in direct interactions with South Africa finds itself within the global political system on the issue of apartheid. In the UN, the process of delegitimizing the South African government is linked to most other issues with which it deals. Governments are under pressure, but specific-issue groups, notably Anti-Apartheid, and religious bodies also try directly to affect the employment policies of multi-national companies. The EEC is drawn in to harmonize the impact on companies. Recreational clubs are asked to break their contacts with South Africa; political parties are expected to take a stand; and professional associations have debated how to apply their professional ethics to work in a society practising apartheid.

When we move from politics as the exercise of authority to the second meaning of politics as the mobilization of legitimacy, once again governments, intergovernmental organizations and pressure groups are all involved. But governments are no longer the dominant actors. Legitimacy attaches to actors, in the way we perceive their status, and to ideas or policies, in the way we measure their moral value. The concept of power (as capability rather than as influence) is usually taken to cover the ability to utilize coercion, with the more recent

emphasis in international relations on the ability to dispose of economic resources. The ability to mobilize legitimacy should also be seen as a power capability. In this domain, it is conceivable that Amnesty International, for example, has greater power than any single government. It derives global legitimacy both from its very high status, one recognition of which was the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977, and from the high moral value that so many people attach to the policies it is pursuing.

One reason for the interaction between different actors can be the attempt of an actor to increase its legitimacy by association with another actor of high status. The United Nations may have little power, in the sense of a very limited ability to impose coercion or to dispose of economic resources, but it does have considerable power, by virtue of its high status and widespread support for the ideals it seeks to promote. This helps to explain the interaction between pressure groups and the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations. On each side there is the potential for increasing legitimacy by participation in the relationship.

We can now produce a definition of global politics, which is fundamentally different from that of the three established schools. International relations is not concerned just with the exercise of power, predominantly in the form of military capabilities, in order to influence outcomes. Nor can interactions across the world be seen as predominantly concerned with the production and disposal of economic resources. Global politics covers the utilization of coercion *and* the disposal of economic resources *and* the mobilization of legitimacy, by governments and intergovernmental organizations and pressure groups. Governments are important as *loci* of authority and in the possession of military capabilities. Sectional interest groups are important as transnational economic actors. In addition we must regard the five types of promotional pressure groups, along with intergovernmental organizations, as important transnational political actors, mobilizing legitimacy. Indeed, all types of global actors may in principle engage in all three types of interactions. If we wish to explain political processes, we should not assume in advance that certain types of actors or certain types of interactions can be ignored. Our models of global politics, unfortunately, must become more complex.

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ELEVEN · *Implementation Amidst Scarcity and Apathy: Political Power and Policy Design*

PETER S. CLEAVES

WHAT are the conditions for a policy or program to be successfully implemented in the Third World? Each of the case studies in this volume has reiterated two central ideas in response to this question. First, political and administrative actors need to mobilize sufficient power to execute a policy design, and their ability to do so depends on the influence and predilections of others in the political environment. Second, because of their content, some policies or programs themselves can be more or less difficult to implement. Thus, the scope of political power available to implementors and what I would call the policy's *problématique* are two broad categories of variables that need to be considered by analysts when they evaluate the potential of various programs to be carried to completion. The specific examples of policy execution in this book present a number of operational lessons of how policymakers, bureaucrats, and political activists may be able to manipulate these variables to facilitate the implementation of reform programs. Briefly, they may be able to do so either by mobilizing additional political resources to achieve their goals or by making policies less complex and more responsive to the interests of affected populations.

It should be clear, however, that the "success" of program implementation depends upon the perspective of the observer. Implementation involves a process of moving toward a policy objective by means of administrative and political steps. To the degree that these steps approximate the desired end, the program is be-

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ing implemented and the policymaker is pleased. When the policy itself, however, contains features that are contrary to the interests of the target populations, successful implementation will not cause them to rejoice. Indeed, the failure of such a program may be a source of relief. Thus, when the words "successful implementation" have been used in this book, they refer to the outlook of those groups that favor the respective policy objectives.

In this summary chapter, I draw on the case studies to explore broadly the nature of the policy context in terms of the political power available to different actors in the society, including the government, and to analyze how the problématique of a policy affects its implementation. Also, I attempt to join these two elements schematically as a means of explaining why some policies are implemented and others are not. The chapter concludes with a number of recommendations for how implementors can proceed under unpropitious conditions, either by altering the correlation of forces mobilized around a policy or by modifying its content, to bring about change in their societies. Thus, while most of the previous chapters have dealt with failures in implementation, my task here is to try to suggest how things "might have been different."

POLITICAL POWER AND POLICY PROBLÉMATIQUE

Political power can be understood as a variable that directly affects implementation because the amount of resources that can be mobilized in favor of or in opposition to a specific policy is vital to estimating its chances for implementation.[1] But the resources available to policy actors are not uniform in all societies. Power is divided differently in various types of political systems, and implementors need to be aware that its distribution influences both the content of policy and the success with which policy is executed. Although it is difficult to classify specific systems into rigidly defined ideal types, it is possible to make at least three distinctions among regimes depending on the amount of power vested in the government and the structural arrangements linking the bureaucratic apparatus to groups, classes, and individuals in the society at large. Systems approaching each type—open, closed,

[1] By resources I refer to the differentiated definition of power developed by W. Ilchman and N. Uphoff in *The Political Economy of Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 49-91.

and intermediate—have been included in this volume, and each type calls forth different tasks for policy implementors and analysts to address.[2]

Open political systems are characterized by a large number of relatively autonomous interest associations, political organizations, and governmental agencies. These diverse actors generally have competing ideas about what the government should do in response to public problems and the scope and direction of change to be sought in the society. In such a context, classes and groups that join alliances or maneuver skillfully can tilt the content of policy in their favor or undermine policies that are contrary to their interests. In fact, it is often misleading to consider policies in these systems as being simply "public" or "governmental." Quite frequently, important private groups also pursue policies that have an affect on the public domain. Moreover, as soon as public policies elicit an organized response from nonofficial sources, they may generate counterproposals and activities that change the intentions and perceptions of the original policymakers in governmental circles. This sort of pluralism can enhance policy implementation when public and private resources eventually support compatible goals, but it can also entail costs. For instance, when

[2] It is venturesome to utilize all-encompassing labels for contemporary political systems, and this nomenclature is a compromise that applies generally to the cases in this book and to many other Third World countries. The "open" type refers to systems that might also be called liberal, democratic, pluralistic, or multiparty. Characteristic features of the open system are manifest in works following upon D. Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965). "Closed" systems would include most authoritarian, totalitarian, centralist, or single-party dominant governments. One type is described by V. Lenin, *State and Revolution* (New York: International Publishers, 1932), but such systems are not confined to the left of the political spectrum, as G. O'Donnell spells out in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973). "Intermediate" systems are those that have sectoral or communal subsystems with relatively little autonomy, and are alternatively labelled neocorporatist, consociational, or premobilized. The corporatist type is described in Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *The Review of Politics*, 36, No. 1 (January 1974), 85-131. For useful attempts at systems comparisons across geographic and cultural regions, see G. Almond and B. Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966); D. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); and J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, 3 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 175-411.

power is widely distributed in a policy arena, there is less chance for the implementation of a policy connoting significant change. The case of housing programs in Cali, Colombia, documented in this volume by Irene Fraser Rothenberg, is an example of the pathological effect of severe power fragmentation on policy implementation. In this case, stalemate and failure were the consequences of a multiplicity of actors seeking incongruent objectives, not compromise and subsequent collaboration. In open systems like the cases of Colombia and India discussed in this volume, the basic issue for the analyst often is not the degree to which a public agency achieves its original goals but what mix of interested-party objectives appears to be most consolidated in response to the policy initiative. There is a need, in such a situation, to ask how this alliance of forces has affected the ability of the government to approximate its goals. Government programs in such systems are most likely to be revamped (or discarded) during their execution when officials have set their original priorities with little regard for the preferences of influential opponents or potential supporters in the society at large.

When the state apparatus itself monopolizes economic and social power in the society and retains full discretion over policy initiatives, the system can be labelled closed. Its policies generally respond to the institutional interests of the group that dominates the government machinery. Commonly in such systems, national elites conclude that their goals for the society, such as economic development or national security, are prejudiced by the social and economic patterns characterizing "marginal" populations. The chapter by Janice Perlman provides an example of how this type of regime—Brazil in her case—may embark on programs to coordinate the behavior of the poor with national plans. She is also able to suggest reasons why these policies are usually inconclusive, pointing to the tendency of the regimes to be unresponsive and to misperceive the factors that in actuality determine the behavior of the underclasses. Interestingly, although a unified core may dominate organized political activity in the country, such a system may not have sufficient power to force compliance from disorganized but wary people who are well aware that the government's policies do not respond to their particular needs. In this case, the subdued antipathy of Brazilian *favelados* toward their new dwellings sabotaged the government's stated intentions and actually exacerbated many of the problems that relocation was to resolve. Thus, al-

though these sectors did not articulate overt hostility toward the policy during execution, and indeed were incapable of opposition on a group basis, they could withhold their individual cooperation to a point of representing a barrier to implementation that surpassed the resources of the political leadership and bureaucracy. In closed systems, negative sanctions are usually more frequently employed than positive inducements because of the difficulty of reconciling the logic of ideologically inspired policy with the economic and social interests of affected populations. The task for the analyst here is to question how much coercion the regime will employ to achieve its goals, the impact that this will have on the responses of the affected population, and whether the goals actually are a viable solution to the problem, given the aloofness of policy planners from the interests and life styles of the poor.

The situation is somewhat different in intermediate systems, where power is less centrally concentrated. Policy content corresponds partially to the interests of national elites and of popular sectors who, theoretically, are harmoniously integrated into the state via nationalism (or an organicist ideology) and special political structures are managed vertically. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, such systems are usually found in countries with long-standing corporate or communal structures (church, army, tribe, village), and where large portions of the population are parochial in outlook, living at close to subsistence levels, and unorganized for collective political action. Classes and privileged groups in the "modern" sector of these countries typically behave in ways that are similar to those in open societies. They generate demands, form coalitions, and may even share the reins of power on a rotational basis. The existence of large unmobilized populations, however, distorts many aspects of "normal" political life, including public policy. Although traditional groups do not generate policy alternatives nor determine their outcome, their very numbers have an important effect on elites' perspectives, as Merilee Grindle points out in her discussion of agriculture and food policy in Mexico. In this case, the government provided positive incentives to integrate potentially unruly groups into the distributional network and attempted to design a policy that would forestall violence or public dissent. Similarly, in Kenya, the Temples indicate that housing policy became a tool to be used in clientelist fashion to help allocate rewards in the political system. When assessing implementation problems in cases such as these, the

analyst needs to be sensitive to the extent to which policies serve as symbols rather than designs for execution, and side bargains or payoffs are tolerated as a means of system preservation despite the negative effect they may have on achieving stated policy goals.

The political leadership makes periodic decisions about the priority of each sector of the population, and these choices tend to be supportive of the type of political system that the elite hopes to sustain. Given the limits on the government's capability, re-sources allocated to one sector obviously cannot be invested in another, even though the regime may announce uniformly high priority for most of its economic, political, and social goals. Im-plementors often find that even an initial, formalized allocation plan, such as a yearly budget or a five-year plan, may be altered during the course of its execution because of an underestimate of program needs, general resource shortfalls, or new priorities announced at mid-stream. System-threatening disturbances in some sectors may draw a sudden influx of resources to attend to the crisis, draining them from other programs. Also, the failure of certain sectors to provide outputs crucial for the success of a coordinated plan will deprive other policy areas of the means for achieving their objectives.

These introductory remarks, which will be amplified later in the chapter, should be sufficient to demonstrate that the kinds of power underlying implementation attempts are conditioned by varying state-society relations. They should not be interpreted to mean, however, that the only factor weighing on policy imple-mentation is the distribution of power among implementors, their allies, and their opponents, measured along some scale. If so, ideologically convinced or intensely goal-oriented political actors would have no compunction about "shooting for the stars" in terms of policy objectives whenever they perceived a favorable political advantage, however slight. Similarly, more prudent po-litical or bureaucratic leaders might hesitate to implement even modest changes if their power was on the decline. The policies that these actors pursue can vary significantly in terms of how difficult they are to implement.

There are at least six intrinsic aspects of any policy that affect its chances for successful implementation (see Table 11-1). First, there is the complexity of the change mechanism itself. When in-novative organizational forms, untried technology, extensive co-ordination, or complicated methodologies are prerequisites, the

chances for successful implementation are reduced, as Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky have pointed out.[3] In Chapter Five, David Pyle argues that these factors of complicated organi-zation, staging, and supply lines were crucial in determining the outcome of the nutrition project in India. Likewise, one of the findings of the community development pilot project that Gerald Sussman discusses was "keep it simple," but the lesson was not applied in subsequent efforts. A second aspect of policy content to consider is that, as Charles Lindblom has argued, when the change sought is incremental in comparison with the prepolicy status quo, the possibilities for execution are greater because the risks of error and the amount of information required are both smaller.[4] It is conceivable that an incremental approach might have resulted in more positive results in the case of the coopera-tive organizations in Zambia that are analyzed in Chapter Two. Certainly the rapid and extensive attempt to spread the program nationally for maximum visibility and impact discouraged policy planners from paying much attention to the concrete details of the effort or to the amount of change realistically possible through the program.

TABLE 11-1
CHARACTERISTICS OF POLICY AFFECTING ITS IMPLEMENTATION

Less Problematic	More Problematic
1. Simple technical features	Complex technical features
2. Marginal change from status quo	Comprehensive change from status quo
3. One-actor target	Multi-actor targets
4. One-goal objective	Multi-goal objectives
5. Clearly stated goals	Ambiguous or unclear goals
6. Short duration	Long duration

Implementation is also affected by the number of actors in-volved and the variety of goals that each espouses vis-à-vis the policy in question. In the simplest case, a unified set of policy-makers with a single goal confronts a target group with a similar preference regarding the same issue area. Such two-actor, limited-goal interfaces are rare, however, and when the number of actors increases, the incidence of trade-offs generally increases as does

[3] J. Pressman and A. Wildavsky, *Implementation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 6, 93, 100-101.

[4] C. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

the cost of competence. Cynthia McClintock shows that peasants in Peru attempted to maximize the agrarian reform's positive elements while minimizing its negative aspects in terms of their own goals, and in so doing significantly altered the feasibility of the policy. Such activities may not oblige a public reformulation of policy objectives but can result in sufficiently severe alterations in the original guidelines to force the conclusion that the plan being carried out is no longer the one originally designed.

Implementation and its measurement are complicated by the existence of the multiple goals a policy may incorporate. A policy to increase expenditures in health care for the urban poor, for example, may derive from a variety of interests, many of them difficult to pin down, ranging from the stated objectives to tend to the sick to a desire to promote the hospital construction industry or give greater visibility to the newly appointed minister of health. N. Roos points out that goal definition may vary because people disagree about the objectives of a given program or because "no one is willing or has given time to defining them," often because it is not to their advantage to do so.[5] Certainly McClintock, Quick, and Pyle, in their separate chapters, emphasize the ramifications of goals not agreed upon or not clearly stated for the outcome of implementation activities. Indeed, clarity of objectives is one of the most important factors singled out by Susan Hadden in determining the utility of the strategy of controlled decentralization for successful policy execution.

On other occasions, the policymaker simply *assumes* he knows the aims of the groups whose situation he is attempting to ameliorate. This is a persistent cause of failure of social policies directed toward nonmobilized populations, as Perlman's Brazilian case illustrates. Consequently, the researcher often must deduce inherent policy goals from the behavior of participating actors over time, rather than from their stated preferences. Frederick and Nelle Temple utilize this approach astutely to learn that the real purpose of public housing in Nairobi was not to build shelter for the poor, but to respond to nationalist sentiments and to provide status and income property for the middle and upper-middle classes. If all other factors are equal, when many goals are pursued at once, or when goals are unclear, a policy has less of a

[5] N. Roos, "Proposed Guidelines for Evaluation Research," *Policy Studies Journal*, 3, No. 7 (Autumn 1974), 107-111.

chance for successful execution than when its goals are limited, explicit, and mutually reinforcing.

The final element of a policy's problématique is the length of time programmed for its implementation. If the policy lends itself to rapid execution, the policymaker can reduce uncertainty to a minimum. On the other hand, the greater the duration of sequential steps involved in the implementation stage, the greater the possibilities for existing actors to alter their goals, for leadership to turn over, for new actors to enter the scene, or for unintentional consequences to take their toll.[6] Gerald Sussman points to such factors of timing in considering why the original pattern for community development was abandoned and a new model adopted in India. Since it is unlikely that policymakers can foresee the exact mixture of these contingencies and compensate for them in the original plan, the longer the duration of implementation, the slimmer the possibility that the original policy will prevail, even if relative power factors have not altered significantly.

This discussion of the resources of political power available to a regime and the problematic aspects of a policy suggests that both factors need to be taken into consideration by implementors and policymakers in gauging chances for successful execution. Table 11-2 postulates four possible outcomes of implementation activities depending upon whether the regime has more or fewer resources to apply and whether the policy itself is more or less problematic, based on a composite reading of the six continua in Table 11-1. This table presents a number of basic hypotheses. It suggests, for example, that the more problematic the intrinsic features of the reform, the greater the amount of power that will be required for implementation. The kind of policy and political context conforming to Box I in the figure are the most absorbing and difficult. The policies in question are technically complicated, comprehensive, with many actors seeking multiple goals; they imply long-term horizons, and require a large amount of physical and material resources for implementation. This type of policy is exemplified by the Peruvian agrarian reform in the McClintock chapter. Box IV suggests the corresponding hypothesis that the less problematic the policy, the less power required. As a consequence,

[6] D. R. Bunker makes a similar point and presents a three-dimensional figure to illustrate his argument in "Policy Science Perspectives on Implementation Processes," *Policy Sciences*, 3, No. 7 (March 1973), 75-77.

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[6] D. R. Bunker makes a similar point and presents a three-dimensional figure to illustrate his argument in "Policy Science Perspectives on Implementation Processes," *Policy Sciences*, 3, No. 7 (March 1973), 75-77.

when policy actors have reduced power they are well advised to deal in less problematic policies, as I will discuss in the next section. In addition, Table 11-2 indicates that a policymaker could expect to face defeat if he attempted to implement an extremely complicated policy with very few resources, a situation corresponding to Box II. Nutrition policy in India clearly faced this problem, as David Pyle reported. Likewise, the policymaker would be foolish to engage in overkill in Box III, which besides squandering resources might engender exaggerated unintended consequences, such as Perlman foresees as a possible outcome of the favela relocation project in Brazil.

TABLE 11-2
COORDINATES AFFECTING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

	Policy Features	
Policy Actor	*More Problematic*	*Less Problematic*
More resources	I	III
Fewer resources	II	IV

These statements on the problématique of a reform policy and the power generated by different parties during its execution indicate that reformers may be able to manipulate some aspects of the policy or its environment in order to bring about changes in a society. The main lessons to be drawn from the preceding chapters relate to this observation. But not all factors that impinge on an implementation outcome can be controlled or even predicted. One such factor is the "historical moment" of the reform attempt. This term is less esoteric than it sounds, referring simply to the coincidence of events, many of them seemingly insignificant by other standards, that appear to play an important role at a particular point in time with respect to a policy outcome. The fact that these variables often cannot be systematically classified analytically does not diminish their importance. The arrival of a reform leader with deeply felt commitments or animosities, the emergence of an outside threat bringing together erstwhile enemies in a coalition of convenience, or the partial breakdown of a political system may generate sufficient momentum for reformers to overcome normal resistance. The importance of historical moment is exemplified by attempts at land reform. In Mexico, China, Japan, Cuba, Algeria, and Peru, severe disjunctions occurred in the national political systems that fixed attention on the rural sector

and provided reformers with considerable impetus to push their policies forward.[7] Similarly, national independence and anticolonialism in Zambia, India, and Kenya were important forces behind the policies described by Quick, Sussman, and the Temples.

These structural breaks are not explicitly linked to theoretical propositions about implementation because they occur earlier in the policy process. When they occur, however, they do affect the ideological predispositions of both policymakers and those affected by policy in their perceptions of what can and should be accomplished. They often result in simultaneous policy initiatives in other sectors, which modify the environment for implementation. They may change the total political power in the system as a whole (by means of force or additional budget, for instance), and imply a new relationship with unintegrated or only marginally participant sectors of the population.

Another factor weighing on implementation not fully apparent in Table 11-2 is *non*opposition to reform. The table suggests that were implementors to face no resistance, the chances for successful implementation would be greater. Such is not always true, however. Stephen Quick refers to this point by arguing that bureaucratic adversaries can have a salubrious effect on policy implementation by obliging program advocates to specify their goals and procedures in advance. Nonopposition to reform may also camouflage public apathy. This issue pops up frequently in the case of social or economic policies (such as "basic needs") ostensibly favorable for, but foisted upon, unmobilized groups. Policymakers often design such legislation by themeslves, justify the measures on ethical grounds, and create the necessary infrastructure for their implementation, counting on few if any allies and facing no visible opponents. When the implementors leave, the beneficiaries feel little attachment or gratitude for the services rendered. The whole operation may be counterproductive because it deprives the recipients of the practical experience of having demanded and obtained these public goods through their own pressure and initiative. Since the "cheap" goods of the basic infrastructure have already been granted, the next level of ostensible demand on the government (such as greater employment opportunities, rent laws, progressive tax policies) requires more negotiating skill than these groups can

[7] See Hung-Chao Tai, *Land Reform and Politics: A Comparative Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

tion is not the same as showcasing. Model projects are susceptible to the Hawthorne effect, whereby the participants change their normal behavior because of the extra attention focused upon their activities. Social experiments often benefit from management expertise, funding, and institutional backing that are not generally replicated on a national basis. Pilot projects must absorb no more resources than would be available if the program were deployed throughout the policy arena. The Etawah project, for example, as described in Chapter Four of this volume, was faithful to these and other criteria typical of a well-designed social experiment. The lessons that Sussman enumerates about such experiments might usefully be applied elsewhere. Third, once new approaches are instituted, *continuity* is essential. The first year or two of a reform may simply inform relevant populations that the project exists. Given the understandable hesitancy of traditional groups to upset existing relationships, patience and perserverance are preconditions for the policy to take hold. Steady rather than momentous change is sufficient proof that nonproblematic policies are effective. This precaution might have enhanced the viability of the cooperatives stimulated by the government of Zambia. Unfortunately, by the time policy directors no longer demanded immediate results, participants and political supporters alike had become largely disillusioned with the entire program because of the erratic way in which it had previously been pursued.

Fourth, national leaders and policymakers must change their frame of reference as to the *definition of personal and policy success* and reward policy implementors accordingly. When money is limited, quality personnel in outlying districts scarce, and possibilities for change marginal, administrators who undertake these assignments must be recompensed, in terms of both remuneration and prestige, for handling small budgets, working in difficult terrains, and accomplishing small, gradual, and continuous change. The policy must contain self-evident measures of social improvement so that administrators and supervisors can record their progress. While appeals for altruism are legitimate ways to build motivation, they cannot completely substitute for direct compensation, especially when implementors sense that they are bearing the brunt of the responsibility for national development. In cases of doubt or alienation, they are likely to seek advantage from their working environments, which could vitiate policy objectives, a subject of concern in Grindle's discussion of Mexico. The contact

points between implementors and clients, and implementors and the central bureaucracy, must be monitored closely to assure that inducements and sanctions motivate behavior consistent with policy goals.

Instructively, David Pyle attributes the failure of the Poshak nutrition policy in India to each of these factors and to all of them acting together. It is clear in this case that thoughful analysis of the policy context was absent prior to implementation. The food supplement, Instant Corn-Soya-Milk, was a sophisticated import chosen instead of an effective product developed locally. Promoted by CARE, the pilot project was a showcase requiring substantial financial resources and administrative resources that clearly were unavailable on a large scale. Continuity suffered when only part of the project extended for more than one year. And the lower echelon health workers, on whose shoulders the success of the intervention rested, were demoralized because the project added responsibilities to their jobs without increasing their prestige or salaries.

Contrarily, Susan Hadden's case study of rural electrification in India exhibited quite opposite features, which she summarizes under the heading of "controlled decentralization." Policymakers thoroughly examined the state's electrification needs beforehand, including the relative capacity of electricity to raise the agricultural productivity and income of village farmers. The technology utilized was easily available and maintained. Policymakers accurately calculated the cost of the project, and established criteria for extending electricity to villages that were based primarily on economic factors. The administration of the project was rather simple, because cost was measurable along a single scale. Widespread knowledge of operating rules allowed engineers and accountants to resist political and social pressures for inorganic electricity growth. The program's long duration did not trigger goal distortion because its continuity had a soothing effect on popular expectations. Villages denied one year knew that their position on the eligibility list would rise. Finally, implementors worked earnestly in their jobs partially because of their belief that they were participating in the dramatic modernization of rural India and because their status as engineers and "scientists" was protected and enhanced throughout the program.

These are a few general suggestions for manipulating the content of various policies to ensure more successful implementation of

reformist policies. Nevertheless, even though problematic policies are thus reduced in scale, it is still important that the bureaucratic and environmental contexts be sensitively nurtured by policy promoters to further enhance the possibilities for success. If not, it is unlikely that policy actors will be able to take best advantage of the small amount of resources that are available to them. In the following section, various strategies for affecting the policy environment to encourage successful implementation are discussed.

Changing the Power Balance

Many policymakers and political activists refuse to abandon the notion that comprehensive or highly problematic policies can indeed be implemented, and rightly so. A question then arises: Is it possible to mobilize sufficient resources in a policy arena to overcome the inherent constraints of technically complicated, comprehensive, multiactored and multigoaled, long-term policies?

There are, of course, several ways to do so, and all are difficult. The first is by means of revolution, or a total modification in the structure of power in a society which displaces dominant elites and incorporates previously powerless groups and their articulated preferences into the decision-making structure. The occurrence of such upheaval is linked to the concept of historical moment discussed earlier. "Revolution" is possible only at specific moments of social disjunction, and is not often an event that can be planned in detail beforehand. Even when such drastic change occurs and progressive political leadership takes advantage of it, problems emerge concerning how to direct the energies that are unleashed. Attending to short-term, individualistic, or material values that motivate many popular sectors may help sweep away the defenders of a pernicious system, but may also result in a new set of relationships that is little more economically or socially advantageous to the poor and, more importantly, has no effect on consolidating their power for future initiatives. Spontaneous redress of deep grievances, such as land invasions in rural areas or vengeance against an alien commercial class, can have the effect of weakening the class power of the perpetrators, because once the political act is complete, the threat of its occurrence in the future disappears.

One practice proposed to solve this problem is the "mass line." As developed in Maoist ideology, the concept involves abstracting particular aspirations of the masses into an awareness of total interrelations and corollaries for action. The leaders who abide by

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the mass line are also the followers of the popular sectors. The responsibility of the government is to gather the ideas of the masses, which are scattered and inconsistent, merge them into a consensus, and then discuss them with the masses so that the ideas can be incorporated as their own.[9] While there is debate as to the precise nature of Chinese revolutionary praxis, and whether it can be repeated in less extraordinary historical circumstances, the general objective is sound, especially if policies are to be comprehensive, not incremental, and their implementation to depend on the internalization of their goals by the populations and leaders affected by them.

A frequent occurrence in revolutionary situations, however, is that one elite is displaced by another, but the masses do not take part; or, if they do participate, they disaggregate soon afterwards and continue to reflect defensive, short-term, security-maximizing attitudes toward new initiatives. In such instances, it is clear that no significant change occurs in the total amount of power generated that can be used to underwrite various policies for change. Soon the revolutionary government is faced with the same set of hurdles in implementing problematic policies affecting poorer constituencies, and the latter have no means of proposing systematic alternatives. More seriously, because the new regime does not rest solidly on the organized backing of previously nondominant groups, opponents not eradicated by the revolutionary thrust can rear up and undermine its progressive intent.

In summary, revolutions are not commonplace because their necessary preconditions occur infrequently, and often revolutionaries are incapable of seizing the moment. Even when revolutions topple the elite in power, this does not guarantee that comprehensive policies can be implemented to benefit the country's poorer sectors, because transforming the society's unintegrated population into a new power bloc is far from simple. When revolutionary leadership fails to do so, or abandons the task, a possibility exists for counterrevolutionary forces to fill the void.

A second means of generating extraordinary resources for problematic policies (though not of the magnitude potentially available in a revolutionary situation) is through bureaucratic mechanisms, both within and among reigning national institutions and in association with various social classes. This tactic, however, is

[9] See S. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963), pp. 315-317.

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delicate, requires political acumen, and runs some risks. Bureaucratic response to social demands is related to the type of political system in which the policy actors are embedded. When an open, modern sector is differentiated among various political parties, social institutions, and relatively autonomous public agencies, power contenders claiming to represent the masses can promise revolutionary programs in the hopes of changing the power balance in their favor. Especially when accompanied by isolated outbursts of dissatisfaction among these sectors, the result can be a realignment of national priorities, investment of funds in social programs, and the integration of affected groups into a new relationship in which they have a stake.

The risks inherent in this sequence, however, can escalate rapidly. If the manifesters do not succeed in changing the government's outlook, the state may endeavor to change theirs. Dominant social classes perceiving popular agitation to be a threat may commission the state's repressive arm to quiet the turmoil. Extreme leftists and/or anarchists, denouncing policymakers as exploiters, reactionaries, and elitists, may provoke the government into further repression on the notion that coercion is preferable to reform because repression aggravates misery and alienation. The paradox is that liberal politicians must tolerate and encourage political organization of target groups for implementation to succeed, yet the creation of that power is often perceived as threatening to the system and may bolster the position of reform opponents.

In closed systems, on the other hand, the state concentrates enormous relative power within its boundaries, but it tends to become blind to the society of which it is a part. The public institutions of these regimes have difficulty tapping the resources of the poor because the poor's most effective resource lies in numbers, and mass pressure is inconsistent with bureaucratic norms of deliberation, procedure, and control. Typically, the norms for promotion and recognition make administrators respond to superiors' aspirations for the image of success, rather than client satisfaction. In addition, power concentration may in reality be somewhat illusionary because the overall poverty of the society places absolute limits on the regime's capabilities to execute far-reaching change. A frequent occurrence is that leadership, exhilarated by the reflection of its own power, sponsors highly problematic policies that fail spectacularly.

Implementation in such systems can be enhanced when internal control is translated into disciplined monitoring of policies of intermediate levels of complexity. To compensate for the rigidity spawned by control and discipline, bureaucratic organizations in these systems need to devise means to assimilate new information at the project site and to learn from program beneficiaries. In this system, but in others as well, administrators often decry the lack of participation in myriad organizations created by supposedly innovative policies. The invocation, "Participate," is confusing because groups not organized on a national basis have roles and obligations that they fulfill quite actively locally. Animated by criteria formulated by political superiors, reform implementors refuse to participate in *their* systems. And if policies do not reach some sort of compromise with these short-term, material, and individualistic orientations, successful implementation is unlikely. The challenge for reformers therefore lies in utilizing the discipline inherent in a closed system to loosen the structure and thus to permit the system to adapt and learn rather than remain persistently sealed from the social forces in its midst. When this task is accomplished, the resources available for policy implementation are recombined and increased.

In an intermediate state-society power relationship, the potential power of unmobilized groups is implicitly acknowledged and the regime caters clientelistically to some of their demands while assuring that these pressures do not reach a level requiring more severe structural reform. Dispensing valued services on a selective basis creates an image of resource distribution that is more symbolic than real. The positive aspect of corporatist or communal structures is that their local agents do tend to maintain close touch with the mood and preferences of traditional sectors, and the goods distributed, while insufficient in quantity to serve the whole population, at least are suited to their immediate needs. On the other hand, stability is dependent on steady economic growth and an ideology that creates a mystical barrier between the popular sector's awareness of its relative impoverishment and of the operations of the overall system. Corporatist structures tend to foment competition within the same class over valued goods, defusing popular agitation but at an ever increasing cost.

In these systems, Grindle and the Temples agree separately that the most promising means of increasing the ability of the popular sectors to receive benefits from public policies is through direct

organization. Historically, political activists who have been most successful mobilizing power among potential benefactors of social policy operate outside of the government machinery and define their followers' interests in class terms. Since this type of system can move toward either a more closed or open mode, however, these activists are well advised to proceed gingerly. Their tactics generally involve a mixture of incentives, including a close attention to their constituencies' material aspirations and need for short-term results. In some situations, building voting strength is an alternative. In others, rural land invasions, workers' strikes, and urban squatting are feasible tactics because they operate on the margin of the poor's tolerance for risk taking. Furthermore, they provide an opportunity for popular leaders to demonstrate that collective action can bear fruits.

It is in the interests of the bureaucracy to establish links with the most organized of these groups, if only to absorb them into national structures and make them dependent on government largesse. The combination of popular mobilization and official concern in intermediate systems results in an uneven and staggered distribution of political goods. The gradual implementation of social policies is in the interests of the regime and the populace until the magnitude of the operation outdistances the government's resources. At that point, the integrating ideology may be challenged, and deep transformations may take place. If popular groups have remained organized, they may be in a position to help define the nature of the new system.

CONCLUSION

In brief, drawing on the preceding chapters, I have tried to indicate how the content of policies and the resources available to political leaders in various kinds of political systems might be changed to enhance the possibilities for successful implementation. Conditions in Third World countries will occasionally emerge that are favorable to a revolutionary breakthrough. In usual cases, however, the situation will be one in which only less problematic change can be implemented. In the past, opportunities for gradual change have been scorned, poorly analyzed, and rarely seized, meaning that for all the development rhetoric, little improvement has occurred in the living standards of vast sectors of Third World peoples. The implementation of workable policies in situations of

low economic resources and low to intermediate political mobilization is not as difficult as complete social transformation, but elusive nonetheless.

Identifying the most pertinent lessons from the preceding chapters depends on the vantage point and goals of the observer. Whether inside or outside of government, however, the implementor should have a general idea of how power is distributed in the society, and the margin of change that can be realistically accomplished at that particular moment. In normal times, policies and programs should be explicit in their objectives and procedures, and modest in their pretensions. For best results, the content of the policy should reinforce many of the propensities of the target populations so that their support is likely to abet the implementation process. Determining those propensities, however, requires sensitivity and insight on the part of policy advocates and administrative personnel. Implementation itself requires bureaucratic responsiveness even if, as in the case of closed political systems, it must be artificially manufactured. In general, it appears that the tolerance of relatively autonomous political organization among the poorest sections of the population is an essential feature of the implementation of both gradual and large-scale policies for change. In cases where the politically dominant groups are unable or unwilling to carry out this assignment, or even actively oppose it, the way is left open for antisystem advocates to try to fill the breach.

2

The Many Meanings of Research Utilization*

CAROL H. WEISS**

This is a time when more and more social scientists are becoming concerned about making their research useful for public policy-makers, and policy-makers are displaying spurts of well-publicized concern about the usefulness of the social science research supported by government funds. There is mutual interest in whether social science research intended to influence policy is actually 'used', but before that important issue can profitably be addressed it is essential to understand what 'using research' actually means.

A review of the literature reveals that a diverse array of meanings is attached to the term. Much of the ambiguity in the discussion of 're-search utilization' – and conflicting interpretations of its prevalence and the routes by which it occurs – derives from conceptual confusion. If we are to gain a better understanding of the extent to which social science research has affected public policy in the past, and learn how to make its contribution more effective in the future, we need to clarify the concept.

Upon examination, the use of social science research in the sphere of public policy is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. Authors who have addressed the subject have evoked diverse images of the processes and purposes of utilization. Here I will try to extract seven different meanings that have been associated with the concept.

The Knowledge-Driven Model

The first image of research utilization is probably the most venerable in the literature and derives from the natural sciences. It assumes the following sequence of events: basic research → applied research →

development → application. The notion is that basic research discloses some opportunity that may have relevance for public policy; applied research is conducted to define and test the findings of basic research for practical action; if all goes well, appropriate technologies are developed to implement the findings; whereupon application occurs. (An example is Havelock, 1969, ch. 1.)

Examples of this model of research utilization generally come from the physical sciences: biochemical research makes available oral contraceptive pills, research in electronics enables television to multiply the number of broadcast channels. Because of the fruits of basic research, new applications are developed and new policies emerge (cf. Comroe and Dripps, 1976).

The assumption is that the sheer fact that knowledge exists presses it towards development and use. It is debatable how well or poorly this model describes events in the natural sciences. There is some evidence that even in areas of need in the natural sciences, basic research does not necessarily push towards application. For example, Project Hindsight indicated faster, and probably greater, use of basic science when it was *directed* toward filling a recognized need in weapons technology (Sherwin *et al.*, 1966; Sherwin and Isenson, 1967). In the social sciences few examples can be found. The reasons appear to be several. Social science knowledge is not apt to be so compelling or authoritative as to drive inevitably towards implementation. Social science knowledge does not readily lend itself to conversion into replicable technologies, either material or social. Perhaps most important, unless a social condition has been consensually defined as a pressing social problem, and unless the condition has become fully politicized and debated, and the parameters of potential action agreed upon, there is little likelihood that policy-making bodies will be receptive to the results of social science research.

I do not mean to imply that basic research in the social sciences is not useful for policy-making. Certainly many social policies and programmes of government are based, explicitly or implicitly, on basic psychological, sociological, economic, anthropological and political scientific understandings. When they surface to affect government decisions, however, it is not likely to be through the sequence of events posited in this model.

Problem-Solving Model

The most common concept of research utilization involves the direct application of the results of a specific social science study to a

pending decision. The expectation is that research provides empirical evidence and conclusions that help to solve a policy problem. The model is again a linear one, but the steps are different from those in the knowledge-driven model. Here the decision drives the application of research. A problem exists and a decision has to be made; information or understanding is lacking either to generate a solution to the problem or to select among alternative solutions; research provides the missing knowledge. With the gap filled, a decision is reached.

Implicit in this model is a sense that there is a consensus on goals. It is assumed that policy-makers and researchers tend to agree on what the desired end state shall be. The main contribution of social science research is to help identify and select appropriate means to reach the goal.

The evidence that social science research provides for the decision-making process can be of several orders. It can be qualitative and descriptive, for example, rich observational accounts of social conditions or of programme processes. It can be quantitative data, either on relatively soft indicators, such as public attitudes, or on hard factual matters, such as number of hospital beds. It can be statistical relationships between variables, generalized conclusions about the associations among factors, even relatively abstract (middle-range) theories about cause and effect. Whatever the nature of the empirical evidence that social science research supplies, the expectation is that it clarifies the situation and reduces uncertainty, and therefore it influences the decisions of policy-makers.

In this formulation of research utilization, there are two general ways in which social science research can enter the policy-making arena. First, the research antedates the policy problem and is drawn in on need. Policy-makers faced with a decision may go out and search for information from existing research to delimit the scope of the question or identify a promising policy response. Or the information can be called to their attention by aides, staff analysts, colleagues, consultants or social science researchers. Or they may happen upon it in professional journals, agency newsletters, newspapers and magazines, or at conferences. There is an element of chance in this route from problem to research to decision. Available research may not directly fit the problem. The location of appropriate research, even with sophisticated and computerized information systems, may be difficult. Inside experts and outside consultants may fail to come up with relevant sources. The located information may appear to be out of date or not generalizable to the

immediate context. Whether or not the best and most relevant research reaches the person with the problem depends on the efficiency of the communications links. Therefore, when this imagery of research utilization prevails, the usual prescription for improving the use of research is to improve the means of communication to policy-makers.

A second route to problem-solving use is the purposeful commissioning of social science research and analysis to fill the knowledge gap. The assumptions, as with the search route, are that decision-makers have a clear idea of their goals and a map of acceptable alternatives and that they have identified some specific informational needs to clarify their choice. This time they engage social scientists to provide the data, analytic generalizations and possibly the interpretations of these generalizations to the case in hand by way of recommendations. The process follows this sequence: definition of pending decision → identification of missing knowledge → acquisition of social science research → interpretation of the research for the decision context → policy choice.

The expectation is that research generated in this type of sequence, even more than research located through search procedures, will have direct and immediate applicability and will be used for decision-making. In fact, it is usually assumed that the specific study commissioned by the responsible government office will have an impact and that its recommendations will affect ensuing choices. Particularly the large-scale, government-contracted policy study, tailored to the specifications set by government staff, is expected to make a difference in plans, programmes and policies. If the research goes unused, the prescription to improve utilization that arises from this imagery is to increase government control over both the specification of requested research and its conduct in the field. If the research had actually met decision-makers' information needs, it is assumed, it would have been used.

Even a cursory review of the fate of social science research, including policy research on government-defined issues, suggests that these kinds of expectations are wildly optimistic. Occasional studies have a direct effect on decisions, but usually on relatively low-level, narrow-gauge decisions. Most studies appear to come and go without leaving any discernible mark on the direction or substance of policy. It probably takes an extraordinary concatenation of circumstances for research to influence policy decisions directly: a well-defined decision situation, a set of policy actors who have responsibility and jurisdiction for making the decision, an issue whose resolution depends at least to some extent on *information*,

identification of the requisite informational need, research that provides the information in terms that match the circumstances within which choices will be made, research findings that are clear-cut, unambiguous, firmly supported and powerful, that reach decision-makers at the time they are wrestling with the issues, that are comprehensible and understood, and that do not run counter to strong political interests. Because chances are small that all these conditions will fall into line around any one issue, the problem-solving model of research use probably describes a relatively small number of cases.

However, the problem-solving model remains the prevailing imagery of research utilization. Its prevalence probably accounts for much of the disillusionment about the contribution of social science research to social policy. Because people expect research use to occur through the sequence of stages posited by this model, they become discouraged when events do not take the expected course. However, there are other ways in which social science research can be 'used' in policy-making.

Interactive Model

Another way that social science research can enter the decision arena is as part of an interactive search for knowledge. Those engaged in developing policy seek information not only from social scientists but from a variety of sources – administrators, practitioners, politicians, planners, journalists, clients, interest groups, aides, friends, and social scientists, too. The process is not one of linear order from research to decision but a disorderly set of inter-connections and back-and-forthness that defies neat diagrams.

All kinds of people involved in an issue area pool their talents, beliefs and understandings in an effort to make sense of a problem. Social scientists are one set of participants among many. Seldom do they have conclusions available that bear directly and explicitly on the issue at hand. More rarely still do they have a body of convergent evidence. Nevertheless, they can engage in mutual consultations that progressively move closer to potential policy responses.

Donnison describes this interactive model of research use in the development of two pieces of legislation in Great Britain. He notes that decisions could not wait upon completion of research but had to be made when political circumstances compelled.

Research workers could not present authoritative findings for

others to apply; neither could others commission them to find the 'correct' solution to policy problems: they were not that kind of problem. Those in the four fields from which experience had to be brought to bear [politics, technology, practice, and research] contributed on equal terms. Each was expert in a few things, ignorant about most things, offered what he could, and generally learnt more than he could teach. (Donnison, 1972, p. 527)

In this model, the use of research is only one part of a complicated process that also uses experience, political insight, pressure, social technologies and judgement. It has applicability not only to face-to-face settings but also to the multiple ways in which intelligence is gathered through intermediaries and brought to bear. It describes a familiar process by which decision-makers inform themselves of the range of knowledge and opinion in a policy area.

Political Model

Often the constellation of interests around a policy issue predetermines the positions that decision-makers take. Or debate has gone on over a period of years and opinions have hardened. At this point, decision-makers are not likely to be receptive to new evidence from social science research. For reasons of interest, ideology, or intellect, they have taken a stand that research is not likely to shake.

In such cases, research can still be used. It becomes ammunition for the side that finds its conclusions congenial and supportive. Partisans flourish the evidence in an attempt to neutralize opponents, convince waverers and bolster supporters. Even if conclusions have to be ripped out of context (with suppression of qualifications and of evidence 'on the other hand'), research becomes grist to the mill.

Social scientists tend to look askance at the impressment of research results into service for a position that decision-makers have taken on other grounds. They generally see it as an illegitimate attempt to 'use' research (in the pejorative sense) for self-serving purposes of agency justification and personal aggrandizement. Using research to support a predetermined position is, however, research utilization, too, in a form which would seem to be neither an unimportant nor an improper use. Only distortion and misinterpretation of findings are illegitimate. To the extent that the research, accurately interpreted, supports the position of one group, it gives the advocates of that position confidence, reduces their uncertainties, and provides them an edge in the continuing debate. Since the research finds ready-made

partisans who will fight for its implementation, it stands a better chance of making a difference in the outcome (Weiss, 1973).

One of the appropriate conditions for this model of research use is that all parties to the issue have access to the evidence. If, for example, bureaucrats monopolize research that would support the position of clients, then equity is not served, but when research is available to all participants in the policy process, research as political ammunition can be a worthy model of utilization.

Tactical Model

There are occasions when social science research is used for purposes that have little relation to the substance of the research. It is not the content of the findings that is invoked but the sheer fact that research is being done. For example, government agencies confronted with demands for action may respond by saying, 'Yes, we know that's an important need. We're doing research on it right now.' Research becomes proof of their responsiveness. Faced with unwelcome demands, they may use research as a tactic for delaying action ('We are waiting until the research is completed').

Sometimes government agencies use research to deflect criticism. By claiming that their actions were based on the implications and recommendations of social science research studies, they may try to avoid responsibility for unpopular policy outcomes. Or support for a research programme can become a tactic for enhancing the prestige of the agency by allying it with social scientists of high repute. Some agencies support substantial amounts of research and, in so doing, build a constituency of academic supporters who rally to their defence when appropriations are under Congressional review. These are illustrations of uses of research, irrespective of its conclusions, as a tactic in bureaucratic politics.

Enlightenment Model

Perhaps the way in which social science research most frequently enters the policy arena is through the process that has come to be called 'enlightenment' (Crawford and Biderman, 1969; Janowitz, 1972). Here it is not the findings of a single study nor even of a body of related studies that directly affect policy. Rather it is the concepts and theoretical perspectives that social science research has engendered that permeate the policy-making process.

There is no assumption in this model that decision-makers seek

out social science research when faced with a policy issue or even that they are receptive to, or aware of, specific research conclusions. The imagery is that of social science generalizations and orientations percolating through informed publics and coming to shape the way in which people think about social issues. Social science research diffuses circuitously through manifold channels – professional journals, the mass media, conversations with colleagues – and over time the variables it deals with and the generalizations it offers provide decision-makers with ways of making sense out of a complex world.

Rarely will policy-makers be able to cite the findings of a specific study that influenced their decisions, but they have a sense that social science research has given them a backdrop of ideas and orientations that has had important consequences (see, for example, Caplan, Morrison and Stambaugh, 1975). Research sensitizes decision-makers to new issues and helps turn what were non-problems into policy problems. A recent example is child abuse (Weiss, 1976). Conversely, research may convert existing problems into non-problems, for example, marijuana use. Research can drastically revise the way that policy-makers define issues, such as acceptable rates of unemployment, the facets of the issue they view as susceptible to alteration, and the alternative measures they consider. It helps to change the parameters within which policy solutions are sought. In the long run, along with other influences, it often redefines the policy agenda.

Unlike the problem-solving model, this model of research use does not assume that, in order to be useful, research results must be compatible with decision-makers' values and goals. Research that challenges current verities may work its way into official consciousness (Aaron, 1978) and, with support from dissident undergrounds, overturn accustomed values and patterns of thought.

The notion of research utilization in the enlightenment mode has a comforting quality. It seems to promise that, without any special effort, truth will triumph; but the enlightenment process has its full share of deficiencies. When research diffuses to the policy sphere through indirect and unguided channels, it dispenses invalid as well as valid generalizations. Many of the social science understandings that gain currency are partial, oversimplified, inadequate or wrong. There are no procedures for screening out the shoddy and obsolete. Sometimes unexpected or sensational research results, however incomplete or inadequately supported by data, take the limelight. As an environmental researcher has noted, 'Bad science, being more

newsworthy, will tend to be publicized and seized on by some to support their convictions' (Comar, 1978). The indirect diffusion process is vulnerable to oversimplification and distortion, and it may come to resemble 'endarkenment' as much as enlightenment.

Moreover, the enlightenment model is an inefficient means for reaching policy audiences. Many vital results of social science research never penetrate to decision-making centres. Some results take so long to come into currency that they are out of date by the time they arrive, their conclusions having been modified, or even contradicted, by later and more comprehensive analysis.

Finally, recent reviews of research on poverty, incomes, unemployment and education suggest that social science research has not led to convergent conclusions (Aaron, 1978; Cohen and Weiss, 1977); as more studies are done, they often elaborate rather than simplify. They generate complex, varied and even contradictory views of the social phenomena under study, rather than cumulating into sharper and more coherent explanation. The effect may be to widen and enrich our understanding of the multiple facets of reality, but the implications for policy are *less* simple and clear cut. When the diverse research conclusions enter the policy arena, the direction they provide for policy is confused. Advocates of almost any policy prescription are likely to find some research generalizations in circulation to support their points of view.

Research as Part of the Intellectual Enterprise of the Society

A final view of research utilization looks upon social science research as one of the intellectual pursuits of a society. It is not so much an independent variable whose effects on policy remain to be determined as it is another of the dependent variables, collateral with policy – and with philosophy, journalism, history, law and criticism. Like policy, social science research responds to the currents of thought, the fads and fancies, of the period. Social science and policy interact, influencing each other and being influenced by the larger fashions of social thought.

It is often emerging policy interest in a social issue that leads to the appropriation of funds for social science research in the first place, and only with the availability of funds are social scientists attracted to study of the issue. Early studies may accept the parameters set by the policy discussion, limiting investigation to those aspects of the issue that have engaged official attention. Later, as social science research widens its horizons, it may contribute to reconceptualization of the

issue by policy-makers. Meanwhile, both the policy and research colloquies may respond, consciously or unconsciously, to concerns sweeping through intellectual and popular thought ('citizen participation', 'local control', spiralling inflation, individual privacy). In this view, research is one part of the interconnected intellectual enterprise.

These, then, are some of the meanings that 'the use of social science research' can carry. Probably all of them are applicable in some situations. Certainly none of them represents a fully satisfactory answer to the question of how a polity best mobilizes its research resources to inform public action.

An understanding of the diversity of perspectives on research utilization may serve many purposes. For one, it may help to overcome the disenchantment with the usefulness of social science research that has afflicted those who search for use only in problem-solving contexts. For another, it may enable us to engage in empirical study of the policy uses of research with better awareness of its diverse and often subtle manifestations; if immediate impact of a specific study on a specific decision is only one indicator of use, we will have to devise more complex but more appropriate modes of study.

Finally, we may need to think more deeply about the proper role of social science in public policy-making. There has been much glib rhetoric about the vast benefits that social science can offer if only policy-makers paid attention. Perhaps it is time for social scientists to pay attention to the imperatives of policy-making systems and to consider soberly what they can do, not necessarily to increase the use of research, but to improve the contribution that research makes to the wisdom of social policy.

10   International lobbying

"Don't just do something. Stand there!"

Most Northern NGOs spend a small portion of their budgets on "development education" – to influence their own societies about Third World issues. They seek to give a more accurate impression of the Third World, particularly to school children. The commonplace images of perennial starvation, mass ignorance, scorched earth, and beggary are challenged by images of vibrant cultures, ingenuity and self-reliance. Discussion of the problems faced by developing countries emphasizes the social, historical and political factors.

Though with schools NGOs avoid overt bias, NGOs are adopting a more propagandist, action-oriented approach with the general public, calling on their supporters to join in advocacy or lobbying campaigns. They quite deliberately seek to influence decision makers into changing some aspects of policy or practice.

A two pronged approach is needed. No matter how well researched their case and articulate their presenters, significant political change is unlikely unless there is a groundswell of public opinion demanding those changes. The converse is also the case. If a campaign skilfully mobilizes public opinion but does not have a water-tight argument, the decision makers will find it easy to dismiss it as little more than hot air. Hence an NGO needs skills of both lobbying and public campaigning. Their supporters must be informed about the issue in question, invited to join the lobbying (for example by raising the issue with their local Member of Parliament or by writing letters to decision makers), and asked to help mobilize public opinion (for example through publicity stunts or writing letters to newspapers).

Effective lobbying affords a powerful and increasingly important

means for NGOs to multiply their impact on significant development questions, ranging from the design of specific World Bank projects to the debt crisis. Such lobbying on the international stage has been largely dominated by Northern NGOs until recently, with Southern NGOs concentrating their efforts on influencing decision makers within their own countries. This is, however, beginning to change quite swiftly.

Northern NGOs are increasingly being challenged by their Southern partners to put more resources into education, campaigning and advocacy. An international meeting of Southern NGO leaders in June 1989, for example, called on their Northern counterparts to monitor and campaign on issues such as official aid and multinational corporations ("Manila Declaration"). African NGOs meeting at the UN Special Session on Africa in 1986 drafted a declaration which, *inter alia*, called on Northern NGOs to "re-orient their activities" towards development education, advocacy and information flows, and in particular to attack "policies of their governments, corporations and multilateral institutions . . . which adversely affect the quality of life and political and economic independence of African countries". ("Declaration of NGOs on the African Economic and Social Crisis"). In 1989 a larger gathering of African NGOs and officials meeting in Arusha made similar points.[93] And many Latin American NGO leaders have called for a new relationship with Northern NGOs in which "influencing" is the shared goal. For instance Mario Padron criticizes the majority of Northern NGOs for their reluctance to spend money on development education, saying that they "accept too easily the idea that funds are only for the poor".[94] A new, genuinely two-way relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs, in which development education in the North is a shared responsibility, is essential, he argues, for moving "from development aid to development co-operation".

Southern NGOs are saying that it is not enough to give money, what is needed is political action to help them in the struggle to get the Rich North off the backs of the South's Poor. As Larry Minear points out, in effect they are saying, "Don't just do something. Stand there!"[95]

All but the most unobservant NGOs working with the poor must have experience of international factors exacerbating problems of poverty. More often than not, however, they fail to take action on them. This could be because they don't see it as their job to

do so, because they distrust the anecdotal nature of their own evidence, because they feel powerless to effect change, or because they fear reprisals from indulging in political action, both from host governments and from donors. The dangers and drawbacks are valid, but can be surmounted.

Not the NGO's job

The NGO decides its own work objectives – these haven't been handed down from a higher power. For instance, the NGO will move from hospital-oriented to primary health care when convinced of the superiority of prevention over cure. It should equally be prepared to take up "preventive development" – that is, lobbying to eradicate impediments to just development. This does not mean giving up conventional project work ("curative development") but instead seeing advocacy as a natural extension of its project work.

Many Northern NGOs have assumed the role of ambassadors for the world's poor. With this goes a responsibility to represent the political concerns of the poor, to be a "conduit for popular democracy". This entails helping to make the political and economic institutions of the world more broadly accountable, injecting the voice of the traditionally voiceless into international decision making, and facilitating the two-way flow of information that might both improve decision making and improve the capacity of the poor to influence those decisions.

Progressive NGOs may agree with this in theory, but in practice neglect to act. Advocacy may be seen as *important* but it is not *urgent*. Consequently it is easily squeezed out by the day-to-day dilemmas and crises arising from the project activities, from donor pressures and from media enquiries.

International factors are not necessarily the most important root causes of poverty but they are ones which Northern NGOs should not ignore. If they do so they must expect to be viewed with increasing suspicion by their Southern partners. The latter are increasingly making it clear that they want a more equal partnership. As donors expect regular financial and progress reports from the projects they fund, so Southern NGOs are starting to ask their donors to report to them on the action they are taking to educate Northern publics and to tackle the international causes of global poverty.

The question should not be whether international advocacy is the

job for a Northern NGO. It is whether NGOs which neglect this role should have a job at all.

Anecdotal evidence

When pitted against great volumes of statistical data, evidence that an NGO may have of the impact of a particular policy on the poor living in one community may seem insubstantial and anecdotal. This lack of confidence is unwarranted.

To get a portrait of a city there are two approaches. The first is to charter an aeroplane and take photographs of the city from the air. This shows the main housing areas, the industrial complexes, the principal buildings, the main communication routes and the physical terrain. It is a complete view but it only allows guesses to be made about the condition of life in the different quarters. The alternative approach is to visit particular communities or work-places, talk to the community workers or residents and stay with them long enough to appreciate their concerns and aspirations. This gives a more accurate portrait of the human condition, but a patchy view – a snapshot of a few streets, districts or ethnic groups.

Since development is essentially about the human condition, the "street view" is at least as valid as the "aerial view" and one in which the NGO has unchallenged advantage. The street view is perhaps less scientific but it may reveal serious problems and important issues which are not picked up by the aerial view. Whether or not these issues are general or unique to the community studied is important, but the uncertainty should not prevent the NGO from making its experience known. NGOs should make little apology for the somewhat anecdotal nature of their evidence, infuriating as development economists often find it.

For example in 1987 through its work in two poor districts of Malawi (Phalombe and Mulanje), Oxfam became concerned about the costs to the poor of closing down the agricultural parastatal's marketing depots. As part of the World Bank-funded structural adjustment programme, the government of Malawi had agreed to start dismantling a number of parastatals, including the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC). There is no doubt that some changes in ADMARC were required, since it was losing money heavily. However most of the losses were on its estate management and food processing operations. The "bread and butter" task of basic agricultural marketing was widely regarded as one of the more efficient examples of state marketing operations in Africa.

Traditionally ADMARC bought cereals after harvest, sold some to the cities and stored the remainder in its rural depots. Some months later the rural poor would have run out of food they kept back after harvest for their own use and they would engage in wage labour activities. They would then purchase food back from ADMARC depots. When the World Bank inspired programme of market liberalization came in, licences were given to private merchants to buy and sell cereals and other crops. In the regions where it was felt that there were sufficient private traders to fill the gap, the ADMARC depots were closed down. ADMARC was to be reduced to a "trader of last resort".

From its contact with poor farmers in these areas, particularly with female-headed households, Oxfam became concerned that the valuable "food security" role played by ADMARC would be lost. Oxfam relayed these concerns to the World Bank, however the closure of depots continued. Come the harvest, most of the sales in Phalombe and Mulanje were to private merchants. As the NGO had predicted when, a few months later, farmers came to buy back food they found they simply couldn't afford the prices. Whereas traditionally the buying price would be about 20 per cent higher than the sale price at harvest time, the merchants were charging up to 7 times the sale price. It was proving more profitable to sell the food in the nearby city of Blantyre. This resulted in immense difficulties for the poor in that region.[96]

When this fresh evidence was presented, the Bank became responsive. It investigated the claims and found them to be accurate in certain districts of the country. Generally, they maintained, the new system was working well but they did admit that mistakes had been made which should be corrected by strengthening the food security role played by ADMARC in vulnerable regions.

This is an illustration of how NGO evidence, based on day to day contact with poor people in a dozen villages in one region, revealed a problem which had been overlooked by the "aerial view" and led to the authorities pledging to take corrective action.

is changing, especially as many of the problems they address have clear northern connections.

These NGOs may, like their Northern counterparts, comprise highly educated, politicized staff and have a Western outlook and communications style. Or they may be grassroots organizations which have direct experience of the problems.

For example, the rubber-tappers union and a number of tribal indian groups in Brazil have led worldwide action for international responsibility for the protection of the Amazon rainforests. And village-level health workers have provided much of the evidence on which campaigns against the marketing malpractices of baby milk and pharmaceutical manufacturers have been based.

Many of these grassroots organizations have long had connections with northern NGOs but the funding relationship has been the basis for this. They now seek a different form of partnership in which the northern NGOs lend their name, media skills and contact with people of influence to help champion the cause they are fighting.

New campaigning alliances

The increased prominence of Southern NGOs has both strengthened international lobbying and changed its focus. Campaigns for the New International Economic Order, for official aid targets and for commodity agreements have given way to campaigns against environment damaging logging operations, against marketing malpractices by Western companies and against inhuman adjustment programmes. The former set dwell on the unjust treatment of poor nations by rich ones, while the latter set dwell on the injustices done to poor people. The former set demand Northern institutions "to *do* something", implying that their sin has been past *failure to act*, rather than the active causing of damage. The latter set call for harmful practices to be stopped.

These trends have not only fostered new allegiances between Northern and Southern NGOs but have also opened doors to movements outside the development sphere. At the same time as development NGOs have become more concerned with other social issues, so too various social movements have become more concerned with development and international issues.

International action on hazardous practices in the marketing of pesticides first brought a group of development and environmental

NGOs together from the North and South. This was followed by concerted action against careless planning of big dams, and later by the launch of international campaigning on the rainforest issue. Similarly the analysis by NGOs of the gender relationships in development has engaged the interest of the women's movement. They have helped campaign against male bias in development planning.

Campaigns to reform or scrap projects which involve the displacement of large numbers of people have been greatly strengthened by the support of Northern human rights groups. For example Survival International and other Northern NGOs have joined forces with Indonesian NGOs against the World Bank funded Transmigration Programme. In this scheme tens of thousands of people have been moved from the densely populated islands – especially Java – to the sparsely populated territory of Irian Jaya where the culture and environment of the indigenous tribes has become severely threatened. Other campaign issues have brought developmental NGOs together with labour unions (e.g. regarding the conditions of Bolivian tin miners), and with consumers organizations (such as regarding the dumping of hazardous products in the Third World).

Specialist campaign groups

Many international campaigns have been successful because they have been led by NGOs uniquely set up for the purpose. Though small in staff terms these have the advantage of being able to concentrate totally on their chosen issue, and to have spokespeople with direct experience of it. Examples are to be seen in the Canadian NGO Probe International, concentrating on environmentally damaging energy generating programmes; a number of "solidarity groups" campaigning on specific geopolitical issues such as Nicaragua or the Philippines; and of course the Anti-Apartheid Movement campaigning for international sanctions and other action against South Africa.

Of particular importance are the specialized networks which bring together in an exciting and equal partnership NGOs from North and South, from the developing community and from other disciplines. For example both the International Baby Foods Action Network (IBFAN) and Health Action International (HAI) – which campaigns against the marketing malpractices of pharmaceutical companies – comprise NGOs, health professionals, consumer

groups, women's organizations and others. Other networks campaign on the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, the marketing of pesticides, rainforest destruction, Third World debt, the provision of development aid to Cambodia, and a variety of other issues. The important lesson learnt from the effectiveness of this networking is that, through co-ordination, the whole can become more than the sum of the parts.

What NGOs campaign on

The range of issues has evolved over time as the profile of lobbying NGOs has evolved and the increasing contribution of southern NGOs to international lobbying endeavours has shifted the focus of this lobbying from the macro concerns of Southern governments to issues which are of more direct relevance to Southern people.

The seventies

In the early 1970s the major campaigning activities of northern NGOs followed an agenda which was largely determined by the UN system, in particular by the objectives declared for the Second Development Decade and by the FAO's Freedom From Hunger Campaign. This trend continued throughout the 1970s with attention generated by the World Food Conference in 1974 and UNCTAD IV in 1976.[98] Much of the NGO campaigning was rather untargeted in nature. It sought to bring about more caring attitudes among northern publics and decision makers, and to describe the immoral contrast between Western opulence and Third World misery, rather than to lever for specific changes or new policies. Where specific targets were set they again reflected the UN offered agenda. Examples were campaigns to reach the 0.7 per cent of GNP target for official aid, to increase the multilateral (as opposed to bilateral) component of official aid, to set up specific commodity agreements and to support proposals for the New International Economic Order.

In parallel to these campaigning activities was a more politically charged strand, which attacked multinational corporations for exploiting the Third World. These campaigns were little financed by establishment sources, were usually run by highly committed but inexperienced volunteers, and were highly effective at capturing

the public imagination. One of the earliest examples of this was a British campaign in which the World Development Movement and War on Want joined forces to challenge the below-starvation wages paid by UK food giants to tea pickers in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. This achieved massive media coverage and forced some of the major tea companies to revise their employment practices.

Another British campaign, which subsequently spread to other countries, was the attack on coffee multinationals by the specially formed Campaign Co-operative. This group financed their venture by selling instant coffee they imported directly from a government-owned factory in Tanzania. The coffee also formed the vehicle for their message – "political packaging" – and for action. Their supporters set up stalls to sell the "Campaign Coffee", persuaded their student unions to switch to it, got local shops to stock it, and organized coffee mornings using it.

This was an early example of an NGO importing a basic commodity. Similar ventures during the 1970s, particularly in Holland, have influenced an important category of NGOs which are today known as the Alternative Marketing Organizations. For example the Max Havelaar campaign in Holland has now captured some 2.4 per cent of the country's coffee market for its own brand name. In this case the consortium of NGOs license the name, they do not import the coffee themselves. Instead they persuade major Dutch coffee roasters to import from suppliers on a list they provide, and offer some collateral to safeguard imports and arrange the advertising and promotion.

The Baby Milk campaign

In the late 1970s development campaigning became considerably more sophisticated. A landmark was the international Baby Milk campaign.

The problem of marasmus induced by the unhygienic use of bottle feeds in the Third World had been discussed by health workers throughout the 1960s. However it wasn't until 1973 that the issue, and its relation to the aggressive marketing of those products in the Third World by the manufacturers, was brought into the public domain by the *New Internationalist* magazine. The following year War on Want (WOW) produced a report called "The Baby Killers". A small Swiss pressure group translated the WOW report into German under the provocative title "Nestlé

Kills Babies" – the Swiss-based multinational being the dominant Third World supplier of baby-milk. Nestlé filed a libel action which they technically won, however the outcome was generally seen as a triumph for the campaigners. The judge in summing up made it clear that the moral victory went to the campaigners.

The international publicity generated by this case triggered intense citizen action in the USA. A church group called Interfaith Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) organized pressure from church leaders and shareholders. And a small group of baby milk campaigners, inspired by Ralph Nader's new radical consumer movement, set up the Infant Formula Action Group (INFACT) whose main purpose was to organize an extremely effective nationwide boycott of all Nestlé products.

In October 1979 the World Health Organization and UNICEF organized a meeting of unprecedented composition. It brought together in Geneva for the first time representatives of governments, health professional bodies, the industry and the NGO sector. The stormy meeting eventually agreed to recommend to the World Health Assembly that an international code of conduct be drafted to restrict the marketing activities of the baby milk companies.

An incidental outcome of this event was the physical coming together for the first time of many of the major NGOs – Northern and Southern – which had been active on the issue. Until this time the NGOs had corresponded with each other but few had met. They decided to maintain and broaden this new partnership and so, after the formal meeting closed, representatives from six NGOs held a press conference to announce the launch of the International Baby Foods Action Network (IBFAN). Within a year there were well over 100 NGOs within the network, including a number of very experienced southern NGOs.

Thanks to the efforts of IBFAN and its member agencies, the 1981 World Health Assembly was to debate the adoption of an International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes – the first global agreement ever to restrict the marketing practices of multinational corporations. The 1981 Assembly – normally a sober occasion – was a hive of lobbying, bribery and intrigue. Confidential telexes to the US State Department were leaked which showed collusion between US officials and the industry in a plan to steer the Assembly away from its course of consensus. And media "exposés" of the political inclinations of the activists in prestigious

journals were shown to have been generously financed by Nestlé, as part of its orchestrated plan to discredit its critics.

These dubious activities back-fired on the industry and served to harden the attitude of delegates in favour of the proposed Code. When it came to the vote only one government, the USA, opposed it. Ironically this was the country where citizens action had been most prominent.

Since this momentous Assembly, IBFAN has continued to play a prominent and powerful role. It has lobbied at national level in many countries for governmental and legislative action to make the code effective and binding. And it has published regular reports describing continued violations of the code by major manufacturers.

Many governments have taken significant action and as a result some of the more offensive marketing practices have been curbed. The politicization of the issue has also prompted many governments to invest heavily in breastfeeding promotion campaigns which have helped to reverse the trend towards the bottle.

Sadly there has been no evaluation of this campaign. Were one able to calculate the global results – in terms of infant lives saved, reduction in infant diarrhoea and marasma, the return to breast feeding and the wasted foreign exchange saved – it would almost certainly conclude that the combined effort of NGOs, WHO, UNICEF and others has been one of the most cost effective ventures in infant health care ever.

The eighties

Lobbying and campaigning have continued to become more sophisticated and targeted throughout the 1980s. The campaigns tend to focus on aid, trade, international finance and foreign policy in the governmental domain; and buying, selling, investing and employment practices in the corporate sphere. The major trends have been an *increasing strength* of the "NGO lobby", a more *strategic approach* to advocacy, closer *integration* of lobbying and public campaigning/education, and more attention to the use of the *media*.

The increasing strength of the NGO lobby comes in part from the substantial resources some of the larger northern NGOs with overseas operations have begun to put into advocacy activities and from the growing credibility of the NGO sector as a whole.

Learning how best to use democratic channels has led to more strategic lobbying. For example many US groups and coalitions regularly present evidence to congressional committees and draft bills for individual congressmen and senators (the structure of the US political system gives greater opportunities for this than in most other countries). In the UK NGOs frequently submit evidence to Select Committees or to other parliamentary bodies and distribute briefings to MPs prior to debates on international issues. Furthermore events on the mainstream political calendar are used more systematically as fora to present NGO concerns (for example the World Health Assembly on the marketing of pharmaceuticals, the World Bank Annual Meeting on "problem projects", the "Group of Seven" summit on debt).

NGOs have become more forthright in inviting their supporters and the public at large to join in the lobbying. Their publicity materials regularly suggest action in addition to making donations. This, together with public concern generated by the African famine and mounting environmental crises, has sharply increased public support for NGO campaigns. For example the "Fight World Poverty" lobby of the UK parliament in 1985 set an all-time record for the number of people who met their MPs in a single day. Westminster was besieged for the whole day, every meeting room in the Commons was booked for the occasion, some 16,000 people managed to meet their MP and several thousand more took part in other meetings.

NGOs have also formed closer links with journalists and the broadcast media. Their causes are, as a result, more likely to be the subject of documentaries and feature articles. And their events are more likely to be planned with a view to being "media worthy". Some of the more significant campaigning throughout the 1980s is described below.

Aid Pressure for increasing official aid, using the UN target of 0.7 per cent, remains a familiar agenda item for Northern NGOs. In some countries, such as Finland and Italy, there have been considerable increases in aid budgets as a result. However campaigns for increasing the quality of official aid (as defined by NGOs this means increasing the benefits and reducing the costs for the poor) have become of greater significance. In the UK the campaign for "Real Aid" (described by the government as the development lobby's most significant venture at the time)

was backed by a number of development academics as well as NGOs.

Trade With a few notable exceptions, campaigning on the economic issue of trade has been relatively unexciting. Most NGOs agree that Trade is a far more important subject than Aid. The problems are very clear but the solutions are so intractable. Continuing the style of the 1970s, NGOs loyally make inputs into the agenda set by the UN system (UNCTAD, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, support for the Common Fund, and so on) but it is doubtful whether this effort is richly rewarded. International lobbying concerning the EEC's Lome agreement has been extensive, however, and with some success.

Some specific trade campaigns have achieved considerable prominence – especially concerning trade of "problem products" from North to South. Baby-milk, pharmaceuticals and pesticides have already been mentioned in this context. In many countries high profile attacks have been made on the escalating arms trade and in particular on government subsidies for this. Reforms have been called for to the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy, particularly by French NGOs. And in some countries campaigns for the reform of the Multi-Fibre Agreement have achieved significant success. In the UK, for example, a campaign led by the World Development Movement succeeded in getting the government to scrap restrictive quotas on the imports of shirts made in Bangladesh.

International Finance Debt has become an increasingly prominent campaigning item. Though complex, there have been some highly imaginative and provocative ways of presenting the subject to the public, for example the "Profits out of Poverty" campaign against commercial debt in the UK and the campaign to "Stop the Aid from South to North" in Germany. The emphasis has always been on how the debt crisis is at root an unacceptable human or environmental crisis.

NGOs in both the US and UK have formed "Debt Crisis Networks" to co-ordinate action (in the UK this includes environmental NGOs). In Germany NGO preparations for the 1988 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF gave rise to two coalitions, one oriented to environmental issues, the other to debt. And there is now a European-wide network of NGOs designed to

plan and take forward common action. This concentrated initially on commercial bank debt.

The main specific issues raised by these campaigns have been the need for special debt relief measures for the poorest countries in Africa; the demand for changes to the orthodox approach to adjustment pursued by the IMF and World Bank; the responsibility of commercial banks to use some of their considerable profits to reduce Third World debt; and the connection between the debt and environmental crises.

Foreign policy

Geopolitical issues have taken an increasingly prominent place in NGO campaigning. In the UK, campaigns on Central America and South Africa have achieved massive public support but have had little success in shifting the government's position. The campaign for a review of the West's attitude to Cambodia, conducted by an international consortium of NGOs has been greeted with rather more concessions. Similarly the NGO campaign to give increased support to the Frontline States, and to isolate the South African backed Mozambique National Resistance rebel forces in Mozambique has helped shift the British government's position.

Experience indicates that the major issues of foreign policy are ones on which governments have deeply entrenched views. NGOs have considerable potential for putting a new item on the political agenda, or for changing a weakly held view on a subject on which there has been little debate. But to change a government's approach to an issue on which it has taken a firm stand requires a monumental effort which lies well outside of the NGOs' potential unless they can engage remarkably strong allies.

Corporate campaigning

The most effective campaigns relating to multinational corporations in the 1980s have centred on irresponsible selling of potentially hazardous or undesirable products in the Third World.

Campaigns on corporate buying practice have been less prominent, with two notable exceptions. One is the boycott of supermarkets selling South African produce. This has led many supermarket chains either to withdraw such lines or to have a policy of offering a

non-South African alternative wherever possible. The other has been the campaign against unsustainable logging of tropical hardwoods. This has led a number of furniture manufacturers and other wood users to switch to other sources. Some campaigns have attacked the low prices paid to Third World producers for their commodities, such as sugar. This has exposed the low proportion of the final selling price that reaches the farmer or labourer but it has done little to change trade relations.

Campaigning on investment has concentrated on environmental issues and on the role of commercial banks. In Japan, for example, NGOs have attacked companies whose Third World subsidiaries have bad pollution records. And in the UK the End Loans to South Africa Campaign has mounted shareholder actions against the banks who make major investments in South Africa. Activists each buy a single share in the bank so that they can attend and raise awkward questions at the company's AGM.

Activities relating to employment policies focus on issues such as the exploitative and discriminatory practices with regard to women employees, manipulative use of Free Trade Zones, maintaining appalling standards of health and safety, poor wages and repressive practices by Third World subsidiaries of multinational corporations, and racist employment practices and below-starvation wages in South Africa.

Choice of issues

NGOs clearly need to be guided first and foremost by their experience and in particular by the messages they receive from grassroots workers in the South. But this has to be balanced by an objective assessment of what causes are winnable.

This presents a dilemma. Field level experience might indicate that what is needed amounts to fundamental, far reaching changes in North–South relations, for example the cancellation of debts, doubling of commodity prices and a completely new approach to official aid. But "real politik" in most Northern countries relegates such goals to the realm of pie-in-the-sky. On the other hand, setting sights solely on minor reforms which might be winnable risks side-lining the NGO into marginal causes.

A pragmatic course is to concentrate on campaigning for changes which are conceivably winnable in the prevailing climate but to see those changes as stepping stones to more profound reforms.

Changes won can be used as precedents to secure similar, further reaching victories in related areas – a case-law approach.

This has parallels with the typical NGO project approach. An NGO may wish, for example, to eliminate the barriers which prevent women's access to credit. It may establish a women's credit scheme in one region. This amounts to no more than a drop in the ocean, but it reflects the capacity of the NGO and it might lead to bigger and bolder ventures in the future, and it should plan for this. The NGO starts with the single project because it realizes the need to match its work tasks to the resources at its disposal.

An example of the pragmatic choice of targets can be found in campaigning on debt. Most NGOs would like a massive writing-off of both official and commercial debt and a considerable reduction of interest rates for the remainder. After seven years of global concern about the issue, however, we have only seen marginal debt reductions and debt service concessions – and these have been dwarfed by the on-going process of debt escalation. For Northern NGOs to call for total debt write-off, in this climate, is fanciful (this is not to say it is fanciful for Northern NGOs to call for major debt relief, nor for Southern NGOs to call on their governments to default).

The campaign of Oxfam and others which drew public and mass media attention in the UK to the intolerable debt service of the poorest countries of Africa hit a raw nerve. The slogan was: "The scandal of the money that Africa gave to us. For every £1 we all gave for famine relief in Africa, £2 came back in debt payments. Don't stop the giving, stop the taking". It would have seemed unconscionable for Northern governments to ignore such public concern in the aftermath of the African famine. The Chancellor duly proposed a "Group of Seven" debt initiative in April 1987, encouraged to do so by many members of parliament.

His plan – initially resisted by the US, Japan and West Germany – was eventually modified and accepted by the Group of Seven meeting in Toronto in autumn 1988. However what was agreed to amounted to a fraction of Africa's needs. To restore growth and reverse the relentless increase in Africa's debt burden would require perhaps $3 or $4 billion per year. The Chancellor's plan amounted to at most $1 billion per year of debt relief (only countries undergoing IMF-approved adjustment programmes would be eligible). In practice the process of translating promises of relief into action has proved extremely slow, to say the least. In its first

full year, the so-called Toronto plan has provided only $50 million of relief, a twentieth of the original estimate. Several meetings of the world's most powerful finance ministers and 18 months of high-level negotiation between governments was only able to come up with this derisory effort, amounting to less in financial terms than was contributed to Africa that year by the UK's two leading NGOs, Oxfam and Save the Children Fund.

Disappointing as it has been, the UK NGOs guardedly welcomed the launch of this initiative. They pointed out that it set a precedent. It was the first occasion (other than the translation of past aid loans into grants) that Northern governments have accepted a share of the burden of the debt crisis and have accepted anything other than a market determined path forward. It opens the door to pressure for the scheme to be extended to other poor countries and deepened, as the UK chancellor proposed to other finance ministers in September 1990.

To summarize, experience indicates that when identifying the subject of a campaign, it is important to ask the following questions:

Is there a clear **link**, connecting the issue to the society campaigned in?

Does the NGO have **direct experience** of the issue?

Is the NGO seen as a **credible authority** on the issue?

Is there much prospect of **generating popular appeal**? (if not then a central lobbying operation rather than a public campaign will be more appropriate).

Can **clear and realistic** policy changes be advocated?

Are there **intermediate goals** that are possibly winnable?

(For Northern NGOs) would **Southern partners support** the campaign objectives?

Can the campaign objectives be shown to be of direct **relevance to poor** people?

(For public campaigns) does the NGO have the information, photographs and so on, necessary to prepare **effective campaign materials**?

Has a suitable **media strategy** been devised, again, focusing on human appeal?

Are there forthcoming meetings, debates or other events which provide useful **pegs** for the campaign?

Can a **network** of concerned NGOs be formed?

What **allies** can be encouraged to lend their weight to the campaign?

Can **pitfalls** be anticipated and planned for?

How to make campaigns effective

The NGO needs to demonstrate expertise regarding both the issue itself and the policy opportunities and dilemmas. It also needs to demonstrate that its field-based experience is thorough, convincing and not merely emotive. It needs to have evident widespread and influential support for its cause. And it needs to establish a negotiating relationship with the authorities it seeks to influence.

Valuable lessons can be learnt from the experience of southern NGOs in influencing policy makers (see earlier chapters on "Building Grassroots Movements" and "Influencing Policy Reform"). In addition there are a number of practical techniques indicated by experience of effective campaigning.

Balance analysis and prescription

The foundation of an effective campaign must be a compelling and authoritative analysis of the problem concerned, but this must be balanced by an equally thoughtful analysis of the possible solutions. Authors of a campaign report, may put 90 per cent of their labour into the main body of the report and only 10 per cent into the concluding recommendations, but the the attention given by its readers is in inverse proportion.

Many NGOs, however, give scant attention to the specific policies they recommend or to the plan of attack they map out. A wearisome number of so-called campaigns amount to little more than broadsheets or pamphlets in which the NGO demonstrates its knowledge of a subject, presents its own analysis, and adds, by way of an afterthought, a few ideas for action its supporters can take. Few will be so motivated, and the "campaign" will enter a lull until the next pamphlet is published.

Such NGOs have been unable to shake off an academic approach. The task of the scholar is to research and to reflect. Their conclusions are presented in a paper or book and they are then likely to turn to fresh pastures, unless another scholar chooses to make a riposte. It is lamentable how few academics seek to encourage decision makers to take note of their conclusions. For most academics, the book or paper is the *end* of

the exercise. For a strategic lobbyist it should be the *starting point*.

Scholars can present some justification for shying away from action. Their task is to assist in the pursuit of knowledge, not its application. Their neutrality might be questioned if they become identified with a political cause. And they might feel that they don't have the skills needed for condensing years of research into a pamphlet or a parliamentary bill. NGOs have no such excuses. Their task is action. They are required to have a pro-poor bias. And their constituency is the general public.

The converse of the "academic disease" is naive simplicity. An NGO might spend weeks planning, for example, the shipment of relief food to a troubled region. It knows how complex the operation is, how many things can go wrong, and how important it is to plan for every eventuality. But the same NGO might take just a few hours to prepare a blueprint on changing world structures. An objective reflection should warn the NGO that this is a disservice. It may gain a moment of media attention but it won't change the world and it could devalue its image in the eyes of decision makers.

Plan a strategy for presenting the case

The first people to hear of the concerns outside of the NGO network and close advisers should be those who the campaign seeks to influence. It may be that the reception will be hostile but it will certainly be more hostile if the authorities first hear of the campaign through the media or through letter writing campaigns. When this happens the authorities can be forgiven for thinking that the main object is to embarrass them rather than to resolve the problem at issue.

The initial presentation of the case is all important. If too timid and apologetic it will be dismissed as no threat. But if too hectoring and categoric it will be dismissed as arrogant. The lobbyists, in judging their strategy, should think about their own experience: when were they themselves sufficiently convinced by the argument of another to change their views; how was this argument presented?

Before presenting the case the lobbyists should do enough homework about the institution to be lobbied to know who the people are who have the power to effect the desired changes, and

who – in positions of seniority – are most likely to be sympathetic to the cause. Lobbyists should angle to have those people present at the meeting. This might indicate that the lobbyist should engage others in their team who are of comparable status.

Plan when and how to use public campaigning

The NGO has to decide whether it wishes to engage its supporters and the public at large in the campaign, or to take it forward solely by the work of the NGO's representatives. It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that public campaigning is necessary without considering the pros and cons, and without being clear what the campaigners will actually contribute.

The pros are obvious, in terms of increasing the momentum of the campaign, but these will only be realized if the NGO really has the ability to excite a significant number of people. An activity billed as a public campaign, but in which few participate, will signal to the authorities concerned that it is a tired and unthreatening exercise.

To run an effective public campaign also requires considerable investment of time from the issue specialists and they may find that their time is eaten up by giving public talks to the extent that they are not investing enough of it in the direct lobbying work. The effective public campaign also requires considerable inputs of time and money to produce the materials required.

When the public campaigning route is decided its objectives should be clear. Many so-called campaigns are really no more than educational exercises. Public education may be laudable but the NGO should consider whether it is a cost effective way of achieving heightened public understanding of the issue. It might be more effective to put time into first persuading and then helping a television producer to make a documentary on the subject.

If a public campaign is embarked on, the action the supporters are asked to take should be clear, compelling and realistic. A wide array of options which the supporter is asked to choose from will give the impression that the strategy is unclear and that none of the component actions are really important. Conversely if the guidelines are too rigid (for example providing the text of letters which are to be sent to decision makers) then supporters are made to feel like "lobby fodder", and those lobbied resent having to respond to large numbers of identikit letters.

Supporters should feel excited by the action they are being asked

to take. This means it should neither be daunting nor marginal. And if they receive responses from their lobbying which reveal that the proposals they submitted were unrealistic then they will feel let down by the NGO and become disillusioned.

Action proposals should also reflect the degree of experience of the activists. An effective campaign strategy should be like a ladder. It rests on the ground – which is the level of the bulk of the population; a level of basic human compassion for the world's hungry but no practical involvement and little knowledge of the underlying issues. The ladder should stand there, inviting people to climb on to it. The first rung is an easy step – a simple donation or the signing of a petition. People should be thanked for taking that step but encouraged to move to the second step. The rung might challenge people to learn something about the underlying causes of hunger and to make a commitment to action, such as to take part in a fun-run, attend a demonstration, or join a meeting with a member of parliament. At this stage they should be urged to move on to the third rung of deeper involvement and deeper understanding and so on.

This strategy of gradual involvement and facilitating the entry of "new blood" may seem self-evident, but it is disturbing how inaccessible much NGO literature is to the lay public and how off-putting are the actions asked of them. Such an approach amounts to asking people to jump straight to the top of the ladder – a daunting prospect for anyone.

Reward supporters

Campaigning NGOs are well aware that the contribution made by dedicated, imaginative supporters is invaluable. A few hours of well targeted lobbying or media work can be worth more than the most generous donation. But on the whole NGOs are poor at rewarding their supporters or confirming the worth of their contribution. No NGO would dream of accepting a sizeable donation without sending back a receipt and a note of thanks, and yet the donation of labour to a campaign can go unmarked.

Campaigning NGOs should make a special point of giving out "receipts" to their activists. One NGO which is excellent in this respect is the US-based development pressure group, Results. They have some 150 groups throughout USA (and some in Canada, the UK, Australia and West Germany). Results groups are mostly small –

four to ten members – but each person is expected on almost a contractual basis to make a very significant contribution of time and money each month. The campaign objectives, set nationally, are to achieve very specific changes, such as an increase in the US contributions to specialized UN agencies (UNICEF and the International Fund for Agricultural Development) or the introduction of a "micro-enterprise" bill to vote a portion of USAID funds for small-scale credit.

Results' members are asked to lobby politicians and to get articles published in the State's newspapers. The organization gives excellent briefings, including monthly telephone conferences, which make the members feel valued and professional, and which ensure well-informed advocacy. At major meetings, Results organizers make a point of introducing the audience to the speaker, as well as the speaker to the audience. They will ask all those to stand who have written articles on the subject which were published. Then each person standing shouts out in turn the name of the newspaper which published it. Next, the process is repeated for articles inspired by Results activities but written by journalists. Then for letters printed by newspapers and so on. By the end of this process the speaker is impressed by the commitment and effectiveness of the audience and energized to give a good performance; those standing are proud to have had their personal victory noted and see how it fits into a nationwide campaign which is making a real impact; and those still sitting feel determined that, come the next meeting, they too will be one of those standing.

NGO campaign leaders should avoid the temptation during briefing meetings to spend all the time explaining the issue. Time should also be reserved for carefully explaining the action that is requested and for debating/clarifying it. And, most importantly, time should be made for praising the particularly effective action of specific groups, for summarizing the popular action taken to date (so that supporters feel part of a significant movement for change), and for relaying any significant campaign advances, such as any noteworthy responses or concessions from the decision makers (so that the supporters can share in any sense of progress).

A typical NGO spends half to three-quarters of its operating budget on salaries. Well targeted labour is its principal tool. But donated labour is all too often deployed with little thought and little thanks. It might well be more effective to have far fewer campaign volunteers which the NGO staff try to relate to directly

and to ensure that these are well used, well supported and well thanked.

Achieve bargaining power

Most decision makers in public life are constantly engaged in balancing dynamic forces. Senior civil servants, for example, experiences pressures from ministers, parliament, other departments, industry, interest groups, the media and from their staff. Each of these pressures waxes and wanes to different rhythms, but the civil servant knows that they must all be reckoned with. The NGO needs to position itself as one such force. It needs to shift from being a body that has something to say, to being a legitimate interest group that knows what it is talking about and that authority feels obliged to negotiate with.

This happens, crudely, when authority cannot afford to ignore the case being made and cannot satisfy it with vague expressions of good will. The NGO needs to have frequent meetings with the relevant decision makers (again, homework is needed to ascertain who these are). One-off meetings can appear constructive, but good intentions may evaporate. Conversely routine, regular meetings without a very clear purpose will dull the advocacy and serve to draw the NGO into the official camp. The NGO team needs to steer meetings around to clear decisions and to follow them up, such as by asking for progress reports on promised action. It needs to be constantly gathering new information on its case and watching for new developments which present opportunities for follow-up meetings.

The decision makers are more likely to allow a negotiating relationship to develop when:

(a) They respect the NGO team. This can mean including eminent experts or influential allies on the team. It can also mean maintaining a cordial style of dialogue.
(b) They sense that the NGO listens as well as preaches, that the dialogue established is a two-way one.
(c) They know that the outcome of the meeting will be noticed. This can be the case when the NGO has good access to the media, to politicians and to others of influence.
(d) They know that the campaign is persistent; that the NGOs expect specific action promises and will be sure to follow up on these.

Bring the issue to life

The engine driving the NGO cause is moral compulsion. This is revealed not by economic statistics but by the impact of the issue on poor people. It is this *human picture* which will win the case. It is this that the campaign supporters are motivated by, that the media want to cover, that the politicians can include in their speeches and that the decision makers feel obliged to respond to.

Arguments of mutual self-interest (as were developed particularly by the Brandt reports) are important but are unlikely by themselves to change practices radically in the current political climate. Governments which reject Keynesian economics at home are hardly likely to be persuaded to fund a massive programme of public works abroad. The NGO also has to recognize that it is not likely to be regarded as a source of credible expertise on macro-economic analysis, whereas it may well be regarded as an expert when it comes to the grassroots ramifications of the issue.

The NGO can bring this out in two ways. Firstly by careful gathering of human interest stories which illustrate the issue through the experience of poor people that the NGO comes into contact with in its field work. Secondly by use of Southern witnesses. Funding eloquent and experienced Third World NGO spokespeople to come over for key meetings, speaker tours or media activities usually proves an excellent investment.

The human interest slant should not be reserved for media work and public audiences. It should also be an essential flavour of the direct negotiation with decision makers. They too will be concerned about the human impact of policies they are responsible for and are most likely to be influenced by graphic (though not distorted) illustrations of it.

Choose an appropriate style

The effective campaign must be authoritative, persistent, morally charged and professional but within these parameters the NGO has to decide what style to adopt. In particular it should decide how aggressive or conciliatory to be.

This will depend to some extent on the stage and history of the campaign and the culture of the NGO. A campaign which jumps too quickly to an aggressive style may be excluded from

any negotiating relationship and may find that it is no longer given privileged access to information. However, if, having forged a negotiating relationship, action on the issue fails to develop, the NGO should consider a tougher approach (for example seeding hard-hitting media coverage or tough parliamentary questioning). Maintaining a cosy relationship with decision makers which does not result in action is not doing the poor any good.

Anticipate the backlash

The NGO should consider what might happen as the campaign builds up momentum. What steps might the vested interest groups take to discredit the NGO or to frustrate the campaign? How can these eventualities be guarded against by advance planning?

For example, there may be a systematic counter-campaign waged to impugn the political motives of the NGO, to challenge its charitable or "not-for-profit" status, or to press for the withdrawal of foreign funding. To guard against this threat the lobbyists need to ensure that they have influential allies who will testify to the organization's motives, and they need to ensure that everyone within their own organization is aware of and supportive of the campaign.

Build strong networks

The advantages of collaboration within networks have been described in earlier chapters. These advantages apply equally to international lobbying endeavours. In addition to mutual fortification and mutual protection, networking on lobbying provides the possibility for NGOs to specialize in areas in which they have individual advantage.

For example a network may arise because a group of NGOs shares concerns about World Bank funding for a particular dam. Some might know most about the environmental consequences of the submergence. Some might be most concerned with the displacement and resettlement issue. Others might have worries about the social consequences of the changing pattern of agriculture which the irrigation scheme will bring about. Yet other NGOs might have different concerns. Within a network, each can concentrate on its own area of expertise. Similarly, different NGOs might have different constituencies. Their membership may be concerned,

variously, with environmental, development, or minority cultural issues. Some might have wide, public constituencies, others might be respected by a small but influential academic audience, and others might be particularly strong at media relations. Different NGOs might also have access to different decision makers or people of influence. Most obviously, in the case of international agencies such as the World Bank, NGOs can lobby their own government on its voting intentions.